^

Given By

U. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Fifth Air Force

in THE

War Against Japan

Military Analysis Division

June 1947

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Fifth Air Force

in THE

War Against Japan

Military Analysis Division

June 1947 U. S. SUPERINTENDENT Of DOCUMENTS

OCT 14 1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.

ii FOREWORD

The United States Strategic Bombing- Survey The military segment of the organization was was established by the Secretary of War on 3 drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 per- November 1944, pursuant to a directive from cent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40 the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave to conduct an impartial and expert study of the the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be men, supplies, transport, and information. The used in connection with air attacks on Japan Survey operated from headquarters established and to establish a basis for evaluating the in Tokyo early in September 1945, with sub- importance and potentialities of air power as headquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, an instrument of military strategy for planning and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating the future development of the United States in other parts of Japan, the islands of the armed forces and for determining future eco- Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. nomic policies with respect to the national It was possible to reconstruct much of war- defense. A summary report and some 200 time Japanese military planning and execution, supporting reports containing the findings of engagement by engagement, and campaign by the Survey in Germany have been published. campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate On 15 August 1945, President Truman re- statistics on Japan's economy and war produc- quested that the Survey conduct a similar study tion, plant by plant,, and industry by industry. of the effects of all types of air attack in the In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's war against Japan, submitting reports in dup- over-all strategic plans and the background of licate to the Secretary of War and to the her entry into the war, the internal discussions Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the and negotiations leading to her acceptance of Survey during its Japanese phase were: unconditional surrender, the course of health Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. and morale among the civilian population, the Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice effectiveness of the Japanese civilian defense Chairmen. organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will issued Harry L. Bowman, be covering each phase of the study. J. Kenneth Galbraith, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Rensis Likert, Japanese military, government, and industrial Frank A. McNamee, Jr., officials. It also recovered and translated many Fred Searls, Jr., documents which not only have been useful to Monroe E. Spaght, the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, for other studies. Arrangements have been Theodore P. Wright, Directors. made to turn over the Survey's files to the Cen- Walter Wilds, Secretary. tral Intelligence Group, through which they will The Survey's complement provided for 300 be available for further examination and civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. distribution.

in :

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This report has been guided by an original report prepared for the United States Strategic Bombing Survey by Brig. Gen. J. V. Crabb, Commanding General, V Bomber Command. The information contained in this report is based on official reports of the Army Air Force, Far East

AF, Allied Air Force SWPA . General Headquarters SWPA, the Fifth AF and analyses prepared by the USSBS. Unless otherwise designated, the claims in this report and the statistics used in discussion of enemy aircraft and shipping losses are taken from final claims of the Fifth Air Force based on its combat records.

The report has been primarily the work of these officers:

Col. William Hipps, Former A-3, Fifth AF and A-5, FEAF.

Col. Francis Gideon, Former A-3, Fifth AF, FEAF and Dir. of Ops., AAF.

Col. Benjamin Cain, Former A-2, Fifth AF, FEAF and Dir. of Intel., AAF.

Major William E. Johnson, Cartographer.

Contributors of special sections to this report are

Brig. Gen. F. H. Smith, Former C/S, Fifth AF and CG, V Fighter Command.

Col. H. F. Cunningham Former A-2, Fifth AF.

Col. B. A. Schreiver, Former C/S, Far East Air Service Command.

Col. Alvin Pachynski, Former Signal Officer, Fifth AF and FEAF.

R. E. BEEBE, Colonel, A.C., Former C/S, Fifth AF, FEAF & AAF.

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pace

Section I. Introduction 1

Orientation Map Facing P. 2 (1) Joint Chiefs of Staff Campaign Directives Facing P. 2 (2) Air-Ground-Naval Team, SWPA 3

II. Assembly and Composition 5 Role of the Fifth AF in the SWPA 7 Origin of the Fifth AF 8 Organization and Channels 8 Fifth AF Commands and Tatical Strength 11 Aircraft Strength 13 Personnel Strength 15

III. Air Campaigns 17 Geographic—Terrain suitable for Military Operations Facing P. 18 Typical Missions of the Fifth AF 19 Distribution of Effort 20 Progression of Air Attack Facing P. 20 Master Maps of SWPA Campaigns 23

Situation Map, 8 April 1942 Facing P. 24 (1) First Phase Facing P. 24 (2)

Second Phase Facing P. 24 (3) Third Phase Facing P. 24 (4) Fourth Phase Facing P. 24 (5)

Phase I. Isolation of Rabaul 25

Phase II. Preparation for Assault on the Philippines 31 Phase III. Occupation of the Philippines 34 Phase IV. Preparation for Final Assault on Japan 37 Conclusions 38

IV. Total Fifth AF Effort and Results 41 Effective Sorties Flown 43 Aircraft Hours Flown (Bombers) 44 Aircraft Hours Flown (Fighters) 45 Aircraft Attrition 46 Tons of Bombs Dropped 47 Disease Incidence Compared with Battle Casualties 48 Destruction of Enemy Aircraft 49 Enemy Shipping Destroyed 50 Low Altitude Radar Bombing Results 51 Bomb Distribution 52

V. Fortunes of War 55 Examples of Actions with Inter-Theater Importance: Bismarck Sea Battle 57 Attrition of the Japanese Naval Air Force 58 Attrition of the Japanese Army Air Force 60 Reinforcement of Ormoc 61 Air Entry into Japan 63 Examples of Actions with Theater Importance: Cape Gloucester 64 Capture of Corregidor 68 Extension of Aircraft Range 70 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page VI. Operational and Technical Factors of Importance 73 Ground Support 75 Reconnaissance 78 Development of Intelligence 82 Troop Carrier Operation 85 Air Defense in SWPA 87 Weather Service 87 Communication and Aircraft Warning 89 Logistic Support of the Air Force 90

VII. Chronology 97

VI SECTION I INTRODUCTION

WESTERN PACIFIC AREA

SCALE 5 TH AF REPORT iop__g loo 200 soo «o o soo soo (SECTION I) STATUTE MILES FIGURE I

,*— \.^ LAKE BAIKAlrf-T t-*/ JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVES IN SWPA AND POA OPERATIONS < !r - SWPA FORCES se^^poa FORCES

*»

.GILBERT ISLANDS

-^1.

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

5TH AF REPORT SECTION I FIGURE 2

AIR-GROUND-NAVAL TEAM, SWPA

Before detailing the history of the Fifth AF forces to permit simultaneous operations. The in its operations against the Japanese it is air-ground team became very cooperative and, advisable to show the role the Air Forces played after initial difficulties imposed by communica- in the combined all-force team play organized tions in jungle warfare, the entire Air Force by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Essentially the stood in support of ground action when re- structure was of three forces, ground, naval quired. Fifth AF support to the Sixth Army and air in combination, operating their special- was climaxed at Ormoc and Luzon. Air-naval ties in weapons to destroy a common enemy coordination was particularly effective with objective in order to create a new Allied base PT boats and later, in 1945, with submarines, for repeated operations. but generally it was found best to keep naval Naval units permanently assigned to the surface force operations apart from land-based SWPA were small until late 1944 and battle air operations, due principally to communica- grounds were restricted prior to the Luzon tions requirements of the naval forces. When campaign. The air forces, therefore, were beachhead operations were supported by naval called upon for more extended operations carrier-based aircraft the preliminary period than would have been normal under other was of naval responsibility after arriving at circumstances. the operation. No appreciable difference in operating techniques existed but basic lack of Therefore, in addition to the standard effect the necessary coordination destruction of the enemy normally accomp- liaison to such joint operations impracticable. The lished by air action, the Fifth AF adopted made full employment at one time of the forces avail- operations designed to readjust quickly to tac- able for an operation was never feasible and tical situations occurring from the all-out hence required elaborate and detailed schedules aggressive action of forces operating on little of separating forces, both in time and distance. or no reserve. This led to tactics and methods Despite this, the preinvasion cooperation be- of controlling aircraft to make them all-pur- the Fifth Air Force and the Third and pose. In a war of maneuver a high degree of tween effective and without "force Seventh Fleet units was flexibility" is important, a point adopted ;^i serious difficulty. The operation to seize' as policy by the Fifth AF. The history of the u A«io in Luzon is a small example of this?-' Fifth should be inspected for such actions as Legaspi the four-day battle between aircraft and a large In combined operations the interval between Japanese convoy in the Bismarck Sea; an successive operations was minutely calculated encounter where a single cannon equipped B-25 to save every day of the Allied advance. The secure, mastered a destroyer in a gun fight; the isola- absolute necessity of the Air Forces to tion of New Britain and New Ireland by in advance of combined operations, air su- premacy in Amphibious Force operating areas, combined air action ; the preinvasion prepara- tions at Gloucester, Biak, and Corregidor where the preinvasion isolation of the battlefield and bomb tonnage almost alone reduced prepared the destruction of beachhead defenses required beach defenses; the use of fighter-bombers at daily maximum effort throughout the period of Subic Bay and the Yamashita line to destroy the war. gun positions uninterdictable by artillery fire; Throughout the war in the SWPA, amphibi- the establishment of air and ground bases at ous operations were supported entirely by Tsilli-Tsilli, Wanagela, Dobodura, and Laoag by land-based aircraft except in a few cases where air transport; the supply of food, fuel and the objective was beyond supporting range of ammunition to scattered troops cut off from the the land-based fighters. Hollandia, Morotai, beachhead by terrain in almost every ground Leyte and Linguyan Gulf landings were furn- action; and other points which make the cron- ished close air support by CVEs of the 7th Fleet ology of the Fifth's air effort a constant for a few days until a fighter strip could be succession of varied events. constructed ashore and land-based aircraft In planning tri-force operations the most could take over and allow the CVEs to withdraw complex problem was the proper segregation of in order to refuel, replenish their aviation gasoline and bombs and rest their crews. At adequately emphasize the complete coordination this time responsibility for air support of the of Southwest Pacific forces which was respon- beachhead and the ground forces would pass sible for our successes. The Air Force part in to the Allied Air Force Commander. GHQ this achievement is on the records now being SWPA plans in general called for construction assembled. The presentation herewith is pri- of this initial fighter strip by D plus 5 to D plus marily an outline to point out the pattern of 10 as the 7th Fleet never had sufficient carrier events and the objectives of the Fifth's leaders, strength to maintain continuous operations for Generals Kenney and Whitehead. The com- longer periods. plete story must wait the digestion of statistical The historical notes and statistics in this facts and the issuance of a combined Allied, report cannot, as a description of one air force, Army, Navy and Air history. SECTIONfll ASSEMBLY AND COMPOSITION

ROLE OF FIFTH AF IN SWPA

The campaign of the Fifth AF in operations force as a complete entity and provided a con- against the Japanese was confined primarily to centration of its means. With the exception of the Southwest Pacific Area and to preparing, rt anti-submarine units and certain transport air- along with other Army forces, for the^fmaf ?>* craft all tactical aircraft in the SWPA were assault on Japan. Maximum effort of all^" under the control of Allied Air Force. In turn friendly forces against a single enemy objective this required that the Air Force have full was a keynote of theater policy. This policy, em- ability to support compatriot arms while con- ployed along a single line of attack, required tinuously engaging the enemy on the "Air full coordination of air and surface operations. Front." The Fifth AF was therefore "all pur- Limitations of operating space and of forces pose" in its composition. It was essentially a on hand required concentration of means and field operating unit, provided with the greatest brought the GHQ policy that the American flexibility and with freedom from administra- Sixth Army, Seventh Fleet and Fifth AF would tive and service burdens. The composing of be the "spearhead" forces. The Fifth AF be- many air forces into Allied Air Force by Gen. came by the turn of events the largest operator George C. Kenney developed the policy of of land-based aircraft in the Pacific except for assigning one major air force organization to B-29s. This accumulation of air power under achieve one major objective. The composition a single command provides the student of mili- of the selected air force or "Assault Air Force" tary history with an excellent example of a as it was 'termed, was determined by the re- series of highly successful campaigns in which quirements of the assigned mission. The air operations were coequal and coordinate with composition of forces therefore was changing those of ground and naval forces. constantly as bases shifted and forces reallo- The policy of Gen. Douglas MacArthur to cated. Emphasis was placed on complete and operate his major forces as a composite team responsible coordination between equal levels of land, naval and air forces, retained each of command. Figure 3 illustrates this.

PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF JOINT OPERATIONS THEATRE BOUNDARY GHQ ADJACENT SWPA THEATRES

ALLIED ALLIED MAJOR LAND NAVAL TASK FORCES FORCES UNITS

i OPERATQ OPERAT'G OPERAT'G UNITS UNITS UNITS SUPPORTS AIR UNITS

CONTROL U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT COORINATION SECTION n FIGURE 3 ORIGIN OF THE FIFTH AF ORGANIZATION AND CHANNELS In April 1942 General MacArthur had Air Task Forces formed an Allied Air Force under the command The Pacific being essentially a theater of of Lt. Gen. George H. Brett. This was a com- maneuver, the ability to effectively shift opera- posite organization of Royal Australian Air tional command from place to place was of vital Force squadrons, a few Netherlands East importance. The initial growth of newly ac- Indies squadrons and remnants of the Ameri- quired beachheads required on-the-spot super- can Far East Air Force formerly in the vision. The steady increase of sorties from a Philippines. These units had been evacuated new base would eventually demand a command to Australia and Port Moresby, New Guinea, headquarters approaching the Air Force Head- and were operating in combination with each quarters level. It was not feasible to suddenly other wherever service of any sort could be close a large headquarters and quickly move it found. In July 1942, Lieutenant General Brett to a new location since transportation and was succeeded by Gen. George C. Kenney. On duplicate equipment were not available. Fur- 3 September 1942 authority was received to thermore, air operations were continuous and activate the Fifth AF from existing American the movement of communications was critical AAF units in the Theater. Command was as- at any stage. To meet this problem three com- sumed by General Kenney in addition to his mand echelons called air task forces were position as commander, Allied Air Force. formed. Essentially they were standard air Forward operations were delegated to Lieut. force headquarters units less administrative Gen. Ennis Whitehead as deputy commander. sections. Their mission was the establishment The operational RAAF and Dutch units were of air force units at newly acquired bases or combined under Air Vice-Marshall D. W. Bos- beachheads, the conduct of air operations di- tock's RAAF Command. National and service rectly affecting action at the new base, and entity was retained throughout the war by development of the airdrome areas for opera- similar subdivisions under Allied Air Force. tions. The Fifth AF Headquarters would The growth of the Fifth AF resulted prim- eventually supplant them and the Task Forces arily from a troop requisition submitted to the would be prepared for new operations. If the War Department in early 1943. The troops new base was to remain detached, the air task arrived in the Theater during the latter part force continued as the direct representative of of 1943 and throughout 1944. Further sub- Fifth AF Headquarters and acted independ- stantial increase in strength was dependent on ently only in local operations. In development the cessation of hostilities in Europe and rede- of bases in conjunction with land and naval ployment of European units. However, by the forces the air task forces were never respon- cessation of major air activity in the South sible for the local defense, for the logistic sup- Pacific Theater the Thirteenth AF joined the port of the base as a whole, or the construction SWPA in June 1944. The Fifth and Thirteenth of airdromes. These missions were delegated Air Forces were then combined under the com- by GHQ to senior ground force commanders. mand of General Kenney as the Far East Air Contrarily, air operations were not placed Forces on 15 June 1944, and became mutually under the local ground commander except for supporting by combinations of forces. General emergency defense. Whitehead was appointed to command the Fifth The initial need for an air task force (First AF. Further reinforcement of air effort was Air Task Force) occurred in April 1943, to in- derived with the attachment of certain Naval augurate operations at Buna (Dobodura). In search squadrons and Marine air units to the July and September of 1943 the Second and Fifth Air Force as the campaign progressed. Third Air Task Forces were activated to par- In almost all operations the Fifth was in itself ticipate in airborne operations in Eastern New Allied an force. This presentation is confined Guinea. At this time the use of air head- principally to the organic assigned units al- quarters in widespread airborne operations, though its attached units were a considerable coupled to relatively major sea-supplied bases, factor in operations. was comparitively new. To illustrate the fiexi- 8 JVEWAK

5 th AIR FORCE DISPOSITION, OCTOBER 1943

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

.OH 5TH AF REPORT (SECTION TX) FIGURE 4 ROLE OF 5TH AF IN SWPA ALLIED

AIR FORCE

AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT THIRTEENTH FIFTH SEVENTH RNZA.F R.A.A.F 7TH FLEET NORTHERN SOLOMONS AIR FORCE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE T

TROOP AIR RECCE CARRIER SERVICE WING COMMAND WINS

I

i

FIGHTERS MED. BMRS. SERVICES I

TACTICAL i LT. BMRS. BOMB PHOTO WING

>- RECCE HQ. FIGHTERS

USSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION H FIGURE 5

10 .

ble manner in which these task forces were used structure. The arrangement was considered in October 1943 the geographical locations are the simplest method of administration, and the given in Figure 4. Sea distances from Port accountability of supply. It was not entirely Moresby (Fifth AF Hq.) to subordinate task suitable for operations due to the inability to forces required radio communication, and re- maintain the integrity of commands as units liance on aircraft for transportation of critical moved forward. This difficulty was solved by supplies. differentiating between "operational control" Task Forces Continued Throughout the War and "assignment" of units. Essentially assign- The need to continue task forces for future ment carried the responsibility of administra- operations became apparent. As a means of tion and for nonexpendable supplies for units, supplying authorized personnel and equipment whereas operational control referred to the the three bomb wings (308, 309 and 310) control of units in combat, with the responsi- authorized for the Fifth AF were used in lieu bility of tactical direction and furnishing of of their normal role to cover partially the task expendable supplies. Operational control of a force requirements. Task forces were hence- unit was normally vested in the senior air com- forward designated as bomb wings. Tactical mand conducting operations in the immediate and service units were attached to bomb wings area of the unit and greatly reduced communi- according to the mission and length of active cations and staff orders. Operational control operations. Units were selected from all Allied varied with the tactical situation and could be air commands when Fifth AF units were not redesignated on a daily basis if necessary. available. Lack of staging facilities and con- Administrative channels, however, remained tinuous operation sometimes made the assembly standard regardless of the location of units. It of Task Forces a very difficult achievement. should be noted that such frequent shift in tac- The method of assembling these forces is given tical responsibility was detrimental to main- in Figure 5. Bomb wing headquarters were taining any large scale teamplay between sub- not involved in the administration of these ordinate commands, and to the maintenance of units. records, but it was largely responsible for the Chain of Command ability to maintain flexibility in the arrange- The organization of the Fifth AF and its sub- ments of forces needed for operational ordinate commands followed conventional efficiency.

FIFTH AIR FORCE COMMANDS AND TACTICAL STRENGTH ACTIVATED IN THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS, SWPA, 3 SEPTEMBER 1942 COMMANDERS

Gen. George C. Kenney, 3 September 1942-15 June 1944 Lt. Gen. Ennis Whitehead, 15 June 1944^ SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (ACTIVATION DATE) V Fighter Command (11 Nov 1942). 54th Troop Carrier Wing (13 Mar 1943). 85 Fighter Wing (Jan 1944). 91st Photo Reconnaissance Wing (20 Oct 1943). 86 Fighter Wing (Mar 1944). Task Force Headqarters (Air). V Bomber Command (5 Sep 1942). 308th Bomb Wing (Apr 1943). V Air Service Command (Jul 1943). 309th Bomb Wing (Jul 1943). 310th Bomb Wing (Sep 1943). TACTICAL GROUPS

GROUPS JUL 1942 JAN 1943 JUL 1943 JAN 1944 JUL 1944 JAN 1945 JUL 1945

Fighters <3 SQD) 5 Bombers (4 SQD) 7 Reconn and Photo (4 SQD) Transports (4 SQD) 3

Night Fighter (3 SQD) . .

15i/4 Total Groups 10 1/4 21^ 20^ 23 33 Source: AFSSC-1C 11

«t

en

Z>

O< I-o <

m s>

5TH AF 1ST LINE AIRCRAFT ON HAND BY TYPE

JUNE 1942-AUGUST 1945

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 2,500

2,000

1,500

ipoo

500

JJ A SONDiJ FMAMJ JASONDIJ FMAMJJASONDIJ FMAMJJA 1942 1943 1944 1945

NOTE- ON HAND REPRESENTS ALL COMBAT AND TRANSPORT AIR TYPE AIRCRAFT IN THE FIFTH FORCE. US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

SOURCE- FEAF, AIRCRAFT STATUS REPORT. 5TH AF REPORT AFSSC (SECTION H) FIGURE 8

13 •J A gj- 5TH AF, FIRST LINE AIRCRAFT ON HAND AND OPERATIONAL BY MAJOR TYPE AIRCRAFT JUNE 1942 - AUGUST 1945

NUMBER OF NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT TOTAL - ALL TYPE AIRCRAFT HEAVY BOMBERS —

2000

1500 '

AAF PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF FIFTH AIR FORCE BY AIR CORPS AND ARMS AND SERVICES

NOVEMBER 1941 - AUGUST 1945 NUMBER Cf PERSONNEL

125,000

100,000

75,000

50,000

25,000

N D JFMAMJJASOND J FWAMJJ ASOHDjJFUAM^JASONDIJFMAMJJA '41- 1942 1943 1944- 1945-

NOTE- ASWAAF WCLUOES ONLY PERSONNEL IN ASWAAF UNITS) CORPS UNITS ARMS AND SERVICES SECTIONS WITH AIR STRATEGIC BOMBMG SURVEY NOT AVAILABLE BY COMMAND AFTER JUNE 1948. DATA US. BY ARMS AND SERVICES NOT AVAILABLE FOR PERIOD 5TH AF REPORT NOVEMBER 1941 THRU DECEMBER 1942. (SECTION m SOURCE- AFSSC FORM 127 FIGURE 10

1 "II 15

SECTION III AIR CAMPAIGNS

17

TERRAIN SUITABLE FOR MILITARY OPERATION SHOWN IN SHADED AREAS

JAPANESE HELD AND EXPLOITED THESE AREAS

ANO REQUIRED SWPA TO LEAD INTO JAP STRENGTH FROM THE

WmbM ORIGINAL ALLIED HOLDINGS I J . THE SWPA SELEC- TIONS ^ WERE MADE PRIMARILY FOR AIRDROMES AND srw-^ 270,000 £?•„ HARBOR POTENTIALS BUT SERVED SECONDARILY TO CONTAIN

JAP GARRISONS ESTABLISHED AT POINTS NOT REQUIRED FOR

OUR AIR OPERATIONS. VERY LITTLE TERRITORY 1

HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED BY JAPS IN THEIR SOUTHWARD MOVE-

MENT. THE ADVANTAGE OF OPEN WATER NORTH OF NEW GUINEA

AND ABILITY TO COOPERATE WITH CENTRAL PACIFIC OUT-

WEIGHED THE POOR SHIPPING LANES BUT BETTER AIRDROME

SITES IN THE CELEBES AND BORNEO AS ROUTES TO NORTH.

245,000 £}%*

.via* ^^1^^ ^^^k am* /

70,000 auT!5 ^

US strategic bombng survey

5 th A F REPORT SECTION H. FIGURE II

COMMANDS CONCERNED AIR MISSION

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ONLY PASSIVE DEFENSE

541b T/C WING DIR OF AIR TRANSPORT, BULK TRANSPORT OF A.A.FAIR TRANSPORT ALL FORCES 8 CLASSES COMMAND, CIVIL AIR LINES. OF SUPPLY

FIGHTER COMMAND + ACTIVE DEFENSE A/A COMMAND

TACTICAL TRANSPORT 54th t/C WING CRITICAL SUPPLY

FIGHTER COMMAND OR FITER COVER 24his./DAY NAVY CVE BOMB WINGS + GROUND SUPPORT FIGHTER COMMAND BOMB WINGS UNESCORTED INDIVIDUAL UNIT 5 AF BOMBER COMM. DESTRUCTION OF MILITARY COORD FIGHTER COMM } PERSOMEL a MATERIEL

BOMBER COMM. COMBINED ESCORTED OPER- FIGHTER COMM. ATIONS TO SECURE NEUTRALI- ZATION OF SELECTED BASES 8 ASSISTED BY CONTAIN AREAS TO BE BYPASS- ED. ENEMY AIR ACTION PRO- BOMB WINGS HIBITED.

