DOCSLIB.ORG

Anatoly Chernyaev, Georgi Arbatov, and the Foundations of the Soviet Collapse, 1970-1979

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Anatoly Chernyaev, Georgi Arbatov, and the Foundations of the Soviet Collapse, 1970-1979 THE RUSTY CURTAIN: ANATOLY CHERNYAEV, GEORGI ARBATOV, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOVIET COLLAPSE, 1970-1979 Michael Ginnetti A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS May 2015 Committee: Douglas Forsyth, Advisor Beth Griech-Polelle © 2015 Michael Ginnetti All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Douglas Forsyth, Advisor “It seems the Western interpreters of Marxism are right when they say it is an outdated gospel.” Such a harsh condemnation of communist ideology might be expected from some persecuted Soviet dissident or perhaps a war-drumming functionary in Washington. However, this quote is from none other than Anatoly Chernyaev, a high-level apparatchik working for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who found himself disillusioned with the state of Soviet society in the 1970s. In much the same way, Georgi Arbatov, the director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, declared that, “one had a particularly sickening feeling inside because of the intolerable propaganda.” From these perceptions of the Soviet Union in the 1970s, Chernyaev and Arbatov would rise to become personal foreign policy advisors to Mikhail Gorbachev and active reformers in the 1980s. The current restrictions on research in Russia have turned the personal writings of Chernyaev and Arbatov into resources of nearly exclusive importance on the history of the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Not only were Chernyaev and Arbatov highly placed individuals within the Soviet government, they were remarkably intelligent, creative, and observant men who recorded their thoughts, impressions, and memories of the Soviet Union as it was before the implosion of the communist system. Secondly, Chernyaev and Arbatov recognized how the Soviet Union had gone astray and recorded evidence of its waywardness for posterity. Lastly, Chernyaev and Arbatov’s realizations in the 1970s as to the bankruptcy of the entire Soviet apparatus, coupled with their unique positions within that apparatus, specifically iv conditioned and prepared them to work for the reformation of the Soviet Union when the proper opportunity presented itself with the election of Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union in 1985. For their singular contributions to the historical narrative of the Cold War, documentation of the factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and efforts with Gorbachev to overhaul the Soviet system, Chernyaev and Arbatov can no longer remain as little-known figures in the historiography of the end of the Cold War. v To Mom, my first teacher, and Dad, whose sacrifices made that education possible, and to the “good fight.” vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, this is God’s thesis, not mine. He wrote it, not me. I was asked to endure many months of uncertainty, anxiety, and arduous work, but in the end, He is the one who brought the project together. There is no way I could have written this thesis alone. Secondly, I want to thank my family for supporting me in my study of History, especially my Mom and Dad who placed great value on my education and made great sacrifices to provide transformative educational instruction for me and my two brothers and sister. So many people have left their mark on this work through their vocation as professional academics. A special thanks to Douglas Forsyth for sticking with me through the dark days of this project and for helping me to see it through to completion. A very warm thank you also to Beth Griech-Polelle for jumping on my thesis committee and helping me to see how my project could come together. Thank you both for trusting me and believing that I was capable of getting the job done. A personal thanks also to the faculty members of the History Department of Bowling Green State University: Scott Martin, for your tireless efforts to keep the Department afloat in the midst of difficult circumstances; Walter Grunden, for our frank conversations and your dedication to pedagogy; Rebecca Mancuso, for instilling in me a budding interest in Canada, local history, and for a delightful TA experience; Ruth Herndon, for the time you took to teach us new grad students about professionalism and life within academia; Benjamin Greene, for your willingness to assist me on multiple occasions when I was searching for direction and information, and for the invaluable lessons on teaching and researching; Nicole Jackson, for your amazing seminar on Reconstruction (will we ever understand?!); Amilcar Challú, for welcoming me to the Undergraduate Curriculum Committee and taking an interest in hearing about my studies; Michael Brooks, for “working your magic” to make my cohort’s graduate experience a vii truly edifying and memorable one; Ian Mladjov, whose mentorship and generosity towards me exceeded all bounds and whose unending confidence in me drove me to become the best scholar I could be. A special thanks also to Michael Carver, who has moved on to sunnier climes, but who welcomed me to the Department and made me feel at home in new environs. And of course, a big thank you to Tina, without whom, there is no History Department as we know it. I have told the members of my cohort this many times, and I do so here again. An immense thank you to my cohort: Alex, Chloe, Ethan, Joan, Katherine, Meghan, Rachel, and Stephanie. I could have never made it through grad school without you guys! Our Cohort Rocks! I will never forget any of you…ever. And an extra special thank you to the one and only Joe Faykosh. I cannot imagine my grad school experience without you! I would also like to mention several of my undergraduate professors who had a profound impact on me and in preparing me for future studies. A heartfelt thank you to Hongshan Li for opening the vast expanses of history to me. An immense expression of gratitude to Leslie Heaphy for welcoming me as a student, setting me up for success in grad school, and opening up many doors of opportunity for me. Likewise, thank you Ralph Menning for introducing me to the historical field of international relations and Great Power diplomacy; I have been hooked ever since. A sincere thank you to James Carlton who is singularly responsible for inspiring my interest in political science. Similarly, a hearty thank you to John Jewell for accepting me into the Honors Program and remaining one of my staunchest supporters. A thank you also to Rob Brindley, Melissa Crites, Sally Fadorsen, John Highman, Pam Patacca, Laurie Donley, Fran Haldar, Gregg Andrews, and all the wonderful people where my collegiate education began, back at Kent State University Tuscarawas. