THE FORGOTTEN AIR FORCE-

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF AUSTRALIAN AIR POWER IN THE NORTH-WESTERN AREA

1941-1945

PETER BELSON

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS AT HONOURS LEVEL AT THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF , 1997. Abstract

The air campaign conducted by the RAAF in the North-Western Area during the Second World War has been largely ignored by historians yet it contributed significantly to the outcome of the . This thesis sets out to discuss the campaign by considering various factors that impacted on the RAAF in the lead up to and during the course of the Pacific war and their relevance to the campaign. It looks at the way air operations were conducted in the North-Western Area between 1942 and 1945 and describes the role played by the flying squadrons based in the area.

Using primary sources such as operational record books, documents and files at archives and libraries and interviews with veterans and experts the thesis found that the campaign was conducted in several phases. It started with the defence of Darwin. In keeping with overall allied strategy the RAAF then went on an offensive into what was ·then the East Indies (NEI) using medium and heavy and mine laying sea planes flying from bases in 's north west.

'The NEI was vital to the Japanese war effort as a source of essential raw materials such as oil, timber, and rubber. To defend· this part of their new empire the Japanese had amassed large military garrisons on the islands. The vessels used to transport troops and materials became the most important targets for the RAAF' s squadrons. As MacArthur's forces advanced along the north coast of the North-Western Area based units conducted raids into the NEI to deceive the Japanese into thinking an invasion would be launched from Darwin. As the gained momentum the RAAF' s task was to protect its western flank, to prevent the Japanese from moving troops and aircraft east to the .

The thesis concludes the campaign was successful because Darwin was defended, it denied the Japanese vital materials for the conduct of the war and it kept hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of troops away from the allied advance.

ii Acknowledgments

When I began work on this thesis I was ignorant of the air war in the NW Area other than the Japanese air raids. However, even then my knowledge was possibly no greater than the injured Darwin resident, evacuated to following the , 1942 bombing raids, who claimed that "only six people had been killed in the bombing" .1 My initial line of thinking had been to approach the NW Area as a sideshow; an area divorced from the main allied operations of the Pacific war; a place where nothing happened and little contribution was made to the war effort.

Quite obviously, I was very wrong. I found that a large portion of the RAAF' s personnel and assets had been sent to the area and operations vital to the war effort, such as maritime reconnaissance, shipping interdiction, mine laying and heavy bombing were flown on a regular basis, hence the title "The Forgotten Air Force".

Many people have assisted me during the four years I spent researching and writing this' thesis and I would like to acknowledge their help. First, thanks to Dr Alan Stephens-RAAF Historian-for suggesting the topic in the first place. Thanks also to Dr Stephens and Dr John McCarthy for their role of supervisors, for patiently reading drafts, answering numerous questions, for steering me in the correct direction and for maintaining my interest in the subject.

Thanks to David Kent RAN for the days and nights he spent proof reading and reformatting the draft and for helping me with all manner of word processing difficulties. Thanks also to Lieutenant Alan Pearson of the Inspector-General Division and Ric Pelvin of the for proof reading drafts and explaining so many military terms to me.

A lot of people helped me with research and data collection. In no special order (as their help was all equally wonderful) thanks goes to Mollie Angel, Janet Beck and David Wilson of the RAAF Historical Section, Russell ACT; W alshe of the RAAF Museum, Point Cook, ; Kate Cumming of the Australian Archives, Mitchell, ACT; Lee Carter of the Australian Customs Service Library and Julie Bowler of the Dept of Defence Library.

I extend my gratitude to those veterans with whom I corresponded and who gave me their time in interviews. It was those people who convinced me of the importance of theNorth- Western Area campaign.

Michael Nelmes of the Australian War Memorial and Dr David Stevens of the RAN Historical section answered numerous questions and put up with my continual pestering. Even as the drafting was being :finalised they still took my telephone calls.

Finally, thanks to Valerie Belson for all manner of assistance and moral support.

1 Comment recalled by Ms Kath Walker, former Canberra Hospital staff member, October 7, 1996.

iii Declaration

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text.

Peter Helson May 1997.

Dedication

To Norman V Helson 1924-1994

22 SQNRAAF

Noemfoor-Morotai-Tarakan

iv CONTENTS

Page

Abstract 11 Acknowledgments 111 Declaration IV Dedication IV Contents v Tables and Maps Vll Appendices VII Abbreviations and Acronyms IX Imperial/Metric Conversions X1l Note on Place Names Xll

Introduction Xlll

· CHAPTER 1 THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF 1 AUSTRALIAN AIR POWER IN THE NORTH- WESTERN AREA 1941-1945 The Pacific War-An Overview 1 The North-Western Area's Role 2 The Forgotten Air Force? 5 MacArthur's Flank 6

CHAPTER2 PRELUDE TO 1942 10 Australia and the Outbreak of the Pacific War 11 High Command in the Pacific 14 ABDA Command 15 The Invasion Threat 17 Australia and US Forces 18 The Southwest Pacific Area 23 Allied Strategy 24 The Allied Air Forces 25 General 26 Command Arrangements for the RAAF 29 RAAF Command 32 Aircraft Shortages 32 The Japanese Air Forces 37 Allied Perceptions of the Japanese 38

CHAPTER3 AUSTRALIAN AffiDEFENCE 42 The Organisation of Air Power 42 The Best Way to Deploy Air Power 46 Air Power in the NW Area Before the Japanese Attacks 49 Establishment of the RAAF Station at Darwin 51 Establishment of other RAAF Bases 60

v The Strategic and Operational Importance ofDarwin 61 Formation ofthe North-Western Area 62 Early Operations 65

CHAPTER4 THE RAAF ON THE DEFENSIVE 70 The Japanese Air Raids 70 Command Arrangements 72 Aftermath of the Initial Japanese Air Raids 76 The Lowe Report 78 Lessons Learnt 80 The 49th Pursuit Group 82 The RAAF Build Up 85 Japanese Intentions 88 Japanese Air Operations 90 The Kittyhawk Squadrons 94 77 Squadron 95 76 Squadron 99 The Spitfire 100 54 Squadron RAF 105 452 Squadron 109 457 Squadron 110 114

CHAPTERS THE RAAF STRIKES BACK: TOO LITTLE TOO 118 LATE? 2 Squadron 121 12 Squadron 122 13 Squadron 125 18 (NEI) Squadron 125 The Heavy Bombers 128 The Attack/Intruder Squadron 132 31 Squadron 133 Reconnaissance Units 136 No. 1 PRU and 87 (PR) Squadron 137 Transport Units 140 34 Squadron 140 6 Communications Unit 141 Too Little, Too Late? 142

CHAPTER6 TAKING THE OFFENSIVE 1943-45: ONLY A SIDE- 145 SHOW? Command Arrangements 146 RAAF Organisation 148 Geographic Boundaries 149 Reporting the RAAF Effort 150 Japanese Intentions 154 Allied Invasion Plans 158

vi CHAPTER 7 DEFENDING THE NORTH-WESTERN AREA 167 The Fighter Squadrons 167 1 Fighter Wing 167 54 Squadron RAF 174 452 Squadron 176 457 Squadron 178 548 Squadron RAF 183 549 Squadron RAF 185 83 Squadron 186 The Attack/Intruder Squadron 189 31 Squadron 190

CHAPTERS ON THE ATTACK 194 The Catalina Squadrons 194 Mine Laying 199 Air Sea Rescue Flights 202 112 Air Sea Rescue Flight 204

CHAPTER9 THE BOMBING OFFENSIVE 208 Japanese Shipping 210 79 Wing 215 1 Squadron 216 2 Squadron 219 13 Squadron 222 18 (NEI) Squadron 224 Dive Bombers 227 Heavy Bombers 229 The Oil Fields 236 12 Squadron 237 21 Squadron 238 23 Squadron 242 24 Squadron 243 99 Squadron 245 201 Flight 246 Reconnaissance Units 246 No. 1 PRU and 87 (PR) Squadron 247 Transport Units 252 6 Communications Unit 252

CHAPTERlO CONCLUSION 253

TABLES RAAF Organisation-North-Western Area-January 1945 210

8.1 Bomb Tonnage; North-Western Area, July 1944-July 212 1945 8.2 RAAF B-24 Units 236

MAPS 1.1 The Pacific Theatre- following page 14 1.2 The Southwest Pacific Area, July 26, 1942 23

vii 3 .1 RAAF Area Boundaries-following page 63 4.1 RAAF Bases NW Area, April1943-following page 85 5.1 Allied Air Forces Areas ofResponsibility, April1, 1945 150 7.1 RAAF Bases NW Area, 1944-following page 173 9.1 The Netherlands East Indies-following page 236

APPENDICES A. Membership of the 1940~5 257 B. List of Squadrons and Locations-1939 262 C. Air Officer Commanding, North-Western Area, 1942- 263 1945 D. North-Western Area; Bases and Units 1939-1945 264 E. USAAF Combat Units in Australia 1941-1945 278 F. Specifications of Allied and Japanese Aircraft 285

BffiLIOGRAPHY 287

viii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA Australian Archives AAA Anti Aircraft Artillery AAF Allied Air Forces AAU Air Ambulance Unit ABDACOM American, British, Dutch, Australian Command ACH Area Combined Headquarters ACM Air Chief Marshal ACS Airfield Construction Squadron AD Aircraft Depot ADHQ Air Defence Headquarters ADSC Australian Defence Studies Centre AIF Australian Imperial Forces AIRCDRE Air Commodore AM AMF Australian Military Forces AOB Advanced Operational Base AOC Air Officer Commanding AOR Air Operations Room AP Aircraft Park ARD Aircraft Repair Depot ARP Air Raid Precautions ASRF Air Sea Rescue Flight ASV Air to Surface Vessel radar ASW Anti Warfare AVG American Volunteer Group AVM Air Vice-Marshal AWM Australian War Memorial

CAC Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation CAS Chief of the Air Staff CGS Chief of the General Staff CNS Chief of Naval Staff co Commanding Officer COIC Combined Operational Intelligence Centre COL Colonel CWR Central War Room

DAP Department of Aircraft Production DCAS Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

EATS Empire Air Training Scheme

FBMU Maintenance Unit FBRD Flying Boat Repair Depot FCU Fighter Control Unit FEAF Far Eastern Air Force FLGOFF Flying Officer

lX FLTLT Flight Lieutenant FSGT Flight Sergeant ft foot/feet (distance)

GEN General GHQ General Head Quarters GP General Purpose GPCAPT GR/B General Reconnaissance/Bomber

HQ Headquarters

km kilometres

£ pounds (money) lbs pounds (weight) LCDR Lieutenant Commander I LRMP Long Range Maritime Patrol LT Lieutenant LTCOL Lieutenant Colonel

MAJGEN General MFCU Mobile Fighter Control Unit MIS.-X Military Intelligence Service-Section X mph miles per hour MVO Member of the Royal Victorian Order

NCO Non Commissioned Officer NEArea North Eastern Area NEI Netherlands East Indies NLA National Library of Australia NT NW Area North-Western Area

OBU Operational Base Unit ORA Other Regional Activities OTU Operational Training Unit

PM Prime Minister POL Petrol, Oil and Lubricants POW Prisoner ofWar PRU Photographic Reconnaissance Unit

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAF RAN RHS RAAF Historical Section RN

X RNMFS Royal Netherlands Military Flying School rpg rounds per gun RSU Repair and Salvage Unit

SAR Search and Rescue SQN Squadron SQNLDR SWPA South West Pacific Area

TAF Tactical Air Force TAIU Technical Air Intelligence Unit TMO Transportation and Movement Office

USAAC Army Air USAAF Air Forces USN

I VADM Vice Admiral

WGCDR

X1 IMPERIAL/METRIC CONVERSION TABLE

I inch (in) 25.4 millimetre (mm) I foot (ft) 30.5 centimetre (em) I yard (yd) 0.9I4 metre (m) I mile (m) 1.6I kilometre (km) I nautical mile (nm) I852 metres

I pound (lb) .454 kilograms (kg) I ton 1.02 tonne (t)

I mile per hour (mph) 1.6I kilometres/hour (km/h) I knot (kt) I nautical mile per hour (nm/hr)

I pound(£) 2 Dollars ($)

NOTE OF PLACE NAMES

Numerous islands, towns and cities are named throughout this thesis. The majority of them are located either within Australia or Indonesia. In the case of the latter I have referred to it as the Netherlands East Indies or NEI because that was the name by which the archipelago was known before and during the Second World War. That is the name given in contemporary documents. Similarly I have used the contemporary names for cities and towns within the NEI. This presented some problems as the spelling of towns and bases varied according to the source. I have tried to standardise on the spelling given in the AAF intelligence reports.

Xll Introduction

At the end of the Second World War nearly one half of the RAAF' s flying squadrons

in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWP A) had been at some time based in the North­

Western Area (NW Area). They fought an air war, in difficult conditions, away from

the rest of the Pacific war. The RAAF's role in this area went largely unnoticed during

the course of the war, especially after the Japanese bombing of northern Australian

centres had declined, and was quickly forgotten once the war ended.

It follows that the air campaign conducted by the RAAF in the NW Area has received

' little attention from historians or commentators. That attention is disproportionate to

the magnitude of effort and resources allocated to the campaign. Although the NW

Area has been mentioned in the official histories of Australia's participation in the war;

in squadron histories; in books and articles devoted to individual aircraft types and in

histories ofDarwin and the Northern Territory; there has been virtually no study of the

air campaign and its contribution to the allied war effort. One can speculate that this is

because there was no allied advance from the NW Area and that the main theatre that

attracted the public and media's attention was the New Guinea campaign and the

subsequent advances towards the Japanese homeland. One could be forgiven in

thinking that the NW Area campaign was a sideshow and that the RAAF' s personnel

and assets would have been better used elsewhere.

This thesis attempts to correct this notion and argues that the NW Area campaign was

not a sideshow. It further argues that it was a campaign vital to the allied victory over

Japan and that RAAF assets and personnel deployed to the area were not misused.

There are many issues which relate to the RAAF in the Pacific war and in the NW

Area. Therefore chapter one of this thesis begins with a very brief look at the war in

the SWP A in order to place the NW Area campaign in perspective and how the

xiii campaign fitted into the overall allied strategy for defeating the Japanese. Chapter two

attempts to answer some of the questions that might be asked as to why the RAAF did

not do more to defend Darwin and attack the Japanese early in the war and examines

some of the issues that impacted on the RAAF as a whole during the Second World

War. A shortage of combat aircraft and the initial deployment of RAAF assets either

overseas or to the southern regions of Australia obviously made an impact on the NW

Area. Chapter three looks at the status of the RAAF at the outbreak of the Pacific war

and the introduction of air power to the NW area. Chapter four starts with the

, Japanese air raids on Darwin and describes the subsequent build up of air defence until

mid 1943. The beginning of the offensive phase of the campaign is described in

chapters five and six while chapter seven is concerned with the defence of the area

from mid 1943 through to the end of the war. Chapter eight is devoted to the vitally

important Catalina operations while the final chapter looks at the NW Area based long

range bombing operations.

The air campaign fought in the north west of Australia was conducted for a period of

over four years. In the most simplistic terms it followed the pattern of the whole allied

Pacific campaign: defence then offence. The RAAF operated from their front line

bases and attacked targets at the limit of their aircraft's range. The "front" did not

move forward until 1945. Instead of advancing to islands in the NEI close to

Australia, the RAAF remained in the NW Area and relied on the advantages of

technology in the form long range aircraft to enlarge the area covered by the campaign.

In the case oftlie NW Area the notion is rejected that Australian forces were pushed

into the background or were unnecessarily deployed in the closing stages of the war

and many of the actions they fought were not needed. The NW Area campaign was

xiv continuous for the duration of the Pacific war. It was fought from Australian territory and it seems appropriate that it was undertaken by an Australian Service.

The starting point for this thesis was two volumes of the official in the War of 1939-1945, those written by Gillison and Odgers. However their works were published in 1962 and 1957 respectively and they dealt with RAAF operations in many theatres of the war. There are chapters on the NW Area in Odger' s work and these were drawn upon to put operations noted in the thesis into perspective.

Similarly, information relating to the development of air power in the NW Area was taken from Gillison. Craven and Cate's history of the US Army Air Forces was also consulted for background information on the early stages of the Pacific war and the movement of USAAF units into Australia. The build up of the USAAF in Australia and operations flown from this country have been the subject of a comprehensive study by Rorrison while Alford has written on the air war over Darwin. Powell has included a good account of the air war in the Northern Territory generally. There have been numerous books, journal articles and videos about specific aircraft types and the units that operated them. This is a continuing process and such works are still being produced, in fact several were published during the time this thesis was being researched. A considerable amount of information for this thesis came from government files stored by the Australian Archives while details of flying units' day to day activities came from records kept by the RAAF Historical Section, the Australian

War Memorial and the RAAF Museum.

Some parts of the air campaign are dealt with briefly while others (such as details of the activities of non-flying units) are not included at all. The limitations placed on an

XV MA thesis meant rather a concentration on the efforts of the front line operational

activities (eg the fighter defence, long range bombing and mine laying). This in tum

raises the possibilities for other students to study other aspects such as the

personalities involved and the less "glamorous" but important activities such as those undertaken by the non flying units.

xvi The Establishment and Employment of Australian Air Power in the North­ Western Area 1941-1945.

There was plenty to hold my attention in the Northern Territory as the area was a complex of bases and dispersal areas between Darwin and Katherine. Fighter squadrons equipped with Spitfires, Squadrons armed with Mitchell B-25s, Beaufighters for intruder operations, Lightnings for Photographic recce, and Liberators for heavy strikes formed part of the complex pattern of operations.

AM Sir Valston Hancock1

Chapter 1. The Pacific War-An Overview

The Pacific War started in December 1941 with Japanese attacks on Allied military

bases and colonies in Malaya, Hawaii, the Philippines, , Wake Island and Hong

Kong. By the middle of January 1942 many of these colonies and islands had been

conquered by the Japanese. Closer to Australia, and Kavieng and towns on the

east coast ofNew Guinea were occupied in January and February that year.

Australian defence planning had centred around a strong British naval and military presence based in . This strategy came to an abrupt end with the fall of

Singapore on February 15, 1942. In the early part of that year it was reasonably expected that the Japanese would invade Australia. This did not occur and following reversals in battles such as Midway and the Coral and Bismarck Seas the Japanese advance halted. The Allied forces then went on the offensive.

The allied strategy for retaking the region and defeating centred around two loosely coordinated campaigns. The first was a thrust across the central Pacific by the

US Navy. This began in 1942 and progressively recaptured the islands in that area.

The second was an advance, from Australia, through the island chain on the south west

1 VHancock Challenge. Access Press, Northbridge, WA, 1990. p. 97. rim of the Pacific. This move started with a campaign by Australian and US forces, under the command of General MacArthur, in south eastern New Guinea and the invasion of the by US forces. The campaign continued along the north coast of New Guinea and into the north-eastern islands of the Netherlands East

Indies (NEI, now Indonesia) and then to the Philippines which was reached in October

1944. The two campaigns coalesced at·the Philippines with MacArthur's forces being supported by Admiral Halsey's fleet.

Both campaigns bypassed many Japanese held territories including the NEI which presented some significant problems for the allies, In the first place there was

(correctly) believed to be a very large number of Japanese troops dispersed through the numerous islands. Secondly, the islands were rich in resources (such as oil, minerals and timber) strategically essential to the Japanese war effort.

The North-Western Area's Role

Despite the large numbers of personnel, squadrons and aircraft deployed there, the NW

Area seemed to miss the attention that was directed towards the air fighting in other parts of the SWP A, even in contemporary reports. At the end of the war, in his report to the Minister for Air, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Air Vice Marshal George

Jones gave a very brief summary of the RAAF' s effort in the NW Area. He stated that the Japanese may have attempted to capture or neutralise Darwin.· Therefore allied plans were to defend Darwin and to launch raids against Japanese occupied territory in the NEI and . CAS added that throughout the war the NW Area formed a secure western flank for General MacArthur's offensive through New Guinea and the

2 Philippines: . This is an extremely brief summary of four years of air warfare.

2 Chief of the Air Staff War Report of the Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Australian Air Force; 3rd September 1939 to 31st December 1945, to the Minister for Air. RAAF Printing and Publications Unit, , ViC, 1946. p. 50.

2 Discussing the role of the RAAF in the NW Area in isolation is difficult as numerous

questions arise on the overall allied command structure, the perceived role of the

RAAF prior to the Pacific war, and the relationship between the Australian and US forces. The first chapter of this thesis examines these issues.

Fallowing the outbreak of the Pacific war Darwin became a strategic location for the allies. It was a port capable of servicing large numbers of ships, 3 it was an air base and it also became the closest large town to the Japanese held NEI. In order to defend the newly acquired part of their empire and to ensure the uninterrupted flow of raw materials from the NEI back to the homeland, the Japanese military forces had to prevent any allied interference which was sure to come from Darwin.

Therefore much of the RAAF's early activities in the NW Area centred around defending Darwin. Fighter defence came initially from United States Army Air Forces

(USAAF) and RAAF squadrons equipped with P-40 Kittyhawks. These were replaced by Spitfire squadrons. At the same time maritime defence, in the form of shipping searches, convoy escorts and anti-submarine patrols were flown by Hudsons and

Wirraways. However, RAAF operations were hindered by the lack of suitable aircraft.

As more aircraft became available the roles of the RAAF expanded to include shipping strikes, reconnaissance, bombing and long range mine laying. All these missions were necessary to ensure the Japanese could neither gain materially from their empire nor divert their military resources to fight the allied advance.

Allied strategy for the NEI called for a blockade to deny natural resources to the

Japanese and,. the neutralisation of local garrisons. The most effective weapons for implementing this strategy were the allied and the long range bombers (the

NW Area's long range bomber was the B-24 Liberator). Insofar as the bombing was

3 At the time of the first air raid-February 19, 1942-there were 52 vessels either at the port of Darwin or in its vicinity.

3 concerned, the eastern half of the NEI was covered initially by the USAAF's B-24s

based in New Guinea or the NW Area. However, in mid 1944 the RAAF started to

receive its own B-24s and RAAF squadrons progressively replaced

those of the USAAF in the NW Area.

The B-24s attacked land targets including oil refineries, military bases and garrisons,

power stations, ship building facilities, quarries and, most importantly, airfields.

Maintaining an anti-shipping blockade had a high priority for the RAAF' s bombers and

the B-24s were used for low level strikes against all types of Japanese vessels. A

major departure from the blockade role started in early April 1945 when detachments

of B-24s from 21 and 24 SQNs were deployed to Morotai Island (in the Halmahera

group) to undertake heavy bombing to prepare the ground for the invasion of .

In the meantime three squadrons of Catalina flying boats, operating from bases in the

NW Area laid mines in sea lanes and Japanese held harbours, thus disrupting shipping

through the NEI and ports as far away as Hong Kong.

To guard against Japanese reprisal raids the NW Area was defended by three RAAF

and Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons flying Spitfires. Various controversies are

associated ·with these aircraft, including the argument that there was little need for

them to remain in the area after the Japanese bombing had ceased. However, a

Japanese invasion of northern Australia was not discounted until so it

seems logical that they should have remained in the NW Area until that time. The

B-24s and Catalinas could have presented a tempting target for Japanese bombers. It

should be remembered that the Japanese occupied Timor (approximately 800 km from

Darwin) until the end of the war. Allied bases in the NW Area were within range of the airfields on Timor and, given the ability of the Japanese to move aircraft east from the NEI or south from Indo-China, it is feasible that they could have moved a force to

Timor and attacked Darwin again. This suspicion gains some credibility when it is remembered that as late in the war as November 22, 1944, Japanese aircraft staged a

4 night attack on Morotai island and decimated 22 SQN' s aircraft strength while in

March 1945 a raid was staged on Biak. Therefore it was essential that vital RAAF

assets be defended and one way to do that was to maintain squadrons of interceptor

fighters. Unfortunately for the fighter pilots their time in the area was months of

boredom as they waited for Japanese aircraft whose numbers declined to nothing.

The Forgotten Air Force?

The conflict in the NW Area was largely an air war. The Army presence was mainly

crewing anti aircraft artillery (AAA), defensive artillery, and providing all manner of support functions such as transport. As it was an air war, there was no invasion of

Japanese held territory from the NW Area and the RAAF could not show visible gains in the same way as land warfare, such as the conquest of enemy territory or the capture of Japanese materiel or personnel. After the Japanese air raids ceased on November

12, 1943 there was no air combat victory for the media to report. Training regimes and scrambles to intercept friendly aircraft would hardly have made interesting news reports. Depictions of the war of conquest were readily available from the allied forces advancing through the Pacific. How~ver, there was nothing that could show immediately the achievements of long range bombing, shipping patrols or mine laying.

Apart from photographs of bomb damage or destroyed shipping there was no way of conveying to the public the progress of the war in the NW Area. It is quite understandable that the RAAF personnel in the area felt that they had been forgotten and that the war had by-passed them. Yet the role the RAAF played in the area was absolutely vital to the allied advance to the Philippines.

5 MacArthur's Flank

MacArthur's allied forces fought their way along the north coast of New Guinea and

by April 1944 had secured the Hollandia and Aitape areas and were ready to embark

on the retaking of the Philippines. The US Fifth Air Force (including No. 10

Operational Group RAAF) provided air support for the advance while NW Area based

RAAF units were attacking Japanese bases in the NEI and protecting the sea lanes.

The Japanese, in tum, began defensive measures, part of which was the west to east

movement of aircraft from the NEI to the Halmahera Islands.

There have been arguments, post war, that Australia's armed forces played a

secondary role; that MacArthur sought to keep the conquest of the Philippines and

subsequent campaigns all-American affairs; that Australians were pushed into the

background and lives were wasted on unnecessary mopping-up actions. In some theatres this is possibly correct. 4 This thesis argues that such statements cannot be

applied to the RAAF' s NW Area campaign. The argument is based on the following

Issues.

Darwin had been recognised as a vital strategic port at the start of the Pacific war.

During the course of the war it was developed into the additional role of a strategic air base. CAS's report that Darwin had to be denied to the Japanese was correct but for two years the Japanese continued to bomb the town and allied bases nearby. Denying

Darwin to the Japanese also meant ensuring that the Japanese did not launch an

4 The use of Australian troops in unnecessary campaigns in the Pacific war has been argued in P Charlton The Unnecessary War. Macmillian, South Melbourne, Vic, 1983.

6 offensive so large that it would divert allied resources from the advance towards the

Philippines.

The Japanese had a large garrison to defend the NEI. Allied intelligence estimates of

the number of aircraft stationed there rarely dropped below 3 00 during the first half of

1944, while in late 1945 the estimated number of military personnel was still in excess

of 161,546. 5 It was essential to MacArthur's campaign that these personnel were

· neutralised in the NEI. That is, they should not be allowed to consolidate or be

transported east from the NEI to the Halmahera Islands or the Philippines. Therefore

the anti-shipping campaign had to be conducted to prevent these personnel either being

moved east or supplied in their present location.

Had the NW Area campaign not been conducted the Japanese most certainly could

have moved their troops east. Conventional wisdom is that an invading force should

have a numerical superiority of three to one over the defending force. MacArthur thus

would have required at least an additional 484,638 (nearly half a million!) troops for

his invasion of the Halmaheras and the Philippine campaign. Given the allied

agreement to "Beat Hitler First" we can only question whether this large number of

additional troops would have been made available to him. In simple terms, had the

NW Area air campaign not been conducted it is possible that MacArthur's plans for

the retaking the Philippines would not have succeeded. It is interesting to speculate

.· that if this was the case, would the Japanese then have used their consolidated forces

and launched a counter offensive from the Halmahera Islands or the NEI?

7 One other consideration reinforces the vital role of the NW Area campaign. General

MacArthur, at the time of the allied invasion of the Philippines expected that his role

for the remainder of the war would be to neutralise Japanese forces in those islands.

When this was complete his forces would move south to take the NEI. He expected

Admiral Nimitz would command the forces to invade Japan. 6 If this was to be the

proposed strategy then MacArthur's forces would have benefited greatly from the

RAAF's efforts for the same reasons that they gained during their Philippines

campaign.

The allegations that Australia was pushed into the background do not ring true in the

case of the NW Area. The campaign was vital to the overall allied strategy and the ensuing victory. It had to be conducted and if not by the RAAF then perhaps by the

USAAF or even, in the later stages of the war by the RAF. It seems appropriate that the RAAF should conduct one of the most vital campaigns of the Pacific war from

Australian territory.

Perhaps one of the best acknowledgments of the RAAF' s operations in the NW Area may be found in the citation for the Medal of Freedom (Silver Palm) awarded to Air

Vice Marshal WD Bostock-Air Officer Commanding (AOC) RAAF Command- which reads, in part

he maintained the strong air defence of Australia with the utmost efficiency, and most capably provided effective protection for Allied sea routes in Australian waters. Exercising operational command of the Royal Australian Air Force and certain United States and Dutch units,

5 AA A1966/5/95 General-Headquarters Allied Air Forces-South-West Pacific Area. Summary of Daily Messages No. 1285, October 11, 1945. As at October 2, 1945, 341,015 Japanese Army and Navy personnel had surrendered in the SWPA. Of these 161,546 had surrendered in the NEI. 6 TB Allen & N Folmar Codename Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan. Headline, London, UK, 1995. p. 152.

8 he conducted a devastating aerial offensive which struck heavy blows against enemy oil centres, harbour facilities, and air dromes from to , crippling or destroying these vital Japanese installations. Demonstrating his exceptional tactical ability, he directed missions which exacted a heavy toll of enemy shipping and aided in wresting the air initiative over the Netherlands East Indies from the Japanese. 7

7 AA A1067/1/46/35/1/23 Citation For Medal of Freedom (Silver Palm)-Air Vice Marshal W.D. Bostock.

9 Chapter 2. Prelude to 1942

In order to describe the establishment of air power in the NW Area between 1942 and

1945, it is necessary to consider how Australian air power, particularly that deployed

to the area, was expected to be integrated into the overall command and strategy at the

outbreak of the war with Japan.

A great number of questions about the conduct of the Pacific war arise in hindsight

such as why the allies or even the RAAF did not pursue various courses of action.

This chapter is intended as a background to the subsequent chapters in that it serves to

describe some of the decisions, significant events and strategies which impacted on the

RAAF and which influenced the evolution of its organisation and operations. It would be unrealistic to give a complete history of the relationships between countries involved in the Pacific war up until 1941, or to describe in detail the fighting that took plac;e before . 1 Rather, the chapter is necessarily selective.

The term "Pacific war" is frequently used to describe the conflict that began in

December 1941 with Japanese attacks on US and European bases and colonies in and the Pacific, and ended in August 1945 with the Japanese surrender. Australia and consequently the RAAF had been involved in the European war since September 1939, following the then Prime Minister Menzies' announcement that Australia was at war with Germany.

The RAAF entered the Pacific war as a small organisation with few combat aircraft.

Its main function was to train aircrew for the RAF for service in Europe. Its equipment af).d organisation reflected its lack of preparedness for fighting in this part of the world. This situation had an impact on the RAAF in the NW Area, as did other

1 To provide an account of the early phases of the Pacific war would only duplicate many published works. For a commentary on books that provide an overview of the war see J Keegan The Battle for History. Hutchinson, London, UK, 1996. For specific subjects see the titles listed in the bibliography at the end of this thesis.

10 issues such as minimal knowledge of the Japanese forces, the involvement of several

allied powers in the Pacific war, the inclusion of the RAAF in the Allied Air Forces and

the direction ofthe course of the war taken by the United States.

Australia and the Outbreak of the Pacific War

In October 1941 a Labor Government, led by , took office in Australia,

replacing the coalition government of Arthur Fadden? The Labor Government

inherited its predecessors' defence policies of reliance on Britain and the Royal Navy.

Two months later, in early December, the Pacific war began with Japanese military forces attacking US bases in Hawaii and the Philippines and the British colony of

Malaya. The Japanese then embarked on a rapid Asian and Pacific conquest.

Following these conquests it was expected by the majority of Australians, including the

Government, that the mainland of Australia was under imminent threat of Japanese mvas10n.

Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific war, Australian defence policy revolved around a theory that a strong, well defended and unconquered Britain was fundamental to

Australia. Britain would defend Australia and therefore it was in Australia's interests to provide Britain with men and materiel. The defence planning for Australia had hinged upon the ability of the Royal Navy to prevent a potential invader reaching this country and upon the "impregnable" British military base at Singapore. This plan-the

"Singapore Strategy"-was also dependent on the belief that the Royal Navy was

2 To avoid confusion over the personalities who served as Prime Minister at this time the following explanation is given: Menzies was PM at the outbreak of the war and resigned in August 1941. He was replaced on August 29, 1941 by Country Party leader Arthur Fadden, who served until October 7, 1941 when his budget was defeated in the House of Representatives. Fadden was replaced by Labor leader John Curtin who remained in office until his death on July 6, 1945. He was succeeded by Francis Forde, who held office from July 6 to July 13, 1945 when the Labor Caucus elected Ben Chifley as leader.

11 superior to all others.3 Following the outbreak of war, the Royal Australian Navy

(RAN) was deployed to other parts of the world, the 2nd AIF was deployed to the

Middle East, and the RAAF became involved in the Empire Air Training Scheme

(EATS) which was developed as a means to supply the Royal Air Force with trained

aircrew.4 In addition, a large amount of military materiel was sent to Britain. 5

The emergence of a hostile Japan and more specifically the sinking, by aircraft, of two

British capital ships-HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse (sent to South East

Asia as part of the Singapore strategy to counter the Japanese fleet)-and the rapid fall

of Singapore on February 15, 1942 are events that quickly changed contemporary defence thinking. 6

In the meantime some high level planning that would have implications for Australia had occurred on the other side of the world. At the "Arcadia" conferences held in

Washington, in December 1941 and January 1942, between US President Franklin

3 In practice this meant that most of the Royal Australian Navy was attached to the Royal Navy. Singapore was impregnable insofar as it was planned that the base should be able to withstand attack until the RN fleet arrived from the UK. 4 J McCarthy A Last Call of Empire. Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988. This book is the definitive work on the EATS and covers the Scheme from the Australian point of view, from its instigation to its conclusion. The Scheme was a means for supplying the RAF with trained aircrew from of the British Empire (Australia, :t..:ew Zealand, and Southern Rhodesia). Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, EATS was another means by which Australia could provide assistance to Britain. As part of EATS the strength of the RAAF increased with a large number of RAF supplied training aircraft as well as Wirraways and Tiger Moths constructed in Australian factories. However, these were just training aircraft and completely unsuitable for combat in the defence of Australia. After the return of Army units from the Middle East, EATS became Australia's largest contribution to the European War. 5 Including 30,000 Lee Enfield .303 rifles during 1940. Following the defeat at Dunkirk the British Army was short of all weapons. Australia sent these rifles at a time when the production of such weapons at the Lithgow Small Arms Factory equalled 35,040 for the 1940-41 fiscal year. See ID Skinnerton The Lee Enfield Storv. Ashmore City, Qld, 1993. p. 308-310. There are conflicting views on tJ;le preparedness of Australia and the armed forces to fight the Pacific War. For example, Ross has argued that Australia was ready for the Pacific War and that Australian industry, science and technology were key factors in deterring a large scale attack by Japanese forces. See AT Ross Armed and Ready. Turton & Armstrong, Wahroonga, NSW, 1995. 6 Other works have adequately covered most of these events and defence thinking of the time. For example, the development of the Singapore strategy has been described by John McCarthy in Australia and Imperial Defence, while the sinking of the Force Z is described in many works. One of the most recent is Christopher Shores et al Bloody Shambles Volume One. Grub Street, London, 1992. pp. 108-127.

12 Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, proposals for the division of

responsibilities for fighting and defeating the Axis forces were discussed. The two

leaders finally agreed upon the strategic responsibilities for the regions in March 1942. 7

In so far as Australia was concerned the war in the Pacific theatre was designated an

area of primary US strategic responsibility and the Indian Ocean theatre was a British

responsibility. Australia remained entirely in the Southwest Pacific Area of the Pacific

theatre. 8

Other strategic decisions made at the conferences are summarised as a reaffirming of

the "Beat Hitler First" policy and to concentrate on the war in Europe; to pool US and

British military and industrial resources; to establish the American, British, Dutch and

Australian (ABDA) Area Command under General Wavell; and to set up a US and

British Combined Chiefs of Sta:ff 9

Those decisions that would make an impact on Australian planning were the "Beat

Hitler First" strategy and the ABDA Area Command. The "Beat Hitler First" strategy

had been agreed by Roosevelt and his top defence advisers in November 1940. 10 The

strategy meant that a large part of the military resources of Britain and the United

States would be allocated to defeating Germany before Japan. The Pacific war was to

be a holding campaign against the Japanese, based on a secure Australia. Therefore a

7 JJ Dedman The Line in Australian Outlook, Vol. 22, No.2, August 1968. pp. 150-151. 8 The Pacific theatre was divided into three separate areas of responsibility, the (under the command of Admiral CW Nimitz), the Soutli Pacific Area, and the Southwest Pacific Area. The latter two were directly concerned with operations against the Japanese. See Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific. Volume 1. US Government Printing Office. pp. 30-31. Despite Australia's location within the S\VPA, RAN warships served with the RN in the Indian Ocean. 9 D Horner mgh Command. Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1992. pp. 147-148. The principal military advisers to Roosevelt and Churchill were the Combined Chiefs of Staff (comprising the heads of the navy, army and air forces of the US and Britain) who had general jurisdiction over the grand strategic policy and all related factors that were necessary for its implementation, including the allocation of forces and war materials. Ibid. p. 190. 10 J Robertson Australia· and the 'Beat Hitler First' Strategy, 1941-42: A problem in Wartime Consultation in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. VoL XI, No. 3, May 1983. pp, 300-321.

13 secure Australia became very important to Allied strategy. British and US forces in

Europe were to be transferred to the Pacific theatre following the defeat ofGermany. 11

If Australia was invaded on a large scale by the Japanese, Britain had promised to provide a fleet capable of fighting any Japanese force. 12 Homer comments that this undertaking was "militarily worthless". He argues that Japan was only likely to begin a large scale invasion once it had naval domination, had established bases in the region and had neutralised Singapore. In this case, Britain would not be in a position to assist

Australia. 13 Homer points out that Churchill's words caused the Australian defence chiefs to regard the defence of Singapore as being of primary importance as a means to a secure Australia. 14 Thus some of the RAAF' s assets were deployed to Singapore instead of northern bases in mainland Australia.

The "Beat Hitler First" and its implications, would be given as a reason for the initial slow progress of the allied offensive in the SWP A and for a perceived shortage of resources up until VE Day. General MacArthur, the Allied commander in the SWP A, later argued that "Beat Hitler First" hindered his conduct of the war against Japan. 15

High Command in the Pacific

The Pacific commands were put directly under the United States

(JCS). 16 The JCS decided the strategy for US military forces. Under its strategic

11 DA Day Promise and Performance: Britain's Pacific Pledge, 1943-5 in War & Society Vol. 4, No. 2, September 1986. p. 71. 12 WS Churchill The Second World War. Volume II; Their Finest Hour. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, 1988. p. 386. 13 Horner Op cit. p. 38 14 ibid. p. 39. 15 As an example, the conduct of the North African campaign in the second half of 1942 meant that supplies to !he-Pacific theatre were postponed, thus delaying MacArthi.rr's operations. MacArthur also took this move as a slight against himself by Generals Marshall and Eisenhower. See M Schaller Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General. Oxford University Press, New York, 1989. p. 69 16 The JCS was established on February 9, 1942, as a counterpart to the British chiefs of staff and consisted of the heads of the Navy, Army and Army Air Force. From June 1942 the chairman was Admiral William D Leahy (chief of staff to the President). For most of the war the heads of the Services were Admiral Ernest King, US Navy, General George Marshall, US Army and General Hap Arnold, USAAF.

14 ... ' • ; ;:f:~M:idway •.:·:1,-'::. ·.. ' .·::-:·CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA ·.:;:~~~~e... 2-:) . ·. .. PACIFIC .:· .. ~:~A: ..,:· .... ·: ··.;:;:;;.!;;!Marshall Is.

~ ~~;:'m~i: ·-----~=- . · .. · ·:·Y·.~.~1;'Gilbert Is. ~ ... ·;::.~:::.··.' .. '··,,.. . ·: .. OCEAN ~~ o. ~ :::l1"0 n ~ ~· =-~ . )i;NO~: :~!~!if :'!t~s.;~oa ~ . ·:-:.~Hebndes ·~·:p: .. I ~ INDIAN .:A~L .: ·:::';!~ :''';,i\;~~·~ .. ~ AUSTRALIA OCEAN . ·::::·Caledonia. ·.. ·.. ' .::·:::·:

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

. . A. Under South Pacific operational control during Solomons campaign ... direction, area -in-chief directed all US forces in their respective areas (regardless of Service) as well as allied forces. MacArthur's comments to the Australian Government on the command structure was "the greatest weakness of the present set up is that there is too much strategical control in London and Washington". 17

ABDA Command

The command known as ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command) was organised to check Japanese expansion in South East Asia. The ABDA area included Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) the Philippines and the northern area of Australia including Darwin. The British general, Sir Archibald Wavell, assumed command of ABDACOM on January 15, 1942. (Lieutenant General George H Brett United States Army Air Corps-USAAC18-was selected as his deputy.) As supreme commander, Wavell was to hold Burma and the Malay Barrier (a line presumably well anchored at Singapore in the west and extending through the NEI to Australia in the east). He was to achieve air superiority over the area through the concentration of available air assets; re-establish communications with US forces on the Philippine island of Luzon through the NEI; support MacArthur's beleaguered garrison in the Philippines; and, at the earliest opportunity, launch offensive operations designed to roll back the advancing Japanese. 19

Wavell's responsibility was primarily operational. He was to co-ordinate the operations of all forces assigned to the area by the participating governments and arrange for the formation of task forces to undertake specific missions. For command of these missions he was to designate officers of his choice, regardless of seniority or

17 AA A5954/46/814/1 minute 967; June 17, 1942. 18 The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) had been created on June 20, 1941. However, it was not until a fundamental re-organisation of the US War Department on March 9, 1942 that the USAAF was made one of the three co-equal autonomous branches of the US Army. Craven and Cate QJ!.Q!. p. 115. 19 ibid. pp. 367-368.

15 nationality. Wavell was the contact point between the various commanders and their governments. In addition to the Japanese advance, ABDACOM had its problems from the outset which largely revolved around the novelty of the undertaking; the demand for haste in its formation; the vastness of the area involved; the absence of adequate communication facilities; and the lack of other aids which could have been provided as a result of comprehensive planning. 20

In practice the British forces fought in Burma and Malaya while the major responsibility for the air defence of the NEI was given to the USAAC. In regard to

Australia's contribution, Craven and Cate note that the contribution to be expected from the RAAF was limited. They state, quite correctly, that much of the RAAF' s strength in Australasia consisted of obsolescent planes while demands for a defence of

Australian territory were immediately pressing. 21 Even so, the RAAF contributed aircraft and pilots to the campaign in Malaya and the NEI. Unfortunately, the RAAF' s

HudsoQ.s, Wirraways and Buffalos lacked the performance of the Japanese aircraft and suffered heavy losses. 22

The ABDA partners had greatly underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese military forces. This, together with the lack of suitable military equipment and the command problems noted above, gave the Japanese the advantage that allowed them to overrun the ABDA defended countries. The most significant Japanese conquest, as far as Australia was concerned, was Singapore on February 15, 1942. ABDACOM was dissolved on February 25. Further resistance against the Japanese was controlled

20 ibid. pp. 368-370. 21 ibid. p. 372: . 22 Generally the ABDA air forces suffered badly at the hands of the Japanese air forces. Surprisingly, despite its poor performance, RAAF Brewster F-2A Buffalo aircraft achieved a 2 to 1 kill ratio over Japanese aircraft. J Maas F2A Buffalo in Action. Squadron/Signal Publications, Carrollton, Tx, 1987. p. 29. Even so, the Japanese possessed a greater number of aircraft and the losses sustained by 21 and 453 SQNs led to combining the two squadron's aircraft and the eventual disbanding of 453 SQN. See also J Rawlings Fighter Squadrons of the Royal Air Force and their Aircraft p. 445 and JR Grant Buffalos in the RAAF in Flightpath Vol. 2, No. 1, October 1989, pp. 76-79.

16 from three separate centres: , where Wavell remained in control of the land forces; Australia, where MacArthur became supreme commander; and Hawaii, where

Nimitz directed the US Pacific Fleet. 23 The surviving RAAF units returned to

Australia.

The Invasion Threat

Four days after the surrender of Singapore Japanese aircraft carried out their first bombing raids on Darwin. Australia appeared open to Japanese invasion. On March

9, 1942, the Australian War Cabinet was told by its military advisers that an anticipated

Japanese invasion would include attacks on Darwin, and New Caledonia during March and April, culminating in attacks on the Australian east coast during May.24

The Japanese Navy high command favoured an invasion of Australia. In December

1941 they calculated three divisions would be needed to secure footholds on the north­ west and north-east coasts. According to Homer, these plans were strongly resisted by the Japanese Army, which estimated that it would need at least ten or twelve divisions for such an invasion. The Army considered that these divisions could not be spared from China or Manchuria, where they were based in case of war with the Soviet

Union. In addition, a major assault on Australia would require between one and a half and two million tons of shipping which was unavailable as it was required to transport raw materials back to Japan from the newly conquered states in South East Asia. The

Army favoured an invasion of Burma and India.

Not all the Japanese Navy staff supported the Australian invasion. Instead Admiral

Yamamoto favoured drawing the US Navy into battle at Midway Island. A compromise was reached within the Japanese high command. The invasions of

Australia and India were put aside. It was agreed to isolate Australia by capturing Port

23 G Long MacArthur as Military Commander. Angus and Robertson, , NSW, 1969. p. 81. 24 D Day The Great Betrayal. WW Norton & Company, New York, NY, 1989. p. 289.

17 Moresby, the Solomons, , Samoa and New Caledonia. The thinking was that an

isolated Australia could no longer serve as a base for the US forces. For the allies the security of Australia would therefore depend on the defence of Port Moresby. Should

it be captured the Japanese then could move into northern if they so

wished. 25

Australia and US Forces

We should now go back a few months to consider the Australian/US relationship. On

September 24, 1940, the Australian War Cabinet discussed the use by US forces of

bases in Australia and the Pacific in the event of war in this theatre. 26 It was

considered to be advantageous for the US to have access to such bases if they were to

undertake offensive action against Japan. Singapore and Manila were considered by

Cabinet to be the final operational bases, but if the Japanese attacked the NEI, then

Darwin and Port Moresby would become important. Cabinet, however, was still

thinking of the US forces in terms of their navy but realised that air and army units would be necessary for the security of the bases-shore based aircraft would be

required for reconnaissance. Therefore, Cabinet concluded that access to Australian and Pacific Island bases would allow the US to use their bases in the Philippines for offensive action if attacked and would assist in maintaining the status quo in the NEI because of "the potential threat from the USA Fleet" ?7 The Australian Government agreed to the construction or upgrading of air bases in the country, including the

airfield at Darwin.

25 D Horner Defending Australia in 1942 in War & Society. Vol. 11, No. 1, May 1993. pp. 4-5. 26 EJ Drea 'Great Patience is Needed' in War & Society. Vol. 11, No. 1, May 1993. p. 21. For details of US plans for war with Japan see TB Allen & NPolmar ~- pp. 11-33. The US Navy had, since 1897 prepared plans for war against, and the invasion of, Japan. These plans, codenamed "Orange" depended on the sea-borne invasions of the Japanese occupied Pacific islands, culminating in the invasion of Japan. The "Orange" plans did not include a role for Australia 27 AA A 5954/46/804/1 Cabinet minute 526; September 24, 1940.

18 Consequently the US had begun a build up of materiel and a supply infrastructure in

Australia, even before the "Arcadia" conference and the "Beat Hitler First" decision.

The USAAC had planned, before the attack on Hawaii, to use Australian airfields as part of a ferry route for aircraft bound for the Philippines. Rorrison comments that the

international situation had convinced the USAAC that the time to dispatch fighters to

Manila by sea was gone and the air route from Australian was the best option left.Z8

The air routes then stretched from the sea ports on the eastern Australian coast to

Darwin and thence to the Philippines via Timor, the Celebes and Borneo. The ferry

route was used frequently by US aircraft, including B-17 s and B-18s, before December 1941. The Air Board was advised of each aircraft movement because as CAS, Air

Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, explained to MacArthur "all aircraft landing in

Australia come under my direction". 29

The use of the ferry route was noted by Major General Lewis H Brereton (commander

of the USAAF's Air Force-FEAF-based in the Philippines) who undertook a brief inspection tour of airfields in Australia in early January 1942. This tour pleased Australian politicians because it suggested, at last, American military interest in the region. 30 However, the defence of Australia was still not a feature of Brereton's planning, despite "heavy political pressure". Brereton advised Menzies, Sir Frederick Shedden (the Secretary of the Department of Defence Co-ordination), and the CAS, that his mission was to keep open the lines of communication to the Philippine Islands and to support the defence of the Philippines. Brereton advised Burnett that he proposed to use Darwin as a temporary base for operations from advanced landing grounds in the Philippines. He asked for the RAAF to provide one radio circuit and

28 JD Rorrison Nor the Years Contemn: Air War on the Australian Front 1941-42. Palomar Publications, Hamilton Central, Queensland, 1992. pp. 8-9 29 AA A1196/6/60/501/76 Movement of U.S. Aircraft from Philippines to Darwin. Telex from CAS to Brereton, November 1941. 30 Rorrison Qn...Q!!. p. 8 .. Brereton observed the arrival of Douglas A-24 dive bombers and Curtis P- 40 fighters in Brisbane-the convoy transporting them was diverted to Australia, following the Japanese invasion of the Philippines.

19 necessary personnel for passing operational directions between Darwin and Manila 31

Brereton told the Australians that the fighting in the Malay Peninsula or Singapore was

not within the US jurisdiction and he would not contemplate the employment of any

forces for combat there, without direct orders from the US government. 32

In 1942 the US and Australia were drawn together through a logistic system created

out of necessity to counter the Japanese advances. Australia became a base for US

troops and materiel needed to defend the Philippines and the NEI. Drea writes that the

Americans did not come to assist Australia. They came because the only way to reach

the beleaguered Philippines was northward from Australia. The first official proposal

(after the attack on Hawaii) to use Australia as a base for the defence of the southwest

Pacific was put forward on December 14, 1941, when the War Plans Division of the

War Department recommended to General. Marshall that Australia serve as the supply

base .to support operations in the Philippines where General MacArthur had to be

resupplied and reinforced with all due speed. 33

In the meantime the US forces fighting in the Philippines were retreating to the Bataan

peninsula following the Japanese landing on Luzon. General Douglas MacArthur was

the commanding general of US Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The US

Forces in the Philippines included the FEAF, equipped with B-17 bombers and

Curtis P-40 and Seversky P-35 fighters. MacArthur had the strongest American air

force outside the United States. It comprised 277 aircraft and included 35 heavy bombers and approximately 100 fighters. The Japanese, however, had almost twice

31 AA A1196/6/60/501/74 American Reinforcement of the Philippines. Telex from CAS to Air Board, Dec~mber 22, 1941. 32 LH Brereton The Brereton Diaries. Da Capo Press, New York, NY. 1976. pp. 74-75 33 Drea op cit. p. 22. As noted, the JCS had already decided to bolster Australia for use in a future offensive against Japan. By March, 1942, approximately 80,000 troops had been sent to the country, with an additional 200,000 scheduled to go later in 1942. Although MacArthur had expressed disappointment with the paltry resources at his command (and the plans to assist Britain as a higher priority), ·these forces, with accompanying aircraft actually represented the largest concentration of American power outside the Western hemisphere during the early stages of the war. See Schaller Qp_Qt. p. 62.

