Robert M. Dehaven (Part 2 of 5)
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The American Fighter Aces Association Oral Interviews The Museum of Flight Seattle, Washington Robert M. DeHaven (Part 2 of 5) Interviewed by: Eugene A. Valencia Interview Date: circa 1960s 2 Abstract: In this five-part oral history, fighter ace Robert M. DeHaven is interviewed about his military service with the United States Army Air Forces. In part two, DeHaven continues to describe his experiences as a fighter pilot, including his time in the South Pacific with the 7th Fighter Squadron of the 49th Fighter Group during World War II. Topics discussed include DeHaven’s involvement in the Wewak raids in 1943, his other combat missions in Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, and his respect for fellow pilots and combat leaders. He also shares his thoughts on the developments of manned and unmanned weapon systems. The interview is conducted by fellow fighter ace Eugene A. Valencia. Biography: Robert M. DeHaven was born on January 13, 1922 in San Diego, California. He joined the United States Army Air Forces in 1942 and graduated from flight training the following year. DeHaven served with the 7th Fighter Squadron of the 49th Fighter Group during World War II, flying missions in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea. He later became Group Operations Officer of the 49th Fighter Group. DeHaven remained in the military after the war, representing the Air National Guard as their acceptance test pilot for the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star. He transferred to the Air Force Reserve in 1950 and retired as a colonel in 1965. In his civilian life, he worked for the Hughes Aircraft Company as a test pilot and executive and as the personal pilot for Howard Hughes. He also served as president of the American Fighter Aces Association. DeHaven passed away in 2008. Biographical information courtesy of: Boyce, Ward J., ed., American fighter aces album. Mesa, Ariz: American Fighter Aces Association, 1996. Restrictions: Permission to publish material from the American Fighter Aces Association Oral Interviews must be obtained from The Museum of Flight Archives. Transcript: Transcribed by Pioneer Transcription Services 3 Index: Wewak raid (October 1943) ............................................................................................................ 4 Cross-branch teamwork in the Pacific Theater ............................................................................... 6 Aerial victory during a scramble..................................................................................................... 7 Comparing the European and Pacific Theaters ............................................................................... 8 Top fighter aces and combat leaders ............................................................................................... 9 Weapon system developments ...................................................................................................... 10 Experiences of old and new fighter pilots ..................................................................................... 11 4 Robert M. DeHaven (Part 2 of 5) [START OF INTERVIEW] 00:00:00 [Wewak raid (October 1943)] EUGENE A. VALENCIA: Bob, you mentioned the Wewak melee. That certainly sounded like one that will be remembered. Do you recall any of the incidents at the big air show? ROBERT M. DEHAVEN: Well, yeah. This was—yeah. It was the 26th of October in '43. Wewak was the focal point. It was actually the pivotal point of the air defense, or air forces, of the Japanese in that theater. And I use this term exclusive of Guadalcanal, who of course got their beatings out of Rabaul. Rabaul was actually the axis of the Japanese fighter forces in the South Pacific. As far as the island in New Guinea was concerned, the counterpart of Rabaul was Wewak, and there were three tremendous dromes there. And this was a—the major strike in October to knock out these three dromes, or at least decimate them to the extent where they were no longer truly effective. The P-38 aircraft, which were the only ones able to reach this area at the time, simply were not equipped in the sense of quantity. That is the number of aircraft available to do a proper fighter cover job for the number of bombers required to compromise these three bases, which incidentally were contiguous. They were right along the coast there. 00:01:24 RMD: So Fighter Command came up with this brilliant idea of staging the P-40s—about, as I recall, four or five squadrons of us—out of a little place called Benabena, which was just a mud strip cut out of the side of a mountain about halfway up New Guinea—Aussie New Guinea, probably, in contrast to Dutch New Guinea. And we staged out of there at our field flown in by C-47s, 50-gallon drums. We topped off there and then rendezvoused with the bombers en route. And apparently, the Japanese radar, crude as it was, picked up the flights coming in. And to the best of our knowledge, they simply scrambled everything that would fly in the area. And I have forgotten now exactly how many fighter aircraft we had. It seems to me that we actually got over the target somewhere between 40 and 50 machines, in addition to the bombers. And we were assigned a medium or close cover, which would happen to be my responsibility with the 7th Squadron. And the P-38s were flying high cover. These were all B-24s. When we went into the target area, the plan was to go parallel to the coast, make a 180, and make the bombing run down the coast headed for home. 00:02:43 5 RMD: When we got in the vicinity of the target going up the coast out at sea, there were three tremendous clouds of Japanese fighters. We actually counted in excess of 30 airplanes in each gaggle. And they were strictly on our path and preparing to cut us off, so the lead bombardier or the lead—or the commander of the lead airplane elected to make a 90-degree turn into the coast over the target and bomb perpendicular to the line of airstrips, rather than in parallel to them. Well, this was fine. This didn't cause any trouble, except that we didn't anticipate that the Japanese would hit us at this point. We thought they'd wait until we got turned and then present a line abreast with their sweep troop. And as soon as he made his turn, started his turn—this was a pretty aggressive bunch—and they came charging through. And I remember the first flight when there were six airplanes, two Vs of three, made a high overside over—had side approach to the lead three bombers, and they never got within gun range. They just went down, fired ineffectually, and peeled off. Then the rest of them started coming down. And at this point, I made my pass into them and scared off the first bunch, and my wingman made a mistake of following one down. And when I pulled up over the top to reset myself over the bombers with the squadron, as I looked down, I saw him streaking out some 5,000 or 6,000 feet below me and he had two Zeros sitting on his tail. So I called my wingman, the element leader, and told him to hold the flight together and I went down after this kid trying to get him out of it. And before I got there, they nailed him and he caught fire and rolled over and went in the water. I couldn't get both of them, but the guy that shot him down, I got him. 00:04:39 EAV: [unintelligible 00:04:39] RMD: And it was the only wingman I lost. Well, the upshot of this whole fight, the—I think there were some 21 or 22 airplanes shot down that day. We lost six bombers, which doesn't sound like very many by European standards, but percentage-wise it was one of the largest losses in World War II, to lose 10% of the bombing force on one raid. EAV: So the Japs got them? RMD: Yeah. EAV: They must have been an aggressive group. RMD: They were very aggressive. This was, in effect, the last gasp. It's my firm belief—and there are some historians who have referred to it in this manner—that that particular fight that day broke the back of the fighter—effective fighter complement in New Guinea on that day. Besides the obvious losses they sustained, since they were fighting right over their front yard, there must have been an equal number of airplanes damaged beyond repair. Some that were recovered and crash landed. And this is typical of combat. If you're over your own front yard, 6 you can struggle an airplane back in, but it's totally useless. So I imagine their losses were very sizable at that time. We do know from the Intelligence reports at the time, they pulled quite a number of them back up into Hollandia. And of course, in the island-hopping process—which we followed the grand design of General MacArthur—the next strike, of course, above Wewak was Hollandia. This is where we moved into next. 00:06:09 [Cross-branch teamwork in the Pacific Theater] EAV: Bob, you mentioned something a few minutes ago that Joe Foss brought to light a few months back, was that in many of these melees he was happy to join up on a P-40 or a P-38 or a P-39. He had no preference out of that area at all. RMD: Well, as a matter of fact, this was particularly true in the disorganized early days of the Philippine campaign. We were the first Air Force fighter units into Leyte—Tacloban, as it was called. We arrived there, oh, it was a matter of two or three days after the initial landings. They were hardly prepared for us. And it was a matter of scrambling every time the three shots went off or the siren went off, and you got in the air as best you can.