Australia:
Professor Marian Simms
Head, Political Studies Department
University of Otago
Paper prepared for presentation at the joint ANU/UBA ‘John Fogarty Seminar’,
Buenos Aires, Argentina 26-27 April 2007
Please note this paper is a draft version and is not for citation at this stage
1
Overview:
Australian has been characterized variously as ‘The Lucky Country’ (Donald Horne), ‘A
Small Rich Industrial Country’ (Heinz Arndt), and as suffering from ‘The Tyranny of
Distance’ (Geoffrey Blainey). These distinguished authors have all mentioned negatives alongside positives; for example, political commentator Donald Horne’s famous comment was meant to be ironic – Australia’s affluence, and hence stability, were founded on good luck via rich mineral resources. For Blainey, the historian, geography mattered, both in terms of the vast distances from Europe and in terms of the vast size of the country.1 For economic historian Arndt, size was a double-edged sword – Australia had done well in spite of its small population.
Those commentatories were all published in the 1970s. Since then much has happened globally, namely the stock market crash of the eighties, the collapse of communism in the late eighties and early nineties, the emergence of the Asian tigers in the nineties, and the attack on New York’s twin towers in 2001. All were profound events.
It is the argument of this paper that in spite of these and other challenges, Australia’s institutional fabric has incorporated economic, social and political change. This is not to say that it has solved all of its social and economic problems, especially those dealing with minority groups such as the indigenous community, disaffected youth and some immigrant groups. Some would say that Australia’s political institutions may have stifled change and innovation but that has been the price of stability.
2 1. Stability and Democracy
As a federal system, the Commonwealth government in Australia shares power with the
six states and two internal territories. The federal system was established in 1901 and has
never been under serious challenge. The broad outlines of the current party system were subsequently established in 1910, and have remained in place with only minor variations.2 Both levels of government conducted extensive legal reforms in the 1970s
and 1980s dealing with social rights especially equal rights and anti-discrimination
procedures. Both levels also underwent extensive reforms in the 1980s implementing new
public management policies. Local government is weak and regional government non-
existent,
Parties are deeply entrenched in Australian political life – one indicator being the very
few private members bills passed by national and state parliaments. By international
standards, then, Australian politics is dominated by an extremely strong party-system,
which has been in place since early in the twentieth century. The electoral system for the
House of Representatives – the majoritarian, alternative vote (since 1918) with single
member constituencies – has militated against the formation of new parties, and the
election of minor party and independent candidates, for the House of Representatives.
There have been at least four failed attempts to establish a Woman’s party and one
unsuccessful effort to set up an Aboriginal party. The first attempt occurred immediately
after Federation, in 1903, and was at the first election where all adult white females could
vote. The party was center-left, and lost female support to the Labor party. This was the
same story at the three subsequent efforts, which have coincided with the re-birth of
feminism, during the Second World War, the 1970s and the 1990s. The Aboriginal Party
3 of the mid-1990s, met with a similar fate, as the majority of Aboriginal electors identify with the Labor Party.
Subsequently, several minor parties have emerged that have successfully gained Senate
representation. The introduction of proportional representation in 1948 gradually paved
the way for new parties and minority candidates. The Australian Democrats Party has
been very effective in selecting women candidates and has produced five women party
leaders since its establishment in 1977. The Australian Democrats also selected a high-
profile Aboriginal candidate in 1998, who was subsequently elected, becoming only the
second Aboriginal Senator. In 2003 he was elected as Deputy Party Leader. Since that
time the Democrats popularity and their parliamentary representation has shrunk, and
they have been largely displaced by the Australian Greens.
2. Interaction of political forces
Political parties have been the main type of political force in Australia. They are federal
creatures having strong roots at the State level and a thinner veneer at the national level.
In this part of the paper, I will firstly discuss the nature of party interaction at the national level in recent years; and I will then outline this interaction at the State level, using the example of New South Wales the oldest and by far the largest of the Australian States
(i) National Politics
By the end of 2007, the Coalition government of the Liberal and National parties, led by
John Howard and John Anderson, will be seeking its fourth term in office. First elected in
1996, it replaced the Labor Government, which had been in office since 1983. Prime
Minister Howard has become the second longest serving Prime Minister in Australian
4 history. Labor, with a new leader Kevin Rudd, will be seeking government after eleven
and a half years in Opposition. Rudd is the fourth Labor Leader during that period. The
Labor party has begun to resemble the divided Liberals during their period in the
wilderness from 1983-1996. Of the minor parties, the Australian Democrats are in a
weakened state and the Greens who polled over 800,000 primary votes in 2004 are
appearing confident. All eyes will be on the Senate as the Coalition Government gained
control of the Senate after the 2004 election.