20 the number of aircraft, flown by experienced pilots. 34 While the were amongst the most modern in the US arsenal, their performance was inferior to their ' Japanese counterparts. Thus when the fighting started, the FEAF was unable to make any significant impact on the Japanese forces. 35 MacArthur would later claim that his ground forces had been let down by the USAAF.

On February 24, 1942, Roosevelt gave the order for MacArthur to leave the

Philippines and proceed to Australia to reorganise the American offensive against

Japan, the primary objective being the relief of the Philippines. 36 Travelling by PT boat and B-17 aircraft, MacArthur, his family and personal staff reached Darwin on March

17 and Melbourne four days later. 37 Prime Minister Curtin had not been informed of

MacArthur's escape or arrival in the country until Brett advised him, on March 17, of

Roosevelt's message that MacArthur had been appointed to command all US Army

Forces in Australia. 38

The message from Roosevelt suggested that MacArthur should be appointed Supreme

Commander of all allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. The appointment was considered by the Australian War Cabinet, which agreed MacArthur's leadership of the allied forces would be an inspiration to the Australian people and all forces serving

34 RH Spector Eagle Against the Sun. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, 1987. p. 108. 35 Early on December 8, 1941, after receiving information on the attack on Hawaii, Brereton requested permission from MacArthur to use the B-17s for a retaliatory bombing raid on Japanese bases on Formosa. Permission for the raid was not given until late in the morning. Two squadrons ~f the aircraft were still on the ground, at Clark Field, being fuelled and armed when they were destroyed by a Japanese air raid. See Spector ibid. pp. 107-108 and L McAulay Battle of the Bismarck Sea. StMartin's Press, New York, NY, 1991. p. 2. · 36 By January 5, 1942, the US and Philippine forces had retreated to Bataan and MacArthur had established his HQ on the fortress island of Corregidor. The US forces at Bataan surrendered on April9, 1942 and those on Corregidor on May 6. 37 W American Caesar. Arrow Books, London, UK, 1979. p. 247. 38 D McCarthy Australia in the War of 1939-1945: South-West Pacific Area-First Year, to Wau. AWM, Canberra, 1962. p. 17.

21 under his command. 39 The following day Curtin announced the news of MacArthur's

arrival to the Australian people, who greeted it with enthusiasm. 40

On April3, 1942, MacArthur was issued with his directive as Supreme Commander of

the SWP A and of all armed forces assigned to the Area. The directive told MacArthur

that his operations' were to accomplish the following:

(a) Hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive action against Japan, and in order to check the Japanese conquest of the Southwest Pacific Area.

(b) Check the enemy advance towards Australia and its essential lines of communication by the destruction of enemy combatant, troop, and supply ships, aircraft, and bases in Eastern and the New Guinea-Bismarck Sea-Solomon Islands Region.

(c) Exert economic pressure on the enemy by destroying vessels carrying raw materials from the recently conquered territories to Japan.

(d) Maintain our position in the Philippines Islands. (e) Protect land, sea, and air communications within the Southwest Pacific Area, and its close approaches.

(f) Route shipping in the Southwest Pacific Area.

(g) Support the operations of friendly forces in the Pacific Ocean Area and the Indian Theatre.

41 (h) Prepare to take the offensive. .

The actions arising from several of these points would keep the RAAF in the NW Area

occupied for the remainder of the war.

39 AA A5954/46/808/1 Cabinet minute 2021; March 17, 1942 40 Roosevelt's suggestion was welcomed by the Australian Chiefs of Staff, as they had, at the time of MacArthur's arrival, completed a report in which they agreed that the supreme commander of the SWPA should be an American and that he should be located in Australia. 41 Robertson & McCarthy op cit. pp. 303-304.

22 On April 17 the Australian Government approved the recommendations of its chiefs of staff and assigned all combat sections of the Australian defence forces to the SWP A, under its Supreme Commander. 42 Australian military commanders were advised that, as from April 18, 1942, all orders and instructions issued by the Supreme Commander in conformity with his directive should be considered as emanating from the Australian

Government. 43 As far as the RAAF was concerned, all service squadrons, but not training units, were attached to MacArthur's command. 44 This marked a departure from the established precedent in that, for the first time, Australian forces were handed over to the control of a foreign (i.e. non British Empire) power.-

As Commander in Chief, MacArthur issued orders direct to Australian commanders.

His communication with the Australian Government was with the Prime Minister and

Minister for Defence, John Curtin, with the Department of Defence as the only intermediary.

The Southwest Pacific Area

The area ofland and sea that constituted the SWP A was defined as:

The westerly boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area is the westerly boundary of the Pacific theatre, the area including necessary naval and air operational areas off the West Coast of Australia. The north and east boundaries of the Southwest Pacific Area run as follows: From Cape Kami (Luichow Peninsula) south to Latitude 20 North; thence east to Longitude 13 0 East; thence south to the Equator; thence east to Longitude 165 East; south to Latitude 10 South; southwesterly to Latitude 17 South, Longitude 160 East; thence south. 45

The SWPA came into being at 1400 GMT on April 18, 1942. On that same date

MacArthur, by agreement of the Governments of Australia, the UK, the Netherlands and the USA was appointed commander in chief and proceeded to establish his

42 AA A5954/46/808/l Cabinet minute 2109; April17, 1942. 43 P Hasluck The Government and the People 1942-1945. p. 113 44 AA A5954/46/808/l Cabinet minute 2109; Aprill7, 1942. 45 Robertson & McCarthy op cit. p. 305.

23 Map 1.2 Southwest Pacific Area July 26, 1942

MILES 500 0 500 1000 H R H 3 LEGEND CHINA - Theater Boundary Japanese Line of Penetration ~#/&'////- Australian Defense Areas

•' cP OKINAWA

OFORMOSA 'IWO JIMA Hong Kong

130"( MARIANAS ISLANDS

MARSHAll ISlANDS

!59"( o·

b NEW HEBRIDES ~>'

NEW ~ "• CALEDONIA~ • A U S

AUSTRALIA

NEW~( TASMAN SEA ??

Map Copied From N Tunney Gateway to Victory. Myla Graphics, Brisbane, Queensland. 1991. General Headquarters (GHQ) in Melboume. 46 The forces assigned to him were

organised into five subordinate commands, largely for the purpose of operational

control.47 The ground troops were designated the Allied Land Forces and placed under

the command of General Blarney. The United States Army Forces in Australia were

commanded by Major General Barnes, while the United States Forces in the

Philippines were under Lieutenant General Wainwright. The naval elements assigned

to the Allied Naval Forces were under the command of Admiral Leary. Command of

the USAAF tactical and service units, together with operational control of the combat·

elements of the RAAF and the NEI Army Air Forces was assigned to the Allied Air

-Forces (AAF) commanded by Lieutenant General Brett. 48 In the case of the RAAF this ' meant that operational control of the squadrons and necessary operational

headquarters was vested in the Commander of the Allied Air Forces. CAS remained

responsible for all matters associated with RAAF personnel, provision and maintenance

of aircraft, supply and equipment, works and buildings, and training. 49

Allied Strategy

MacArthur's strategy was to move from the defence to the offence by abandoning the

defensive plan known as the Brisbane Line, 50 moving allied forces forward into eastern

1 Papua and stopping the Japanese advance on the . 5

Homer points out that the Australian high command were already working on their

own plans to defend Australia before MacArthur's arrival. This included a rapid build

up of the in Darwin to counter an expected Japanese invasion from

2 the NEI and the development of as a base. 5 In addition the high command recognised that the "critical point" was Port Moresby, and that if sufficient naval and

46 AWM 54 81/2/17, SWPA General Order No.1, April18, 1942. 47 Reports of General MacArthur. The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific Volume 1. pp. 32-34 48 AWM 54 81/2/17. SWPA General Order No.1, April18, 1942. 49 AA A5954/46/808/1. Cabinet minute 2127; April28, 1942. 50 JJ Dedman The Brisbane Line in Australian Outlook. Vol. 22, No.2, August 1968. pp. 150-151. 51 D MacArthur Reminiscences. Heinmann, London, UK, 1964. p. 152. 52 D Homer Crisis of Command. pp. 72-74

24 air forces could be found, Australia could be defended there. 53 MacArthur told the

Advisory War Council, on June 17, 1942, that the Allies should take the initiative

rather than wait for the results of fighting in other theatres. The aim should be to

strike at Japanese bases in the islands to the north and to "throw the enemy bomber

line back 700 miles". His aim then was to retake New Guinea and Rabaul and then

make a thrust to the Philippines or move through the NEI to Malaya-the former was

the more favourable. 54

The important issue for this thesis is that the defence of Australia and much of the subsequent offensive action was to take place in north-eastern Australia and New

Guinea. Despite some planning at different stages during the war to include the NEI,

the allied operations would not include a major offensive from north-west Australia.

The Allied Air Forces

The Allied Air Forces (AAF) of the Southwest Pacific Area were formed on April 22, 1942. The AAF comprised units from Australia, the US and the NEI. 55

Brett was initially the Allied commander in Australia but relinquished this position

upon the arrival of MacArthur. Brett then succeeded Brereton as commander AAF.

Spector notes that MacArthur's air forces were formidable on paper but many of the

air crews and their equipment were worn out from fighting in the NEI while other

pilots were newly arrived in the SWP A and inexperienced. Of the approximately 500 aircraft in the AAF only about 200 were operational. 56

53 ibid. p. 74. 54 AA A5954/46/814/1 Advisory War Council minute 967; June 17, 1942. 55 US Survey Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan. p. 4. 56 Spector Qp_Q!. p. 159.

25 Unfortunately for Brett, the relationship between himself and MacArthur (and some of

MacArthur's staff officers) was not a happy one. MacArthur felt that the Air Force had let him down in the Philippines and Brett represented the Air Force. 57 Following adverse reports by MacArthur, Brett was replaced as commander of the AAF by Major General George C Kenney. 58

General George Kenney

George Kenney was a career military officer who joined the US Army Air Corps in

1917 and flew combat missions in during World War One. Following the war ' he remained in the Service where he developed innovative theories on attack aviation.

At the outbreak of the Second World War he was commanding the USAAF's Fourth

Air Force. He was sent to the SWPA to command the Fifth Air Force. Kenney arrived in Australia in late July 1942 and took command of the Allied Air Forces on

August 4. 59

Wolk describes the status of the USAAF in Australia, in August 1942, as a terrible situation which Kenney moved quickly to rectify. He scrapped what he considered to be a chaotic organisation and created clear lines of authority. Faced with severe shortages of aircraft and equipment, he instituted new supply and maintenance programs. Kenney was perhaps the most innovative air commander of the war. 60

57 Brett's situation was also complicated by the fact that the US had no separate air force. Up until 1947 the USAAF was part of the US Army. MacArthur allowed his chief of staff, Major General Sutherland to dictate practically every action of the Air Force. See N Baker A Higher Plane: Land/Air Operations in the South West Pacific 1942-1945 in J Grey and P Dennis (eds) From Past to Future: the Australian Experience of Land/Air Operations. ADFA, Canberra, 1995. p. 71. 58 Homer High Command. p. 353. 59 At its meeting on August 13, 1942, the Advisory War Council noted that the Australian Government had not been consulted in regard to the replacement of Brett by Kenney. AA A5954/46/814/1 Advisory War Council minute 1032. 60 HS Wolk George C Kenney; MacArthur's Premier Airman in WM Leary We Shall Return: Macarthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, 1942-1945. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 1988. p. 88.

26 The Fifth Air Force was described by MacArthur as a tactical unit with command,

communications, combat and service elements. 61 Kenney was thus commander of the

AAF and the Fifth Air Force. He appointed Brigadier General Ennis C Whitehead as

deputy commander and placed him directly in charge of the Fifth Air Force, Advance

Echelon (ADVON) at Port Moresby. This move allowed Kenney the freedom to

manage the AAF and to provide advice to MacArthur. 62 There was to be flexible

movement of units between RAAF Command and the Fifth Air Force. 63 Similarly there

was to be a combined headquarters staffed by officers from the allied air forces.

However, this last initiative soon disappeared as Air Vice Marshal Bostock noted,

"The combined staff arrangement is retained, in principle, at Allied Air Headquarters

only". 64

Kenney's first action was to separate the USAAF and the RAAF into two distinct

commands. The USAAF, along with No.9 Operational Group RAAF, was designated the Fifth Air Force and allocated responsibility for operations in the north eastern part

of the Australian continent and for Papua and New Guinea. The bulk of the RAAF

along with a handful of USAAF and Dutch units became RAAF Command. This force was given responsibility for the defence of mainland Australia and for reconnaissance

and bomber operations flown from Darwin against the Japanese in the NEI. 65 Craven

and Cate note that this arrangement was not inflexible and that "RAAF squadrons were

attached to the Fifth Air Force and repeatedly participated in its operations, while the

Fifth frequently furnished units to its ally on request". 66

61 A WM 54/81/2/10. Letter to Curtin from MacArthur, January 11, 1943. 62 WF Craven and JL Cate The Army Air Forces in World War 11; Volume Four; The Pacific: to Saipan. August 1942 to July 1944. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ill, 1965. p. 99. 63 G Odgers Australia in the War of 1939-1945: Air War Against Japan 1943-1945. AWM, Canberra, 1957. p. 8. 64 AA A5954/l/238/l RAAF Command-Organisation, WD Bostock, January 3, 1943 (NB dated January 3, 1942). 65 Baker op cit. p. 75. 66 Craven & Cate The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume IV; The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan. August 1942 to July 1944. p. 99.

27 Kenney justified his decision to separate the USAAF and RAAF units by arguing that

in the event of the USAAF moving forward from Australia, the RAAF organisation would remain intact (a move that in hindsight seems consistent with MacArthur's

strategy to retake the Philippines). Separate organisations eliminated the difficulties in framing common instructions for USAAF and RAAF units (confusion had apparently arisen around differences in the organisation and administrative systems). Kenney further argued that separation would reduce the number of subordinate commanders that he had to deal with to two (Whitehead and Bostock). 67

Alan Stephens has commented that placing the RAAF' s operational squadrons into the

Allied Air Forces was consistent with such air power tenets as unity, concentration and economy of effort. Unfortunately the way in which it was done meant that the control of operations and administration within the RAAF had been divided and that the lines of authority and responsibility were not always clearly established. 68

MacArthur was justifiably proud of his air commander and wrote, many years later, of

Kenney's aggressive vision, mastery of air tactics and strategy and the ability to exact the maximum in fighting qualities from both men and equipment. 69 Kenney's innovative approach suited MacArthur's strategies for the defence of Australia, the subsequent campaign to regain the Philippines and eventually defeat the Japanese.

Briefly, Kenney's idea was that the cheapest place to destroy the Japanese air forces was on the ground. He thus switched from Brett's defensive strategy to a highly offensive campaign within three days of his arrival in Australia.

67 AA A1969/100/6/320/5CI Organisation Allied Air Forces. Letter from General Kenney to CAS; August 27, 1942. "Organisation Allied Air Forces". 68 A Stephens The Command of the RAAF in M Lax (ed) Air Power Presentations 1995. APSC, Canberra, 1995. p. 43. 69 D MacArthur Reminiscences. Heinemann, London, 1964. p. 157. Kenney, he wrote, through his extraordinary capacity to improvise and improve, took a substandard force and welded it into a weapon so deadly as to take command of the air whenever it engaged the enemy, even at apparent odds.

28 Kenney's goal was to find and destroy enemy aircraft on the ground. The key to the

campaign was the availability of ground forces to seize and hold air bases from which

operations directed deeper into Japanese held territory could be conducted?0 This

objective was supported by aerial attacks on the logistic system that supplied the

Japanese forces, an important role that, as the war progressed, would be undertaken by the RAAF in the NW Area.

So only part of Kenney's approach to air fighting was applied in the NW Area as there was no advance by surface forces supported by the AAF. Instead, as we will see in later chapters, the AAF in the NW Area adopted methods of long range air warfare such as ground attack, shipping interdiction, bombing and minelaying when suitable aircraft became available.

Command Arrangements for the RAAF

The RAAF was beset with problems in its high command from the start of the war. From its formation the RAAF had been part of a defence structure that was dominated by the Navy and Army. 71 Consequently, when the RAAF went to war in 1939, its squadrons and aircraft types were still based, to a large extent on carrying out Navy and Army tasks. The principal body established to administer and control the Air Force was the Air Board. 72

At the outbreak of the Pacific war the RAAF was commanded by Air Chief Marshal

Sir Charles Burnett. 73 Burnett, an RAF officer and a strong advocate of imperial

70 JA Warden The Air Campaign. Pergamon-Brassey's, New York, NY, 1989. p. 26. 71 The structuJ.:e, role and development of the Services prior to the Second World War has been described in several sources including J McCarthy Australia and Imperial Defence: A Study in Air and Sea Power. University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1976; CD Coultard-Clark The Third Brother. Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1991, R Williams These are Facts. AWM, Canberra, 1977; and A Stephens The Command ofthe RAAF in Lax (ed) op cit. 72 Williams QQ...Q!. p. 138. 73 Prior to his appointment as CAS, Burnett had been Inspector-General of the RAF, a position Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams described as a means of continuing in employment an officer who had completed a term in a senior appointment and who had only a short period to serve before his

29 defence, with a forceful personality, considered that his main purpose was to train

aircrew for the RAF. He showed little interested in the home-defence of Australia. In

his view the defence of Australia rested in the Singapore base. 74

Burnett served as CAS until April 4, 1942. His role in this position has been described

by Stephens as an RAF officer who had filled the post without particular distinction for

the previous two years. 75 While in office he paid little heed to the formalities of the

RAAF command arrangements. He rode rough-shod over the Air Board, ignoring the

members' collective responsibility and acting as though he were a Commander in Chief

as he sought to implement the provisions of EATS as quickly and as broadly as

possible. 76

Following his retirement, the Government replaced Burnett with Air Vice Marshal

George Jones. 77 This promotion was to cause a split between the operational and

support sections of the RAAF that would remain for the duration of the war. A feud

developed between Jones and the operational commander Air Vice Marshal William D

retirement. See Williams op cit. p. 246. Prior to his appointment Burnett had not been to Australia nor had any knowledge of it. However, Burnett had served with Williams in the Middle East in 1918. See M Lax The Impact of Technology and Command on No 1 Squadron Operations 1916-1958. MA (Hons) thesis, University ofNSW, 1996. 74 Homer High Command. p. 28. 75 A Stephens Power plus Attitude. AGPS, Canberra, 1992. p. 64. 76 A Stephens The Office ofthe Chief ofthe Air Staff in A Stephens (ed) Australia's Air Chiefs. Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992. p. 7. Burnett's achievements have been the subject of debate. He was the driving force behind the formation of the Women's Auxiliary Australian Air Force. See JA Thompson The WAAAF in Wartime Australia Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1992. pp. 45-46. He was also responsible for the formation of the RAAF Nursing Service; the Directorate of Medical Services; the inspectorate of Air Accidents and the Directorate of PUblic Relations. See NK Quamby Regrettable at Best? A Reappraisal of Sir Charles Burnett's Effect on the Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942. BA Honours thesis, Dept of History, RMC Canberra. 1985. p. 38. 77 AA A5954/46/808/l Cabinet minute 2130 of May 5, 1942 confirmed the appointment of George Jones as CAS. Air Vice Marshal Jones was not the most senior of RAAF officers at the time and his rapid elevation from a temporary Group Captain and acting Air Commodore to Air Vice Marshal meant that he passed over eight officers who were senior to him. See CD Coulthard­ ClarkAn Extraordinary Group of People: Personalities from the 1920s to the 1970s in Stephens (ed) Op cit. p. 28.

30 Bostock which became possibly the most detrimental issue to the professional standing

ofthe Service during the war. 78

The RAAF's command situation was not lost on Kenney, who commented on the

situation and gave his own views ofthe divided command structure:

As a matter of fact, except for the feud which sometimes was a nuisance, I liked the situation as it was. I considered Bostock the better combat leader and field commander and I preferred Jones as the RAAF administrative and supply head. 79 Bostock commanded the operational part of the Air Force. Jones was to provide him with materiel and trained personnel to maintain the operational force. In theory this should have worked with few problems. In fact the two fought for the rest of the war over who commanded and/or controlled what, and whether Bostock's first responsibility was to CAS and the Air Board or to General Kenney. 80 The RAAF became divided along lines of those that supported either Jones or Bostock. In the case of the NW Area it meant that the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) was dependent on

Jones for personnel and aircraft but relied on operational direction from Bostock.

78 M Lax A Short History ofthe RAAFin Lax (ed) Op cit. p. 160. 79 GC Kenney General Kenney Reports. Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, NY, 1949. p. 80. Kenney later advised Bostock "I not only sincerely believe you the best qualified officer in the R.A.A.F. to handle operations but am especially desirous of having you on my side all the way back to Tokio (sic)". See AA A5954/l/238/l Minute from General Kenney to Air Vice Marshal Bostock, date bllirred 1942. Following the end of the war in a letter to the Prime Minister, Kenney stated "In planning, directing and coordinating the operations of air units of Australia, and the Netherlands and from time to time, certain American units as well, Air Vice­ Marshal Bostock showed himself to be an outstanding executive and commander. Charged with the air defence of Australia during a most critical stage of the war in the Pacific, he played a part in those operations which saved Australia and wrested air superiority from the Japanese". See AA A816/l/66/301/177A minute from General Kenney to PM, Commonwealth. of Australia, November 17, 1945. 80 A Stephens The Command ofthe RAAFin Lax (ed) op cit. p. 43.

31 RAAF Command

Initially the RAAF component of the AAF was known as The Coastal Command,

Allied Air Forces. It was constituted on September 5, 1942, with Air Vice Marshal Bostock as AOC and with its headquarters located in Brisbane. The Coastal

Command comprised all RAAF operational units including operational headquarters

and other allied units attached to it. 81 The title Coastal Command suggested to Curtin

the possibility that the RAAF's squadrons may be used in defensive or secondary roles.

On his instigation the title was changed. 82 On September 21, 1942, the Coastal

Command Allied Air Forces was redesignated RAAF Command, Allied Air Forces. 83

Tramoundanis notes that the arrangement afforded Bostock the rare opportunity to

function as an operational level commander (possibly the only time an RAAF officer has been in this situation). 84

Aircraft Shortages

A major problem the RAAF had to contend with for much of the war was a severe

shortage of aircraft. The shortage and its implications was recognised by the Air

Board even before the outbreak of the war. When providing details of the RAAF' s

mobilisation plans, in August 1938, the Secretary of the Board advised the Secretary of

the Department of Defence that these plans were in embryo stage only and added:

Actually at the present stage of Air Force development, mobilisation plans are of little value. The Air Force could not be brought up to war strength in the present circumstances owing to the serious lack of Air Force equipment in the country. When the present Development Programp1e is complete the Air Force will either hold or have under its control sufficient aircraft and equipment with which to mobilise. Thus,

81 A WM 54; Allied Air Forces General Orders No. 47; September 5, 1942. 82 Robertson & McCarthy op cit. pp. 340-341. 83 A WM 54; Allied Air Forces General Orders No. 53; September 21, 1942. 84 D Tramoundanis Australian Air Power in Joint Operations. APSC, Canberra, 1995. p. 2.

32 so far as this Service is concerned, in implementing the Development Programme it is proceeding with its mobilisation plans. 85

McCarthy commented that to plan for future war in such circumstances "was quite impossible". Furthermore there seemed to be no way that the shortage of aircraft could be overcome. Given the nature of imperial defence, such equipment was on order from the UK. However, British planning was for a European war and air parity with Germany, therefore aircraft and materiel were required for RAF squadrons first and then for European allies. There was little to spare for a on the other side of the world.86

At the start of the Pacific war the RAAF had insufficient aircraft for the role of maintaining a defensive, reconnaissance or strike force in vital centres around

Australia. Jones noted after the war:

The outbreak of war found us at RAAF Headquarters working hard to build up an operational force with which to meet the coming storm. For three years we had been trying to buy up to date aircraft with little success. 87

The role of the RAAF in Australian defence had increased due to the shortage of naval forces in the region. By December 1941 the RAAF was responsible for maintaining an outer reconnaissance and striking force capacity over an area stretching from New

Zealand through New Caledonia, New Hebrides, the Solomons, New Guinea to the NEI. In addition it was to conduct inner reconnaissance around Australia, primarily

85 AA A705/35/501/14 Mobilisation-General Policy File. Minute Secretary of the Air Board to the Secretary Department of Defence. August 17, 1938. 86 J McCarthy Planning for Future War 1919-1941 in Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire No. 72, 1990. p. 118. It should be remembered that pre-war, the RAAF's preference was for British equipment. 87 G Jones Australia's Shield and Spear in Aircraft. April 1951. p. 21. Jones's remark is contradicted by Hall who states that Canada had offered Hurricanes and the US had offered the superb P-38 Lightning fighters in early 1941. Both were rejected~the Hurricane was said to have insufficient range while Bostock claimed the P-38 was dangerous to fly. These arguments are more pointed when it is noted that the Hurricane was fitted with long range tanks when used in North and Burma and the P-38 became the most important USAAF fighter of the Pacific war. See Hall Op cit. p: 104. With its exceptional range and twin engine reliability the P-38 would have been the ideal fighter to base in the NW Area. Approximately 9,393 P-38s were built and the type was flown by the two top scoring USAAF fighter aces.

33 over the Arafura, Coral and Tasman Seas and the southwest approaches to

Fremantle. 88 A very large area for a Service with less than 200 front line aircraft.

The Australian Government could procure aircraft overseas or manufacture them locally. As Australia had a very small local aircraft industry, the logical conclusion was to import until the local industry could be expanded. The two major sources of aircraft were the US and the UK, although Japan was at one time considered as a source for training aircraft. 89

The RAAF continued to expand as the war progressed. By June 1940 it was considered that 19 squadrons were required (of which three were based overseas).

When asked by the Attorney-General (WM Hughes) whether this was adequate for the air defence of Australia, CAS replied that. with the completion of the delivery of 100

Hudsons, the procurement of seven Catalinas and the increased production of

Wirraways: that a sufficient striking force would be available to make an aggressor think seriously before attacking. The force in course of development and under training for the Empire Scheme would be sufficient for our needs, and if we obtained the aircraft proposed we would be safe.

The Cabinet minute recording the above advice notes that "safe" meant to implement obligations under EATS, not safe from an attack by a powerful enemy. 90

In December 1941 the Australian Government approached the British Government with the aim of obtaining more aircraft from US sources through the Lend Lease scheme. It was stated that, at the time, the RAAF had 17 Consolidated PBY Catalinas and 53 Lockheed Hudsons (of which 24 were in the NEI or were about to go there-

39 had even arrived in Australia without gun turrets or armament). One hundred and one Wirraways were available as a first line striking force but it was recognised their

88 NLA PRO Reel 6791/611 Construction of US Aircraft in Australia, cipher telegram from Australian Government toDominions Office. December 12, 1941. 89 AA A5954/46/803/1 Cabinet minute 63; October 25, 1939. 90 AA A5954/46/803/l Cabinet minute 299; June 5, 1940.

34 radius of action and armaments were limited. At the same time a second line striking

force could be formed from Fairey Battles, Ansons and Wirraways taken from training

schools. However, these aircraft were not fully armed and their use in the defence of

Australia would lead to delays in aircrew training. 91

The Government considered the return of 3 and 10 SQNs (from the Middle East and

the UK respectively) immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific war. The principal

reasons were the paucity of Australian air resources and the value of these squadrons

for local and Far East defences, together with the effect on the morale of Australian

Forces in Europe who would see the withdrawal as a demonstration that the

Government was maintaining Australian security. At the War Cabinet meeting on

December 8, 1941 CAS stated that there were difficulties in the way of the return of 3

SQN owing to its employment in operations in and also because it would be

necessary to ship the aircraft to Australia. At the same meeting the acting Chief of

Naval Staff (CNS) stated that an attack on Australia from Japanese aircraft carriers

was not likely in view of the escort a carrier would require. 92

The Australian Government advised their British counterparts that they considered that

the squadrons were undertaking important tasks and it would have been inappropriate to return them. Instead the Commonwealth asked for nine Catalinas and 18 long range bombers. The Catalinas proved to be a reasonable choice and during the course of the war the RAAF received a total of 168 of this type in different versions. As we will see in later chapters, they undertook a variety of strategic operations flown by squadrons

91 Air 8/611. Telegram from the Australian Govt to the Dominions office; December 12, 1941. The RAAF received 366 Battle aircraft during the War. The type was initially designed as a light day bomber but suffered high combat losses in France in 1940 and was thus relegated to the training role. It was anticipated that similar losses would have occurred had the aircraft been used to defend Australia~ However, in early 1941 it was the fastest aircraft in service with the RAAF. To meet the RAM's estimated needs for home defence, 499 aircraft were ordered, including 107 Hudsons, 297 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers, 54 Bristol Beaufighters and 27 Douglas C-47 transports. While the other aircraft in the order were the type suitable for the established tasks of maritime patrols and Army co-operation, the inclusion of the Beaufighters and C-47s suggests the RAAF was to develop other roles such as air defence, long range attack and expand its transport role. 92 AA A5954/46/807/1 Cabinet minute 1557; December 8, 1941. Nevertheless a fighter squadron of trained, combat experienced pilots would have been an invaluable asset at that time.

35 based in the NW Area. What type of long range bombers the RAAF requested is not

known. It is highly unlikely that Britain could have supplied any indigenous types as

all that could be built were being taken by the RAP for raids on Germany. The main

long range bomber in the US inventory was the Boeing B-17, 93 a type rejected in 1940

as unsuitable for RAAF operational requirements with very expensive capital costs,

maintenance and housing. 94

By January 1942 the Government quite reasonably believed the need for aircraft was

even more urgent. A request for an additional 248 fighters was made to Britain. The Government. of New Zealand was also asking for fighters. The British proposed that while Australian and New Zealand requirements be shared equally by the

US and Britain, the latter had insufficient Hawker Hurricanes to meet the demands of fighting in Britain, the Middle East and the USSR. Furthermore it seemed reasonable to the Air Ministry that as the US was already shipping large numbers of P-39 and

P-40 aircraft to Australia for division amongst the ABDACOM powers, all air forces in the Pacific could use the same aircraft as the USAAF. Therefore the Air Ministry offered 142 P-40s (ordered for the RAF to use in the Middle East) to be shipped direct from the US to Australia and New Zealand. 95

Even when aircraft were delivered from the supplier countries there were problems with delivery times. MacArthur pointed out, in May 1942, that of the total of 1,112 aircraft allocated by the US to Australia 953 had been delivered, while of the 2,087 aircraft requested from the UK only 3 16 had been delivered. 96

93 In February 1941 only 50 B-17s had been delivered to the US.MC. SeeR Spector Op cit. p. 17. 94 AA A5954/46/804/2 Cabinet Minute 550; October 2, 1940. 95 Air 8/675 Supply of Aircraft to New Zealand. Telegram from Air Ministry to Air HQ New Zealand; January 29, 1942. The P-40 served in greater numbers than any other fighter deployed by the RAAF (a total of 848 aircraft) and was flown by eight operational squadrons in the North­ Eastern, North-Western and Western Areas and in the NEI. See S Wilson of Australia. pp. 86-87. General Kenney notes that the P-40s were initially ex USAAF aircraft that were passed to the RAAF when replacements arrived to re-equip US squadrons. Kenney Qp_Qt. p. 214. 96 AA A701/36/501/312 Amended 73 Squadron Plan. Cablegram to Dr Evatt, No. 69, May 22, 1942.

36 The shortage of aircraft would hinder the RAAF' s NW Area campaign for many years,

initially because there was no fighter squadron (other than those of the USAAF) to

defend Darwin from the early Japanese raids and later because there were insufficient

aircraft to carry out sustained bombing operations in the NEI. Many of the aircraft

deployed to the area were used in maritime reconnaissance roles. Only in late 1944,

with the arrival of the first of the RAAF's B-24s, did the aircraft shortage start to ease.

The Japanese Air Forces

An important issue that deserves consideration at this point is what the allies knew of

· the Japanese and how their combat capabilities were regarded. Japanese military air

power was divided into two separate arms, the Japanese Army Air Force (JAAF) and

the Japanese Navy Air Force (JNAF). Each was a prominent arm of the existing army

and navy and each developed separately.

The functions of the two air forces were clearly divided. The JAAF was to support the

army's ground forces. The JNAF was charged with supporting the fleet, coastal

defence, convoy protection and anti submarine patrols. 97 Each air force had its own

chain of command, supply, maintenance and training infrastructure and each was equipped with unique aircraft types. 98

Facing the RAAF and USAAF was a well equipped and very well trained force that, in

December 1941, consisted of 2,700 aircraft. The Japanese navy had approximately

3,500 pilots while the army had 2,500. Within this latter group 50 per cent had gained

combat experience fighting in China or against the Soviet air force. The Japanese pilots receive 300 hours in training units before being assigned to combat units. The average front line pilot had, by 1941 about 600 flying hours, while those assigned to

97 Craven & Cate The Army Air Forces in World War 1 L Volume 1. p. 77. 98 For a far more detailed comment on the Japanese air forces seeR Pelvin Japanese Air Power 1919- 1945-A Case Study in Military Dysfunction. APSC, Canberra. 1995; and RJ Francillon Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War. Putnam, London, UK, 1994. pp. 29-59.

37 carrier groups had over 800 hours.99 Gillison notes that USAAF pursuit pilots arriving

in Australia had an average total flying time, in pursuit aircraft, of 15 hours. Dive

bomber pilots had .a similar number of hours with six hours spent on actual dive

bombing practice. 100

Allied Perceptions of the Japanese

In the lead up to the Pacific war, racial stereotyping seems to have been a widespread form of propaganda. Personnel in allied military forces were told that the capabilities ofthe Japanese as soldiers were inferior to those of Europeans and that defeating them would be an easy task. Examples of stereotyping depicted the Japanese as ape-like creatures who lacked the ability to fight or to produce substantial war materiels. 101

This kind of thinking was common among the allies. For example, pilots joining the

American Volunteer Group (AVG) in China were told that the Japanese were flying antiquated aircraft and the pilots were renowned for their inability to fly. 102

In a similar manner, RAF intelligence officers provided RAAF and RAF aircrew, stationed in Malaya, with inaccurate information such as the Zero was a and

"that Japanese pilots could be shaken off a Wirraway's tail with violent evasive action because this would dislocate the enemy pilot's. neck". 103

The Australian War Cabinet was told, in January 1941 :

It is understood that a new naval air service fighter was put into production in 1940. It appears to be a development of the Naval T96 SSF. The armament is said to be two 20mm Cannon and two 7.7 mm machine guns and the top speed 300 mph. 104

99 Craven & Cate The Army Air Forces in World War 1L Volume 1. p. 80. 100 D Gillison Australia in the War of 1939-1945; Royal Australian Air Force. AWM, Canberra, 1962. p. 381. 101 J Mackinolty Wake up Australia! Australia's home front propaganda during the second world war in Journal of the Australian War Memorial. No. 1, October 1982. pp. 18-23. 102 D Ford Flving Tigers. Smithsonian Institution Pres~, Washington, DC, 1991. p. 7. 103 WH Brook Demon to Vampire. Demonvamp Publications, Glen Waverly, Vic, 1986. p. 69. 104 AA A5954/46/804/2 Cabinet minute 731; January 22, 1941.

38 When the Minister for the Army questioned the capability of the Wirraway to compete with such Japanese aircraft, CAS replied that the high powered aircraft were most likely to be -borne and were therefore relatively few in number. He held the opinion that in· the event of an attack on Australia, "the Wirraway would be able to make quite a good show". He also commented that the Wirraway was an obsolete type which had some fighting value and should be retained until more modem aircraft were obtained. 105 Given CAS's aim of providing .aircrew for Britain, it is doubtful that he would have said otherwise.

On February 14, 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham spoke to the

War Cabinet. 106 Brooke-Popham was a RAF officer who had been appointed

Commander in Chief Far East in November 1940. In this position he was responsible for operational control and general direction of all British land and air forces in

Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong and for the coordination of plans for the defence of these territories. He told Cabinet that he was:

of the opinion that Japanese planes were not highly efficient and that the Malayan Air Force would put up a good show against them. Some of the Japanese planes had a longer flying range than the Malayan planes. Their fighters were not as good as the Buffalo Brewsters (sic) now being obtained and our pilots were considerably superior for the following reasons. (a) training of British and Australian Air Force was more thorough and on sounder grounds;

(b) although it would be unwise to stress it u!lduly he did not look upon the Japanese as being air minded, particularly against determined fighter opposition;

(c) t.!J.e Japanese were not getting air domination in China, -. notwithstanding the overwhelming superiority of numbers.

He considered that his Air Force would put up a much better show against the Japanese planes than they would against the Germans, and

105 AA A5954/46/804/2 Cabinet minute 737; February 4, 1941. 106 Gillison op cit. p. 145.

39 generally he thought that the Malayan Air Force would cause such loss to the Japanese Air Force to prevent it from putting the forces out of action either in Singapore or Malaya. 107

Air Commodore Bladin, who would play a vital role as AOC NW Area, explained the

lack of knowledge of Japanese aircraft as:

I can recall my search for information, about 1940 on the capabilities of Japanese aircraft. The 'Most Secret' little Red Book in my double locked safe (I was director of Operations and Intelligence) shows the Zero with every column containing only a except 'Number in Service' which showed 12 also with a query! Signals to the Air Ministry London confirmed this. Chennault in China was not present in my view. 108

·Even as late as April 1942 CAS was still advising the Australian Government that the

Curtiss P-40 was "quite as good as, if not better than, the Zero fighter". 109

The RAAF had received information on Japanese capabilities from Wing Commander

Gamet Malley, a reserve officer serving as aviation adviser to Chiang Kai Shek during

the late 1930s. Malley was in a unique position to gain a first hand insight of Japanese

tactics and the means the Chinese used to counter them.no RAAF intelligence

arranged for Malley to lecture at air bases in eastern and northern Australia on

measures of airfield protection that had been successfully adopted by the Chinese. m

As late as July 1941, the Minister for Air advised Cabinet that the Japanese had an air

strength of 2,000 aircraft, of which half were deployed by the Army and half by the

107 AA A5954/46/804/2 Cabinet minute 802; February 14, 1941. 108 RAAF Museum Darwin Documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids - Reflections. Ignorance of Japanese fighters and the belief that the Japanese could not develop such aircraft continued well into 1942. The intelligence summary of May 18, 1942 notes the presence of the German Me~l09 and He-112 fighters in New Britain. See AA A5954/l/402/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. Southwest Pacific Area. Directorate of Intelligence. Intelligence Summaries serial numbers I to 16. Intelligence Summary serial No. 1; May 18, 1942. 109 AA A5954/46/814/1 Advisory War Council minute 840; Aprill, 1942. 11 ° Coulthard-Clark The Third Brother. pp. 449-450. 111 Hall Op cit. p. 108. Hall notes that intelligence chief Wing Commander G Packer reported later that not a single base commander had attempted to incorporate any of the lessons presented. See also CD Coulthard-Clark Garnet Malley and the RAAF's Chinese Connection. APSC, Canberra, 1997. p. 23.

40 Navy. At the time it was noted that "the strength indicated was less formidable than

might have been expected in relation to the combined Empire and Allied air strength in

Malaya, Netherlands East Indies and Australia". 112 It is now known that by early 1942

the Japanese had assembled a force of 129 aircraft (63 "Betty"

bombers, 48 Mitsubishi A6M "Zeke" fighters and 18 four engined flying boats) in the

islands to the north of Australia. These were drawn from the combat experienced units

ofthe 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas which had participated in the Philippines campaign and

the sinking ofthe HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. 113

This thinking and stereotyping combined with the other issues described in this chapter

and a lack of a co-ordinated approach to the collection and analysis of intelligence on

the part of the allies led to the lack of attention paid to reports on the capabilities of the

Japanese in combat. This was to have severe consequences on the allies in the early

stages of the Pacific War. It was not until June 1942 that MacArthur conceded that

the Japanese possessed "the finest air force in the world". It was not, he claimed the

most powerful but it was the most efficient. 114

The Australian Government and the country's armed forces were in a situation in early

1942 where they were facing an enemy whose potential had been severely underrated but who had conquered most of the neighbouring countries to the north.

112 AA A5954/46/806/l Cabinet minute 1173; July 9, 1941. 113 M Clayton The north Australian air war 1942-44 in Journal of the Australian War Memorial. No. 8, Aprill986. p. 33. 114 AA A5954/46/814/l Advisory War Council minute 967; June 17, 1942.

41 Chapter 3. Australian Air Defence

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War the main role and functions of the

RAAF were to support the Navy and the Army. This was reflected in the deployment

of squadrons, their tasks and the types of aircraft with which they were equipped. Tlie

support role also meant that the RAAF' s assets were located largely in the south-east

part of Australia, close to Navy and Army bases, major cities and shipping lanes.

The Organisation of Air Power

Before discussing the operations undertaken from the NW Area it is important to go

' back to the late 1930s and consider the deployment of the RAAF at the outbreak of

the war. On August 27, 1939, the RAAF possessed 13 squadrons based in six

locations in Australia. 1

To man these squadrons the RAAF had, in July 193 9, personnel numbers of 3, 104 in

the permanent Air Force and 552 in the Citizen Air Force reserve.2 The total number

of aircraft was 246, every one of which was obsolescent (82 Ansons, 54 Demons, 7

Wirraways, 21 Seagulls and 82 training aircraft ofvarious types). 3

At the outbreak of the war the position of the RAAF was as follows:

Whole of the active Citizen Air Force called up and such members of Reserve necessary to bring units to restricted war establishment. Action taken in co-operation with Military Board to guard civil aerodromes at Archerfield, Townsville, Mascot, Essendon and Para:field. Disposition of units as last reported except one Flight No 9 SQN transferred from Richmond to Mallacoota, Vic, and additional Flight No 12 SQN transferred Laverton to Darwin. 4

1 AA A1196/35/502/6 Precautionary and War Stage Measures Taken Immediately Prior to an Outbreak of War, 1939-48. Reply to Secretary, Dept of Defence by Secretary of Air Board, August 27, 1939. A list showing the squadrons and their locations is at Appendix B. 2 Gillison~. p. 55. 3 ibid. p. 57. 4 AA A705/35/501/89 Position of Australian Forces September 1939. Teleprinter message to Secretary Prime Minister's Dept from Secretary Dept of Defence, September 5, 1939.

42 At the beginning of the Pacific war CAS advised the Government that the RAAF was equipped with 179 "front line" aircraft (53 Hudsons-20 ofwhich were in the NEI, 57

Wirraways, 17 Catalinas and 12 Seagulls). 5

The most noticeable observation made from a quick glance over the RAAF' s strength

at this time was its lack of combat capability. That is, the RAAF possessed only one

dedicated offensive combat squadron (1 SQN). There was no fighter squadron nor

fighter aircraft. The CAC Wirraways were unsuitable as fighters. 6 This was despite

being the most modem aircraft built in Australia at that time. 7 It was only after the start of the war that the RAAF received its first modem bomber aircraft-Lockheed

Hudsons. These were based on a pre-war transport design and had been selected as

delivery of the preferred first choice, the , had been delayed because of

development problems with its Bristol Taurus engines. 8 Until the delivery of the

Beauforts the RAAF planned to use Ansons. The Anson was a short range

coastal reconnaissance aircraft capable of carrying a very small bomb load and with

inferior performance to that required. 9 The majority of the 1,028 Ansons acquired by the RAAF were used as trainers.

The aircraft selected as the most suitable for the role of protection of sea communications was the Short . The Australian Government had ordered aircraft to equip one squadron (10 SQN) and RAAF aircrews had travelled to Britain shortly before the outbreak of the war. They were still there in September 1939 and

5 AA A5954/46/813/1 Advisory War Council Meeting, Minute 586; December 9, 1941. 6 John McCarthy writes that the Wirraway was promoted as a two seat fighter, light bomber, army cooperation.and reconnaissance aircraft. See McCarthy Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39. pp. 125-127. 7 Ross .Qp__gt. p. 287. 8 AA All96/35/502/6 Minute from Secretary of the Air Board to the Secretary of the Dept of Defence, October 31, 1939. The Beaufort's engine problems were eventually resolved. Over 700 served with the RAAF many of which were built in Australia and fitted with Pratt and Whitney R- 1830-S3C4G piston engines. 9 Coulthard-Clark The Third Brother. pp. 453-454.

43 the Australian Government decided that they should remain there for the purpose of creating an Australian air squadron. 10 The RAAF thus lost the use of what would have been its only strategic asset at the start of the Pacific war. With its long range (1, 780 miles) and ability to carry various anti shipping and anti submarine weapons (mines, bombs and depth charges), the Sunderland was a most suitable aircraft for the protection of shipping and the detection and destruction of submarines. It was very successful in this role over the . 11

A question that comes to mind is what did the RAAF intend to do with its small .number of aircraft? In 193 5 it undertook a study to develop a paper on the tactical deployment of air forces that was to serve as a guide to commanding officers when drawing up their annual training syllabus. The initial request for input from commanding officers stated that it was proposed to develop tactical methods for the local defence of Australia in certain definite stages. 12 When the final paper, titled Tactical Employment of Air Forces in the Local Defence of Australia, was printed it stated "The aim of defending air forces is to protect Australia from external aggression." 13 The paper considered the employment of the RAAF to be the protection of coastal areas against sea raids; the protection of coastal shipping; and

10 AA A5954/46/803/1 Cabinet minute 52; October 20, 1939. The initial proposal of the Australian Government was to create an Air Expeditionary Force of six squadrons (two fighter and four bomber) to be sent overseas. This plan was abandoned on October 20 and it was decided that the Sunderland squadron would remain in the UK. 11 W Green Warplanes of the Second World War; Vol. 5; Flying Boats. Macdonald, London, UK, 1962. pp. 95-101. The RAAF then acquired five Empire flying boats impressed from and to fly maritime surveillance and transport operations around Australia and New Guinea. See Wilson Military Aircraft of Australia. p. 185. 12 AA A705/15/501/3 Tactical Employment ofAir Forces in the local Defence ofAustralia. Minute from Squadron Leader J McCauley; September 18, 1935. 13 It is interesfug to compare this statement with the RAAF objective in the Defence Annual Report 1994-1995, p. 103, which states that Air Force is: To provide air forces capable of: • conducting effective air operations in the pursuit of Australia's security interests using both regular and reserve forces; • expanding in a timely manner against warning of more substantial conflict. When looking at the first point it could be argued that there is a great deal of similarity between the 1935 and 1994 statements.

44 defence against large scale attacks involving landing and occupation. However, as

noted earlier, the role of the RAAF's squadrons and their aircraft do not reflect the

ideas presented in the paper.

Stephens makes the point that prior to the Second World War the RAAF had sought to acquire general purpose aircraft (such as the Hudson, Wirraway and Beaufort) as platforms which met the requirements of the Navy and Army and which also gave the

RAAF some capability for the independent strike role. 14 By 1940 the other Services had accepted the RAAF's line of thought. The Defence Committee (comprising the three chiefs of staff) agreed that the general reconnaissance squadrons were vital to the. defence of Australia. In the opinion of the committee the destruction of air bases from which attacks against Australia could be staged .was a more effective method of defence than attempting to intercept the aircraft in the air. This was the reason for building up the General Purpose (GP) squadrons and the lack of fighter units. 15

Air Commodore Bladin has also provided an explanation of the RAAF's thinking:

Australian Defence Forces had, historically, been closely linked with Great Britain-particularly the RAN-as an element of Empire Defence. Australian Chiefs of Staff referred to the British Chiefs of Staff for advice on the probable 'Scale of Attack' we could expect. The reply­ "light (possible cruiser) sporadic raids particularly on trade" encouraged RAN and RAAF to plan seaward reconnaissance systems controlled by a Central War Room in Melbourne where the Chiefs of Staff were, and tactically controlled by Area Combined (Navy-Air) Headquarters, each of these latter having advanced operational bases (AOB) from which aircraft could operate (i.e. refuel and re-arm with bombs). The Army of course traditionally went abroad]

14 Stephens Power Plus Attitude. p. 72. 15 The opinion of the committee regarding the destruction of air bases should not be dismissed totally as another misguided idea on the part of pre-war defence planners. It was similar to the tactics employed by General Kenney and noted in the preceding chapter. It also gains some support from the latter day air power writer Colonel John Warden who states "that the best and cheapest place to destroy the enemy was on the ground". See Warden QQ.Q!. p. 26.

45 Fighter aircraft squadrons were, in these circumstances, not a priority requirement. When the scale had to be revised to include "possibly from aircraft carriers" it was too late to get fighter aircraft.16

The Best Way to Deploy Air Power

The question that arises from the immediate pre-war deployment of the RAAF is was

this the best way to organise air power? To answer this question it is first necessary to

consider the anticipated threat to Australia, the planned role of the RAAF and its

available assets. The first point to consider is the possibility of war with Japan.

Australia's position at the outbreak ofthe Pacific War has been briefly summed up by

Homer as a country with a small population, a weak economy and without the

resources to defend the continent, although the possibility of a Japanese attack had been the driving force behind Australian defence thinking for almost 40 years. As a result, security was sought by cooperating with British imperial defence which, in the period before the Second World War, revolved around the Singapore Strategy. If war began in the Far East, Britain would send its main fleet to its naval base at Singapore while, for its part, Australia would not need a large standing army during peace, but would provide naval forces to cooperate with the Royal Navy. Leaders in the

Australian Army opposed the reliance upon the Singapore Strategy, but the government accepted the assurance from Britain and the RAN that Australia could best be defended by cooperating with imperial defence. 17

It would be reasonable to ask at this point what type of attack on Australia was expected? On May 15, 1941, CNS Vice Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, advised Cabinet that attacks in the form of invasion by a hostile power could be ruled out. He was of the opinion thaj provided Singapore and the NEI remained under allied control

Australia might, at the most, be subjected to intermittent bombardment from raiding and by quick cruiser-borne raids on vital centres (these raids would be

16 RAAF Museum, Darwi~ Documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids-Reflections. 17 Homer Defending Australia in 1942 in War & Society. p. 2.