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………..... 1 CHAPTER I. ANATOLY CHERNYAEV……………………… ....................................... 5 CHAPTER II. GEORGI ARBATOV…………………………………………………….. 49 CHAPTER III. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL LITERATURE REVIEW ……………… ......... 81 CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION……………………………. .............................................. 104 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………… .......... 108 1 INTRODUCTION With a resurgent Russian menace towards Europe, especially Ukraine, many people have begun to wonder if the Cold War is on again, or even if it was ever over in the first place. From 1946 to 1991, the titanic struggle between the United States of America and its Western European allies versus the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics engulfed the globe and informed nearly every event of the second half of the twentieth century. Whether in the form of democratic capitalism or totalitarian communism, ideology lay at the root of the conflict, a conflict that would test and ultimately be decided by the strength of those disparate ideologies. For many who lived through the Korean Conflict, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, or collapse of the Berlin Wall, thinking of the Cold War as history can oftentimes be a disorienting experience or an inconceivable realization of how much time has passed since those events. As relatively new history, one that is steeped in obfuscating propaganda from both sides, historians have much to discover and learn about the Cold War, particularly the end of the Cold War. Utilizing western sources, historians have been able to analyze the Cold War with some regularity, but that endeavor only represents half of a story that was at its core bilateral. Public access to Soviet archives and primary sources was nonexistent during the Cold War, and has been little better in the less than forthright regimes which have been the heirs to the Soviets in Russia. In fact, after a brief period of access immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the doors to the Russian archives slammed shut to curious scholars and have remained largely so ever since. In the former Eastern bloc countries where less repressive governments have succeeded in holding onto power, former communist archives have been more available to scholars, although the Russian archives remain still off limits. 2 Until such time when the seal on the Soviet archives is re-broken and historians can resume their quest in their traditional environs, scholars must hunt in other places for sources of information on life in the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Two non-governmental sources with considerable potential are the diaries and memoirs of Soviet citizens and officials who witnessed or even participated in the events leading up to the downfall of the Soviet Union. As eyewitness accounts, these primary sources can help to contextualize what is already known about the Cold War, as well as illuminating the darkened corners of that history. The diaries of Anatoly Chernyaev and the autobiography of Georgi Arbatov are sterling examples of two such sources. Both Chernyaev and Arbatov were key actors in the unfolding drama of the Cold War.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR
    asdf PMUNC 2015 Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR Chair: Jacob Sackett-Sanders JCC PMUNC 2015 Contents Chair Letter…………………………………………………………………...3 Introduction……………….………………………………………………….4 Topics of Concern………………………...………………….………………6 The Space Race…...……………………………....………………….....6 The Third World...…………………………………………......………7 The Eastern Bloc………………………………………………………9 The Chinese Communists…………………………………………….10 De-Stalinization and Domestic Reform………………………………11 Committee Members….……………………………………………………..13 2 JCC PMUNC 2015 Chair’s Letter Dear Delegates, It is my great pleasure to give you an early welcome to PMUNC 2015. My name is Jacob, and I’ll be your chair, helping to guide you as you take on the role of the Soviet political elites circa 1961. Originally from Wilmington, Delaware, at Princeton I study Slavic Languages and Literature. The Eastern Bloc, as well as Yugoslavia, have long been interests of mine. Our history classes and national consciousness often paints them as communist enemies, but in their own ways, they too helped to shape the modern world that we know today. While ultimately failed states, they had successes throughout their history, contributing their own shares to world science and culture, and that’s something I’ve always tried to appreciate. Things are rarely as black and white as the paper and ink of our textbooks. During the conference, you will take on the role of members of the fictional Soviet Advisory Committee on Centralization and Global Communism, a new semi-secret body intended to advise the Politburo and other major state organs. You will be given unmatched power but also faced with a variety of unique challenges, such as unrest in the satellite states, an economy over-reliant on heavy industry, and a geopolitical sphere of influence being challenged by both the USA and an emerging Communist China.