The 2007 election may well be a referendum on the Government’s handling of the war in
Iraq and its part in President George W. Bush’s war on terror. The economy is likely to
be foregrounded in 2007; as it was one factor assisting the Howard Government in 2004.
Subsequently there have been several increases in interest rates.3 Another big issue may
be the handling of refugees, as the Howard Government’s new policy of exchanging
asylum seekers with the United States may provoke controversy in some quarters. Earlier
in the pivotal 2001 campaign – when the early indicators were suggestive of a Labor
victory – the Coalition Government’s linking of the threat posed by illegal entrants from
the North, with the problem of burgeoning terrorism swayed enough undecided voters to retain power.4
The Labor Party has endured a tumultuous time in the opposition wilderness. After its
1996 defeat Paul Keating resigned as leader and was replaced by deputy leader and
former Defence Minister Kim Beazley, who led Labor to two election defeats. After the
2001 defeat, Simon Crean, Labor’s deputy, replaced Kim Beazley and many frontbench
members stood down, including its Leader in the Senate John Faulkner. Between 2001
and 2007 the party was bitterly divided. Crean survived a challenge from former leader
5 Beazley before eventually falling on his sword to allow a second contest between
Beazley and political neophyte Mark Latham. Latham won narrowly, and surprisingly, by
just two votes. One policy that needed urgent resolution was on asylum seekers and
detention policy. The internal tensions were evidenced by the early resignation from the
front bench of the high profile Dr Carmen Lawrence and the formation of an internal
grouping named ‘Labor for Refugees’.5 While Crean was still leader Lawrence
successfully stood for the position of Labor’s first directly elected party president, which
she held during 2004. Public debate about Labor’s prospects and weaknesses continued
throughout the period. After sustained ill-health Latham resigned from the leadership and
from Parliament in January 2005. Surprisingly Beazley was re-elected as leader
immediately provoking much media speculation regarding the need for new talent.
Meanwhile the Coalition Government demonstrated its capacity for internal renewal,
which is one of the keys to success in a Westminster style parliamentary system. Howard
appointed women to senior posts with a record three woman in the cabinet. For most of
the period the Howard-Costello relationship has remained an issue. When Howard
announced in mid-2003 (July 26) on his 64th birthday that he would be carrying on
beyond the next election Costello was visibly disappointed. There have been several ministerial resignations since Rudd’s election as leader and Howard has managed to turn these into signs of strength (i.e. sticking to principles) rather than of weakness (i.e. poor quality talent). Howard has remained dogged in the face of sustained attacks upon his integrity and performance.
Australia’s enthusiastic membership of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ and its commitment
of troops to the war in Iraq, however, have remained a significant political issue. It had
6 hurt the Labor party, as under Latham’s leadership the Coalition Government could
exploit his well-known antipathy to the US in a society that has economic, cultural and
historical links to the US. In contrast, the current leader Kevin Rudd has been careful to
stress his and Labor’s support for the USA alliance in spite of disagreement over the
handling of the war in Iraq. Critics of the government, including church leaders and
former public servants, have been particularly concerned with the Iraq War. Forty-three
former Defence, military and public service leaders, led by Richard Woolcott and John
Menadue, issued a statement entitled ‘Time for Honest, Considered and Balanced
Foreign and Security Policies’ (Canberra Times 9 August 2004). Shortly afterwards former Defence bureaucrat Mike Scrafton challenged John Howard’s version of events in the Children Overboard affair (The Australian 16 August 2004). One poll showed almost half of Australians believed Howard lied over the affair (Herald Sun 24 August 2004).
The tale of the minor parties is dominated by the Greens. They were the party on the rise throughout as measured by the polls and by the high profile of their leader Bob Brown.