46 undertaken by forces not exceeding 100 men). He further stated that an attack on

Australia by one of the Japanese Navy's older battleships was unlikely because of the distance from Japanese bases (the Japanese had no convenient base or docks) and the vulnerability of its lines of communication. He stated that an attack on Sydney by a was possible but not probable. As Australia was the main source of supply to the armed forces in Malaya there was a risk that shipping between the two countries would come under attack. He considered the risk not to be great, but if the attack occurred it would be made by an armed merchant cruiser. 18

With the thinking directed towards sea-borne raids and threats to shipping, one of the issues Menzies discussed with the UK Air Ministry during his 1941 visit to Britain was the organisation and strength of the RAAF for the air defence of the Commonwealth.

The Air Ministry made the following comments on a memorandum presented by

Menzies:

2. The memorandum does not state the scale of attack to be expected but it will be remembered that the assumption has always been that attacks would be limited to sea-borne raids.

5. As the Air Board will have fully appreciated, the effectiveness of air defences of Australia will depend largely upon the mobility of squadrons. It is assumed that the proposed organisation will include measures necessary to afford the greatest practicable degree of mobility.

7. In view of the nature of attack to be expected, the Air Staff considers that a strong case cannot be made on purely military grounds for the provision of fighter squadrons for use in Australia. They realise, however, that there may be psychological and other reasons for forming some fighter squadrons; such squadrons would in any case be valuable as reinforcements for employment elsewhere in the Far East theatre . where shore-based air attack might have to be met. 19

18 AA A5954/46/805/2 Cabinet minute 1073; May 15, 1941. For the British response to an attack on Australia see Churchill'.s memo to Casey, November 21, 1939 in Robertson & McCarthy QJL9!. pp. 144-145. 19 AA A5954/46/806/1 Cabinet minute 1139; June 10, 1941.

47 We must view the RAAF in light of the Singapore Strategy and the complementary opinions of the nature of sea borne assaults or raids. Australia was providing men and materiel for Britain. These resources were transported by ship. The shipping routes from Australia usually had the vessels departing from Sydney and stopping at

Melbourne, and before sailing across the Indian Ocean to the Suez

Canal.2° One of the RAAF' s tasks was to provide escort and anti submarine flights over the shipping lanes (a task 2 SQN undertook prior to its transfer north). 21 While the Ansons based at Laverton, Richmond and Pearce had a very short range, in light of the ideas of imperial defence, this task was appropriate and the deployment of aircraft to these bases was a suitable use of available air power assets. In fact it may have been I even more appropriate to move at least one squadron to a location in so that the RAAF could have covered the Great Australian Bight-an area then out of the range of aircraft in service.

Insofar as the NW Area was concerned, these vital shipping routes did not pass near

Darwin or any other northern port. At a time when the RAAF was short of suitable aircraft and not at war with Japan it may have been difficult to justify the movement of scarce resources to a location where they would not have been carrying out their primary function. It is possible to justify the lack of attention given to the NW Area before the Pacific war on these grounds. 22

20 Information provided by RAN Historical and Records Section; Aprill2, 1996. 21 The Secretary Dept of Air advised the Secretary Dept of Defence Co-ordination on April15, 1940 that the operati~nal duties of Service squadrons were routine patrols, in co-operation with the Navy, to ensure the safety of shipping in coastal waters. These had been flown on numerous occasions to a distance of 200 miles from the coast. An example given was the departure of the 2nd AIF when in order to protect the convoy while in Australian waters RAAF aircraft patrolled areas totalling nearly half a million square miles. AA A 701/35/502/13 PM's Statements Opening ofParliament, Apri/1940. 22 When questioned as to the ability of the defence forces to repel an invasion, CAS replied that there was no joint plan to cover the situation, "but plans existed in each Service for coping with attacks on these shores." See AA A5954/46/805/2 Cabinet minute 1136; June 10, 1941.

48 Air Power in the NW Area Before the Japanese Attacks

In 1928 the Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, invited the RAF to send a senior officer to inspect and report on the RAAF and air defence generally. The RAF sent Air Marshal

Sir John Salmond, who submitted his report on September 20, 1928.23 Insofar as the

NW Area was concerned, Salmond's view was that the RAAF was to be concentrated in New South Wales and Victoria from where it could protect the major centres of population and industry and could reinforce Brisbane, Albany and Darwin. 24 In addition he recommended the construction of flying boat slipways at each of these locations. 25 Despite the recommendation, it was not until the late 1930s that the

RAAF established a permanent presence in Darwin.

Before then there was consideration by the Northern Territory administration as to the usefulness of aircraft for coastal surveillance. In March 1932 the Northern Territory

Administrator wrote to CAS, requesting that a Moth aircraft, with the capability to be equipped with either wheels or floats, be based in Darwin. Its anticipated tasks would have been surveillance; fisheries and pearling patrols; and assisting the Customs, police, quarantine and immigration officers.26 The RAAF evaluated the request and decided against it for several reasons: the absence of a hangar at Darwin, in which the aircraft could be stored between flights (leaving the aircraft parked outside would lead to excessive. deterioration); there were insufficient funds available to meet the request; the RAAF considered that a would have been more appropriate but the existing Seagull IIIs would not be economical for use in this task and their replacements had not been delivered. The

,. 23 The findings and implications of the Salmond Report have been described in several of the sources consulted during the preparation of the early part of this thesis including Stephens Power plus Attitude and McCarthy Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39. 24 McCarthy Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39. p. 66. 25 Gillison .QQ..Qt. p. 33. . 26 AA A705/13/5/151 Proposal to Station RAAF aircraft at Darwin. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel RH Weddell to CAS; March 31, 1932.

49 decision was deferred until a permanent RAAF unit had been established in Darwin. 27

Even if the original proposal had been agreed, the Moth, with its very short range (290 miles), could not have been used for anything other than surveillance flights over the coast and ocean close to Darwin in good weather. The range would not permit any sustained surveillance or the shadowing of suspect vessels. 28 However, had the initiative been implemented it would have had some benefit to the RAAF as it would have provided experience in operating aircraft in the area and aircrew would have gained some familiarity with the landscape. Other Government agencies could have built up experience in using aircraft to assist them with their tasks.

The Chief of the General Staff (CGS) undertook an inspection of defences in and around Darwin in September 1936. In his report of the visit he noted that it was planned to install six anti aircraft guns and six search lights. At the time of his visit there were only two of these guns and no searchlight. He considered this situation to be inadequate for the protection of the fuel oil storage facilities and added:

the situation will be improved when extra guns are available. The question of anti aircraft defence must also be considered in relation to the fact that it is intended to establish a squadron of the RAAF at this station. He concluded that when the anti aircraft guns, lights and the trained personnel

provided for under present plans are installed and the RAAF squadron is stationed in the area it will be adequate in relation to the scale of attack envisaged.

His version of the expected attack was a rapid assault by a small force landed to the east of Darwin, on a beach or in one of the many creeks, or even as far away as the

27 AA A705/13/5/151 Proposal to Station RAAF aircraft at Darwin. Letter from CAS to Administrator NT; July 31, 1934. 28 The de Havilland DH 60 Gypsy Moth had a cruising speed of74 knots and a range of 290 miles. That ratige would not permit a surveillance flight around Bathurst and Melville Islands. For details of the DH 60 see Wilson Military Aircraft of Australia. p. 100.

50 Adelaide River, and depending for success on surprise and the absence of a mobile

garrison. 29

The CGS' s findings as they relate to the RAAF in the anti aircraft role are notable and

it would be interesting to know what he had in mind. As noted, when the war broke

out the RAAF had no fighter squadron and no modem fighter aircraft. It is highly

unlikely that Ansons and Demons would have been suitable aircraft to complement the anti aircraft guns.

, Establishment of the RAAF Station at Darwin

Provision to establish a RAAF Station30 at Darwin was made in the financial estimates

for 1937-38, with an allocation of £282,000. The land for the base, 2,900 acres, was

acquired at a cost of £1,000. The Air Board recommended the expenditure of £13,480 to have the land cleared of timber, ploughed and levelled in order that the surface would have time to settle before the arrival ofaircraft.31

Prior to the formation of the base, the CAS, Air Vice Marshal R Williams, instructed

Wing Commander G Jones and Squadron Leader C Eaton, on April 11, 193 8, to act as a committee to collect and collate all information relevant to the construction of the base; to arrange for visits by RAAF aircraft; and to submit a report on these activities to the Air Board.

29 AA A5954/1/919/9 Darwin Defences. Copy of CGS Report on inspection-1936. Report on Inspection of Port Darwin Defences and Reconnassiance of Surrounding Country by CGS 7/12 September 1936. 30 The RAAF Station was formed on June 1, 1940. It was disbanded on August 22, 1942 when it became Operational Base, Darwin, under the command of Squadron Leader AD Swan. It became No. 52 Operational Base, Darwin on October 10, 1942 and No. 52 Operational Base Unit, Darwin on December 24 of the same year. It was renamed RAAF Station Darwin on August 1, 1944 with Wing Commander JP Ryan as commander. See RAAF Museum Darwin Documents box file RAAF Darwin Commanding Officers. 31 RHS BriefHistory ofRAAF Station Darwin. 1990

51 The committee carried out its tasks in Darwin during April and May 193 8. The report

was then submitted to the Air Board. 32

The construction of the station proceeded more slowly than anticipated because of the

shortage of skilled tradesmen in the area. The shortage itself was a result of the large

amount of defence work then being undertaken in and around Darwin. To overcome

this the Federal Government arranged for the transport by air of 150 skilled persons,

recruited in the eastern and southern states. At the time, this event was the largest

movement of people by air in Australia. 33

In May 1939 it was decided to move part of 12 (GP) SQN from Laverton to Darwin.34

The initial proposal was to transfer two flights of the Squadron-eight aircraft (four

Avro Ansons and four Hawker Demons35) to Darwin, beginning as soon as possible after July 1, 193 9. As the station was not completed the Squadron was to operate from the civil airfield. Temporary huts were to be constructed for Squadron personnel, while the aircraft were to be sheltered in temporary hangers. 36 An advance party of two officers and 30 NCOs arrived in Darwin aboard the SS Montoro on July 24. Temporary accommodation was prepared at Vesteys meatworks, Fannie Bay.

Squadron HQ personnel travelled to Darwin by commercial Lockheed aircraft and arrived on August 26. The first three Ansons arrived two days later. 37 In their first months at the new location all squadron personnel were engaged in the construction of accommodation and other buildings. Living and working conditions were poor but it was noted that morale was high. 38 Despite the rush to build adequate accommodation

32 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 33 RHS BriefHist~ry ofRAAF Station Darwin. 34 Squadron Leader C Eaton was appointed squadron commander on 6 February 1939. 35 The Demons were replaced with CAC Wirraways before the transfer took place. 36 AA A 705/9/2/155 No. 12 Squadron, Move to Darwin. Technical Stores and Allotment ofAircraft. Minute from ACAS to HQ Laverton; May 8, 1939. 37 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing box file A BriefHistory No. 12 Squadron RAAF. 3 8 RAAF Museum, 12 Squadron box file 12 Squadron.

52 before the onset of the wet season, operations continued with little interruption. By early September, eight Ansons and five Wirraways had arrived in Darwin and were operating from the civil air field. 39 Squadron personnel were housed in the temporary camp at the civil air field.

During the latter part of 1939 the squadron's aircraft engaged in various operations.

The Ansons flew coastal patrols while the Wirraways were used for Army Co­ operation work and for practice with the East Point anti aircraft battery. A Seagull V seaplane was used for target towing for air to air gunnery exercises for the

Wirraways. 40

The defence of Darwin was co-ordinated by the Darwin Defence Committee, comprising Lieutenant Colonel HCH Robertson, DSO (President); Wing Commander

C Eaton, AFC (Air Force member); and Lieutenant Commander JH Walker, MVO

(Naval member). It was customary for the committee to meet daily and to discuss defence plans and arrange exercises. On August 31, 1939 the first aircraft patrol was flown from Darwin as part of a trade defence exercise conducted by the combined HQ.

Aircraft were subsequently used for escort duties, patrols, army co-operation activities and assisted with transporting explosives and other supplies to newly formed

Operational Base Units (OBU). 41 By December 4, a weekly shipping and coastal patrol over the Darwin-Derby-Wyndham-Broome area had commenced.42

39 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945, in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. September 1987. The RAA.F facility at the civil air field was declared a prohibited defence area on October 12, 1939 under the National Security (General) Regulations, see Royal Australian Air Force War Book, 1939 (Provisional). Chapter II; Special Internal Security Measures. Under these regulations it was an offence for a person to be in that place without a permit; to loiter in the vicinity of the place and to disobey directions given while in the place. 40 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing box file. A BriefHistory No. 12 Squadron RAAF. 41 Operations in the DarwtnArea 1939-1945, in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 42 B Alford Darwin's Air War. Coleman's Printing, Darwin, NT. 1991. p. 8.

53 RAAF Station Darwin was formed on June 1, 1940, by a direction of the Air Board

and 12 SQN provided the greater part of the Station's aircraft and personnel. The

Station's headquarters absorbed almost all of 12 SQN's headquarter resources. 43 The

Station's administration building had not been completed and the headquarters staff carried out their duties at the temporary camp at the civil air field. 44 At this time the

Station's strength was 30 officers, five cadets and 207 airmen. A total of 515 hours was flown by the Station's aircraft during June 1940. 45 During the same month 13

SQN, commanded by Squadron Leader JR Balmer, was formed. The new squadron absorbed most of the remaining personnel and all the aircraft from 12 SQN' s A and B

Flights. C Flight, equipped with Wirraways remained as 12 SQN.

On July 2, 1940 twelve Hudsons of the Laverton based 1 SQN departed Darwin for

Singapore where they would come under the command of the Air Officer Commanding

(AOC) RAF Far East. Prior to the squadron's departure from its home base at

Laverton the CO, Squadron Leader AL Walters, (carrying a civil passport in the name of Mr AL Walters) had flown on a Qantas Empire flying boat to Singapore. The

RAAF' s Director of Intelligence, Group Captain FM Bladin, asked Qantas to deviate their aircraft to overfly Koepang, Bali, Sourabaya and Tanjong Perak so that Walters would be able to inspect, from the air, the airfields to be used by the Hudsons.

Instructions were sent to Walters to obtain navigation charts of the NEI. Qantas were to be reimbursed for any extra costs incurred by the over flights. The telex instructing

Walters to purchase the charts did not reach him and two sets of the charts were purchased by Qantas at a cost of £8. Despite fact that all aircrews were not fully trained and not all aircraft were armed, 1 SQN flew to Singapore via the NEI. Their arrival at the putch airfields was deliberately kept quiet and was not reported in the local papers. Even so, the British consul at Sourabaya expressed concern that the

43 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945, in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 44 The Administration Bullding was occupied for the first time on August 8, 1940. 45 RHS BriefHistory ofRAAF Station Darwin.

54 squadron might attract Japanese attention. When 1 SQN arrived in Singapore Walters was instructed to return the two sets of charts urgently to the Air Board.46 More than anything this episode demonstrates how unprepared the RAAF was for a war in the region to the north of Australia.

In July the Minister for Air, Mr JV Fairbairn, made an inspection tour of the Darwin base. He found morale very high and advised the CO that he was pleased with the keenness and efficiency of all ranks at the base. 47 These are interesting comments when considered in light of the findings by Justice Lowe following the bombing of

Darwin nineteen months later, or even when compared with Jones' findings when he visited the Area in early 1942.

By December 31, 1940, RAAF strength at Darwin comprised 48 officers and 571 a1rmen. Aircraft from the base had participated in exercises with aircraft from

Laverton and Pearce during the second half of 1940 so that a total of 5,230 flying hours had been achieved since June. 48 This number was increased in early 1941 (13

SQN alone flew 4,000 hours in February and 4,492 hours in March49) despite an instruction from RAAF HQ which directed: "Owing to the need to conserve flying hours in Hudsons, G.R. Squadrons should aim at not exceeding 300 hours per month, total flying". 50 A further directive from the Air Board stated that 120 hours of this time was to be used "for operations to seaward". 51 Such instructions raise the question whether the personnel at RAAF HQ, located at the ot~er end of the country had any comprehension of the conditions for operations that existed in the NW Area or

46 AA All96/6/60/501/ll Air Operation- Flight ofNo. I Squadron- Darwin to Singapore. 47 RHS Brieflf_istory ofRAAF Station Darwin. 48 RHS BriefHistory ofRAAF Station Darwin. 49 RHS History Sheet A 50; Rolll5. 13 SQN operations record book. 50 AA All96/6/60/501/52 Operations to Seaward. All RAAF Stations. Policy. Minute from DOl to all Area HQ; February 27, 1941. 13 SQN started to replace its Ansons with Hudsons in June 1940. 51 AA A1196/6/60/501/52 Operations to Seaward. All RAAF Stations. Policy. Telex from Air Board to Area HQs; March 6, 1941.

55 whether they were aware of the distance involved or the time required to fly shipping patrols in the waters around the north west of Australia? An alternative view is that

HQ were just attempting to conserve aircraft that were in very short supply.

In February 1941 the Federal Cabinet was advised by CAS of the proposal to base three squadrons permanently at Darwin. 52 While it was not noted in the Cabinet minute, CAS most likely was referring to 2, 12 and 13 SQNs.

In May 1941 aircraft from the NEI Army and Navy visited Darwin for the first time.

The Australian Government agreed to the visit as a means of paving the way for reciprocal visits by RAAF aircraft to Ambon (on the island of the same name) and

Koepang (on Timor). The reasoning was that: "these are bases from which we would operate in war in collaboration with Netherlands East Indies. It is of some importance that we should be able to make some reconnaissance of these bases in advance of outbreak of hostilities". 53 No doubt earlier visits to each country by representatives of the various air forces, together with familiarisation flights and joint air defence and bombing exercises would have been good training for future operations. 54 As it was, the visiting NEI aircraft carried out only one night flying/ blackout exercise Darwin. A reciprocal visit to Koepang and Ambon during the same month was undertaken by a flight of five RAAF Hudsons, lead by Wing Commander Balmer. 55 On this flight a

52 AA A5954/46/804/2 Cabinet minute 748; Agendum 36/1941; February 4, 1941. 53 AA A5954/46/805/2 Cabinet minute 912; cable from Minister for Air to UK Consul-General in Batavia; March 22, 1941. 54 The Australian Government was aware of the value of the NEI both as a source of raw material for Japan and also as a strategic base for operations against Singapore and Australia. Therefore Defence contacts with the NEI were strengthened in early 1941 by an exchange of naval liaison officers, the visits by Menzies, PC Spender (Minister for the Army) and a military mission to Batavia and also by plans to send forces to Ambon and Koepang. See WJ Hudson & HJW Stokes Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49; Vol. IV: July 1940-June 1941. AGPS, Canberra, 1980. 55 RHS Brief History of RAAF Station Darwin. John Balmer was the commander of 13 SQN between June 1940 and March 1942. He then commanded 100 SQN in New Guinea. He died on the night of 11-12 May -1944 while leading 467 SQN in a raid on a German military camp at Bourg-Leopold, Belgium. See J Ritchie (ed) Australian Dictionary of Bibliography. Volume 13: 1940-1980. Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1993.

56 number of RAAF and Army officers were carried as passengers to undertake a

reconnaissance of Ambon and Koepang. 56

In September four Hudsons from 2 SQN left Laverton for the NEI, via Darwin. The purpose of the operation was to familiarise air crews with conditions at Advanced

Operational Bases (AOB) in the NEI and to enable personnel to study conditions for control of operations at those bases. Squadron personnel inspected and reported on airfields, communications, operational and accommodation facilities, and petrol, oil and lubricants (POL) storage at Laha, Harlong (on Ambon), Namlea (on Boeroe) and

Koepang. Aircrew undertook communications exercises with the RAAF station at

Darwin, other aircraft in the flight and with an RAAF Empire flying boat. The operation was considered to be valuable to all who participated. It was found that local flying conditions varied from those normally experienced in the southern parts of

Australia (for example poor visibility due to thick haze) while it was noted "the importance of local knowledge regarding aerodromes and their localities and weather conditions cannot be overstressed". 57

Meanwhile, accommodation and living conditions in Darwin for RAAF personnel had started to improve and amenities were increased. For example, on January 22, 1941

Cabinet gave approval for the construction of a 165 feet by 25 feet concrete swimming pool at the Darwin air base at an estimated cost of £10,800. 58

Insofar as the overall command of the RAAF in Darwin was concerned, up until

December 7, 1941, the RAAF station and 2, 12 and 13 SQNs were administered by the

56 AA A5954/46/S06/l Cabinet minute 1052 of May 9, 1941. 57 AA Al196/6/60/501/77 Flight of No. 2 Squadron Hudsons to NE.l. 2919/41-6/10141. Report of No.2 Squadron Operations 25/9/41-6/10/41. During the flight between Laverton and Darwin two of the four aircraft were delayed due to mechanical problems. All aircraft departed Laverton on September 24 and arrived Laha on September 28. 58 AA A5954/46/805/l Cabinet minute 706; Agendum No. 18/1941; January 22, 1941. The pool was for the use of RAAF personnel and was also "available to the white civil population who were honorary members of the Service mess".

57 Northern Area HQ at Townsville with higher operational control placed in the Central

War Room in Melbourne. 59

Following the outbreak of the Pacific war the RAAF Station went on to a war footing.

On December 21, 1941 orders were issued for the following defence initiatives at the base:

1. Trip wires with jam tins, etc, attached are to be erected around all posts for which Stn HQ is responsible.

2. Trenches are to be dug, under section arrangements for the use of all HQ personnel, at places of employment and quarters.

3. Rifles and sidearms, together with 10 rounds of ammo. per man are to be carried by HQ personnel, other than officers and warrant officers (who have revolvers) to and from place of employment, and short periods of instruction are to be given in handling of rifles and bayonet fighting, disarming practice, etc.

4. Webbing equipment is to be made up ready for attachment to belt, and is to be complete with change of clothing, ammunition, (another 160 rounds), iron rations, mess tin, water bottle and cutlery, not forgetting first aid bandage. 60

Later that month the station commander directed that all ordinary night leave be restricted, that outside lighting be reduced to a minimum and that lights outside quarters be fitted with blue globes. On January 6, 1942, it was arranged for all base HQ personnel not otherwise detailed for specific duties to parade each evening for bayonet fighting practice. 61

Air raid practices were staged by the RAAF Station Darwin and one month before the first Japanes~ raid the following conclusions were reached:

59 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945, in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 60 RAAF Museum, Darwin Documents box file. 61 ibid.

58 a. any air raid Darwin may expenence would be without appreciable warning;

b. protection of personnel against injury would be of utmost importance. Aircraft and motor transport could only be protected by dispersal and camouflage;

c. the RAAF Station could offer no real active opposition other than rifle fire from slit trenches. Gun posts could not be maintained at all times due to shortage of personnel. 62

By January 1942 arrangements were made for the dispersal and camouflage of aircraft in Darwin. This included orders that aircraft were not to be lined up in the customary manner on the tarmac and in the case of servicing, only one aircraft was to be in a hangar at any one time. 63

In that same month DCAS issued instructions to the HQ Northern Area on the important objectives for the RAAF:

a. to strike at Japanese bases or shipping wherever possible;

b. to obtain such warning as is possible of any attempted southward movements by the Japanese throughout the Island areas;

c. to keep open the shipping routes through the Coral, Arafura and Timor Seas;

d. to deny enemy access to Rabaul and to the Territories of New Guinea, Papua and the Mainland of Australia. 64

For the RAAF at Darwin the instruction meant very large tasks for only three squadrons-and one of those equipped with short-range single-engine trainers.

62 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 63 ibid. 64 AA A1196/6/60/501/62 Operations to Seawards- Northern Area. Minute from DCAS to HQ Northern Area; January 8, 1942.

59 George Jones visited the NW Area and reported in February 1942 that he found the

fighting value of 2, 12 and 13 SQNs "to be not very high". This was due to the

unsatisfactory state of serviceability of a considerable proportion of the aircraft; to the

low morale of all ranks; and to the wide dispersal of aircraft and personnel. 65 Jones

attributed the poor standards of maintenance to the dispersal of aircraft away from the

appropriate facilities. Jones' report was dated five days before the first air raid. While

RAAF HQ was made aware of the poor condition of their squadrons in Darwin it is

unlikely that they would have been in a position to re-equip them or to provide fresh

air crew or additional maintenance personnel before the raid given the overall position

of the RAAF and the time and distances involved in moving anything to Darwin.

Establishment of other RAAF Bases

A tender for the construction of a gravel runway at Batchelor, approximately 100 km

south-west of Darwin, was issued on October 20, 1940. In February 1941 the

Government agreed that a subsidiary air base would be constructed at Batchelor at an

estimated cost of £75,000.66 Further development work at that airfield included the

relocation of fuel and bomb storage facilities from Katherine. This latter work was

undertaken following a direction by CAS, Air Chief Marshal Burnett, after his visit to

Darwin to attend the Darwin Defence Co-ordination Committee meeting on November

15. 67 Construction of a RAAF replenishing centre to provide accommodation for

personnel and storage for war materiel at Katherine had been proposed by the CAS

and agreed by the Air Board in May 1940. 68 The runways at Batchelor were extended

in December 1941 at the request of the US Government, who funded the construction

65 AWM 3DRL 3414 Papers of AM Sir George Jones. Report on Personnel and Administrative Problems in the North Western Area- Written by Air Commodore Jones for the CAS. February 14, 1942. 66 AA A5954/46/805/1 Cabinet minute 747; February 4, 1941. 67 Alford Darwin's Air War. p. 9. 68 RHS BriefHistory ofRAAF Station Darwin.

60 work at a cost of £8,600. 69 At the time this airfield was considered to be "of the

greatest importance in the defence ofNorth Australia". 70

During May 1941 action was taken to develop AOBs at Bathurst Island, Wyndham,

Drysdale, Broome and Port Hedland. Fuel dumps were established at these locations

·and equipment and stores were transported there by sea and air. 71

The Strategic and Operational Importance of Darwin

The importance of Darwin was a subject for discussion at the Defence Committee

· meeting convened on September 18, 1940. It was noted that the overall situation for

Australia was conditioned by Japan's intentions towards the NEI, Singapore and

Australia together with the British reaction to any Japanese moves. At that time

Darwin was considered to be of value as a naval and air base (secured by Army units)

for forces actively engaged in guarding trade routes. 72 The Committee added:

The provision of a secure base at Darwin is of paramount strategic importance in providing facilities to develop Naval and Air action in conjunction with operations developed from the main base in Singapore.

Even if this eventually does not arise, Darwin is still operationally important as a defended port since, as such, its easy possession is denied to an enemy who requires to use it for further operations against vital areas elsewhere. Further, the naval and air defences located there deny or restrict an enemy's freedom of movement in Northern Australian waters.

The Committee further considered that as long as the war was being fought in Europe,

only small naval forces were likely to use the port. If, however, Japan attacked the

NEI or Singapore, the RAAF would h~tve to operate from Darwin for operations over

69 AA A5954/46/807/1 Cabinet minute 1572; December 11, 1941. 70 Air Board paper No. 3541. 71 RHS BriefHistory ojF,AAF Station Darwin. 72 AA A5954/1/459/2 Anti Submarine Boom, Darwin; Minute by Defence Committee at meeting held on September 18, 1940.

61 the theatre of war or use Darwin as a base for reinforcing flights to Singapore. 73

Shortly after the war's end the US Strategic Bombing Survey noted that Darwin, as

northern Australia's only large settlement, was of great importance to the allies as an air base and a port especially during the early months of the Pacific war. Apart from

Port Moresby it was the only forward allied base from which the southern flank of the

Japanese forces could be attacked. 74 By February 1942 Darwin had become an important air and sea staging area and, in hindsight, an obvious target for the Japanese

air forces.

Formation of the North-Western Area

It is now necessary to go back several months to discuss the organisational aspects behind the formation of the NW Area. During 1940 the Air Board put into effect plans for reorganisation of the RAAF, drawn up by the acting CAS, Air Vice Marshal Goble.

The plans heavily emphasised, inter alia, decentralisation of the home organisation.

The Air Board agreed with the decentralisation approach and began by dividing the home service into four areas, viz.

• the Southern Area-with its headquarters in Melbourne, comprised all units in Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and the southern Riverina;

• the Central Area-with its headquarters in Sydney comprised New South Wales with the exception of the southern Riverina and the northern part of the state;

• the Northern Area-with its headquarters in Townsville comprised northern New South Wales, Queensland, the Northern Territory and Papua; and

• the Western Area-with its headquarters in Perth comprised all units in .

73 AA A5954/1/459/2 Anti Submarine Boom, Darwin; Minute by Defence Committee at meeting held on September 18, 1940. 74 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan. pp. 3-4.

62 The division was geographically based with the establishment of boundaries

determined by the distribution of population and the use of existing air bases as sites for training schools, thus saving time (on training) and money. These areas had three basic defence tasks within their geographic boundaries:

• protection of naval, military and air force equipment and installations and all other vulnerable national centres against enemy air attack;

• protection of sea communications, including surface vessels, against submarine attack; and

• reconnaissance of sea areas and enemy bases to .provide intelligence of enemy activity.

In the event of enemy attack, the air officer commanding (AOC) the area concerned was to assume operational control of all MAP formations and units within that area. 75

Each of these roles required aircraft capable of combat or other specialised tasks. That is, the protection of national centres and military installations requires fighter aircraft, while the protection of sea communications requires long range maritime patrol and anti-submarine capable aircraft. Generally the RAAF lacked these capabilities.

The area commands were planned in such a way to parallel the Australian Army's system of Military Districts. The Army had been using this system, based on state boundaries, for approximately fifty years. Prior to the formation of the areas the

RAAF was managed from its headquarters in Melbourne. The areas were not established concurrently. The first to come into being was the Southern, followed by the Central and then the Northern. It was planned for the area HQ to manage the administrative and operational aspects of all units within the area, regardless of the functions of the units_76

75 Gillison~. pp. 90:.._92 76 Interview with Air Commodore AD Garrison; October 11, 1995.

63 i 5'~~~" I u!: PACIFIC 0. ··'1"'',.••'./ ·'~:·.:. q.······' i \\;; ..~ -· ·-~""" ' ( 7 r' i ; ----,----=:;----:;;,. .,,,,,,.,., Nu"!" j' '""''-v-' , )"'Ji(•; ;,. ' ..' :'l\;" ' • "'·"""' • ...,..., • ~-"~ ~- ~(·~Yc~ J: ·~""'""''"\:> 0 ~~ ~ ·~ '\.. :;l \,o \~ t··rf'' ~\f.. :·\):.• \5 ~k,~~ '\~ ,,.:, _''-,, .-,~ ~:::~ ' :\. .. ."" J . ·~ '· ' "''" -· .. '-:3 0 .,_"' ,, ~ ···~'J-v"i!v; • 't2 iJ . 5\ s.. '·;::" ~: ~~. ·...... L . "' "_,.,,___ 'G9< • ' ~ . ~' . .. ' . :;t,··.~ '.·a--. . i.IRE:4;."'. • . ,.• ¥ tY'fr1 \1., • .!'~ , ·"'~'". ~- q

' r·non:: ...... "· \,;..o' ~~~~-" . · •.;-./ ~- • ),C "''N'..J '\ oo•m-m,,,·,; ''""' .:-""· _/' I !..1_. ''")"' "'----"' •o·~::•,-. _ (;::'~"""' . - . I ¢' ~ L~.jf~-~~~:----

1 SOUTHERN . I ·''~~~·:<': I 'ti~,.,~., &., .. I I !60" The formation of the areas was explained as an additional measure of decentralisation

to allow the staff at RAAF HQ to concentrate on questions of major policy. The

existing Number 1 and 2 Group HQs formed the nucleus of the Southern and Central

Areas. However, it was proposed to defer the formation ofHQs in the other two areas until the number of units allocated there made such HQs necessary.77

In a similar manner, the powers given or delegated to the AOCs in each area were formulated through a gradual process. On March 29, 1940, the Minister for Air, JV

Fairbairn, wrote to CAS impressing upon him the need for the RAAF to make a total effort in every aspect of its work. In this letter he also requested that attention be given to increasing the executive powers of Air Board members, Branch Heads and

Area AOCs. Such action, he wrote:

should be designed to facilitate the smooth running of the administration of the Air Force under the steady growing burden which will be imposed as the Empire Air Scheme evolves. It should also be designed to facilitate the implementing of any extremely rapid action which might be required for our home defence in time of emergency.78

Given the lack of combat aircraft and the allocation of much of the RAAF' s resources to the EATS, one can only question what manner of rapid action could be undertaken.

Following the outbreak of the Pacific war, the Air Board decided that the existing

Northern Area should be divided. This was due to operational pressures as well as the recognition by the Australian and US Chiefs of Staff of the strategic importance of

Darwin.79 Therefore on January 15, 1942, the North-Eastern and North-Western

Areas· were formed with their headquarters at Townsville and Darwin respectively. so

77 AA All96/35/502/13 Briefing by Secretary Dept of Air to Secretary Dept of Defence Co­ ordination, April 15, 1940. 78 AA A701/4/4/192 Delegation ofAuthority for "Total Effort". Minute from Minister for Air to CAS, May 29, 1940. . 79 A Powell The Shadow's Edge. Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1992. p. 73. 80 Gillison ~. p. 311.

64 Air Commodore D Wilson was appointed the acting Air Office Commanding (A/AOC)

NW Area, with Group Captain F Scherger as senior staff officer81 and Wing

Commander S Griffith became commander of the RAAF base at Darwin. 82 The NW

Area assumed operational control of the following units:

• RAAF Station Darwin

• 2SQN

• 13 SQN

• ACHNambon

• AOBs at Koepang, Laha and Namlea

• AOBs at Bathurst Island, Broome, Derby, Drysdale River Mission, Groote Eylandt, Millingimbi, Port Hedland and Wyndham

• No 5 Replenishment Centre, Batchelor.83

The full strength of the NW Area HQ at the time of its formation was 24 officers and

89 other personnel.

Early Operations

In addition to the training flights with Navy and Army units, from early 1940 the

Wirraways of 12 SQN practiced bombing and gunnery at the newly established armament range at Lee Point. 84 Aircraft also flew familiarisation flights to Wyndham and Bathurst Island and monthly training flights to Katherine and Drysdale. In March

1941 the Squadron was placed on alert for possible attacks on a German raider

81 FRW Scherger was appointed to command the RAAF station at Darwin on October 7, 1941, following the posting of C Eaton to No. 2 Service Flying Training School at Wagga Wagga. Scherger remained in this position until March, 1942 when he was replaced by Wing Commander DE Walker. DE Walker was in tum replaced by Squadron Leader BR Walker on December 28, 1942. See RAAF Museum Darwin Documents box file RAAF Darwin Commanding Officers. 82 Powel1Q!!.91- p. 73. 83 RAAF Museum, Worlq War Two Australia box file. ED Plenty A Brief History of North-Western Area at Darwin. 84 RAAF Museum, 12 Squadron file; 12 Squadron.

65 suspected to be in the area. 85 In , equipped with 18 Wirraways and reassigned to a 'general purpose' role, 12 SQN moved to the newly constructed RAAF station Darwin.

Operations from the new base included anti submarine patrols, shipping escorts,

coastal patrols (covering an area from Port Hedland to Millingimbi), transporting bombs to AOBs and seaward reconnaissance. For the long distance flights refuelling facilities were maintained at Port Hedland, Wyndham, Derby, Broome, Bathurst Island, Millingimbi and Drysdale River Mission. Aircraft were also used for the surveillance of Japanese pearling luggers which were suspected of being used for intelligence gathering. After the outbreak of the Pacific war, these activities were,

quite rightly, intensified. 86

On January 21, 1942, HQ North-Western Area directed that Wirraways were not be

used as fighters but were to be utilised for dive bombing only. A Japanese was reported to be in the Flores Sea and to prevent aircraft being destroyed by a surprise attack Wilson sent the Wirraways south from Darwin to Daly Waters on January 27. They had hardly arrived at the new location when Bostock instructed

Wilson to move them back to Darwin. Bostock later claimed that he considered the aircraft would have been of greater use in Darwin. This proved to be an incorrect

decision as several Wirraways were destroyed in the first raids. 87 During early February 12 SQN had been based at several airfields and by February 19 it had been dispersed so that A Flight was at the Darwin civil airfield while B and C Flights were at

Batchelor. 88

85 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing box file; A BriefHistory No. 12 Squadron RMF. 86 RAAF Museum, 12 Squadron file; 12 Squadron. 87 Hall Q!Lffi. p. 108. . 88 RAAF Museum 82 Wing box file; A BriefHistory No. 12 Squadron RMF.

66 Using the Ansons, 13 SQN's initial task was to fly shipping patrols and searches over the waters around northern Australia. 89 The squadron was re-equipped with Lockheed

Hudsons in June 1940 and deployed them on similar tasks for the remainder of that year and the early part of 1941. In May 1941 familiarisation flights began over the

NEI, where it was intended 13 SQN would be based in the event of hostilities with

Japan.9o In November the same year three Hudsons were engaged in a search for the

RAN cruiser, HMAS Sydney.91

Following the outbreak of the Pacific war, the squadron's aircraft were based concurrently at Laha and Namlea. Despite attacks on their bases by Japanese flying boats and land based aircraft, the Hudsons carried out attacks on Japanese shipping until withdrawn to Darwin in February 1942.92 A total restriction was imposed on bombing in the NEI sphere of naval operational control east of 116° east from January

8, 1942, to prevent allied aircraft from attacking US and Dutch submarines operating there.93

Another Hudson equipped unit to arrive in the NW Area was 2 SQN. The squadron, originally based at Laverton and flying Ansons, was re-equipped with Hudsons and moved north, where it operated simultaneously from Darwin, Koepang and Namlea.94

Operations from these bases were largely shipping and anti-submarine patrols. Such actions led to attacks on Japanese shipping and occasional aircraft losses. While operating in the NEI, 2 and 13 SQNs came under the command of ABDACOM in

89 RAAF Museum, 13 Squadron box file; 13 Squadron. 90 RAAF Museum, 13 Squadron box file; 13 Squadron. By this time six major plans (covering different scenarios) for RAAF operations in the NEI had been prepared. See AA All96/ 6/60/50l/80,Ptansfor Operations in NEI (Netherlands East Indies)-Plenaps. 91 The cruiser HMAS Sydney disappeared in the Indian Ocean in November 1941. At the time Navy HQ was uncertain of its location so it seems reasonable that RAAF aircraft stationed around the Indian Ocean and north west Australia were used to search for the ship. 92 RAAF Museum, 13 Squadron box file; 13 Squadron. 93 AA A1196/6/60/50 1/80. Plans for Operations in NEI (Netherlands East Indies)-Plenaps. Cypher Message from NEI C inC to C inC Eastern Fleet, January 7, 1942. 94 A WM64 1/13 Operations Record Book ofNumber 2 (GR) Squadron.

67 Java, through Area Combined Headquarters (ACH) at Koepang and Halong.

However, on December 18, 1941, Hudsons provided anti submarine and air cover for

the allied forces' move to Timor. 95 Up until the Squadron's evacuation to Darwin on

February 18, 1942, it combined with 13 SQN to fly patrols, twice daily from Koepang

to Darwin via (in the Celebes). 1 SQN aircraft were placed under the

command of the CO of 13 SQN when operating from Darwin.

The rapid Japanese advances overran the AOBs in the NEI in early 1942. On January

30, personnel from the AOB at Namlea were evacuated to Darwin by Hudsons and

Empire flying boats. On that same day the RAAF in Darwin was placed under the

ADBACOM. The following day the Japanese reached Laha.96

The inclusion of Darwin in ABDACOM was to present new problems for the RAAF as the AOC NW Area, who was part of the RAAF' s structure, suddenly found himself under the command of officers of allied military forces based in other countries, or as

Air Commodore Bladin commented later:

Hindsight shows that, after Singapore, there never was any mileage in the concept of setting Wavell & Brett (U.S.A.) up with a Command in Java. This fact . exposes the unenviable position in which Air Commodore Wilson was placed in Darwin, also the commanders in Timor and Ambon. All their links were firmly established south towards Melbourne but their responsibilities were suddenly oriented to Java and all this in the midst of a disintegrating situation. 97

The HQ NW Area assumed operational control of all American combat aircraft passing through Darwin enroute to the NEI on February 7, 1942.

95 As an attempt to pre-empt the Japanese occupation of the Portuguese colony, a force, commanded by Colonel van Staaten, comprising Dutch units and 270 men of the Australian 2/40th battalion took over the town and, airfield at Dili. 96 A WM 64/Roll 111 Operations Record Book-North-Western Area. 97 RAAF Museum Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections.

68 On February 14, Air Commodore Wilson and Squadron Leader JW McGilvray departed Darwin on a USAAC B-17 for a week long flight to Bandoeng, Batavia, and

Tjilatjap. They returned to Darwin on February 21. 98 By then the Japanese had launched their first air attacks on this important base.

98 AWM 64/Rolllll Operations Record Book-North Western Area

69 Chapter 4 The RAAF on the Defensive

The Japanese Air Raids1

On February 19, 1942, a force of 188 Japanese Naval aircraft (comprising 36 Zero

fighters, 71 "Val" dive bombers and 81 "Kate" bombers) of the First Air Attack Fleet,

led by Commander , were launched from the aircraft carriers Akagi,

Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu and proceeded towards Darwin, a target described as "the

powerful enemy stronghold on Australia's north-west coast". 2 Fuchida used

essentially the same force that had devastated Pearl Harbor ten weeks earlier. On their

· way to the target area they shot down a US Navy PBY flying boat and destroyed a USAAC Douglas C-53 transport on Bathurst Island. 3

Although warnings of the approaching aircraft were received in Darwin, none was

taken seriously and the local defences were surprised by the attack. 4 The first bombs

were dropped on Darwin at 9. 48 am. The raid continued for approximately 40 minutes. The targets were the port, the business district and the civil airfield at Parap. 5 A second raid by 54 land based bombers (27 "Betty" and 27 ''Nell"), flying in two

formations, from Ambon, commenced at 11.55 am and lasted between 20 and 25

minutes. The target this time was the RAAF base, where Japanese bombs destroyed buildings, aircraft and equipment.

1 The first raids against Darwin have been described elsewhere in great detail and will not be dealt with in such depth in this thesis. The intention of this section is to describe briefly the effect of the raids on the RAAF. For more information on the raids themselves see Hall Qn...m; D Lockwood Australia's Pearl Harbour. Cassell, Sydney, NSW, 1966; Powell ~- ch. 3; AD Garrison Darwin 1942 in Journal. No. 122, January/February 1997; Gillison QQ cit. ch 22; and S Dyer Devastation at Darwin in After the Battle. No. 67, 1990. 2 M Okumiy!!, JHorikoshi and M Caidin Zero! The Story of the Japanese Nayy Air Force 1937- 1945. Cassell & Company Ltd, London, UK, 1957. p. 95. Darwin was in fact poorly defended. The harbour itself was defended by an AAA battery of 18 guns. Fuchida reported the formations of Japanese aircraft, unhindered by effective opposition, were able to pick off the ships in the harbour "at our leisure". See R Treloar and A Titheridge Counter Air Operations in A Stephens (ed) Defending the Air/Sea Gap. ADSC, Canberra, 1992. p. 50. 3 Alford Darwin's Air War. p. 14. 4 Treloar and Titheridge Qo...Q!. p. 50. 5 Alford Darwin's Air War. p. 19.

70 The only defence was provided by Army AAA batteries and ten P-40Es of the USAAC's 33rd Pursuit Squadron (Provisional) led by Major F Pell. This unit was

flying to Timor (escorted by a B-17) to reinforce the defences there but had been forced to return to Darwin because of bad weather. The P-40s could offer little more

than token resistance and suffered badly in combat against the more experienced Japanese. Four of the US pilots were killed in the action and ten of the 11 US aircraft

were destroyed. 6

As a result of these first two raids 23 ships were either sunk or damaged, 7 numerous

buildings in the town were destroyed, 243 people were killed and a further 350 injured

or missing. During the second raid, hangars and sheds at the RAAF station were

destroyed while six Hudsons were destroyed on the ground, one was badly damaged as was one Wirraway. Nine RAAF personnel died during the raid, including Wing

Commander A Tindal, the area armaments o:fficer. 8 US losses included three PBY

Catalinas destroyed, eight P-40s destroyed in the air, one P-40 damaged in the air and two P-40s and one B-24 destroyed on the ground. 9 In all 26 allied aircraft were destroyed or reduced to components. 10 The Japanese loss for the two raids was five aircraft. 11

These were the first and second of 64 recorded air raids against Darwin and its environs. The Japanese would continue to bomb Darwin until November 12, 1943,

6 R Alford Air War Operations, Darwin '42. In Flightpath. Vol. 3, No.2. p. 33. At the time the RAAF had only 31 so-called front line aircraft in the NW Area-17 Hudsons and 14 Wirraways (five of which were unserviceable). See Treloar and Titheridge Op cit. p. 51. Lieutenant R Oestreicher was the only US pilot to shoot down a Japanese aircraft during the raid. 7 Information. from D Stevens, Director of Naval Historical Studies, Canberra; July 2, 1996. A Japanese reconnaissance flight on February 18 confirmed the presence of 45 ships in the harbour. 8 A WM 64/Roll 111 Operations Record Book-North Western Area.. 9 Justice C Lowe (Commissioner) Commission of Enquiry Concerning the Circumstances Connected with the Attack made by Japanese Aircraft at Darwin on 19th February 1942. Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, ACT. 1945. p. 8. 10 Rorrison QQ..gj!. p. 189. 11 RAifordAlliedAircraft Losses Darwin; 19 February 1942 inFlightpath. Vol. 3, No.3. p 35.

71 making it the second most bombed allied base in the SWP A, behind Port Moresby. 12

The raids were not flown on a daily basis-they were often weeks apart. Numbers of

Japanese aircraft deployed varied between 188 on the first raid down to one bomber on

August 24, 1942. The main target areas were the town of Darwin, RAAF station

Darwin and other AAF bases. 13

Command Arrangements

One of the outcomes of the early Darwin raids was the change to the command

arrangements in Darwin. On March 11, General Brett asked the Australian

· Government to establish a unified command in Darwin. He pointed out that the town

was subject to enemy attack and that he was concerned with the protection of

American lives and US Government property. He stated that some form of unified·

command was required. 14 After some debate as to whether an Army officer could be

placed in command of Air Force units on March 24 the War Cabinet approved a

unified command and appointed Major General Herring Commander in Chief of all

forces with full operational and administrative responsibility. 15

The RAAF set about replacing all senior officers in the NW Area. On March 25, 1942

Air Commodore Wilson16 was replaced by Air Commodore FM Bladin as AOC North­

Western Area and Group Captain JP McCauley replaced Group Captain Scherger as

Senior Air Staff Officer. 17 CAS's directive to Bladin included the following points:

12 Clayton Op cit. p. 34. 13 Alford Darwin's Air War. pp. 78-79. This number does not include Japanese reconnaissance flights over northern Australia. 14 AA A5954/l/581/20 Unified Command of Defence Forces at Darwin. Message from Brett to Curtin; March 11, 1942. 15 AA A5954/46/808/l Cabinet Minute 2049; March 24, 1942. 16 Air Commodore Wilson was posted to AF HQ on March 29, 1942, as Air Member for Organisation and Equipment. Treloar and Titheridge note that as a result of the February 19 raids all three Service commanders in Darwin were relieved of their commands. See Treloar and Titheridge .QQ...g!t. p. 50. 17 Group Captain Scherger's removal and his later career has been told in some detail in chapter five onwards ofH Rayner Scherger. AWM, Canberra. 1984. In his report of the , Lowe praised Scherger for acting "with courage and energy" during the Japanese raids. Group

72 1. It is the intention that Darwin and the Darwin area shall be held. Any plan is unacceptable which is based primarily on a presumption that the enemy must necessarily establish himself on Australian territory and, whilst such considerations are of great importance, they must be subordinated to the overriding necessity of preventing the enemy from gaining a footing.

5. The aim of the Air Force is not merely to prevent the enemy from obtaining a foothold in the Darwin area, but to locate and destroy his forces and installations where ever possible in order to prevent a concentration of such a force as will enable him to conduct offensive operations against North-Western Area. 18

In retrospect, such a directive would have been a challenge to say the least. Given the low morale, the desertions by some RAAF personnel following the first air raids and the general expectation of a Japanese invasion coupled with a lack of combat aircraft suitable for taking the fight to the Japanese, Air Commodore Bladin had quite a task ahead of him. Stephens writes:

Bladin brought strong leadership skills and common sense to the challenges. He insisted on combat training, rifle shooting and route marching for all ground crew; started the construction of urgently needed airfields; and dispersed his forces widely from Darwin to Daly Waters. 19

Bladin was a long serving RAAF officer who was well suited to the task of leading a mixed Australian-US command (a command that would expand to include Dutch and RAF units before he was replaced). Powell refers to him as "a quietly efficient, diplomatic man, his nickname 'Pop' or 'Dad', was more an indication of his concern for the welfare of his men than his age". 20

Captain McCaUley was posted on May 19 1942 to AF HQ as ACAS. He was replaced as SASO by Group Captain WL Healy. 18 AA All96/6/36/501/283 Nth Western Area. Organisation & Command Policy. Directive from CAS to Air Commodore Bladin, March 21, 1942. Jones added that Bladin was to undertake repair or salvage of damaged or destroyed RAAF equipment, something that had been lacking in the NW Area. 19 A Stephens and J Isaacs High Fliers. AGPS, Canberra, 1996. p. 56. 20 Powell .Qn...gh. p. 111. During our interview on December 12, 1996, Wing Commander Cresswell referred to Bladin as 'Dad Bladin'.

73 All Allied air units in the NW Area were under the AOC's control. Bladin wrote some

time after the war that he was entirely satisfied with this arrangement. He noted some

examples of the co-operation that existed between the RAAF and the USAAF:

When I reached Darwin, March 1942, I had the greatest co-operation from the American Lieut. Col. Paul Wurtsmith commanding 49th Pursuit (Fighter) Group. I allotted him his airfields, discussed operations and so on just as though his was a RAAF unit. In the same way when General Brett visited N. W. Area, to decorate an American pilot, I arranged with Wurtsmith to have a combined Australian-American parade on one of . . 21 t h e fi g hter a1rstnps.

It was on that visit, too, that Bladin persuaded Brett to promote Wurtsmith to Colonel,

' saying he needed (and deserved) the rank to take command of the Air defences which

were to be delegated to him. This included the Fighter Section Headquarters

controlled by Wing Commander Primrose. It was an arrangement which Bladin

claimed worked very well.