    [Show full text]
  • Title of Thesis: ABSTRACT CLASSIFYING BIAS
    ABSTRACT Title of Thesis: CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis Directed By: Dr. David Zajic, Ph.D. Our project extends previous algorithmic approaches to finding bias in large text corpora. We used multilingual topic modeling to examine language-specific bias in the English, Spanish, and Russian versions of Wikipedia. In particular, we placed Spanish articles discussing the Cold War on a Russian-English viewpoint spectrum based on similarity in topic distribution. We then crowdsourced human annotations of Spanish Wikipedia articles for comparison to the topic model. Our hypothesis was that human annotators and topic modeling algorithms would provide correlated results for bias. However, that was not the case. Our annotators indicated that humans were more perceptive of sentiment in article text than topic distribution, which suggests that our classifier provides a different perspective on a text’s bias. CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Gemstone Honors Program, University of Maryland, 2018 Advisory Committee: Dr. David Zajic, Chair Dr. Brian Butler Dr. Marine Carpuat Dr. Melanie Kill Dr. Philip Resnik Mr. Ed Summers © Copyright by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang 2018 Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincerest gratitude to our mentor, Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Essential Questions and Answers… Cold War Crises and the End of the Cold War, 1958-1991
    Essential Questions and Answers… Cold War Crises and the end of the Cold War, 1958-1991 QUESTION ANSWER 1. What was the Berlin Khrushchev’s demands to the Western allies (USA, France, GB) to leave West Berlin. Ultimatum of 1958? 2. What did the Berlin That the Western allies had 6 months to leave West Berlin and that it should be a Ultimatum say? free city (with its own independent government). 3. What was discussed at How Berlin should be run. No agreement was reached. the Geneva summit meeting in May 1959? 4. Who met at Camp Khrushchev and Eisenhower. They could not agree on a way forward for Berlin but David (in the USA) in the USSR did withdraw the Berlin Ultimatum. September 1959? 5. What was a U2? An American spy plane. It could fly at 70,000 feet and take photographs of Soviet bomber plane bases and missile sites. 6. When was Gary 1 May 1960. It was shot down by a SAM (surface to air missile). Power’s spy plane shot down by the USSR? 7. Who was the leader of Nikita Khrushchev. the USSR at this time? 8. What did Khrushchev He said the USSR had shot down a plane (but did not say it was a spy plane). do about the U2? 9. How did the American He said it was a weather plane. president, Eisenhower, respond? 10. What did Khrushchev He showed the photos Gary Powers had taken, proving it was a spy plane and that do next? Eisenhower was lying. 11. How did the U2 crisis Khrushchev walked out of the Paris Peace Summit meeting because Eisenhower make the Cold War refused to apologise for spying on the USSR.
    [Show full text]
  • The End of the Cold War Housekeeping
    The End of the Cold War Housekeeping Paper due tonight. Can turn it in later to me via email Final: QUESTIONS: THE END OF THE COLD WAR REVIEW: 1979-1985: The End of Détente The Invasion into Afghanistan Solidarity Reagan elected, calls USSR an “evil empire” and pushes buildup with changed strategy Gas prices go down Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) Computer weapons technology at all levels The new social contract in Soviet bloc wears thin Soviet leaders start dying off Gorbachev Comes To Power Committed Communist “Child of the 1960s”/ Knows something has to change DOMESTIC POLITICs “Acceleration”= Discipline, anti-alcohol “Perestroika”= Reform “Glasnost”—Ability to criticize Very uneven: Moscow and Leningrad in 1987 “Demokratizatsiia” Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy “The New Thinking” Abandons the position of strength argument Calls for mutual interdependence, peace: Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok Wants to ”deprive the United States of its image of the USSR as an enemy” Unilateral concessions for arms control talks Reykjavik Summit, 1986 The Zero-Zero Option in Europe in 1987 The unilateral arms concession in 1988 Eastern Europe: Rejects Brezhnev Doctrine in March 1988 in Yugoslavia In October, 1989: The ”Sinatra Doctrine” • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ielyVJUgXK8 Reagan’s Role Defense spending and getting Saudi Arabia to lower oil prices– a little Strategic Defense Spending—no Gorbachev was most important Reagan recognized an opportunity Eastern Europe Roundtables in Poland, Hungary Poland: Stalemate between regime and society
    [Show full text]
  • The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives
    COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER #47 The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives By Sergey S. Radchenko THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN, Series Editor This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a periodic BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications.