Their threat has been recognised by both major parties in their appointment of high profile and charismatic spokespeople on the environment. The Coalition’s Minister is
Malcolm Turnbull, a flamboyant millionaire banker and co-founder of the modern republican movement, facing off against Labor’s Peter Garrett, founder of the protest rock group Midnight Oil.6 At the same time, the Democrats were stumbling badly. Lees
left the party to form her own Progressive Alliance and Natasha Stott Despoja was forced
from the leadership after a battle with Andrew Murray, an ally of Lees. Brian Greig
assumed the leadership briefly before Andrew Bartlett won a membership ballot. He led
the party to the election but suffered considerable adverse publicity after a drunken
7 incident at a 2003 parliamentary Christmas party. Pauline Hanson had quit her positions
with One Nation but her court case and subsequent imprisonment and publication of her
memoirs continues to keep her name in the papers.
The Coalition Government has entered the pre-election period with many positives
notably a very strong economy, a continuing mining boom, high levels of consumer and
business confidence and a housing boom ( which has slowed down in Sydney), but there
Significantly, the pre election mood of economic buoyancy is shadowed by fears of further rises in interest rates. However, the issue most likely to be relevant to the next election will be the strong state of the economy. Continuing government surpluses have enabled generous government spending and more of this is expected at May 2007
Budget.
Immediately after the last election Labor took office in South Australia meaning the
Labor Party was in office in all States and territories. That has continued to be the case.
Labor governments were re-elected in Queensland, Victoria and NSW. Labor was
recently re-elected again in NSW and the issue of ‘coast to coast’ Labor governments is
being used by the Coalition Government to highlight to voters the danger of electing a
Labor Government in the next national election due in late 2007.
(ii) New South Wales State Politics
New South Wales is an important case study demonstrating the operation of federal
politics in one major part of Australia, and also demonstrating the emergence of what has
been termed the ‘cartelisation’ of politics and government in the State branch of
Australian Government.7 Cartelisation refers to the case whereby party elites rewrite the political rules to ensure their longevity. It also implies collusion between these ‘insiders’
8 against newcomers. Apart from its size and history, New South Wales is particularly
significant for three reasons. First, in the past thirty years it has undergone a period of
intense constitutional and electoral reform almost unprecedented amongst mature
democracies. Second, these substantial reforms involved the re-casting of sections of the
State Constitution and other important electoral legislation in order to shore up the major
parties and make it harder for minor parties and independents to be elected. Thired, these
attempts to enshrine the party system show there is a fine line between stability and lack
of democracy.
The Labor Government of Premier Neville Wran (1976–1986) enacted significant
constitutional and electoral law amendments. Key electoral principles were entrenched in
the NSW Constitution. The Wran changes were substantial and ‘complex’ – according to
constitutional lawyers.8 Premier Wran, during his decade in office, introduced eight
major changes to the State’s electoral methods, and held three constitutional referenda
relating to the franchise and electoral laws, besides making several consequential changes. His successor Barrie Unsworth (4 July 1986–25 March 1988) introduced two major changes.
In 1978, direct voting for the Legislative Council, using optional preferential voting, was
introduced, via a constitutional referendum – a process mandated by the decades old constitutional amendment under the Constitution (Legislative Council) Amendment Act
1929. In 1979, compulsory voting for both Houses of Parliament, optional preferential voting for the Lower House, single-member constituencies and ‘one vote, one value’ clauses were also entrenched in the Constitution, meaning it would require a successful referendum, rather than an Act of Parliament, to change those provisions. In 1981, a
9 maximum four-year parliamentary term was introduced, and compulsory disclosure of
MPs’ financial interests. These were passed by popular referendum, but were not
entrenched. In 1981, public funding was introduced, New South Wales becoming the first
jurisdiction in Australia to do so. Crucially, the public funding laws involved the
registration of political parties, and consequential amendments saw the roles and
privileges of parties spelt out in the NSW electoral laws.
Breaking the previous pattern of party conflict over electoral and constitutional matters,
Coalition Governments under Nick Greiner (1988–1992) and John Fahey (1992–1995)
successfully brought forward referenda that broadly followed previous Labor
Government constitutional changes, with some interesting exceptions.