FIGHTER COMM. FITER SWEEPS TO GAIN OR AIR SUPERIORITY IN BOMB WINGS ALL AREAS.

BOMBER COMM. ESCORTED HEAVY BOMBER

STRIKES TO REDUCE

FIGHTER COMM. KEY BASES 8 SHIPPING

PHOTOS 8 MAPS FOR NEXT 915! RECCE WING SCHEDULED OPERATION

BOMBER COMM. SNOOPER, LAB 8 RECCE TO SEARCH OUT AND AIRCRAFT SEVENTH DESTROY THE ENEMY FLEET

Jfl DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT TOTAL ACTION SORTIES a TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED 5TH AF tons a AND SORTIES SUPPORTING OPS TO SWPA BY CARRIER BASED AIR 20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

1,000 800 SONDJFMAMJJASO DJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA 1942 1943 j.-^ \ 1944 7/ yg 1945

FIFTH AF REPORT INCLUDES RECCE, FIGHTER, a BOMBERS, ONLY AIRCRAFT REACHING TARGET. FROM

FORMS 34. NAVY REPORT FROM DRAFT STUDY U-S.S-B.S. WITH SOURCE UNKNOWN. BOMB TONNAGE NOT TO BE USED AS AN MDEX OF EFFICIENCY OF ATTACK.

US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT

( SECTION II ) FIGURE 13

20 '

SE/ OKh PROGRESSION OF AIR ATTACK * '<* SEMI-ANNUAL tuva o Ctannu : FIFTH AIR f FORCE .j~< \ ^48W0VSK RAF " ALL AREAS INCLUSIVE - ALL ATTACKS CONTINUOUS CrSITSIHAS — ^ OUTER MONGOLIA /* 3 SEPT. 1942-14 MANCHURIA f? AUG. 1945 VLADIVOSTOK W-- 4 ,"V- HOKKAIDO SOURCE: AAF FORMS MUKDEN ^ 34-

P*PtNG SEA TKNTSINV-^ ^ANGTUNGX ,*£„ \PORT ARTHUR .(. A JAPAN

«*». "<>, «*»

N

MARSHALL ISLANDS

.GUEBT ISLANDS

ELLICE , ISLANDS

SANTA C

FIJI WESTERN PACIFIC AREA ESPIRITUfL. j N£ SANTO I.W^,' ISLANDS H£e ,

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

SCALE 5 TH AF REPORT lOO^J POgOO 100 40 aoo 1 00 STATIC section n MtLES FIGURE 14

EXTRACT—USSBS—DRAFT REPORT CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT ACTION SUMMARY—PACIFIC WAR

Raid, battle, or campaign Target area, type of carrier k MASTER MAPS OF SWPA^CAMPAIGN

LEGEND 5TH AIR FORCE REPORT OF OPERATIONS FROM INITIATION OF OFFENSIVE TO JAPANESE SURRENDER OCCUPIED BY JAPANESE AREA 6 APRIL 1942 TO 14 AUGUST 1945 • AND PRINCIPAL JAPANESE BASES OBJECTIVE JAPANESE NARBOR TO ADVANCE ALLIED BASES AND FORCES TO JAPANESE HOMELAND, DESTROYING OR NEUTRALIZING ENEMY WAR CAPABILITIES „ JAPANESE SHIPPING LANES MISSION ACCOMPLISHED IN FOUR PHASES IN SWPA . JAPANESE PERIMETER SHOWN ON THE FOLLOWING CHARTS 2 TO 5 5TH AIR FORCE OBJECTIVE EACH PHASE TO NULLIFY ENEMY RESISTANCE SO THAT ARMY, NAVY, AIR TEAM COULD TAKE ADVANCED BASES

5 SUB-PHASES OF EACH PHASE

! GAIN CONTROL OF AIR* IW*&AbH1 PHASE AREA BLOCKADE OF EACH PHASE AREA A AIR RECONNAISSANCE OF ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLY LINES AND MILITARY POTENTIAL

B. EXTERNAL BLOCKADE OF SEA LANES OF SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT

C, INTERNAL BLOCKADE OF COASTAL AND LAND COMMUNICATIONS BETWE^.gASES NEUTRALIZE ENEMY BASES AND CAPABILITIES

A. DESTROY ENEMY POTENTIAL AT SELECTED BASES.

B. ISOLATE AND IMMOBILIZE ALL OTH£R ENEMY FORCES AND RESOURCES WAY OPEN FOR GROUND FORCES TO TAKE KEY POSITIONS -AIR FORCE ACTION WAS - A AIR PROTECTION OF CONVOYS AND NAVAL TASK FORCES B AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCE ACTION

C. AIR SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION TO ADVANCED BASES

MAINTAIN SECURITY IN BY- PASSED AREAS BY CONTINUING AIR BLOCKADE AND THE NEUTRALIZATION AND IMMOBILIZATION OF LOCAL ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS

EACH PHASE REPEATED ABOVE WITH VARIATIONS IN OUTSTANDING, CRITICAL . AND UNEXPECTED ACTION, COVERED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT AND CHARJ-S ENIWETOK

JAPANESE STRENGTH SWPA 3 APRIL P3'42

6B5 AC WITHIN OPERATIONAL RANGE OF 5TH AF (30 MAY 1942) 3l (2656 AC , JAPANESE AIR ORDER OF BATTLE , MARCH 1942)

FORCE STRENGTH AS ALLIED AF UNTIL THESE UNITS WERE ACTIVATED AS 5TH AF 3 SEPTEMBER 1942)

368 AC ON HAND (265 OPERATIONAL)

2 FORWARD BASES ONLY,AVa|lABLE TO 5TH 'AF 8 APRIL 1942. PORT MORESBY AND OARWIN CAROLINE ISLANDS

LEGEND 5TH AIR FORCE FIRST PHASE OF OPERATIONS PRINCIPAL JAPANESE BASES SECONDARY JAPANESE BASES ISOLATION OF RABAUL INITIATION OF 5TH AF OFFENSIVE TO EMIRAU LANDING 8 APRIL 1942 TO 21 MARCH 1944

EACH SOUARE= 400 AC AC LOST BY 5TH AIR FORCE X y 661 (22 APRIL 19441 5TH AF AIRCRAFT 1989 ON HAND (MARCH 1944)

9GMIM IS 2656 AC 3I "ARCH JAPANESE AIR ORDER OF BATTLE ' 1942 4653 AC, 31 MARCH 1944 J4HSNE: AF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT HI 12 39 SE EFFICIENCY REDUCED TO 50%(2I MAR 44) mM* i» ^ 1348 AC WITHIN OPERATIONAL RANGE OF 5TH AF JAPANESE AC DESTROYED BY 5TH AF I I 2978 DESTROYED (21 MARCH 1944) (2203 SHOT DOWN > 775 DESTROYED ON GROUND)

EACH TRIANGLE = 100,000 TONS »«ke i JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK T 600,000 TONS (21 MARCH 1942) BY 5TH AF

EACH DIAMOND = 100,000 TROOPS JAPANESE TROOPS NEUTRALIZED 4 147,000 IN CURRENT PHASE AREA (15 MARCH 1944)

NOTES'. PHASE ONE RABAUL ISOLATED ANO NEUTRALIZED. EFFICIENCY OF JAPANESE AIR FORCES REDUCED MARIANA iqi TO 50% fW JAPANESE ,.%.,». NAVAL AIR FORCE FORCED TO WITHDRAW FROM SWPA ITS ' J-ffiJiS EFFECTIVENESS DESTROYED. ' * JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES DRIVEN OUT OF FIRST PHASE ARE^"'"""!!.

. \ L1NDINS » »sua» ALLIED FORCES ADVANCED J THROUGH SOLOMONS AND BISMARCKS TO THE «««J«i-Ei~' iDMIRALTY IS AND THROUGH E NEW GUINEA TO SAI06R AND DUMPU. ".to," BIAK AND HOLLANDIA NG .BROUGHT WITHIN RANGE OF HEAVY ATTACK BY 5TH AF

' % "^S?&

— ^^CORAl. SEi BATTLE £• JAMHESE IUV*L FORCE «=i HEPULSEO HIT 1942 ilLNE Uf Battle >2 j4ps repulsed

FIRST PHASE, 8 APRIL '42 TO 21 MAR '44

ro.»s«,u* CHART 2 (of 5)

5™ AIR FORCE SECOND PHASE OF OPERATIONS LEGEND SHOT DOWN BY 5»» AF PREPARATION FOR ASSAULT ON PHILIPPINES JAP BASE 400 JAP AC | PRHGIPAL PHASE IN CURRENT HOLLANOIA TO EVE OF LEYTE - 21 MARCH 44 TO 20 OCTOBER 44 SECONDARY JAP BASE 400 JAP AC DESTROYED ON GROUND BY 5'" AF j JAP HARBOR JAP SHPPING LANE [jn 400 JAP AC SHOT DOWN PREVIOUSLY BY AF SHIPPING LANE CUT BY 5™ AF 5" 4.0 MP AC. JAP AF EFFICENCY ^PERIM^R SWPA MARCH 44 Q % - JAP AIR ATTACK If 100,000 TONS JAP SHIPPING SUNK BY 5'k'aF IN CURRENT PHASE V CRITICAL ACTION X JAP BASE OR FORCE NEUTRALIZED + ALLIED LANDING OR OCCUPATION • ALLIED BASE

400 AC 5T "AF PERIMETER OF CURRENT PHASE

F i 2 v/

LEGEND ( KOREA 5th. AIR FORCE THIRD PHASE OF OPERATIONS »f tN current phase PRINCIPAL JAP BASE »P AC SHOT DOWN B> 1

„ SECONDAH. JAP BASE er 5TH A AP OH G f no jP4 H DESTROYEO OCCUPATION OF THE + JAP HARASS PHILIPPINES ^j l^JSHIKOKl MEVlOUSLl BY STM A F & J»F SHIPPING LAHI AC SHOT OO.N AND

SHIPPING LANE CUT «» 5TM »F ««««[> TO (0% .0 »C. JAP A F EFFICIENCY CUTTING JAPANESE LIFELINE TO S.W. Br 5 00 TONS JAP SHIPPING SUNK LIBERATION PHAGE LEYTE TO PROCLAMATION 20 OCT 44 TO 5 JULY 45 :OO.OOOT„,S „„„.. «.»»»" ™« » »«" £ C.I..C.L .01,0. V EACH SQUARE • 400 AC 'REVIOUS DESTRUCTION j.p ..s< o> porce iehjtiuuzbi ,e„trai.,ie» •» curre«t ran , 00 TR00PS K ^ , 000 „, JL ALLIEO lAHDIHS OB OCCUPATION ^^ A C LOST BY 5™ A F 13 6.3 c z july « • ALLIEO BASE <*X ,00,000 JAP troops or PASSED in

1 ^ PREVIOUS PHASE AREAS I 5'H. .00 AC STH A. 0*' AF AIRCRAFT """HO DDD .9/4 on hand i june «s gj 1? -Jg""* PERIMETER OP CURRENT PHASE JAP AF EFFICIENCY SEOUCED TO 20% '.Oil AC. i order of battle

jap aircraft , "

^^^^zl[3ai «a«e n^B aB b isrr destroyed in current phase ° JAC DESTROYED I (733 SHOT DOWN, 644 ON GROUND I Z JULY 45 BY 5™ AF

(ZK7T SHOT DOWN, '481 OH e ROUND 1 /'° EACH TRIANSE • 100,000 TONS //\ A (lEUTRAl IIATION SUNK THIS PHASE ( \ A f0 "1 D>* \ JAP SHIPPING SUNK * « *f JA" H • BY 5™- AF vitrA*' f • 21,609 TONS SUI V WW V w ^ re'"^g, THIRD PHASE, 20 OCT 44 TO 5 JULY 43 JAP TROOPS NEU- MONO* 100. 000 TROOPS . WIlH SUPPORT OF IJTH 1 SEWEHfC JAP SHIPPIRC ROUTES AF AND PERIODIC OPERt S(0 AC. MARIANA ISLANDS TRALIZED IN PHASE [N6TRI ^Z-alONO The China And PROGRESSIVELY NEUTRALIZED. THIN DESTROYED THE^ 29,000 I 5 JULY 43 . iNDO China \ r / COASTS AND Thrown SOUTH CHINA SE*• * SOUTHERN. CENTRAL AND NORTHERN PHILIPPINES. THREE J LUZON tesr **" ISOL1TC0 LtTTI AND PROOftl l$iv(iv ALL OF THE PHILIPPINES; aiWTOr, " "" E WCTtD E " OtSTROTEO s»AT ER AND L JAP TROOPS BY LAND a ^rot. I DUN IDDIMC ™ 326,000 S . HHILIPPINL COMMUNICATIONS ; COVERED CONVOY MOVE # PASSED IN PREVIOUS^< *"*" PHASE AREAS

»- ...

LEGEND 5TH AIR FORCE FOURTH PHASE OPERATIONS "00 JAPAC SHOT DOWN BY 5TH AF IN CURRENT" PHA! j PRINCIPAL JSP BUSES BB PREPARATION for SECONDARY JAP BASES . FINAL ASSAULT on JAPAN . „ 40Q JflM( DESTR0TED 0N GROUND BY 5 T>» AF + JAP HARBOR / SHOT DOWN BY, 5TH AF •JjBp SHIPPING LANE ill 400 JAPAC PREVIOUSLY JAP SHIPPING LANE CUT BY 5TH AF IS"/,'400 ac II *- [2 JAP AF EFFICIENCY REDUCEOTO 45 JAP PERIMETER 2 JULY BY 5TH AF SB 100,000 TONS OF JAP SHIPPING SU^IK AF W 100,000 TONS PREVIOUSLY SUNK/BY 5TH ?|T)CAL ACTION JAP BASE OR FORCE NEUTRLIZED^ 5 , 00,000 JAP TROOPS i. ALUEDLANDINGOROCCUPATION T" TROOPS NEUTRALIZED. J ALLIED BASE V 100,000 Hi 400AC 5TH AF ^ 100,000 TROOPS BY PASSED CURRENT PHASE PERIMETER A —

PHASE I. ISOLATION OF RABAUL To that end 1. Airfields will be established on Woodlark The Presidential Directive to the Supreme and Kiriwina Islands. Commander Southwest Pacific Area, dated 30 2. Take and consolidate the Solomon Islands March 1942, directed General MacArthur to: including southern Bougainville. 1. Maintain our installations in the Philip- 3. Take and consolidate Finchshaven, Sala- pines. maua, Lae, Western New Britain and the destruction troop, combat, 2. By of enemy Madang area. supply ships, well as aircraft and bases and as A further directive from JCS dated 23 Janu- in Eastern Malaysia, Guinea, Solomon New ary 1944 gave instructions to CinC SWPA to Island and Bismarck regions, stem the Japanese undertake the control or seizure of the Bis- advance toward Australia and disrupt its lines marck Archipelago which mission was fore- of communication. warned in the previous directive. The landing 3. Guard allied air, land, and sea communica- in the Admiralties was made on 28 February tions in and around SWPA. 1944 at Los Negros. 4. Supervise the operation of shipping within Subsequently in JCS 713/4, dated 12 March SWPA. 1944, the planned assault on Kavieng was can-

5. Assist friendly forces in their activities celed and the neutralization of Rabaul-Kavieng in the Indian Theater and POA. by occupation of the Admiralties was directed. Mussau and Emirau Islands were to be occupied 6. Maintain economic pressure on the home if required as air bases. The development of islands, by the destruction of their facilities the Admiralties was to be expedited to assist for transporting resources from newly con- in the neutralization of Truk and Palau. quered territories to Japan. General MacArthur's directives to the Fifth 7. Hold areas of Australia most suited for AF in the form of Operations Instruction pre- establishment of bases to be used in future scribed the role of the air forces in carrying out offensive action in order to check complete the Theater's mission. enemy conquest of SWPA. Stopping the Japanese Offensive 8. Be ready to mount an allied offensive. The mission of the Fifth AF, as prescribed The 30 March 1942 directive was amended in July 1942, by General MacArthur, was the by radio directive from Cominch on 2 July 1942 support of SoPAC forces in the occupation of in which CinC SWPA and Com SoPac were Southern Solomons by reconnaissance, the in- directed carry out the following tasks to with terdiction of enemy supply lines, and the neu- ultimate objective of the seizure and occupation tralization of enemy air bases. The objective of the Britain, Ireland, Guinea New New New of all Allied forces at this time was to stop the area: Japanese advance and to gain time during

Task 1 : Take and occupy, Lae, Salamaua, the which our own forces and bases could be built up NE New Guinea coast and remaining Solomon in preparation for the offensive. The Fifth Islands. AF was the principal weapon at General Mac-

Task 2 : Take and occupy Rabaul, plus an ad- Arthur's disposal to enable him to accomplish jacent location in the New Ireland or New this objective while Allied Naval and Ground Guinea areas. Forces were in formation.

Task 3 : Seize and consolidate Tulagi and The Japanese had landed at Buna on 22 July Santa Cruz Islands, with adjacent positions if 1942, and at Milne Bay on 26 August. This necessary. plan of double envelopment of Port Morseby Tasks 1 and 2 of the 2 July radio directive was intercepted and defeated by the repulse of were canceled by JCS 238/5/D 28 March 1943 the Japanese forces at Milne Bay. The Japanese at which time CinC SWPA was directed to: thrust from Buna, however, advanced rapidly Prepare to seize the Bismarck Archipelago. over the Owen Stanley Range toward Moresby. Maintain the initiative in order to contain and U. S. Army engineers had been bending every inflect losses on enemy forces as well as deny effort to construct roads, docks, airdromes, and areas to the enemy. storage facilities in the Moresby area since

25 FIRST PHASE

5th AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

26 July 1942 to permit the concentration of all ever the minimum safety requirements for a forces in New Guinea. Completed projects strip could be met. The troop carrier aircraft were still limited at this critical time. The air were utilized on return trips from "air heads" units available to meet the threat against to Port Moresby and Townsville to evacuate

Moresby were : two fighter groups and one sick and wounded personnel. An average of squadron of the 3d Bomb Group (L), equipped 100 patients daily was evacuated during this with modified A-20s, all based at Moresby, and phase of the campaign. The benefit of this one heavy group and one medium bomber group quick air evacuation from the battlefield was so staged in through Moresby from Australia. At great that for the remainder of the war a sub- Milne Bay two veteran RAAF P-40 squadrons stantial portion of the air effort was devoted were in position at the time of the Japanese to that service. assault. The combat air support of the Buna opera-

The severing of the enemy supply lines over tion had two principal missions : First, to main- the Owen Stanley Range was accomplished by tain the isolation of the battlefield, already se- utilizing the strafing and dive bombing capa- cured by geography, and second, to furnish bilities of the fighters. In addition the recently maximum close support to the ground forces. modified A—20, using its 8 forward machine The small numerical strength of the Fifth AF guns, and dropping a dispersed group of 23 lb at this time dictated tactics that called for using fragmentation bomb along the jungle trails, all types of aviation, in concentrated form on quickly established itself as a killer in jungle a priority basis, to meet constant requirements warfare. The Japanese, closely pressed by demanding more aircraft than were ever avail- Australian ground forces, dropped back over able. The only means of enemy reinforcement the torturous jungle trails to Buna. of Buna was by seaborne movement. Enemy During the Australian pursuit of the Jap- shipping was thus first priority while ground anese over the Owen Stanleys the troop carrier support was second. Normally a striking force aircraft in the Southwest Pacific first came into of aircraft was held on ground alert until re- its own. Air supply proved the only practicable connaissance reported that no shipping targets method of meeting the demands of troops bearing possible enemy reinforcement were in advancing through jungle trails. Thousands range. If such shipping was discovered it was of pounds of food, ammunition, clothing and immediately attacked, otherwise the striking shoes were dropped daily by free drop. Weather force was released for ground support. Special and terrain made the dropping incalculable at missions utilizing all available aircraft were best, and in some areas a drop recovery of only normally set up days in advance to support an 20-30 percent of supplies could be expected. all out ground effort. Only the threat of water- Simultaneously our ground effort against Buna borne reenforcements was allowed to interfere was intensified by flying the greater portion of with this type of planned support. the United States 32d Inf. Div. into the Buna In this campaign the importance of aerial area. Due to the lack of amphibious lift in the reconnaissance became fully appreciated. Long SWPA, and the inability of the Navy to enter range reconnaissance revealed enemy concen- the uncharted and confined waters north of trations, and new bases in sufficient time to New Guinea, the supply mission for the ground permit adequate preparation to meet new forces in the Buna are a continued to fall to the thrusts. Reconnaissance photography provided troop carrier aircraft, supplemented by combat artillery and ground reconnaissance maps and aircraft at critical periods. The air lift avail- briefing photos for air crews, while the verbal able was insufficient to meet more than current reports of aerial observers on enemy troop supply commitments so that any curtailment of movements and concentrations were invaluable supply missions, because of weather or diver- to the ground commanders who lacked suitable sion of missions, left the ground forces in a military maps. precarious logistic position. The advantage of The capture of Buna was a result of the landing supplies, and unloading them directly teamwork of ground and air forces. It gave in dumps, was recognized, and "air heads," territory on the North Coast of New Guinea rough jungle air strips, were established wher- on which to build new bases and permitted the 27 Fifth AF to eliminate the Owen Stanley Range, Japanese forces in early 1943 when Australian and hence to extend the range of aircraft well reinforcements were rushed in by air trans- beyond the mere airline distance between port. These same Australian ground forces Moresby and Buna, due to better weather and then pushed the Japanese back to Salamaua in smaller gas reserve requirements. The offen- one of the most closely knit air supported oper- sive of the Japanese in New Guinea had now ations conducted in the SWPA. Next another been stopped. Bases at Milne Bay, Oro Bay, inland airdrome requiring complete air support and Port Moresby were at last secure to set the was built at Marilinan in the interior of British stage for the initiation of the real offensive New Guinea. This airdrome was the key in SWPA. factor in the later annihilation of the Japanese Allied Offensive for the Isolation of Rabaul air units in Wewak where more than 200 The broad scheme of maneuver, as contained enemy aircraft were destroyed on airdromes in directives to General MacArthur, was to by coordinated air attacks, both low and high knock out Rabaul and prepare for further ad- level, on 17 and 18 August 1943. With the im- vances towards the Philippines. The South and mediate enemy air threat from Wewak elimi- Southwest Pacific forces were linked in a nated and air cover for amphibious forces double-barreled offensive. The South Pacific assured by the Marilinan base, the next move- forces, on the eastern flank of the advance, were ment forward against Lae was now feasible. to follow the Solomon Islands chain towards The attack against Lae, following a long Rabaul, at the same time the Southwest Pacific period of harassing and neutralizing air raids, forces were to move up the northeast coast of was carried out as a pincers movement, one jaw- New Guinea and into western New Britain amphibious and the other airborne. The Subsequent directives extended the eastern amphibious assault north of Lae was accom- flank advance to Mussau and Emirau Islands, plished on 4 September 1943. The airborne and the western arm was advanced to include assault on 5 September of the United States the Admiralties. 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment at Nadzab Aviation engineers followed the ground has become a model in airborne tactics. troops in the Dobodura plains to construct the Preliminary heavy bombardment of the Lae series of airdromes from which the effective area had eliminated all known prepared enemy range of Fifth AF B-25 strafers was extended defenses. Preceding the paratroopers succes- over Rabaul and Wewak. Maximum effort was sive waves of fighters, bombers and attack placed in the Dobodura airdrome construction bombers raked the drop area with machine gun so that in the spring of 1943 combat elements fire and fragmentation bombs, eliminating all of the Fifth AF began concentrating under the possible enemy resistance. Attack bombers First Air Task Force. The primary mission of screened the drop area with smoke to prevent the Air Force now became the neutralization of any enemy fire from the flanks. No enemy Rabaul, which since the summer of 1942, had resistance was left to meet our paratroops who been a primacy target for Fifth AF heavy and quickly consolidated their positions, assisted medium bombers. Previously, the neutraliza- the engineers in building rough landing strips tion of Vunakanau and Lakunai airdromes at and advanced upon Lae village. Following the Rabaul by Fifth AF. units in support of the seizure of Lae against negligible resistance, Guadalcanal landing had drawn a "Well Done" amphibious forces, intended to reinforce the from Admiral Ghormley. attack on Lae, were diverted to seize Finschafen The movement of the Southwest Pacific —the next scheduled objective on the North Forces on the western axis of attack was Coast of New Guinea. Following the capture launched on 22 and 23 June 1943 when amphibi- of Finschafen and Lae, air and service bases ous forces seized Kiriwina and Woodlark were quickly built at Nadzab (as a center) with Islands. the whole lower Markham Valley progressively Further preparations for the advance up the developed into a major air base. Simultane- North Coast of New Guinea were progressing. ously with the capture of Finschafen, the Aus- Wau, in central New Guinea southwest of Sala- tralian Seventh Division—supported entirely maua, had been saved from a sudden thrust by by aircraft of the Fifth AF for troop move-