GHQ SWPA issued Operating Instruction No 4 on May 5, 1942. This instruction

stated that all Australian and US military forces operating in the NW Area were to be

placed under the operational control of the General Officer Commanding the Northern

Territory Force. The Instruction continued:

In the exercise of this authority the General Officer Commanding the Northern Territory Force, while co-ordinating and perfecting the planning of all forces in preparation for defence, will not, except when attack is imminent or in progress, disturb the execution of the general plans of the local commanders of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and the Commanding General US Army Forces in AUSTRALIA.

The General Officer Commanding the Northern Territory Force will continue to operate under the direct command of the Commander Allied Land Forces. 22

21 RAAF Museum, Darwin Documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids-Reflections. Later in the war Wurtsmith was placed in command of the USAAF's 13th Air Force. 22 AA A5954/1/0581!20 Unified Command of Defence Forces at Darwin; GHQ SWPA Operating Instruction No.4, May·5, 1942. This instruction was reinforced by the AAF Operation Instruction No. 3/1942, signed on May 20, 1942, which stated that all Australian and US air force units "now or hereafter in the Darwin Area are to come under the operational control of the General Officer

74 The US Air Command No. 1, comprising the 38th Bombardment Group (M), 43rd

Bombardment Group (H) and 49th Pursuit Group merged with the North-Western Area

HQ on May 23. US officers joined the HQ staff, in the positions of Chief of Staff,

Assistant Intelligence Officer, Ordnance Officer, Assistant Medical Officer and

Assistant G4. Two days later No. 3 Works Maintenance Unit was formed as an

integrated RAAF and US Army unit. 23 The North Western Area HQ became HQNWA

Allied Air Forces on June 26. 24

Following the raids and as a precautionary measure most of the Area HQ's records

were dispersed in buildings in the scrub adjacent to the RAAF Station. On February

28 the HQ moved to a site approximately 1.5 miles south of the RAAF Station. The

new accommodation was in tents dispersed in the scrub, while a rear HQ was

established near Larrimah six days later. 25 The forward HQ was moved to a camp in

the bush alongside the main road 22 miles from Darwin and the AOC operated from

there. As the fear of invasion developed the HQ was again moved, on April 30, this

time to a location alongside Army HQ (the Berrimah hospital building) where as Bladin

comments "the set up was worse still as far as ability to control. The operations room

was a hessian structure, the AOC' s mess was a sail cloth under a gum tree and the

cook was a coal miner (with a tin opener)". Bladin later wrote that he made the wrong

decision in locating his headquarters alongside the Army Commander. It was in the

middle of a battle area and isolated from the air units. There was no radio or W/T

mobile vehicle. He added "Had I gone south (to Batchelor), and remained there (the

only airfield which would have been out of the battle zone) I could have exercised control of air units but would have been out of close touch with the Army-and close

Commanding the Northern Territory Force." It is not known why it was necessary to issue this instruction as it gave similar directions to those issued by GHQ. See AA All96/6/60/501/103 Allied Air Forces-Operation Instruction. 23 AWM 64/Roll 111 Operations Record Book-North Western Area 24 RAAF Museum, World War Two Australia box file, ED Plenty A Brief History of North Western Area at Darwin. 25 AWM 64/Roll 111 Operations Record Book-North Western Area.

75 touch is one essential if air is to give army close support in battle. Remaining alongside

the Army Commander I found I had parlous communications with Army units using

field telephone land lines which were cut every day by vehicular tra:ffic". 26

On May 9, 1942 the RAAF Station HQ Darwin moved to Berrimah (collocated with

Area HQ administration staff) and on August 16 the Operational Base Darwin

commenced operations room control at Berrimah.Z7 On August 17, HQ NW Area

moved again and an advance HQ was established at 57 Mile and a rear HQ at Adelaide

River.

Aftermath of the Initial Japanese Raids28

The air attacks against Darwin demoralised and exposed the civilian population and the armed forces. 29 The events which followed the first raids were amongst the most humiliating moments in Australian military history. There was an outbreak of military and civil disorder which, fuelled by rumours of a Japanese invasion, led to a state of panic. 30 Bladin noted the overall situation the RAAF found itself in during late

February and early March 1942. Morale was a problem as was the "sense of despair at an inability to better our living conditions, to better operating conditions, to strike back".31 A comfortable RAAF Station had peen destroyed as had clothing, supplies, tools and transport. Ground crews had been dispersed away from the Station without adequate facilities to support the dispersal. They were recalled as and when required.

The area was living under the threat of invasion.

26 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections. 27 RHS BriefHistory ofRAAF Station Darwin. 28 For detailed descriptions of conditions in Darwin see the Lowe Report pp. 11-13; Powell Op cit chapters 3 and 4; and Hall Qo.m. 29 Treloar and Titheridge Qo.m. p. 50 3° Clayton Qo.m. p. 33. 31 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections.

76 The threat of invasion, reinforced by the February and March air raids, was the focus

of defence planning and on March 17 officers from the Area HQ and the Australian

Army discussed the demolition of airfields. 32 As part of the planning to counter the

possible invasion Bladin had to assess the capabilities of RAAF ground staff to operate

in a land combat situation. He found:

men not long in the Service who could not correctly load their rifles and few knew how to assemble webbing equipment in marching order much less how to wear it comfortably. 33

The Japanese high command had not agreed on an invasion plan for Australia. 34

, However they were keen to consolidate their occupation of the resource rich NEI. Darwin had been bombed in order to prevent the US use of the port for the Java

campaign; to destroy the port's military facilities so that a convoy could not be sent to

reinforce the allied forces on Timor; and the Japanese could proceed with their plans

for the conquest of the NEI. Koepang and Dili were occupied the day after the raid. 35

Powell argues that Japanese intelligence incorrectly believed that Darwin was an important allied offensive base. As it was, the only aircraft that could have opposed the Timor invasion were the Hudsons and the USAAF's Douglas A-24s and it is

unlikely that they could have been much of a threat without fighter escort. Powell

adds that the Japanese "used a sledge-hammer to crack an egg and with it they cracked

the shell of Australian self-assurance". 36 One wonders, however, whether the Japanese had gained copies of the papers from the Imperial Conference of 193 7 which stated

that in a war with Japan, Darwin would be of considerable importance as an

operational base, a naval control base, a contraband control base and a refuge port. A

report titled Darwin Defences-Report of Sub-Committee dated March 11, 193 7,

noted the strategic reserve of fuel oil, the important civil air centre and the fact that

32 A WM 64/Roll 111 Operations Record Book-North Western Area. 33 RAAF Muselllil, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections. 34 For details on the debate over whether to invade Australia see HP Frei Japan's Southward Advance and Australia. Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic, 1991. Ch. 10. 35 Rorrison .Qp_Q!. p. 192. 36 Powell.Qp_Q!. p. 94 ..

77 Darwin was nearer to a possible Japanese base than any other Australian port. Perhaps

the sledge-hammer was the most appropriate weapon, given the pre war Australian and

UK findings. 37

Rather than support an invasion, the carriers that launched the aircraft for the first raid

sailed on and all four vessels were sunk by the US Navy four months later at Midway

Island.

From bases in Java, Timor, the Celebes and New Guinea the Japanese were able to launch attacks against every operational airfield in the northern and north-western parts

of Australia between Exmouth and Townsville for the next two years. 38 These raids, while very wide ranging and seemingly unrelated in strategic terms made an impact on

MacArthur's plans especially during 1942. The perceived threat of a Japanese invasion forced the allies to defend northern Australia. Initially this was done at the expense of the New Guinea campaign. MacArthur viewed the threat to northern Australia to be serious enough to warrant the despatch of his first pursuit group to Darwin rather than

Port Moresby. 39

The Lowe Report

On March 3, 1942 the Commonwealth Government appointed Justice Charles Lowe to head a Royal Commission to inquire into and report on all the circumstances connected with the attacks made by enemy aircraft on Darwin on 19th February, 1942.40 Lowe visited Darwin, interviewed witnesses and prepared two reports, the first of which was submitted to the Minister for Defence Co-operation on March 27, 1942.41

37 AA A5954/l/1057/12 Imperial Conference 1937-Australian Papers. 38 H Brown Australia 1942: The Most Dangerous Year in The Australian Magazine. January 25-26, 1992. pp. 8-9. 39 Clayton Op cit. p. 33. 40 Lowe Report. p. 5. 41 A complete copy of the Lowe report is with the Parliamentary papers for 1945. See also N Rosenthal Sir Charles Lowe. Robertson & Mallens, Melbourne, Vic, 1968. pp. 102-117.

78 The findings of Lowe's commission were eventually tabled in Parliament by the then

Prime Minister JB Chifley on October 6, 1945 (two months after the war had ended).

The contents of the report were made known to the public for the first time in January

1972.42

Lowe was critical of the RAAF in his report. He found that the RAAF in Darwin had received advice at 9.37 am, from observers on Bathurst Island, that a large number of aircraft were proceeding south. However, no general alarm was given in the town until just before 10.00 am. The failure by the RAAF to pass this information on to Air

Raid Precautions (ARP) HQ was inexplicable. He argued that had an alarm been given vessels may have been able to leave the harbour and waterside workers many of whom were killed on the Darwin wharf when a ship loaded with depth charges blew up, may have been able to escape to a safe location. 43 He found that the RAAF Station had suffered extremely serious damage, that orders passed to personnel (of whom most were experiencing eneniy attack for the first time) were confused and "many of the men simply took to the bush". Lowe added:

The Air Station itself was practically deserted. For several days afterwards men were still straggling back to the Station, and at a parade on 23rd February, the muster showed 278 men missing. As the casualties were very small, the result can only be regarded as deplorable. 44

Lowe put the conduct down to the lack of training and lack of leadership at the relevant time and warned that what happened in Darwin could be repeated in other parts of Australia. He found that the layout of the RAAF Station was not suited to meet the raids; the buildings were not dispersed and as such presented a good target;

42 AA A5954(1/524/1 Japanese -Second World War. "Australia's Pearl Harbour" by Douglas Lockwood. Also extract from Newman Rosenthal's Biography "Sir Charles Lowe." Lowe had tried several times before 1972 to have the contents of his report made known to the public. See also Release raid evidence in The Age August 27, 1966. Details of the Lowe report were first published in The Sunday Australian January 16, 1972. 43 Lowe Report. pp. 9-10. 44 ibid. p. 12. Powell has written that the panic and desertion by service personnel and civilians was not as widespread as reported by Lowe. See A Powell The Darwin 'panic', 1942 in Journal of the Australian War Memorial. No. 3, October 1983. pp. 3-9.

79 little had been done to provide pens for aircraft around the Station's perimeter; and

nothing had been done in the way of camouflage. 45

In the response to the Lowe Report the RAAF noted that corrective action had been

initiated in relation to air raid warnings and a variety of other issues such as dispersal,

protection and camouflage of aircraft; training and leadership; and airfield defence. 46

Lessons Learnt

The RAAF' s inability to intercept and destroy the attacking aircraft was the

· consequence of many years of neglect during the interwar period. 47 The RAAF was

placed in a situation where it had to make up for the neglect in a very short time. This

involved, inter alia, the formation of squadrons, the development of doctrine and

acquisition and deployment of suitable aircraft. The RAAF was in a position where it

had perhaps only days in which to learn to fight a war. As part of the learning process,

in early March 1942, Group Captain Rely sent a minute to all Area HQs advising of

lessons which could be drawn from the February 19 raid. He noted the preliminary

reconnaissance of Darwin by two Japanese aircraft on February 18. He pointed to

several measures which should be taken to minimise the possibility of damage and destruction in future raids:

1. an adequate and reliable warning system is required, coupled with the provision of suitable modem interceptor aircraft;

2. a number of aerodromes in the forward area from which fighter aircraft may operate. Such aerodromes should all be equipped with maintenance and refuelling detachments and communications facilities to the controlling headquarters;

/ 3. major repair installations and stores should be at a considerable distance inland from the coastline;

45 Lowe Report. pp. 14-15. 46 ibid. pp. 27-36. 47 Treloar & Titheridge .QQ.g!!. p. 50

80 4. adequate dispersal and camouflage of aircraft is essential. Dispersal alone is inefficient in comparison with dispersal and camouflage. 48 Decoy aircraft have definite value in attracting the fire of enemy aircraft;

5. stores, equipment and munitions must be dispersed in a number of smaller groups regardless of the total quantity of any item which is held in the area. This will ensure that damage to any one store will not cause total loss of any one item, whether these items are essential or relatively important. Where possible, such stores should also be camouflaged and, in many cases, should be placed below the level of the ground, for example, petrol drums, bombs, ammunition;

6. accommodation and messing facilities require some dispersal and camouflage, but the degree of dispersal must not be limited in order that operational efficiency will not be lost;

7. small slit trenches properly dispersed and sited well clear of buildings have been shown to be most effective in prevention of loss oflife;

8. adequate light anti-aircraft fire (i.e. Bofors) supplemented by adequate fire is essential to prevent low flying attacks on aerodromes, installations and personnel. 49

This type of information should have been known to RAAF officers in Darwin before the raids. Hall writes that one of the most depressing features of the first raids was that few, if any, lessons already learned in the war had been put into practice. Details of the fighting in , and Malaya were available to RAAF officers in Darwin

"although for all the good they did, they might never have been sent them".

Information from the Malayan campaign described how the Japanese strafed aircraft parked outside the airfield perimeter-yet aircraft were parked in this manner in

Darwin. The blame for poor organisation and a lack of preparedness does not only rest with the officers in Darwin. The Air Board had been advised of deficiencies in

48 AA Al196/6/15/501/246 Enemy Air Attacks-Darwin Area. A minute from Williams to the Secretary of the Air Board dated February 27, 1942, notes the aircraft in Darwin were camouflaged and dispersed. 49 AA All96/6/15/501/246 Enemy Air Attacks-Darwin Area Minute to Area HQs from Group Captain Hely, March 3, 1942.

81 camouflage, AAA, fighters and warning systems at Darwin. However, it had done

nothing. 5°

Bladin had started to disperse materiel and in May was able to advise the Air Board

that 14 days supplies for all units, (including US units) were located at Katherine. 51

Later that year, following an intelligence report which indicated the possibility of an

attack on the north west coast of Australia, he directed stocks of bombs, ammunition

and petrol be placed at Corruna Downs for use by units operating there. Bladin noted,

at this time, the maximum effort the NW Area could put forward consisted of one

Hudson squadron, one P-40 squadron and one USAAF heavy bomber squadron. 52

The 49th Pursuit Group

Early fighter defence for Darwin was provided by the USAAF' s 49th Pursuit Group,

which had been on Horn Island in Torres Strait since February, 1942. 53 In early March

the group was ordered to Darwin and the first element, the 8th Squadron, moved there

on March 8, followed by the 7th and 9th Squadrons during April. In Darwin the group

was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) Paul B Wurtsmith. By March 8

Darwin had been subjected to 13 raids. The threat of invasion loomed over the town, morale among the population was low and up until then, there was no interceptor aircraft based in the area. The arrival of the 49th Pursuit Group had a profound effect

50 Hall QQ..Q!. pp. 114-115. It is questionable as to what the Air Board could have done, given that radar and advance fighter aircraft were unavailable. 51 AA A1196/6/46/501/186 Supply and Distribution of Petrol and Bomb Stocks, North Western Area-Policy. Minute to Secretazy Air Board from HQ NW Area, May 1, 1942. 52 AA A1196/6/46/501/186 Supply and Distribution of Petrol and Bomb Stocks, North Western Area-Policy. Minute to Secretary Air Board from HQ NW Area, August 29, 1942. 53 Initially it was planned that the 49th Pursuit Group would be placed at the disposal of the RAAF for operational training and then for the defence of the north-east coast of Australia. See AA A1196/15/501/268 Fighter Defence of Darwin Area. Notes on Conference, February 7, 1942, to discuss details of USA Air Corps 49th Pursuit Group operating under RAAF control.

82 on the populace. 54 The greatest stimulant for the restoration of morale was the sight of

American fighter aircraft patrolling the skies above the town. 55

The pilots of the 49th found that to fight with the Zero, the P-40 needed superior altitude so that it could dive on the enemy formations. Its rate of climb was not fast and therefore the Group needed the greatest advanced warning of the approach of hostile aircraft so that they could take off, climb and intercept from a higher altitude.

For this reason radar stations were established as far as possible towards the Japanese bases to give the earliest warnings. 56 The Group flew its first intercept mission in the

NW Area on March 22 when nine bombers, three Zeros and a reconnaissance aircraft attacked Katherine. The P-40s had received warning of the Japanese approach as the

NW Area's first radar had become operational that day. The Nakajima reconnaissance aircraft was destroyed in that combat. On other occasions, such as April 4, when the group was able to assemble in large numbers and employ these tactics, 14 P-40s, together with the Army's anti-aircraft guns, destroyed four out of seven bombers and four fighters. In the same raid one bomber and two fighters were claimed as damaged. 57 Units of the group operated from Darwin, Batchelor, Strauss and Livingstone.

Initially the Group flew under the operational control of the RAAF. Bladin knew little of the characteristics of the P-40 or the tact!cs the US pilots would use against the Japanese fighters. He therefore delegated operational control of all air defence fighter units to Colonel Wurtsmith. 58 Bladin advised the Air Board of this decision and added that RAAF staff would be replaced by US Army personnel as soon as they became

54 RAAF Museum, Darwin Doctiments box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids-Reflections. 55 Gillison Q12..Q!. p. 469. 56 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections. 57 A WM 64/Roll 111 Operations Record Book-North Western Area. 58 A Stephens RAAF Operational Commanders in A Stephens (ed) The RAAF in the Southwest Pacific Area 1942-1945. APSC, Canberra, 1993. p. 30.

83 available. 59 Such a move did not appear to concern the Air Board and Bladin received

a message:

It is most gratifying to note that the American fighter squadrons in your Area have settled in and have achieved early, and notable, success. 60

The Group engaged in its final combat in the NW Area on August 23 1942 (raid No.

27) when a force of 27 bombers escorted by 27 fighters was intercepted by 24 P-40s

from the 7th and 8th fighter squadrons over Hughes. During the ensuing combat 15

Japanese aircraft and one P-40 were shot down. This proved to be the most successful

allied combat fought in the NW Area. 61

By September 17, 1942 the Japanese advance in New Guinea had come to within 20

miles of Port Moresby and Allied reinforcements were rushed to the area. Among these was the 7th Squadron ofthe 49th Group. On October 9 the ground echelon of the

8th and 9th Squadrons arrived at Port Moresby with the air elements following so that by the end of the month the entire Group was in New Guinea. 62

The Strategic Bombing Survey summed up the 49th Group's efforts in the NW Area as

"The operation of this unit early discouraged the mass attacks against Darwin and permitted the rebuilding of our bases there with minimum interference". 63 During their time in the NW Area the 49th claimed 75 Japanese aircraft shot down (almost half the

Japanese aircraft shot down over northern Australia) for the loss of seven pilots and twenty aircraft of their own. 64 With the departure of the 49th Group the last USAAF

59 AA A1196/6/60/501/42 Operations to Seaward, RAAF station- Darwin. Report of Operations . carried out April 7-15, 1942. From AOC NW Area to Secretary Air Board; April17, 1942. 60 AA All96/6/60/501/42 Operations to Seaward, RAAF station- Darwin. Minute from D Ops to HQ North-Western Area; April 30, 1942. 61 Clayton Op cit. p. 43. 62 ER McDowell 49th Fighter· Group. Squadron/Signal, Carrollton, Texas, 1989. p. 16 63 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan. p. 29. 64 Powell Qp_Ql p. 110.

84 officer left the combined HQ NW Area. 65 While based in Port Moresby, the Group's

main tasks were air defence and providing escorts for RAAF and USAAF bombers.

The RAAF Build Up

In the months following the first air raids the RAAF was faced with the task of moving huge numbers of personnel and aircraft and their support infrastructure to the NW

.Area. Under the plans agreed by the Australian Government and MacArthur for the disposition of air forces, the USAAF was to operate in the North-Eastern Area and the

· RAAF in the NW Area. 66 The RAAF build up was slow at first because of the shortage of aircraft, the lack of fighters and the non existence of a fighter squadron.

The Japanese raids led to the hasty formation of fighter squadrons equipped with whatever aircraft were available. After the Japanese decision ofMarch 1942 against an invasion of Australia the main task of the Japanese Navy's air flotillas was then to prevent the use of Darwin as an offensive base. 67 They attempted this, initially with great determination. Therefore the main need of the RAAF was for interceptor aircraft.

Under Bladin' s direction the RAAF set about building up the defences of Darwin.

Bladin notes that:

The defences had to be provided with depth and linked with a network of reliable telephone lines. Some ten or so good airstrips were constructed. Finding potable water was a problem. Siting of each had to be done by controlled dispersion. 68

In addition to airfield construction, fuel was dispersed in small batches of 44 gallon drums, grass was cut to prevent fires spreading and were set up. All of this was

65 RAAF Museum, World War Two Australia box file, ED Plenty A Brief History of North Western Area at Darwin. 66 AA A5954/46/814/1 Advisory War Council minute 1001; July 16, 1942. 67 Powell~· p. 111. 68 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections.

85 Map 4.1 RAAF Bases NW Area Aprill943

130" 131'

!30' 121. 132' 133'

Map copied From G Odgers Op cit. carried out with the minimum available facilities. Bladin comments that operating

"without air superiority is a condition that few present day senior officers have experienced. Operating on a shoe-string 1500-2000 miles from base is a sobering exercise". 69

By June 1942 there were 33 airfields planned, under construction or operational in the

NW Area. 70 In addition to the combat squadrons, support units started to move north.

By there were three repair and salvage units (RSU) in the area (at Fenton,

Adelaide River and Batchelor) and a stores depot at Birdum holding six months requirements for the whole Area. Also at Birdum was an aircraft repair depot (ARD) with two months stock of its own requirements. 71

A large number of airstrips were constructed alongside the main road from Darwin to

Alice Springs. The main reason for this was the ease of construction. Several airstrips thus gained their water supply from tapping into the main Darwin to Batchelor water pipe. Initially, at some airstrips this was the only water supply. Some of the airstrips, were named after US pilots killed during. Japanese air raids. 72 Pell was named after

Major F Pell, Livingstone after Lieutenant J Livingstone and Strauss after Captain A

Strauss.

Communications was another vital issue for the Darwin based forces. In early 1942 there was one telephone line for use between Darwin and RAAF HQ in Melbourne, so the main form of communication with the HQ was via the Navy radio station. Local telephone lines between airfields and HQ NW Area were cables strung between trees

69 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections. 70 AA All96/6/36/501/310 RAAF and US Operational Stations in Australia. Minute to Air Board from AOC NW Area, June 8, 1942 71 AA All96/6/46/501/233 NW Area Equipment policy. Minute to Secretary Air Board from AOC NW Area, April17, 1943. 72 Interview with Wing Commander R Cresswell; December 12, 1996. Fenton was named after the flying doctor (later Squadron Leader) Clyde Fenton. See MV Nelmes Tocumwal to Tarakan. Banner Books, Belconnen, ACT. 1994. p. 53.

86 which were tested every three hours. Couriers travelled between HQ NW Area at 57

Mile and the airfields twice each day. The only means of delivering written messages

was to have them typed and delivered by a dispatch rider mounted on a Harley

Davidson motor cycle. 73

Most facilities and utilities (ie wharfs, stores, road transport etc) in Darwin were

controlled by the Australian Army. Roads, airfields, revetments etc in the NW Area were built by the Commonwealth Construction Corps (CCC) which was manned by

civilian labourers who had "no friendship with the Army". 74

Shortages of personnel and material were a continuing problem. When the rear

echelon of the HQ NW Area began its move to Adelaide River in July 1942 it was

necessary to transfer radio aerials to the new site. RAAF HQ Melbourne was asked to

supply skilled personnel to move the aerials because the Army in Darwin could provide

only unskilled labour. 75 Not only were the aerials moved but the concrete in which they were anchored was also relocated, such was the shortage of building materials at the time. 76

Insofar as the movement of AAF units was concerned, instructions were issued that

divided the units into three groups or echelons. The first or advance echelon was to

comprise sufficient personnel and equipment to service the air echelon for immediate operations upon arrival at a new base. The second or air echelon comprised the aircraft, combat crews and minimum maintenance personnel. This group had to be capable of limited operations within ten days of arriving at the new base. When moving this echelon the instructions stated "It is contemplated using only the combat

73 Interview with Wing Commander R Cresswell; December 12, 1996. 74 ibid. 75 AA All96/6/53/502/141 Transfer of Darwin Transmitting Station to Adelaide River. Cypher message to RAAF HQ Melbourne from HQ NW Area, June 28, 1942. 76 AA All96/6/53/502/141 Transfer of Darwin Transmitting Station to Adelaide River. Letter from Squadron Leader Tomkins to Pilot Officer Dawson, November 28, 1942.

87 planes to move heavy and medium bombardment units. Air transports will, as far as

possible, be provided to move light bombardment and fighter squadrons." The third or

rear echelon comprised the remainder of the unit's personnel and equipment. 77 RAAF

units moving to the NW Area were usually moved in these echelons.

When it came to moving personnel and materiel there was very little movement initially by air. As air transport was still largely undeveloped at the start of the war, the majority ofRAAF personnel posted to the NW Area were transported by road and rail. Heavy equipment usually was moved by sea and aircraft were flown. Many units were formed in the southern regions and personnel could look forward to travelling for at , least a week before they reached their new base.

Japanese Intentions

While invasion was the general expectation of the Australian people, the Government

was being advised that the threat was probable and that Darwin was the most likely

target. In April 1942 the Australian Government was told by the UK Government's

military advisers that the Japanese would aim at consolidating as quickly as possible

the East Asiatic area including the occupation of the whole of Burma; securing peace

in China; occupying bases in the south-west Pacific from which to harass sea routes

from the US to Australia; and compelling the allies to dissipate troops and disperse

naval forces by raids and threats of raids. Future Japanese action was expected to be

conditioned by the success achieved by these initiatives. In the long term Japan would

tum towards the USSR to complete the East Asiatic sphere by the conquest of that

nation's maritime provinces. The most likely courses for Japan were:

Her aim therefore is to consolidate gains this year and to achieve as far as possible unassailable strategical position. She may then think it worthwhile to offer peace. ·

77 AA A1196/6/60/501/103 Allied Air Forces-Operation Instruction. Operational Instruction No 24/1942.

88 17. Japan will be concerned with the protection of the extremities of the east Asia sphere. Consider these-

(a) East-occupy bases in Carolines to harass supply line to Australia (b) West-harass shipping routes in the Indian Ocean

(c) South-it is not believed that Japan aims at the occupation of Australia and New Zealand but would be content with their isolation through the occupation of bases on islands covering the approaches. The occupation or denial of Darwin for the protection of the southern extremity of the greater East Asia area is probable. Raids on other parts of the coast of Australia and New Zealand to disperse Allied forces is also Iikely. 78

' Despite the unnamed expert's opinions, the notion of a Japanese invasion somewhere in

the NW Area was still considered a possibility. The fear of invasion was fuelled by

evidence of a build up of military force and the development of bases in the NEI. In

April 1942 Bladin reported to the Air Board that the Japanese were developing

Koepang airfield and installing shelters, camouflaged runways and AAA. He stated

"All this activity points to the great importance the enemy attaches to this, their nearest

stepping stone to the North and North-Western coast of Australia."79 Allied

intelligence reports a month later told of the construction of airfields at Dili and Babaoe

on Timor (14.56 miles from Koepang) and Laha; the deployment of between 2,000 and

4, O?O troops to Ambon; and the build up of Japanese aircraft at airfields in the NEI. 80

78 AA A5954/l/575/13 Enemy intentions. Appreciation by Government's Military Advisers. Enemy Intentions. Summary of a Paper by United Kingdom Government's Military Advisers, as at 6th April 1942. The paper did not name the advisers. 79 AA A1196/6/60/42 Operations to Seaward RAAF Station-Darwin, Report of Operations carried out. April 7-15, 1942. 80 AA A5954/1/402/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. South West Pacific Area. Directorate of Intelligence. Intelligence Summaries, serial numbers 1 to 16. During the week May 5-12 intelligence reports showed 24 fighters, 18 heavy bombers and 12 fighter bombers on Timor and 27 fighters, 18 heavy bombers and four reconnaissance aircraft on Bali. During May 19-25 the numbers were 21 fighters and 15 heavy bombers on Timor, 27 fighters, 18 heavy bombers and 4 reconnaissance aircraft on Bali and nine fighters, 36 heavy bombers and 12 fighter bombers on Ambon.

89 As a defence against invasion Bladin issued directives for squadrons to train for ground

support operations and to move radar stations to new locations. Plans were drawn up

for the movement of troops and squadrons to bases south of Darwin. Planning also

directed "Demolition and denial of all remaining equipment will be carried out, or

alternatively a demolition party will be detailed to remain behind to carry out

demolition later if necessary". 81 RAAF ground staff were to be transported to the bases

by road and instructions titled What to do during the actual road move were issued. 82

Counter invasion plans were expanded and updated on a regular basis at least until

· early 1944.

Japanese Air Operations

Japanese air operations against northern Australia fell into three separate categories;

viz. anti-shipping, reconnaissance and bombing. The first anti-shipping strikes were

flown against allied vessels attempting to re-supply the beleaguered ground forces in

Java and Timor. These strikes were reduced after the February 19, 1942 raids but

resumed in early 1943 against shipping in the Arafura Sea and Torres Strait.

Early anti-shipping strikes included the dive bombing of an allied west of

Bathurst Island on February 8, 1942 and an attack on the convoy on February

14. 83 On February 18 the Filipino supply ship MV was attacked north of

81 A WM54 6l.5/5/14 Operational Policy Directives by Air Commodore FM Bladin, Air Officer Commanding North-Western Area-General Operational Policy in the event of Land Attack on Darwin. General Operational Policy in the event of Land Attack on Darwin, 1/43, January 13, 1943. 82 ibid. 83 A convoy, escorted by the cruiser USS Houston had left Darwin, without air cover, to carry supplies and personnel to the allied garrison on Timor. After air attacks the convoy returned to Darwin, which it reached on February 18. See Powell~- pp. 74-75.

90 the Wessell Islands. The following day this vessel was again attacked by aircraft

returning from the first Darwin raid. 84

On February 19 the US supply ship Florence D was sunk by 27 dive bombers of the

Japanese 1st Air Fleet. This sinking was, in effect, the last anti-shipping strike of 1942.

Japanese tactics had changed by January 1943. The vital shipping lane to Darwin was

constantly patrolled by small formations of Japanese navy single-engined float planes.

A common bombing tactic was for the aircraft to dive out of the sun with its engine cut.

That way it was undetected by the ship's crew until the bomb fell. On January 22,

' 1943 the supply vessel Pat Cam was sunk by this method of attack, as was the

Macumba on May 10. 85 Ships coming from eastern Australia had air cover from Hom

Island but were unprotected as they crossed the Gulf of Carpenteria until they came

into the range of allied fighters near the Wessel Islands. The Japanese usually attacked

the shipping during the unprotected section of the voyage. 86

The anti-shipping operations did not cause any lasting disruption to the allies' coastal

supply route and the Japanese seaplane bases at Taberfane and Dobo in the Aru Islands

were frequently attacked by 31 SQN Beaufighters during 1943. Radar equipped

Beauforts (from the NE Area based 7 SQN) had also began to exact a toll and by early

1944 the Japanese anti-shipping campaigns had ceased. By then the Japanese had lost

seven float planes over northern Australia. The majority of these losses were attributed

to twin engine bombers, such as Hudsons or Beauforts. 87 While the anti-shipping

operations did ·not disrupt shipping they certainly tied up RAAF resources. The

84 Clayton~· p. 35. 85 ibid. p. 35 and Odgers~· p. 107. 86 KN McDonald Coomalie Charlie's Commandos. Banner Books, Macyborough, Qld, 1996. p. 101. McDonald added that Taberfane seaplane bases were regularly attacked by 2, 13 and 18 SQNs as well as the USAAF's 319th Bombardment Squadron.

91 majority of NW Area based squadrons had aircraft deployed on convoy escorts as

shipping received cover from Hudsons, Venturas, Spitfires, Wirraways, Boomerangs

and Beauforts while in the waters of the NW Area. The RAAF became so heavily

committed to patrolling the Australian coastline that by 1943 there were more

operational squadrons on duty in Australia than there were in New Guinea. 88

Both the Japanese army and navy flew reconnaissance flights over northern Australia.

The first known navy mission was flown over Darwin on February 10, 1942.

Reconnaissance operations were more frequent than bombing strikes but only ten

' reconnaissance aircraft were destroyed over Australia (nine of which were Mitsubishi

Ki-46 "Dinahs" of the Timor based 70th Independent Squadron). The reconnaissance

aircraft flew at high altitudes and often preceded bombing strikes. 89

Nearly 160 Japanese aircraft were lost during bombing raids over northern Australia. 90

It was these raids that were to make the greatest impact on the allied strategy, causing

MacArthur to direct Kenney to transfer fighter and bomber squadrons to the NW Area

at a time when the AAF was critically short of both aircraft types. The Japanese

bomber offensive started on February 19, 1942 and ended on November 12, 1943 with

a raid on Parap, Adelaide River and Batchelor. 91 Most of the raids were flown by navy

units but the army flew at least two raids-February 19, 1942 and June 20, 1943.

87 Clayton QQ_gt. p. 36. 88 ibid. p. 36. 89 ibid. p. 36. 90 ibid. p. 39. 92% of all Japanese aircraft shot down over northern Australia were destroyed either by P-40s or Spitfires. The remaining 13 aircraft were shot down by AAA, Hudsons, Beauforts or Beaufighters. 91 Alford Darwin's Air War. p. 79.

92 The bomber aircraft tended to be Mitsubishi G4M "Bettys" although other types such

as "Vals" and Nakajima Ki-49 "Helens" participated to a lesser extent. 92

Land-based bombers participating in daylight raids were usually escorted by Mitsubishi

A6M Zero fighters. On several raids there were almost as many escort fighters as there

were bombers. 93

The units raiding Darwin adopted five distinct bombing patterns which alternated

between day and night attacks. For months at a time the Japanese would follow the

same attack procedure, giving the AAF many opportunities to predict when and where

· the next raid would occur. The first of these patterns-usually flown by a force of

seven aircraft-was used between March and April 194 2 (raids 3-13). The pattern

changed with raid 14 on April 25 when a force of 24 bombers and nine fighters

attacked the Darwin RAAF airfield. Raids using similar aircraft numbers continued

until mid-June. These raids were consistent with most units arriving over the target

area in mid-afternoon. These raids proved to be costly as the USAAF' s 49th Pursuit

Group had began operations in the NW Area and after June 16 there was a pause in the

bombing.

When the bombing resumed on July 25 it took the form of flights of three aircraft

arriving over the target at night and at a high altitude. While these raids caused

minimal damage they had a demoralising effect on Darwin's population. The night

bombing pattern was maintained until March 2, 1943 when daylight operations were

resumed. These attacks continued at irregular intervals on targets around Darwin.

92 Clayton Qp_ill. p. 37. 93 Alford Darwin's Air War. pp. 78-79.

93 After June 30 the pattern changed again and the target became the USAAF bomber

base at Fenton. 94

The raids_on Darwin ceased because the Japanese were unable to maintain more than a

few aircraft at their forward bases. The Japanese navy had lost a large number of

aircraft around Rabaul and the Solomons and this had forced them to redistribute their

available squadrons. 95 Thus NEI based units were moved to the Pacific in an attempt

to combat the allied advance there.

, The Kittyhawk Squadrons

To coincide with the departure of the 49th Pursuit Group, the RAAF moved 76 and 77

SQNs to Darwin. The two squadrons had an "exasperating-though mercifully

short-stay, since Japanese losses at the hands of the 49th had caused them to change

their tactics to night attacks". 96 However, even those attacks were few. As Wing

Commander Cresswell remembers "The Japanese never came over unless it was a

moonlit night. The sky was very clear on those nights. "97

In relation to the capabilities of the RAAF P-40 squadrons, Wing Commander

Cresswell comments:

Both P-40 squadrons had excellent pilots and personnel. The replacement pilots came from the south, some with 60 hours flying time on P-40s. What was missing was training in air combat tactics. Both squadrons had a training flight and would take it in turns to act as "Zeros". Therefore each squadron would have 12 aircraft on standby, the others would be engaged in training. 98

94 Clayton Q:Q.m. pp. 37-38. 95 Odgers Op cit. pp 120-121. 96 Powell Q:Q.m. pp. 181-182. 97 Interview with Wing· Commander R Cresswell; December 12, 1996. Cresswell added "The moonlight was so bright you could read a newspaper at 20,000 feet in a P-40 on those nights." 98 Each squadron had an establishment of 26 aircraft and 31 pilots.

94 Organising night defences was still a learning process for the allies in Darwin. Anti

aircraft guns, controlled by the fighter sector HQ, tended to fire individually at targets.

Night fighter pilots had to advise the sector HQ of their intention to attack Japanese

aircraft and then wait at least half a minute before beginning the attack. The delay was

to allow the fighter sector to pass the message to the anti aircraft guns to stop firing

and thus prevent the allied fighter from being hit. 99 The Japanese aircraft could be

illuminated by searchlights which, initially, tended to focus on targets individually.

Better illumination and tracking of the aircraft occurred when searchlights operated in

groups of two or more. Few Australian fighter pilots had gained experience at night

flying and up to that time it was rarely included as part of flying training. 100

77 Squadron

77 Squadron was formed at Pearce, Western Australia on March 16, 1942, under the temporary command of Squadron Leader DF Forsyth. The Squadron undertook training and interception flights with Curtiss P-40Es while based at several airstrips in

and around Pearce. By July 1942 the Japanese had not launched an attack against

Perth and on July 24, AAF HQ advised the squadron that it was to move to the North­

Western Area at the end of that month. 101 The squadron commander, Squadron

Leader R Cresswell, flew to Darwin to discuss the move with Bladin who advised on the operational and living conditions in the NW Area. The situation was that there was nothing in the form of facilities or equipment available in DarWin for the squadron so they would have to bring everything they needed from Perth. On his return, Cresswell was authorised by Air Commodore HF de la Rue (AOC Western Area) to spend

£63,000 to equip the squadron. For the ground personnel the move to the NW Area

99 Interview with Wing Commander R Cresswell; December 12, 1996. 100 ibid. 101 A Donselaar (ed) Swift to Destroy. Lutheran Publishing House, Adelaide, South Australia, 1992. pp. 7-8.

95 was by road to Guildford (y{A), then by train to Port Pirie102 where they changed trains for Alice Springs. From Alice Springs they went by truck to Birdum and then to

Batchelor. The trip took 13 days. 103 The P-40s were flown to Darwin, escorted by a

Douglas DC-5. 104 Wing Commander Cresswell added that when the P-40s arrived at

Darwin "Dad" Bladin was waiting at the airfield with a bottle of beer for each pilot. 105

Owing to the movement to the NW Area the squadron was non operational during

August 1942. 106 Despite this 77 SQN had become the first Australian fighter squadron to be based in Darwin.

During August 77 SQN commenced training exercises such as air to air gunnery, air to ground gunnery, interception and night interception over the land and sea surrounding

Darwin, as well as conducting familiarisation flights. Aircrew were also involved in a four day search and rescue operation when one of the pilots, Pilot Officer JG Gorton, crash landed on Melville Island on September 7, 1942. During September the squadron flew 450 hours which included 30 hours at night.

The first real interception attempt was made on September 13 when the squadron scrambled to intercept aircraft over Charles Point. When they arrived at the location they found no aircraft. This was the first of over 50 interceptions flown during the remainder of the year. These operations were usually flown by single aircraft or groups of two or four. Occasionally the entire squadron was scrambled. Such operations generally failed to find the enemy but occasionally met friendly aircraft.

102 It was in A4elaide that a large amount of the £63,000 was spent on tools, bedding, vehicles and 11 powered refrigerators. When the squadron arrived in Darwin it found that kerosene was unavailable. 103 After 77 SQN's arrival in Darwin, the Air Board sent a message to Bladin asking why the move had taken such a long time. Wing Commander Cresswell said that he told Bladin to send Jones a map of Australia so that CAS could gain an appreciation of the distances involved. 104 Interview with Wing Commander R Cresswell; December 12, 1996. 105 ibid. 106 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 53. 77 Squadron Operational record book.

96 As interception operations were not flown each day, aircraft were used for shipping escorts, 107 formation flying exercises, searchlight co-operation, shadow shooting108 and training flights with Hudsons. In addition to these exercises, aircraft practised bombing, dive bombing and . Training exercises were generally flown on a daily basis, usually by two or four aircraft. During November the squadron commenced patrol flights over the approaches to Darwin. Again no enemy was sighted.

On October 15, 1942, 77 SQN moved from Batchelor to Livingstone where they were based for the remainder of their time in the area. Apart from the continual training regime and the interception scrambles, other actions and activities in Darwin were comparatively routine. In the six months between August 1942 and late January 1943

(the time the squadron was in the NW Area) there were 25 Japanese raids. 109 Former

Prime Minister Sir John Gorton summed up his time in Darwin as "The most excitement we had was going across to Timor and flying top cover back over the ship that was bringing the commandos back."no

107 77 SQN flew escorts for shipping including RAN vessels supplying allied forces on Timor. These flights were usually made by four aircraft. With full fuel tanks and flying between 11 - 16,000 feet they could remain airborne for 3Y2 hours and could fly up to 360 miles from Livingstone. 1 08 Shadow shooting was a training exercise, usually involving two aircraft, flying over the sea. One aircraft would fly straight and level at a predetermined altitude, so that its shadow appeared on the water's surface. The second aircraft would dive and shoot at the shadow. The first aircraft would obseiVe the results. The exercise stemmed from an experiment conducted by Group Captain Caldwell in the Western Desert. Pondering why he had not been able to score hits on enemy aircraft he fired at the shadows of the aircraft in his formation as they flew over the desert. He realised that he had identified a simple but accurate way of assessing deflection. Caldwell subsequently destroyed four and a half enemy aircraft during the following two weeks. An instruction was issued to all fighter squadrons in the Middle East directing them to adopt shadow shooting. See Stephens and Isaacs High Fliers. p. 63. 109 AlfordDarwin'sAirWar. pp. 78-79. 110 NLA TRC 121178 Transcript of interview with Sir John Gorton. Members of the 2/2 and 2/4 Independent Companies had remained on Timor to fight a guerilla war against the Japanese. The soldiers remained in radio contact with Australia and were supplied and supported by NW Area based aircraft and RAN ships. By November they had been in action for nine months and it was decided to withdraw them using the corvettes HMAS Armidale and HMAS Castlemaine and the HMAS Kuru. See Gillison~- pp. 647 - 648. The operation was unsuccessful and HMAS Armidale was sunk by an air attack. The ships at Darwin were too slow and small for the task. A successful extraction was eventually carried out by the Dutch T}erk Hiddes.

97 On four occasions the interceptions led to engagements with enemy aircraft and at

0507 hours on November 23, 1942, the squadron had its only success in the area when

Squadron Leader Cresswell shot down a Mitsubishi G4M1 "Betty" bomber. This was the first Japanese aircraft to be shot down over Australia at night. 111 The destruction of the "Betty" proved to be a bonus for allied intelligence. It was a near new aircraft and the first of its type destroyed over land. Its remains were transported to the

Technical Air Intelligence Unit (TAIU) SWPA for examination. 112 During that same month 77 SQN flew 428 hours (including eight hours at night).

While the Japanese bombers flew at night, they continued their reconnaissance flights during daylight hours. The fast, high flying "Dinah" had performance superior to that of the P-40E. 113 In an attempt to intercept the reconnaissance aircraft, Cresswell had two P-40s modified by removing their camouflage paint and most of their armour plate, while their armament was reduced to four .50 machine guns with 100 rpg. The modified P-40s performance was a marked improvement over the standard version of the fighter. 114 Wing Commander Cresswell advised that a Kittyhawk was at its limit at

24-25,000 feet. 115

111 RHS History sheets A50, roll 53. 77 Squadron Operational Record Book. 112 TAIU was a US unit, based at Eagle Farm, Queensland and was responsible for evaluating and monitoring the development of Japanese aircraft. TAIU had establis:Q.ed a sub-unit in the NW Area in October 1942 with Pilot Officer Crook as its Australian representative. Crook's task was to examine the wreckage of Japanese aircraft so as to monitor changes in armament, crew capacity, camouflage, airframe and engine design. By comparing serial numbers and production dates it was possible to estimate the rate of aircraft production. Clayton QQ..Q!. pp. 39-40. See alsoP Butler War Prizes. Midland Counties Publications, Leicester, UK, 1994. Ch. 14. 113 RFrancillon Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War. Putnam, London, UK, 1994. pp. 168-177. The Japanese ~y's Mitsubishi Ki-46-11 "Dinah" had a top speed of 375 mph at 19,030 feet, a cruising speed of 249 mph at 13,125 feet, a service ceiling of 35,170 feet and a range of 1,537 miles. 114 Interview with Wing Commander R Cresswell; December 12, 1996. Cresswell added that when it came to contact with the Dinahs, the modified aircraft "got close but never shot one down". 115 W Green Warplanes of the Second World War; Vol. 4; Fighters. Macdonald, London, UK. 1969. pp. 52-56. The Curtiss P-40E Kittyhawk had a maximum speed of 362 mph at 15,000 feet, a service ceiling of 29,000 feet and a range of between 650 and 850 miles (depending on the capacity of the drop tank.

98 In late January the squadron left Darwin and was moved by sea to Townsville and from

there to . 116

76 Squadron

76 SQN was formed at Archerfield Queensland, on March 14, 1942 with Wing

Commander Jeffery as CO and also was equipped with P-40s. The squadron was

initially based in Townsville before moving to Port Moresby in July 1942 and then to Milne Bay in August. 117

The 34th and 36th squadrons of the USAAF's 8th Fighter Group relieved 76 SQN on

September 21 and the next day the Australian aircraft departed for Darwin, arriving on

September 30. Personnel and some equipment were embarked aboard the MV Van Heutz. 118

The squadron was based at Batchelor for its first nine days in the NW Area. It was

then moved to Strauss, where it remained until January 29, 1943. Due to a shortage of equipment, (eventually disembarked from the MV Van Heutsz on October 5), and

sickness (squadron personnel were suffering from malaria contracted in New Guinea)

the flying effort was curtailed during October. 119

Between October 1942 and February 1943, Darwin received 12 Japanese raids of which seven were flown by two or three aircraft. 120 In November, 76 SQN flew 48

operational hours while 13 5 were flown during December. Most of this time was

116 Donselaar Qn._Qj;. p. 9. 117 The defence of Milne Bay has been described in D Wilson The Decisive Factor. Banner Books, Brunswick, Victoria, 1991 and C Baker and G Knight Milne Bay 1942. Baker-Knight Publications, Loftus, NSW. 1992. 118 RAAF Museum, 76 SQN file. ED Plenty A BriefHistory ofNo. 76 Squadron. 119 RAAF Museum, Darwin Documents box file. Squadron Roll Call, Darwin Area 1939-1945. 120 Alford Darwin's Air War. p.79.

99 spent on convoy patrols and shipping escorts. The squadron's only combat success in the NW Area occurred soon after midnight on January 21, 1943, when four P-40s attacked three "Bettys" over Darwin. Squadron Leader Truscott was credited with shooting down one of the Japanese bombers. 121

On January 29, 1943, 76 SQN started its move to Onslow in Western Australia and the fighter role was undertaken by the Spitfire squadrons.

The Spitfire Wing122

The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr HV Evatt, visited Britain in May

1942. One ofthe objects of his visit was to present a case to the British Government for increased air strength in Australia. Churchill was agreeable and considered it important for the future of the empire that Britain participate in Australia's defence. 123

Churchill stated, at a meeting on May 21, 1942 (attended by Evatt and RAF CAS Air

Chief Marshal Portal) that there were seven squadrons in Britain manned by

Australians and asked Portal to consider the dispatch of three Spitfire squadrons (one RAF unit and two RAAF units) to Australia. The Spitfires would need to be modified (i.e. tropicalised for operation in hot climates) and would be supplied to Australia at the expense of the RAF' s demands for such aircraft in Malta and the Middle East.

Portal proposed what he considered to be a better plan. He. pointed out that there were a large number of trained Air Force personnel in Australia and suggested that rather than send three complete squadrons, it would be a more economical use of resources if the RAF was to make available, from US deliveries, sufficient P-40s to

121 RAAF Museum, Darwin Documents box file. ED Plenty A BriefHistory ofNo. 76 Squadron. 122 After the information for this part of the paper was collected and drafted, a complete description of RAAF Spitfire operations in 1943 was published. J Grant Spitfires over Darwin 1943. RJ Moore, Melbourne, Victoria, 1995. 123 WS Churchill The Second World War: Vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, 1985. p. 770.

100 fully equip three RAAF squadrons. Evatt opposed the suggestion, saying the three

Spitfire squadrons would have a tremendous effect on Australia. 124

Evatt stipulated that it should be understood that the dispatch of the two Australian

squadrons was an initiative of the British Government-not a recall by Australia. He

advised Curtin that these were the only two Australian squadrons flying Spitfires. 125

He further asked that the decision should not affect Australia's application for the

allocation of aircraft to the SWP A. Churchill agreed, pointing out that the three

squadrons were a special contribution to Australia in an emergency.

Of the three squadrons, 54 SQN was a regular RAF unit and had been formed during the First World War. The other two (452 SQN and 457 SQN) were Australian manned squadrons that had been formed in Britain in 1941 with personnel provided by

EATS. 126 Initially, there were personnel from other dominions in 54 SQN. In time, they were posted out and replaced by British equivalents, so that the squadron became entirely British manned. Similarly, the two Australian squadrons became entirely manned by Australians, other dominion personnel being posted out. 127 Each squadron, complemented to UK establishment standards, was sent out with the addition of a maintenance echelon and certain specialist personnel as well as equipment, jigs and drawings to allow major overhauls to be undertaken in Australia. The arrangement was that each squadron initially would be equipped with sixteen aircraft and would receive replacements at the rate of five per month per squadron. 128 The aircraft were to be Spitfire Mk:Vc with the universal wing. 129

124 Air 8/678 Dispatch ofthree Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Minutes of meeting. May 21, 1942. 125 AA A705/If501/474 Allotment of Spitfire Squadrons from the UK. Cable Evatt to Curtin. May 22, 1942. 126 S Wilson The Spitfire, Mustang and Kittyhawk in Australian Service. Aerospace Publications, Weston ACT. 1988. p. 29. 127 Air 8/678 Despatch ofthree Spitfire squadrons to Australia. Minutes of meeting. May 21, 1942. 128 AA A705!1/501!474Allotment ofSpitfire Squadrons from the UK. 129 The Universal Wing was a wing designed for the Spitfire MkV which allowed a variety of armament to be installed in it, namely eight .303 machine guns, or two 20 mm cannon and four

101 However, the delivery of the Spitfires was delayed by events in North Africa. In May

and June 1942, the was on the offensive and the Spitfires, modified for

tropical conditions, were required by the RAF in that theatre. The initial sh!pment of

48 aircraft, bound for Australia, were at sea off the West African coast. The British

Government's Dominions Office asked Curtin whether the aircraft could be off loaded

at Freetown and flown to . Another consignment would be supplied to Australia one month later. 13° Curtin, after consultation with MacArthur, refused on the grounds that Australia's needs were as great as those of the British in North Africa. The British

Government controlled the ship and overrode Curtin's objection. 131 The RAF

offioaded 42 aircraft, while six continued to Australia.