In 1990, Premier Greiner overhauled the State’s electoral law. The Constitution and
Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1990 legislated for the inclusion of party or
‘Independent’ labels on ballot papers, and for the registration of preference deals.9 This brought New South Wales into line with the Commonwealth. In a rare show of bipartisanship, it was a Coalition State Government following a Commonwealth Labor
Government initiative. Party politics were evident, however, in the tightening of formality criteria: ticks and crosses were no longer to be counted as valid votes for the
Assembly and the Council.10 Other parts of the law, such as lowering the deposit, easing
the rules on refunding deposits, and weakening the criteria for classification as a political
party, were based on the demands of the minor parties.11 Between 1988 and 1991 minor
parties – Call to Australia (CTA) and the Australian Democrats – held the balance of
power in the Council; after the 1991 election the Coalition Government had a workable
majority in the Council, relying on the CTA Party, but was in a minority in the Assembly.
10 On 25 May 1991, NSW voters approved a two-part referendum broadly continuing
Labor’s Legislative Council reforms. There was clear majority support, but the vote was
closer than for either the 1978 or the 1981 referenda.
Labor’s Neville Wran had introduced maximum four-year terms for the Legislative
Assembly. Liberal-National Party Premier John Fahey went one-step further and in 1995
successfully brought down a referendum for fixed parliamentary terms.
Business was supportive, as it had been of the earlier Wran changes to the length of
parliamentary terms. The Labor Opposition supported the Bill but did not campaign
actively.12 The major arguments in favour were cost, stability, and removal of the
partisan element in State politics.13 The main arguments against were that it removed the flexibility of the Premier and was therefore against the spirit of the Westminster tradition, and that it forced the acknowledgment of vice-regal powers.
The idea of extending parliamentary terms beyond the traditional three years was not
new. The Commonwealth had seriously considered it in the late 1920s, and still was in
the 1998 post-election review.14 What was new was fixing the term.
Coalition Premier Nick Greiner had reduced the size of the Legislative Council to 42
(with 21 members elected each time) and the Legislative Assembly back down to 99.
Labor Premier Robert (‘Bob’) Carr (1995–2005) further reduced the size of the Assembly
to 93 members for the 1999 elections.15 This was provided for in the Constitution and
Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1997.16 Because it was a reduction rather
than an increase in the size of the legislature, it did not create negative publicity.
The law also removed section 35F of the Constitution, which controlled the size of the
Ministry and originally specified its precise composition.17 Incrementally, the size of the
11 Ministry had increased throughout the twentieth centuryas the size of the Legislative
Assembly had increased. What the 1997 Act indicated was a new direction; a shrinking
House and a growing Ministry.
Carr came to power at the 1995 State elections, as the first NSW Premier elected to run a
fixed-term government. He quickly legislated to permit ballot papers marked ‘with only a
tick or cross … to be classed as formal’.18 Informal votes had increased at the 1991
election after the Greiner Government had legislated against ticks and crosses.19
Different voting systems for referenda (ticks and crosses) and for the State Parliament
(numbering boxes) were blamed.20 This was not a new issue. Since Federation,
politicians had debated the potential problems of voters facing different voting methods.
Like his Coalition predecessors, however, Carr was unable to gain an Upper House
majority, and learned to work with minor players, especially the CTA Party.21 Dealing
with small parties and Independents had become an unpleasant fact for NSW premiers.
The introduction of direct proportional representation voting for the Legislative Council
would be expected to support the election of minorities. This was true in terms of some
social groups, especially women, but not others, notably Aborigines. It was also true for
some small parties. In June 1998, Virginia Chadwick became the first woman President
of the Legislative Council. She was to be followed by Meredith Burgmann (1999 –
2007).
Above the line voting had been introduced in New South Wales in 1987, and the
inclusion of party names and registration of preference arrangements in 1990, bringing
the State in line with the Commonwealth.22 With the small quota – 4.5 per cent for 21
Councillors statewide – election for very small parties became theoretically easier.