28 — jnents, food, ammunition and close support Arthur's advance. The air operations at this followed the retreating Japanese up the Ramu base, conducted by the RAAF Command, were River Valley as far as Bogadjim, while other of sufficient strength to require a sizeable Allied ground troops pushed the Japanese up enemy force to oppose them. Its assistance to the North New Guinea Coast from Finschafen. the main New Guinea action was invaluable. Airborne effort was utilized in the Ramu The 49th Fighter Group operated from Dar- Valley to construct a major air base at Gusap win throughout the spring and summer of 1942, from which two fighter groups and a light bomb and built up a superb combat record against group could be operated. These were supplied the Japanese. The operation of this unit early entirely by air to support further movement discouraged the mass enemy attacks against up the North Coast of New Guinea. Darwin and permitted the rebuilding of our The role of the Fifth AF in the intertheater bases there with minimum interference. The effort to neutralize Rabaul now lent itself prim- receipt of additional RAAF units permitted this arily to the support of the South Pacific Force group to shift to New Guinea. in their advance up the Solomons to Bougain- Medium bombers were temporarily staged ville. The new base at Dobodura was the con- into Darwin for operations against the islands centration point for the entire Fifth AF in a in the Arafura Sea during this period. Upon series of attacks during the period 12 October its arrival in May 1943 the 380th Bomb Group through 7 November 1943 against enemy air- was detached to the Darwin Area to carry on dromes, aircraft, and shipping concentrations long distance raids against the Japanese. The at Rabaul. This all-out effort against Rabaul heavy bombers, in conjunction with the RAAF, was continued by SWPA and Sopac Air Forces concentrated on harassing the enemy supply and insured that the Japanese were never lines, and air bases in the Arafura Sea, the again able to use it as a threat to the Allied valuable Avgas refinery at Balikpapan, the advance. The Fifth AF turned its attention critical nickle mines at Pomelan in the Celebes, westward. and the NEI shipping centers within range. The movement of the Southwest Pacific The results of this constant flank effort were Forces continued into New Britain, where suc- great. The Japanese maintained fighters at cessive landings were made at Arawe, and Balikpapan and in the Celebes to guard the Cape Gloucester in late December 1943. The valuable gas and nickel sources. Ever sensi- Gloucester landing was unique because of the tive to any threat against the NEI, they reached extensive concentrated air bombardment prepa- to the staging of medium bombers into Darwin ration for the landing. Three thousand five by reinforcing Timor to a full division strength. hundred tons of bombs were dropped within In their efforts to keep their forward forces 37 days prior to the landing, leaving the 3,500 supplied, constant losses in shipping, men and Japanese defenders dazed and disorganized so material were inflicted against the Japanese. that ground troops walked ashore from their Gains from Rabaul's Isolation landing barges unopposed. A further amphibi- The isolation of Rabaul marked the end of ous move was made up the New Guinea Coast the first phase of the war against Japan. In where Saidor was captured on 2 January, pro- addition to eliminating Rabaul as a base the viding a valuable new airdrome on the North following results were obtained: New Guinea Coast. Little time was lost by the 1. Japanese Naval Air Force crippled, and Southwest Pacific Forces in advancing again. forced to withdraw toward the homeland for Air reconnaissance of the Admiralty Islands reorganization. indicated that the enemy defenses there were 2. Heavy attrition forced on Japanese Army not strong. A ground reconnaissance in force and Navy Air Forces and the Japanese Navy on 29 February was successfully developed into and Merchant shipping. a full scale operation. The seizure of the 3. Isolation and neutralization of approxi- Admiralties completed the isolation of Rabaul. mately 147,000 enemy ground troops in Solo- Flank Support from Darwin mons, New Guinea, and Bismarck Archipelago. The Allied base at Darwin, Australia, 4. Provision of new bases from which to sup- guarded the western flank of General Mac- port the advance toward the Philippines.

29 SECOND PHASE FIFTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION a FIGURE 16

30 :

logistics. PHASE II. PREPARATION FOR THE in addition, to operate on minimum ASSAULT ON THE PHILIPPINES Ship-tons delivered over the beach were as im- portant as bomb-tons on the target. The effect 1 March 1944 to 15 September 1944 of this aim was noticed in the necessity to With the establishment of forces on Manus, compose base garrisons from those units most Emirau, and Green Islands, the encirclement of economically transported forward; in splitting Rabaul was complete; its isolation could be units into echelons of movement, some of which insured by small forces operating against ever were never reunited until June, 1945; in re- diminishing targets and keeping constant sur- ducing vehicle strength of organizations by 25 veillance over the sea lanes along which relief to 50 percent ; in transporting material instead of reenforcement might travel. The next cam- of personnel so that relief and replacement paign was opened immediately—the campaign fillers were left behind; and other means of to establish thoses bases from which the assault reducing the overhead of combat operations. on the Philippines could be launched. This economy proved a severe strain on the The theater mission for this campaign stated ability to maintain 24 hour air operations but in JCS 713/4, 12 March 1944 was: the fact that it was done and the operations of a. Occupy Hollandia. were carried out provided a new concept could b. Then carry out, with whatever forces are the speed with which land-based air available, such other activities along the New advance. Guinea coast and elsewhere which would give To advance the bomber line as planned re- the greatest support to future operations quired the combined effort of all forces. The against Palau and Mindanao. air force missions were

c. Prepare bases in the Admiralties as soon a. Destroy the enemy air forces within radius as possible in order that SWPA air forces may of action of our airplanes. join in the neutralization actions against Palau b. Prepare beaches for landing by destroying and Truk. enemy ground defenses prior to D-Day. In the Theater Commander's outline plan c. Protect naval forces en route to objective (Reno III, 20 October 1943) for accomplishing areas. the mission to seize Mindanao by airborne- d. Establish air forces in objective areas to waterborne operation, the scheme of maneuver protect and support the forces in the area, es- and effective blockade was : by occupying minimum bases, advance tablish reconnaissance westward through New Guinea and into the over sea areas within range, destroy enemy Philippines as soon as possible; in order that war resources and, in preparation for further land-based bombers may be used as effectively operations, again destroy enemy air power as possible. within range. Specifically, in successive operations, the This pattern, applied by the Fifth AF to the Allied Air Forces were directed to: second major campaign, was accomplished in a. Provide fighter cover for convoys and the following successive steps: naval task forces. a. Hollandia was attacked and the enemy air b. Destroy ground defenses prior to D-Day. force there was destroyed in a series of Fifth

c. Neutralize hostile air operations within AF attacks from 30 March to 6 April 1944. range. This total destruction of the enemy air force d. Destroy hostile shipping and port installa- supported the carrier task force in its attack tions within range and deny hostile reenforce- on Palau and in its mission of interdicting ment of the objective area. enemy air forces west of Hollandia during the e. Provide close air support of ground forces. landing operations there. The Carrier Task

/. Continue strikes on Truk and Woleai. Force's report of this operation supporting g. Continue neutralization of Palau Group. Hollandia stated that so much damage had been h. Provide aerial reconnaissance as required. accomplished against installations at Hollandia

i. Establish air forces in the objective area by prior Fifth AF attacks that enemy defense as directed. was negligible and that any claims against the The decision to occupy minimum bases meant, enemy were difficult to establish. 31 b. Air cover was provided for the Seventh objective of having a strip prepared for the Fleet forces advancing to Hollandia and Aitape. operation of our aircraft within a minimum of

c. Air Forces were established at Aitape, 5 days of the assault landing. The limitation Hollandia and Wakde. to the speed of forward movement was not en- d. Defense and support mechanism was put tirely the installation of Air Forces but was into operation. governed by the speed with which ground e. Heavy attacks on Palau were conducted troops could be assembled, trained and more from Manus, Hollandia and Wakde. important still, by the availability of amphibi-

/. Enemy air forces in the Biak-Noemfoor- ous lift, always a critical item. Geelvink Bay area were destroyed. While the Fifth AF was growing in power g. Beach defenses were knocked out prior to and experience, constant pressure maintained landing- at Biak and Noemfoor. against the Japanese Air Force from all sides

In. Air cover was provided for naval forces continued the depletion of his combat effective- advancing to Biak-Noemfoor. ness. In actual numbers of airplanes the Jap- i. Enemy sea-borne reenforcements for Biak anese Air Force had grown perceptibly, but the were turned back in an air action west of Biak, number, experience, and ability of the pilots 8 June 1944. and crews declined. The efficient organization j. Air forces were established at Biak, Noem- which had been able, during 1942 and 1943, to- foor, and Sansapor. shift forces quickly and fight effectively was k. Attacks were launched against Celebes gone. The heavy losses at Midway, Rabaul, bases, Davao, and Ceram. Wewak and Hollandia had so weakened and

1. Air forces were established on Morotai. disorganized the Japanese Air Forces that ef- During this period the Fifth AF progressed fective operations on a large scale were no from a force of 378 planes deployed on the longer possible. Japanese losses were cumula- Darwin-Nadzab-Manus line to a force of 1,100 tive as valuable maintenance units and equip- planes on the Darwin-Biak-Morotai line. Im- ment were lost with each successive operation provement in equipment gave greater range and forward movement of our forces. and greater striking power, heavily defended Losses in larger and faster ships, and the targets were brought under attack and escort- necessity of maintaining such vessels on the ing fighters now accompanied bombers on main routes of supply to Empire, caused the longer range missions. Troop carrier planes, Japanese to resort to smaller shipping for inter- augmented by combat types, were employed to theater troop movements and supply. The "Sea carry tremendous quantities of food, supplies, Truck," a small wooden ship of stylized con- and ammunition to forces whose seaborne sup- struction (100/300 tons), became a most im- plies were not adequate. Air-sea-rescue facili- portant factor in his surface movement from ties and techniquies were developed to give air- early 1943. The power barge was also made men a greater sense of security and chance for and used in large numbers. These vessels were survival. manufactured at Soerbaja, Davao, and other During this phase of operations in which the places beyond our range of attack. They were Fifth AF spearheaded the theater attack, used on long sea hauls at times, movement SWPA forces moved rapidly from Lae to Moro- being traced from Philippines to Halmaheras tai. Each successive move was made as rapidly and New Guinea in such vessels. They were as a task force could be equipped, the attack used almost entirely in redistribution from rehearsed, amphibious shipping assembled and supply termini in the combat zones. Fishing launched. The primary objective of each move- vessels, luggers, and prahus were also exten- ment forward was to secure a new beachhead sively used in intertheater supply and were area on which airdromes could be installed from capable of moving effective tonnage by their which further advances could be supported. numbers and the ability to hide in small inlets. The assault beachhead was carefully surveyed This small shipping became an increasingly from preinvasion photos, airdrome areas se- important target for Fifth AF and regular lected and airdrome engineers following closely hunts were made for it until its movement on the heels of the assault troops with the ceased.

32 THIRD PHASE 5th AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

5th AF REPORT (SECTION m FIGURE 17

33 The over-all results of this campaign, meas- fighting strength and to reduce immediately the ured in terms of accomplishment were these: reserve and potential supply of fuel for the a. The directive from the JCS to the theater enemy fighting machine, a series of attacks commander was accomplished; the Thirteenth were launched against Balikpapan in late Sep- AF attacks on Truk and Woleai were continued tember and early October. The destruction of until these bases were no longer a threat to our vital oil refining and storage facilities here immediately decreased the enemy's ability to forces ; Hollandia was occupied isolating a large Japanese garrison in New Guinea and provid- wage war. In these attacks heavy bombers, ing a major base for support of the Leyte opera- taking off from bases over 1,100 nautical miles tion; Biak, Noemfoor, Sansapor and Morotai from the target with a gross load of over 69,000 were occupied and major air elements based pounds rendezvoused at the target with fighters there to provide flank protection for our forces taking off from other bases more than 700 nau- advance to the Philippines, cover for seaborne tical miles from the target. In addition to the moves and bases for offensive operations. damage to the oil industry at Balikpapan, the b. Five hundred eighty-four enemy aircraft combined power of the bombers and fighters were destroyed according to combat claims accounted for the destruction of 96 enemy air- made by the Fifth AF. planes during these attacks. capture of Morotai and Palau provided c. The air blockade isolated New Guinea and The the Halmaheras and denied the Japanese the the springboards for the assault on the Philip- power of supply, reinforcement and evacuation pines and permitted the neutralization of bases in those areas. and air forces in the Southern Philippine Is- it originally to d. The bomber line could now be extended to lands. Although was planned Balikpapan and the Visayas. seize bases at Talaud and Sarangani Bay for the installation of air forces covering the e. All Japanese bases in New Guinea and the Philippines, Celebes were rendered ineffective. advance to Central and Northern intelligence reports from the Third Fleet, then PHASE III. OCCUPATION OF THE attacking the Philippines, brought about a rapid PHILIPPINES rearrangement of plans. The first report, Preinvasion dated 13 September, indicated that landing From the capture of Morotai to the assault on there could be made without any intermediate Leyte the Air Forces mission was to: (a) con- operations, covered by fleet air. The enemy air tinue attacks on the enemy air forces within forces were reported by Commander Third range, (b) support the ground forces, (c) pro- Fleet to be a "hollow shell, operating on a shoe tect areas occupied and (d) such other missions string." Taking advantage of this reported as would prepare the way for the invasion. weakness in the Japanese defenses the invasion With the establishment of the Fifth AF on of the Philippines, which in JCS 713/9 had Biak, Sansapor, and Morotai the enemy aban- been directed for 20 December, 1944, was moved doned their air bases in the Celebes and up to 20 October 1944 by the JCS on 15 Sep- Halmaheras. Heavy attacks were concentrated tember 1944. on enemy air forces and shipping in the Ceram The Leyte operation was agreed upon under area; Laha and Haroekoe, Witicola and Am- the assumption that Jap air strength in the boina were attacked in strength; Menado, Philippines was weak and naval forces would Belaagoeki and Samoerang came under heavy not retaliate. The invasion was accomplished attacks by medium and heavy bombers. Daily 60 days early by diverting the ground forces fighter sweeps on offensive and reconnaissance set up for the Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani Bay missions kept all these dead areas under sur- operations. The decision called for abandoning veillance. An effective method of inducing the standard pattern of movement so success- attrition in these forces was to keep them on fully used in the Southwest Pacific Area: that the move within a limited area, thereby further no offensive movement would be made beyond weakening their hopeless supply and food the effective supporting range of land-based problem. air. Only once before had this pattern been To assist in the over-all reduction of the Jap broken, and then by going into Hollandia where

34 PARAPHRASED COPY

FROM CTF 77 TO CINO 8WPA INFO COMFEAF — 26 OCT. 44

CAN FITERS BE FLOWN IN TOMORROW ? APPARENTLY THE ENEMY HAS FLOWN A LARUE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, IN ADDITION STRONS JAPANESE SURFACE UNITS SOT THROUGH SAN BERNAOINO STRAIT LAST NITE. OUR CVES HAVE BEEN CRIPPLEO SEVERELY BY REPEATEO AIR ANO SURFACE ATTACKS TODAY PROBABLY LESS THAN HALF THE 8ROUP CAN FUNCTION AT ALL. THE MAXIMUM CVE AIR EFFORT HAS BEEN EXTENDED IN SELF OEFENSE MANCHURIA WITH SUBSEOUENT INABILITY TO PROVIDE FITER COVER FOR LEYTE. IN LEYTE 6ULF THIS AFTERNOON WILL BE ONE CRIPPLED CVE DIVISION WITH OTHERS F0LL0WIN8 TOMORROW. TASK SROUPS 38.1 AND 38.2 WILL BE HERE TOMORROW MORNING AND WILL BE ABLE TO FURNISH FITER COVER BUT THOSE CROUPS SHOULD BE HITTIN8 ENEMY SURFACE VESSELS IN THE AREA AS WELL AS ATTACKIN8 ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR AND ON THE SROUND. IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT LAND BASED FITERS BE ESTABLISHED IN LEYTE IMMEDIATELY.

OCT

c E N

TO COMFEAF FROM CTF 77, I NOV. 44

NAVAL FORCES COVERING LEYTE REPORT 2 HEAVY AIR ATTACKS

THIS DAY. I DD HAS BEEN SUNK BY TORPEDO PLANE AND 3 ADDITIONAL SEVERELY DAMAGED IF ADEQUATE FIGHTER COVER T T IS NOT MAINTAINED OVER G0M8A AN SHIPS THEIR DESTRUCTION IS INEVITABLE. CAN YOU PROVIDE NECESSARY PROTECTION?

PARAPHRASED COPY MARSHALL ISLANDS

l.TRUK IS IJAP) -fONAPE

JALU.IT CAROL N E S L A N D S

5th AIRFORCE ADMIRALTY is MARINE AIR BOEROM BISMARCtN^ m\ 1 C^ , ARCHIPELAGO _

.'"» i "Cx^oa, NEW BOUGAINVILLE-5 .^ * s 8Rlf B>> ,CS<™°« ' KOEPANG TIMOR £?'

AREAS OF AIR RESPONSIBILITY PACIFIC ESPIRITU WESTERN AREA SANTO LEYTE CAMPAIGN S EA U.S.STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY « SHIPPING BLOCKAOE.

SCALE « PRINCIPAL LAND TARGETS 5TH AF REPORT 00 100200 300 4pO 500^00 • ATTACKED EXCLUSIVE OF B (SECTION n) STATUTE MILES LEYTE -SAMAR AREA. FHURE 18 the enemy air forces had been destroyed by the first reenforced squadron of P-38s arrived at Fifth AF. Engineer plans for early construc- Tacloban at noon 27 October and the Fifth AF tion of airdromes on Leyte were predicated on assumed the Philippine air responsibility at the decision to rely on carrier based air until 1600 of the same day. 4 November. During the preinvasion period the Fifth AF

The mission of the Third Fleet was to neu- had : completed the neutralization of enemy tralize the hostile air forces in Okinawa, For- forces in the Celebes and Halmaheras, reduced mosa, Northern Luzon, Bicol, and Visayan areas the great Balikpapan oil installations, closed the prior to A-Day and support landing operations Makassar Straits to all except minor shipping, in coordination with the Seventh Fleet. The and supported the initial Leyte operations by mission of the Seventh Fleet was to provide air the neutralization of the enemy forces in Min- protection for convoys and naval task forces danao. and to provide direct support of landing opera- Leyte tions until relieved by land-based air. The The next phase of the Fifth AF campaign to Fifth AF was charged with destroying hostile occupy the Philippines deals principally with air forces in the Celebes Sea area, protecting the securing of the forces in Leyte Gulf area the Western flank of the operations until re- and the support of the ground forces at ORMOC. lieved by the Thirteenth AF, neutralizing hos- Lack of airdrome sites, shortage of engineer tile air forces in Mindanao south of 8°45' N. units and heavy rains prevented the movement and protecting convoys and naval forces within of Air Force units into Leyte as planned and range of land-based air. air operations were improvised to meet this un- The trials of our Third and Seventh Fleets foreseen condition. Since airdromes would not following the initial landings of our forces in support the bomber operations as originally outer Leyte Gulf, 17 October, are carried in planned, fighters were to carry out their func- detail in other reports. The increasing tempo tions. In addition to the task of furnishing air of enemy air action beginning 20 October were protection for the ground and naval forces in a prelude to the concentration of opposing naval the Leyte area, fighters of the Fifth AF were forces for the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 24-26 Oc- called upon repeatedly to engage shipborne tober. With the withdrawal of naval forces reinforcements being pushed recklessly into the the Jap counter air attacks confined in order Visayas by the enemy. During the course of to cover the entry of Jap infantry into the "back the operations to secure Leyte the Fifth AF estimated door" of ORMOC, which is further described accounted for the sinking of an in Section VI, paragraph 17b, of this report. 40,000-70,000 troops of which an unknown As a result of the enemy air and surface attacks number got ashore without equipment at other in the battle for Leyte Gulf the Seventh Fleet islands than Leyte. In the defense of Leyte Air combat effectiveness was destroyed and the Gulf area the Fifth AF accounted for the CVE's had to be withdrawn. The Third Fleet destruction of 117 enemy airplanes in the air in maneuvering to meet the various enemy task during the period 27 October to 3 November groups during the period 24-26 October 1944. Conditions at Leyte were still hazardous increas- expended its potential to the extent that it was and the Japanese effort continued on an forced to withdraw to Ulithi to refuel by 30 ing scale until 6 December on which day there October. As a result of the exhaustion of Third were more than 150 enemy sorties. His attacks and Seventh Fleet Air in the Leyte Gulf action, were effective and further reduced our air and on the request of the naval commanders; operations which were already hampered by General MacArthur directed the Allied Air lack of airdrome capacity. Heavy and medium Forces (Fifth AF) to assume the responsibility bomber operations in the Visayas required care- for all air operations in the Philippine Islands staging through Tacloban airdrome on a on 27 October. The original date for the Fifth fully integrated timing of flight schedules and AF assumption of the air mission was 4 Novem- likewise reduced the scale of our operations. ber and this advancement of transfer date Mindoro prevented airdrome construction to provide In following the SWPA principle of making even minimum operational standards. The amphibious forward movement only within sup-

35 :

porting operational radius of land-based air an were available. The heavy sustained coordi- intermediate base was required between Leyte nated attacks of the air force team of fighters and Lingayen to cover operations within the and bombers had been proven by experience Central Luzon Plain. Another factor requiring the only effective means of destroying an enemy a further base was weather which hampered air force in an area such as Luzon where suf- Leyte's airdrome development to the extent ficient airdromes existed to permit effective that only a fraction of the strength of the Fifth dispersal and shifting of forces. AF could be brought to bear against the Jap- Before the launching of the Lingayen opera- anese air force in the Philippines. At this tion air forces in the Philippines had time of year the west side of the Philippines a. Neutralized enemy air forces in central has better weather than the east side. Mindoro, and southern Philippines and initiated attacks within fighter cover range of Leyte and capable on Luzon. of easy development, was selected for the new b. Severed enemy sea lines of communication base with D-Day set for 5 December. As the to the Philippines and destroyed large tonnages date for the operation approached it became of enemy shipping. apparent that air strips at Leyte for basing c. Accomplished the destruction of large fighters were not being completed quickly numbers of enemy troops through shipping at- enough by the Sixth and later Eighth Armies. tacks and ground support operations. When the weather forecast made it look doubt- d. Made enemy movement throughout the ful that fighters from Tacloban could get over Philippines virtually impossible by continued Mindoro on D-Day and D-l, General Kenney attacks on land and coastal movements. requested GHQ to supplement the cover of Lingayen Mindoro forces by including CVE's in the con- The Lingayen operation was launched before voy until D-Day only, at which critical time the neutralization of Luzon was complete. The they would retire. At the suggestion of CinC risk of moving a convoy under cover of CVE and Fleet, POA Com Third the landing was carrier air into an area in which the destruction postponed until 15 December. This was done of the enemy air force was not complete was because of the Third Fleet's requirement to again accepted. refuel and rearm to cover the withdrawal of the To cover the approach of the Bombardment Seventh Fleet beyond plus 1 Day, and to give D Task Force and the assault forces a maximum an additional 10 days' construction of air- air effort was expended to counter the serious dromes for land-based air. Kamikaze threat. Three air units were as- The task force at Mindoro was unopposed in signed the task. First the Third Fleet was to its landing but a Japanese naval task force ap- neutralize all bases north of an east-west line peared to threaten the garrison before adequate through Lingayen Gulf. Second the Far East air or light naval forces had been established. Air Forces with the Fifth AF as its principle Our main naval force was en route in its return combat unit was given the tasks of (a) isolating to Leyte and was unable to return to Mindoro the landing area and of (b) neutralizing air- in time for the engagement in daylight. How- dromes on Luzon South of the east-west line ever, the night of 26 December, a small force of through Lingayen Gulf. Either FEAF or fighters and one squadron of strafers took the Third Fleet could cross the boundary line by enemy task force under attack and drove off previously announcing strike plans. The third the entire force in a brief but savage engage- force was the Seventh Fleet Air composed of 10 ment in which one destroyer was sunk, and CVE's in the Langayen Assault Task Force. three destroyers and two cruisers were dam- The task prior to D-Day of the Seventh Fleet aged. No appreciable damage was sustained Air was that of providing local air cover for from enemy bombardment. the Assault Task Force. The securing of Mindoro and development of Heavy attacks were accomplished against airdromes thereon permitted the normal Fifth Clark Field by Third Fleet air on 14, 15, and 16 AF plan of air development. This plan was to of December. However, from then on until the bring forward fighters followed by strafers and naval Assault Forces reached Lingayen the heavy bombers as rapidly as airdrome facilities neutralization task fell to FEAF. The Japan-