The British Government justified their action by explaining that the diversion of the

aircraft did not mean the plan for air support had been cancelled; the personnel and

support equipment would land in Australia and their aircraft would arrive one month

later. Furthermore, the defeat of the Japanese navy at Midway Island had changed the

strategic situation in the Pacific and thus reduced the threat to Australia. 132 Churchill

promised to replace the offioaded aircraft with 50 new Spitfires. Evatt reluctantly

accepted the diversion but stressed the need for the fighters stating the RAAF was

loosing personnel to superior Japanese fighters. 133

The arrival of the Spitfires was kept secret. in accordance with wartime regulations.

The aircraft was given the codename "Capstan". 134 Despite security instructions, the

.303 machine guns, or four 20 mm cannon. See A Price The Spitfire Story. Arms and Armour Press, London, 1986. p. 129. 130 Air 8/678 pispatch of 3 Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Minute from Dominions Office to Australian Govt. June 27, 1942. 131 Gillison op cit. pp. 650-651. 132 Air 8/678 Dispatch of 3 Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Minute fro~ Dominions Office to Australian Govt. June 27, 1942. 133 Air 8/678 Dispatch of 3 Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Message from Evatt to Dominions Office. June 30, 1942. 134 AA A7051l/501/474Allotment of Spitfire Squadrons from the UK. AFCO 231 Secrecy regarding new types of war equipment.

102 press reported the oflloading ofthe aircraft in North Africa, referring to them as "high performance fighter aircraft". 135

Following shipping delays the majority of aircraft did not arrive in Australia until

August 1942. Even then, flying was restricted because of equipment shortages due to the off loading in Freetown. Evatt tried to take advantage of the diversion of the initial aircraft by asking for replacement equipment and for Spitfire Mk VIII or Mk IX aircraft, a request which led an Air Ministry officer to comment "he seems quite determined to get his full pound of flesh". 136

In June 1943, Portal replied to the request for the newer aircraft. He told Evatt

Spitfire Mk VIlis were available but few had reached RAP squadron service. He promised:

It is our hope that we shall be able to dispatch Spitfire VIlis in the monthly quotas to Australia before Autumn, but I am sure you will agree that the squadrons which are fighting the FW190 and the Me 1000 (sic) should have priority. 137

In the meantime Churchill asked Portal for details on the use of the Spitfires in

Australia and the . In relation to the Australian aircraft, Portal replied on

January 16, 1943, that the three squadrons had been stationed at Richmond until a few days previous. He added:

We are told that they are now being moved to the north western area and are expected to be operational by the 21st of this month.

135 Planes Divf!rted From Australia in The Sun. August 11, 1942. It has also been claimed that Japanese radio propaganda broadcasts at the time stated that Capstans were in Darwin and either cork tipped or plain they would burn well. Capstan was a cigarette brand sold in Australia during and after World War Two. 136 Air 8/678 Dispatch of 3 Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Minute from DWO to CAS. January 2, 1943. 137 Air 8/678 Dispatch of 3 Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Letter from Portal to Evatt. June 18, 1943. The designation "Me 1000" arouses curiosity. A check through several well respected books on the Second World War has failed to reveal details of the "Me 1000".

103 As 68 of the 124 Spitfires so far shipped had arrived in Australia by the end of October, it does not seem that the Australians have been in a great hurry to use the squadrons. It is of course impossible without a full knowledge of the local conditions to say whether the time taken to get them fully operational has been excessive, it has certainly been much more than we expected. 138

The secrecy surrounding the "Capstans" officially ended on March 4, 1943, when

Curtin announced to the Australian Parliament:

It gives me great pleasure to be able to announce the presence in Australian battle areas of Spitfire Fighter squadrons. These squadrons have been in Australia for some time, but their presence has hitherto been kept secret in order to exploit the maximum element of surprise. This objective has been realised. On the 2nd March, they took part in the interception of an enemy force over Darwin, when the enemy suffered a decisive defeat, losing six planes out of his total raiding force of fifteen. 139

Curtin went on to say that personnel from the squadrons included members of both the

RAAF and RAF who had trained under the EATS and that the squadrons had come to

Australia as complete units bringing their ground crew and all equipment. The aircraft had been modified for conditions in northern Australia. 14° Curtin gave credit for the squadrons to Evatt and Churchill whom, he claimed, proposed the transfer of the

138 Air 8/678 Dispatch of 3 Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Message from CAS (RAF) to Prime Minister (UK). January 16, 1943. 139 CPD. Representatives, 4 March, 1943. pp. 1175-1176. Two days later (the same date as John Curtin made his announcement regarding the Spitfires) the BBC world news service announced: "It can now be revealed that Spitfire aircraft are operating in the South West Pacific Area." The broadcast stated that RAF pilots were flying the aircraft and claimed six enemy aircraft destroyed in the combat on March 2. 140 One major part of this modification, or "tropicalisation" was the installation of a large fairing for the Vokes air filter beneath the nose section of the aircraft. It was suggested that as many of the airfields in_the Northern Territory were sealed this modification was unnecessary for combat but could be attached to aircraft for ferrying or training flights. Tropicalisation was found to reduce a Spitfire's speed by approximately 2% and its range by approximately 4%. The Vokes air filter was retained on Spitfire Mk Vs operating in the North-Western Area. The addition of 90 gallon drop tanks increased the aircraft's weight to 7,740 lbs and reduced its speed by a further 4%. It was also found that the aircraft's paint had a very coarse finish and in some cases aircraft were painted an inappropriate desert camouflage scheme on their uppersurfaces. The aircraft's speed was increased with the application of smooth paint. AA A705/l/501/478 Report on Comparative Tests. Capstan v Kittyhawk (P-40E).

104 squadrons which "are a material expression of the constant mutual support which binds together the nations of the British Commonwealth". 141

In the NW Area the three squadrons were amalgamated into No. 1 Fighter Wing under the command of Group Captain Walters, with Wing Commander as the . 142 The RAAF now had a fighter aircraft to deal with an enemy who had started to vanish. By the time the Spitfires had arrived in the NW Area (January 1943) the number of raids and quantity of aircraft involved had decreased significantly.

Most of the pilots in the Australian squadrons had not been in combat since the previous March or May, a period of nine to twelve months, ie between their time in the

UK and the NW Area. No. 1 Fighter Wing had 95 pilots, a small number of whom had distinguished themselves in the UK or the Middle East. Six were experienced fighter pilots, 3 7 had some combat experience and the remainder had no combat experience. 143

In 54 SQN, apart from Flight Lieutenants R Foster and R Norwood (both of whom had flown in the Battle ofBritain) there were few pilots with combat experience. 144

54 Squadron RAF

54 SQN was the first RAF squadron to take part in the defence of Australia. It was a

British squadron and while in the SWP A remained a unit of the RAF with its members

141 CPD, Representatives, 4 March, 1943. p. 1176. The transfer of the Spitfire squadrons had political significance. In the 1943 Federal election Evatt was portrayed as "the man who got the Spitfires for Australia" and he gained the highest number of first preference votes by any candidate since the country's foundation. See R Quinault Churchill and Australia; The Military Relationship 1899-1945 in War & Society. Vol. 6, No. 1, May 1988. p. 58. 142 For a brief biography of Wing Commander Caldwell see C Shores and C Williams Aces High. Grub Street, London, UK. 1994. pp. 162-163. 143 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Newsletter No. 10. September 1987. 144 J Grant Beyond Reasonable Doubt in Flightpath. Vol. 2, No. 3, April/May 1990. p 45. Squadron Leader Robert Foster joined 605 SQN (RAF) in July 1940. He transferred to 54 SQN in April 1942. Between February and July 1943 he claimed five Japanese aircraft shot down. In August that year he was awarded the DFC. He returned to Britain in February 1944. See Shores & Williams QQ..Q!. p. 266.

105 subject to the conditions of that air force. 145 The squadron departed from England on

June 19, 1942 and arrived at Richmond, NSW, on September 7. The remainder ofthat

year was spent gaining an appreciation of local geography and flying training with the

Spitfire Mk V c. 146 Training consisted of formation and cloud flying, cannon and long

range tank testing and scrambles. 147 In November 1942 official trials were conducted

to test the capabilities of the Spitfire against the Curtiss P-40. The tests were

conducted between ground level and 20,000 feet. It was found that the Spitfire had

the greater rate of climb and was more manoeuvrable at all heights. The P-40 was

faster in level flight to 16,000 feet and could accelerate and dive faster. It was

considered that up to that altitude the P-40 ·had the advantage in combat. However,

the Spitfire was considered to be the more suitable aircraft for operations; it was easier

to fly, required a shorter take off, the mixture and boost were automatically controlled,

and it had a better rudder and elevator trims. These points all contributed to a

reduction ofthe problems a pilot faced and thus increased his fighting e:fficiency. 148

During December 1942 the squadron personnel and equipment were moved either by

rail, ship or aircraft to the NW Area. Operations began from Nightcliffe on January

25, 1943. 149 Air Vice Marshal Jones explained that the Spitfires were deployed to the

Darwin area "as Kenney would not have them in forward areas, because of their short range". 150 Despite its short range,.mechanical problems and combat losses, the Spitfire

145 Air 8/678 Dispatch of 3 Spitfire Squadrons to Australia. Despite representations by Dr Evatt to Portal, squadron personnel continued to receive English rates of pay while in Australia and did not receive any special allowance 146 The Spitfires were assembled at Laverton and flown to Richmond. The first six aircraft left Laverton on October 31, 1942 and after landing at Wagga Wagga due to bad weather, arrived at Richmond on November 8. The remainder of the aircraft were delivered during that month. The squadron spent the rest of 1942 training on the type and suffered one pilot death due to an accident. . 147 RHS History Sheet A50; Ro1145. 54 SQN Operations record book. 148 AA A705/l/501/478 Report of Comparative Tests. Capstan v Kittyhawk (P-40E). 149 RHS History Sheet A50/ Ro1145. 54 SQN Operations record book. 150 G Jones From Private to Air Marshal. Greenhouse Publications, Richmond, Vic, 1988. p. 101. Regardless of this opinion, Spitfires were flown by 79 SQN from Goodenough and Kiriwina Islands off the east coast of Papua. See N Medew Up North in Forty Three. E- Printers, , Vic, 1989. Eventually a Spitfire wing would operate as interceptors and short range fighter-bombers with the 1st Tactical Air Force in 1945.

106 could do one thing that no other aircraft could do-by its very presence it created

confidence amongst the civil and military population, 151 through its reputation of being the foremost allied fighter aircraft in service.

The Spitfire Mk Vc was powered by a Rolls Royce Merlin liquid cooled V12 engine.

It had a maximum speed of374 mph at 13,000 feet, its service ceiling was 37,000 feet and its range (using internal fuel tanks) was 470 miles. 152 The principal fighter used by the Japanese Navy at this point in the war was the -Sen

(allocated the allied code name "Zeke"). The A6M3 Model32 Zero was powered by a

12 cylinder air cooled . It had a top speed of338 mph at 19,685 feet, its service ceiling was 36,250 feet and its range on internal fuel tanks was 1,160 miles.

Range could be extended to 1,930 miles with drop tanks fitted. 153

54 SQN' s first combat operation, a scramble to intercept a reconnaissance aircraft, was flown on January 28, 1943. Initial operations centred around convoy patrols and the interception of enemy aircraft. The first combat success was a "Dinah", shot down over the sea by Flight Lieutenant Foster, on February 6, 1943. Weather and a lack of enemy aircraft resulted in the Spitfires being placed on day or night readiness but remaining on the ground for weeks at a time or undertaking training flights while squadron personnel amused themselves with fishing, concerts and shooting flying foxes. 154

151 Medew Q:Q..lli. p. 76. 152 W Green Warplanes of the Second World War: Vol. 2; Fighters. Macdonald, London, 1969. pp. 99- 100. 153 R Francillon Op cit. p. 377. Reference to Zeros or "Zekes" is frequently made in many contemporary and later accounts of the Pacific air war. It would appear that the code name became a generic term for radial engined Japanese fighters. The Model 32 Zero was allocated the code name "Ramp". In comparing the Zero with the Spitfire it should be noted that the Zero's range was obtained by extremely light construction and poor protection which was to prove fatal in combat, even against aircraft of notionally lesser performance such as the P-40 and F4F. 154 RHS History Sheet A50/ Roll45. 54 SQN Operations record book.

107 Combat came at last on March 2, 1943 (raid 52) when a formation of 12 to 15 "Kates" escorted by an unknown number of "Zekes" attacked Coomalie airfield. The Spitfires intercepted the Japanese on their outward flight and fought them over the sea

(approximately 30 miles WNW of Port Charles) in a combat that lasted eight minutes.

Wing Commander Caldwell, writing a report of the combat, noted that the Spitfire's combat tactics were governed by a shortage of petrol. 155 Two 'Zekes" and one "Kate" were claimed as destroyed and one "Kate" as probably destroyed while the Spitfires suffered no loss.

The next combat was on March 15 (Raid 53) when 54 SQN flew with 452 and 457

SQNs to intercept a formation of 22 bombers escorted by an unknown number of

"Zekes". In preparing for this combat it was directed that 54 SQN was to engage the escorts while 452 SQN was to attack the bombers. This instruction did not mean much in practice as a 54 SQN pilot destroyed a "Betty" and damaged another while two 452 SQN pilots destroyed a fighter and damaged two more between them. 156

During the combat two of 54 SQN's Spitfires were destroyed (their pilots killed) and one was damaged. 157

Throughout the rest ofMarch and April the Squadron waited for Japanese aircraft that never appeared. Personnel kept themselves busy with training flights, films (twice a week), fishing, grass clearing and collecting souvenirs from crashed Japanese aircraft. 158

155 AA A705/l/501/505 Report of trials conducted between Spitfire 5c and Mk 2 Zero. Wing Commander Caldwell's report was sent to the various RAAF HQs and AHQ India. 156 J Grant Beyond Reasonable Doubt. p 46. 157 The amended claims for the raid were eight Japanese aircraft destroyed, eight probably destroyed and seven damaged. Total Spitfire losses (for the entire wing) were four. 158 RHS History Sheet A50/ Roll45 54 SQN Operations record book.

108 452 Squadron

452 SQN was formed on April 8, 1941 at Kirton-in-Lindsay in Britain as a RAAF

squadron in the RAF. The squadron participated in combat over Britain before being

deployed to Australia under the command of Squadron Leader RE Thorold-Smith in

late 1942. 159

The Australian deployment began with training flights in Spitfire Mk V c aircraft at

. Mascot. On January 12, 1943 the move to the NW Area started. An advance party

left Sydney aboard the Dutch ship Maetauyher for the 14 day voyage to Darwin. In

· the meantime the Spitfires departed Mascot on January 15. The flight to Batchelor, via

several refuelling stops including Wagga Wagga, Mildura, Oodnadatta, and Alice

Springs, took two days.

Operational flying commenced on January 21 and the squadron then moved to Strauss

on February 1. Throughout this time the squadron was on alert and was scrambled

several times although no Japanese aircraft was shot. down. 160 Darwin had a quiet

time, in so far as air raids were concerned, in January and February 1943. 161 A

contemporary HQ AAF report explained "The recent lull in North West Australia is

not due to any diminution of enemy interest and can be regarded as purely temporary.

There are indications that the offensive plan~ of the enemy in the SWPA still include

this area." To reinforce their statement HQ AAF noted the increase in Japanese

strength in the close proximity to the NW Area from 102 to 128 aircraft. It was also

noted that the Japanese bombers based on Timor had a range of 700 miles, putting

towns as far south as Da1y Waters within their range. 162

159 For a bnef description of 452 SQN's operations in Britain see JRD Rawlings Fighter Squadrons of the RAF and Their Aircraft. Crecy Books, Cornwall, UK, 1993. p. 444. 160 RAAF Museum, 452 file. BriefHistory-No. 452 Squadron. 161 Raid 50 on January 20 was flown by seven bombers and raid 51 on January 21 was by two bombers. Both raids were intercepted by P-40s. 162 AA A5954/1/404/3 Headquarters Allied Air Forces. South West Pacific Area. Diref(torate of Intelligence. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 68. January 13, 1943. Known Japanese air bases

109 While the Spitfire had achieved a favourable reputation as an interceptor fighter in

Europe, in Australia the aircraft had its problems. The major ones were engine failures

and the short range (due to the limited internal fuel capacity). Between February 16

and 27, 1943 the squadron lost four aircraft to these causes. 163 On this latter date six

aircraft were dispatched to Wyndham and one failed to arrive. The remaining five flew

to Strauss on March 4 and such was the state of communications that this was the first

time that the rest of the squadron knew that one of its aircraft was missing. 164

The squadron participated in the interception of Japanese aircraft on March 15, 1943

and lost two pilots killed, one of whom was Squadron Leader Thorold-Smith. The new CO was Squadron Leader RS McDonald. 165

457 Squadron

457 SQN was the second Australian Spitfire squadron to be formed in Britain. It was formed at Baginton in June 1941 initially under the command of Squadron Leader PM

Brothers. 166 The squadron arrived in Melbourne on August 13, 1942. From there it moved to Richmond NSW during the first week at September. The squadron, now under the command of Squadron Leader K James was equipped with two Spitfires, four Wirraways and a Ryan STM trainer. These aircraft were used for local flying and while the full establishment of Spitfire Mk Vc was delivered. In November the squadron moved to Camden. While at this location they received a visit from Wing

on Timor at that time were Penfoei, Fuiloro and Dili. A conservative estimate on the part of AAF intelligence. The Mitsubishi G4M2 Navy Type 1 attack bomber("Betty") had a range of 3,765 miles-it was capable of flying well beyond Daly Waters. See Francillon QQ...Qt. p. 386. The range of borpber aircraft varies, depending on the bomb load they carry. A comparison between "Betty" and some allied bombers is interesting. With full bomb loads the Mk3 had a range of 1,660 miles; the Mk3 1,030 miles and the Mk3 only 590 miles. See FK Mason The British Bomber since 1914. Putnam, London, UK, 1994. 163 C Shores The Churchill Wing in Air Classics. Vol. 17, No.4, April1981. p. 14. 164 RAAF Museum, 452 SQN file, BriefHistory-No. 452 Squadron. 165 J Doyle Heroes in Spits in Flightpath. Vol. 8, No. 1, August/October 1996. p. 78. 166 AA All96/6/43/501/28 Aircraft-Publicity-Spitfires. Minute from Director Public Relations. January 28, 1943. For brief details of the squadron in Britain see Rawlings Qn_Qt. pp. 448-449.

110 Commander Caldwell who suggested shadow shooting as an exercise. The move to

the NW Area took place during January 1943. The Spitfires were flown to Batchelor while a large component of the ground party travelled aboard the Dutch vessel

Maetauyher and arrived in Darwin on January 25. 167

457 SQN moved to Livingstone on February 2. Four days later the first interception

scramble was made although no enemy aircraft was sighted. Three other scrambles

were flown that month with similar results. In between scrambles pilots were engaged

in engine and aircraft testing, practice interceptions, searchlight exercises, cannon

testing and sector reconnaissance flights. At the end of that month the squadron

strength was 379 officers, NCOs and airmen. The operational record book noted "The

month's end finds the squadron in excellent fighting shape. The pilots, though

disappointed at the lack of Japanese aircraft action throughout the month, are on their

toes in readiness to meet the present threat of enemy bomber attack." 168

The squadron achieved its first "kill" on March 7, 1943 when a "Dinah" was shot

down over the sea 15 miles from Darwin. The first major combat with a large formation of Japanese aircraft was fought on March 15 when Spitfires from all three

squadrons engaged 22 bombers and their escorts. 457 SQN claimed one "Zeke"

destroyed, one "Betty" destroyed and one "Zeke" probably destroyed. While 457

SQN suffered no loss it was noted that the Spitfires were very low on fuel when they returned to base. Bladin visited the squadron on March 29. He inspected all facilities and offered to supply reading material to pilots on standby. The operational record book noted at the end of March "Since the fifteenth the enemy has made no move to repeat his raids and our pilots are becoming impatient at the lack of action. They discuss little else but tactics against Jap. (sic) aircraft." 169

167 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 86. 457 Squadron Operational record book. 168 ibid. 169 !.1_."b"d

111 April 1943 was devoid of contact with Japanese aircraft. The Spitfires flew convoy patrols, tested weapons and flew interception exercises with Hudsons from 2 SQN. A

new combat formation-flying line abreast-was tried during the month and received a favourable response from the pilots. Again, the operational record book noted the

disenchantment of squadron personnel "This month has been a heavy strain on the

patience of both air and ground crews. Lack of action and days of monotonous routine and hot weather tend to make the squadron personnel a little restless, as there

are no facilities for enjoying brief respites away from service life." 170 Entertainment for

squadron personnel certainly was limited; there was a weekly screening at the cinema,

ground crew were taken on fishing trips around Darwin courtesy of the RAN and

pilots were given seven days home leave (travelling time was not included in the leave).

Various sports were conducted. Squadron personnel won boxing competitions, they

were runners up in the NW Area hockey championship and were moderately successful

in four cricket matches.

Combat came again in May, albeit briefly. 457 SQN together with 54 and 452 SQNs

intercepted a bomber formation over Daiwin on May 2. For the loss of one Spitfire, 457 SQN claimed one "Zeke" destroyed and two damaged and one "Hap" probably

destroyed. On May 9 a detachment of six Spitfires was sent to provide aerial defence

for Milingimbi (on the north coast ofNT approximately 459 km east ofDarwin). This

detachment went into combat the next day when five Spitfires claimed two "Zekes"

destroyed, one probably destroyed and another damaged. Unfortunately one Spitfire

crashed on landing after the engagement. The next combat was on May 28 when the

Spitfires intercepted eight "Bettys" and their fighter escort. The operations record

book noted "For the first time our pilots had a good crack at the bombers and

destroyed three". Another "Betty" was claimed as damaged. Two Spitfires were also

170 ibid.

112 lost in the fight. In the meantime 457 and 54 SQNs continued to deploy detachments to Milingimbi.

Detachments of Spitfires were also sent to Darwin where they flew night patrols, searchlight exercises, interception and army co-operation exercises, and convoy patrols. For this last task aircraft were fitted with 90 gallon belly tanks. One aspect of army co-operation exercises was practice with AAA. Squadron personnel fitted a cine-camera from a Spitfire to the sights of an army Bofors gun. Gunners could then photograph the "attacking Spitfires" by pointing the gun at them and the photographs would give an indication of the accuracy of their aim.

On June 20 (raid 55) the three Spitfire squadrons intercepted a Japanese bomber formation. Despite problems with cannon and machine guns freezing, 457 SQN claimed one "Zeke" and one bomber destroyed and three bombers damaged. Eight days later the squadron, operating by themselves, intercepted 15-20 "Bettys" and their escorts over Darwin. Four "Zekes" were claimed as destroyed and two "Bettys" probably destroyed. Two Spitfires were shot down and a third was damaged. Another interception with the other two squadrons took place on June 30. This time aircraft from all three squadrons attacked the same Japanese formation and as a result there was some debate over the claims for aircraft destroyed. 171

There were two combats during July 1943. The first was an interception of 25 bombers and their escorts by all three Spitfire squadrons. 457 SQN claimed three

"Bettys" destroyed and one damaged for the loss of three Spitfires. On July 18

Squadron Leader James shot down a "Dinah". The operations record book summed

171 Japanese losses for the day were three fighters and six bombers destroyed; two bombers probably destroyed; one fighter and five bombers damaged. See Alford Darwin's Air War. pp. 78-79.

113 up July as "Lack of action and the feeling that the Japanese are neglecting us is making

the pilots restless". 172

Radar

No radar station was "on watch" at the time of the first Japanese raids. The first three radar sets of Australian manufacture were completed by February 4, 1942 and were then installed at Port Moresby, Darwin and Port Kembla. Mellor, in his volume of the

official history, notes that the set sent to Darwin (No. 31 Radar) was accompanied by

RAAF technicians who were without manuals but felt confident in their ability to operate it. They failed to "get the set on the air" and were still attempting to make it operational when the Japanese raids began. 173

The radar was set up at Dripstone Cliffs. A second was installed at Charles Point on the western approaches to in mid April. Three more stations became operational in June. Two of these, one at Cape F ourcroy (on the south west coast of

Bathurst Island) and the other on Melville Island, advanced the early warning capabilities by up to 60 miles. 174 During the course of the war the RAAF would operate a chain of over 20 radar stations in the NW Area, controlled from Darwin. 175

Wing Commander Cresswell advised the radar at Cape F ourcroy was able to give the distance of approaching aircraft but not their altitude. 176 Nevertheless the early warning radar was the most important factor to influence the outcome of the air war

172 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 86. 457 Squadron Operational record book. 173 DP Mellor Australia in the War of 1939-1945; The Role of Science and Industry. AWM, Canberra, 1.958. p. 435. More recent research suggests that installation of the radar set had not been completed and therefore could not have been "on the air". See C MacKinnon Darwin 's Radar 19 February 1942-The Truth in Wings. Vol. 48, No.2, Winter 1996. p. 13. 174 Powell QQ..Q!. pp. ll0-1ll. . 175 Correspondence from Mr RT McDonnell, Newborough, Vic. 176 Interview with Wing Commander Cresswell, December 12, 1996. Cresswell added that a contemporary rumour was the Japanese had sunk a ship in shallow water off Cape Fourcroy. Part of the ship's cargo was bottled beer. The radar personnel were able to dive and salvage the beer as it was required. Thus personnel were reluctant to be transferred from that site.

ll4 over northern Australia. Without adequate warning the allied fighters could offer little defence against the Japanese formations which usually flew over mainland Australia at very high altitudes. 177 The radar became a necessary part of Darwin's air defence system as its warning capabilities gave the allied fighters the opportunity to take off and climb to a greater altitude than their adversaries, from which they could dive to attack.

No. 31 Radar came "on air" on March 22, 1942 and almost immediately located an attacking force of Japanese aircraft. USAAF P-40s were sent to engage the formation and destroyed one reconnaissance aircraft. This was the 49th Pursuit Group's first combat in the NW Area and was thought to be the first radar directed intercept of the

Pacific war. 178 Mellor states that following the successes at Darwin, radar was "no longer a new fangled invention to be regarded with suspicion, but a valuable weapon"

179 . He also notes that initially the Japanese were unaware that, by flying low, they could avoid detection by radar. Bladin reported in mid April that the second radar was being installed and was expected to be operational by April 20, 1942. 180

The radar sets were manufactured in Australia, Canada or the UK. British sets used in the NW Area were:

COL Chain Overseas Low flying ACO Advanced Chain Overseas COLGCI Chain Overseas Low flying Ground Control Interception

The Canadian sets were known as RWG GCI, while the Australian were AW (Air

Warning) and LWAW (Light Weight AW). The COL, ACO, AW and LWAW were

177 Clayton~ .. p. 41. Clayton adds that although early radars were in short supply, Darwin received priority over Port Moresby. 178 ibid. pp. 40-41. 179 Mellor Qp_gli. p. 436. Mellor claims that the Luftwaffe had found, from their raids on Britain, that they could avoid radar detection by flying low and climbing to an attack height shortly before reaching the target. They passed this information on to their Japanese allies. 180 AA All96/6/60/501/42 Operations to Seaward, RAAF station-Darwin. Report of Operations carried out April 7-15, 1942. From AOC NW Area to Secretary Air Board; April17, 1942.

115 all long range search equipment capable of detecting an aircraft at a range in excess of

100 miles. These long range stations were usually located on lonely islands, in camps

and remote locations where living conditions were very basic with few comforts or

amenities of any sort. The GCI stations had limited range and were located close to

the town or the base it was intended to protect. As a reflection on the situation of

radars in remote locations Sir V alston Hancock noted:

We seemed to have a capacity amounting to genius for finding the most desolate, the most unprotected and the hottest inland sites for these radar units whose strength totalled some thirty men each. 181

. Some ofthe British sets were sent to Australia with the Spitfires in July 1942. 182 As an

example, No. 132 Radar Station was equipped with a COL GCI and was formed at

Richmond NSW in August 1942. Personnel and equipment embarked from Sydney

aboard the RAAF charter ship Wanaka on October 31, arriving in Darwin on

November 19. The Station was located at Knuckeys Lagoon and was tasked with

supporting No 1 Fighter Wing. 183 In January 1943 the vessel James Russell Lowell

arrived in Darwin carrying 307, 308 and 309 radar stations. 184

As the Japanese raids became fewer a lot of the radar station's time was spent on

practice interceptions. In their spare time the radar operators swam, fished, read, went

crocodile shooting at Kakadu and wrote letters. A former radar operator recalls that

one big project was the construction of a fish net from camouflage nets, cut up life

buoys and stolen lead. The net was so heavy when wet and filled with fish that a truck

was required on either end to pull it in. 185

181 VHancock~. pp. 86-87. 182 While the radar came with the Spitfires, Britain did not provide operators or instructors. 183 Correspondence from Mr RT McDonnell. 184 RAAF Museum, World War Two Australia box file, ED Plenty A Brief History of North Western Area at Darwin. 185 Correspondence from Mr RT McDonnell.

116 Bladin experimented with another form of early warning, with the co-operation of the

RAN. Navy positioned a vessel, approximately 150 miles from Darwin on the direct route between Darwin and Koepang. This took place shortly after an RAAF raid and it was expected the Japanese were likely to retaliate. The ship was to provide a radio warning of the Japanese aircraft as they passed overhead on their way to Darwin. 186

186 AA All96/6/60/501/42 Operations to Seaward, RAAF station-Darwin. Report of Operations carried out April 7-15, 1942. From AOC NW Area to Secretary Air Board; Apri117, 1942.

117 Chapter 5. The RAAF Strikes Back-Too Little, Too Late?

At the time of the first Japanese air raids, the RAAF's only bombing assets in the NW Area were two Hudson equipped squadrons (2 and 13 SQNs). These units together

with the Wirraway equipped 12 SQN and two USAAF squadrons equipped with

Douglas A-24s were, in the days following the raids, armed and standing by to repel

the expected Japanese invasion. 1 Hudson operations were planned with the aim of

giving the earliest warning of approaching troop convoys and navy ships. The

Wirraways were given the job of searching the coastline for clandestine landings of

small parties. 2

By mid to late 1942 the situation in the NW Area had improved. The Japanese

invasion did not occur and the RAAF had started a gradual build up of personnel and

aircraft. 3

CAS reported, post war, that Joint Service Plans to deny Darwin to the Japanese

"hinged largely on fighter and ack-ack ground defences, coupled with offensive operations by bombers directed against enemy bases within striking range". He added that RAAF air strength in the NW Area was gradually increased during 194 2 and was considerably augmented by USAAF fighter and heavy bomber units. 4

General MacArthur had reasons for wanting a build up of RAAF assets in the NW

Area. At the time of his advances in New Guinea and the Solomons in 1943 he ordered air raids to be made on Ambon, Timor, Tanimbar and other bases in the NEI to deceive the Japanese as to the direction of his offensive. He also had false radio

1 Craven and Cate The Anny Air Forces in World War II. Volume 1. p. 410. 2 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections. 3 A Stephens RAAF Operational Commanders in Stephens (ed) QJ2..9!. p. 30. 4 War Report of the Chief of Air Staff. p. 50.

118 signals sent from Darwin and Perth in an attempt to convince the enemy that a

5 diversionary attack would be launched from the NW Area. .

The RAAF went on the offensive. Bladin enjoyed a good deal of autonomy in planning attacks. 6 Initially there was an ad hoc quality about offensive operations in

1942. Bladin claimed that AAF HQ did not provide him with any clear indication of

target priority. Instead he was left to react to threats as he saw them. This was a

difficult proposition because without adequate long range bombers or reconnaissance

aircraft he never had full information on Japanese locations and movements. 7 To

complicate matters, much of Bladin' s air strength was absorbed in constant patrols,

planned to ensure early warning of possible surface attack, protection of sea lanes and

close escort of allied surface vessels. All squadrons-except the short range

Spitfires-participated in these activities that were so important to the conduct of the

NW Area campaign. 8 An interesting observation that arises from this activity is that

Darwin commenced the war as a strategic port and became an air base.

Throughout the war the area was dependent on supplies from the southern parts of

Australia. Early in 1942 the RAAF reported difficulties in transporting stores to the

NW Area. The overland route (rail and road) took time and was controlled by the

Army. Air freight was delivered by service or chartered civil aircraft that, because of the possibility of encounters with Japanese aircraft, had to arrive after dusk and leave before dawn. The load capacity of transport aircraft, at that ·time, was limited. In regard to sea transport, it was noted "because of the likelihood of enemy action this channel cannot be considered as reliable". 9 Shipping to the NW Area, for the most part of the ~ar, ran the risk of being attacked and sunk by Japanese submarines and

5 MacArthur Reminiscences. p. 166. 6 A Stephens RAAF Operational Commanders in Stephens (ed) Qn_Qj;. p. 31. 7 Powell Qn_Qj;. pp. 117-llS. 8 Odgers Qn_Qj;. p. 53. · 9 AA All96/6/12/501/72 Lines of communication, Darwin. Minute from Squadron Leader DJ Rooney to DWB. April4, 1942.

119 German U-boats. 10 It was vital that the sea lanes be maintained secure for allied shipping. Much of the materiel needed to conduct the air campaign was moved to Darwin by ship and the RAAF was required to protect these ships. Thus it appears that due to inadequate aircraft numbers, the provision of unsuitable aircraft types and the strong Japanese presence, the early years of the war in Darwin were a circle of flying operations to defend shipping that provided for aircraft flying maritime patrols.

The early bombing raids were flown by the Hudsons. Due to destruction during the

February 19 raids, combat losses and mechanical problems very small numbers of these were available. Furthermore because of the distance to targets the bomb capacity of the aircraft was reduced to make way for additional fuel. Thus Hudsons could only carry a 500 lb bomb load to Ambon and 1,000 lb to Koepang. 11 There was clearly a need for a long range bomber aircraft to be based in the NW Area if the RAAF was to hamper the Japanese operations. In April 1942 Bladin advised the Air Board of the need:

I would again stress the importance of making available in this Area suitable aircraft for heavier attacks on Koepang, Ambon and Kendari. 12

The Air Board's simple reply was:

Under eXIstmg strategical and tactical situation, it is essential that priority of allotment of bombing aircraft should be made to North­ Eastern Area. 13

10 Several works were consulted for details on the submarine campaign around Australia including D Stevens The Japanese submarine campaign against Australia 1942-43: a critical assessment; unpublished. paper August 1995; D Stevens The role of radio intelligence in the anti-submarine war around Australia, 1942-45 in Journal of the Australian War Memorial. October 1994. pp. 23-30. 11 The maximum bomb load for a Mk 111 Hudson was 1,600 lbs. See S Wilson The Anson. Hudson and Sunderland in Australian Service. Aerospace Publications, Weston, ACT, 1992. p. 82. 12 AA All96/6/60/501/42 Operations to Seaward, RAAF station- Darwin. Report of Operations carried out April 7-15,-1942. From AOC NW Area to Secretary Air Board; April17, 1942. 13 AA All96/6/50/501/42 Operations to Seaward, RAAF station- Darwin. Letter from D Ops to HQ NW Area; April 30, 1942.

120 Bladin's squadrons would still be flying Hudsons until the following year, while heavy

bombers would be flown in the area by the USAAF and only in small numbers.

2 Squadron

As a general reconnaissance/bomber unit, 2 SQN had been operational in the NEI and

from Darwin since the start of the Pacific war. The squadron was evacuated to

Darwin and arrived there on February 19, 1942. Four of its Hudsons were destroyed

during the air raid that day. The remains of the squadron, together with 13 SQN were

' moved to Daly Waters (an air base believed to be beyond the range of Japanese

aircraft). Darwin was to be the forward base for both squadrons and 13 SQN's CO

remained in Darwin to command operations. During late February 1942 aircraft from

both squadrons carried out small scale bombing raids on Dili and Koepang and I reconnaissance flights of the Koepang area.

In March 1942, 2 SQN began to undertake tasks that would become its routine for

almost the remainder of the time spent in the North Western Area. Hudsons were used

usually to search for enemy surface vessels and submarines. The flights were flown by

one to five aircraft during day or night and usually lasted three to four hours. Other

continuing operations were searches for missing allied aircraft; searches for allied

vessels; training flights; night exercises with search light operators; and convoy

escorts. 14 At the same time bombing raids were aiso flown.

While the maritime patrol flights may have been mundane they were vital to the NW

Area's survival. Not only did the aircraft search for enemy fleets or raiders from the

early stages of the war, they also maintained submarine surveillance.

14 AWM 64 1/13 Operations Record Book ofNumber 2 (GR) Squadron.

121 During March 1942, the Hudsons flew more than twenty sorties to Dili and Koepang.

However, these operations were to be at a cost. While the total overall combat losses

ofHudsons at this time were low (three in the NW Area), the steady wear on machines

and their crews was more serious, especially at a time when aircraft were in short

supply. 15 In May, July and August that year, raids were flown against Dili, Koepang,

Penfoei (Timor), Doelah (Kai Islands) and Ambon. Targets were shipping, airfields,

barracks and electrical power stations. Time taken for the flights varied, depending on

the target, but was usually between six and seven hours, while the number of aircraft

. flown on the bombing raids was between five and nine. 16 Japanese fighter defence was

a serious enough threat and Bladin issued instructions that directed aircrew "unless

otherwise ordered Hudson crews were to abort a mission over Zero defended airfields

unless there was sufficient cloud cover to permit escape, this was to be at the Captain's

discretion". 17

By the second half of 1942 the squadron was flying these various operations on an

almost daily basis. In addition, armed reconnaissance flights by single or a small

number of aircraft were undertaken. These flights occasionally resulted in the bombing

or strafing of enemy vessels or buildings. 18

12 Squadron

As a result of the February 19 raids, 'A' Flight had two Wirraways damaged, much of

its equipment destroyed and its hangar burnt out. For the next few days Wirraways

searched for and dropped supplies to the survivors of the ships sunk at and near

Darwin. In addition to this activity, defensive patrols were flown to Cap Van Diemen

and Perron Island, while anti submarine patrols were flown over Darwin harbour. 19 12

15 Craven & Cate The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 1. p. 414. 16 AWM 64 1/13 Operations Record Book ofNumber 2 (GR) Squadron. 17 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. FM Bladin Darwin Air Raids Reflections. 18 AWM 64 1/13 Operations Record Book ofNumber 2 (GR) Squadron. 19 RAAF Museum 82 Wing file. A BriefHistory No. 12 Squadron RAAF.

122 SQN was assisted with the patrols by Douglas A-24s of the USAAC's 17th

Bombardment Squadron. This unit had originally been sent to Koepang but was at

Daly Waters at the time of the first raid. It remained in the NW Area until early March

1942 when it was transferred to Townsville.Z0

Despite the resumption of air raids in March 1942, the Wirraways continued to fly

without encountering any direct opposition from the Japanese-a situation which, as

the months went by and the prospect of invasion started to fade, began to aggravate . the squadron personnel. 21

The anti submarine patrols and close-in coastal patrols continued through March. On

March 11 the Squadron was regrouped at Batchelor. During the same month

Wirraways flew test flight exercises for the newly established Darwin radar station (known as the RDF station). Up until July, 12 SQN flew army co-operation flights,

beach, coastal and anti submarine patrols, and search and rescue flights. During this

time several crashed RAAF, US and Japanese aircraft were found. On April20, three

Wirraways were deployed to Drysdale for a possible strike on Japanese shipping

believed to be near the coast. As Batchelor was made available to the USAAF, 12 SQN moved to Pell on July 15, 1942.22 Between July and September the Wirraways flew Army co-operation and searchlight training flights and anti submarine patrols. In addition they carried out aerial surveys for the selection of bombing and gunnery

ranges around Fenton. 12 SQN returned to Batchelor on September 15 and during the

following month began to re-equip with US built Vultee Vengeance dive bombers.

The RAAF saw the possibilities for replacing the Wirraways in the Army co-operation

role with Vultee Vengeances, and raised a requirement for 367 of the type. Despite

20 RAlford The DouglasA-24 inAustralia-1942 inFlightoath. Vol. 2, No.4, Jul/Aug 1990. p. 59. 21 RAAF Museum 12 SQN file. 12 Squadron. They should be so lucky! One can only speculate the fate of the squadron's Wirraways-in the dive bombing role-in action against a Japanese carrier group. 22 RAAF Museum 82 Wing file. A BriefHistory No. 12 Squadron RAAF.

123 expectations of the first delivery of 12 aircraft in May 1942 and 20 per month thereafter, only five arrived initially followed by ten in July. As a result, the re­ equipment was delayed until October 1942 when 12 SQN started to receive its first aircraft (the first unit in the SWPA to receive this type). 23 The re-equipment was popular with squadron personnel because there was the feeling that they would, at last, be able to play an active part in the war. 24

Despite the change of title to No. 12 () Squadron, the Wirraways continued to operate along side the Vengeances and undertook operations similar to those described above for their remaining time with the squadron. During November an intense pilot training program for the Vengeance started. The Vengeances flew their first operational mission on December 2 when, fully armed, they carried out escort flights for Allied naval vessels?5 No enemy vessel was sighted during the mission. On March 27, 1943, the last of the Wirraways and the target towing were ferried to bases in Southern Australia. 26 The Vengeances then solely had the responsibility for search and rescue, army co-operation and shipping escort flights-tasks for which the aircraft was not designed. Powell points out the frustration that 12 SQN personnel faced having been equipped with combat aircraft "only to find them slow, short ranged and plagued by mechanical troubles".27

23 C Shores and FF Smith Diving Vengeance in Air Enthusiast No. 5, November 1977. p. 37. 24 RAAF Museum 12 SQN file. 12 Squadron. During the early war years the RAAF had determined the task of the dive bomber squadrons to be the attack on targets by the most effective bombing methods of which the type of aircraft employed by the squadron is capable. The roles of squadrons stated that the squadrons were "by virtue of their manoeuvrability, accuracy and ·comparative ability to maintain a high rate of operation, very suitable for attacks upon naval forces once the latter come )Vi thin range". Another role added was that dive bombers must be prepared to carry out bomb and machine gun attacks on land targets in direct support of the Army. See AA A 705/1/501/488 Minutes of Committee for Operational Training-Roles of Squadrons. Meeting February 19, 1943. 25 The Vengeance was armed with two .5 machine guns in each wing and two similar guns in the rear . The maximum bomb load was 2,000lbs. See S Wilson Military Aircraft of Australia. p. 211. 26 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing file. A BriefHistory No. 12 Squadron RAAF. 27 Powell Op cit. p. 158.

124 13 Squadron

By February 1942 the three RAAF squadrons based in the NW Area were dispersed around the available airfields. In the case of 13 SQN this meant one flight at Darwin and two at Daly Waters. 28 Maintenance facilities at the latter station were a problem as was the lack of equipment which meant that only a small number of aircraft were serviceable at any one time. Between February and April, enemy raids and reconnaissance flights were frequent and as a result the squadron's Hudsons flew

. bombing missions over Japanese bases in Timor and the NEI as well as flying reconnaissance and search flights?9

On August 10 the squadron carried out a successful shipping strike off Timor in which a 3,000 ton ship, a 1,200 ton ship and another vessel were claimed as sunk. By early

1943 the squadron was in need of rest andre-equipment. Accordingly, it became non

30 operational in April and moved to Canberra. The aircraft were transferred to 2 SQN • and equipment was passed on to other squadrons in the NW Area.

18 (NED Squadron

18 Squadron was formed at Canberra on April4, 1942, with Major BJ Fiedeldij as CO.

As a bomber unit the squadron trained on Douglas A-20 Bostons and North American

B-25 Mitchells before standardising on the latter aircraft. In addition to training flights, the first operations were anti submarine flights, from Canberra, and the Unit

History Sheet shows a Japanese submarine claimed as sunk off the NSW coast on June

5, 1942.31 The squadron's pilots were mostly Dutch transport pilots while the maintenance ~rews and air gunners were from the RAAF. 32 The Dutch Government

28 Daly Waters became an RAAF Station on March 18, 1942 with Wing Commander S pe B Griffiths as CO. 29 RAAFMuseum, 13 SQNfile. Operations from the Darwin Area 1939-1945. 30 AA All96/6/36/501/397 Reorganisation ofHudson Squadrons. Minute from OIC Aircraft Status to DCAS, March 17, 1943. 31 RAAF Museum, 18 SQN file. This claim was later found to be incorrect. 32 Odgers QQ..Q.t. p. 42.

125 had ordered the B-25s for use in the NEI well before the fall of Java. They then offered them to the Australian Government as a squadron under RAAF command. The squadron was to be based in the NW Area because the Dutch wished to maintain a

. .c: . 33 presence over t herr 1ormer emp1re.

In early 1942 the USAAF established a flying training school for NEI personnel at Jackson Mississippi-the Royal Netherlands Military Flying School (RNMFS). Its establishment was to alleviate the problem of a shortage of training facilities in

Australia. The first group of Dutch personnel from Australia to attend the school departed from Melbourne on April 17, 1942. The first B-25 crews graduated in September that year and the school continued to function until February 8, 1944.34

On June 29, 1942, all RAAF pilots and Wireless Air Gunners were posted from the

squadron to various destinations. 35 On July 6, 18 SQN was deleted as a RAAF squadron and became a Netherlands East Indies unit?6 Despite this change, at least half the Squadron's personnel were serving members of the RAAF. During October the Squadron undertook training flights including air to air firing and shadow shooting.

Starting on November 9 all aircraft were sent to Laverton for the fitting of an operational fuel tank in the bomb bay.

It was planned to base 18 SQN at Fenton. However, this base was reserved for US heavy bomber squadrons and was not available for the NEI uirit. 37 MacDonald was then selected as their base. The squadron's move to the NW Area started on December 4 when ground· personnel departed on the long journey by road. The aircraft depa~ed on December 26, 1942 while the rear party moved to the area by

33 Powell ~- pp. 155-156. For details of the delivery arrangements see NL Avery B-25 Mitchell; The Magnificent Medium. Phalanx Publishing, St Paul, MN, 1992. pp. 81-86. 34 Avery Qrr..Q!. pp. 85-86. 35 RHS History Sheets A50/Roll20. 18 Squadron Operations Record Book. 36 RAAF Museum, 18 SQN file. 37 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Signal A132 from RAAF Command to AOC NW Area, October 21, 1942.

126 sea. 38 18 SQN remained at MacDonald until May 8, 1943.39 The main reasons for the

long delays between the squadron's formation and its deployment to the NW Area

were manning problems and the argument as to its exact status (i.e. a NEI squadron in

the RAAF) together with the usual problems associated with the shortage in the supply

of aircraft. 40

The first combat operations were flown in January 1943. Initially these were

reconnaissance flights by groups of three aircraft. The first bombing raid was on

January 19 when three B-25s set out to attack shipping between Sermata and Kisar

Islands, with Fuiloro (on Timor) a as an alternative target. The B-25s were attacked

by five Japanese fighters (said to be "Zekes") over Fuiloro. Due to heavy clouds the

targets could not be found and no bombing was undertaken. Despite this poor start,

18 SQN attacked Timor on 30 different occasions during 1943. 41

The Squadron flew 15 operations during January (including four at night). These were

planned to be strikes on harbours, airfields and buildings at Dobo, Moa Island, Timor,

Toeal and Sermata Island. The raids were flown by flights comprising three to nine

aircraft, each carrying three 500 lb general purpose bombs together with incendiaries.

The raids were usually unsuccessful due to bad weather and poor visibility. The final

operation for the month was on January 30, when six B-25s attempted a dawn attack

on Dili. The priority targets were shipping and the airfield. Due to rain there was no

visibility and the target area could not be located. Therefore no bombing was

undertaken. On the return to MacDonald two B-25s made forced landings due to fuel

shortages. 42

38 RHS History Sheets A50/Roll20. 18 Squadron Operations Record Book. 39 RAAF Museum, Darwin Documents box file. Squadron Roll Call-Darwin Area 1939-1945. 40 Powell Op cit. p. 156. 41 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan. p. 12. 42 RHS History Sheets A50/Roll20. 18 Squadron Operational Record Book.

127 Similar situations occurred during February when six operations were flown. Once

again targets could not be located. The squadron's poor performance attracted the

attention of RAAF Command and Bladin was asked "Cannot you get more availability

from 18 squadron?"43 On February 18, on a raid on Dili, the B-25s encountered heavy

anti-aircraft fire and five Japanese fighters. During March, 11 operations were flown.

In addition to the combat missions, the B-25s flew training flights, carried out practice

shoots at the gunnery range between Sandy and Hayes Creeks, and conducted

reconnaissance and search and rescue flights. Early in 1943 the aircraft had additional

long range fuel tanks fitted in their wings, 44 while a request was made for the bomb bay tanks to be fire proofed. The reason for the last modification was that it was planned to use 18 SQN for long range reconnaissance in lieu of the USAAF' s 319th squadron.

It was claimed that the use of the US squadron in the reconnaissance role considerably

dissipated its striking value. 45

The Heavv Bombers

The RAAF did not acquire its own heavy bombers until mid 1944. Up until then the long range heavy bomber offensive from the NW Area was conducted by USAAF units. The first of these was the 19th Bombardment Group which had been flying B-

17C and B-17Ds from Batchelor to the Philippines before the outbreak of the Pacific war. The unit's aircraft staged through Batchelor for occasional raids on the NEI. On

March 26, 1942 three B-17s and three RAAF Hudsons flew an unsuccessful raid on

Koepang. On May 18 and 20 six B-17s attacked Koepang again and on July 3 three

B-17s attacked the airfield at Penfoei.

43 AA Al969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Telex from Bostock to Bladin, February 2, 1943. Bladin's reply was "Am dissatisfied too with 18 SQN and will visit today to investigate". 44 RHS History Sheets A50/Roll20. 18 Squadron Operational Record Book. 45 AA Al969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Minute from RAAF Command to RAAF Forward Echelon, Aprill2, 1943.

128 The bombing offensive was then undertaken by the 64th squadron, 43rd Bombardment

Group. The 64th Squadron moved from Randwick race-course to Daly Waters in May

1942. The unit received the first of four B-17s in July and moved to the sealed airstrip

at Fenton (185 km south of Darwin) at the beginning of August. The final aircraft

arrived on August 5. The following day two aircraft were returned east for operations

in New Guinea. The other two B-17s followed on August 13. 46

Fenton was reserved as the base for USAAF heavy bomber operations. 47 The USAAF

started a build up of non flying units at the base including the 43rd Service Squadron

(for aircraft maintenance), the 709th Ordnance Co, the 206th and 1927th Quarter Master

· Co, and the 895th Chemical Co. 48 USAAF personnel transferred to the base were 11

officers, four warrant officers and 311 enlisted men, together with 151 vehicles.