12 Antony Green uses the term ‘harvesting’ to describe preference deals by small parties to keep preferences away from major parties.23 The election of 1995 saw the arrival in the
Legislative Council of Alan Corbett from A Better Future for Our Children, with a tiny
primary vote supplemented by ‘harvested’ preferences.24 In 1999, there were a record number of candidates for the so-called ‘tablecloth’ election (referring to the record size of the ballot paper).25 Later that year amendments were passed to limit the chance of a
recurrence, and stricter eligibility requirements were introduced.26 Parties were to register
12 months before the election, and were required to have 750 members (compared with
200 previously) and to pay a fee of $2000.27 Voters were also given the option of placing
a ‘1’ in the party or group square of their choice, and giving a ‘2’ to another party or
group.28 In 2000, this law was further clarified, providing that parties may supply a
supplemental list, in addition to the 750 names, in case the commissioner ‘determines’
the membership is invalid.29 In 2002, further amendments gave the Electoral
Commissioner wider powers to check the bona fides of political parties.30
Proportional representation in the Upper House could not explain the election of
Independents in the city and the country to the Legislative Assembly. Their threat to the
major parties is reflected in provisions of the electoral law forbidding the use of terms
like ‘Independent Labor’ and ‘Independent Liberal’.31 The major parties have, since the
1980s and the bipartisan acceptance of public funding, begun to collude to retain power
and maintain their smooth-running organisations. The anti-party sentiment in the
community – possibly aided by the perception of big-party collusion – has aided the rise
of minor parties and Independents, who in turn have issued challenges to the operations
of the two-sided system in a way that few had predicted.32 The minor players have
13 challenged the textbook model of major party dominance in Australia and forced the government of the day to offer concessions in exchange for support. It has been a classic case of the ‘law of unintended consequences’ in politics as the reaction against these laws and for other reasons minor parties and staunch independents have gained a bigger role in
NSW State politics than at any time since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
3. The role of the State in the economy and society
Since the 1970s, Australia has been in a ‘post-protectionist’ mode.33 The Labor
Government of Robert ‘Bob’ Hawke elected in March 1983 inherited an economy under siege. A weak manufacturing sector and a tiny tertiary sector sat on top of a large rural and mining export-orientated economy. Still dealing with the inflationary consequences of the oil crisis of the 1970s the Australian economy was plagued by high levels of inflation, growing unemployment and a large deficit. There was widespread recognition, including amongst the farming and union groups, that structural change was inevitable.
Whilst the wage freezes that had characterized the previous Coalition Government (1975-
83) had eventually alienated working class and middle class voters, it was the Labor
Government of former union leader Bob Hawke that had the necessary political influence to implement a wages slowdown.34
The Labor Government under Prime Ministers Bob Hawke (1983-90) and Paul Keating
(1990-96) instituted a wide-ranging array of reforms. The slowdown in real wages growth was instituted via an accord between the ALP and the Australian Council of
Trade Unions (ACTU). The Accord was signed before the 1983 election and indicated that most unions were prepared to trade off monetary wages for the so-called ‘social
14 wage’. The social wage included non-wage health and welfare benefits notably Medicare
the government sponsored universal health care system that had been established by the
Labor Government of E. G. ‘Gough’ Whitlam (1972-5). Essentially the unions had
promised not to seek wage increases in return for a Labor Government maintaining
Medicare and increasing family welfare assistance. The Accord was Hawke’s creature
and the (then) Treasurer Paul Keating had other concerns and agendas. He went on to
unleash major waves of financial reform, including deregulating the banks and floating
the dollar. His first concern, however, was to cut the deficit which had blown out under
the previous Coalition Administration of Malcolm Fraser. It was to be cut by spending
reductions rather than via tax increases.35 Keating was to become the darling of the
financial press.
Meanwhile the Hawke Government pursued the accord model, and in April 1983 pioneered the use of the parliamentary chamber to stage of a full meeting of representatives of government, business and unions. It was designed to create a conducive environment for dialogue, necessary for solving Australia’s structural economic problems. Hawke had been a long-time advocate of root and branch institutional reform, arguing that the combination of adversarial party politics and federal rivalries had been barriers to economic reform. At the time of the Economic Summit, however, critics were concerned at the poor representation given to women and the community sector, although the representation of local government within the
government sector permitted some representation of the grass roots of society.
The summit model created a growth industry amongst academia and among political
commentators more generally. Randal Stewart has usefully summarized the Australian
15 response in the context of the European debates over corporatism.36 Corporatism itself
was, and remains, a controversial idea. Some, such as Leo Panitch, have argued it is a
hierarchical system of social control, and others, such as Philippe Schmitter have
depicted it as fostering greater representativeness in decision-making than normally
permitted under parliamentary democracy. Gwen Singleton has persuasively argued that
the Accord model was not corporatist because it lacked formal business involvement,
even if business were a back stage player.37 Stewart was also critical of its hierarchical
nature, which he depicted as undemocratic.38
The neo-corporatist phase fizzled out. First, Keating, who was never a fan of the model, replaced Hawke as Labor leader and Prime Minister.39 Second, the Accord had been re- fashioned on numerous occasions, with a weakening of the central wage-fixing model, and had ended up with an orientation towards an enterprise bargaining model. Thus, giving greater flexibility, but leading to a loss of union strength on the other. Third, by
1990, Australia was in the grip of a recession, which also weakened union power.