36 :

ese air in the Philippines was destroyed as an 67 staff cars. effective air unit. In spite of heavy destruction 18 tanks. the enemy was able to save some miscellaneous In close support of the ground forces on aircraft which were later committed in sporadic Luzon, the Fifth AF flew 47,250 sorties and suicide attacks. The majority of these suicide dropped 38,900 ton of bombs. Letters to ground aircraft were committed between the 4th and force commander, the low casualty figures of 10th January. In this period, although weather our ground force units in comparison to the hampered FEAF operations, on 6 January an tenacious enemy resistance and the number of effective attack was made on Luzon airdromes. enemy casualties inflicted attest to the effec- During this period the Third Fleet extended tiveness of this air support. As many as 300 their cover over the whole of Luzon on 6 and fighters, each carrying napalm belly tanks, were 7 January in order to neutralize enemy air. In utilized in concentrated attacks on small enemy spite of excellent coverage, the enemy was still strongholds. able to launch 19 successful Kamikaze attacks Attacks on enemy sea lines in the South during the 2 days. Following this period, the China Sea began as soon as reconaissance and enemy having committed his scattered rem- strafter airplanes were based in the Philip- nants of an air force, Kamikaze attacks all but pines. Regular attacks reaching the China and ceased. It was apparent that despite an over- Indo-China coast quickly weakened the lines of whelming preponderance of friendly air it is communications from the southern empire to impossible to prevent the launching of small the homeland of Japan and by 12 May 1945 sporadic attacks from well dispersed airdromes these lines were completely severed. Since the or to completely stop these sporadic enemy beginning of the war submarines played an Kamikazes in the air. effective role in these operations against enemy The principal missions of the Far East Air shipping in the South China Sea, but their at- Forces as soon as established at Lingayen were tacks had not yet been able to halt Japanese a. To keep the enemy air force on Luzon neu- shipping without the assistance of airplanes tralized and initiate attacks on Formosa at the which could reach into every harbor. The earliest practicable date. Navy carrier force made a one-day attack at b. Attack and sever land lines of communi- Touraine and Saigon and another one-day at- cations. tack at Hongkong and daily coverage was

c. Support the ground forces. maintained by FEAF planes. d. Cut enemy sea lines of communication within range. PHASE IV. PREPARATION FOR FINAL (Prior to this time close air support of land- ASSAULT ON JAPAN ing operations was furnished by CVE's.) JCS directive 713/19 dated 3 October 1944 The sustained attacks on the Japanese air- directed General MacArthur to establish bases dromes in Luzon reduced their effectiveness in Luzon from which to suport further ad- completely and no further threat from these vances, and to provide support for the occupa- airdromes developed. As soon as this mission tion of the Ryukyus Islands. CinC POA in this was complete and staging bases in Luzon were same directive was directed to occupy one or established, the neutralization of Formosa more positions in the Ryukyus Islands with tar- began. The first attacks were launched in get date of 1 March 1945. January 1945 and continued in their intensity Subsequent theater directives to the Fifth until by 1 April there were no remaining lucra- AF, which was agreed to by CinCPOA, gave the tive targets in Formosa. Fifth AF the missions of: (a) conducting re- Attacks on enemy lines of communication on connaissance to the west of Okinawa (b) as- Luzon were extremely profitable and by mid- sisting in the neutralization of Formosa (c) January the Fifth AF had damaged or de- continuing cutting of the Japanese life line to stroyed the following: Asia (d) continuing the clean up of the Philip- 79 locomotives. pines. 456 railway cars. To meet requirements to support South 468 motor cars. Pacific Forces in the Okinawa campaign pri-

37 : :

ority was given to the reconstruction of the To simplify the command situation on Clark Field Air Base and to the development Okinawa, the invasion of which had been of Laoag as an advance staging base. The launched as a CincPOA campaign, the control attacks against Formosa were carried out con- of the Ryukus Islands and army units thereon currently with the clean up of Philippines by was transferred to Cine RFPAC on 18 July the Fifth AF. The success of the neutraliza- 1945. All AAF units, except USASTAF, now tion was attested to by the negligible number of came under the Commanding General, Fifth AF, enemy aircraft that were able to stage through for coordination and control. The Fifth AF as- Formosa's 53 airdromes to attack the Okinawa sault on the Japanese homeland which began task forces. Interrogations and documents ob- with the arrival of the 35th Fiter Group on Ok- tained after the surrender show that Kyushu inawa on 2 July 1945, now continued completely based suicide planes made practically all the under Army Air Force control. The Okinawa Kamikaze attacks against Okinawa. Pilots and Ie Shima airfields were kept saturated with were instructed to fly South and then West and aircraft as rapidly as engineering effort could to approach Okinawa from the West or the produce space, so that by the 14th of August, Southwest, so as to create the impression that when hostilities ceased, 1,065 aircraft, repre- they were operating from Formosa. Constant senting 60 percent of the Fifth AF, were in individual reconnaissance by H2X and LAB position pounding the Japanese. During the B-24s of the Fifth AF kept Japanese surface neutralization period in July and August the craft and sea ports in assigned areas constantly Fifth AF released a series of attacks against under surveillance and harassing attack. The communications, airdromes, shipping and in- scale of effort expended by the Fifth can best dustrial areas of Kyushu and Southern Honshu be gauged by the fact that 15,315 tons of bombs in which all the lessons learned in the Pacific were expended on Formosa in 7,690 sorties. In war were used. Fragmentation bombs, napalm, addition, day fighter sweeps and night intruder strafing and high explosives were used in coor- missions over Formosa made air movement of dinated attacks that left the enemy dazed with any kind hazardous for the Japanese. For- their suddenness and intensity. mosa's great potential of being a serious block Subsequent to peace the Fifth AF was as- to our advance and to supply Japanese counter signed two missions. The first was the trans- attacks was quickly and effectively nullified by portation, with the assistance of ATC, of the air action alone. occupation units to enforce the preliminary In JCS 1331/3 25 May 1945 General Mac- peace. Weeks were saved by this method of Arthur as Cine Army Forces Pacific was di- entry into Japan. Details of this maneuver are rected to invade Kyushu on 1 November 1945 in contained in Section VI of this report. As a order to supplementary mission thousands of released 1. Destroy and contain major forces of the Allied POWs were flown out of Japan. As a enemy. final mission the Fifth AF was assigned as the 2. Assist in any further advances. Occupation Air Force for Japan and Korea. 3. Increase current effort in air bombard- CONCLUSIONS ment and blockading of the home islands. lead The Fifth AF objective in the softening up of Performance in the Air Campaigns had any amphibious assault beachhead was to so to the following conclusions, that blast the enemy's prepared defenses and a. The land masses and islands of the South demoralize the defenders that the ground troops and Western Pacific are so situated that suf- would be able to walk ashore with their wea- ficient areas were available for the operation of pons slung over their shoulders. In prepara- land-based aircraft to follow the pattern of any tion for the aerial assault on Kyushu, our air- scheme of maneuver employing sizable forces. drome capacity was the first requirement, so b. Sustained air operations conducted for a that concurrently with the ground cleanup on duration and in a volume proportionate to the Okinawa every possible effort was put into the strength of the target are a primary require- development of airdromes on Okinawa and Ie ment prior to invasion. Shima. c. In the Southwest Pacific island structure,

38 —

no battlefield could be logistically supported 3. The best defense against attack is the pos- without continuous air superiority. session of the longest ranged offensive air d. Land-based aircraft alone could have pre- weapons with which to neutralize the enemy at pared for and tactically supported the scheduled distances greater than his own ability for operations in the SWPA had the schemes of counter-action. maneuver continued to call for that manner of k. The priority of targets for air operations accomplishment. in the SWPA was effective. e. Naval carrier forces could be effectively (1) Primary—Destruction of enemy air force employed in conjunction with land-based air. wherever in operation or in assembly—in the /. The Japanese concept of defense was estab- air, on the ground, in the factories, bauxite lishment of isolated points of resistance was in in vessels, or gasoline any place. itself no deterrant to our operations. The oc- (2) Secondary—Imobilization of activity cupation of Hollandia clearly demonstrated this shipping, rail, bridges, motor columns, any point. movement of any sort (including power

g. As the Pacific war was fought it demon- sources) , and immediate close support of Army strated that aircraft range was the paramount action. factor in the neutralization of enemy power. (3) Tertiary — Paralyzation of industrial The ability to destroy, however, began at the areas, centers of population and supply points, nearest target and extended to the limit of the and the denial of concerted enemy naval inter- radius of action. ference with operations.

h. The effective neutralization of opposing I. The tactics of using combat aircraft at low land-based aircraft could only be effected by altitude with long low approaches defeats radar sustained attack in force. Piece-meal or limited detection and gets surprise. We repeatedly operations did not accomplish this. killed mechanics working on airdromes. i. As the Pacific war was fought, the adequate m. Air transport alone can support sub- defense of an objective from air attack could stantial intra-theater operations. With air not be obtained solely by employing the means superiority and proper objective preparation, of defense at the objective, although such de- an area can be seized and maintained by air fense could limit the size of the force which operation alone subject to the limitation of the could infiltrate. rate at which cargo must be delivered.

39

SECTION IV TOTAL FIFTH AF EFFORTS AND RESULTS

41

43 5TH AF ASSIGNED AND OPERATIONAL BOMBERS AIRCRAFT HOURS FLOWN

JAN 1943 AUG 1945 AIRCRAFT HOURS FLOWN 600 eoo

540 — leo

480 — 160

420 140

360 120

300 100

240 80

180 60

120 40

20

JFMAMJJASOND J FMAMJJA 1943 1944 1945 SOURCE'- 34 TH SCU MONTHLY STAT SUMMARIES

U S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION H FIGURE 20

44 5TH AF ASSIGNED AND OPERATIONAL FIGHTERS AIRCRAFT HOURS FLOWN

JAN 1943 AUG 1945

HOURS FLOWN

200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

SOURCE •• 34 TH SOU MONTHLY STAT SUMMARIES. U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION H FIGURE 21

45 5TH AF AIRCRAFT ATTRITION

NOV 1942 — AUG 1945 AIRCRAFT ISO 5TH AF TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED

SEPT 1942— AUG 1945

SONDjJFMAMJJASON JFMAMJJAS OND|jFMAMJJA| 1942 1943 1944 1945

SOURCE: AAF FORM* 34. U-S. STRATEGIC BOMSHC SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION n FIGURE CS

47 5TH AF DISEASE INCIDENCE COMPARED WITH BATTLE CASUALTIES

48 DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT COMBAT CLAIMS OF 5TH AF SEPT 1942 AUG 1945

AIRCRAFT IOOO

NOTE- THESE FIGURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM THE COMBAT RECORDS OF THE FIFTH AIR FORCE. NO OTHER ANALYSES OF DESTRUCTION ARE AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME FOR COMPARI- 900 — SON THE CLAIMS WERE MADE IN CONFORMITY WITH DIREC- TIVES FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION HAS BEEN USED IN ASSESING DESTRUC- TION OF AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND.

800

700

600 -

500

400

300

200

100

SONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA

1942 I 1943 1944 1945

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION m FIGURE 25

49 ENEMY SHIPPING DESTROYED COMBAT CLAIMS OF 5th AF SEPT 1942- AUG 1945

19! JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY LOW ALTITUDE RADAR BOMBING COMBAT CLAIMS OF 5TH AF OCT 1943— AUG 1945

THE INFORMATION SHOWING ENEMY SHIPPING SUNK IS PRESENTED AS A CLAIM COMPLIED FROM FIFTH AIR FORCE COMBAT RECORDS. THIS RECORD IS BASED ON FIFTH BOMBER COMMAND ANALYSES OF OPERATIONS, EX- TRACTS FROM AAF FORMS 34, AND OTHER INFORMATION, SUCH AS STRIKE PHOTOS, AS WAS AVAILABLE IN THE MIDST OF COM8AT. THE USSBS SURVEY OF SHIPPING SUNK IS NOT BROKEN DOWN BY INDIVIDUAL AIRFORCES AND DOES NOT INCLUDE SHIPS OF LESS THAN 500 TONS. THE ABOVE FIGURES CANNOT THEREFORE BE CHECKED AGAINST THEM. THE INDICATION IS HOWEVER, THAT FINAL ASSESSMENT BY JANAC WILL RESULT IN A REDUCT- ION IN THE ABOVE FIGURES. THE FIGURES INCLUDE CLASSIFIED SHIPPING OF LESS THAN 500 TONS BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE BARGES OR SIMILAR SMALL CRAFT.

LEGEND U.S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY V//A DAMAGED 5TH AF REPORT i'v-";l PROBABLE SUNK SECTION H SUNK FIGURE 27

51 DISTRIBUTION OF BOMB TONNAGE

Computation of the distribution of Fifth AF target tonnage was negligable. Accordingly Bomb tonnage, as furnished by the tabulating the tabulation section's computations have been section of USSBS, included 49,277 tons dropped adjusted on a relative percentage basis. The as "unidentified targets," so called because of over-all total remains the same. difficulty in extracting information from the The Fifth AF study revealed that the tabu- Forms 34. Unless personnel doing this work lated distribution between "napalm" and "other are thoroughly familiar with operations and incendiaries" required correction. Since the nomenclature of Pacific Island areas, classifica- Fifth AF had done considerable pioneering with tion by type of target is extremely difficult. napalm, From Forms 34 and other basic documents in particularly as a ground cooperation Japan, personnel of Fifth AF compiled a similar weapon, accurate records had been maintained tonnage distribution study. While total ton- as to amounts employed, again totals remain the nage figures differed slightly, "unidentified" same as in the Tabulation Section's reports.

52 5TH AF BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED AT PRINCIPAL TARGET SYSTEMS BY TYPE BOMB DROPPED SEPT 1942 — AUG 1945

TONS OF BOMBS 60,000

55,000

50,000

35,000

10,000

— TARGET SYSTEM —

US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION XL FIGURE 29

53

SECTION V FORTUNES OF WAR

55

:

EXAMPLES OF ACTION WITH INTER- One division could probably turn back the Allied THEATRE IMPORTANCE threat and certainly prevent an advance of the then available Allied ground forces. A large Bismarck Sea Battle augmented convoy generally estimated at 16 As has been previously shown, enemy Air ships was formed in the Rabaul area by the Forces and enemy shipping were the primary enemy and dispatched for Lae under cover of targets of Fifth AF. cloudy weather to effect this reinforcement. Japanese advance as planned and executed The first elements of this movement were picked was rapid and secure enough to maintain at all up by our reconnaissance at 1600 local time, 1 times protected sea routes, adequately covered March 1943. All available airplanes were by land-based air. During his offensive thrust alerted and the ships were under attack in in- this fact proved satisfactory to him. This creasing tempo and force, up to the climax of precluded the necessity of developing an air 3/4 March, when the enemy effort was de- transport system. His airplane production stroyed. A second convoy of six to eight ships could be concentrated on combat types in which may have followed the first. These convoys he anticipated a high rate of attrition. Thus, reached waters south of Vitiaz Straits and were surface transportation was the enemy's only there completely disrupted. The facts of the medium of invasion, supply, reinforcement, or naval-air action remain partially in doubt but evacuation on any appreciable scale. the result was clear—a strongly reinforced Destructive inroads on shipping had been naval convoy had been prevented from accomp- accomplished by high and medium level visual lishing its assigned mission of penetrating our bombardment by early 1943. Low clouds over air superiority to land troops at Lae. United water with the passage of the intertropical States Strategic Bombing Survey reports list weather front required low level attack to sink the following ships sunk ships. Torpedo attack was not feasible because Kyokusei Maru AK of the limited range of current torpedoes and Kokoku AK lack of sufficient available fighter strength to AK cover such operations. Oigawa Shinai AP To meet this problem constant experimenta- Taimei AP tion and training had been engaged in for Kenbu APAK months. The development of skip bombing or Teiyo APAK masthead height attack covered by maximum Maru Aiyo AC gun power strafing on approach seemed to be Shirayuki DD an adequate answer. Exhaustive rehearsals DD of coordinated skip bombing strikes were made Asashio DD in February 1943 and the weapon appeared Arushio Tokitsukaze DD adequate for its assigned task. This training was to be invaluable by its use in stopping Total 12 Japanese shipping in the Bismarck Sea. The Japanese position in British New Guinea No final assessment of damaged or probably was precarious early in 1943. He had been sunk has been completed. The remainder of driven from Papau. His troops in Lae- the two convoys never completed their mission. Salamaua-Huon Peninsula area were underfed This movement was covered heavily by and were badly in need of supplies and rein- Japanese naval air. It is difficult to make an forcement against the growing Allied offensive. accurate assessment of aircraft destruction be- To lose the Lae area meant the loss of control cause of the confined area of these operations of Vitiaz Straits and the seas off the Southeast in which so many sorties were flown. An esti- New Guinea coast. mate is that which is officially claimed by Fifth Previous attempts by the Japanese at rein- AF (and is believed to be a minimum) —60 forcement had resulted in the loss of portions enemy destroyed and 39 probably destroyed. of small convoys, but the cost had not proved The action demonstrated to the enemy the in- excessive and the need was considerably greater adequacy of his best air cover in the face of after the capture of Papua by Allied forces. American attack. 57 The attacking American force was composed vessels of small tonnage would follow adequate of: 66 B-25s, 22 A-20s ; 23 Beaufighters ; 85 B- supply with a minimum of tax on his merchant 17s; 11 B-24s; 72 P-38s and 57 P-40s. The shipping. Originally two and later four first cost was : 1 B-17 ; 1 B-25 ; 1 Beaufighter and class airdromes for basing his striking air 3 P-38s. forces were available in "Vunakanau", "La- The mission of Fifth AF as executed had a kunai", "Rapopo", and "Tobera." Rabaul was far reaching effect on the enemy. Japanese of major importance and exceeded Truk in in- reaction to the shock was apparent along his stallations. entire chain of command. Not until the Leyte Enemy Air Organization. In 1942 enemy air campaign, did he again attempt to reinforce operation in Southwest and South Pacific areas or supply in force a beleaguered battlefield in was under Japanese naval air command. This range of American medium bombardment. force had the best equipment and personnel in As a result, the enemy resigned his force in the Japanese Air Forces. British New Guinea to a delaying action. He (Japanese Army Air Forces at this time had later retired these forces by land, in stages, to the primary mission of offensive operations in the Wewak area, where they were isolated and Burma—China and defense of the Netherlands by-passed. Indies.) Attrition of Japanese Naval Air Force Rabaul as a Target. Rabaul provided the Japanese Offensive Plan. In the enemy's best available concentration of both primary offensive, his most determined thrust was targets of Fifth AF "air forces and shipping." through the Solomons toward New Calendonia Attack was begun on 23 February 1942 from and Fiji. Reasoning from the Japanese view- Port Moresby. Succeeding strikes were made point : Australia constituted the greatest threat on March 13, 18, 19, 20 and 31; April 8 and to his most sensitive area, Netherlands Indies- 10; April 21 and 23 (B-17) : May 4, 13, 14, 17, Philippines. Australia was weak, having air 24, 25, 28, 29 and 31. By the middle of May power of less than one hundred combat air- this target was attacked with regularity, at planes, insufficient shipping and small ground intervals corresponding to the time he required forces (some inexperienced American troops to rebuild his forces and to replace his losses. and Australian Militia constituting the prin- Stubborn adherence to a preconceived plan cipal troops). Without substantial reinforce- was clearly evident in many instances but no- ment Australia was impotent and could be where was this operational inflexibility more effectively neutralized by cutting communica- apparent than in the enemy's continuing to re- tion to the East, on which it was wholly depen- inforce Rabaul with new air units and a good dent. portion of that part of his airplane production If he could extend his lines to New Caledonia alloted to noval air forces. He permitted him- and Fiji quickly enough, this neutralization self to be bled of his resources by continuing would be completed. Adequate time would then to enrich a target that would obviously be be available to consolidate his own communica- repeatedly attacked by American air forces. tions, and his position would be admirable "for After a large portion of the air garrison had fighting his hundred years of war," for which been destroyed or rendered nonoperational by he had carefully prepared his people. Holding damage, a delay of a few days to a week would this position to the point of ultimate exhaustion insure the presence of new air units and/or air- of his enemies, he would finally accept a peace planes in strength. which would leave him in possession of the Japanese Morale. Discouragement of enemy desirables parts of Netherlands Indies—Borneo pilots, gunners and anti-aircraft crews was in- —Celebes—Philippines, which had all the as- creasingly keen because of their inability to sets necessary for empire, and he had won his destroy the B-17. Many captured diaries and war. later interrogation reports support the fact that Area of Operations. Geographically the Bis- this had a depressing effect on enemy morale. marcks area was well suited to this purpose. This same fact naturally reacted inversely as A fine harbor and facilities for a major supply a stimulant to American airmen. terminus existed at Rabaul. Trans-shipment in Neutralization. A climax to the effort of

58 neutralizing enemy Air at Rabaul occurred 2 "first team" into Rabaul and the Solomons November 1943. The Trobriand Islands had where it was destroyed by Fifth and U.S. Naval been occupied for the purpose of securing a base Air Forces cost the enemy the cream of his air within fighter-covered, strafer range of that force. Our 2 November strike was followed by target. Such a base was built on Kiriwina. a carrier strike on 5 November and South Heavy raids in October and a final strike 2 Pacific forces continued the neutralization of November by B-25s and P-38s, completely this target until it became a training ground surprised the enemy and resulted in such heavy for new pilots and air crews. destruction that it was obvious that Rabaul was Early in November Japanese naval air forces no longer a satisfactory base for any kind of in the Solomons and Bismarks were ordered to operations. retire in stages through the Mandates to the Effect on JNAF. It was not known early in Empire "for reorganization and refitting" and the war that it was Japanese policy to garrison the Theater Air Command went to Japanese his outer defense perimeter with his most Army air forces. capable units, nor that he would feed these units Results. Records of enemy destruction prior into the Rabaul-Solomons area. This was true, to September 1942 are not available, but from however, and the result was the sapping of the September 1942 to November 1943 inclusive striking capabilities of the whole Naval Air 1750 airplanes had been destroyed in aerial Force structure. combat and 613 on the ground by the Fifth AF, Concurrently with our Rabaul attacks Ameri- according to combat claims of that force. About can naval air forces were meeting and destroy- twelve hundred of these were Rabaul based, ing strong elements of these Japanese naval air some 500 of which were destroyed over our forces in the Solomons. The feeding of the New Guina bases

FLYING HOURS PILOTS EFFICIENCY •100% COMBAT 600 eooo .96.7% JAP NAVAL AIR FORCE DETERMINED FROM PILOT EXPERIENCE

soo 5000

400 4000

300 3000

£00 EOOO

100 1000

|0 j|F|M{*|M|j|j|A|s!0|N|D j|F|MlA|Mlj|jlA|3|0 N|p]jlF M|A|wl j|j|A|s 0lNlD|jiF|M|A|MUluH | | | | | | ' DK T*U» 4APR I NOV IMAK UUHC I MPT ISHAR ISAU*18 1942 1943 1944 1946 41