The 64th Squadron was replaced by the 400th Squadron with four Consolidated B-24

Liberators. Their task was visual and photographic reconnaissance and bombing. 49

This unit was succeeded by the 319th Squadron, 90th Bombardment Group, also flying

B-24s from Fenton. The squadron came from Iron Range in the North-Eastern Area.

While in the NW Area it came under the operational control of the AOC NW Area but

its mission was determined by RAAF Command. In addition to deep reconnaissance

flights, the "mission of the B-24 squadron is concentrated attack on (I) shipping and

stores Ambon (2) naval base at Halong (3) aircraft and aerodrome at Laha."50 In early

February 1943 Bostock sent the following message to Bladin on the deployment of the

heavy bomber squadron:

46 A Powell Op cit. p. 118. 47 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Minute from HQ RAAF Command to AOC North-Western Area, November 21, 1942. 48 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 A/tied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. HQ AAF Command, "Movement order 43" November 12, 1942 49 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Minute from Colonel Beebe AAF to RAAF Command, January 18, 1943. The 400th Squadron handed over two of their B-24s to the 319th Squadron following the latter unit's arrival in the NW Area. 50 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Minute from HQ RAAF Command to AOC North-Western Area, January 27, 1943.

129 Am particularly anxious to use B-24s for bombing in large formations. Appreciate your deep reconnaissance commitments but suggest you do not attempt bombing and reconnaissance on same days. Will be satisfied if all available B-24s do one massive raid once in three or four days, intervening two or three days being devoted to reconnaissance and maintenance. Aim should be bombing formation of not less than six aircraft. 51

On most days the available aircraft numbered eight B-24s. Bladin noted the proposed deployment of the aircraft but requested that he be permitted to vary the target if bad weather prevented strikes on Ambon. 52 Ambon (on the island of the same name) was to become a very important target for the allied bombing effort. AAF intelligence reports continually noted a large presence of Japanese aircraft there. There were other

'facilities to interest the AAF. In early 1944 it was reported that there were 11 heavy, one medium and 45 light anti-aircraft guns complemented by search lights and a

"possible" radar site. The other area of interest for the allied bombers was the port which contained jetties, slipways, coal and oil storage and ammunition dumps. Nearby were the air bases at Laha and Halong. 53

RAAF aircrew flew with the squadron as gunners and photographers. 54 As the time spent by the 319th Squadron in the NW Area was not regarded as a permanent deployment it did not have a full complement of personnel. RAAF Command advised

General Kenney on March 24, 1943 that the squadron was short 131 personnel ( 49 aircrew-including two pilots-and 82 ground crew). 55 Hence RAAF personnel flew with the squadron. During its time in the NW Area the 319th flew 23 8 missions and

51 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Telex from Bostock to Bladin, Febll;Ull}' 2, 1943 52 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Telex from Bladin to Bostock, February 10, 1943. The comment "approved provided every effort is made to hit Ambon area as often and hard as possible. WDB." was written in pencil on the telex message. 53 AA A5954/l/411/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 179. February 5, 1944. 54 Nelmes QQ.m. pp. 53-54 55 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Minute from COL Elsmore to GEN Wilson, March 21, 1943.

130 lost three aircraft. 56 Bladin was well pleased with the squadron's performance and

advised RAAF Command:

I consider 319 squadron are doing excellent work and show high fighting spirit in carrying out missions particularly strikes. I make these observations after watching every phase of recent strike on Babo including flying with them on strike. 57

Bladin recommended the squadron's CO, Lieutenant Olsen, be promoted to captain

and remain in command. Once again communication problems came to the fore when

RAAF Command advised that Olsen had been promoted ten days before Bladin sent

his recommendation. 58

While the 319th and other USAAF squadrons based in the NW Area came under the

operational control of the RAAF, the squadron commander retained the responsibility

for his unit's internal administration, discipline and training. 59

The 319th Squadron was transferred to New Guinea in June 1943. They did not leave

the NW Area until the first squadron of their replacement, the 380th (H) Bombardment

Group, became operational. 60

Another USAAF unit to operate in the area, albeit briefly, was the 22nd Bombardment

Group which deployed ten Martin B-26 Marauders to Batchelor during the first week

of November 1942. This squadron had been deployed to the NW Area as support for

Lancer Force61 and also came under the command of the AOC NW Area. Its task was

to carry out four missions over the Dili area. The actual targets were to be determined

56 R Alford Air War Operations, Darwin '42. p. 34. 57 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Telex from Bladin to Bostock, April 9, 1943. 58 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Telex from RAAF Command·to AOC NW Area. 59 AA A1969/100/6/320/5C1 Organisation-Allied Air Force. GHQ SWPA, AG353 "Internal Administration, Discipline and Training of Units." June 10, 1943. 60 AA A1969/I00/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Telex from AOC North­ Western Area to HQ RAAF Command, June 1, 1943. It was planned to move the 319th squadron to New Guinea by air. In addition to the B-24s the squadron required 20 C-47 transports to complete the move. 61 Powell Qn..j;ll. p. 155. The guerilla force on Timor was renamed Lancer Force in November 1942. See ibid. p. 121.

131 by the AOC NW Area. 62 The missions were reduced to a single operation, flown on

November 4, before the squadron returned to the North-Eastern Area. 63

The Attack /Intruder Squadron

The RAAF had determined the proposed role for attack squadrons as undertaking

operations (flown at the extent of the aircraft's range) that varied from attacks directed

. at objectives in the vicinity of friendly troops to strikes against enemy base installations

and lines of communications. 64 In the NW Area the attack squadron would fill this

· role.

During 1942 the first attack squadron (31 SQN) moved to the NW Area. Its arrival

gave Bladin a valuable weapon. The squadron was equipped with Bristol

Beaufighters-twin engine aircraft armed with four 20mm cannon and six .303

machine guns. It had a maximum speed of320 mph and a range of 1,500 miles. 65

The Beau:fighters joined other NW Area based units in the important task of attacking

Japanese airfields within their range in an attempt to destroy them and drive away the

Japanese. It was hoped that this action would prevent the Japanese from using the

airfields as jumping-off points for raids on Australia. Unfortunately, with the small

force initially available to Bladin, it would be some time before the airfields were

totally eliminated as a threat. 66

62 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Minute from HQ RAAF Command to AOC North-Western Area, October 30, 1942. 63 There is some conflict in the reporting of the 22nd Group's operations. Powell Qn._Qj;. p. 155 states "for three successive days, 2-4 November they attacked Timorese targets in co-ordination with 13 Sqnadron Hudsons", while Bladin reported that the USAAF squadron flew one raid. See AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force Units under RAAF Control. Minute from HQ Fifth Air Force to AOC North-Western Area, November 3, 1942. One B-26 was lost on this raid. One of its crew died while the other six were rescued. 64 AA A705/1/501/488 Minutes of Committee for Operational Training-Roles of Squadrons. Meeting February 19, 1943. 65 Green Warplanes of the Second World War; Vol2; Fighters. pp. 17-21. 66 Odgers Qn..£tt. p. 53.

132 31 Squadron

Formed at No. 5 Aircraft Depot (AD) Forest Hill NSW on August 14, 1942, under the

temporary command of Squadron Leader BF Rose and initially equipped with

Beauforts, 31 SQN received its first British built Bristol Beaufighters in early

September. 67 By the end of that month the squadron's strength was 17 aircraft.

Under its new CO, Wing Commander CF Read, 68 the squadron began training for long

range fighter and ground attack operations. While Read and Rose were the only pilots

with any Beaufighter experience, many of the others were ex-service instructors, some

with 2, 000 flying hours. 69 In early October the squadron was ordered to the NW Area

· and an advanced party left Forest Hill for Batchelor on the 15th of that month with the

main party leaving two days later. The parties arrived on October 26 and 28,

respectively, and on November 2 moved to Coomalie Creek, (about 105 km south of

Darwin) where they would remain until October 17, 1943.70

31 SQN' s arrival in the NW Area signified a turning point in the air campaign. The

AAF had, up until then been fighting a defensive campaign over their own bases. The

introduction of the Beaufighter gave the RAAF a potent weapon with which they

could attack the Japanese on their own territory. Unlike the existing bombers (Hudson

and early versions of the B-25) the Beaufighter was a highly suitable ground attack

aircraft which, when used against air bases. significantly added to the numbers of

destroyed Japanese aircraft. 71

67 The RAAF received its Beaufighters from two sources-Britain and the Australian Dept of Aircraft Production (D AP). Britain supplied 217 aircraft of various different types between March 1942 and July 1944. Contracts were drawn up for DAP to construct 450 aircraft (at a cost of £22,339,100) between and July 1946. In addition to equipping the squadrons of 77 Wing, aircr~ were also to be handed over to the Royal Navy and to RAAF training units. Production reached 364 aircraft before the contract was terminated in January 1946. See AA A705/l/502/24 Recon. Aircraft (Beaufighter ). 68 For a biography of Charles Read see Stephens and Isaacs Op cit. pp. 155-157. 69 N Parnell Whispering Death. AH & AW Reed Pty Ltd, Terry Hills, NSW, 1980. p. 38. 70 RAAF Museum, 31 SQN file. 31 Squadron and Brief History-No. 31 Squadron. Shortly after work began on this chapter an account of 31 SQN was published. Therefore details of the squadron's operations will be covered briefly here. For further details see KN McDonald Op cit. 71 Clayton Qp_Qt. p. 43.

133 The Squadron's first operation was flown on November 17, 1942, when six

Beaufighters attacked targets at Moabissi and Bobonaro on Timor. 72 Unfortunately one aircraft was lost on this raid when its wing tip struck the sea while being pursued by a Japanese fighter at low level. Another aircraft was lost on an operation on

November 3 0 while escorting HMAS Armidale and HMAS Castlemaine. A

Beaufighter scored the squadron's first air-to-air combat victory on December 23 when, during an attack on Lavai, a Japanese "Nate" fighter was shot down. 31 SQN lost one of its own aircraft during this raid. 73 By the end of 1942 the squadron had lost four Beaufighters in combat.

Operating at long range, 31 SQN continued their sorties on Timor. A typical successful raid was on February 23, 1943. The target was a Japanese airfield and 12 aircraft were destroyed and a further ten damaged despite opposition from fighters and AAA. Intercepted Japanese radio messages revealed plans for a raid on northern

Australia on or about February 28, 1943 by bombers staging through Penfoei. Late on

February 27 the Beaufighters were moved forward to Drysdale Mission in north

Western Australia, ready to fly to Penfoei as soon as it was known the bombers had arrived. On February 28, eight Beaufighters attacked, destroying four "Bettys" and eight "Zekes" and damaging one "Betty" and nine "Zekes" while suffering no loss of their own. The surviving bombers did not attack Darwin. 74

These raids, in turn, attracted Japanese retaliation and between November 27, 1942 and November 12, 1943, Coomalie Creek was subjected to four raids, the largest of which was flown by 15 bombers on March 2. 75 On this occasion two personnel were injured and ~o Beaufighters were destroyed on the ground. During the rest of that month the squadron lost three aircraft, one of which was a landing accident.

72 Gillison .QQ..Q!. p. 647. 73 RAAFMuseum, 31 SQN:file. 31 Squadron andBriefHistory-No. 31 Squadron. 74 RAAF Museum, 31 SQN file. BriefHistory-No. 31 Squadron. 75 Alford Darwin's Air War. p. 79. Raid 52, flown by 15 bombers was intercepted by Spitfires. Three Japanese aircraft were claimed as destroyed and one damaged.

134 Another raid was staged on Penfoei on May 2 during which two "Zekes" and a "Betty" were destroyed. Penfoei was of particular importance to the RAAF because its existence as a Japanese base and its relatively close proximity it was a constant threat to the security ofDarwin.

In late 1942-early 1943 the Japanese established float plane bases on the islands north ofDarwin. These aircraft·were used for attacks on allied shipping and reconnaissance aircraft and so neutralising them was of great importance. Bladin ordered an attack on the float plane base at Taberfane, in the Aroe Islands, by every available Beaufighter on May 9, 1943. The aircraft, led by Squadron Leader GW Savage, staged through

Millingimbi and flew through thunderstorms to reach their target. Using their cannon, the Beaufighters destroyed nine float planes before all cannon stopped firing due to faults. One Beaufighter was lost on the raid. 76

Like so many other NW Area based aircraft, the Beaufighters flew shipping patrols and convoy escorts. On May 10, a Millingimbi based Beaufighter shot down a float plane that was attacking the RAN corvette HMAS Latrobe.77 In early 1943 the squadron started to receive Mk VI Beaufighters as replacements for its Mk Ifs. The new aircraft were found to have low level performance inferior to the earlier version. They had a lower top speed and more importantly used more fuel. 78

Operations in the NW Area were different to those flown by RAAF Beaufighter units in other parts of the SWP A in that the distance to the target was further and the average sortie could be up to six hours duration. There were no radio aids available initially so navigation was by dead reckoning-each aircraft was fitted with an astro and drift recorder. Weather forecasting was poor and crews often flew through storms with visibility of about 25 metres. When flying on raids in this weather

76 Odgers Qp__gt. p. 51. . 77 ibid. pp. 52-53. 78 S Wilson Beaufort, Beau:fighter and Mosquito in Australian Service. p. 128.

135 the lead aircraft would fly low, avoiding clouds as far as possible, while the other aircraft would remain close. Accurate shooting was impossible if it was raining over the target due to reflections on the gun sight and the target itself being obscured. 79 Operations at extreme range called for the judicious use of the aircraft's fuel capacity.

On one aircraft the wing mounted machine guns were removed and replaced with fuel tanks. The modification increased the aircraft's operational radius by about 230 miles. 80

Reconnaissance Units

The RAAF's Air Power Manual states that the ability to observe the enemy to gain an awareness of his strength and intentions and to therefore reduce the possibility of being surprised has always been of vital importance in warfare. The manual continues by stating that aerial reconnaissance (which is the observation of specific targets, interests and areas) is important because it provides accurate and timely knowledge of enemy movements, force dispositions and logistics support. 81

Bladin was well aware of the need for a reconnaissance capability in the NW Area.

Unfortunately he was hindered by the lack of a dedicated aircraft type and the limited capabilities of those aircraft available to him. Without specialised aircraft he was forced to use Hudsons for reconnaissance tasks. However this was not always possible as those aircraft were required for bombing missions. In April 1942 he reported to the Air Board that reconnaissance of the sea lanes and approaches to

Darwin had to be kept to a minimum in order to release aircraft for offensive operations. He advised reconnaissance over Japanese held territory was only possible if suitable cloud cover was present. The cloud restricted the reconnaissance activities but gave a measure of protection to the Hudsons which could not rely on speed for

79 Parnell Qn._Q:t. pp. 38-39. 80 S Wilson Beaufort, Beaufighter and Mosquito in Australian Service. p. 120. 81 AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual. (2nd Edition), APSC, Canberra, 1994. p. 121.

136 safety. He told the Air Board "A more suitable type of aircraft for both

Reconnaissance and Photography is sorely needed in this Area". 82 Bladin would have

to wait until August before a special reconnaissance unit was sent to the NW Area and even then its aircraft were unsuitable for the task.

No.1 PRU and 87 (PR) Squadron

Number 1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (which became 87 SQN) was formed at

Laverton on June 8, 1942. Its first commander was Squadron Leader L Law and its • task was to "carry out long range strategic and tactical reconnaissance". The first

aircraft allocated to the unit were six Brewster Buffalos which were modified by the

removal of their machine guns and armour and the installation of auxiliary fuel tanks

and three F24 cameras. Unfortunately two of these aircraft were lost in training

flights. 83

On August 19, the unit moved to Hughes in the NW Area where it remained until

December 5 when it was transferred to Coomalie Creek-its base for the rest of the war. 84 The 27th Japanese air raid on August 23 (27 bombers escorted by 15 fighters) targeted Hughes and another Buffalo was destroyed together with a newly acquired WIrraway.. 85

The unit now had a strength of three aircraft which were further modified by the

replacement of the three F24 cameras with one angle survey camera. The tasks were

not to be reconnaissance of the enemy but instead the photographic survey of airfields

and·possible airfield sites in the NW Area as well as other work requested by the Army

82 AA Al196/6/60/501/42 Operations to Seaward, RAAF station -Darwin. Report of Operations carried out, April 7- 15 1942. From AOC NW Area to Secretary Air Board Apri117, 1942. 83 RAAF Museum 87 SQN file. A History of87 (PRJ Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. 84 RAAF Museum Darwin Documents box file. Squadron Roll Call-Darwin Area 19 3 9-1945. 85 Alford Darwin's Air War. p. 78.

137 Survey Corps, Camouflage Section and the anti aircraft units. The reason for the

change in role was that Bladin quite correctly determined that the Buffalo had neither the speed to evade Japanese fighters nor the range to reach the enemy held. areas. 86

This work started in September and whilst it was being carried out another Buffalo

was destroyed in an accident near Derby. By the end of that month only one aircraft

was serviceable. 87

Finally, on August 31 the first suitable PR aircraft arrived-the Lockheed F -4. This

aircraft was a reconnaissance version of the superb P-38 Lightning fighter and had a

top speed of 395 mph and a range of over 500 miles. 88 With external fuel tanks this

range was extended to over 1,300 miles. A second F-4 was delivered on September 4.

The first mission over Japanese held territory was flown by Flight Lieutenant Talberg

to the Tanimbar Islands on November 3. A further six sorties were flown between

November 9 and 19. The following day one of the F-4s was destroyed in a landing accident at Livingston. 89

The unit's numbers were increased by the addition of a small number of Republic P-43

Lancer aircraft between August and November 1942. 90 The P-43s were to replace the

Buffalos. Like their predecessors they were a less than successful fighter and were

also unsuitable for the reconnaissance role. By the end of November all the unit's

aircraft were unserviceable, the P-43s due to braking problems. 91 During the following

month three unsuccessful attempts at reconnaissance flights over Japanese territory

were made. A total of 29 hours flying time was achieved during December 1942

·, 86 RAAF Museum 87 SQN file. A History of87 (PRJ Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. 87 D Vincent Mosquito Monograph. David Vincent, Highbury, South Australia, 1982. p. 132. 88 R Gillett Australia's Military Aircraft. Aerospace Publications, Weston, ACT, 1987. p. 19. 89 Vincent Op cit. p. 133. 90 Gillett Qo..m. The P-43 had a top speed of 356 mph and a range of 800 miles. Eight aircraft were received; two were destroyed in accidents and the remaining six were returned to the Fifth Air Force in 1943. 91 Vincent Qo..m. p. 133.

138 (compared with 106 hours during November). Improvements were noted in January

1943, when four successful operations were flown before the F-4 was grounded again

due to turbocharger problems. Other reconnaissance attempts failed because of poor

weather. The F-4 flights stopped again in February because of mechanical problems

and poor weather which restricted local survey flights. Instead the Buffalo and Lancer

crews trained in methods of air support for the Army, which included locating targets, recognition procedure, strafing and tactical reconnaissance (the flying time for the month was92.25 hours).92

In March 1943 the F-4 flew only one "partly successful" operation to Penfoei while

attempts to photograph Dili and Penfoei on another occasion failed. In the meantime the Unit's Wirraway experimented with night photography using flash bombs. A third

F-4 arrived from Eagle Farm on March 16. It soon also became unserviceable due to mechanical problems. 93

The lack of suitable aircraft was clearly a problem for the unit. On April17, 1942, the

CAS put forward, to RAAF Command, a proposal that six de Havilland Mosquitoes be acquired, for photo reconnaissance work from the UK Air Ministry. RAAF Command agreed and suggested that 12 aircraft be procured because of the extreme urgency of providing additional reconnaissance aircraft in the NW Area in order to relieve the

USAAF of that duty. If the Mosquitoes were unavailable the RAAF planned to approach the USAAF for additional F-4s. Overseas HQ advised, in July 1942, that PR

Mosquitoes could not be made available until the second quarter of 1944. As an interim, DCAS first requested 12 and then six F-5s from the USAAF. 94 The reply was that none could be made available. In the meantime, Bladin had requested two

92 RHS History Sheets A50/Roll63. Operations Record Book, No. I PRU. 93 ibid. 94 The F-5 was an improved version of the F-4 with more powerful engines and different cameras. See L Davis P-38 Lightning in Action. Squadron/Signal, Carrollton, Texas, 1990. pp. 48-49.

139 replacement F-4s for No 1 PRU as the two remaining aircraft were experiencing

frequent mechanical problems. 95

The next proposal was to get standard P-38s and convert them to reconnaissance

aircraft. This again was rejected by the USAAF, despite a personal representation by

Air Vice Marshal Jones to General Kenney. 96 At the time Kenney was hard pressed to

get sufficient P-38s for his own air force. 97 Without their own aircraft, unit

photographers, from January 1943 onwards, took to flying aboard the B-24s of the

. USAAF's 319th Squadron and the squadrons of the 380th (H) Bombardment Group. 98

This was a situation where the RAAF had specialised personnel and the USAAF had

the aircraft. Bladin requested, from RAAF Command, six to eight photographic air

gunners to complement PRU personnel as the 319th Squadron had only three personnel with this specialisation. 99

Transport Units

So far this thesis has been concerned with the combat units that operated in the NW

Area. Some details are available of the other flying units, of which there were proportionally very few based in the Area.

34 Squadron

The squadron was formed at Darwin on February 23, 1942 with a strength of two de

Havilland DH 84 Dragons, two officers and four airmen. 100 This small beginning was

95 Mechanical (e.g. trouble with the turbochargers and intercoolers) and handling problems were not uncommon with many of the early model Lockheed P-38s. 96 Vincent~. pp. 133-134. 97 Powell Op cit. p. 177. 98 RHS History Sheets A50/ Ro1163. Operations Record Book, No. I PRU. 99 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Message from AOC NW Area to RAAF Command, March 20, 1943. 100 RAAF Museum, 34 SQN file. A Short History ofNo. 34 Squadron.

140 hardly surprising given that it was four days after the first Japanese air raid. The CO

was Squadron Leader JW Warwick.

As was the case with many RAAF units in 1942, 34 SQN moved between several

bases in the NW Area, flying from Darwin, Daly Waters, Batchelor, Hughes and

Manbullo. 101 Its main task was to carry freight and passengers between airfields

around Darwin. During that year squadron strength was increased by three DH 82

Tiger Moths and two Ansons. 102

In August 1942 the RAAF formed 6 Communications Flight (later to become 6

Communications Unit). Its CO was Flight Lieutenant (later Squadron Leader) C

Fenton, a former flying doctor with the NT Medical Service. 34 SQN handed over to

the new unit its aircraft, pilots and facilities before moving south and reforming at

Parafield, South Australia, on January 1, 1943. From this base it operated DH 84s,

DH 86s and later C-47s on flights north to Broome and Darwin. 103

6 Communications Unit

6 Communications Flight was renamed 6 Communications Unit on December 8, 1942

while based at Manbullo. It took over most of the personnel and aircraft (Ansons,

104 Dragons and Tiger Moths ) previously allocated to 34 SQN. The unit's role was the

movement of personnel, mail and freight to bases in the Northern Territory and the

evacuation of sick or injured personnel to hospitals or medical centres. The outlying

centres of Groote Eylandt, Bathurst Island, Millingimbi and Port Keats were included

in a regular flying schedule. Services were flown to Broome, Derby, Noonkanbah,

!OJ ibid 102 Powell~- p. 207. 103 ibid. p. 207. 104 The Tiger Moths carried mail between Darwin and Daly Waters and intermediate points; the Dragons were used for more distant :flights, i.e. as far east as Groote Eylandt and west as far as Broome.

141 Halls Creek and other locations on an as and when required basis. In addition mercy

flights were flown to isolated settlements and cattle stations. 105

On February 27, 1943, the unit moved to Batchelor and on March 19 it received a

Supermarine Walrus sea plane for communications work. On the subject of the unit's aircraft, Powell writes:

No 6 Communications Unit flew probably the strangest assortment of aircraft ever allocated to a RAAF squadron. From the original fifty-four personnel, six DH 84s, one DH 90 and four Tiger Moths, the unit grew to a strength, in February 1945, of two hundred and thirty men, five DH 84s, eight DH 82s, ten Ansons, one Walrus amphibian, two Vultee Vengeances, one Hudson, one Beaufort and one Catalina. 106

The unit undertook other tasks such as conveying personnel from Repair and Salvage

Units (RSU) to crash sites, air/sea rescue flights (by all aircraft including the Tiger

Moths) and dropping supplies to crews of crashed aircraft. In April 1943 regular flights began to Cape Fourcroy, Peron Island, Wyndham and Drysdale.

Too little, too late?

This chapter presents in its title the proposition "too little too late". Before we pass judgement on whether the RAAF's efforts in the NW Area during 1942 were too little and whether its assets were deployed to the area too late, we must consider the following points.

The air power presence in the Area at the time of the first Japanese bombing raids was minimal-the allies had three RAAF squadrons and a variety of US aircraft. This had to be built up in order to protect the strategic port of Darwin and, initially, to guard against the feared Japanese invasion. However, there were few suitable aircraft

105 RAAF Museum, 6 Communications Unit file. ED Plenty A Brief History of No. 6 Communications Unit. 106 Powell QQ..Q!. p. 207.

142 available to the allies. The US fighters were initially to be shipped to the NEI or were needed in the North-Eastern Area for the New Guinea campaign. After the Japanese raids MacArthur had to divert some of his fighter squadrons to Darwin which thus delayed his New Guinea campaign.

Allied intelligence showed that the Japanese were building up their defences in the

NEI. It was therefore necessary for the RAAF to build up air power assets in the Area closest to the Japanese bases. While the Japanese raids seemed to die down, the

RAAF had no reason to suspect that they would not resume at any time. Furthermore, at the time, the Allies could not contemplate an invasion of the NEI due to the distances involved. An invasion fleet would have been easy prey to the land based bombers in Timor or Ambon.

Nor could the Allies strike back efficiently. They were short of heavy bombers, with most of the B-17 s being sent to Europe. 107 It would be mid 1943 before the USAAF sent a Heavy Bombardment Group to Darwin and at least a year later before the

RAAF acquired heavy bombers of its own. In the meantime there were few bombers with the range to attack enemy bases in the NEI. The Japanese could build up defences and, equally importantly take what ever resources they needed from these islands. In so far as the ability to strike back was concerned, the reverse situation applied, that is, the raids by Australian based aircraft served to tie up Japanese resources that could have been deployed to New Guinea.

In short, the RAAF's efforts in 1942 and early 1943 were not too little, too late. They may have been too late to prevent the early raids but a continued presence of fast interceptors guided by radar served as a deterrent to further raids. Those raids that

107 Desperately short of bombers, the RAAF reversed its earlier decision and in May 1942 ordered 143 Boeing B-17s. Unfortunately these were not delivered because the US factories could not produce sufficient aircraft to supply the USAAF in Europe, let alone the air forces of the Allies. See Nelmes Op cit. pp. 34-35.

143 occurred during 1943 served as a reminder that the RAAF presence was still necessary. One might reasonably wonder what would have happened if during late 1942 the RAAF's fighters and radar had been transferred to another theatre. The Japanese may well have attacked again in large numbers.

144 Chapter 6 Taking the offensive 1943-45: Only a side-show?

From January 1943 until the end of the war the strength of the RAAF in the NW Area

increased considerably and then started to decline. At the beginning of that year there

were seven squadrons based in the Area. Between then and the end of the war that

number had increased to a high point of 23 before units were transferred further north. 1

During the latter part of 1944 squadrons based in the NW Area supported the main

allied offensive in eastern and northern New Guinea by attacking the Japanese in the

NEI and destroying as much of their war materiel as often as possible. By December

· that year the nature of the campaign had changed. It was still largely an air war but the

raids on Darwin and other Australian towns had long since ceased and the Japanese air

stre~gth operating from forward bases had declined. 2

The RAAF was acquiring more modem aircraft. A heavy bomber wing, equipped with

Consolidated B-24 Liberators was able to fly long distance raids north and west to

targets in the Celebes and even as far away as Java; Catalinas flew very long-range

mine laying operations, (some as far as Hong Kong); medium bombers attacked

shipping that supplied NEI based Japanese forces; and the NW Area was defended by

Spitfire equipped fighter squadrons. An ironic situation developed whereby the RAAF

had gained, at last, the aircraft it required only to find the enemy was disappearing.

Another interesting development was the use of aircraft for tasks other than their

primary purpose. For example, B-24s flew maritime patrols, Venturas and Catalinas

flew bombing missions and Spitfires were used for ground attack.

The number of Japanese aircraft encountered by the RAAF had decreased. So too had

Japanese shipping. Merchant ships had been destroyed in large numbers by the US

1 RHS records. This figure does not include 76 and 77 SQNs which were based in the NW Area in late 1942 and early 1943. It does, however, include the three RAF units. 2 S Grantham The 13 Squadron Story. SR Grantham, Dee Why, NSW, 1991. p. 82.

145 Navy's submarine fleet and the Japanese navy no longer organised protected convoys

to supply their NEI garrisons. Instead shipping took the form of supply barges and

small freighters. These garrisons had been by-passed by the allies as their advance was

made along the east and north New Guinea coasts and thence to Morotai Island and

the Philippines.

Command Arrangements

On July 16, 1943 Air Vice Marshal AT Cole took over from Bladin as AOC NW Area.

Bladin was posted to a position with the RAF in Europe. He had become the first

· Australian to be decorated by the US in the Pacific war when MacArthur awarded him

the for gallantry in action while leading a bombing raid and was later

awarded the CBE for his leadership in the NW Area. 3 Cole had come from Europe

where he had been AOC in . Before that he had commanded a

reconnaissance wing in the Middle East and then served as air adviser for the Dieppe

raid during which he had been wounded. 4

In addition to defending north-west Australia and the Torres Strait area, Bladin's basic

tasks as AOC had been to destroy the Japanese coastal shipping and air power in the

eastern NEI; to pin down as much of the Japanese force as possible in the islands

facing Australia; and, increasingly during and.after 1943, to destroy oil fields, harbours

and shipping at long distances from northern Australia. 5 However, a great deal of

Bladin' s air strength was absorbed by maritime patrols, protection of sea lanes and

close escort for surface vessels. Most squadrons were involved in these tasks for much

of their time in the NW Area.

3 Stephens & Isaacs QILQ!. p. 56. 4 Odgers QQ__Qt. p. 104. Details of Cole's pre war service with the RAAF may be found in Coulthard-Clark The Third Brother. An interesting situation in light of the command problems described in Chapter 1. of this thesis. The NW Area had as its AOC an Air Vice-Marshal who was to report to the operational commander, an Air Vice-Marshal and CAS another Air Vice-Marshal. 5 Powell QQ_Q!. p. 150.

146 All these operations were vital tasks because the NW Area lay on the western flank of

McArthur's main concentrations which had to be protected to ensure the success of the major offensive against the Japanese. Bladin controlled the air operations except in the event of a major offensive, involving units from the NW and NE Areas, when

Bostock would coordinate. 6 Cole reported on his arrival that his new command was

"well organised, keen and in good shape". 7

On August 4, 1943 General Kenney laid down the operational aims of the NW Area.

Powell states that they were no different to those followed by Bladin. Cole had five main tasks on which to employ his air force: air defence of the NW Area bases; reconnaissance to seaward to give 36 hours warning of raids or invasion; protection of shipping; interdiction of Japanese shipping; and attacks on Japanese airfields. 8 These tasks are reflected in the directives he passed to the operational squadrons (details are noted later in this chapter). The tasks led to some frustration through the RAAF in the area, from Cole right down to the aircrew because the ultimate purpose of what they were doing was obscure. 9 In one of his own directives Cole had simplified the main role of the RAAF as "to defend the North West of Australia and Torres Strait Area." 10

The future security of the area, he claimed, depended on three essential elements: equipment to carry out long range reconnaissance; additional long range fighters; and additional striking power to counter raids or invasion. It would be at least a year before he received the reconnaissance and strike assets while, apart from the

Beaufighters of 31 SQN, long range fighters were not sent to the NW Area.

Cole remained as AOC NW Area until September 1944 when he was replaced by Air

Commodore .AM Charlesworth (formally the AOC Eastern Area). At that time the

6 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 7 ibid. 8 1"b'd 1 . 9 Powell Qn._g!. p. 150. · 10 AA Al196/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 7/43, September 5, 1943

147 offensive action from the NW Area was at its height. Unfortunately Charlesworth immediately struck problems with the defensive arm-No. 80 Wing-as there had not been a Japanese air raid since November 12, 1943.n Furthermore a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft had not been sighted since July 1944. The Spitfire squadrons had done nothing but train.

For the remainder of the war the NW Area was to maintain the offensive but, as the war moved further away from Darwin, Charlesworth had the task of winding down the organisation his predecessors had built. 12 Not only was the war moving away from

Darwin but with it went many of the operational squadrons. By the end of the war squadrons equipped with Spitfires, Mitchells and Liberators had been transferred from the NW Area to other SWP A bases including Morotai and . 13

RAAF Organisation

At a conference in , CAS announced that the future organisation of the

RAAF in areas outside Australia had been considered and the following had been decided:

(a) R.A.A.F. organisation would comprise Groups, Wings and Squadrons, the largest homogenous unit being the Squadron;

(b) Wings to be formed hereafter would not necessarily be organised on a functional basis, but depending on the circumstances surrounding each case, might consist of units having different roles or functions. 14

11 Raid 64 was flown on November 12, 1943. The Japanese force comprised nine bombers which attacked Parap, Adelaide River and Batchelor. They were intercepted by 11 Spitfires which shot down two of the bombers for no loss of their own. See Alford Darwin's Air War. p. 79. 12 Powell~· p. 152. 13 AA A1969/100/6/381/01 Coastal Command-Headquarters Allied Air Forces-Southwest Pacific Area-ForWard Operational Planning. Far East Air Service Command Logistics Instructions No. 95. "Mission of Allied Air Forces." The directive stated that RAAF Command would establish air units, with appropriate service units in the Manggar-Balikpapan area. These were to be one fighter wing of three P-40 squadrons; one air sea rescue flight; one wing of two B-25 squadrons and one heavy bomber wing of three B-24 squadrons. See also Odgers QQ._ill. pp. 481-482. 14 AA A705/12/501/301 CAS Conferences. Air Officers Commanding. Minutes of CAS conference, August 17, 1943.

148 In the North-Eastern Area, it was planned to form Wings which, owing to the large geographical size of the area, would not be on a functional basis. In the NW Area it was planned to form ·Wings on a functional basis, given the comparatively small geographic area in which the RAAF was based.

In the NW Area wings usually comprised three or four squadrons undertaking specific tasks. In most cases the squadrons in each wing tended to operate similar aircraft types (eg the three squadrons of No. 1 Fighter Wing all flew Spitfires). One notable exception was No. 79 Wing, comprising 1, 2, 13 and 18 (NEI) SQNs, which flew

Beauforts, and North American Mitchells on maritime patrol and bombing operations. The RAAF was unable to acquire sufficient numbers of any one of the aircraft types to equip all squadrons in the Wing. 15

Geographic Boundaries

As MacArthur's forces moved north three allied air forces became involved in operations in the SWP A: RAAF Command, the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. The possible conflicting situation of the operational boundary between the RAAF and the

USAAF was resolved with an order which proclaimed it as:

at the intersection of longitude 143 degrees East and the Papuan Coastline proceed northward along this longitude to its intersection with the New Guinea-Papuan boundaries thence to a point whose longitude is 134 degrees East and latitude 3 degrees South thence northward along

15 An interesting case relevant to the composition of wings was that of 22 SQN which was the only RAAF unit to operate the Douglas A-20 Boston. The squadron was part of 77 Wing (the other units were 30 and 31 SQNs while 92 SQN was to join the Wing after its formation). The Wing's other squadrons were equipped with Beau:fighters. On November 22, 1944 nine Japanese aircraft staged a night raid on Morotai. 22 SQN lost nine A-20s and in February 1945 was withdrawn to Noemfoor to re-equip with Beau:fighters .. The remaining A-20s were reluctantly handed over to the USAAF at Biak because for operational and logistic reasons, it was preferable that all squadrons within the Wing flew the same aircraft type. See Parnell.QQ..Qt. p. 36. Later in 1945 the RAAF had the opportunity to obtain, from the USAAF, sufficient A-20s to equip one or two squadrons. These aircraft, which were a mixture of older versions and the new A-20G series were surplus to US requirements. The RAAF considered the offer but rejected it on the grounds that there was no requirement for the type any longer. See AA A705/1/501/437 Home Defence Expansion-73 Squadron Plan, Aircraft Requirements.

149 longitude 134 degrees East. The R.A.A.F. Command interests lie to the South and West of this line and the Fifth Air Force to the North and East, in performing their assigned responsibilities of tactical action, preparation of bases and defences and all other matters of tactical and logistical concern except joint action. Joint action between R.A.A.F. Command and Fifth Air Force will be at the Direction of Commander Allied Air Forces. 16

This order allowed for the July 1, 1944, change to the geographical boundaries of the

NW Area. The boundaries were amended and included the area as far north as Cape

Kami on the Lunchow Peninsula with boundaries along the coast of Tonkin, Indo­

China, and Malaya to the west; down the border between the Australian and

Dutch territories of New Guinea to the east. The area thus included the Philippines, and the NEI, with the exception of Sumatra. This boundary extended well into the and also crossed the boundaries of the operational areas of the

Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. 17

In early 1945 General Kenney assigned complete responsibility for all air operations south ofthe Philippines to RAAF Command from Apri14 that year. Bostock exercised operational control over all AAF units in the area. 18

Reporting the RAAF Effort

From 1942 onwards the Australian Services each produced an annual report in the form of a book of photographs, drawings, paintings, cartoons, stories and poems aimed at the general public. The topics described in the RAAF' s books were general reports of operations on all fronts and first hand accounts and experiences of personnel. It is interesting to note that little in these books is devoted to the NW Area.

16 HQ Allied Air Forces, General Order No. 13; April15, 1943. 17 AA All96/2/60/501/152 Operational Instruction; Geographical Boundaries of North-Western Area and Western Area. 18 Stephens RAAF Operation Commanders in Stephens (ed) QQ.Q1. p. 44.

150 . FORMOSA CtHNA • SAX/SHIMA ~*' Pr;SCADOR&S llllrrulf/t:atiatf (1/ dally * ORM()SA ~-stra/1"'1. rt Hlv/JibomN"''.

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110~0! E ...,o J ~ ~ . -~....,....0 r;rJ1'. !} ~ I'I.OI'!e ~ • • I SOJ!).CBA vnMOfl. to" Z.F. Sli€J..J'OIII Jll.- 1~1 ItO" IZO" 130" f4Q• One book, RAAF Saga, published in 1944 contains only one article written specifically about operations in the area. The article, titled Darwin Fights Back begins with:

Darwin had a quiet spell in 1944. War correspondents delved into the past for copy, wrote stories of gold digging claims pegged by the local RAAF; reported on inter-unit football matches. While spectacular advances were being made along the northern coast of New Guinea to the Admiralities, in the Central Pacific and almost every theatre of war, Darwin cooled its heels. However, the RAAF was not inactive, despite the lull in Japanese aggression. With each new moon Spitfire pilots hoped the Japs would come again. Not since November 12, 1943, when two enemy aircraft were shot down during a night raid, had the Nips dared to venture across the . 19

The three page article went on to describe bombing raids on Timor by Mitchells and

Liberators, the long-range torpedo strike by Catalinas and ground attack raids by

Beaufighters and Spitfires. The bombing raids were described as:

a steady, not very exciting, process ofkeeping a check on every pinpoint located by the Photo-recces. 20

This seemingly low key reporting was in spite of the argument put forward by Cole to

CAS on the inadequacy of publicity of the RAAF' s activities in the area and his request for Public Relations Officers with greater experience to be sent there. 21 Similarly the

1945 book, Victory Roll contained very little about the NW Area. A three page article titled Long Range From Darwin begins with:

There wasn't much excitement around Darwin in 1945. There wasn't much doing that everyone could know about right at the moment.

It was just hard slogging for both crews and ground staffs. As the Japanese were pushed farther and farther back on their home bases and earlier conquests, targets, even in the NEI, began to diminish and retreat.

19 RAAF Director ofPublic Relations RAAF Saga. AWM, Canberra, ACT. 1944. p. 176. 20 ibid. p. 176. 21 AA A705/12/501/301 CAS Conferences. Air Officers Commanding. Minutes of CAS conference, August 17, 1943.

151 However, despite all this, aircraft based in north-western Australia played their part in the general offensive. Their work was not spectacular-it was just hard work. Right up to the time of the invasion of Borneo they played their part in every offensive. Theirs was a protective role, but the troops they were protecting seldom saw them because they were striking the enemy hundreds of miles away, preventing him providing his own hard-pressed garrisons with air support. 22 According to this article the RAAF's tasks centred around interim strikes against Java

and the Celebes, tedious shipping searches over the ocean and mine laying, all of which

were undertaken by long-range aircraft. The article describes the raid on the Kali-

. Kantto hydro-electric system as "one of the most spectacular and daring successes of

the war in the Pacific".

The NW Area fared little better in other reporting forums. For example, in a

Parliamentary speech on the RAAF's war record, on October 14, 1943, the Minister

for Air gave a very brief mention to the activities in the Area. He stated Catalinas,

Hudsons and Beaufighters had attacked targets in the NEI and claimed Spitfires had

shot down 70 Japanese aircraft. 23 Much of his speech was directed towards the RAAF in Europe, the Middle East and other parts of the SWP A. Similarly, CAS in his war report to the Minister for Air devoted two pages (of the sixty page report) to a chapter titled War Against Japan: Malaya and Operations from NW Australia. CAS reported while it was believed the Japanese might not invade Australia they might capture or neutralise Darwin. The Joint Service plans were to deny Darwin to the Japanese by the use of fighter aircraft and AAA, coupled with offensive operations directed at Japanese bases. He added:

Throughout the campaign in the South-West Pacific, North-Western Area formed a secure western flank for General MacArthur's offensives direct.ed at Japan through New Guinea and the Philippines. 24

22 RAAF Directorate of Public Relations Victory Roll. A WM, Canberra, ACT. 1945. p. 76. 23 CPD, Representatives, 14 October, 1943. p. 565. Seventy aircraft was only a slight exaggeration. Between March 3 and November 12, 1943, Spitfires claimed 56 Japanese aircraft destroyed and a further 19 as probable for the loss of37 of their own. See Alford Darwin's Air War. p.79. 24 CAS Op cit. p. 50.

152 , ~, ~ In July 1944 the HQ NW Area started to publish a newslifter titled Bomb::.

Copies were distributed to bomber squadrons in the area. Its Jprpose was: \ 1 Through this medium, we hope to increase interest in tl\e important task ofBomber Crews-Efficient Bombing. t

li On these pages we hope to present some of the experiE\nces and views of our various squadrons. Articles on bombing experienlees-and tactics, suggestions, criticisms and questions, should be addressed to the Area Bombing Leader.25

· The introductory section of each edition gave a brief overview of the conduct of the

war from the HQ NW Area. For example, in July 1944 it reported Japanese shipping

("which is fast disappearing") together with airfields and installations had been

relentlessly attacked.

Our attention is focussed more and more on the Philippines and Japanese mainland. Our air blows from the North-Western sector not only make more difficult the enemies job of supplying his outlying bases, but keep his air bases effectively neutralized. 26

Two months later, comments in the newsletter reflected the disappearirvr Japanese forces and the relegation of Darwin to the position of a strategic backw u. .. -.:r as th..; allied forces continued their advance towards the Philippines:

Our attack squadrons supported the Halmahera move and continue to make enemy bases in this North-Western Area untenable. Although we get sore because the enemy is getting out of reach and we can't hit him hard enough or often enough, we must be gratified to see the tide of battle swinging towards his home land?7

The RAAF certainly tried to make life as untenable for the Japanese as possible. There are reports that describe incidents that, in hindsight, appear excessive. For example, during a low level attack on a "Sugar Dog" vessel, by 13 SQN, it is recorded "orie

25 AWM 66/15/811 Bombs Gone July 1944. 26 ibid. 27 AWM 66/15/8/1 Bombs Gone September 1944.

153 strafing run made on a canoe with two occupants after small arms fire encountered from canoe". 28 The crew of a 31 SQN Beaufighter, engaged in strafing trucks near

Ketabet "observed a Jap running for cover and killed him with a short burst"?9

We should now consider why there was little reported about the NW Area. The war in the NW Area was largely an air war. The other two Services had personnel and assets stationed in and around Darwin but it was the RAAF that took the fight to the

Japanese. Even so, despite the long-range bombing and mine laying raids and the fighter defence, much of the RAAF' s flying time in the area was devoted to maritime reconnaissance activities such as shipping searches and convoy or anti submarine patrols. Despite planning, there was no invasion of Japanese held territory mounted from the area. The planned invasion was highly classified and details were not reported to the public. Consequently there was no land warfare to report, no demonstrated gains in the form of ground taken, prisoners or war materiel captured, or countries liberated to write or make speeches about. Instead there were Japanese aircraft destroyed in combat (for a while), photographs of bomb damage and the occasional ship destroyed. This was of little consequence to the media or the public who appeared to be more interested in the drive towards Japan through New Guinea and the Philippines. So, despite the AOC's request for better publicity, there was very little about the day-to-day operations in the area that was startling news or could be seen by the majority of the Australian population as bringing about an early end to the war.

Japanese Intentions

Following the Japanese air raid on Darwin on March 15, 1943, John Curtin consulted

General MacArthur as to the threat to Australia and the strength of the enemy forces.

28 A WM 66/15/1/1 Operations Room Record. 13 SQN, February 14, 1945. 29 A WM 66/15/8/1 Bombs Gone October 1944.

154 Curtin reported the following to the War Cabinet meeting on March 16. The text of Curtin's statement is included in full because it gives the most accurate portrait available to the Australian Government, at that time, of the strategic position and expectations in the SWP A

On the general question, General MacArthur said there was no doubt that the enemy was trying to infiltrate and shove his position nearer Torres Strait and in the greatest strength he can. This is clear evidence of the enemy's ambitions. It was to meet this situation which caused General MacArthur to despatch Generals Kenney and Sutherland to Washington. Basically General MacArthur does not possess sufficient strength to meet all the enemy moves in the north-east and eastern sector and at the same time to meet all probable enemy moves in the north-west sector. He cannot deal with strong enemy thrusts in both areas simultaneously. At the present time the north-west sector is in the process of being built up by the enemy. General MacArthur does not think the enemy has sufficient forces to launch a major attack now but that he would require from 2 to 4 months to develop the requisite conjunction of forces to make a serious attack. The enemy, however, can be said to be developing what General MacArthur describes as a position of readiness.

In the arc of islands outside the mainland of Australia the enemy is developing 67 airfields. When these are completed he would be able to use them for the purposes of operating air forces of the strength of from 1,500 to 2,000 planes. This means we have to develop equality in strength.

At present time there is no evidence of a serious concentration of air forces on the part of the enemy on his perimeter, but there is evidence of heavy concentrations of ground troops. He has at least 8 first class shock divisions.

The Japanese commanding general is at Dobo in the Aroe Islands to the north-west of Dutch New Guinea and he has a combat team. His intention is to inch forward. There are 2 more combat teams which can be employed unless they have been frightened off by our bombing. These, if not frightened off, would probably be ready by next week. Altogether this is a menacing move which must be met. General MacArthur is trying to get naval forces and has sought 3 cruisers and 9 in order to cover the western end of Torres Strait. He has asked the United States for 1,000 to 1,500 'planes and a corps of troops. Generals Kenny (sic) and Sutherland are not asking for forces for the purpose of an offensive against Rabaul or Tokyo but defend what General MacArthur holds. He states that it is silly talk as things stand to refer to our readiness to push ahead.

155 The enemy is no longer attempting to cut the lines of communication between Australia and the United States, for example Pearl Harbour. His concern is to deal with the Australian base and to concentrate the whole of his power on this weak country. The holding war now requires that we shall be able to meet the enemy's increasingly growing strength arising from his concentrations. We can as things stand hold now, but we could not hold against strength unless we were able to build up greater strength.

The enemy has diagnosed the situation pretty well the same as we have. He knows the com~ct thing in war is to concentrate superior strength against a weak position. The southwest Pacific is no longer menaced but the northwest approach to the Pacific area and North Australia is. 30

Throughout 1943 Allied intelligence reports reinforced General MacArthur's advice.

'For example, Intelligence Summary No. 86, issued on March 17, stated that the aim of

the March 15 air raid on Darwin was probably to "weaken allied striking power and to

divert attention while rearward activity, particularly in the Aroe Islands" was built up.

The summary predicted that air attacks on Darwin would be heavy and sustained and

that in addition to the immediate tactical advantage gained from such attacks, the Japanese might also cause a diversion of Allied resources used for the attack in the

North-east theatre. 31

When reporting on the Japanese raid on Darwin on June 22, Intelligence Summary 114 stated:

The expansion and consolidation of enemy air strength in the North­ Western Area has been discussed before. It has probably now reached a stage where operations of this character will be undertaken more frequently. 32

While in July 1943, HQ AAF advised:

30 AA A5954/1/524/6 Operations at Darwin. Notes of advice conveyed to the Prime Minister by General MacArthur during a secraphone conversation 11.45 am, 16th March, 1943, regarding enemy air raid on Darwin 15.3.43. 31 AA A5954/l/524/6 Operations at Darwin. HQ Allied Air Forces; SWP A. Intelligence Summary, No. 86. March 17, 1943. 32 AA A5954/1/524/6 Operations at Darwin. HQ Allied Air Forces; SWPA. Intelligence Summary, No. 114. June 23, 1943.

156 Although there has been no attack by Army aircraft reported recently in the North-Western Area, the significant absence of enemy air activity in Burma may foreshadow a renewal of Army air operations in the north­ west, possibly on a large scale. 33

The same intelligence summary also advised of further Japanese airfield development at

Penfoei on Timor. A summary on August 31 noted air base development at Babo and

commented on the Japanese reconnaissance flights over northern Australia:

In the North-Western Area, further reconnaissances indicate the maintenance of enemy interest in the north-west coast of Australia. Their primary purpose at the moment is to keep in touch with the disposition of Allied air strength. 34

In September 1943 CAS advised the War Cabinet that despite heavy losses, Japanese

aircraft numbers had increased by 223 in the area to the north of Australia. He

considered that the increase could only have been achieved by a reduction in the

strength ofthe Japanese home forces. He added that since May 1, 1943, the USAAF

strength in the SWP A had increased by 312 aircraft and the RAAF by 170. At that time the AAF in the NW Area possessed 135 serviceable aircraft (89 RAAF, 30 Fifth

AF and 16 NEI AF). The Japanese had 334 aircraft, although it was explained "by the fact that Timor, Ambon and Celebes were used as bases to reinforce the Northeastern Area". 35

From these statements by General MacArthur and the intelligence appreciations it seems that the RAAF still had very good reasons to have a large part of its resources based in the NW Area. The reconnaissance flights suggested that the Japanese were still interested in the port and military bases at Darwin and the build up of their own air bases could suggest that they either feared an invasion of the NEI from the NW Area

33 AA A5954/l/524/6 Operations at Darwin. HQ Allied Air Forces; SWPA. Intelligence Summary, No. 119. July 10, 1943. 34 AA A5954/l/524/6 Operations at Darwin. HQ Allied Air Forces SWPA. Intelligence Summary No. 134. August 31, 1943. 35 AA A5954/46/809/2 Cabinet Minute 3047; September 14, 1943.