    [Show full text]
  • The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1986
    The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1986 Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive Translated by Anna Melyakova Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya http://www.nsarchive.org Translation © The National Security Archive, 2007 The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1986 http://www.nsarchive.org January 1st, 1986. At the department1 everyone wished each other to celebrate the New Year 1987 “in the same positions.” And it is true, at the last session of the CC (Central Committee) Secretariat on December 30th, five people were replaced: heads of CC departments, obkom [Oblast Committee] secretaries, heads of executive committees. The Politizdat2 director Belyaev was confirmed as editor of Soviet Culture. [Yegor] Ligachev3 addressed him as one would address a person, who is getting promoted and entrusted with a very crucial position. He said something like this: we hope that you will make the newspaper truly an organ of the Central Committee, that you won’t squander your time on petty matters, but will carry out state and party policies... In other words, culture and its most important control lever were entrusted to a Stalinist pain-in-the neck dullard. What is that supposed to mean? Menshikov’s case is also shocking to me. It is clear that he is a bastard in general. I was never favorably disposed to him; he was tacked on [to our team] without my approval. I had to treat him roughly to make sure no extraterritoriality and privileges were allowed in relation to other consultants, and even in relation to me (which could have been done through [Vadim] Zagladin,4 with whom they are dear friends).
    [Show full text]
  • Detente Or Razryadka? the Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CGU Theses & Dissertations CGU Student Scholarship 2013 Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American- Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977. Daniel S. Stackhouse Jr. Claremont Graduate University Recommended Citation Stackhouse, Daniel S. Jr.. (2013). Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977.. CGU Theses & Dissertations, 86. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/86. doi: 10.5642/cguetd/86 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Détente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977 by Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. A final project submitted to the Faculty of Claremont Graduate University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History. Claremont Graduate University 2013 Copyright Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr., 2013 All rights reserved. APPROVAL OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. as fulfilling the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Janet Farrell Brodie, Chair Claremont Graduate University Professor of History William Jones Claremont Graduate University Professor of History Joshua Goode Claremont Graduate University Professor of History ABSTRACT Détente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977 by Daniel S.
    [Show full text]
  • Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes: a Comparison of Stalinism and Putinism
    TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A COMPARISON OF STALINISM AND PUTINISM A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY ONUR YENGİL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EURASIAN STUDIES AUGUST 2016 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Pamir Dietrich Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı Co-Supervisor Supervisor Examining Committee Members Assist. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant (METU, IR) Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı (METU, ADM) Assist. Prof. Dr. Yuliya Biletska (Karabük, IR) PLAGIARISM I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Onur Yengil Signature : iii ABSTRACT TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A COMPARISON OF STALINISM AND PUTINISM Yengil, Onur M. Sc., Department of Eurasian Studies Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı Co-Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Pamir Dietrich August 2016, 164 pages This thesis aims to compare and contrast Stalin’s Soviet Union with Putin’s post- Soviet Russia by looking at the totalitarian and authoritarian characteristics that these two periods as well as these two leaders display.
    [Show full text]
  • Afforded Majesties Welcome Inussr
    KABIR & CO. LTD NAWROZ CARPET EXPORT CO. Nlggest exporters of Afchan IF 'IK handicrafts offering the host displays highest quality newold TM AM nuuliiy Afghan products it: runs. Genuine antique ami, LT KABIR BOUTIQUE: and other Afghan - . ; handicrafts: " Address: Charahi Ansari (Share ... ! i' Nau). Address: Share Nau opposite Blue Mosque Tela; 30189 and 30183. , Tel?: 32035 and 31051. Post Box: 406. ' Cable: Nawroz-kabul- . Cable. PUST1NCHA VOL. X "NO 141 ' KABUL, WEDNESDAY, SEPTTEMBER 15, 1971 (SUNBULA 24, 1971 S.H.).. PRICE AF. 4 The Majesties TEXT OF HIS MAJESTY'S SPEECH -- HRH Prince Ahmac ir ! to signi- - both our Shah regent during Dear Excellency, . , Thanks their special improved, meeting .How me to exDress first mv flcance both' treaties are play- - wishes 'and those of . our deap-fe- lt gratitude for1 the Jng a very,, important part in friends.' HM's absence warm hospitality creating an atmosphere of Afghanistan by 'pursuing : a and sincere ' ' ' afforded warm to us at this, friendly ace and security in one or the policy of. positive and active . reception. The warm sentim-- rnajpr regions pi Asia, ine neutrality, nt and KABUL, Sept. 15, (Bakhtar). : tne aosence ents of Your Excellency , and past years ana events .. wnicn in military. uunnj of His other Soviet leaders and the took- - place in the international and political blocs, a policy of Majesty the King, His Royal . of Highness Prince Ahmad Shah peoples of the Soviet . Union situation bore out with f. still firm support for the struggle regent. welcome inUSSR toward Afghanistan are high-l- y greater elmity the positive im- the peoples and nations against is the appreciated by " the Afghan portance of these treaties.