US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION It FIGURE 29 59 In the air blockade of Rebaul the Fifth AF ing with the beginning of Fifth AF operations estimates 373,000 tons of shipping had been from Dumpu, a decided increase in enemy sunk in the same period by our heavy and strength was found at Wewak. A repeat of the medium bombardment. October-November action against Rabaul was Fig. 29 illustrates the result of destruction accomplished at Wewak in 17, 18 August 1943. during this period, reducing the experience B—25 strafers effected surprise and caught a level of Japanese Naval Air Forces. Lowering large force in line on the four fields, some with morale was obviously even more radically fol- engines turning. The raid resulted in destroy- lowing a falling indicator line. ing most of the enemy on the ground, and Attrition of Japanese Army Air Force fighters destroyed most of those intercepting. Weivak a Primary Base. As Rabaul became These strikes were continued to a climax in a more and more hazardous supply base for the February 1944. Some of his best units were enemy, an alternative became a greater neces- broken here, and the resulting shock to the sity. Wewak was decided upon and enlarge- enemy was as apparent as at Rabaul. ment of its facilities was an enemy priority. After the capture of Lae-Nazab area in The harbor facilities were not adequate for September 1943, our advance up the Ramu large shipping but with Hansa Bay to the east Valley was quickly effected by air transport and it served for small ships and sea trucks. The supply. KAPIT and Dumpu were captured. enemy had lost in shipping and air forces at Near the latter, Gusap proved a good site for Rabaul to the extent that he abandoned the an advanced base from which fighter cover idea of evacuating his ground force there or could be provided for attacks on Wewak. even of supplying it. As in many isolated areas Neutralization of Hollandia. During Decem- in the theatre, the trapped forces were in- ber 1943 construction at Hollandia indicated formed that they must live off the land and the disposition of the Japanese to use that base could expect no assistance. as a supply terminal and reserve base for We- Wewak had four good airdromes, "But", wak. Humbolt Bay was a satisfactory anchor- "Dagua", "Boram" and "Wewak" and was age and the three existing airdromes were good, established on the narrow enemy line which was with dispersal at Aitape and Tami. As Wewak the north coast of New Guinea. The mountains became weakened, he strengthened Hollandia in the unexplored heart of New Guinea were in proportion. When air strength at Hollandia effective cover for his right flank. The sea to was built to large proportions, attacks were the north was an effective barrier on his left. begun. The same tactics were applied that had Marshalling of JAAF. As enemy naval succeeded at Wewak and Rabaul. Heavy air forces were weakened at Rabaul, Japanese bombers in strength raided these airdromes and Army air was advanced into New Guinea. on the last two day days of March, immediately Finally the Fourth Air Army Headquarters followed by strafer raids with fighter cover was located there. Heavy construction was April 1 to 6 inclusive, Hollandia as a base was apparent in May 1943 and B-24 raids were similarly destroyed. Destruction was even begun. Enemy interception was determined, more complete here than at Wewak. Technical and the construction continued. A dogged intelligence identified, by types from engines determination to strengthen and hold this base and fuselage plates, 340 enemy airplanes de- was apparent. The results of these initial stroyed on the ground at Hollandia alone. raids were heartening and many airplanes were Shortly after our occupation of Hollandia a being destroyed not only at Wewak but in the document was captured which was an order Madang-Alexishaven area. Reinforcement was from High Army Air Force Command relieving quick, however, and enemy total combat the Theatre Air Command with a reprimand strength was on a constant increase. *< for permitting "the destruction of Army air Neutralization of Wewak. The same enemy forces in New Guinea before they could engage reaction was being repeated here that was ap- in combat." This had been executed shortly parent in Rabaul. The enemy continued to after our last B-25 attack. Prisoner interroga- move new units and airplane replacements into tion indicated very few airplanes were able to Wewak as his forces were destroyed. Coincid- leave the area after these strikes. Pilots, air-

60 crews, engineering, and technical personal were pilot efficiency in Japanese Army Air Forces critically short at this time and many of their during this period. best were driven into the jungles from Hol- Reinforcement of Ormoc landia with no chance of evacuation. The effect After establishment of American forces on was immediate and lasting on the Japanese the east side of Leyte, the enemy became more AAF. They were disorganized to a point from and more determined to fight a decisive battle which they never recovered. Later attacks by for the Philippines, on that island. He held the Fifth AF on Halmaheras were met with prac- Ormoc corridor which had the best weather tically no resistence although his available air- at the season and tried desperately to reinforce plane strength was high. Ormoc for a counter attack. Our troops had Results. In addition to the destruction of entered the North section of the corridor, were enemy airplanes (Fifth AF combat records crossing the mountains, and were making a show destroyed in the 5 months ending April thrust to Bay Bay in the South. During this 1944, 595 in the air and at least 490 on the period the Fifth AF denied the Japanese the ground), this neutralization caused a greater power of supply, and destroyed much of his loss of air personnel, as the invasion of Hol- shipping and more than two divisions before landia was soon enough after this destruction they could be landed. Some of these movements to prevent the evacuation of pilots, air crew- of troops were from Luzon where he weakened men, maintenance and technical personnel. his local situation. An amphibious movement Isolation was complete and the air blockade of American forces finally sealed the corridor destroyed (the Fifth AF estimated) 232,000 and closed the campaign. tons of shipping from December 1943 to April By 28 October some reinforcement had been 1944, inclusive. accomplished by the Japanese. Opposition was Fig. 30 illustrates the actual reduction of not possible by United States air forces as

COMBAT EFFICIENCY -.. FLYING JAP ARMY AIR FORCE ~3 HOURS DETERMINED FROM PILOT EXPERIENCE

3000

d|j|f|m|a|m|j|j|a|s|o|n|d j|f|m|a|m|j|j|a|s|o|n|d j|f|m|a|m|j|j|a|s|o|n|o|j|f|m|a|m HZ] | |

i nov i i 7 dec' tain 4«m mar june i sept i? mir aAue « 1942 1943 ' «J 1944 ** ** **" 1945 «• 46

US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION H FIGURE SO

61 LEYTE CAMPAIGN MAP SAMAR

SAN ISIDRO

JAP REINFORCEM'T

BOHOL

U.S. FORCES U. S. STRATEGY BOMBIN6 SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT JAP FORCES SECTION H FIOURE 91

62 carrier forces had expended their maximum were enroute to Ormoc covered by the Fifth effort in defending themselves against air and AF. Their objective was to establish a beach surface attack 24, 25 and 26 October and head at Bay Bay to flank the enemy forces in Tacloban airdrome was not ready for land based the drive on Ormoc. At the same time enemy air. convoy No. 10 was on the way with reinforce- Following is a chronology of reinforcement ment for Ormoc. convoys and the claimed results of attack as During the day this entire convoy was sunk, analyzed from American intelligence sources: 70 enemy airplanes were shot down and our 1/3 November. 7 large merchant vessels, 4 forces were safely landed. destroyers, 2 destroyers escorts plus a number 12 December. 6 merchant vessels, 5 de- of barges and landing craft. stroyers or destroyer escorts. Two merchant vessels were sunk, several Five merchant vessels and 4 destroyers or others were damaged. This brought in the destroyer escorts were sunk. This convoy was Japanese 1st Division. headed for Palompon and was attacked by the 9/10 November. 3 to 4 merchant vessels and Fifth AF and its attached Marine Unit. It was 15 destroyers or destroyer escorts. the final effort of the enemy and on 26 Decem- Three merchant vessels and 15 destroyers or ber, GHQ announced the Leyte campaign closed. destroyer escorts were sunk by P-38s and B- Mopping-up operations lasted another 30 days, 25s from Morotai. (The B-25s landed at during which all remaining Japanese were de- Tacloban for fuel and returned to Morotai.) stroyed or captured. No evacuation of enemy A large part of this destruction occurred after forces was possible. unloading but most of the supplies and some The number of airplanes the Fifth AF had troops were destroyed on the beach. This was available at Leyte is tabulated below. Average the Japanese 26th Division. available 11 November. 4 merchant vessels, 5 de- daily 28 Oct-2 Nov 44 stroyers and 1 destroyer escort. 3 Nov-9 Nov 73 Four merchant vessels and 4 destroyers were 10 Nov-16 Nov 119 sunk by airplanes from the fast carrier force 17 Nov-23 Nov 118 lying outside the bad weather, which had 24 Nov-30 Nov Ill grounded Fifth AF. 1 Dec-7 Dec 175 14 November. 2 merchant vessels, 2 small 8 Dec-14 Dec 232 freighters and 6 destroyers. 15 Dec-21 Dec 286 This landing was unopposed. Fifth AF 22 Dec-25 Dec 342 grounded on account of weather. On the 17th cost of these operations to the enemy the enemy began to employ small shipping from The transport escort vessels, approxi- Cebu to effect further reinforcement. P-40 was: 50 and substantial amount and P-38 sweeps soon after terminated this mately 70,000 troops* and a supplies according to available effort. of destroyed States intelligence. (From Japanese 21 November. 1 merchant vessel (4,500 United least 32 transport and escort vessels tons), 6 to 8 small freighters, 1 submarine sources at result of the chaser. have been confirmed.) The actual of our position Three small freighters sunk. air blockade was the assurance in the Philippines. 24/25 7 merchant vessels with undetermined escort. * As previously stated, an unknown number of these troops got ashore, without equipment, at islands other than Leyte.

, Five destroyer merchant vessels and 1 escort Air Entry Into Japan sunk. On 15 August 1945, it was decided that im- 28/29 November. 12 merchant vessels and mediate advantage must be taken of the Japan- 3 destroyer escorts. ese surrender offer. Entry into Japan with The entire convoy was sunk. available forces was a gamble as a million enemy 7 December. 9 merchant vessels and 4 de- troops were in the Tokyo area. Should a stroyer escorts with strong air cover. change of heart induce resistance on their part At this time, American amphibious forces the results would be embarassihg.

63 :: :

This invasion had to be very rapid, for The operation began 29 August and was com- psychological as well as practical reasons. This pleted as planned on 13 September, except for meant air transport, and the task was divided continued resupply. into two phases. First Although planned on short notice, this was Move the 11th Airborne Division from Luzon among the most important air movements of to Okinawa, Second: the war in scope and importance. The rapid Garrison Tokyo with deployment and maintenance of armed forces a. 11th Airborne Division. by air had been a task indigenous to the Theater 6. Eighth Army Headquarters. since the Battle for Buna and the development c. Advanced G.H.Q. to its ultimate refinement was accompanied by d. Advanced F.E.A.F. plans for greater expansion. The next phase, e. 27th Division. should the need have arisen, was the transport /. Fifth AF Airdrome Operations. of complete air base units, and Army corps. g. Resupply. Garrison Kanoya with EXAMPLES OF ACTION WITH a. 127th Infantry. THEATRE IMPORTANCE b. 309th Bomb Wing. Cape Gloucester c. Air Freight Forwarding Units. d. 873rd Engineers. The capture of Lae in September 1943 gave e. 8th Service Squadron. us bases for the control of the waters of the

/. 5th Air Technical Intelligence Unit. southeast coast of New Guinea. The Japanese g. 188th A.A.C.A. had developed an intricate barge system of h. 1037th Signal Company. supply from New Britain to Umboi Island to i. 1062nd Quartermaster Company. New Guinea. In order to close this last effort j. 2812th Engineer Petroleum Company. and have complete control of Dampier and k. 307th Airdrome Squadron. Vitiaz Straits it was necessary to control

I. 153rd Weather Squadron. Western New Britain. Cape Gloucester air- As a supplement to the second phase, Ameri- drome seemed to be adequate to base fighters can prisoners of war were to be evacuated. It in support of troops and air barge-hunters. was a large task and planning time was short. Most of the Japanese strength was at Cape Fifth AF transport was augmented by 100 B- Gloucester proper, with sizeable units at Bor- 24s from the Fifth AF and the Thirteenth AF. gen Bay, El Bay and Rein Bay—all cognizant of The 11th Airborne Division, 11,300 personnel, our intentions. A landing was planned for plus impedimenta, were moved from Luzon to Borgen Bay and Tauili. Preparation for Okinawa in less than 72 hours in 651 plane invasion called for prolonged bombardment of loads. a large area in order to cover all enemy con- Phase Two was the greater problem calling centration and installations. for first, garrison Tokyo; second, garrison The date of landing was to be 26 December Kanoya; third, furnish continuous resupply at 1943 and preparatory air attacks were begun Atsugi Airdrome from Iwo Jima; and fourth, on 19 November, and continued 38 days to the evacuate prisoners to Luzon via Okinawa. One invasion. All installations were saturated. hundred sixty-four C-54s were loaned by Air Some 1845 sorties were flown and 3926 tons of Transport Command for the operation. They bombs were dropped in preinvasion strikes. were flown in 15 serials per day at the rate of The result was the elimination of resistance 7 planes per hour (around the clock) until against our assault and negligible retaliation completion of the mission. Interspersed in after our troops were established. Supplies and these schedules, 46 C-46s from Iwo Jima kept munitions destroyed Atsugi restocked fith fuel, rations and were were to the point that some ready if necessary to supply munitions. Ninety- troops charged our lines unarmed. The success five C-46s and C-47s supplied Kanoya. Fifty- of the ground troops and the limitation of six B-24s shuttled prisoners of war from casualties demonstrated the ability of prolonged Okinawa to Luzon. bombardment to nullify determined resistance.

64 65 Preparatory Strikes on Cape Gloucester Area [19 Nov - 25 Dec 43]

Number and type of A/C Number and weight of bombs Target A-20 B- B-26 B-24. 250 300 500 1,000 2.000

Barge sweep 59 22 Gloucester dumps 456 64 1 Cape Rauolt, A/A posns 2 1 Gloucester dumps 242 72 2 8 Barge sweep 26 15 Gloucester dumps 600 29 Borgen Bay area 216 14 Borgen Bay, Barge sweep 46 25 Borgen Bay area 164 35 do 257 29 Gloucester dumps 156 17 Gloucester dumps & A/A 130 25 do 177 Kokopo; barge sweep ... 16

6 Rein Bay to Iboki Ptn . . 41 24 do 170 10 Gloucester A/D & Rein Bay 66 15 Gloucester A/A posns 118 27 Gloucester dumps . . . 216 20 Dorf Pt. Area 146 24 Ulamaingi Village . . 191 24 Borgen Bay area . . . 143 6 do.... 36 18 Gloucester A/A posns 240 62 26 do... 312 96 27 Kokopo area 176 24 Borgen Bay area . . . 144 23 Cape Raoult-Rein Bay 152 27 Borgen Bay area . . . 189 1 Gloucester A/D 2

14 Gloucester dumps . . . 106 26 Borgen Bay area . . . 165 1 Gloucester bivouacs . 12 do....

Gloucester bivouacs . 2 do... 4

13 Gloucester dumps . . . 73 23 Gloucester A/D, etc. 23 19 do.... 144 18 Ulamaingi area 101 20 do. ... 136 10 Target Hill 45 6 Dorf Pt. area ' 36 22 Gloucester A/A posns 25 Gloucester A/D .... 198

33 12 Gloucester dumps . . . 264

24 . . Borgen Bay area . 162

20 Cape Hoskins A/D . . 160 17 do... 102 39 Gloucester A/D .... 274 36 Gloucester A/D, dumps 216 22 Gloucester dumps 174 24 Dorf Pt. area 172

25 Target Hill . 192 Sag Sag 31 12 Aisega 41

23 Silimati Pt. . 176 18 do 93

16 Gloucester A/D . 90 24 Borgen Bay area 176 25 Sag Sag 42 44 10 Ulamaingi 60

35 Gloucester A/D . . 378 18 19 ... do 192 24 24 Target Hill 80 32 Gloucester dumps 384 46 9 Borgen Bay area 82 43 122 18' Gloucester dumps 216 26 do 287

66 Preparatory Strikes on Cape Gloucester Area—Continued [19 Nov - 25 Dec 43]

Date Support Operation over Cape Gloucester, 26 December 1943 A. Bomber Operations

Number CORREGIDOR U.S. PLAN OF OPERATIONS

CAPE CORREGIDOR

ROCK PT.

MORRISON PT.

MAUNTA HILL 8 TUNNEL

US. PARA" DROP AREA. U.S. AMPHIBIOUS LANDING. • JAPANESE GUN POSITION

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

5TH A.F. REPORT

SECTION U FIGURE 33

69 side of the island. Passing at 300 feet no enemy sistance had ceased on 23 February. "Mopping activity was noted. At this time one battalion up" had taken another 13 days. of infantry departed Marivales for San Jose The final result was that 4,560 American Bay in 35 Army LCMs. Immediately after C- troops had captured the fortress from nearly 47s of the first two flights began the paradrop, 6000 Japanese. Our casualties were 210 killed the men being jumped in "sticks of eight." and 985 wounded or injured in action. Naval Wind had arisen to 12 knots so the jump casualties were 34 killed, 109 wounded and 7 line was changed at the last minute and the missing, with unreported casualties from 3 altitude was lowered to 500 feet above the ter- LCLs destroyed in night attacks by enemy rain. On the first drop mission 51 C-47s re- suicide "Q" boats. leased 1,021 paratroops, one support aircraft The wounded were evacuated by Navy LST's party officer, and two joint assault signal com- to Subic Bay and thence flown to base hospitals munications officers. Some 151 parabundles of by Troop Carrier evacuation units. supplies were dropped at this time. These From 16 February to 3 March P-47s ana transports departed at 0932 after making 174 P-51s flew 407 sorties against ground targets passes over the drop zones with 92.5 percent of in requested support missions. In this effort troops and supplies landing in the designated they dropped 466 x 500 pound bombs, 55,500 areas. Twelve Fighters and 34 A-20's were in gallons of Napalm and fired 320,000 rounds of the air for call on ground support missions. .50 caliber ammunition into the targets. Four fighters were in the air continuously Two Navy destroyers were on station until during daylight hours for called support mis- 27 February for requested support gunfire. sions. Thereafter one destroyer was on station. At 0930 preinvasion bombardment of the All Fifth AF, naval and ground forces ac- amphibious landing areas was begun by Naval complished their tasks in a superior manner. Units, and at 1028 the amphibious landing was Commanders of these forces had a high degree made by one battalion. Naval fire control and of mutual confidence in each other and this support air officers accompanied this force. operation is a fine example of balanced forces. At 1230 51 C-47s dropped 979 paratroopers Loads : In 189 sorties C-47s lifted 2,908 para- and 159 supply bundles in the landing areas. troops and 243,450 pounds of supplies for a Wind had arisen to 16/18 knots but 92.7 percent total lift of 855,900 pounds. Full fuel loads of the troops and supplies landed in the drop were carried in order to save the time for re- areas. These C-47s were over the target until fueling between missions and to insure suf- 1400 ; and made 170 passes. The situation hav- ficient endurance in the event of a forced post- ing been reported in hand, the remaining 889 ponement of the drop. paratroopers were put in by amphibious craft Troop carriers lost no airplanes or personnel. as their jump was considered an unnecessary Twenty-six airplanes were holed by ground fire risk due to the high wind and the small drop and 6 personnel wounded. areas. (The available drop areas were quite No fighters or bombers were lost in the opera- restricted, the only suitable places being the tion. old parade ground and golf course. One zone was 1500 x 750 feet, the other 1500 x 250 feet.) Extension of Aircraft Range Two hundred and three paratroops were in- Although an increase of fire power on strafer jured in the drop and 19 killed or missing. airplanes had given us a strong weapon against The following morning 197 supply bundles the enemy air strips, ground installations and were dropped, 95/98 percent landing in the drop shipping, the range of these airplanes was still zones. On the afternoon of February 17th C- too limited. As Allied air strikes became more 47s dropped 785 supply bundles and packs from effective, the enemy pulled his forward bases 1410 to 1630. These airplanes made 191 single back beyond what he considered the range of passes at the target and again accuracy was our longest weapons. This counter measure in excellent as 95/98 percent were recoverable. turn required that the Fifth AF either ; 1. Ex- Fighters were constantly in the air during day- tend the range of its weapons; or 2. establish light, on call for support missions until all re- new forward bases. Since the latter was not 70 always possible, due to the lack of amphibious terials and had to be accomplished before the lift, the former or the constant drive to extend arrival of new equipment to the theatre. The aircraft range was given even greater impetus. burden fell on the depots for field modification. From a very early period in the war, all divi- As they were not organized to accomplish this sions of air planning were devoted to this type of work, it greatly handicapped normal problem. Increased range afforded the element maintenance. Long range forces were obvi- of surprise and could catch the enemy when ously never large as it was impossible to effect and where he felt secure. these modifications on a scale which would Additional gasoline tanks, installed on the equip a major part of the Air Force at any one B-25s eventually gave them a radius of 720 to time. Results were effective, however, and this 750 nautical miles. Fighter range was ex- rapid adjustment of weapons to the enemy and tended to over 700 nautical miles, heavy bomber the geography was of enormous significance in formations flew missions of 860 to 1,020 nau- Fifth AF operations. tical miles, and night bomber and reconnais- Outstanding examples of exploitation of this sance continually flew 14 and 16 hour missions. increased reach were (a) fighter escort to heavy It became possible at selected intervals to pro- raids on Balikpapan from Noemfoor and Moro- vide fighter escorted strikes at distances great tai, (b) fighter cover for B-24s to Singapore enough to penetrate the zones where the enemy from Palawan and (c) fighter cover for ship- felt secure from such attacks. These changes ping strikes to the Indo China coast from required the use of available Australian ma- Luzon.