157 or they were about to launch further offensives. Furthermore, a formidable AAF

presence in the NW Area coupled with continual raids on Japanese bases would either

destroy the enemy's aircraft or keep them engaged in defence and thus away from the

allied advances in the North-Eastern Area. It was not until January 18, 1944 that Cole

was able to include in one of his directives the comment that "in view of the recent

appreciation of the situation, .... we no longer anticipate invasion in the North­

Western Area. "36

Allied Invasion Plans

· There were several plans made for an invasion of the NEI. In July 1942 Generals

Marshall and MacArthur sought to exploit the changing situation in the SWP A by

launching offensives designed to drive the Japanese back as far as Truk in the Pacific

and Wewak in New Guinea. Admiral King suggested two simultaneous drives, one by

MacArthur's forces into Timor or some other suitable location in the NEI and one into

the Solomons under Vice Admiral RL Ghormley. MacArthur opposed this because he

considered the available forces would be sufficient for only a single offensive. An

operation against Timor, even if successful, could not be supported as strongly as one

from the NE Area and it was doubtful whether Timor could be held in view of other

nearby bases from which the Japanese dominated the sea. Marshall supported

MacArthur's plan for the drive from the NE Area. 37

Nevertheless, a year later MacArthur considered other plans for an advance into the

NEI-including Borneo and the Celebes. Initial plans envisaged the capture of islands

in the Arafura Sea to the south west of New Guinea as well as the move along the

north east coast of that island. An airfield was to be constructed at Merauke and Aru

and possibly the Tanimbar Islands were to be captured. It was planned that as the

36 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Addendum to Operational Policy Directive 7/43, January 18, 1944. 37 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Emplovment of Forces under the Southwest Pacific Command. Military Analysis Divn, US Govt Printing Office, Washington DC, 1947. pp. 9-10.

158 allied forces moved along the north coast, those in the south west would move to the

McCleur Gulf and Ambon. He concluded that the large disposition of Japanese forces

combined with "close waters in which both enemy navy and shore-based aircraft would

operate, provided the enemy with the geographical requirement for strong defences". 38

However, operations on the north coast of New Guinea took advantage of the more

open waters where allied sea power could be better deployed. Thus a sea borne

assault across the Arafura sea did not eventuate.

Instead MacArthur used the NW Area based squadrons to support the New Guniea

campaign. To counter, New Guinea campaign units of the Japanese 7ili Air Division

' began withdrawing from Ambon and moving to Wewak in early August 1943. The

Japanese aimed to consolidate all regional Army air units in the Rabaul and Solomons

areas. 39 The RAAF was tasked with pinning down the Japanese air forces in the NEI

so that they could not be sent as reinforcements to New Guinea. It would aid

MacArthur if the Japanese were confused as to the direction of his advance and a

sudden heavy campaign from the NW Area would add to the confusion. MacArthur

claimed that false radio signals from Darwin, Perth and Merauke helped convince the

Japanese that at least a diversionary attack was to be mounted from Northwest

Australia. 40

General Kenney's instructions to Bostock pointed out that if a campaign were to be

launched from Darwin the most likely Japanese bases to be neutralised were Koepang

on Timor, Kendari on the Celebes, Ambon, and Babo in New Guinea. Kenney directed

the majority of attacks be on Koepang, pointing out that if the base were destroyed the

Japanese would develop the three other locations. 41 Cole had his prescribed tasks to

manage and initially had little capacity to aid MacArthur unless additional squadrons

38 Odgers Qn..Q!. p. 56. 39 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987 and Odgers Op cit. p 107. 40 D MacArthur Reminiscences. p. 102. 41 Odgers Op cit. pp. 56-57.

159 were assigned to the NW Area. However, by reducing the reconnaissance flights from

the area he had aircraft to strike at the diversely located targets. 42 Kenney's instructions were carried out by NW Area based squadrons during August and September 1943. Hudsons, B-25s, B-24s, Beaufighters and Catalinas flew bombing and strafing missions into the NEI. This action caused the Japanese to retain their

fighters within the NEI and reinforce other bases to the north of Darwin. There was a

secondary outcome of this vigorous campaign. Intelligence reports confirmed the Japanese, fearing an allied invasion, began to build up their bases in the area. In doing

this they lost additional personnel, aircraft, materiel and shipping to the allied air

attacks. 43 This aspect of the campaign was successful as the Japanese used resources

that could have been diverted to fight MacArthur's advance.

With the cessation of air raids on the NW Area, Cole no longer thought in terms of a

holding war in the NW Area. He now sought a change to an offensive policy. Darwin

was a base from which an invasion of the NEI could be launched and Cole started to

plan accordingly. He moved stores, maintenance and repair facilities, previously located beyond the range of Japanese bombers, to Darwin to save transport

resources. 44

In October 1943 Cole forwarded to RAAF Command a paper detailing a scheme for operating the maximum air strength from the NW Area with the least construction

requirements. Cole proposed the basing of four heavy bomber squadrons in the area around Iron Range (from where, by staging through Darwin or Drysdale, they could

strike north-east or north-west); a force of up to 16 light, medium and G/R bomber

types in and around Darwin; together with three interceptor and one long-range mobile

fighter squadrons. 45 The paper was sent to the CAS who commented:

42 ibid. pp. 111-112. 43 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 44 Odgers Qn..Q!. p. 121. 45 AA Al196/6/15/501/273 Scheme for heavy Air Operations in the North West Area. Paper "Scheme for Heavy Air Operations and Subsequent Staging Through of LB and Fighter reinforcements-North-Western Area" October 8, 1943.

160 This paper suggests provlSlon be made for a force, the scale and composition of which would appear to be unnecessary. No action is to be taken in regard to this matter until plans for further assignment of units to North-Western Area are received from RAAF Command. 46

Cole argued the force would provide support for a seaborne invasion of Japanese held territory (he referred to the use of air power at Dieppe) as well as protecting the base

against air attack; guard against counter attack by sea borne forces; and protect

friendly shipping lines of communication. 47 Jones' reply to this argument was simply "I have no comments". 48

, On January 13, 1944, Cole sent a minute to RAAF Command in which he

optimistically pointed out that as Germany was weakening it could be expected that the

RAF and USAAF would soon take part in a joint four prong attack against Japan

(three of the prongs were land based, i.e. through India/Burma, Ceylon and Australia).

He assumed that the RAAF would participate in such a move and would acquire US

and/or British aircraft. He noted the NW Area was the closest 'British Territory' to the enemy lines of communication through the NEI and the Philippines. Furthermore,

as Germany was soon to be defeated the U-boat threat would disappear from the

Australian shipping lanes. He therefore suggested the construction of a large repair

and maintenance facility at Darwin to support the RAAF in the forthcoming move against Japan. 49

The proposal was forwarded to RAAF HQ. The Air Member for Engineering and

Maintenance advised he was sympathetic to Cole's views but he had no knowledge of

any plan to increase RAAF forces to justify the construction of new repair facilities.

46 AA All96/6/15/501/273 Scheme for heavy Air Operations in North West Area. Minute from CAS to DASP and DTOR, October 22, 1943. 47 AA All96/6/15/501/273 Scheme for heavy Air Operations in North West Area. Minute from AOC NW Area to RAAF Command, October 21, 1943. 48 AA All96/6/15/501/273 Scheme for heavy Air Operations in North West Area. Minute from CAS to DCAS and DTOR, November 2, 1943. 49 AA A 705/1/501/508 Repair and Maintenance: North-Western Area. Minute from AOC NW Area to RAAF Command, January 13, 1944.

161 He noted the proposed small expansion of operational units in the NW Area "and, as a complement to this, one extra RSU is to be moved into the Area". 50

DCAS replied to Cole:

the Head Quarters has not received any intimation from RAAF Command or GHQ of intended increases in the Air Forces which it is proposed to deploy in the Darwin area, but following a request to RAAF Command for information as to future intentions, RAAF Command has advised that the whole matter of the disposal of RAAF and allied Air Forces in North-Western Area is now under discussion and that further advice will be forwarded as soon as a decision is reached. 51

Regardless of Cole's proposal, the RAAF had issued an operational instruction on

March 3, 1944 which stated:

Amphibious operations will be undertaken by Allied forces against enemy held territory in the Arafura and Banda Seas.

Units allocated to RAAF Command (under the direct command of the AOC RAAF

Command) were to take part. A task force, comprising RAAF and Fifth Air Force units (temporarily allocated for the purpose) was to be established in the NW Area.

The RAAF component was to be two wings of fighter squadrons with ancillary units and was initially to be integrated into the NW Area. The Wings were No. 80 comprising three Spitfire squadrons (79, 452 _and 457 SQNs together with 110 Mobile

Fighter Sector HQ) and No. 81 comprising three Kittyhawk squadrons (82, 84 and 86

SQNs and 112 Mobile Fighter Sector HQ). 52

50 AA A205/1/501/508 Repair and Maintenance: North-Western Area. Minute from Air Commodore E Wackett AMEM to DCAS, January 18, 1944. 51 AA A705/1/501/508 Repair and Maintenance: North-Western Area. Minute from DCAS to AOC NW Area, February 3, 1944. 52 Each Wing had the necessary ancillary units attached to it. These were an OBU, a Transport and Movements Office (TMO), an RSU, a medical clearing station, a signals unit and a postal unit detachment. In addition each wing was to have a section from No. 3 Malaria Control Unit (which had to be moved from Melbourne!), a detachment from No. 28 Air Stores Park and a detachment from No. 9 Replenishing Centre.

162 Such vast planning required the movement of existing RAAF units. 86 SQN was to move from Merauke (it was to be replaced by 120 (NEI) SQN, itself moved from the Eastern Area). Similarly 82 SQN was to be moved from Bankstown in the Eastern

Area and re-equipped with Kittyhawks. 53 A forward command post was to be established alongside HQ NW Area. Total personnel for the task force was to be

4,242. It was not intended to maintain the task force following the operation.

No. 80 Wing HQ and No. 81 Wing HQ were to come directly under the command of

HQ NW Area. 54 No. 80 Wing HQ was formed at No. 1 Embarkation Depot

Melbourne on March 31, 1944 while No. 81 Wing HQ was formed on the same date at

Ballarat. 55 It was estimated that both HQs would require 100 motor vehicles. 56

Cole at last had his invasion opportunity. He began preparing for the operation by ordering bombing raids on Japanese ground forces and shipping installations. He advised Bostock that the operation would become more difficult if delayed as the

7 Japanese were reinforcing their positions. 5 Unfortunately for the AOC the operation was cancelled seemingly as suddenly as it started. In late April orders were given to divert 82 SQN to Townsville and then to New Guinea; 84 SQN was to move from

Horn Is to New Guinea while 86 SQN, 14 RSU, 81 Wing HQ, 61 OBU, 20 Medical Clearing Station and 112 Fighter Control Unit were sent to Townsville. 58 On June 7

53 AA Al196/6/50/501/49 Movement Task Force North-Western Area. Operational Instruction No. 22/1944, March 3, 1944. 54 AA A1196/6/50/50 1/49 Movement Task Force North-Western Area. Organisational Memorandum No. 450, March 25, 1944; "Formation of Nos. 80 and 81 Wing Headquarters." 55 AA A1196/6/50/50 1/49 Movement Task Force North-Western Area. Organisational Memorandum No. 451, March 27, 1944 56 AA Al196/6/50/501/49 Movement Task Force North-Western Area. Minute to DEA, April 25, 1944. This figure included two ambulances, 24 Jeeps®, eight command cars, nine motor cycles and trucks and trailers in various configurations. 57 Odgers Qn..m. p. 231. · 58 AA Al196/6/50/501/49 Movement Task Force North-Western Area. Circular from D of 0, April 28, 1944, "81 Wing Organisation."

163 MacArthur shelved the invasion plan until after the recapture of Mindanao because there could not be a diversion of naval and amphibious forces until then. 59

Cole tried again in May 1944 when he proposed the capture of a Japanese base within

500 miles of Darwin. He claimed there was evidence that Japanese air defence in the vicinity was negligible, while ground troops were improving their installations. His argument to support the capture of a base was that it would increase the war efficiency, the striking power and the radius of action of the NW Area. It would be a simple operation at that point in time, provided shipping was available and should occur before the Japanese consolidated their beach defences. He pointed out that it was becoming tactically necessary to protect the New Guinea flank and the shipping routes through the Ara:fura Sea. Furthermore, the capture of a base would retain the allied initiative and provide a good platform for further advances to the north or east.

It would also considerably raise the morale in the NW Area. He concluded by noting that facilities existed in the NW Area "to operate and stage through the reinforcement air forces necessary to achieve success". 60 Intelligence information favoured Selaru as the suitable island. General Kenney supported the initiative and proposed a plan for the island's capture.

Kenney's argument supporting the invasion was that the initial role of the RAAF in the

NW Area had been defence and offensive operations against targets within range (i.e. within the Arafura, Timor and Banda Sea area). This was sufficient while allied forces were operating in eastern New Guinea. With the advance into western New Guinea, the RAAF in the NW Area was not able to fully support the allied effort. Even an increase in air power strength in the Area would not meet the demands of the changing situation. 61

59 Odgers Op cit. p. 232. · 60 AA A705/1/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciation. Report by AOC NW Area, May 1944. 61 Odgers Qp_ill. p. 231.

164 It is important to consider this proposal because the question must be asked why was there no invasion of the NEI? The Allied commanders had canvassed the option of launching the campaign against the Japanese through the NEI but had elected to advance along the eastern coast ofNew Guinea. In addition to the difficulties with the movement of a fleet in the close waters around the NEI, one additional factor impacting on this move was the lack of a large navy under MacArthur's command.

MacArthur had a naval forces commander (Rear Admiral Carpender initially and then

Rear Admiral Kincaid) who had a small fleet largely comprising landing craft. Admiral

King's major assets in the Pacific were involved in fighting the Japanese in a series of battles and he was unable to provide aircraft carriers, battle ships or cruisers to the

SWPA command. 62 MacArthur's strategy for the advance against the Japanese revolved around amphibious assaults by troops in landing craft supported by air power.

For the Allies, it was no simple matter to implement the AOC's suggestion. It was not just a case of invading an island and seizing a base, especially in the NEI. In July 1945

CAS was advised that it was estimated 70,000 Japanese troops remained on the islands between the Celebes and . The correspondence pointed out that all areas were undeveloped and "separate campaigns would be needed to subdue each area. Our experience teaches us that after Jap (sic) military organisations are disrupted every individual must be exterminated". 63 CAS may have underestimated the strength of the Japanese in the NEI. In October 1945 AAF intelligence advised that in the

SWPA approximately 341,015 Japanese navy and army personnel had surrendered to the allies. Of these 161,546 had surrendered in the NEI. 64

62 D Stevens Maritime Aspects ofAustralian Amphibious Operations in G Wahlert (ed) Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific 1942-45. Army Doctrine Centre, Sydney, NSW, 1995. p. 104. 63 AA All96/6/15/501/285 Future Role ofAustralian Forces in the assault on Japan 1945. Minute from Secretary Defenc~ Committee to CAS, July 17, 1945. 64 AA A1966/5/95 General Headquarters Allied Air Forces-South West Pacific Area. Summary of Daily Messages No. 1285, October 11, 1945.

165 To consider the proposal simply, the Allies would have been unable to invade an island in the NEI without a large naval force-which was unavailable to them. Furthermore, had it been possible, upon landing they would have faced fierce resistance from a numerically superior Japanese force. Conventional wisdom suggests that an invading force of three to one is required to fight and dislodge defending troops. In this case

MacArthur would have required approximately 484,638 additional troops to invade the

NEI if he continued with his New Guinea campaign at the same time. It is highly unlikely that the allied forces would have had the resources to mount two concurrent advances into Japanese held territory.

166 Chapter 7. Defending the North-Western Area

The Fighter Squadrons

1 Fighter Wing

By June 1943 the three Spitfire squadrons had been organised into No. 1 Fighter

Wing, No. 5 Fighter Sector and No. 10 Mobile Fighter Sector. No. 5 Fighter Sector

. was situated near Darwin while No. 10 Mobile Fighter Sector was near Batchelor and

its operational use centred around raids on Fenton. 1 At the same time the RAAF was

· winding down its fighter defences in the Southern, Eastern and North-Eastern Areas

(south of the Tropic of Capricom). 2 In September 1943 Wing Commander P Jeffery

took over as CO of the wing. 3

Three months earlier, in July 1943, John Curtin instructed the Australian High

Commissioner to Britain, Stanley Bruce, to make a request for additional Spitfires

from the British government. His argument was reinforced by the proposition that

while the squadrons located in the NW Area had incurred few losses and had received

little opportunity for combat, the situation in New Guinea had led to the formation of a

fourth squadron (79 SQN). This Squadron had suffered losses in combat and therefore

wastage rates had increased. Curtin was keen to see the replacement rate increased

from 15 to 25 per month and wanted the allocation of a further 3 0 aircraft. 4 Dr Evatt

visited Britain and the US again in July 1943. He asked Churchill for a squadron each

of Spitfires, Lancasters and Sunderlands. 5 The British government's response was to

1 AA All96/6/15/501/268 Fighter Defence ofDarwin Area. Report dated June 20, 1943. 2 AA All96/6/15/501/267 Reduction in Defences in Southern Areas-Policy. Report of conference held by DCAS on June 19, 1943. 3 Shores & Williams~- p. 355. Wing Commander Jeffery flew P-40s with 3 SQN in the Middle East and had shot down five German aircraft in that theatre. 4 AA A705/l/501/474 Allotment of Spitfire Squadrons from the UK. Telegram from Curtin to Bruce, July 9, 1943. An account of some of79 SQN's activities is N Medew op cit. 5 Powell~- p. 186. Six Sunderlands were delivered to the RAAF in the SWPA in mid 1944. They were flown by the Townsville based 40 SQN. Instead of LRMP their role was that of a

167 send two further RAF fighter squadrons (548 and 549 SQNs) to Australia. In this

instance the aircraft and pilots were provided by the RAF while the RAAF provided

the ground crew. Wastage replacements were increased to 22 per month. 6 Dr Evatt

announced to the Parliament, on October 14, 1943, that Britain would provide

"additional Spitfire fighter aircraft fully tropicalised and of the latest type". 7 This latest type was the Spitfire Mk VIII. By January 1944 sufficient aircraft had arrived in

Australia to equip the two new RAF squadrons.

Curtin's statement that the Spitfires had incurred few losses was not entirely accurate.

While they had relatively few combat losses they suffered badly through accidents and mechanical problems. 8 By July 1943 losses had reduced the strength of the fighter wing to a low level. In addition, due to the mechanical problems and cannon and machine gun stoppages the performance of many aircraft had deteriorated. Bladin pressed for replacement aircraft. His case was supported by the attempted interception of a successful Japanese raid on Fenton on July 6. His signal to RAAF HQ stated

"Imperative that all Spitfires allotted to this area from Southern sources be delivered immediately". 9 The July 6 raid was the last made by a large number of aircraft. Within a few days the replacement Spitfires began arriving from the south.

Bostock considered that the tactical situation in the NW Area could call for fighter defence in several locations. He requested RAAF HQ to disband No. 1 Fighter Wing.

transport service between Townsville and other bases including Darwin. See Wilson Military Aircraft of Australia. p. 182. 6 AA A705/1/501/474 Allotment of Spitfire Squadrons from the UK. Minute from Aust High Commission UK to Prime Minister, August 1943. 7 CPD Representatives October 14, 1943. p. 567. Dr Evatt added "I should add that both the President (Roosevelt) and Mr Churchill indicated their special desire to provide for the Royal Australian Air Force additional striking power in the South-West Pacific theatre of war, where for the past 22 months, Australia's main war effort has necessarily been concentrated. The contribution to the Royal Australian Air Force is over and above all pre-existing commitments". 8 One source claims that the Spitfire squadrons lost 44 aircraft in six months of operations but only 17 of these were due to combat. It is also noted that at that time they had destroyed 63 Japanese aircraft and probably destroyed 13 more. See Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987 9 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987.

168 RAAF HQ directed that the fighter squadrons were to come directly under NW Area for administration but operational control was to be exercised by No. 5 Fighter Sector

HQ. During fighter operations there had been confusion over the function of the wing leader and the commander of the Fighter Sector HQ. The problems were exacerbated when the controller on duty attempted to control fighters in the air. Some months later

RAAF HQ reintroduced the name No. 1 (Fighter) Wing but the organisation remained the same. The "Fighter Wing" became synonymous with "Fighter Sector HQ" and the new system was never fully tried as, by then, the RAAF was rarely engaged in defensive operations. 10

Cole advised Bostock in July 1943 that he could not guarantee the initial security of the area from an air point of view and he considered the three Spitfire squadrons to be insufficient. This view was supported by the Commander of the Northern Territory

Force, Major General Allen, who pointed out that the Spitfires were inadequate for repelling an invasion and, due to their short range, could not be used as escorts for bombers. Both officers considered that the P-38 would be more suitable but none was available because of the demands of the New Guinea and Solomons offensives. 11 To allay their concerns Bostock advised that in the event of an emergency temporary reinforcements from the Fifth Air Force would be flown to the NW Area. 12

It was decided to transfer the two new RAF squadrons to the NW Area, which in tum would release 452 and 457 SQNs for movement to No. 10 Operational Group operating from Morotai Island. 13 This transfer took some time as the new squadrons did not reach the NW Area until June 1944. 14 In the mean time the AOC NW Area

10 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 11 Odgers Qn.m. p. 104. 12 ibid. p. 105. 13 AA A705/l/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciation. Minute from DTOR to DCAS, Jan 24, 1944. 14 Rawlings Op cit. p. 467.

169 advised that he was unable to release 452 and 457 SQNs as "No. 1 Fighter Wing is

essential for the defence of the area". 15

One can only speculate as to the reasons behind Cole's argument for the retention of

three fighter squadrons. AAF intelligence frequently reported a sizeable presence of

Japanese aircraft based throughout the NEI but by early 1944 many of these were

being moved east to the Halmahera Islands (an island group between the Celebes and

New Guinea). From there they were either flown further east to combat the US

advance through the Pacific islands or were used against allied forces in New Guinea.

The Japanese had established a large network of airfields through the NEI and thus

were able to deploy aircraft to any part of the island chain. As AAF intelligence

reported, the construction of these airfields presented a formidable obstacle to the

allied advance as they enabled "air strength to be swung quickly from any sector to the

area of greatest danger". 16 However by early March it was reported that the principal

function of the Japanese air forces in the NEI had become "patrolling sea lanes for any

sign of surface force movements." Japanese air capabilities in the NW area were termed as "distinctly weak", and the withdrawal of aircraft "renders unlikely a renewal of such raids on any scale". 17

We now know that Japanese air raids on Darwin had ceased by this time. Intelligence speculated that the raids would not be resumed. However, the build-up of RAAF

personnel and materiel in the NW Area together with its increasing use as a base for

offensive operations could make it a tempting target for further raids. The Japanese were still flying reconnaissance sorties over northern Australia and as late as

September 1944 the Japanese flew raids against Noemfoor, Morotai and the Cocos

15 AA A705/1/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciation. Report by AOC NW Area, May 1944. · 16 AA A1966/5/49 Allied Air Force Intelligence Summary-No. 176/26 January 1944 to No. 189111 March 1944. Intelligence Summary serial No. 185. February 26, 1944. AAF intelligence reported that in the Halmalleras in February 1944 there were four existing airfields, two under construction and a further six sites were possible airfields. 17 AA A1966/5/49 Allied Air Force Intelligence Summary-No. 176126 January 1944 to No. 189111 March 1944. Intelligence Summary serial No. 188. March 8, 1944.

170 (Keeling) Islands. 18 Darwin was within range of Timor, on which were several

Japanese air fields, and which remained in Japanese hands until the end of the war.

AAF intelligence advised that the Japanese were replacing the aircraft moved east from the NEI with aircraft from bases in the north (presumably in Malaya and Indo China).

Another factor to consider was that Japanese aircraft production was still increasing during 194419 so there should have been no shortage of aircraft to deploy in the NEI using inter-island ferry routes. However, by this point in time Japan's big shortage was in trained pilots.

Furthermore, a large Japanese air raid or series of raids might have been employed to deceive the allies into thinking that northern Australia was once again under threat of invasion. Military forces being used in the allied advance in New Guinea would then have to be redeployed to the NW Area to counter the expected invasion. Therefore, as the AOC commented, air defence for the area was essential.

Regardless of such speculation the retention of the RAF squadrons in the NW Area was the subject of discussion between the Australian and UK governments. The latter questioned why the squadrons remained in Australia where they had "outlived their usefulness". The discussions continued until the end of the war without resolution.

The lack of meaningful operations and the Spitfire's mechanical problems had a bad effect on squadron personnel's morale. 20

In early 1944 Cole issued directions on the role of interceptor fighter squadrons. They were to provide: continual protection of military installations and equipment against attack; protection of sea communications and surface vessels or other aircraft within

18 AA A5954/1/416/1 Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 242. September 22, 1944. 97 raids were made on Morotai Island. 19 Estimates for navy aircraft production in January 1944 was 858 and by July it had risen to 1,068. Army aircraft production went from 505 to 735 during the same period. See AA A5954/1/416/1 Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 242. September 22, 1944 20 Powell Op cit. p. 187.

171 the area; and close tactical support to ground forces (including reconnaissance) within their range. In this latter role the fighters were expected to be capable of carrying 2x500 lb bombs. Target priorities were (on offensive patrol) the destruction of all enemy aircraft and (on escort duties) the protection offorces (which took priority over the destruction of enemy fighters)? 1

Following the departure of 452 and 457 SQNs from the NW Area to the Halmaheras,

54, 548 and 549 SQNs were formed into No. 80 Wing. As Japanese raids on Darwin and environs had ceased in November 1943, Charlesworth, upon his appointment as

AOC NW Area, was faced with morale problems within No. 80 Wing. He requested that Bostock employ the wing on active operations in another theatre or withdraw it south for a rest. This did not happen. The Spitfires were deployed in the ground attack role on two occasions before the end of the war. They remained in the NW

Area, undertaking training with aircraft that were suffering from mechanical problems.

In July 1944 approval was sought to re-equip 85 SQN, then flying Boomerangs, with

Mk V Spitfires that were becoming surplus as the existing squadrons were receiving the Mk VIII version. 22 85 SQN received Mk V Spitfires and operated them from

Pearce WA until the squadron was disbanded at the end ofthe war?3

By the start of 1945 most Spitfire squadrons were used almost solely for defensive operations and the wastage allocation was greater than requited. Therefore it was proposed to form yet another squadron. The war ended before this happened.

However, Australian production of the North American P-51 Mustang was starting and by the end of 1945 it was planned to equip three Spitfire Squadrons with P-51s. 24

21 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives & Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive No. 8/44, February 19, 1944, "Interceptor Fighters". 22 AA A705/231/9/1251 Establishment General-Heavy Bomber Squadrons Minute from D of 0, RAAF HQ to RAAF representative, Washington, July 6, 1944. 23 Wilson The Spitfire, Mustang and Kittyhawk in Australian Service. p. 30. 24 AA A705/l/501/437 Home Defence Expansion-73 Squadron Plan, Aircraft Requirements. Estimate of aircraft requirements, 1945-1946.

172 Eventually all interceptor fighter squadrons were to be re-equipped with one aircraft

type, the P-51. 25 It was planned for six RAAF Mustang squadrons, organised into two wings, to be provided for the expected invasion of Japan in late 1945 or early 1946. Each wing was to be complete with ancillary units such as base unit, repair and

servicing unit, medical unit, mobile fighter control unit and air stores park. 26 It is interesting to consider that in four years the RAAF had progressed from a Service without a fighter aircraft to being in the position to provide two fighter wings, well

equipped with 144 of the Allies' best aircraft.

In addition to the fighters, other components of Darwin's defences continued to

function until the end of the war. In addition to the chain of radar stations an observer organisation was established. This was staffed by personnel from three Services at observation posts in the NW Area. The posts were responsible for maintaining an

efficient look out and reporting "all identified hostile aeroplanes flying into or out of the Area". 27

Aircraft based in the area were frequently used to test the other defences such as anti aircraft artillery and search lights, while two Fairey Battles and a Vengeance were deployed for this task on a permanent basis. Night fighter exercises were flown which led to requests for additional searchlights in January 1943?8 To test the radar exercises were conducted including one l.n May 1944 using two low flying

25 AA A705/l/501/533 Acquisition of Heavy Bomber Aircraft from Overseas. Memorandum to Minister, October 1944. On September 7, 1945, RAAF HQ advised HQ NW Area that all Spitfires had been allotted to No. 6 Aircraft Depot (AD) for storage. HQ NW Area was to arrange delivery of the aircraft. See AA A705/9/2/445 Spitfire Aircraft allotment Policy. Message from RAAF HQ to HQ NW Area, September 7, 1945. 26 AA All96/6/15/201/285 Future Role ofAustralian Forces in the assault on Japan 1945. Minute from CAS to Secretary, Dept of Air. August 9, 1945. An interesting proposal considering the detonation of the nuclear weapons over Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. The Japanese government surrendered unconditionally on August 15. 27 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives & Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive No. 21, May 10, 1944, "Enemy Aeroplane Reporting System-NWA". 28 AA A705/l/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciation. Report by AOC NW Area, January 1, 1943. The searchlights were requested for installation at Fenton, Batchelor and Coomalie.

173 Map 7.1 RAAF Bases NW Area, 1944

130" 131 132" 133" u·

-12

14

!30" i31' 132'

Map copied from G Odgers Op cit. Beaufighters. It was found that no radar plot was received by either the RAAF or

Army. The existing radar coverage could detect aircraft flying above 500-1,000 feet

and below 30,000 feet. It could not detect aircraft flying below 500 feet. Cole

realised the opportunity for low flying aircraft to launch surprise raids and requested

20 barrage balloons to be stationed on ships in the harbour and at searchlight positions.

Their function was to force aircraft to fly higher and thus make them easier to detect. 29

Exercises with radar were beneficial to the RAAF as the Japanese, by this time, had

started to acquire radar of their own. Thus the RAAF had the chance to develop low

flying tactics as a means to avoid detection. This was put into practice in raids such as

that on Seloroe Island when the attacking aircraft approached the target at an altitude

of 50 feet.

54 Squadron RAF

The months of May, June and July 1943 were busy periods for 54 SQN, during which

several Japanese raids wer~ intercepted. 30 However, the Squadron's effectiveness was hindered due to servicing conditions. 31

On May 2, 21 "Bettys" accompanied by "Zekes" and "Hamps" dropped 40 bombs on or around Darwin airport. 54, 452 and 457 SQNs intercepted the enemy after the bombs had been dropped and the aircraft were on their outward flight. Combat took place over the sea and resulted in the destruction of two "Zekes" and the probable destruction of another. Two "Zekes", one "Hamp" and one "Betty" were claimed as damaged. The combat was broken off as the Spitfires ran short of fuel. 54 SQN lost

29 AA A1196/6/15/501/275 Protection of Darwin Area from Low Flying Aircraft Radar Coverage. Minute from Air Vice Marshal Cole to RAAF Command, June 2, 1944. 30 Alford lists Raid 54 for May 2 with 20 Japanese fighters and 21 bombers; Raid 55 for June 20 with 21 fighters and 21 bombers; Raid 56 for June 28 with 9 fighters and nine bombers; Raid 57 for June 30 with 21 fighters and 27 bombers; raid 58 for July 6 with 21 fighters and 27 bombers. Between this last date and November 12 1943 there were six raids. See Alford QQ..Ql. p. 79. 31 Rawlings Op cit. p. 134.

174 five aircraft and one was damaged. Only one of these losses was due to enemy action

the other aircraft being lost because of fuel shortages.

The Japanese continued the night raids and interception attempts were unsuccessful. On August 13, 1943 Batchelor, Hughes and Coomalie were bombed during a night

raid. There was no damage or casualty. Spitfire squadron personnel that night were

celebrating the anniversary of their arrival and only very limited interception was

poss1'bl e. 32

The role ofthe Squadron changed temporarily on April18, 1944, when, equipped with

Mk VIII Spitfires, they flew their first ground attack operations at Tepa on Babar

Island. Altogether 11 Spitfires from 54, 452 and 457 SQNs, accompanied by two

Beaufighters from 31 SQN took part in the operation. The aircraft left Darwin at first

light and landed to refuel at Bathurst Island. They approached the target area at an

altitude of 50 feet and led by a Beaufighter, strafed the village, a Japanese radio station

and huts and barges on Wetan Island. All aircraft returned safely. 33

In May 1944 a detachment of Spitfires was sent to Exmouth Gulf to cover operations

there. The rest of the Squadron waited at Darwin for the Japanese to reappear.

Unfortunately for them, Japanese aircraft were few-only one was destroyed in July.

In June 1944 the Squadron was relocated to Livingstone and remained there until

October 23 that year when they moved to Darwin. Otherwise there was little action until September, when a ground attack operation was flown, with 548 and 549 SQNs

to Seloroe Island, approximately 130 miles north of Darwin. The Spitfires were

accompanied by a B-25. The raid was directed at a Japanese camp and installations

south of Lingat. The aircraft flew the last fifty miles to the target at an altitude of fifty

32 Operations in the Darwin Area 1939-1945 in 13 SQN Association Newsletter No. 10. Sept 1987. 33 Odgers Qggt. p. 217.

175 feet to avoid detection by radar. The strafing attack was made by three flights of four

aircraft while the B-25 followed up dropping incendiary bombs. 34

There was another period of inactivity until late 1944 when a few ground attack sorties

were flown against Japanese airfields. It had been intended that 54 SQN form part of

the 1st TAF but this did not occur. The Squadron left Darwin on August 1, 1945, and

moved to Melbourne where it was disbanded on October 31, 1945.35

452 Squadron

· The combat experiences of 452 SQN were similar to the other squadrons of No. 1

Wing. Between January 1943 and January 1944 they operated Spitfire Mk Vc aircraft

from Batchelor. 36

Through April 1943 the squadron flew patrols and intercept scrambles without making

contact with Japanese aircraft. On May 2 all three Spitfire squadrons were scrambled

to intercept a raid (Raid 54) on Darwin by 18 bombers, escorted by 27 fighters. The

Spitfires caught the Japanese after they had bombed their target and were on their way

back to base, a situation which resulted in some criticism being levelled at Caldwell. 37

On this occasion the combat took place at an ever increasing distance from the

Spitfires' bases. This and the hard dog fighting stretched the Spitfires' fuel supply to

its limits. The combined Spitfire squadrons lost a total of 13 aircraft out of the 49

participating. Five were shot down, five ran out of fuel and three had engine problems.

Fallowing this action the Advisory War Council set up an inquiry into what the public

(influenced by adverse media reports) perceived to be a debacle. A result of the

34 AWM 66/15/8/1 Bombs Gone September 1944. The Spitfires fired 1,356 rounds of 20mm and 5,418 rounds of .303 ammunition. 35 Rawlings~- p. 134. 36 RAAF Museum, Darwin docs box file, Squadron Roll Call-Darwin Area 1939-1945. 37 Doyle Op cit. p. 78.

176 inquiry was a decision to fit drop tanks to the Spitfire (given the aircraft's short range was well known it is surprising that it took so long to make this decision); while dog fighting with Japanese fighters was banned. Instead the fighters would attack the

Japanese formations from above, shooting as they dived through them. This last point should have been obvious to AAF squadrons after two years in combat against highly manoeuvrable Japanese fighters. It was used by the 49th Pursuit Group in their combats over the NW Area.

This tactic was tested on June 20 (Raid 55) when 25 bombers and 21 fighters were intercepted by 46 Spitfires. The result was that 14 Japanese aircraft were destroyed and a further ten damaged. No. 1 Fighter Wing's lost two Spitfires while another was damaged. 38

Three weeks later on July 6 a Japanese bomber and a fighter were shot down during a raid on Fenton. On this occasion 452 SQN suffered no loss. On July 18 a "Dinah" reconnaissance aircraft was shot down south-west of Point Stuart. 39 Interceptions against Japanese aircraft continued spasmodically for the remainder of the year, while long periods were spent on the ground, in training or flying patrols. In that time a small number of Japanese aircraft were destroyed including two bombers on the night ofNovember 11. The squadron's first Spitfire Mk: VIlis were received on January 11, 1944.

On March 8, 1944 the squadron was deployed to Perth as part of a move to counter a

Japanese invasion threat spurred by the arrival of Japanese aircraft carriers in Singapore. 40 The two day flight was via Wyndham, Derby, Port Hedland and

Carnarvon. Two aircraft were damaged in accidents during the trip. The invasion did not materialise and the squadron was ordered back to Strauss on March 24.

38 Wilson The Spitfire, Mustang and Kittyhawk in Australian Service. pp. 36-37. 39 RAAF Museum, 452 SQN file, BriefHistory-No. 452 Squadron. 40 Odgers Op cit. p. 215.

177 On May 12 both 452 and 457 SQNs moved to Sattler. One month later Spitfires

destroyed a "Dinah" off Port Blaze but lost one of their own number in the engagement due to an engine failure. Following the arrival of 548 and 549 SQNs in

June 1944 the Australian manned Spitfire squadrons were transferred from No. 1

Fighter Wing to the newly formed No. 80 Fighter Wing, under the command of Wing

Commander Caldwell. 41

Two advance parties of squadron personnel left Darwin on December 9 and 10 aboard

Douglas C-4 7 transports for Morotai Island. The Spitfires followed on December 16, via Gove and Merauke. (On this date the squadron became part of the RAAF's 1st

42 Tactical Air Force. ) Their flight was delayed because of bad weather and they did

not reach their destination until December 25. Operations were flown from Morotai

until the squadron moved to Tarakan. The next move was to Balikpapan where they

operated until the Japanese surrender. The final move was back to Tarakan where 452

SQN was disbanded on November 17, 1945.

457 Squadron

The squadron's operations record book comments that at the start of August 1943

"Events in the Solomons are causing an off period in this area, and possibilities of mass raids over Darwin appear slight". 43 For the pilots the long periods in the dispersal hut were filled in with playing various games of chance, reading, writing, arguing or listening to periodic lectures by the Intelligence Officer. After stand down the squadron engaged in flying tactics such as formation flying, aerobatics, dog fighting and camera gun and shadow shooting. In addition to waiting for Japanese aircraft the

41 ibid. 42 Rawlings QQ...gtt. p. 444. 43 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 86. 457 Squadron Operations Record Book.

178 pilots also flew army co-operation exercises, practiced air firing and flew simulated

attacks on Hudsons. It was noted that "Evenings are difficult to fill in after a day of

waiting for something to happen, and pilots are faced with the prospect of doing the

same thing which they did during the day, and are unable to travel any distance,

visiting other squadrons because of transport shortages". 44 The local cinema was well

patronised by off duty squadron personnel as was the nearby Service's canteen which

had billiard tables.

The squadron went into action again on August 8 when a "Lily" was intercepted and

, claimed as damaged. Three "Dinahs" were destroyed by the squadron's Spitfires on

August 17. One was shot down over Fenton by Squadron Leader K James: another

over Anson Bay by Flight Lieutenant J Watson; and a third over Bathurst Island by

FSGTs R Jenkins and R Watson. 45

Combat came again on September 7 when a formation of Japanese aircraft were intercepted in the vicinity ofBerry Springs. 457 SQN claimed four "Zekes" destroyed,

one probably destroyed and two damaged without a loss to the squadron. However

this was the only action for September and at the end of that month the operations

record book notes September was a dull month with the pilots tired of doing nothing. 46

Some relieffrom the boredom was provided for the airmen. On September 11 the first group from the squadron was sent to the Berrimah rest camp for 48 hours rest and

recreation which included spending days at the beach and attending the cinema at

night.

Two Spitfires were sent, for a month, to Millingimbi as part of a rotation detachment

alternated with 452 SQN. A further detachment, shared with 54 SQN was sent to

44 ibid. 45 Another "Dinah" was shot down on the same day by Wing Commander CR Caldwell. This was to be the final of his 28\12 confirmed victories. 46 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 86. 457 Squadron Operations Record Book.

179 Drysdale Mission while the remainder of the squadron flew army co-operation exercises (which included strafing "invading" armies) and practiced night flying. Cine­ gun combat exercises were flown with B-24s and B-25s; however, a problem was noted in that the film emulsion stuck in the magazines due to excessive humidity. Despite these problems camera gun shooting was found to be a valuable training aid with pilots tending to close in on "enemy" aircraft before "firing". On November 3 squadron aircraft began patrolling for Japanese reconnaissance aircraft in the vicinity of

Drysdale mission and three days later a "Dinah" was intercepted and claimed as damaged. On the night of November 12, a Spitfire flown by Flying Officer J Smithson shot down two "Bettys" over Darwin.

In early November it was noted that "readiness" was a term interpreted as

"monotonous hours waiting for nothing". 47 The impression is gained from various accounts that the Spitfire squadrons' personnel were stationed in Darwin for years with little or nothing worthwhile to do. However, this in fact does not appear to be the case for 457 SQN. Most squadron personnel were posted in and out of the squadron while it remained in Darwin. The operations record book noted in January

1944 on the posting out of personnel "these departures leave us with only four of the older members of the squadron who have been with it for longer than eight months."

One problem that 457 SQN, along with the other Spitfire units, encountered was landing accidents. Between August and December 1943, three aircraft were lost in this manner, while in February 1944 there were six accidents which attracted the comment

"Our accident incidence has been higher than usual. 48

The squadron moved to Sattler in January 1944 for ten days of ground attack practice and army co-operation exercises. In the meantime, for amusement, transport was

47 ibid. 48 !....!.._."b"d

180 arranged to take personnel to the All Services Canteen five miles south of Livingstone

on Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays. The canteen supplied a change to the diet and

provided various forms of entertainment. Movies were screened at Hughes and

Noonamah on Friday and Saturday nights.

In February Squadron Leader TH Trimble took over as CO and in March squadron

personnel and their aircraft became involved in two operations that took them away

from Livingstone. On March 1, orders were given for three pilots to ferry Spitfires

. from the Wing's reserve pool to Port Moresby. 49 These aircraft were to be handed

over to 79 SQN. Due to poor weather conditions the aircraft did not leave until

March 8, escorted by a Beaufort from 2 SQN. The flight was via Gove, where four

aircraft had to be repaired before they could continue on the next part of the flight to

Horn Island. At Horn Island one Spitfire was grounded due to mechanical problems.

They reached Ward air strip in New Guinea on March 9. The pilots were then transported to Townsville aboard a USAAF C-47.

In the meantime there was thought to be a Japanese task force moving towards Perth.

The remainder of the squadron was mobilised with thirteen Spitfires flying to Derby where they met up with the three aircraft from Drysdale Mission. One aircraft was

damaged in an accident on take off from Derby. The aircraft then flew to Carnarvon via Port Hedland. Ground personnel followed in the eight C-47s allocated by the

USAAF. At Carnavon two aircraft had magneto problems including the CO's aircraft.

When he radioed the rest of the squadron that he was unable to take off most did not receive the message as their radios were unserviceable.

The pilots from the New Guinea flight found themselves stranded in Townsville and were unable to find transport back to Darwin until March 15. On their arrival at

Livingstone they were. sent to Corruna Downs to provide fighter escort for the B-24s

49 Three pilots also came from 54 SQN and four from 452 SQN.

181 at that base. One Spitfire crashed at Wyndam on the way to Corruna Downs. The two remaining aircraft returned to Livingstone on March 20 via Exmouth where one had to have a glycol leak repaired.

The Japanese task force did not attack Perth and squadron personnel generally enjoyed their time while based at Guildford airfield. One activity in Perth was a fly past with 85 SQN and Vengeance and Beaufort squadrons. The operations record book noted that the fly past was to impress Perth residents who would be exhorted to invest in the

Victory Loan and added "Our imagination boggles at the thought of the cost of bringing these aeroplanes to Perth compared with the amount their propaganda value will raise in the loan". 50

The squadron returned to Livingstone, less six aircraft (three had suffered damage on the flight to Perth and three had been left at Guildford with mechanical problems). The next month was spent on training exercises, with an attack on Bandar Island being the only break from this routine. On April 18 1944, four Spitfires from 457 SQN accompanied aircraft from 54 and 452 SQNs and two Beaufighters on a strafing attack on a Japanese radio station on Bandar Island. Two of 457 SQN's aircraft were unserviceable by the time they reached the newly constructed airfield on Bathurst

Island. The remaining two continued with the attacking group. 51 The raid was led by

Group Captain Jeffery and it was the first attack on a ground target conducted by

Darwin based Spitfires. 52

During May the Spitfires were deployed to a secret location known as "Boarshead" and on July 2 1944 the first of the Spitfire Mk VIlis arrived in the NW Area. The squadron spent the remainder of 1944 undertaking activities similar to the other Spitfire squadrons with their new aircraft.

50 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 86. 457 Squadron Operations Record Book. 51 ibid. 52 Odgers~. p. 217.

182 On January 14, 1945 the squadron received notification of its move to Morotai Island.

The first squadron members to depart were a ground crew party who left that month

by sea. Following their departure the pilots assisted the remaining ground crew in their

tasks of maintaining and polishing the aircraft. The remainder of the squadron

departed in February. Personnel and equipment were flown to Morotai Island aboard

15 C-4 7 transports, the large items of equipment were transported by sea while the

Spitfires flew to their new base via Gove, Merauke and Noemfoor. 53

, 548 Squadron RAF

This squadron was formed at Lawton, Queensland, on December 15, 1943, and was

commanded by Flying Officer FJ Todd initially and then by Squadron Leader WH

4 Wright. 5 It moved to Strathpine in January 1944 to begin training. However the first

aircraft-a Tiger Moth and a Wirraway-did not arrive until February 5. These

aircraft were flown continuously until the first Spitfire Mk VIlis arrived on April 6.

Flying training continued as the full establishment of Spitfires (24 aircraft) was

delivered. In May orders were received to transfer the squadron to Darwin. At the

same time instructions were issued for the removal of camouflage paint from the

aircraft and consequently ground and air crew spent many days cleaning Spitfires. 55

The 24 Spitfires, in two groups of 12 aircraft, escorted by Beauforts, left Amberley on

June 10 and flew to Darwin via Townsville, Cloncurry and Gorrie. Four aircraft were

destroyed on the flight and the remainder reached Livingstone on June 16. Other

53 A WM 64 Roll 86, History Sheets A50. 457 SQN. 54 Squadron Leader Wright died when his Spitfire collided with another on April 19, 1944. Flight Lieutenant Watts acted as CO until his permanent appointment to the position in . 55 RAAF Museum, RAF squadrons file. ED Plenty A Brief History of No. 548 (RAF) Squadron in Northern Territory.

183 squadron personnel travelled to Townsville by rail and then boarded a ship to Darwin.

On arrival, orders were given by HQ NW Area to re-camouflage the aircraft. 56

By June 30 the squadron strength was 23 officers, 31 senior NCOs, 258 airmen and 19

Spitfires. As noted earlier, 548 SQN was manned by RAF pilots and RAAF ground

crew. On July 1, in the company of other fighter squadrons in the NW Area, 548 SQN

participated in a mass fly past of all operational airfields around Darwin. Training,

consisting of practice scrambles, air to ground gunnery, formation flying and fighter

tactics was flown for the remainder of the month. At the end of August four Spitfires

were deployed to Truscott to take over from a detachment from 549 SQN. 57

The first combat operation took place on September 4 when four Spitfires each from

54, 548 and 549 SQNs flew strafing attacks on the Japanese camp on Seloroe Island.

The remainder of the month was taken up with a small number of scrambles which

turned out to be against friendly aircraft, training flights (day and night) and changes to

the deployments to Truscott.

On October 22 the squadron moved to Darwin civil air field. The period up until

Christmas 1944 was taken up with local flying. All aircraft were then grounded for the

first three months of 1945 for repairs to the glycol cooling system pipes and the fuel

systems. While this occurred some of the pilots assisted with ferrying Mk V Spitfires

56 At a conference with CAS in June 1944 Cole recommended that camouflage schemes be the responsibility of each AOC. CAS disagreed and said there would be no change to existing policy. He added that suggestions to camouflage schemes be submitted to RAAF HQ "in the normal way". In the meantime various instructions had been issued on the subject. It appears there were opinions between areas on how aircraft should be prepared. See AA A705/12/501/301 CAS Conferences. Air Officers Commanding. Minutes of CAS Conference June 20, 1944; G Pentland RAAF Camouflage & Markings 1939-45 Vol 2. Chapters 2 and 3; and Air Force HQ Technical Order Camouflage Schemes and Identification Markings. May 26, 1944. In hindsight the painting of aircraft at this point of the war seems pointless. Despite reconnaissance flights, it had been over six months since the last Japanese bombing raid and therefore there was little need to disguise the aircraft. Furthermore the USAAF had ceased to camouflage aircraft and gained better performance from them without the added weight of paint. 57 RAAF Museum, RAF squadrons file. ED Plenty A Brief History of No. 548 (RAF) Squadron in Northern Territory.

184 from Darwin to storage at Oakey near Brisbane. 58 By March the engine problems had apparently been cured but morale had suffered. 59

548, together with 549 and 54 SQNs now formed No. 1 Fighter Wing. Their deployment to the NW Area meant that the Australian manned 452 and 457 SQNs could be transferred to Morotai Island to join the allied advance, while Darwin theoretically retained adequate fighter defence. How adequate it was is of course open to debate given the poor condition of the aircraft.

The remaining flying time during the first half of 1945 was spent in deployments to

Truscott, search and training flights and infrequent interceptions (which turned out to be friendly aircraft). However, by April the squadron had fallen below operational standard and was not operational again until the following month. 60 On June 3 six

Spitfires took part in a strafing attack on the Japanese air field at Cape Chater on

Timor. 61 This provided a boost for morale but the offensive activities were not sustained and no other operation was flown before the war's end. Local flying continued for a few months after the Japanese surrender until October 31, when 548

SQN was disbanded in Darwin and its aircraft were ferried to Oakey.

549 Squadron RAF

The formation and deployment of 549 SQN in Australia was .similar to that of 548

SQN. It was formed at Lawton on December 15, 1943 with Squadron Leader EP

Bocock as CO. At the time of its formation, squadron strength was 17 officers and eight airmen from the RAF and two officers and 245 airmen from the RAAF. During the next three months the personnel assisted with the assembly of Spitfires and other equipment from the UK.

