^ Given By U. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY The Fifth Air Force in THE War Against Japan Military Analysis Division June 1947 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY The Fifth Air Force in THE War Against Japan Military Analysis Division June 1947 U. S. SUPERINTENDENT Of DOCUMENTS OCT 14 1947 This report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey. ii FOREWORD The United States Strategic Bombing- Survey The military segment of the organization was was established by the Secretary of War on 3 drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 per- November 1944, pursuant to a directive from cent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40 the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave to conduct an impartial and expert study of the the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be men, supplies, transport, and information. The used in connection with air attacks on Japan Survey operated from headquarters established and to establish a basis for evaluating the in Tokyo early in September 1945, with sub- importance and potentialities of air power as headquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, an instrument of military strategy for planning and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating the future development of the United States in other parts of Japan, the islands of the armed forces and for determining future eco- Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. nomic policies with respect to the national It was possible to reconstruct much of war- defense. A summary report and some 200 time Japanese military planning and execution, supporting reports containing the findings of engagement by engagement, and campaign by the Survey in Germany have been published. campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate On 15 August 1945, President Truman re- statistics on Japan's economy and war produc- quested that the Survey conduct a similar study tion, plant by plant,, and industry by industry. of the effects of all types of air attack in the In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's war against Japan, submitting reports in dup- over-all strategic plans and the background of licate to the Secretary of War and to the her entry into the war, the internal discussions Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the and negotiations leading to her acceptance of Survey during its Japanese phase were: unconditional surrender, the course of health Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. and morale among the civilian population, the Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice effectiveness of the Japanese civilian defense Chairmen. organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will issued Harry L. Bowman, be covering each phase of the study. J. Kenneth Galbraith, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Rensis Likert, Japanese military, government, and industrial Frank A. McNamee, Jr., officials. It also recovered and translated many Fred Searls, Jr., documents which not only have been useful to Monroe E. Spaght, the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, for other studies. Arrangements have been Theodore P. Wright, Directors. made to turn over the Survey's files to the Cen- Walter Wilds, Secretary. tral Intelligence Group, through which they will The Survey's complement provided for 300 be available for further examination and civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. distribution. in : ACKNOWLEDGMENT This report has been guided by an original report prepared for the United States Strategic Bombing Survey by Brig. Gen. J. V. Crabb, Commanding General, V Bomber Command. The information contained in this report is based on official reports of the Army Air Force, Far East AF, Allied Air Force SWPA . General Headquarters SWPA, the Fifth AF and analyses prepared by the USSBS. Unless otherwise designated, the claims in this report and the statistics used in discussion of enemy aircraft and shipping losses are taken from final claims of the Fifth Air Force based on its combat records. The report has been primarily the work of these officers: Col. William Hipps, Former A-3, Fifth AF and A-5, FEAF. Col. Francis Gideon, Former A-3, Fifth AF, FEAF and Dir. of Ops., AAF. Col. Benjamin Cain, Former A-2, Fifth AF, FEAF and Dir. of Intel., AAF. Major William E. Johnson, Cartographer. Contributors of special sections to this report are Brig. Gen. F. H. Smith, Former C/S, Fifth AF and CG, V Fighter Command. Col. H. F. Cunningham Former A-2, Fifth AF. Col. B. A. Schreiver, Former C/S, Far East Air Service Command. Col. Alvin Pachynski, Former Signal Officer, Fifth AF and FEAF. R. E. BEEBE, Colonel, A.C., Former C/S, Fifth AF, FEAF & AAF. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace Section I. Introduction 1 Orientation Map Facing P. 2 (1) Joint Chiefs of Staff Campaign Directives Facing P. 2 (2) Air-Ground-Naval Team, SWPA 3 II. Assembly and Composition 5 Role of the Fifth AF in the SWPA 7 Origin of the Fifth AF 8 Organization and Channels 8 Fifth AF Commands and Tatical Strength 11 Aircraft Strength 13 Personnel Strength 15 III. Air Campaigns 17 Geographic—Terrain suitable for Military Operations Facing P. 18 Typical Missions of the Fifth AF 19 Distribution of Effort 20 Progression of Air Attack Facing P. 20 Master Maps of SWPA Campaigns 23 Situation Map, 8 April 1942 Facing P. 24 (1) First Phase Facing P. 24 (2) Second Phase Facing P. 24 (3) Third Phase Facing P. 24 (4) Fourth Phase Facing P. 24 (5) Phase I. Isolation of Rabaul 25 Phase II. Preparation for Assault on the Philippines 31 Phase III. Occupation of the Philippines 34 Phase IV. Preparation for Final Assault on Japan 37 Conclusions 38 IV. Total Fifth AF Effort and Results 41 Effective Sorties Flown 43 Aircraft Hours Flown (Bombers) 44 Aircraft Hours Flown (Fighters) 45 Aircraft Attrition 46 Tons of Bombs Dropped 47 Disease Incidence Compared with Battle Casualties 48 Destruction of Enemy Aircraft 49 Enemy Shipping Destroyed 50 Low Altitude Radar Bombing Results 51 Bomb Distribution 52 V. Fortunes of War 55 Examples of Actions with Inter-Theater Importance: Bismarck Sea Battle 57 Attrition of the Japanese Naval Air Force 58 Attrition of the Japanese Army Air Force 60 Reinforcement of Ormoc 61 Air Entry into Japan 63 Examples of Actions with Theater Importance: Cape Gloucester 64 Capture of Corregidor 68 Extension of Aircraft Range 70 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page VI. Operational and Technical Factors of Importance 73 Ground Support 75 Reconnaissance 78 Development of Intelligence 82 Troop Carrier Operation 85 Air Defense in SWPA 87 Weather Service 87 Communication and Aircraft Warning 89 Logistic Support of the Air Force 90 VII. Chronology 97 VI SECTION I INTRODUCTION WESTERN PACIFIC AREA SCALE 5 TH AF REPORT iop__g loo 200 soo «o o soo soo (SECTION I) STATUTE MILES FIGURE I ,*— \.^ LAKE BAIKAlrf-T t-*/ JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVES IN SWPA AND POA OPERATIONS < !r - SWPA FORCES se^^poa FORCES *» .GILBERT ISLANDS -^1. U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 5TH AF REPORT SECTION I FIGURE 2 AIR-GROUND-NAVAL TEAM, SWPA Before detailing the history of the Fifth AF forces to permit simultaneous operations. The in its operations against the Japanese it is air-ground team became very cooperative and, advisable to show the role the Air Forces played after initial difficulties imposed by communica- in the combined all-force team play organized tions in jungle warfare, the entire Air Force by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Essentially the stood in support of ground action when re- structure was of three forces, ground, naval quired. Fifth AF support to the Sixth Army and air in combination, operating their special- was climaxed at Ormoc and Luzon. Air-naval ties in weapons to destroy a common enemy coordination was particularly effective with objective in order to create a new Allied base PT boats and later, in 1945, with submarines, for repeated operations. but generally it was found best to keep naval Naval units permanently assigned to the surface force operations apart from land-based SWPA were small until late 1944 and battle air operations, due principally to communica- grounds were restricted prior to the Luzon tions requirements of the naval forces. When campaign. The air forces, therefore, were beachhead operations were supported by naval called upon for more extended operations carrier-based aircraft the preliminary period than would have been normal under other was of naval responsibility after arriving at circumstances. the operation. No appreciable difference in operating techniques existed but basic lack of Therefore, in addition to the standard effect the necessary coordination destruction of the enemy normally accomp- liaison to such joint operations impracticable. The lished by air action, the Fifth AF adopted made full employment at one time of the forces avail- operations designed to readjust quickly to tac- able for an operation was never feasible and tical situations occurring from the all-out hence required elaborate and detailed schedules aggressive action of forces operating on little of separating forces, both in time and distance. or no reserve. This led to tactics and methods Despite this, the preinvasion cooperation be- of controlling aircraft to make them all-pur- the Fifth Air Force and the Third and pose. In a war of maneuver a high degree of tween effective and without "force Seventh Fleet units was flexibility" is important, a point adopted ;^i serious difficulty.