71

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL FACTORS OF IMPORTANCE

73

—

GROUND SUPPORT improve fighters in their close support roles In all its phases, ground support was greatly except to improvise bomb racks in early models. stressed in the Southwest Pacific Area. Enemy Bombs and Fuses defenders killed and installations destroyed in- The early standard bombs and fuses would sured our ground troops against heavy losses. not lend themselves to employment of the low To quote General Whitehead, "The objective in altitude tactics, standard in the Southwest war is to kill the enemy and destroy his equip- Pacific. To meet the requirements for low alti- ment." The Fifth AF followed out the objec- tude attacks many special bomb and fuse modi- tive throughout this war. All types of air- fications were accomplished. planes were used to accomplish this end. When The fire bomb early established itself as a the general situation permitted attack-bombers primary weapon against the Jap. The to obtain surprise, these airplanes carrying magnesium incendiary did not meet require- para-frags or para-demos, in addition to their ments so other bombs were improvised locally. great strafing power, were by far the most The first improvised fire bomb attacks were effective weapon for the destruction of any accomplished by dropping belly tanks, partially target on land or sea. An indication of the filled with gasoline, which broke on impact effectiveness of support aviation in the South- spraying the surrounding area, and then by fir- west Pacifice Area is apparent in the low ing into the impact area with incendiary bullets casualty figures on each of the invasion opera- and igniting the gasoline. The disadvantage of tions from Cape Gloucester to the Philippines. the second pass to ignite the gasoline was over- Aircraft come by attaching a magnesium bomb to the The first essential factor in the development tank which burst into flames and ignited the of ground support was aircraft adaptability. gasoline on impact. Further development pro- In the early phases of the Southwest Pacific the duced an impact fuse that screwed into the gas available United States airplanes did not de- tank in place of the normal cover. The next velop their full potential of forward fire power, improvisation in fire bombs was made by filling nor were they equipped to carry the various practice bombs first with gasoline and later types of bombs that were available. The first with gasoline mixtures that burst on impact type to be developed primarily to carry out low scattering a flame of gasoline, oil and rubber altitude missions was the A-20. Its four .30 over wide areas. This type of bomb later be- cal. forward guns were replaced by four .50 came standard with the development of the cal. forward guns and special racks were fabri- various Napalm types used against Japan. cated to handle fragmentation bomb. Later Napalm became a primary weapon in close factory models of the A-20 were equipped with support in the Southwest Pacific as soon as it the special gun nose and frag racks. became available in quantity late in the war. Early models of the B-25 were equipped with In the Ipo Dam area, west of Manila, the Japan- a single flexible .30 cal. gun in the nose. Ex- ese were holed up in five strongholds embracing perimentation in the Third Bomb Group re- almost a square mile of area. Five fighter sulted in the installation of eight fixed forward groups delivered a total of 646 sorties dropping guns. The gun nose B-25 was later made a 200,000 gallons of Napalm to enable our ground standard production model in home factories. troops to walk, standing up, into the enemy The A-26 with its gun nose and fixed wing guns strong points where weeks of probing prior to was the ultimate in forward fire for low altitude the fire bomb attacks had failed to show a soft work. The B-25 equipped with 75 mm cannon spot. was tried in the Fifth AF in 1943 and 1944. The dispersal effect of small 23 lb. frag- However, the cannon was discarded in favor of mentation bombs against jungle targets was additional .50 cal's high cyclic rate, during the early recognized. The added advantage of rapid closure with the target in low altitude small para-frags with delay fall for low alti- attacks. tude attack made the fragmentation bombs high Heavy forward fire power in fighters was priority for procurement in the Pacific. Short- early developed as standard in the United age of standard para-frags led to the develop- States. Little modification was attempted to ment of the 100 lb. para-frag bomb utilizing

75 the standard para-frag chute attached to a Cape Gloucester and Corregidor are examples standard 100 lb. demolition bomb. Attempts of Fifth AF invasion preparations. Cape Glou- to use large bombs with parachutes attached cester was defended over a wide area and the were unsuccessful because of strain that the prepared defenses of Corregidor were the chute fabric was incapable of withstanding. strongest in the Pacific. Negligible ground A precision delay action fuse development losses were suffered in either operation. was utilized against the Japanese in a most At a selected date prior to the landing the demoralizing manner in the jungle behind Sala- enemy avenues of approach to the landing areas maua. The fuse was time set to be dropped were interdicted to prevent any reinforcements from a fixed altitude for an explosion from 25 gaining the beachhead area. The interdiction to 50 ft above ground. Even though there was of the enemy lines of communication in Luzon a high margin of failures the effect of the num- was an excellent example of planned isolation ber that worked was found most gratifying by of beachhead areas. the Australian land forces. To insure that all enemy opposition was The development of standard bombs and beaten down prior to the final amphibious as- fuses kept up with theater demands once the sault, the timing of H-Hour was usually so fixed requirements were fixed and except for short- to allow coordinated low altitude attacks at the ages in special types the over-all supply kept beachheads, with additional aircraft on air alert up with theater requisitions. over the landing for call at any time of day on Tactics requested support. Ground commanders are The shortage of specialized aircraft due to sincere in their praise for the Fifth AF beach- the relative priority of the Pacific war forced head preparation. Although our troops came the development of tactics to permit all types ashore ready for action, almost 80 separate of aircraft to carry out any required mission. landings in the Southwest Pacific Theater were The coordinated attack utilized medium or accomplished with comparatively negligible high altitude bombers initially to beat down losses. anti-aircraft and thus to cover the approach of The dive bomber was not considered an eco- strafers which were assigned pin point targets. nomical weapon by the Fifth AF and was This proved most effective. Further develop- early discarded for the fighter-bomber, which ment of coordinating low altitude attack, with was also a low-altitude strafer and skip-bomber. leading units assigned to neutralize enemy de- It proved to be an all-purpose weapon. Moun- fenses and to screen following units attacking tainous terrain in New Guinea and the Philip- primary targets made this method a favored pines often dictated dive bomb tactics while means of attack against the Japanese. attacks on pinpoint close support targets desig- Amphibious landings in the Southwest Pacific nated by support air parties were normally required the early development of a technique dive bombed. This technique was developed to for beach head neutralization. Ground sup- the extent that our own ground troops in some port for our troops was commenced long before cases called for and received effective attacks an invasion started in the isolation of the land- within 100 yards of their forward positions. ing area, neutralizing enemy air forces in range High altitude bombing was infrequently but of the invasion area and preventing reinforce- effectively used, against strong area targets re- ment. Attack on the enemy garrison was al- quiring neutralization. High and medium alti- ways heavy enough to enable our troops to land tude attacks were used against specialized and secure the beachhead before being attacked. targets but only after detailed briefing of par- Initially on a new operation, photos of selected ticipating crews. beachheads were searched and prepared de- Communications fenses pin-pointed. Once the targets to be The requirement for greatest speed in receiv- knocked out had been selected and analyzed ing the calls for close support by combat air sufficient bomb tonnage was put into the target units was obvious. During the Buna campaign to destroy the defenses. This preparation was the ground requests were forwarded over Army timed to "D-Day" so that the enemy could not command nets which was cumbersome. To in- improve his defensive position. sure adequate description of targets in the close

76 AIR DIRECTION NET FOR GROUND SUPPORT

GROUND FORCE FRONT 77777777777777777777777777777777777" support requests, pilots from combat units were strength of available airplanes did not permit sent into the front line to act as observers and complete and regular coverage of all possible to assist in preparing requests. In addition danger areas. Reconnaissance was shifted on ground force personnel were detailed to air a day-to-day basis to cover those areas which combat units to brief and explain the ground seemed, from current intelligence and trends of situation to the pilots. As communication equip- enemy action, to be the most sensitive (Figure men became available the support net was es- 35). tablished apart from the command nets and the Heavy bomber reconnaissance operating from Support Air Party came into being. These Townsville in May 1942 first reported the posi- SAPs consisted of officers experienced in close tion of a Japanese fleet movement into the Coral support work and communications personnel Sea. Insufficient airplane strength prevented assigned to assault units for the operation. The the Air Forces from keeping the force under SAP stayed constantly with the forward ele- constant surveillance as well as attack, there- ments of the ground units, calling for and fore, contact was temporarily abandoned during directing air units in their delivery of close periods of preparation for attack. Contact, support missions. however, was never completely lost until the Communications equipment was developed enemy forces had retired beyond our heavy from the heavy transmitters and receivers bomber range. available early in the war to the mobile radio With the establishment of heavy bomber jeep equipped for air-ground and point to point bases on the north coast of New Guinea, the work in the moving stages of the war. The limit of the reconnaissance range of our forces development of strong compact shock proof was extended over the Bismarck Sea and into equipment, moisture proofed to withstand jun- the Pacific Ocean north of the Admiralties and gle rains and fungus growths, made the effec- New Guinea. Increased strength now permit- tiveness of the support air parties possible. ted a more comprehensive search plan to be developed and more regular coverage to be RECONNAISSANCE accomplished. In the advance of our forces along the New The pattern of establishing a coordinated Guinea-Philippine-Japan axis, the reconnais- reconnaissance coverage was a pai't of all oper- sance provided by the air forces was of ines- ational planning. In intertheater planning con- timable value. Faced and flanked by a vast sea sideration was always given to the relation of area impossible to cover by surface or subma- the air reconnaissance of each theater, and rine reconnaissance, it was necessary to expand adjustments were made to insure complete and tremendous effort in aerial reconnaissance. The regular coverage of sea areas. Fifth AF long range reconnaissance was co- Alert reconnaissance picked up a convoy mov- ordinated with that of the Central Pacific forces ing in the Bismarck Sea on 1 March 1943 and on the right flank, and the Australian air forces contact with this convoy was never lost until on the left. Covering the central position of an the convoy was destroyed in the battle of the actively dangerous area, constant vigilance had Bismarck Sea. to be kept over all avenues of approach within Discovery of the movement of an enemy con- range. voy along the New Guinea coast resulted in the Concurrently with the sea reconnaissance, complete destruction of the convoy of 5 ships whose primary purpose was to detect, report on 19 March 1944. Regular sightings, by day and attack enemy shipping, Fifth AF recon- and night, of enemy surface and submarine naissance provided the current information on movements along the coast of New Ireland, New enemy airdromes and air strength, photographs Britain, and New Guinea into and out of Rabaul of enemy positions, as well as mapping pho- and in the Bismarck Sea resulted in regular tography. sinkings of Japanese shipping until shipping no Initially, limited and intermittent reconnais- longer moved in this area. Standard operating sance from Australia and Moresby bases cov- procedure provided for reports to be passed ered the Coral and Solomon seas as well as the immediately to naval commands whose subma- immediate approaches to Australia. Low rines used this information most effectively.

78 SCHEMATIC SEARCH AREAS MAY 1942

AREAS COVERED EyVyl INTERMITTENTLY ROUTES COVERED INTERMITTENTLY

CVBOUOAINVILLE

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT (SECTION II) FIGURE 38

79 'fc.

DAILY SEARCH AREAS JULY 1943 PvavI AREAS COVERED ESS3 BY DAILY SEARCH ROUTES COVERED BY DAILY SEARCH

U.S.STRATEGIC BOMB.SURVEY

5th AF REPORT SECTION H FIGURE 36

80 EAST V v.e CHINA SEA / .r

'. /FORMOS (

DAILY SEARCH AREAS JULY 1944 MARIANAS IS. Areas covered ^Philippines tyVyj by daily search

TRUKIS. ; (MP>

N E ISLANDS

US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

5th AF REPORT SECTION n FIGURE 37

81 .

By successive advances the reconnaissance located and this information passed immedi- coverage was extended to the Philippines. Day ately to the South Pacific Forces. and night search airplanes of the Fifth AF, Development of radar search techniques dur- assisted by Catalinas of the RAAF and Ven- ing late 1942 and early 1943 expanded the effec- turas and United States Navy B-24s, ranged tiveness of air search. Security which darkness the Pacific Ocean areas within 800 miles of our and bad weather formerly afforded enemy ship- bases, the Halmaheras, Celebes, and NEI. By ping moves was no longer provided. Regular 15 September 1944 the eastern and southern night searches now supplemented day searches aproaches to the Philippines were covered and whose coverage now extended through areas of searches extended into the South China Sea, restricted visibility. In October 1943 the as- mapping and target photography missions were signment to the Fifth AF of a unit especially being flown, weather reconnaissance was pene- equipped for radar blind bombing from low trating tropical fronts to obtain Philippine altitudes as well as radar search added an of- weather data, and radar bombers were search- fensive feature to the normally defensive and ing out and destroying enemy shipping in har- intelligence function of reconnaissance. The bors and in open waters. air scout was now able to attack and destroy as well as report and shadow. The Fifth AF com- By April 1945, with long range airplanes bat records indicate that this squadron alone based in Luzon, the Fifth AF was penetrating accounted for 361,425 tons of enemy shipping the East China Sea and overlapping in the sunk during the war. searches from Central Pacific bases. Pacific the DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE Throughout the war, weather reconnaissance Up to the end of May 1942, Intelligence per- provided the only information available beyond sonnel were few and equipment was scarce in the limited range of forward weather observers. the Southwest Pacific Area. The most reliable This was of vital importance when it is con- sources of information were "Central Bureau" sidered that weather was one of the greatest and "Coast Watcher Service." factors affecting the operation and the security The latter consisted of reporters placed in of our forces. the Solomons, New Britain, New Ireland and vital informa- Special reccos to obtain special the Huon Gulf area of New Guinea. Personnel success. tion were employed with outstanding for this service were selected by expedience Pacific Forces Prior to the landing of the South from unevacuated soldiers, traders, planters, con- at Empress Augusta Bay, the enemy had and bushmen in those areas. Gradually new centrated a large air force in the Bismarcks; men were found with intimate knowledge of regular the buildup at Rabaul was observed in these and/or other enemy occupied areas, and suddenly it reconnaissance of that area—then put in such places to strengthen the chain and was noted that the strength of that base was replace casualties. Equipment was primitive depleted to a marked degree. The disappearance and not very mobile, being mostly "pedal" air force was of a major portion of the enemy radios, (the generator operating like a bicycle) reconnaissance cause for alarm and a special This fact caused some loss of personnel and of Bougainville was ordered to determine if considerable delay in the transmission of re- Allied ad- that area, the objective of the next ports, but the service was useful, in the evacua- buildup. vance, had enjoyed a corresponding tion of airmen shot down in those areas, as well The significance of such a move is readily as for much needed information. apparent. Central Bureau was, as in other theatres, a A B-17 was ordered from Milne Bay to recon- low order intercept service, that is, a service noiter the Bougainville area and to bring back capable of cryptanalysis of combat operational the information on its air strength at all cost. codes and their interception. Personnel was The mission was completed in the face of inter- entirely British, as there were no qualified lin- ception by 20-40 enemy fighters and after a guists or cryptanalysts to be found among running fight which lasted nearly an hour. The American forces. airplane was shot up badly and all the crew Technical Intelligence began with the em- wounded or killed—but the enemy force was ployment of several highly qualified civilians.

82 83 -&£fadL2L

DAILY SEARCH AREAS JULY 1945

AREAS COVERED BY 5TH AF PHILIPPINES K»»l DAILY SEARCH.

_ AREAS COVERED ** y[ | BY OTHER THAN 5TH AF.

uastrstesi© eoMBirra survey

5th AF REPORT SECTION IE FIGURE 39

84 Among these was one for instance, who had pines and diverted to Australia early in 1942. been loaned by France to Japan to assist them All available Australian and Dutch transport in building- their airplane industry. airplanes were added. Soon after several addi- By June 1942, all units were partially staffed tional squadrons were formed, and on 13 March with intelligence personnel composed mostly of 1943 the 54th Troop Carrier Wing was formed, grounded airmen. Headquarters used all avail- with its accompanying Combat Cargo, Air able men including malarial personnel who Freight Forwarding, Medical Air Evacuation, could not return to combat zones, but who did and Servicing Units. not desire evacuation to the States. A small It was obvious early in the war that the bur- photographic unit was functioning, and a pri- den on air transport would be heavy because of soner of war and interrogation section had the lack of roads, railroads, shipping and har- been formed for air intelligence. bor facilities in the entire area in which the war Documents at this time were collected must be fought. In March 1942 the first through coast watchers, using trustworthy squadron (having 14 different types of air- natives. of Battle functioning well Order was planes) , was called on to move the entire 102nd by the end of June, assisted largely by the cap- Coast Artillery (AA) and its accompanying ture of a Japanese Army Register from a equipment from Brisbane to Darwin, a distance crashed bomber, and securing the unit code of of 1800 miles. In May it flew troops and sup- both Army and Navy air forces. plies to Wau and Bulolo. Reinforcements Interrogation of natives was always unsatis- and supplies were carried to Kokoda and factory because of their natural exaggeration these troops were supplied by air during the and desire to please. campaign. Four thousand fully equipped men By March 1943, intelligence was completely of the 32nd Division were flown from Australia organized in Radio Intelligence; Enemy Appre- to the Buna area and supplied by air until its

; In- ciation ; Technical Information Objective capture by Allied Forces. By the end of 1943 formation and Target analysis; Relief Maps; four squadrons had carried to the front lines Geological and Geophysical analysis; Aircraft more than 20,000 tons with a loss of 15 air- production; and Photographic Units. Opera- planes. tional intelligence units were in all squadrons, Early in 1944, a division of Australian troops groups, commands and other headquarters. was flown into the Ramu valley and completely The principal difficulty of intelligence in supplied by air during their entire campaign. Southwest Pacific arose from a lack of existing During this period airdromes were constructed basic Substantially all Dutch information. at Dumpu and Gusap and all the accompanying records on Netherlands Indies had been either transport was accomplished by Troop Carriers. destroyed or lost in the evacuation of Java. No No road was ever built from Nadzab to the area, of the areas avail- maps of most combat were and bombs, fuel, parts and supplies were all able, and these had to be developed from our carried by air during our operations from these photographic coverage. With limited fa- own strips. The lift into the Ramu Valley averaged cilities of photo reconnaissance, it imposed a more than six hundred and sixty tons per day. strain on combat photography. Water tables From 29 April constant operations were and other geological information had to be de- carried on to Hollandia. This effort was neces- rived largely from photographic interpretation. sary so early because of the difficulties of build- This information had been compiled in detail ing the road from Humbolt Bay to Lake Sen- for the coverage of the Philippines, but even tani, leaving normal supply for ground forces here, the records were destroyed at the enemy on crowded beaches, with no means of moving invasion. them. No vital area was covered by existing back- The task of moving men and equipment, and ground information. maintaining them in the early stages of suc- TROOP CARRIER OPERATIONS ceeding campaigns, continued in the occupation The first Troop Carrier Squadron in the of Wakde, Sarmi, Biak, Noemfoor, Sansapor, Southwest Pacific Area was formed from three Morotai, and thence to the Philippines. transport airplanes consigned to the Philip- In the Luzon campaign, a number of para-

85 TROOP CARRIER OPERATIONS 5TH AIR FORCE

TON MILES, MILLIONS ' CARGO TONS TRP LOADS I4 r35,000i 17,000

13

THIS GRAPH ILLUSTRATES THE CONTINUED USE OF 12 30,000 TROOP CARRIERS TO CAPACITY TO THE END OF THE WAR.

10 -25,000

-20,000

-I 5,000

4 -1 0,000

N D FMAMJJASOND FMAMJ JASOND J F M A M J 1942 1943 1944 1945 KOKODA TO DOBODURA AND RAMU VALLEY- |HOLLANDIA-WAKDE LEYTE- LUZON BUNA ADVANCE ON LAF FINSCHHAFEN -ADMIRALTY BIAK-MOROTAI MINDORO

CARGO TONS U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

TRIP LOADS 5TH AF REPORT SECTION H TON MILES FIGURE 40

86 troop operations were executed in addition to defense against enemy bombardment was to supply of guerilla forces in addition to the nor- seek out his aircraft on their bases and destroy mal demands. Air transport was accomplished them on the ground. In the preparation of for G.H.Q., F.E.A.F., Thirteenth AF and Sixth every campaign our fighters and our light and Army as well as our own needs. medium bombardment concentrated on this of- June 16th, 1945 began air transport opera- fensive role as the best means of air defense. tions to Okinawa. The air invasion of Japan The operations in the Southwest Theatre in- was commenced on August 30th. By 13 Sep- volved a series of amphibious operations and tember two infantry divisions with base troops mobility at the expense of heavy equipment. and service units, Eighth Army Hq, advanced The development of highly mobile and portable echelons of G.H.Q., F.E.A.F., and Fifth AF had radar equipment capable of being transported been flown in. Seventeen thousand American by air to new operations, enabled us to set up prisoners of war had been evacuated. local air warning nets rapidly which were rea- Figure 40 indicates in blue, cargo tonnage sonably adequate for perimeter air defense carried; in red, trip loads; and in black, ton from a ground alert status. Jungles and moun- miles flown by Fifth AF Troop Carriers during tains provided, in nearly every instance, the course of the war. screened approaches for the enemy forces. In- AIR DEFENSE IN SWPA versely the advantage was with us on offensive operations. Using practically all our resources Area and base air defense in the Southwest in offensive warfare, we were able to force upon Pacific Theater faced entirely different prob- the enemy such attrition of his aircraft as to lems than it did in the European Theater. Sta- prevent him from mounting any serious bom- tionary air warning facilities of long range bardment threat to the areas we defended. could seldom be installed until campaigns were While in the later phases of the war the enemy well along toward their completion, because of established a threat through Kamikaze attacks the difficulties of transportation and supply mounted in small scale efforts, he was not able inherent in the terrain. Trained in air defense after 12 April 1943 to establish a bomber of- systems developed by Great Britain for the de- fense against our ports, airdromes or other fense of the British Isles, the Fifth AF was vital installations. forced to modify radically both methods of em- ployment and types of equipment when we first WEATHER SERVICE encountered the Japanese Air Force in northern In the early phases of the war weather fav- Australia and New Guinea. ored the enemy. The general movement was In April 1942 we had a toe hold at Port south and he was in command of the territory Moresby on the south shore of New Guinea. over which it moved toward our forces. He The almost impassable Owen Stanley Moun- had a highly developed weather service and tains at our north effectively shielded approach- widely dispersed reporting stations. He aug- ing aircraft from early detection by such radar mented this net with weather reporting sub- equipment as we were able to install in the re- marines in Allied territory. To cover his stricted area held by us. Dispersion of air operations he thus had the use of rapidly bases to reduce concentration of aircraft was formed local frontal formations as well as well impossible and we therefore found ourselves defined conditions moving over larger areas. peculiarly vulnerable to air attacks. This put The 15th Weather Squadron serving the us at an extreme disadvantage as to adequate Fifth AF and SWPA ground forces worked early warning to insure air interception prior under the limitations of few stations and, ex- to the enemy's arrival at the bomb release line. cepting spasmodic reporting by guerilla sta- The enemy was able effectively to raid Port tions in the Philippines, no regular coverage Moresby, Wau, Marilinan, and Gusap because from any part of enemy territory other than of these difficulties. Thus we find the initial that reported by our aerial reconnaissance. factors of terrain affording the enemy screened Some assistance was later given by Central approach to our bases, inadequate early warn- Bureau interception of Japanese reports from ing and a shortage of fighters. These factors Rabaul and Truk, and in later phases the Jap developed the theory that our most effective home islands.

87 a WESTERN PACIFIC WEATHER REPORTING STATIONS

• STATIONS REPORTING REGULARLY

A STATIONS REPORTING IRREGULARLY

PHILIPPINES • SAIPAN 0GUAM

PALAWAN, y*"% •YAP I.