The failure of the Accord to provide economic stability and growth led to deep concerns
amongst some academics and the business community about Australia’s future. It is of
relevance to the topic of this seminar that one leading political scientists reflected on the
Argentinean path. Writing in the early 1990s Monash University’s Professor Hugh Emy
drew attention to Tim Duncan and John Fogarty’s 1984 publication, Australia and
Argentina: on parallel paths.40 Worried by the lack of growth as compared with
comparable countries commentators were shaken by the Prime Minister’s half-flippant
comment that Australia was heading towards a ‘banana republic’.41 Keating’s staff
afterwards insisted he was making a precautionary comment stating what may happen if
16 Australia were to further raise interest rates as opposed to tightening fiscal policy. The open door policy of deregulation had created a flood of imports and acute balance of payments problems. Nonetheless, the comment was illustrative of the times and was to live on long after in the future election campaigns. In particular, by the time of the 1996 election it was easy to depict the Prime Minister as out of touch with ordinary
Australians, and as unsympathetic to their plight.42
If the path to economic reform was rocky, then the clear contrast was with the process of public sector reform in Australia. The Hawke Government was elected with ambitious plans for public sector reform. It was argued by some leading lights, notably Gareth
Evans, the Attorney-General under Hawke that without public sector restructuring the public service could not implement Labor’s new policies. It was one area of reform where the federal system was a help rather than a hindrance. Dr Peter Wilenski, a leading
Labor intellectual and adviser had instituted major reforms in the NSW public service under the Premiership of Neville Wran. Wilenski’s 1977 Review of the NSW Public
Service was an effective blueprint for the next federal Labor Government. The three essential characteristics were budgetary reform – budgeting by results, not inputs; management reform – creating a group of managers, via a senior executive service (SES); and the implementation of lateral recruitment from outside the public sector. There were other ideas too, including opening up public sector jobs to women and minorities who had previously been discriminated against. Hand-in-hand with the new public management came the growth of ministerial advisers, whose presence was designed to provide additional advice more sympathetic to party ideologies and goals. Needless to say, this group has grown tremendously at the federal and state levels, leading to claims
17 from some of the ‘politicisation’ of the public sector. However, in terms of the model
outlined in the second section of this paper, it is arguable that political advisers have
strengthened the policy-making capacity of political parties and of the executive vis a vis
the parliament. The Coalition Government has maintained the broad outlines of this
model.
4. Social fabric
The biggest challenge to social homogeneity has been posed by immigration. According
to a recent interview with Mr Kevin Andrew, the Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship, 25% of the Australian population in 2007 was born overseas or had a parent
that was overseas born. The contrast was with 1947 when 10% were from overseas.
However, as in 1947 the largest group is composed of those from the United Kingdom.
Now New Zealand provides the second largest group, followed by China. Australia
abolished the infamous White Australia Policy during the Whitlam years (1972-5), and
has moved on to a mixed policy of family reunion, economic, and humanitarian based
categories. 43The relative balance between the first two has shifted according to the state
of the economy. It is expected that by 2050 Australia’s population will increase from 20
to 30 million. Most of the growth will be from immigration, as like other OECD
countries Australia’s population is not replacing itself by natural means.
Historically, as is well known, Australia has had a bi-partisan approach to immigration
and population policy. This broke down in 1980s. The Hawke-Keating Governments
established a system of multi-culturalism that was designed to foster close connections
between ethnic communities and the State. Previous governments had adhered to assimilationism. In fact, the current Coalition Government now supports the early
18 adoption of Australian citizenship by new arrivals, including a citizenship ‘test’. At the
1996 election there was a backlash against multiculturalism, which was depicted as departing from the norms of universalism towards ‘special interests’. The backlash reverberated within the Labor Party itself and the defeat was partly blamed on Labor’s close identification with feminism, Aboriginal rights and multicultural. It was argued by some that this caused Labor’s loss of blue-collar voters.