    [Show full text]
  • Domestic and Foreign Problems of the Brezhnev Era CHAPTER 5 Domestic and Foreign Problems of the Brezhnev Era
    Chapter 5: Domestic and foreign problems of the Brezhnev era CHAPTER 5 Domestic and foreign problems of the Brezhnev era This chapter analyses Leonid Brezhnev’s rule of the USSR until his death in 1982. The extent to which this was an era of political, economic and social stagnation is fully explored. Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s is also discussed, in particular the reasons for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its consequences. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter: + What were the key features of the USSR’s politics, society and economy under Brezhnev? + Was Brezhnev’s leadership to blame for Soviet stagnation from 1964 to 1982? + What challenges did Soviet foreign policy face in the Brezhnev era? + To what extent were the USSR’s aims achieved in Afghanistan? + Why did the USSR invade Afghanistan? + How serious were the socio-economic and political problems confronting the USSR by the time of Brezhnev’s death? 1 Politics, economy and society under Brezhnev Key question: What were the key features of the USSR’s politics, society and economy under Brezhnev? By 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of KEY TERM the Soviet Union (CPSU), was viewed by senior party members as increasingly unable to exercise the necessary leadership and stability Presidium Dominant, required for the USSR to uphold its world position. policy-making body within the CPSU formed by the Khrushchev was removed from party leadership following a plot by Council of Ministers, members of the Presidium, in which Leonid Brezhnev played a leading part.
    [Show full text]
  • Cultural Response to Totalitarianism in Select Movies Produced in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland Between 1956 and 1989 Kazimierz Robak University of South Florida
    University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 2009 Cultural response to totalitarianism in select movies produced in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland between 1956 and 1989 Kazimierz Robak University of South Florida Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the American Studies Commons Scholar Commons Citation Robak, Kazimierz, "Cultural response to totalitarianism in select movies produced in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland between 1956 and 1989" (2009). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/2167 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Cultural Response to Totalitarianism in Select Movies Produced in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland between 1956 and 1989 by Kazimierz Robak A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Humanities and Cultural Studies College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Maria Cizmic, Ph.D. Silvio Gaggi, Ph.D. Adriana Novoa, Ph.D. Date of Approval: April 6, 2009 Keywords: bolshevism, communism, communist propaganda, sovietism, film, peter bacso, milos forman, jan nemec, istvan szabo, bela tarrr, andrzej wajda, janusz zaorski © Copyright 2009, Kazimierz Robak Dedication To my wife Grażyna Walczak, my best friend, companion and love and to Olga, a wonderful daughter Acknowledgements First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Maria Cizmic, who has been an extraordinary advisor in the best tradition of this institution.
    [Show full text]
  • NEW EVIDENCE on the WAR in AFGHANISTAN Introduction
    COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15 NEW EVIDENCE ON THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN Introduction By Christian Friedrich Ostermann hat was behind the Soviet decision in December a substitute foothold in Afghanistan and worried about main- 1979 to invade Afghanistan? And when and why taining its credibility with communist world allies. Soviet lead- Wdid Mikhail Gorbachev decide to pull out Soviet ers were genuinely concerned that Afghan strongman troops nearly ten years later? What was the role of the US Hafizullah Amin was either a US agent or prepared to sell out covert assistance program, in particular the Stinger missiles? to the United States. At the CWIHP conference, former US What role did CIA intelligence play? How did the Afghan Charge d’Affaires J. Bruce Amstutz as well as other partici- War’s history, a key step in the rise of militant Islam, intersect pants forcefully refuted allegations of Agency links to Amin. with the history of the final decade of the Cold War? These In his five conversations with Amin in the fall of 1979, Amstutz were among the questions addressed at a major international remembered, the Afghan leader did not in any way suggest conference, “Towards an International History of the War in that he was interested in allying himself with the United States. Afghanistan,” organized in April 2002 by the Cold War Inter- US relations with successive communist regimes in Af- national History Project (CWIHP) in cooperation with the ghanistan had been volatile since the April 1978 communist Woodrow Wilson
    [Show full text]