0PALAU IS. vTRUKB. ,PONAPE

CAROL! N E SLA N OS

.ASIA L fMAPIA I. .GREENWICH I

EMIRAU ADMIRALTYJS. •

* Bmm v> ***•» -.'.•• ^J i^AN | MBAR $

TIMOR £0 SEA CORAL

SEA

U S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

5lh A F REPORT SECTION n FIGURE 41 88 In our advance from Port Moresby in the operation, air force organizations were grouped southern hemisphere through equatorial and under Air Task Force Headquarters, organized northern tropical zones to north temperate provisionally. areas of Okinawa and Japan, demands were The communications requirements of each air heavy for long range forecasting to cover ad- task force called for a relatively large communi- vance planning. It became necessary to develop cations installation at headquarters to provide a means of forecasting tropical weather, and service to subordinate units ' in the area, to satisfactory advance was made through experi- higher (air force) headquarters, to adjacent air ence and research. The number of abortive task forces and (for liaison purposes) to missions decreased constantly as our advance ground force and naval sea and air organiza- progressed. They amounted to only 7 percent tions and installations. during the Leyte Campaign. Communications personnel and equipment on Communications difficulties were ever pres- the basis of the then existing tables of organiza- ent. Much data was lost by their inadequacy tion and equipment proved unsuitable and ut- and delays prevented receipt of reports for terly inadequate to the requirements of this many hours. An outstanding example occurred form of organization. The time element did not during the Leyte campaign when the Fifth AF permit completion of action for formal reorgan- could not adequately serve one of its attached ization of units, and equipment of required bombing units on Palau because it operated types and in adequate quantity was not avail- under Navy communications. able in theater stocks. Improvisation was re- Weather reconnaissance was flown regularly sorted to by stripping from squadrons and over large parts of enemy controlled territory groups, and from signal service organizations, and water areas from which no other means of all communications personnel and equipment reporting was possible. As rapidly as possible except the bare minimum required for internal trained weather personnel were put into the unit operations, and pooling them in a provi- Philippines and served with guerilla stations. sional communications organization operating Outlying stations were advanced wherever pos- at Air Task Force Headquarters. This organi- sible and those existing at the invasion of Leyte zation was later formalized in a wing (air task are indicated. force) signal company, based on the team For the remedy of coordination difficulties, organization provided for in T/0 11-500, and after the merging of areas of responsibility on a bomber communications squadron (also based the approach to Japan, all AAF weather serv- on T/0 11-500), which provided an air ground ices were centralized by reporting directly to communications section for each air task force. Chief of Weather Service in Washington. The two units served the Air Task Force total- COMMUNICATIONS AND AIRCRAFT ing approximately 225 to 300 officers and en- WARNING listed men, depending upon team composition Command Communications which was based on Task Force mission. Until the Luzon Campaign our operations in Reserve teams were held at Air Force Head- the SWPA were characterized by a series of quarters for attachment as needed. airborne and amphibious shore-to-shore and Owing to the distances spanning air forces island-to-island landings which in effect con- installations and the fact that wire could not, stituted wide envelopments of enemy held ter- in the majority of cases, be installed, depend- ritory. Terrain secured in each operation was ence had to be placed on radio. Manually op- usually limited in area to that required for erated radio circuits with associated crypto- development of an air and land base, and was graphic systems were found utterly unsuited to separated from other similar air and land bases the requirements of air force operations where by wide expanses of mountainous jungle, enemy speed with accuracy in the dispatch of opera- held territory, or sea. tional messages was of paramount importance. Early in the New Guinea Campaign it became This was particuarly true in those instances evident that air force organization had to be where Air Task Force Headquarters and Air patterned to the peculiar requirements of these Force Headquarters were from 100 to 500 miles "stepping stone" operations. Hence, for each apart. In an effort to circumvent this defici- 89 :

ency, several difficult wire construction projects bulk and weight of equipment which consisted through mountainous jungle terrain were chiefly of the mobile SCR-270 and SCR-268 undertaken, the outstanding one of which was types. No road nets existed and such stations the two wire carrier system between Port were established by virtually carving sites out Moresby and Dobodura, which spanned the of the jungle and muscling equipment into jungle thicknesses of the Owen Stanley range. place. Due to the impossibility of moving such This project was executed jointly by the Fifth equipment any great distance after an amphibi- AF and the Royal Australian Corps of Signals. ous landing, many radar sites represented com- Within the last year, preceding V-J Day, and promises which were anything but ideal from particularly after V-E Day, an increasing the standpoint of exploiting the fulll capabili- amount of relief was obtained through receipt ties of the equipment. in the theater of VHF radio equipment and of The Royal Australian Air Force had devel- radio teletype equipment including automatic oped a light weight radar set (LW/AW) cap- cryptographic devices. able of complete dismantling and manual pack- Aircraft Warning ing which in the absence of suitable United States equipment was adopted and procured in The same considerations of terrain and dis- some quantity our forces. This set tance that influenced the organization of com- by own proved a boon in reinforcing the early warning mand communications in the Fifth AF had a screen established with our own heavy equip- definite bearing on operation and organization ment by permitting establishment of stations of aircraft warning and air defense. Radar in terrain and in locations inaccessible to the for early warning and fighter and anti-aircraft mobile equipment. control had to be dispersed on the basis of a Until the acquisition of modern FM type perimeter for each air base area with continuity radio equipment later in the war, the efficiency of early warning along coastal areas provided of aircraft warning from radar stations to con- for only after terrain between bases could be trol centers was impaired by the manually wrested from the enemy or from the jungle operated high frequency radio telegraph cir- itself. cuits which had to be utilized for reporting To provide for adequate early warning, radar purposes. Furthermore, equipment available stations frequently had to be located outside the for this purpose was unsuited to installation perimeter established by our own ground forces. and operation at remote and isolated locations This was particularly true in operations along in the tropical jungle owing to conditions of the north coast of New Guinea where rugged moisture and excessive humidity the difficulty terrain screened line of sight radiation from of supplying fuel and oil and the bulk of the early warning radar sets established within a equipment itself. defense perimeter and unprotected approach corridors behind terrain screens had to be LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE AIR FORCE closed by locating additional early warning Any description of the logistic support of the radar sets at sites outside the perimeter. The Fifth AF units in the Southwest Pacific must outstanding example of this problem was en- necessarily be divided into two phases; Phase countered in protection of airdrome areas in 1 : 1942 to April 1944, defense action and at- the Markham Valley (Lae, Nadzab, Gusap) tainment of local air superiority ; Phase 2 early in the campaign while the Japs held the Beginning in April 1944, offensive action made Huon Peninsula. The latter presented a solid possible by general control of the air in a given bulwark of mountains to radar and permitted area. the Japs to approach along the north shore and During the first phase, combat units operated through valleys defiladed from our own radar from the same area for relatively long periods, with the result that the first warning of enemy making possible a conventional system of sup- raids was the explosion of his bombs. ply. A large air depot at Townsville, Australia, Until light weight air-transportable and beyond enemy' bomber range, carried large pack-radar equipment was made available much stocks and supplied a 30-day operating level for later in the war, great difficulty was experi- the forward units. Our problem of distribu- enced in the establishment of radar due to the tion within the theater was minor as compared

90 ]5. APPROXIMATE 1 RADAR EARLY WARNING AREAS ESTABLISHED BY 5th AIR FORCE <$w? AND USE BY FIGHTERS IN BASE DEFENSE

SOUTH MARIANAS IS

'SAIMM

'GUAM CHINA

- . •" vTRUKIS, CAROLINE ISLANDS

. ..GREENWICH I,

lNEW IRELAND

91 :

to that of obtaining a sufficient quantity of sup- bat units and capable of implementing the plies from the United States. Therefore, during supply, overhaul, repair, and modification re- this period, because of higher priority else- quirements of the combat commanders. where, critical shortages in all classes of supply Phase 2 of the logistic effort began in April existed in the Southwest Pacific. It was here 1944. Rapid moves forward required every that a well-organized service effort immediately type of service to be mobile, including depots. backing up the combat units first proved its Australian bases were too far distant to be worth. In conjunction with Australian indus- used. Direct line of supply from the United try, it was possible to establish facilities for States began at BIAK. Supply levels were cut overhaul and repair of major components and down, sometimes as low as 5 days in fuel and to manufacture critical parts and equipment, fifteen days in technical supplies. The basic and thereby be self-sufficient to a limited logistic problem covered everything from short- extent. age of supplies to the distribution of them. By reason of our lack of experience in tropi- On our side, a flow of replacement airplanes cal wars, the Southwest Pacific had to act as a and other supplies from the United States was guinea pig for battle-testing airplanes and other accelerated. The airplanes, for the most part, combat equipment. As would be expected, mal- incorporated desired armament modification, functioning developed in much of our equip- and as a result, the functions of the Service ment and immediately corrective action was Command for repair, overhaul, and modifica- necessary to prevent loss of airplanes, lowering tions on a large scale ceased to exist. We were of combat crew morale, and otherwise seriously now ready to make long and rapid movements affecting combat operations. Here again the forward, the success of which depended entirely service effort effected necessary corrective upon our ability to provide logistic support. measures in the field. These measures in the The logistic success of amphibious operations form of changes were later incorporated into against Hollandia, Morotai, Leyte, Mindoro and the production line when such change could be Lingayen was contingent on the landing facili- included without affecting production quantity. ties for cargo-type aircraft at the earliest Perhaps the major accomplishment of the moment, and in no case later than D plus 5. In service effort during Phase 1 was modification short, Air Force mobility became the key word in armament of combat airplanes, thereby and logistic support the solution. adapting them to the peculiarities of the South- As applied to the Air Force, logistic support west Pacific air war. Installation of fixed nose evolved itself into the ability to accomplish the guns on the A-20 and B-25, increasing fuel following capacity of the B-25, nose turret installation on 1. The availability of supplies in the objec- the B-24, and design and manufacture of belly tive area in sufficient quantity and so packaged tank for the P-47 revolutionized air tactics to permit easy handling and identification. against the Jap. A-20 and B-25 airplanes, 2. Means for transporting supplies to the ob- incorporating the nose gun installation, were jective area at the proper time for support of first used in the battle of the Bismarck Sea, and the operation. by March 1944 the remainder of the modifica- 3. The availability of facilities for handling tions were in general use. supplies, including ports, roads, and airdromes. In summarizing, it can be said that the suc- 4. The immediate availability of replacement cessful competion of Phase 1 of our air war equipment for combat units in the objective against the Jap was possible because of superior area. combat personnel, employment of superior tac- Air corps technical supplies were made avail- tics, and use of superior equipment. These able to the assault units in convenient combat tactics were made possible through theater packups and were resupplied by a combination modification of basic equipment and the ability of air and water shipment. All items constitut- of maintaining this equipment in constant op- ing the combat packup were readily trans- erational readiness. Neither of these factors portable by all cargo-type aircraft. In the early would have been possible except for a theater phase of each operation, petroleum products service effort immediately backing up the com- were flown in by air but utilization of aviation 92 ^us^ CHINA GENERAL PROGRESS OKINAWA OF :^\ • AIR DEPOT GROUPS WFORMM OF ' FAR EAST AIR SERVICE COMMAND \ -.1942 - 1945

\ MARIANAS 1S< PHILIPPINES \ iYTE\ \

D • W V C A R \l . N t ISLAM \

BRISBANE

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY SC&LE M HUNDREDS OS.

10 12 3 4 5 6 5th AF REPORT STATUTE MILES SECTION TT FIGURE 43

93 gas barges usually provided bulk gas by D was heavily defended and would be expensive. plus 5. Manokwari was heavily garrisoned and had a The establishment of air depots at Finsc- complex system of defenses. Asia-Mapia had hafen, Biak, Leyte, and Manila provided the fine sites for airdromes and ample coral for means for repair, replacement of airplanes, and easy construction but outside the large inner air corps technical supplies at points immedi- lagoons, dangerous reef structure would have ately in the rear of the combat area. It was held shipping off some three-quarters of a mile possible, therefore, to make available initial air from supply beaches. Construction of piers resupply as it became necessary. Replacement would have been prohibitive even if the equipment was processed and placed in combat materials and engineering had been available readiness at these depots and made available by air. Asia-Mapia could have been supplied, for immediate delivery. In the later stages of however. By this time the Fifth AF had the campaign, supply barges and a number of proven its ability to build bases, and maintain small cargo vessels were made available to the large air and ground garrisons entirely by air. Service Command, greatly enhancing air force It had been done at Gusap, Wanagela, Dobodura mobility. and Marilinan, and Asia presented no greater It can be said generally that internal supply difficulties except that there was no suitable of the Fifth AF was never a serious handcap to area for C-47s to make their original landing operations. The occasions when shortage of with engineering equipment and personnel. supply ran dangerously close to curtailing oper- General Kenney believed he could do the job ations must be accepted as a standard hazard with C-47s on floats and requested them for the of Pacific operations. The success of the logis- purpose. They were not available as those in tical support given provides proof that the air the United States had been previously assigned force can operate effectively in undeveloped to other theaters. tropical country. The inner lagoon at Asia, as in so many other Potential Accomplishment With Specialized Equip- places, offered a great expanse of quiet, pro- ment tected water, ample for landing such an air- The structure of the multitudinous coral plane with a heavy load. atolls in the south and west Pacific makes many We had cut 6x6 trucks and heavy equipment of them particularly adaptable to airdrome in two and loaded them in C-47s and welded construction. Seldom, however, is one found them together at remote unloading points, and that can be supplied by shipping in the quantity could easily have done the same here. and speed needed. Coral reef structure fre- Neither of these islands had any defense as quently constitutes an effective barrier, hold- they were of no value to the enemy. Asia had ing even the smallest ship many hundreds of a small weather reporting station of some half yards from a supply shore. The same reef dozen Japanese. Had the specialized logistic prohibits the use of many sites along the main equipment (C-47s on floats in this instance) land masses, but in the atolls there is usually been supplied, Biak need never have been cap- a large inner lagoon. tured, thus saving a great cost of ground In our reach from Hollandia to the west there forces, time and supply. were five points under consideration for pos- Asia is but one example. Many similar atolls sible capture in the "air steps" toward the are to be found along the entire line of SWPA Philippines. These were (1) Asia-Mapia Is- advance. Had it been possible to have exploited lands, (2) Wakde Island, (3) Biak, (4) Noem- this flexibility of air force, our progress could foor and (5) Manokwari. Wakde and Noem- have been more rapid and considerably more foor were known to be lightly defended. Biak economical.

94 5TH AF REPORT SECTION n FIGURE 44

95

SECTION VII CHRONOLOGY

97

— SIGNIFICANT DATES FAR EAST AIR FORCE ALLIED AIR FORCES SWPA FIFTH AIR FORCE FAR EAST AIR FORCES

Philippine Campaign, 8 December 1941 7 B-17s bomb Davao in first American 7 May 1942* raid from NEI bases. 8 December 10 January (Phil. Time) —Japanese aircraft destroy Jap landings at Tarakan in Borneo and approximately half of the Far East Air Menado in Celebes, using paratroopers. Force at Clark and Iba fields. Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell arrives in 10 December Java to assume command of the ABDA Japanese landings at Aparri and Vigan (American, British, Dutch, Australian) opposed by 10 B-17s, escorted by a few Area. Generals Brett and Brereton are P-40s and P-35s. Lt. Samuel H. Mar- later assigned to his staff, and General rett, pursuit squadron commander, and Barnes resumes command of USAFIA. Capt. Colin P. Kelly are lost in this 16 January action. 5 Java-based B-17s, staging through 16/20 December Palembang in Sumatra, bomb Soengi 14 B-17s are evacuated to Australia. Batani airfield on the Malayan penin- 21 December sula. The Japanese land at Lingayen Gulf. 17 January 2 Januaxy 1942 3 LB-30s and 2 B-17s score hits on air- Japanese occupy Manila. fields and shipping near Menado, 2 LB- 17 March 30s and 1 B-17 lost. General MacArthur reaches Australia. 20/24 January 1942 11 April Jap convoy in Strait of Makassar at- Bataan Forces surrender to the Jap- tacked by Allied planes and naval forces. anese. 24/25 January 11/14 April First American P—40s arrive in Java, 14 General Royce leads a force of 3 B-17s planes of the 17th Pursuit Squadron and 10 B-25s on a mission from Aus- (Provisional). tralia to the Philippines. The planes, 23/26 January staging through Del Monte, bombed air- Kendari in Celebes occupied by Jap- fields and shipping at Luzon, Cebu, and anese. Mindanao. 25 January 6 May Balikpapan is occupied by the Japanese. Corregidor surrenders. 30 January East Indies Campaign, December 1941—March 1942 Landings on Ambon and other nearby 16 December 1941 Dutch islands. Japs land at Luton in Sarawak. 9/13 February 19 December Makassar in Celebes and Bandjermasin Organization of United States Forces in in Borneo occupied. Australia under Brig. Gen. Julian F. 10 February Barnes. The first A-24 [of the 91st Squadron, 24/29 December 27th Bombardment Group (L)] arrives Japs land near Kuching, and after spora- in Java.

dic fighting, capture it. 14/17 February 29 December 1941 Palembang in Sumatra is occupied with to 1 January 1942 aid of paratroopers. 19 February * On 7 December, Maj. Gen. L. H. Brereton was in command of the Far East Air Force. A total of 12 B-17s and 3 LB-30s score

99 hits on Jap cruisers and destroyers near 8 March Bali. First American dive bomber mis- Japanese land at Salamaua and Lae. sion in the NEI against same targets 10 March results in claimed sinking of a cruiser Two U. S. carrier groups execute coor- and a transport. Approximately 150 dinated attack upon Jap shipping at Lae carrier and land-based aircraft attack and Salamaua. The following are Darwin for its first and probably heavi- claimed sunk: 5 APs or AKs, 2 CAs, 1 est raid of the war. In addition to dam- CL, 1 DD. B-17s follow up the attack age to buildings, and air and harbor in- with undetermined results. Japs land stallations, 9 P-40s were destroyed in at Finschafen. the air, 6 Hudsons, 2 P-40s, and 1 LB- 12 March 30 on the ground. 5/10 enemy aircraft American forces land in New Caledonia. were shot down. 6/7 Allied ships were 18 April sunk, and 8 badly damaged. Allied command under General Mac- 20 February 1942 Arthur has been established in Aus- Japanese forces, including paratroopers, tralia. land on Timor. 20 April Brett is announced as com- 25 February General Air Forces. ABDA Command dissolved. mander of the Allied 27 April 26/28 February The United States Army Air Services is Allied Naval defeat in the Java Sea. established under Maj. Gen. Rush B. 27 February Lincoln as a part of the Allied Air Seaplane tender Langley en route to Forces. Java is sunk by Japanese planes. 32 P- 30 April 40s on board are lost. A Japanese patrol reaches Alexishafen. 28 February 4/7 May First Japanese landings on Java. Battle of the Coral Sea. Some B-17s, 3/4 March B-25s, and B-26s participate. 5 B-17s and 3 LB-30s evacuate as many 16 May as possible of remaining American per- Trial of gasoline bombs at Lae. sonnel to Broome, Australia. 31 May 3 March Sydney is attacked by midget subma- raid on Broome, 2 B-17s, 2 Severe Jap rines. B-24s, and 2 Hudsons destroyed. The Papuan Campaign, 20 July 1942—23 Defense of Australia, January to July 1942 January 1943 20 January 1942 20 July 1942 More than 100 Jap carrier-based bomb- GHQ SWPA is closed at Melbourne and ers and fighters bomb Rabaul in New opened at Brisbane. Britain. 21/22 July 23 January B-17s, B-26s, and B-25s supported by Rabaul occupied. fighters attack a Japanese convoy land- 24 January ing troops at Buna and Gona. Kavieng in New Ireland taken by the 4 August Japanese. Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney succeeds 8 February 1942 General Brett as commander of the Gasmata in New Britain occupied by the Allied Air Forces. Japanese. 7 August 23 February 13 B-17s carry out an effective raid on 4 of 9 B-17s reach Rabaul to carry out Rabaul in coordination with the marine first AAF attack on that Jap base. Re- landing upon Guadalcanal. 7 Zeros and sults were unobserved. 1 B-17 are shot down. Probably 50 Jap-

100 anese aircraft are destroyed on the riers to Wanigela and to other points ground. across the Owen-Stanleys. 25 August 11 November The Japanese land troops at Milne Bay. Organization of the V Fighter Com- 12 P-400s strafe Buna airdrome leaving mand. This organization had been approximately 12 aircraft burning on referred to as the V Fighter Command the ground. (Prov.) since 2 October 1942. 3 September 17 November Fifth AF is constituted and General B-24s are used for the first time against Kenney named its commander. V Rabaul. Decision has been previously Bomber Command reconstituted. made to replace all B-17s by B-24s. 10 September 21/22 November The Japanese have been completely de- Dobodura strip ready for use by troop feated at Milne Bay. carrier planes. 12 September 9 December 9 A-20s escorted by P-400s drop para- Australians capture Gona. frags on Buna air strip. This is the first 14 December use of this type bomb in the SWPA. Americans occupy Buna. Support of ground forces is begun in 27 December weight. 12 P-38s attack 20/30 enemy fighters in 14 September 1942 the Buna-Gona area and shoot down 9 The Japs reach Ioribaiwa Ridge less fighters and 2 dive bombers. 1 P—38 is than 30 miles from Port Moresby. lost. This is the first significant combat 27 September engagement of the P-38 in the SWPA. The Air Service Command, Fifth AF is 5 January 1943 established. 6 B-17s and 6 B-24s strike Rabaul ship- 28 September ping. Hits scored on about 10 ships, 1 The Japanese are outflanked at Iora- broke in two, 6 others burning, 3 enemy baiwa Ridge. fighters shot down. 2 B-17s, one carry- 5 October ing Brig. Gen. Kenneth Walker, V Australian infantry battalion is trans- Bomber Commander, are lost. ported by Allied planes to Wanigela Mis- 6/9 January 1943 sion on the north side of the Owen- B-17s, B-24s, B-25s, escorted by P-38s Stanley range. attack a Japanese convoy which succeeds in Lae. least 2 9 October landing troops at At Following an incendiary attack by transports are sunk and more than 60 RAAF PBY's, 30 B-17s drop more than aircraft destroyed. 10 Allied planes are 54 tons of instantaneous and delay de- lost. molition bombs on Rabaul. While this 22/23 January target had been continually attacked this Allied victory in the Papuan Campaign was the largest bombing attack on that is declared complete. objective to date. Operations During the Northeast New Guinea Phase, 23 October 29 January 1943—19 March 1944 11 B-17s attack Rabaul probably sinking 29/30 January 1943 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, and 2 merchant 122 transport planes ferry in reinforce- vessels. In this mission skip bombing ments, munitions, and supplies to be- was first employed in combat in the sieged Australians at Wau. SWPA. This raid was followed by con- 30/31 January tinuous attack on this target. Japanese at Wau defeated and driven 879 November back. 2 regiments of the American 32d Divi- 6 February sion are transported by Allied troop car- 11 P-39s, 8 P-40s, 5 P-400s, and 22 P-

101 38s shoot down 24 enemy aircraft over Makassar in Celebes and drop 38 tons of Wau. 3 P-40s are damaged. bombs on docks and shipping. This is 14 February the largest number of heavy bombers 30 B-17s and 4 B-24s drop approxi- used in a single raid in the Darwin Area mately 50 tons of demos and almost 4,000 to date. incendiaries upon Rabaul. 100-lb. wire- 30 June wrapped bombs are also used. This is Allied forces land at Nassau Bay, on the largest bombing raid to date in the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, and on SWPA. Rendova, Vangunu, and New Georgia. 1/4 March 14 July 1943 Allied air victory in the Battle of the The first P—47s arrive at Port Moresby Bismarck Sea results in sealing off the from Brisbane. Huon Gulf from Jap convoys and proves 22 July the effectiveness of the modified B-25 First Australian-based raid is carried strafer in mast-head attack. out against Soerabaja, a 2,400-mile trip 5 March by 6 B-24s. Activation of the Buna Air Task Force 27 July at Dobodura, later known as the First 25 B-25s and 18 B-24s drop 133 tons of Air Task Force. 49th Fighter Group bombs on Salamaua, probably the heavi- of the established here by the middle est attack on that area to date. month. 5 August 13 March Activation of Second Air Task Force. Headquarters and Headquarters Squad- First units proceed to Tsili Tsili. ron, 54th Troop Carrier Wing is acti- 9 August vated. 33 B-24s and 7 B-17s drop 140 tons on 3 April 1943 Salamaua. Elements of the 162d Regiment land at Morobe harbor, 75 miles from Salamaua. 13 August 37 B-24s, 13 B-17s, and 9 B-26s break 1/4 April for the theater Attack on Jap convoy in Kavieng area bombing record by drop- ping tons the area. 9 results in severe damage to a number of 175 on Salamaua 2,200-mile round trip destroyers and a MV, and claimed sink- B-24s make the to Balikpapan and drop 11 ings of 2 cruisers. from Darwin tons of 12 April bombs. 106th Japanese raid against Port Mores- 17 August by is carried out by 45 bombers and 12 B-17s, 36 B-24s, 32 B-25s and 85 approximately 60 escorting fighters. At P—38s make a coordinated attack on the least 3 B-25s and 1 Beaufighter on the four Wewak airdromes (Boram, But,

ground are damaged beyond repair, Dagua, and Wewak) . 3 heavy bombers others are damaged. 22 enemy planes are lost. are shot down. 2 P-39s are lost. 18 August 2 May 9 B-17s, 17 B-24s, 53 B-25s and 74 21 Bettys escorted by 25/30 Zekes and P-38s attack Wewak. 3 B-25s and 2 Oscars carry out Darwin raid no. 54. 5 P-38s are lost. Damage on the ground enemy fighters and 1 bomber are shot from the two-day raid is heavy, and down. 13 intercepting Spitfires are probably most of the 200 planes previ- either shot down or crash because of ously reported on the Wewak dromes fuel shortage. have been either badly damaged or de- 20 June stroyed. Follow-up strikes continue. Work is begun on Tsili Tsili airdrome. 1 September 1943 23 June 33 B-24s and 43 B-25s carry out the 17 B-24s make a 2,000-mile flight to heaviest bombing raid to date in the

102 SWPA, dropping 201 tons of bombs on 15 October 1943 the Alexishafen-Madang area. 59 P-38s and 8 P-40s intercept a large 4 September force of Japanese bombers and fighters After preliminary bombardment of near- over Oro Bay and shoot down 27 Vals by bases and softening up of landing and 20 Japanese fighters. 1 P-38 is lost. beaches, Allied forces land near Lae. 20/21 October 5 September First units of the Third Air Task Force With bombardment and fighter support, are flown to Gusap. 78 C-47s drop paratroopers of the 503d 2 November Paratroop Regiment at Nadzab. More than 80 B-25s and approximately 7 September the same number of P-38s strike at Troop Carrier planes land at Nadzab. shipping in Simpson harbor, Rabaul. 68 13 September enemy aircraft are shot down. At least Salamaua is captured. 1 destroyer, 5 merchant vessels, a mine- 16 September craft, and a tug are claimed as sunk. 10 Lae is captured. B-25s and 10 P-38s are lost. This at- 19 September tack was coordinated with the South The 7th Australian Division moving Pacific landing on Bougainville. through the Ramu valley, principally by 25 November troop carriers, capture Kaiapit. The Australians capture Sattelberg. 22 September 19 November to First units of the Second Air Task Force 25 December arrive at Nadzab. V Bomber Command and First Air Task 24 September 1943 Force carries out 1,845 sorties and drops The organization of the Third Air Task 3,926 tons of bombs on Cape Gloucester Force is announced at Port Moresby. and northern New Britain in prepara- 27 September tion for landing on Cape Gloucester. 17 B-24s, 90 to 100 B-25s, 121 Allied 13/14 December 1943 fighters attack Wewak airfields and har- All types of Fifth AF bombers carry out bor and drop more than 160 tons of almost 300 sorties and drop approxi- bombs. This is the climax of regular mately 700 tons of bombs along the neutralization strikes. southern New Britain coast. 1 October 15 December First troop carrier plane lands at Gusap Elements of the Sixth Army land at in the Ramu valley. Arawe. 2 October 17 December Finschafen is cleared of the enemy. American fighters begin operating from 10 October Finschafen. 12/13 B-24Ds equipped with blind- 26 December bombing (LAB) equipment are assigned B-24s, B-25s, and A-20s carry out 242 to the 63d Bombardment Squadron of sorties and drop more than 422 tons of the 43d Group. bombs on Cape Gloucester area. First 12 October Marine Division lands. The Fifth AF begins final stages of 30 December Rabaul offensive. 63 B-24s, 107 B-25s, Cape Gloucester airfield falls to the and 106 P-38s hit airdromes and ship- Marines. ping and drop more than 300 tons of 2 January 1944 bombs. 26 Japanese aircraft are shot After preliminary bombing and strafing down, and perhaps 100 are destroyed on by Fifth AF, elements of the 32d Divi- the ground. Numerous small vessels and sion land at Saidor. at least 1 DD and 1 MV are sunk. 4 9 January B-24s and 1 B-25 are lost. The IV and V Air Service Area Com-