As has been conclusively shown by James Jupp ethnic representation has been and remains low in the National Parliament, and the solid ethic electorates tend to be represented by the Labor Party.44 Australia’s tiny Aboriginal population has even lower political representation.45
In recent years, especially since the events of 9/11, Australia’s small Muslim community
– which is concentrated in Sydney – has created media controversy. A vicious physical assault by a small group of Lebanese men in Sydney’s western suburbs in 2000 led to a series of trials, a consequential amendment to the Crimes Act increasing penalties for
‘gang’ attacks, a vicious claims and counter-claims about the capacity of Muslims to
‘assimilate’to Australian society. In fact, these episodes have been partly behind the
Coalition Government’s moves to tighten citizenship eligibility.
There has also been concern expressed in recent years about the low interest by young
Australians in politics, which is sometimes depicted as indicative of a more general social disaffection. The Australian Election Commission recently established a major study of youth politics in order to ascertain the lower than average inclination to register to vote.
There have been moves to lower the voting age to 16 from 18 as an incentive to participate but these have met with little success.
19 5.Unions and Corporations
Much of the ground on this section was covered under section three on the role of the
State in the Australian economy. The broad outlines of the story since the collapse of the
Accord are similar to that in comparable countries. Unionisation has continued to decline.
For example, between 1998 and 2003 there was a 26% decline in unionisation.46 Several
causes have been identified. First, a decline in traditional manufacturing industries- due
to globalisation and the export of jobs – has hit union membership hard. This was
historically a highly unionised area. Second a growth in the service sector, which has no
real union tradition. Third a growth in the casual part-time area, which again has been
weakly unionised. The shift from centralised wage fixing towards enterprise level
bargaining has been an important factor, as has the removal of preference clauses for
unionists in certain industrial awards.
Australia remains one of the few countries where unions have a political role through political party affiliation. Individual unions affiliate to State branches of the Labor Party and generally have block representation within party decision-making fora such as conferences and councils. Their informal role has been significant and since Bob
Hawke’s elevation to the Labor leadership in 1983 the ACTU has become a stepping stone into the Labor front bench.
Business’ political role is less clear cut. Its hay day, ironically, may have been during the
early years of the Hawke Government. Business leaders have not tended to enter politics,
the above-mentioned Malcolm Turnbull is a rare exception.
Australia is becoming internationally known for its business sector. As well as Rupert
Murdoch’s New Ltd and his shift to the United States a large number of Australian
20 companies have become multinational in scope. This is particularly true in the mining
sector. Their international impact may be higher than their domestic role. The ideology of
corporate social responsibility has become international as reflected in the clean up
campaigns by mining giants such as BHP-Billiton.
At the domestic policy level the private sector has become important as a contractor of
services, especially in employment services, child- care and welfare.47 This sector
includes the church sector and an increasingly corporatised welfare and childcare
industry that has been underpinned by government funding. Its political role is still
unfolding.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that the broad outlines of the party political system have remained
intact in spite of the challenges of globalisation, which include immigration, as well as
economic restructuring. It has also suggested that the very strength of the system, while insuring stability, may have posed challenges to democracy. The case study of NSW was utilised to demonstrate the successful attempt to change the political rules to favour themselves; but which was challenged even only at the margins by minority parties and independents.
Some institutions, notably the political party, have thrived, yet others have declined. The
union sector has weakened and the corporate sector has a low public profile nationally.