103 . .

mands are officially organized at Port Netherlands, New Guinea, 30 March—17 Moresby and Townsville respectively. August 1944 14 January 30 March thru Australians capture Sio. 16 April 1944 22 January Fifth AF carries out 993 bomber and 572 Air neutralization of the Admiralties be- fighter sorties against Hollandia, drop- gins. ping 1,832 tons of bombs. Japanese air I February strength in this area decimated. First, Second, and Third Air Task 11 April Forces become respectively the 308th Organization of 13th Air Task Force. and 309th Bombardment Wings (H) and 18 April the 310th Bombardment Wing (M) 21 B-24s of the 13th Air Task Force 3 February 1944 from Momote hit Woliai. 58 B-24s, 62 B-25s, escorted by 16 P- 22 April amphibious forces land Aitape, 38s, 33 P-47s, and 17 P-40s drop 200 Allied at Bays. tons of bombs and nearly 1,000 para- Humboldt, and Halmahera April frags and parafrag clusters on the We- 24 Tadji. Australians enter wak dromes. 43 enemy aircraft claimed C-47s land at destroyed on the ground and 15 in the Madang. 25 April air. Wewak as a target is destroyed. Hollandia air strips occupied. 15 February 26 April American troops land on Green Island. Australians enter Alexishafen. 15/16 February 28 April Two groups of medium bombers together 46 B-24s bomb Biak without fighter with B-24s and PBYs sink many ships cover. Continuous follow-up of this in a 17-ship convoy near New Hanover. strike made until invasion. This is the last attempt to reinforce April Rabaul against the air blockade. Arrival of 86th Air Defense Wing. 91st 29 February Photo Reconnaissance Wing replaces The 5th Cavalry Regiment lands on Los 5212th Photo Wing Reconnaissance (P) Negros Island, and captures Momote air 11 May 1944 strip. 45 B-24s of the 13th Air Task Force hit 24/25 February Truk. The 85th Air Defense Wing arrives in 17 May the SWPA and proceeds to Gusap. Elements of Sixth Army esablish beach- 4 March head at Arara on mainland opposite First important attack on Hollandia is Wakde supported by 6 B-24s, 38 B-25s, carried out by 22 B-24s. and 15 P-40s. II 19 March 18 May Fifth Air Force bombers (B-24s, B-25s, Landing on Wakde. and A-20s) drop 1,588.92 tons of bombs 27 May on the Wewak area. The Japanese Planes from Fifth AF bases made Army Air Service is forced to withdraw their first reconnaissance of the Philip- to Hollandia. pines. Landing on Biak by U. S. forces 19 March 1944 after 15 days of aerial bombardment by A Japanese convoy of 2 transports a the 13th Air Task Force and the Fifth lugger, a barge, and 3 corvettes succeeds AF. in landing reinforcements at Wewak. 7 June But on its return journey, it is attacked Mokmer drome captured. by 40 B-24s and 62 B-25s, and all ships 8 June are destroyed. 10 B-25s of the 17th Reconnaissance

104 Squadron claim the sinking of 4 DDs in The Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines a convoy consisting of 2 CLs and 5 DDs. During this period bombers from both the 3 B-25s are lost. Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces were involved 9 June in the missions listed. 22d Bombardment Group makes first 23 August 1944 landbased daylight strike against a Galela airfields are attacked by approxi- Palau airdrome. mately 60 B-24s which drop 130 tons of 15 June demolition bombs. P-38s, operating at Australian troops occupy Hansa Bay. what was probably the greatest distance Formation of Far East Air Forces from their base in the history of this (Prov.) under General Kenney to in- theater, accompanied the bombers, be- clude the Fifth AF under Lieut. General ginning a continuous neutralization of Whitehead, and the Thirteenth AF under Halmerheras. Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett. Formation 3 September of Far East Air Service Command. Approximately 60 B-24s hit Langoan 20 June 1944 airfield south of Menado in first large Sorido and Borokoe airdromes seized. scale raid on northeastern Celebes. 21 June 15 September Planes of 375th Troop Carrier Group MacArthur's forces, coordinated with land at Owi. the Third Amphibious Forces attack on 23 June Palau, land on the southwest coast of The A-26 makes its operational debut in Morotai island. the SWPA with a barge sweep south of 15 September Manokwari. Decision made to proceed direct to Leyte. 2 July 30 September Allied troops land at Noemfoor. 70 B-24s are dispatched to attack Balik-

3/4 July papen : More than 50 bomb the Pandan- Troop carriers from Hollandia drop sari refinery and the town area, 10 to 2,424 paratroopers on Kamiri drome, 12 the oil tanks at Semoi, and the others Noemfoor. the airfield at Paloe in central Celebes. 6 July More than 110 tons of bombs are RAAF P-40s land at Kamiri. dropped. 4 B-24s are missing, and 7 27 July enemy fighters are shot down. Fifth AF fighters make first flight over 10 October 1944 Halmahera. 125 B-24s attack Balikpapen and drop 30/31 July 160 tons of bombs which virtually de- plants. U. S. troops seize the coastal area at molish the cracking and paraffin Cape Sansapor and Cape Opmarai on the For the first time fighters escort bombers northwest coast of Netherlands New to this target, flying 1,670 miles from Guinea. Amsterdam and Middleburg bases in Morotai. 3 American bombers Islands off Cape Opmari also occupied and 1 fighter are missing; approximately during the day. 55 enemy aircraft are shot down. 5 August 20 October land A small number of B-24s bomb Sasa air- A strong force of American troops field northeast of Davao on Mindanao. on Leyte island in the Philippines. These attacks increase in intensity dur- 22 October ing the month. Headquarters of an advance echelon. 17 August 1944 Fifth AF, arrives on Leyte. Supported by air and naval forces, 27 October Allied troops land at Wardo beach on 34 P-38s of the 49th Fighter Group land Biak and in the Cape Goodehoope area on at Leyte. AAF relieves ANF of the air the Vogelkopf peninsula. defense of Leyte. 105 28 October 19 December Second enemy ORMOC convoy. Fifth AF fighters begin operating from 1/3 November 1944 San Jose air strip on Mindoro. Convoy #3 attempting to reinforce OR- 26 December MOC is attacked by B-24s and fighters. GHQ announces end of all organized 2 ships are claimed sunk. Japanese resistance on Leyte. Japanese 9/10 November naval task force shells San Jose in Min- Convoy #4 is attacked by B-25s and doro and is attacked by B-25s, P-38s, fighters. 2/3 ships and 5/7 escort ves- and P-47s. sels (including DDs) are sunk. 1 January 1945 11 November Fifth AF A-20s and P-51s escorted by destroy 19 small freighters In convoy #5, Navy claims the Third P-47s enemy Fleet sank 4 ships and 2 DD sunk. in Palaniz Bay (West Coast of Luzon). 14 November 3/5 January American troops occupy Marinduque is- Convoy #6 is not attacked. land in the Philippines. 21 November 7 January Convoy #7: 3 small ships are sunk. 40 B-25s and 97 A-20s with P-38 escort 24/25 November make a low-level bombing and strafing Convoy #8: P-40s and P-47s sink 5 attack on Clark Field destroying or ships. badly damaging at least 60 enemy air- 28/29 November craft on the ground, prefacing regular Convoy #9 : approximately 70 P-47s and air coverage of the area. P-40s and 3 B-25s sink all ships in 12 a 9 January ships convoy escorted by 3 destroyer es- U. S. Sixth Army lands at points on corts according to a Navy report. Lingayen Gulf. 3/5 December 10 January Fifth AF "Snoopers" inaugurate attacks 308th Bomb Wing establishes an ad- by Allied Air Forces bombers on Luzon vanced command post at Lingayen. establishments hitting Clark by and Zob- 15 January lan airdromes. Fifth AF fighters begin operating from 6 December Lingayen strip on Luzon. Japanese launch ground and paratroop 17 January attack on Burauen airfields on Leyte. Allied AF relieves Allied Naval Forces 7 December of responsibility for direct operation 56 enemy planes are destroyed by Ameri- with the ground forces in the Lingayen can fighter planes in the last important area and for protection of convoys en air engagement over Leyte. 1 P-38 is route to and from Lingayen Gulf. lost. 21 January 7 December B-24s list Formosa in first large-scale Convoy #10: All ships are claimed as night attack. sunk in a 9-ship convoy escorted by 3 22 January DD. Fighters escort B-24s on the first mass 12 December raid in the reduction of Formosa. Convoy #11: 5 transports and 4 escorts 24 January are claimed as destroyed or probably de- Fifth AF medium bombers begin operat- stroyed. ing from Lingayen and Margsdam 14 December strips. Fifth AF begins a series of dawn-to- 28 January dusk attacks on enemy airdromes on Air fields in the Clark Field area are en- Negros. tirely under American control.

106 29 January 29 April American troops land in Subic Bay area Occupation of Baguio, Philippines. after 10 clays of concentrated air attack. 1 May 80 January 1945 Tarakan, Borneo invaded. Allied ground units make an amphibious 4 May landing in Batangas-Tayabas area. Rangoon, Burma occupied. 31 January 6 May B-24s destroy 25/30 enemy aircraft on Davao, Philippines liberated. Formosa fields. 24/26 May 3 February Superforts Blast Tokyo with Fire The 1st Cavalry enters Manila. Units Bombs. of 11th Airborne Division make para- 10 June chute landing near Tagaytay Ridge. Australians land at Brunei Bay, North 16 February Borneo. Paratroopers of the 503d Regiment land 24 June on Corregidor. Australians capture Miri Oil Fields, 25 February North Borneo. All effective enemy resistance is elimi- 1 July nated in Manila according to GHQ. Australians land at Balikpapan Bay. 27 February 5 July Organized enemy resistance on Corregi- Entire Philippines Liberated. dor ceases. 10 July 28 February Fleet Bombers attack Tokyo Area. 186th Regimental Combat Team lands on 11 July Palawan. Balikapapan Bay, Borneo secured. 2 March 14/15 July Fifth AF B-24s, B-25s and A-20s make Fleet Shells Northern Honshu and Hok- their heaviest strike to this date on For- kaido, Japan. mosa attacking 6 airdromes. Only 1 en- 16 July emy fighter attempted interception. For- XXI Bomber Command redesignated mosa is daily subjected to air sweeps. Twentieth AF. 8 March 18 July 1945 First landings on Mindanao. Fleet blasts Hitachi, Najima Cape, Yoko- 10 March suka, Japan. Lashio, Burma occupied. 19 July 18/22 March Fleet blasts Hitachi, Najima Cape, Yoko- Panay occupied. suka, Japan. 30 March 26 July Last mission by B-29s from China, India Potsdam Ultimatum (U.S., Britain, bases. China) demands unconditional surren- 1 April 1945 to der. 21 June 1945 29 July Okinawa Campaign. Premier Suzuki states Japan will ignore 5 April ultimatum. MacArthur and Nimitz appointed to 2 August lead Army and Navy in the Pacific. General Twining assumes command 7 April Twentieth AF. U.S.S.R. denounces neutrality pact with 5 August Japan. VII Fighter Command assigned to Twen- 7 April tieth AF. First Fighter Escort Mission flown from 6 August Iwo Jima in support of B-29 strike. First Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima.

107 8 August 11 August Depart- U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan, effec- Swiss Legation receives State ment's note clarifying Allied position on tive 9 August 1945. Emperor and relays note to Japan. 9 August 14 August Second Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki. Last B-29 mission against Japan. August in A t ^

. Official Surrender Text transmitted by Domei, Official Japanese News Agency gwiss ^ ^ Department, carried to broadcasts Japan's willingness to sur- White House by Secretary of State render, providing Hirohito's preroga- Byrnes, and at 7 P.M. President Truman tives are unimpaired. announces end of War.

108 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY LIST OF REPORTS

The following is a bibliography of reports resulting 23 Aluminiumwcrk G m b II, Plant No. 2, Bittcrfcld, from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific Germany wars. Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may 24 Gebrueder Giulini GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Ger- be purchased ' from the Superintendent of Documents many at the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 25 Luftschiffbau, Zeppelin GmbH, Friedrichshafen on Bodensee, Germany European War 26 Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Sol- OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN ingen, Germany *i The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: 28 Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke A G, Summary Report (European War) Lunen, Germany *2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: 29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim, Over-all Report (European War) Germany ,*3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German 30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau- War Economy Berlin & Waren, Germany AIRCRAFT DIVISION AREA STUDIES DIVISION

(By Division and Branch) *31 Area Studies Division Report Aircraft Division Industry Report 32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special on Hamburg Report) 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing Airframes Branch on Wuppertal 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Des- 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing sau, Germany on Dusseldorf 7 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing German on Solingen 8 A T G Maschinenbau, GmbH, Leipzig 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing (Mockau), Germany on Remscheid 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 10 Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany on Darmstadt Over-all Report 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 11 Messerschmitt A G, Part A on Lubeck Augsburg, Germany Part B 39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

Appendices I, II, III on Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, 12 Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munch, Ger- Dortmund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen many , 13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, Kassel, Ger- many CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION 14 Wierner Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener *40 Civilian Defense Division—Final Report Neustadt, Austria 41 Cologne Field Report Aero Engines Branch 42 Bonn Field Report 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, 43 Hanover Field Report

Brunswick, Germany 44 Hamburg Field Report—Vol I, Text; Vol II, Ex- 16 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, hibits Germany 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrer- 46 Augsburg Field Report hof, Germany 47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany 18 Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Germany EQUIPMENT DIVISION 19 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany Electrical Branch Light Metal Branch *48 German Electrical Equipment Industry Report 20 Light Metals Industry Part I, Aluminum J 49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Ger- of Germany )Part II, Magnesium many 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Germany Optical and Precision Instrument Branch 22 Metallgussgesellschaft GmbH, Leipzig, Ger- *50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Re- many port

109 Abrasives Branch 83 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Germany *51 The German Abrasive Industry 81 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Ger- 52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Ger- many many 85 Honschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Anti-Friction Branch 86 Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Ger- : Industry 53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings many Machine Tools Branch 87 Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Ger- *54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equip- many ment 88 Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany -55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany 89 Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany 56 Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany 90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, 57 Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany Germany 58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany 91 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION Germany Submarine Branch 59 The Defeat of the German Air Force 92 German Submarine Industry Report 60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign 93 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augs- Force Rate of Operation 61 Air burg, Germany 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Oper- 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany ations in the European Theatre 95 Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany 63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium 96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger- Bombers in the ETO many 64 Description of RAF Bombing 97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German 98 Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany Logistics 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany MORALE DIVISION 100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany Ordnance Branch *64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German : 101 Ordnance Industry Report Morale 102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonweike A G, Magdeburg, (Vol I and Vol II) Germany Medical Branch 103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, *65 Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical The Bochum, Germany Care in Germany 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany MUNITIONS DIVISION 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallen- Industry Branch Heavy dorf, Germany *66 The Coking Industry Report on Germany 107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Ger- 67 Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A, B, C, many & D 108 Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany 68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany 69 Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany OIL DIVISION 70 Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, *109 Oil Division, Final Report Germany :: 110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix 71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf *111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro- Germany pellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (Minis- 72 August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany terial Report #1) 73 Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Germany Germany 74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dort- 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report mund, Germany Team 78 75 Hoeseh A G, Dortmund, Germany 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals 76 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Oil Branch Bochum, Germany 115 Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch Germany—2 Appendices *77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report 116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, "78 Tank Industry Report Germany Wintershall A G, Leutzkendorf, Ger- 79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany many 80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenin- 81 Adam Opel, Russelheim, Germany dustrie A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany 82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Ger- 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger- many many, Vol. I, Vol. II

110 — 119 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg 152 V Weapons in London Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 153 City Area of Krefeld 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook 154 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 1 55 GoUlenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, 121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhe.'ni.s- Knapsack, Germany burg Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 156 Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, 122 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, Brauweiler, Germany Vol. I & Vol. II 157 Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, 158 Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Ger- Hamburg, Germany many 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, 159 Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Hamburg, Germany 100 Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany 125 Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant 161 Henschell & Sohn GmbH, Kassel, Germany Vol. I & Vol. II 162 Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany Rubber Branch 163 Hanomag, Hanover, Germany 164 MAN Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany 126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., . Hanau on Main, Germany 165 Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 166 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant Germany 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry 167 A T G Maschinenbau GmbH, Mockau, Germany 168 Erla Maschinenwerke Mockau, Ger- Propellants Branch GmbH, many 130 Eletrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany 169 Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany 131 Schoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose Spreng- 170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, stoff Werke GmbH, Bad Salzemen, Germany Germany 132 Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & 171 Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Dune- Co, Germany berg, Germany 172 Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany 133 Deutsche Sprengcheme GmbH, Krailburg, 173 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Germany 174 Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS 175 Ammoniawerke, Merseburg-Leuna, Germany DIVISION 176 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Ger- many 134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 177 Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany Gross National Product /Special papers 178 Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany which together Kriegseilberichte ) 179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany the Herman Goering Works j comprise 180 Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany report Food and Agriculture \ above 181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany 134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity 182 Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 184 Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany 134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) 185 Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Ger- Airdrome, Paris, France 135 Villacoublay many 136 Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium 186 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany 137 Railroad Repair Yards, Louvain, Belgium 187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany 138 Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 139 Railroad Germany 140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France 189 Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Ger- 141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France many 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium 191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany 145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 193 Fire Raids on German Cities 146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, 194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, France Vol. I & Vol. II 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, La Mans, 195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany France 196 I G Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany 148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Ger- many 197 Chemische-Werke, Huels, Germany 149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Ger- 150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, many France 199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Ger-

151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France many 111

/ TRANSPORTATION DIVISION *18 Kawanishi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. Ill *200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha) Transportation (Airframes) 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass *19 Aircraft Industries 202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Kawasaki Company, Inc. Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions Corporation Report No. IV 203 German Locomotive Industry During the War (Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki 204 German Military Railroad Traffic Kaisha) (Airframes & Engines) UTILITIES DIVISION *20 Aichi Aircraft Company *205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report Corporation Report No. V 206 I to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports" (Aichi Kokuki KK) 207 II to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Re- (Airframes & Engines) ports" *21 Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division 208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk Corporation Report No. VI A G (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puro- Pacific War pera Seizosho) OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN (Propellers) *22 Hitachi Aircraft Company *1 Summary Report (Pacific War) Corporation Report No. VII *2 Japan's Struggle to End the War (Hitachi Kokuki *3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and KK) Nagasaki (Airframes & Engines) *23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. CIVILIAN STUDIES Corporation Report No. VIII Civilian Defense Division (Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and (Airframes) Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan *24 Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Com- Field, Report Covering Air Raid Protection and pany Allied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Corporation Report No. IX Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Japan (Propellers) Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and *25 Tachikawa Aircraft Company Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan Corporation Report No. X Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and (Tachikawa Hikoki KK) Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan (Airframes) Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and *26 Fuji Airplane Company Allied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1 Corporation Report No. XI *10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection (Fuji Hikoki KK) and Allied Subjects in Japan (Airframes) s ll Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and *27 Allied Subjects in Japan Showa Airplane Company Medical Division Corporation Report No. XII (Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK) '12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical (Airframes) Services in Japan *28 U3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Corporation Medical Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Report No. XIII Morale Division (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) *14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese (Engines) Morale *29 Nippon Airplane Company ECONOMIC STUDIES Corporation Report No. XIV Aircraft Division (Nippon Hikoki KK) p 15 The Japanese Aircraft Industry (Airframes) -16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. *30 Kyushu Airplane Company Corporation Report No. I Corporation Report No. XV (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) (Kyushu Hikoki KK) (Airframes & Engines) (Airframes) *17 Nakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. *31 Shoda Engineering Company Corporation Report No. II Corporation Report No. XVI (Nakajima Hikoki KK) (Shoda Seisakujo) (Airframes & Engines) (Components) 112 . —

*32 Mitaka Aircraft Industries MILITARY STUDIES Corporation Report No. XVII Military Analysis Division (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Components) Gl Air Forces Allied with the United States in the *33 Nissan Automobile Company War Against Japan Corporation Report No. XVIII 62 Japanese Air Power (Nissan Jidosha KK) 63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics (Engines) 64 The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground *34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Army Logistics Corporation Report No. XIV 65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pa- (Airframes and Engines) cific Command *35 Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft 66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Report No. XX Bombardment in the War Against Japan Twentieth Air Force) Basic Materials Division 67 Air Operations in China, Burma, India—World *36 Metals in Japan's Economy Coal and War War II Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division 68 The Air Transport Command in the War Against *37 The Japanese Construction Industry Japan *38 Japanese Electrical Equipment 69 The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against *39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry Japan Electrical Power Division 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Against Japan *40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan 71 The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan *41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant 71a Air Campaigns of the Pacific War Reports) Naval Anaysis Division Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division *72 The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I *42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and and II) Utilization of Manpower *73 Campaigns of the Pacific War Military Supplies Division *74 The Reduction of Wake Island *75 *43 Japanese War Production Industries The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul *44 Japanese Naval Ordnance 76 The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloe- 45 Japanese Army Ordnance lap, Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) *77 *46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding The Reduction of Truk *47 Japanese, Motor Vehicle Industry 78 The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against *48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding Japan 79 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Division Oil and Chemical Foreword, Introduction, Conclusions, and Gen- 49 Chemicals in Japan's War eral Summary 50 Chemicals in Japan's War—Appendix 80 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party 51 Oil in Japan's War (Enclosure A), Kamaishi Area 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix 81 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure B), Hamamatsu Area Over-all Economic Effects Division 82 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party *53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's (Enclosure C), Hitachi Area (Including Appendix A: U. S. War Economy 83 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Economic Intelligence on Japan—Analysis and (Enclosure D), Hakodate Area

Comparison ; Appendix B : Gross National 84 Report of Ships Bombardmert Survey Party Its Components; Product on Japan and Ap- (Enclosure E), Muroran Area

: Statistical Sources) pendix C 85 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Transportation Division (Enclosure F), Shimizu Area 86 Report of Ships Survey Party *54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, Bombardment 1941-1945 (Enclosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-Saki Areas Urban Areas Division 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party *55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Econ- (Enclosure I), Comments and Data on Effec- omy (Summary Report) tiveness of Ammunition *56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo- 88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Kawasaki-Yokohama (Enclosure J), Comments and Data on *57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya Accuracy of Firing *58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto 89 Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party 59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki (Enclosure K), Effects of Surface Bombard- 60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima ments on Japanese War Potential 113 Physical Damage Division 100 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the 90 Effect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan Japanese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb (a Report on Eight Cities) Plotting 91 The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on 101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Inci- Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area dents) Analysis 92 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan 102 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the 93 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Japanese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage 94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on 103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) Japanese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping 95 Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and 104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Five Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Tar- Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics gets (a Report on Eight Incidents) 105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the 90 A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Sum- Japanese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach' Intelli- mary Report) gence :: 10G Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the 2 Division G— Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery 97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence :, 107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the 98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Rail- Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive roads Report 108 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields Analysis

tl U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947—745435 114