21
1 See Geoffrey Blainey, Black Kettle and Full Moon: Daily Life in a Vanished Australia, Viking/Penguin, Camberwell, Melbourne, 2003 for a romanticized picture of the struggle under privations partly caused by remoteness. 2 The establishment of a Country Party in 1918 could have threatened stability but instead was incorporated into coalition with the main non-Labor Party, at that time the National Party. Coalition arrangements also emerged in most States. 3 Mortgage Nation (edited by Marian Simms and John Warhurst) was the title of the 2004 election study reflecting the importance of interest rates as a campaign issue. 4 See Marian Simms, ‘Afghans, Asylum Seekers and Anthrax: The Media and the campaign’ in John Warhurst and Marian Simms (Eds) 2001: The Centenary Election, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (QLD), 2002. 5 Dr Lawrence had previously served as the Premier of the State of Western Australia. 6 Both were elected in the 2004 election. 7 This following section draws upon chapter 9 of Marian Simms, From the Hustings to Harbour Views, University of NSW Press, Sydney, 2006. 8 Geoffrey Sawer, The Australian Constitution, AGPS, Canberra, 1988. 9 (No. 111 1990). 10 ibid; and Parliamentary Electorates and Elections (Amendment) Act 1991 (No. 14 1991). 11 Jeremy Moon, ‘Minority governments in the Australian States: from ersatz majoritarianism to minoritarianism’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30 (Special Issue), 1995, pp. 142–63. 12 Michael Egan, NSWPD, 21 May 1993, p. 2555. 13 For a comprehensive summary, see Scott Bennett ‘Should the House of Representatives have four-year terms?’ in ABS, Year Book of Australia, 2003; http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs
14 Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the 1998 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto, tabled 26 June 2000; http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/em/elect98/report.htm
15 See Scott Bennett and Gerard Newman, ‘New South Wales Election 1999’, Research Paper 22, 1998– 99; www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/sp/1998-99
16 (No. 88 1997). 17 ibid, Schedule 1, Amendments to the Constitution Act 1902, (No.32 1902). 18 Antony Green, Where Do You Draw the Line? Prospects for the 1997 Redistribution, New South Wales Parliament, Background Paper, 01/1997, p.36.
19 See Green, New South Wales Elections 1984–1991, 1993, op cit. 20 ibid. 21 See Fred Nile’s history of the CTA at www.cdp.org.au/fed/history/partyhistory
22 The Hawke Labor Government had introduced these reforms in 1984. 23 Antony Green, ‘Above or Below the Line? Managing Preference Deals’, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 Commonwealth Election. 24 ibid. 25 See Bennett and Newman, op cit. 26 See the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Amendment Act 1999 (No. 70 1999). Assented to 30 November 1999. 27 ibid, Section 66D.
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28 ibid, Section 103. Voters are only required to mark 15 boxes, even though there are 21 vacancies. Depending on the 15 they mark, they run the risk of exhausting or wasting their votes. See Marian Sawer, ‘Above the Line Voting: How Democratic?’ Paper for the ANU Democratic Audit Conference, 2003; http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/abovetheline.pdf
29 Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Amendment (Party Registration) Act 2000 (No. 80 2000). 30 Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Amendment (Party Registration) Act 2002 (No. 90 2002.)
31 Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Amendment Act 1999 (No. 70 1999). 32 This is indicated by the rigorous checks on party membership claims and lists provided under the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Amendment (Party Registration) Act 2002 (No. 90 2002.) 33 Stephen Bell, Australian Manufacturing and the State: The politics of industry policy in the post-war era, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, pp76ff 34 On Hawke’s background and intellectual framework, see Graham Maddox, The Hawke Government and Labor Tradition, Penguin Books, Ringwood (Victoria), 1989, chapter 3. 35 John Edwards, Paul Keating: The Inside Story, Penguin Books, Ringwood (Victoria) 1996, pp 198-9. 36 Randal G.Stewart and Ian Ward, Politics One, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1992, pp 146-7. 37 Gwen Singleton, The Accord and the Australian Labour Movement, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Victoria), 1990. 38 Stewart, op cit, p.146. 39 John Edwards has argued that part of Keating’s negativity was driven by Melbourne-Sydney rivalry. The ACTU was based in Melbourne, Keating was from the NSW Labor Party, and the NSW Labor Council had traditionally been suspicious of the ACTU in spite of its formal affiliation to it. Edwards, op cit, p.200. 40 High V.Emy, Remaking Australia: The state, the market and Australia’s future, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993, p.13. 41 Edwards, op cit, p.296. 42 The ANU election team, of which I was a member, decided to call the book on the 1996 election, The Politics of Retribution, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1997) as voters had voted back the Keating Government in 1993, but regretted it, and hence turned on the Government in 1996. Labor was decimated in that election, losing in its blue-collar heartlands in Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide. 43 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Australian Social Trends, 1998 at http://www.abs.gov.au
44 See James Jupp, ‘Ethic Politics’ in Marian Simms and John Warhurst, Howard’s Agenda: The 1998 Australian Election, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (QLD), 2000 45 See ABS, Population Distribution, Indigenous Australians, 2001 at http://www.abs.gov.au
46 ABS, Feature Article – Trade Union Membership, April 2004 at http://www.abs.au
47 Meredith Edwards, Social Policy, Public Policy: From Problem to Practice, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001
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