58 ibid. 59 Rawlings QQ.Q!. p. 467. 60 ibid. p. 467. 61 The Spitfires were accompanied by B-24s, B-25s and a Catalina SAR aircraft.

185 During May and June the squadron moved to Strauss. The majority of personnel were transported by rail and road, while the equipment (except for the Spitfires) went by sea. The first operational flight was made on July 16 when four Spitfires were scrambled against a radar plot that turned out to be an allied aircraft. 62

Detachments from the squadron were deployed to Truscott during August. Eleven

Spitfires were scrambled on August 21 against a radar plot that was, once again, an allied aircraft. The first offensive mission was flown on September 5 when five aircraft strafed Japanese positions near Lingat in the Tanimbar Islands.

On October 23 the squadron moved to Darwin civil airport. The next month three aircraft were lost while flying to Truscott. The second offensive mission was flown on

November 27 when Spitfires escorted B-25s on a raid on two radar stations63 near

Cape Lore on Timor. The fighters strafed the targets before the B-25s commenced their bombing. 64 Due to the Spitfires short range, refuelling had to be undertaken at

Austin on both the outbound and return flights. Like 548 SQN, mechanical problems were experienced with the aircraft in early 1945 and the next operation was not flown until the June 3 raid on Cape Charter. 65 Two interceptions flown from Truscott without result during July were the last operational flights. 549 SQN was disbanded at

Darwin on October 31, 1945.

83 Squadron

This squadron was formed at Strathpine, Queensland on February 26, 1943, under the command of Squadron Leader WJ Meehan and under the control of Eastern Area. Its

62 RAAF Museum, RAF squadrons file. ED Plenty A Brief History of No. 549 (RAF) Squadron in Northern Territory. 63 The radar stations were seen as important targets because not only did they serve to warn of raids on the bases where they were located, they could also track Catalinas flying past on their mine laying missions. 64 Rawlings .QQ.m. p. 467. 65 RAAF Museum, RAF squadrons file. ED Plenty A Brief History of No. 549 (RAF) Squadron in Northern Territory.

186 task was the interception of unidentified and hostile aircraft, surface vessels and submarines. 66 Its first aircraft were six Bell P-39 Airacobra fighters and a Moth Minor.

These were replaced by Wirraways and then by the Australian designed CAC

Boomerang. From Strathpine the squadron flew routine patrols and the occasional interception (which invariably turned out to be friendly aircraft). 67

In late 1943 the squadron, now under the command of Squadron Leader R Goon,

started to move to Millingimbi. The advance party departed in November and the first

aircraft were sent to the new base in December. In the meantime flying continued from

Strathpine up until February 1944. 83 SQN was to be the only Boomerang equipped

fighter squadron in the NW Area. However, operations were limited due to technical

problems and six aircraft were finally flying shipping patrols in December that year. 68

When the Boomerangs arrived in the NW Area it was proposed to fit them with racks

to carry 1OOlb anti submarine bombs. The Air Board ordered this modification be

discontinued as it was not an Air Staff requirement. 69

The first interception scramble was flown on December 20 when five Boomerangs

were sent to search for hostile aircraft over a convoy. No enemy aircraft was sighted. 70 Later that month two Boomerangs participated in a search for Squadron Leader Fenton's aircraft.

During January 1944 the squadron flew convoy escort patrols· and training sorties as well as the occasional interception which usually turned out to be friendly. The

convoy patrols were a form of continual fighter cover over the shipping that lasted for the duration of the Boomerang's range. This meant two aircraft from Millingimbi

66 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 59. 83 Squadron Record Book. 67 RAAF Museum, 83 Squadron file. 83 Squadron. 68 Odgers QQ..Q1. p. 117. 69 AWM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Letter from AMEM to AOC NW Area; December 21, 1943. 70 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 59. 83 Squadron Record Book.

187 rendezvoused with the convoy and covered it until they were replaced by two others.

Up to six pairs ofBoomerangs were often deployed for this task and occasionally they were joined by aircraft from other squadrons such as Beauforts.71 These escort flights could be hampered by bad weather or the failure of the aircraft to find the convoy.

On February 1, 1944 the remainder of the squadron left Queensland and flew to Gove, via Longreach, Cloncurry and Groote Eylandt. Equipment and supplies were transported by sea to Melville Bay, (where they were unloaded with the assistance of squadron personnel) while some of the ground crew were transported by DC-3. For the remainder of its time in the NW Area the squadron flew from both Gove and

Millingimbi. Aircraft were also flown between the two bases so that convoy patrols could be flown to the maximum extent of the Boomerang's range.

The main roles of the squadron, as directed by Cole, were to provide protection of sea communications and the escort of surface vessels; to protect military installations; and to provide close tactical support to ground forces. 72 Thus operations were usually interceptions, training and convoy patrols. Occasionally searches were flown-a lost

84 SQN P-40 in March and Squadron Leader Fenton was missing again in June 1944.

Boomerangs also assisted other defence units such as radar and anti aircraft artillery located close to the squadron's bases. On May 8 the squadron was sent to intercept an aircraft suspected to be a "Dinah". Unfortunately it was not sighted.

During the time in the NW Area the Boomerangs did not engage in combat with

Japanese aircraft nor did they fly any attack sortie. During a typical month in the area

(June 1944) the squadron flew 14 continual convoy patrols, was scrambled for interceptions seven times and flew 23 training sorties. The patrols and interceptions

71 It was planned that eight Boomerangs would be used, in pairs, to cover a convoy for six hours. See AWM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; .January 1, 1944. 72 AA A1196/6/60/50 1/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 8/44, February 19, 1944, "Interceptor Fighters."

188 were flown by Boomerangs while the training was with Boomerangs and Wirraways. 73

Flying time for the month totalled 530 hours for the Boomerangs and 14 hours for the

Wirraways.

On August 16, 1944 instructions to move from Gove to Camden, NSW were issued

and on August 18 the squadron became non-operational in the NW Area. 74

The Attack/Intruder Squadron

The intruder aircraft used by the RAAF in the NW Area and the NEI were the Douglas

A-20 Boston, the and the de Havilland DH-98 Mosquito. It was planned to deploy other types had the war continued beyond August 1945.

The Mosquito was built in Australia and it was proposed to re-equip some Beaufighter and Spitfire squadrons with the aircraft. Between April and August 1945 it was planned to re-equip 1, 93, and 94 SQNs with Mosquitoes. The RAAF was to then have two attack wings-No. 86 (Mosquito) comprising these three squadrons and No.

77 (Beaufighter) comprising 22, 30 and 31 SQNs with 92 SQN added after its formation in May 1945. 75 Mosquito production was to be 370 aircraft (at a total cost of £15,462,615) and eventually six of the seven attack squadrons were to be equipped with them. 76 No 86 Wing joined the 1st TAF with only one Mosquito squadron (1

SQN) but undertook very little operational flying before August 15, 1945.

The Air Board had also canvassed the possibility of procuring the Douglas A-26

Invader. This proposal was rejected because the aircraft did not come up to

73 The squadron's establishment was 24 Boomerangs and two Wirraways. 74 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 59. 83 Squadron Record Book. 75 On July 20, 1945, the DCAS acting on Cabinet instructions for the reduction in the number of required units, ordered that the action on the formation of 92 SQN be delayed with a view to disbanding. 76 AA A705/1/501/555 Attack Squadrons-Formation and Re-arming, Estimates of Squadron establishments and requirements.

189 expectations in its initial tests and also because production would be insufficient to

allow for the supply of aircraft to the RAAF. 77

For the intruder squadrons, experience in combat led to the adoption of certain tactics,

together with local modifications of aircraft. For example, during May and June 1943

the AOC NW Area noted that Beaufighters had gained considerable success by relying

on surprise when attacking aircraft on the ground. Unfortunately on each raid flown

during that time period, the Beaufighters had been intercepted by Japanese fighters. In

order to minimise losses some aircraft had been fitted with a rear firing machine gun. 78

Despite the additional defensive weapons, Bladin recognised that such combat could

result in a drop in air crew morale as well as unacceptable losses of aircraft. He thus

requested RAAF Command to provide a squadron of Lockheed P-38s to escort such

raids. Escorts, if they were available would also assist the Hudson and Mitchell

squadrons, because at that time they could not operate in the vicinity of Japanese air

fields without the risk of serious losses.79 RAAF Command replied that it was out of

the question to provide P-38s at that time. They added that the losses ofBeaufighters

had been light and the aircraft should be used on low level attacks on targets of

considerable value, away from airfields heavily defended by Zeros. 80 Unfortunately, if

an aircraft was shot down on a low level attack the crew had little chance of survival. 81

31 Squadron

31 SQN continued their attacks on Japanese airfields for the remainder of 1943. On

June 12 seven float planes were destroyed at Taberfane while two "Bettys" were

77 AA A705/1/501/533 Acquisition of Heavy Bomber Aircraft from Overseas, Telex from AUSAIR Washington to Air Board Melbourne. 78 Aircrews encountered problems with this weapon however, as it could not be aimed properly, firing it was liable to cause damage to the Beau:fighter's own tail fin and rudder. · 79 AA A705/1/501/471 Air Staff Requirements-Operational Aircraft, Minute from AOC NW Area to RAAF Command; June 1943. 80 AA A705/1/501/471 .Air Staff Requirements-Operational Aircraft, Minute from RAAF Command to AOC NW Area; June 18, 1943. 81 RAAFMuseum, 31 SQN:file. 31 Squadron.

190 destroyed at Selaru Island 11 days later. Concentrated attacks were made on

Taberfane during late August with the aim of completely destroying this threat to allied shipping. Four float planes were destroyed on August 17; two on August 21 (two Beaufighters were lost on this raid when they collided in mid air); two on August 26; and one on August 30 (another Beaufighter was lost on that raid). 82 Raids on other bases to the north-east of Darwin continued through September and October with aircraft using Millingimbi as a refuelling point. Three Japanese aircraft (one "Sally" and two "Nicks") were destroyed in an attack on Selaru on October 9 and on

November 21 Beaufighters claimed a Japanese ship as sunk and shot down two float planes. By the end of 194 3 31 SQN had flown 1, 13 7 sorties and destroyed 18 aircraft in the air and 49 on the ground (or on the water)83 while numerous vessels had been damaged or destroyed. The cost to the squadron had been the loss of 17 Beaufighters.

The squadron began improvising with armament from September 1943 when four aircraft were modified to carry bombs. The bombs were usually carried on shipping patrols and techniques for their delivery were devised. In December 1943 experiments to fit 300lb bomb racks from B-25s onto Beaufighters were conducted. The modifications did not gain the approval of the Air Member for Engineering and Maintenance (AMEM):

It will be seen that there is danger of considerable wasted effort if Operational Units initiate modification action which is already covered by Air Force Head-Quarters. Such action is, therefore, to be discouraged in order that maximum efficiency and effort may be obtained. 84

There have been several examples of local modifications to combat aircraft noted in this thesis. Some were opposed by higher authorities. The possibility of structural damage to the aircraft was a consideration and it was the Air Board's responsibility to

82 RAAF Museum, 31 SQN file. BriefHistory-No. 31 Squadron. 83 RAAFMuseum, 31 SQN:fi1e. 31 Squadron. 84 AWM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Minute from AMEMto AOC NW Area; December 21, 1943.

191 maintain their assets in flying condition without the possibility of accidents or danger to the crew. (In this case it should be borne in mind that Beaufighters were modified elsewhere to carry a 250lb bomb under each wing.) At the same time it might be wondered whether modifications were opposed because the Air Board, remote from the action, was unaware of the day to day operational conditions in the NW Area and thus could not see their need. Regardless of the directive the Beaufighters used bombs in an attack on a Japanese convoy in the Timor Sea in December 1943. The convoy was strafed and bombed and several vessels were damaged including a 3, 000 ton troopship the Genmei Maru. 85 It also appears that AMEM's advice was not totally followed because in January 1944 Cole advised that information from India, based on combat experience, had been used to fit two 250 lb bomb racks to 31 SQN

Beaufighters. 86

31 SQN started 1944 with a raid on Timor on January 4, during which a "Betty" was shot down. As was the case with many other NW Area based squadrons, raids and patrols were flown at this time of the year when weather permitted. A detachment of Beaufighters was sent to Pot Shot (near Learmonth) on February 21 and flew shipping patrols from that base. The Learmonth detachment was increased, for two weeks, by 14 aircraft (accompanied by 124 personnel-who were transported in nine C-47s) on

March 9. 87 The deployment was in response to the presence of a large Japanese naval force in the Indian Ocean which prompted fears of an invasion of Western Australia. 88

Attacks on Timor continued throughout April 1944. On one sortie on April 6 a

Beaufighter crash landed on Cartier Island. The crew were rescued by a Catalina and the damaged aircraft was destroyed by gun fire from the PBY's turrets. Another ofthe squadron's aircraft was shot down by AAA fire over Timor on April 15. During May

85 S Wilson Beaufort. Beau:fighter and Mosquito in Australian Service. p. 121. 86 AA A705/l/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciations. Report from AOC NW Area, January 1, 1944. 87 RAAFMuseum, 31 SQNfile. Erie/History-No. 31 Squadron. 88 S Wilson Beaufort. Beau:fighter and Mosquito in Australian Service. p. 121.

192 escorts were flown for B-25s and Catalinas engaged in offensive operations.

Operations were flown on an almost daily basis during June and July. During the latter

month 31 SQN destroyed three "Nicks" and one "Topsy". During September the

Beaufighters again flew as escorts for Catalinas over the Arafura Sea. 31 SQN lost

two aircraft on one such mission on the night of September 24. On this occasion the

aircraft had completed the escort, refuelled at Millingimbi and were returning, in very

bad weather, to Coomalie Creek. The radio DF equipment in both aircraft was not

working and they were unable to find their base. Both crews parachuted from the

aircraft. Wreckage of both aircraft was discovered later but only one crew member was found alive. 89

In August 1944 the firepower of the Beaufighters was increased with the installation of four rocket launching rails beneath each wing. On September 20 the squadron received its first Australian built Beaufighter Mk 21 s and within a month these aircraft had replaced their British built counterparts. To supplement 31 SQN, Cole requested

30 SQN, also equipped with Beaufighters be transferred from New Guinea to the NW

Area. 90 This did not eventuate and 31 SQN remained the only Beaufighter equipped squadron within the NW Area. By November 1944 its time in the NW Area was at an end. 31 SQN received orders to deploy to Noemfoor where it remained until January

7, 1945 when it moved to Morotai Island as part of the 1st TAF. The squadron ended its time in the NW Area with an impressive record of destruction inflicted on the

Japanese including 58 vessels destroyed, 61 aircraft destroyed on the ground and 22 in air-to-air comb~t and 47 motor vehicles destroyed. 91

89 RAAFMuseum, 31 SQN:file. BriefHistory-No. 31 Squadron .. 90 Odgers Qn.m. p. 233. 91 Powell Qn.m. p. 154.

193 Chapter 8. Seaplanes on the Attack

The Catalina Squadrons

The Air Power Manual notes that one of the RAAF' s most valuable contributions to

the Pacific war was its mine laying operations, flown by 11, 20 and 43 SQNs between

April 1943 and July 1945. These squadrons operated closer to Japan than any other

RAAF aircraft, and cost the enemy thousands of tonnes of shipping and helped in

dislocating its. vital sea lines of communication. Furthermore, the mine laying was

. undertaken entirely on the initiative of RAAF Command. 1

The RAAF's first SWPA based Long-Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) unit was 11

SQN which, owing to the non availability of more suitable aircraft, was equipped with

two flying boats (taken over from Qantas) and two Seagull amphibians.

As Sunderlands were not available for LRMP work, the RAAF in June 1940 ordered

Consolidated Catalinas from the US. Delivery commenced in January 1941, with

crews from Consolidated flying the aircraft to Honolulu where Qantas crews took over

and ferried them to Australia.2 Under the 73 squadron plan it was decided to equip

five squadrons with Catalinas. 3 Regardless of the planning, the RAAF received 168

Catalinas ofvarious different versions. 4 The aircraft remained in service until1952.

Catalinas were operated from Darwin in early 1942 by the USN's No. 10,

until the February 19 raid caused the Wing and its damaged tender USS William B

Preston to be withdrawn south along the Western Australian Coast. The aircraft type

was not stationed permanently in Darwin while the air raids continued. 5

1 AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual. (2nd Edition) APSC, Canberra, 1994. p. 191. 2 R Creed PIN The Catalina Flying Boat. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1985. · pp. 262- 263 3 AA All96/36/501/312 Amended 73 Squadron Plan. Telegram from D of 0 to Overseas HQ London, May 27, 1942. 4 Gillett Op cit. p. 104. 5 Powell Op cit. p. 173. As Darwin was within the range of Japanese aircraft, Patrol Wing 10's aircraft were sent to Broome, then considered a safe haven. On March 3, 1942 Japanese aircraft attacked the town and destroyed three of the Wing's aircraft. The remaining three aircraft flew

194 In the NW Area, the type was operated by 20 and 43 SQNs from Darwin6 and by 42

SQN from Melville Bay. 7 They flew bombing, mining and Search and Rescue (SAR)

flights. The three squadrons, together with headquarters, maintenance and support units comprised No. 76 Wing. 20 SQN was formed at Port Moresby on August 1,

1941, and flew operations in the North-Eastern Area until September 13, 1944, when it was transferred to East Arm on Darwin Harbour.

Before this 11 and 20 SQNs had occasionally sent single or small groups of aircraft into the NW Area for special missions. For example, on August 18, 1942, a Cairns based Catalina was staged through Darwin to take supplies to the commandos on Timor and to fly back the wounded. Later that month a Catalina located a missing 77

SQN Kittyhawk at Anson Bay. In December that year 11 SQN sent aircraft to search for survivors from the HMAS Armidale. On April 10, 1943 two Catalinas staged through Groote Eylandt to undertake their first bombing mission in the NW Area. The target was Babo. In June 11 and 20 SQNs flew four similar missions to Babo and

Laha. 8 These latter raids were to support General Kenney's plan to launch bombing strikes from the NW Area to convince the Japanese that an allied offensive would be staged through the NEI. 9

Throughout the remainder of 1944, under the command of Squadron Leader A Weame, 20 SQN flew bombing, reconnaissance, SAR, mining and special missions.

The mining operations increased during 1945. The special missions were usually to insert or extract agents or parties operating behind enemy lines. 10

south and :finillly set up base at Crawley Bay on the Swan River in Perth. It was from there, on April27, that two of the Wing's Catalin:;ts undertook a seven day evacuation flight to Corregidor. See ALeebold Silent Victory. Banner Books, Belconnen, ACT, 1995. pp. 35-39. 6 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file; Squadron Roll Call-Darwin Area 1939-1945. 7 P Fooks (ed) With the Catalinas at Melville Bay. Yirrkala Community School, Nhulunbuy, NT, 1992. 8 Powell Opcit. p. 174: 9 Odgers Op cit. p. 57. 10 RAAFMuseum, 20 SQNboxfile;A BriefHistoryofNo. 20Squadron.

195 42 SQN was formed at Darwin on June 1, 1944, with Wing Commander Costello as CO. The unit moved to Melville Bay, near Gove, the following month. By mid August the squadron had received eight aircraft and their crews 11 and by the end of

that month squadron strength was 52 officers and 263 airmen. The first operation was

flown on August 27 when three aircraft carried out a shipping sweep to Ambon and

then flew on to bomb Dili. 12

As with the other Catalina squadrons, 42 SQN's heaviest task was the mining of enemy

held harbours and sea lanes. This task increased significantly in 1945. In addition,

night bombing harassing raids were carried out on many targets. These raids usually

involved an aircraft arriving over the target about midnight and dropping one bomb

every 20 or 30 minutes thus ensuring the Japanese never had the chance to leave their

slit trenches or bomb shelters all night. Leaflets were dropped in conjunction with

these raids.

The third NW Area based Catalina unit, 43 SQN, was formed at Bowen on May 1, 1943 as a general reconnaissance squadron and was initially commanded by Flight Lieutenant C Thompson. As was the case with similarly equipped units, 43 SQN was

engaged in a variety of tasks including maritime reconnaissance, anti shipping strikes, bombing, SAR and mining. 13 With a range of 2,535 miles the Catalina was a highly

suitable aircraft for many of these operations conducted over great distances for

sustained periods of time

In June 1943 the squadron moved to Karumba and on the night of September 8 the first mission was flown. Four Catalinas were sent to bomb Ambon. After staging through Groote Eylandt, three aircraft bombed the designated target while the fourth

11 RAAF Catalinas usually operated with a crew of nine, comprising two pilots, two flight engineers, two wireless air gunners, one navigator, one rigger and one armourer. 12 RAAF Museum, 42 SQNbox:file;A BriefHistory ofNo. 42 Squadron. 13 RAAF Museum, 43 SQN box file; 43 Squadron.

196 bombed Langgoer. Five nights later, three aircraft flew to bomb Babo and despite

heavy anti aircraft fire one Catalina dropped its bombs on the target while a second bombed Langgoer. The squadron flew another two raids on targets in the NEI during that month and a further five in October. These raids were by three or four aircraft.

The bomb capacity of each aircraft was 3,000 lbs carried externally under the main

14 plane and could be made up of 500 lb general purpose or 30 lb incendiary bombs. .

On some raids 20 lb fragmentation bombs were carried inside the aircraft and were thrown out over the target by aircrew.

During October and November 43 SQN also joined with 11 and 20 SQNs to fly

bombing missions over Kavieng on Timor. For these missions the aircraft again staged through Groote Eylandt. In addition to these raids, other bombing missions were flown to New Ireland and New Britain. 15

In November 1943 the bombing raids from the NW Area increased with ten operations flown against targets in the NEI. Again, these were flown by three or four aircraft. 43

SQN records note that the raids usually resulted in fires and explosions while the targets were described as fuel or ammunition dumps, stores, piers or barracks. The time flown to carry out some of the raids occasionally exceeded 25 hours. In that same month Cabinet approved the construction of a flying boat base at East Arm. The estimated cost was £142,400. 16

Bombing by Catalinas continued through 1944 with targets including Saumlaki,

Kairato, Lautem and Dili. Tactics were developed for Catalina bombing operations.

Because oftheir slow speed and poor defensive armament (five or six machine guns) the operations were scheduled to fly over Japanese held territory at night when there was less chance of interception. There was no formation flying; each aircraft left the

14 RHS. Precis History ofNo. 43 (G.R.F.B.) SQDN May 1990. 15 RHS. Annex H to AF 192/8/197 43 Squadron. April22, 1980. 16 AA A5954/40/809/2 Cabinet minute 3173; November 24, 1943.

197 base at a specified time and was allotted a different bombing height between 6,000 and

10,000 feet at 500 feet intervals to minimise the risk of collision over the target. 17

Catalinas were also used in the SWP A for torpedo attacks. In the NW Area this type

of attack occurred once-on June 25, 1944 four aircraft were sent to attack shipping

at Bima Bay on Soembawa Island, 900 miles from Darwin. Three aircraft reached the

target area at night. One attempted an attack on a 4,000 ton vessel with two

torpedoes. The aircraft was hit by Japanese AAA fire and the torpedoes failed to hit

their target. Another Catalina dropped bombs on other vessels while the third bombed

. Bima town. 18 After this attack it was decided that Catalinas were too vulnerable to be

used for torpedo attacks. 19

Another bombing operation flown by Catalinas was harassing ffilSSions. These

missions were flown over Japanese positions at night by single aircraft dropping a

variety of different types of bombs with the aim of annoying the Japanese and denying

them the opportunity to sleep. During , in support of the Borneo operations,

Catalinas flew 40 successful harassing missions and dropped 221x100lb, 66x300lb and

252x4lb bombs. 20 In addition to the bombs, empty beer bottles were thrown from the

aircraft. The falling bottles created a whistling similar to a dropping bomb, a noise

which kept the Japanese awake and, equally as importantly, encouraged "the AA

gunners to keep their heads down waiting for the blast". Aircrews found that bottles

with old razor blades inserted in the neck produced a more realistic sound. 21

With the major Catalina effort concentrated in the NW Area, the RAAF encountered a

problem with maintenance. While minor maintenance was undertaken at the NW Area

bases, major work had to be carried out elsewhere. Due to pre war planning and the

17 AWM66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. August 1944. 18 Odgers Op cit p. 233. 19 D Vernon Catalina Attacks with Torpedoes in AE Minty (ed) Black Cats. RAAF Museum, Point Cook, Victoria, 1994. p. 122. 20 A WM 66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. June 1945. 21 R Kingsland Courageous Cats pitted against the Enemy Lions in Minty (ed) Op cit p. 11.

198 concentration of the war effort in the North-Eastern Area the Catalina maintenance facilities were located at Bowen in Queensland, Rathmines in NSW and Lake Boga, 22 in Victoria, places distant from the forward operational bases. Therefore the RAAF planned the construction of a flying boat maintenance facility at Darwin, for an estimated cost of £217,500. The project was approved by Cabinet on June 5, 1945, with the condition that existing facilities were to be transferred from the East Arm base.23

On November 13, 1945, orders were issued for the transfer of 20 SQN to Rathmines on the following day and 43 SQN to the same location on November 24. Both squadrons were then to be under the command of the Eastern Area. 24

Mine Laying

The laying of anti-shipping mines is an extremely effective way of inflicting damage to enemy ships and submarines with little loss of friendly aircraft. However, it lacks the advantage of immediate visible gains and results. 25

The use of Catalinas for mine laying in the SWP A was an Australian initiative put to

General Kenney, through RAAF Command, by Group Captain NP Engel and

Lieutenant Commander PE Carr. The initiai proposal n

General Kenney's staff agreed and pointed out further advantages. To avoid

22 For an account of this latter base during the Pacific War see B Freeman Lake Boga at War. Catalina Publications, Swan Hill, Vic. 1995. 23 AA A5954/1/199/1945 RAAF Flying Boat Installation Darwin NT-Buildings and Services. War Cabinet Agendum 199/195 and Cabinet minute 4228. 24 AA A705/151/2/1109 Disposal of Units in the North-Western Area. RAAF Organisation Memorandum No. 863. November 13, 1945. Separate instructions were issued for 42 SQN, while No. 2 Flying Boat Maintenance Unit ceased to function on November 24 and was disbanded. No. 76 Wing HQ ceased to function on November 16, 1945 and was disbanded in the NW Area. 25 BC Laite Maritime Air Operations. Brassey's, London, UK, 1991.p. 26.

199 submarine attacks, Japanese convoys tended to stay in shallow waters (which were hazardous to submarines) and mine laying in these waters would deny them a refuge.

In addition, convoys required to loiter or divert because of mine laying were exposed to submarine attack for longer periods. 26

There was an even more significant contribution to the allied war effort to come from mine laying. As Air Commodore BD O'Loghlin has pointed out the Japanese needed strategic resources including tin, rice, rubber and, most importantly, oil back on their home islands in order to maintain their war effort. Japanese supply and communication lines stretched through the Pacific Islands, to China, Korea, Indo China, Burma,

Malaya, the Philippines, New Guinea and the NEI. The Catalinas were to lay mines in the most used waterways and harbours, thus cutting the vital sea lines of supply running back to Japan?7 During the war, RAAF aircraft flew 1,128 mine laying sorties

(26% of the total allied mine laying operations in the Pacific)?8 Catalina squadrons flew mine laying missions to the NEI before they were based in the NW Area.

For 20 SQN, a typical operation to Soerabaya (on Java) would begin at Darwin. 29 The

Catalinas, each armed with two mines would fly to West Bay (near Truscott) to refuel. Take off would be mid-afternoon. As one former 20 SQN pilot recalls:

The aircraft had been sitting in the sun and so everything inside it was red-hot. We would board the plane wearing only our underpants, because of the heat, not daring to touch anything. All we had to do was just to get it moving to get the air flowing in. The take off, on a dead calm sea, in hot weather, took two miles. We were fully loaded with 1460 imperial gallons of fuel and two mines, together with a crew of nine. The flight to Soerabaya took eight hours there and eight hours

26 NP Engel Mine Laying by Catalina Aircraft-The Beginning in Minty (ed) Op cit. p. 100. 27 BD O'Loghlin The Strategic Significance in Minty (ed) ibid. p. xxiv. 28 RP Hallion Air Warfare and Maritime Operations. APSC, Canberra, ACT, 1996. p. 45. 29 Soerabaya had been a very large Dutch naval base pre war and was an important strategic harbour for the Japanese. It was defended by 56 heavy, 27 medium and 68 light anti aircraft guns as well as by 15 searchlights. See RF Honan That's That. Lutheran Publishing House, Adelaide, SA, 1989. p. 79.

200 back. During the flight one pilot could sleep (we had two bunks), read a book or eat food prepared in the galley. 30

For 42 SQN the time spent flying could be even longer. For example, a mission to

Soerabaya would begin with a 3.25 hour flight from Gove to Darwin where fuel and mines were taken on (two mines per aircraft). The next leg was 3.1 hours to West Bay where more fuel was added. 31 The return from Soerabaya would be to Darwin, Heron

Haven in Exmouth Gulf or West Bay-depending on the fuel supply and the time of day. The mine laying operations were flown at night. If there were insufficient hours of darkness left to allow a safe return over the NEI, the Catalinas would fly south to rendezvous with the USS William B Preston in Exmouth Gulf, thus avoiding Japanese fighters based on Timor. 32 The mines were usually US or British types. 33

The mine laying sorties were flown to numerous sites in the NEI and beyond. On April

21, 1944 six Catalinas from 43 SQN left Y ampi Sound on a mission to mine

Balikpapan harbour. The aircraft encountered heavy AAA fire from vessels in the harbour. One aircraft was shot down and another damaged. The operation was unsuccessful as the mines were laid in incorrect locations. The Catalinas returned on the nights of April 24 and 27 and this time laid their mines in the desired locations.

The Catalinas successfully disrupted Japanese shipping at Balikpapan and the harbour was closed until April 29. Catalinas also laid mines at Sarong on April 25 and

Kaimana on April 2 7, 1944.34

In early March 1945, 20 SQN Catalinas undertook operations that were to be the longest distance raids flown by RAAF aircraft during the Pacific war. This was mine laying in Hong Kong harbour. The aircraft flew from Darwin to Manila, via Leyte

30 Interview with Mr Frank Parsons; August 8, 1996. 31 FooksQ:g_Qj: p. 13. 32 Honan Op cit. p. 80. Mr Stevens recalled that mine laying usually took place "when the moon was least. So for 10 days or so each month activity was high". 33 Correspondence from Mr K Stevens, October 26, 1995. 34 Odgers Op cit. pp. 218-219.

201 Gulf From Manila they flew to Hong Kong. A pilot who flew one of the participating

aircraft provided this description ofthe event:

Between the 1st and 11th of March we were in the Philippines. On the 9th of March 1945 four aircraft from 20 SQN mined Hong Kong harbour. Each aircraft carried two mines and we planned to have a string of eight across the harbour.

We flew inland over China and then turned out to sea. The harbour was visible at night. Each aircraft was given a datum point-ours was a headland. We passed the datum point, counted a number of seconds and dropped the first mine. A few seconds later we would drop the second. Other aircraft were given different times or datum points. We had to fly low-150 feet. Any higher and the mine would explode on impact.

They knew we were coming from their radar. There was an element of danger. They had no night fighters, only anti aircraft guns. There were rafts on the harbour with light anti aircraft guns. Their search lights would come on and waver around but couldn't depress low enough to illuminate us. 35

Catalinas continued mine laying operations until an order suspending the activity was issued by the commander AAF on July 10, 1945.36

Air Sea Rescue Flights

Catalinas also flew SAR missions searching for and rescuing allied air crew whose aircraft had crashed in areas remote from allied bases or settlements. The initial aim of the RAAF' s air sea rescue organisation was to provide sea rescue services in those areas in which air operations were most likely to be concentrated. 37

During the war several Air Sea Rescue Flights (ASRF) were formed by the RAAF. 111

ASRF was at Madang, 112 at East Arm, Darwin, 113 initially at Morotai and then at

35 Interview with Mr Frank Parsons, August 8, 1996. 36 Odgers Op cit. p. 219. 37 AA A1196/6/60/501/108 Allied Air Forces Operational Policy Memoranda. AAF, SWPA, Operational Policy Memorandum No.3 of August 30, 1942. Signed by Air Vice Marshal Bostock as Chief of Staff.

202 38 Labuan (under the direct control of the AOR First Tactical Air Force ), 114 at Cairns

and 115 at Morotai. In early February 1944 Cole was able to report that the fledgling

air sea rescue organisation in the NW Area had been strengthened by the addition of a

Dornier Do 24K flying boat and a dedicated B-24. He recommended that another

Dornier be sent to the area. 39 SAR was also flown by the Catalina squadrons until a

specialist unit was formed. The organisation and control of air sea rescue activities

was exercised directly by Air Operations, North-Western Area. 40 In addition to 112

ASRF, rescue flying was also carried out by No.6 Communications Unit.

ASRF Catalinas carried a crew of seven (as opposed to nine on the mine laying

missions). In addition to rescues, ASRF aircraft flew SAR patrols to cover strikes or

transiting aircraft; support operations for amphibious landings (which included the

carriage of mail, blood, passengers as well as the evacuation ot\vounded and the transport of prisoners); insertion of commandos; and the extraction of escapees. 41

In this last role the ASRFs cooperated with Military Intelligence Service-Section X

(MIS-X), SWP A, which was an allied inter-service organisation which operated under the control of GHQ. It was tasked with aiding "the return to Allied lines of personnel who may become isolated in inaccessible or enemy territory."42

The SAR effort became well planned and coordinated with Catalinas accompanying attack and bomber aircraft on strikes. A former Beaufighter pilot recalled:

38 AA A705/36/501/519 Air Sea Rescue- Command Headquarters Standing Orders. First Tactical Air Force Operational Instruction No. 44; April6, 1944. 39 A WM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; February 1, 1944. Unfortunately the Dornier, A49-5, caught fire on March 11, 1944 and sank at its moorings in Darwin Harbour. See RHS Aircraft Status Cards; Roll 9. In addition to the Dornier NW Area received specialist motor launches for SAR work. 40 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Directive 14/43, September 27, 1943. 41 Correspondence from Mr K Stevens, October 26, 1995. 42 AA A705/36/5011541 Land Air Sea Rescue - Policy. GHQ SWP A Standing Operating Procedure; Instruction No. 30.

203 We'd be getting ready for an op and we'd hear th_e Catalina taking off a few hours before us. When we got to the target the Cat was waiting for us. Flying around out of range, waiting to pick us up if we crashed. 43

Should an allied aircraft make a forced landing on the Australian mainland, the crew's

chances of survival was enhanced by emergency food dumps, the establishment of

which was controlled by HQ NW Area. The location of these dumps was made known

to all wing or squadron HQs. 44

· Another form of assistance for aircrew was the installation of Pundit Beacons. These

were a visual navigation aid to aircraft flying at night. In the NW Area they were

' located at Cape Van Diemen, Batchelor, Peron Is, Fenton, Gove, Truscott and Cape

Fourcroy. 45

112 Air Sea Rescue Flight

112 ASRF was formed at Darwin on December 23, 1944 under the command of

Squadron Leader KA Crisp. As the flight had no aircraft, personnel were initially

employed on repairing the buildings allocated to them. The first mission was flown on

January 7, 1945 by a Catalina belonging to 20 SQN tasked with providing an ASR

patrol for a B-24 strike. The second was flown six days later when another 20 SQN

aircraft was used to fly personnel, stores and parts from East Arm to Champagny

Island.

The flight had its first aircraft, a Catalina (A24-54), delivered from 20 SQN on January

26, 1945. This aircraft's first mission with the flight was an ASR patrol for a B-24

strike on Malirnfoeng on the night of February 1-2. The Catalina flew a distance of

43 Interview with Mr G Mierisch; January 6, 1997. 44 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North Western Area Operational Policy Directives & Operation Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 17/44, April 7, 1944, "Air Sea Land Rescue Organisation". 45 AA All96/6/60/50l/142 North Western Area Operational Policy Directives & Operation Instructions. Operational Instruction No. 40.

204 1,500 miles in 15Y2 hours. A similar mission for B-24s striking at the Siman and

Mendalin power stations was flown on February 8-9. On this 17 hour flight a Japanese single engined aircraft was sighted.

The ASR patrol flights were usually flown from Darwin or West Bay (a three hour flight from Darwin). Some ofthe flight's pilots were on loan from 20 or 43 SQNs.

The Catalina would take off at least an hour before the bombers and make its way to a prearranged point close to the target. It would remain orbiting that point, awaiting distress calls from the bombers. Following the raid the Catalina would return to either

Darwin or West Bay. The aircraft could remain at West Bay for three days, depending on the bomber raids and weather conditions. 46

On February 15-16 the Catalina flew the unit's first extraction mission from Darwin, via West Bay, to a location on the south coast of Bomeo.47 The distance flown was

2,000 miles (1,000 miles over enemy territory in daylight).

By March 1945 the flight comprised seven officers and 50 other ranks. During that month they flew one ASR patrol, one combined extraction and supply drop and one medical flight. This last incident, on March 27, involved collecting a sick crew member from the Royal Navy Submarine HM:S Telemachus. On the same mission the

Catalina's crew photographed villages on Binongko Island.

The following month the flight acquired two more Catalinas48 but lost A24-54 to enemy action. The aircraft had alighted to pick up the surviving crew members of a B-

24 when it was strafed by Japanese aircraft. Seven ASR patrols were flown during

April. On one of these, supporting a strike by 79 Wing on Tanimbar Island, the

Catalina's crew photographed the target after the bombers had departed.

46 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 273. No. 112 Search & Rescue. 47 The location was shown in the operational record book as 5°56'S 116°13 'E. 48 A24-58 came from 1 FBRD and A24-42 from 43 SQN.

205 During May the Catalinas flew four extraction missions. These missions lasted up to

18 hours during which time the aircraft flew 2, 100 miles and used at least 1,3 00

gallons of fuel. Between June 9-24 a Catalina was deployed to a base known as

BROWN to support an 87 SQN reconnaissance mission. 87 SQN Mosquitoes flew to

this location via base WIDTE. 49 The Catalina's purpose was to transport maintenance and intelligence personnel and spares. After a reconnaissance flight over Christmas Island the Catalina flew the film to Exmouth.

By the end of June 112 ASRF had grown to 11 officers and 84 other ranks. During

July a successful 13 hour search flight was made between Groote Eylandt and the Roper River for a missing lugger. Between July 20-25 an ASR patrol was flown from Exmouth to cover nine B-24s striking the shipbuilding and harbour installations at

Semerang on the north coast of Java. 50 Also on July 24 an extraction was flown

during which 4,000 lbs of supplies were delivered to an advance base and one Dutch

officer and six natives were extracted. 51

Despite the Japanese surrender broadcast on August 14, the Catalinas continued to fly

searches for missing aircraft, convoy escorts, supply flights and ASR patrols for B-24 strikes (during the first half of the month). The major operation in August and

September was ASR patrols for 2 and 18 SQNs moving to Mototai Island and then to Balikpapan.

Following the end of the war the Catalinas flew convoy escorts, courier flights to

Koepang, medical and POW evacuations and dropped leaflets. Some of these tasks

continued until 194 7. 52

49 The location of base BROWN was most likely Cocos (Keeling) Islands while WHITE was probably Exmouth. See Vincent Op cit. pp 143-145. 50 Odgers Op cit. p. 476. · 51 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 273. No. 112 Search & Rescue. 52 ibid.

206 NORTH WESTERN AREA BATHURST IS. DETACHMENTS MELVILLE IS. HEADQUARTERS NDHAM ~ MILLINGIMBI I I I UNITS NOT 76 WING 82WING CONTROLLED (FLYING BOATS) (H.B.) BY N.W.A. HQ. (FENJON) I I .2 F.B.M.U. I -, (EAST ARM) 24~Q~ I I r ~ 1 20 !QN 3 M.T.U. 23 ~QN 24 A.SP. 5 D.W.O. CANTEEN (EAST ARM) (DARWIN) 6R.S.U. UNIT 43 SQN 11 A.S.R.F. 21 ~QN 30 M~C.S. (DARWIN) (DARWIN) 42SQN (MELVILLE BAY) 79WING AIR DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS (G.R.B.) (DARWIN) (BATCHELOR) (CIVI:_{JTRIP) l I 1 FIG~TER 1 1BR s.u. I I 7 R.S.U. WING I (PELL) 380 BOMB. GROUP 549SQN 18 N.E.I. SQN 28 A.S.P. U.S.A.A.F. 548 SQN (BATCHELOR) (PELL) (H.B.) RADAR STATIONS (DARWIN) 54SQN . I. 13SQN 830.B.U. (GOVE) (BATCHELOR) I I I 2SQN 27 M.C.S. r 39 111159 61 ITII150 224 1111318 344 39 ZONE (HUGHES) (FENTON) 530 baN T,31aN 38 46 60 132 154 . 317 319 FILTER CENTRE I rtn1 529 SQN 528 SQN 308 312

I 1 M.~.S. 7M.R.U.I I (BERRY SPRINGS) 8 C.R.D. 8 POSTAL (9MILE) UNIT 4R.S.U. /' SEC.GUARDS (PELL) £-..---- UNIT 9R.C. (DARWIN) 2 W.U. (KNUCKEY'S LAGOON) 5FtC. I 3\liJ.U. . (BATCHELOR RD.) 5R.LM.U. (BATC~ 6 COMM. UNIT OPERATIONAL (BATCHELOR) (57 MILE) BASE UNITS g s·.o. 87 SQN (P.R.) (DARWIN) I (COOMALIE) 12A.'R.D. 1 N.W.A. Teleco (DET.) 56o B.U. I UNIT . 12AR.D. I GOVE BIRDUM Teleco (DARWIN) 55 O.B.U. 57 O.B.U. UNIT 14 A R.D. RAAF'STN. GORRIE ALICE SPRINGS. DARWIN 2 R.P.P. (GORRIE) 53 0 B.U. 58 O.B.U. BATCHELOR TRUSCOTT 5 c. Reserve 5 C.R. (G.W. DET. 88 MILE) --- (9 MILE) 3 M'C.U. sT.rho. (DARWIN) 5 M.C.U. IDET. BACHELOR) (DARWIN) RAAF ORGANISATION-NORTH WESTERN AREA-JANUARY 1945

RAAF Museum World War Two Australia File. Chapter 9. The Bombing Offensive

The Air Power Manual states that strategic strike or attacking the "heart of the enemy"

is designed to weaken his capacity and will to fight. The Manual adds that in

weakening an enemy's capacity to fight, air power aims to degrade that enemy's

command and control, key production facilities, infrastructure, logistics support

capability and ultimately, combat effectiveness. 1

From 1943 onwards the allied air forces carried out a bombing campaign from the NW

Area that aligned with the Manual's definition. That is, attacking targets in the NEI

· such as military buildings (command posts and barracks), the sources of raw materials

(quarries), infrastructure (power stations and ports), and logistics support capability

(shipping). Part ofthe campaign was undertaken by Catalina squadrons, as previously

noted. The major part was flown by bomber squadrons.

The RAAF' s bomber offensive was restricted by two significant criteria-the distance

between the bases in the NWA to the target areas and the lack of suitable aircraft with

sufficient range and bomb load. The main bomber type in the area, the Hudson carried

the bombing effort into 1943 because the Fifth Air Force, hard pressed to support the

New Guinea campaign could not assist. 2 By 1943 the Hudsons were starting to feel

the strain of continual operation. In order to strengthen the squadrons operating the

type, RAAF Command reorganised the squadrons by ordering the transfer of all Mk 3

Hudsons to the NW Area. All Mk 4 Hudsons were allocated to 6 SQN while all Mk 3

Hudsons held in depots or belonging to 6 SQN were passed to 2 SQN. 3

However, by that time the Hudsons were almost at the end of their service life as Wing

Commander Griffith advised the AOC No.9 OP Group:

I AAP 1000 .QQ.m. p. 93. 2 Powell Op cit. p. 155 .. 3 AA All96/6/36/501/397 Reorganisation ofHudson Squadrons. Minute from OIC Aircraft Status to DCAS, March 17, 1943.

208 the aircraft, on the whole, are in such condition that although they can be made serviceable, they rarely remain so even for the duration of a normal patrol. The records show that after the majority of flights, the aircraft are unserviceable in some manner, and too many of the defects developed in normal flying take a great deal of time and effort to remedy. 4

Similarly, operating conditions in the NW Area proved to be tough on the aircraft

engines. For example, on May 1, 1943 the OIC Aircraft Status advised the AMSE that

22 spare Wright Cyclone engines were required for engine changes by 2 SQN. This

was because "owing to dusty operating conditions, many of the engines installed in No.

2 Squadron Hudsons are using excessive oil before they reach the normal time for

· complete overhaul". 5 Somehow 2 SQN were able to keep these tired aircraft flying

until early 1944 when the squadron was re-equipped with Beauforts.

There were various attempts to overcome the range problem including fitting extra fuel

tanks to aircraft which, in tum, reduced their bomb carrying ability. In January 1944

Cole reported experiments had been conducted with the fuel consumption of heavy

bombers. It was found these aircraft consumed 30 gallons of fuel per hour when flying

independently at night compared with 90 gallons per hour when flying in formation. 6

Quite reasonably he recommended that on night operations B-24s fly independently.

Another unusual problem the RAAF had with the fuel supply became more obvious

with the introduction of the B-24. All aviation fuel was stored in 44 gallon drums.

Cole pointed out that a great deal of time and man power was spent in refuelling

aircraft from drums (a B-24 had a fuel capacity of 3, 100 gallons and would require

70.45 drums). Thus operations requiring a quick tum around of aircraft were

impossible. 7

4 AA All96/6/36/501/397 Reorganisation of Hudson Squadrons. Minute from Wing Commander S deB Griffith AFC to AOC No.9 OP Group, June 22, 1943. 5 AA A1196/6/36/501/396 Reorganisation ofHudson Squadrons. Minute from OIC Aircraft Status to AMSE, May 1, 1943. 6 AA A705/1/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciations. Report from AOC NW Area, January 1, 1944. 7 A WM 66 617/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; February 1, 1944.

209 By March 1944, Cole had two RAAF and one NEI bomber squadrons in addition to

the 3 80th (H) Bombardment Group and at the end of the war the RAAF had one heavy

bomber wing (No. 82 Wing) and one medium (or General Reconnaissance) bomber

wing (No. 79 Wing) based in the NW Area. Had the war continued another heavy

bomber wing (No. 85 Wing) would have become operational. Perhaps the best

summing up of the NW Area's bombing effort was found in the June 1945 edition of

Bombs Gone:

Our role has been an unspectacular but worthy one. In daily combing the North-Western Area for enemy activity, in attacking and destroying his small ships, in striking his major bases and neutralising his airfields we have protected the left flank of the Allied Offensive. And in aircraft destroyed and enemy ships sunk we have added our useful contribution to the destruction of Japan. 8

At the time of the allied invasion of the Philippines, MacArthur had the expectation

that he and his forces would remain in the SWP A He told Kenney that he expected

Admiral Nimitz would command the invasion of Japan while he would "clean up in the

Philippines and then move south into the ". 9

If this was MacArthur's expectation then the NW Area campaign takes on an even

greater importance. The RAAF's role in pinning down Japanese forces, neutralising

their air power and shipping interdiction would have become even more vital as it

made a direct impact on saving allied resources.

Japanese Shipping

By July 1944, shipping strikes were a high priority for the bomber force. However, the

number of large ships was diminishing. The Japanese had taken to supplying their bases in the NEI with small ships travelling individually and close to the coast.

8 A WM 66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. June 1945. 9 Allen and Folmar Op cit. p. 152.

210 Japan's merchant fleet was not able to meet all wartime demands placed upon it. There were insufficient ships to meet the needs of the armed forces and to transport

the raw materials over the long distances from the newly conquered territories. Furthermore the construction of conventional steel merchant ships was slowed by the

Navy's needs for armed warships. Therefore Japan embarked on a plan to build a vast fleet of powered wooden ships. The NEI was an area favourable to this plan. The

advantages were a plentiful supply of timber; the vessels could be constructed in

approximately 3 5 days; the local population could be coerced into supplying · shipwrights who had generations of experience in the construction of small ocean

going ships; and shipyards could be established almost anywhere near water with a

minimum amount of labour and equipment. This plan had the advantages of producing

vessels that were suitable for coastal transport thus freeing larger ships for off shore

voyages; were less vulnerable to attack because of their size; and were powered by

relatively simple internal combustion engines. Furthermore, the weather in the NEI

was unlikely to interfere with navigation, except during the wet season. 10

The ships tended to be of various types but had genetic descriptions such as "Sugar

Dogs" (small supply vessel with one hatch, usually up to 300 tons) and "Sugar

Charlies" (larger vessels with two hatches usually up to 1,000 tons).n Between late 1944 and the end of the war the Japanese were using barges, yachts, ferries and other vessels to move personnel and materiel between islands of the NEI to reinforce their positions. 12 Table 8.1 shows bombing tonnages and shipping destroyed from mid 1944 onwards.

10 AA A1966/5/49 Allied Air Force Intelligence Summary-No. 176/26 January 1944 to No. 189111 March 1944. Intelligence Summary Serial No. 177, January 29, 1944. AA A5954/l/411/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 179. February 5, 1944. 11 Grantham Op cit. p. 84. 12 Correspondence from Mr AD Sieber, December 7, 1995.

211 Table 8.1. Bomb Tonnage, North-Western Area, July 1944-July 1945.13

Month Bomb Heavy Other Main Target Vessels Tonnage Bombers Bombers Destroyed

July1944 473.2 328.6 144.6 Namlea 5

August 1944 448 326 122 Kai Island 16

September 1944 515 415 100 Timor 14

October 1944 468 392 76 Makassar 27

November 1944 449 346 103 Makassar 34

December 1944 412 348 614 Kendari 35

January 1945 335 Lombok 8

Feb-March 1945 178 163 15 Map in 43

June 1945 3,604 2,885 719 Namlea 258

The number of ships sighted and destroyed varied from month to month-no doubt depending on weather conditions and the ability of the AAF to detect them. In January

1945 it was reported "Enemy shipping located during January reached an all time 'low' and the activity of our medium bombers suffered accordingly". 14 Odgers noted the considerable increase in shipping activity the following month. Despite the Japanese losing between 25-50% of all shipping sighted by NW Area based aircraft they persisted in using this form oftransport. 15

Other aspects of the importance of shipping to the Japanese should be considered. As noted earlier the Japanese had a large army deployed at bases located on some of the hundreds of islands that made up the NEI. These troops had to be supplied with the

13 From details published in A WM 66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. Various editions. 14 AWM 66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. -January 1945. 15 Odgers Op cit. p. 403. This figure suggests that between half and three quarters of the Japanese shipping in the NEI escaped detection or destruction and thus had a good chance of succeeding in their task. Such odds .may be unlikely to deter a desperate military force. The Japanese had no choice when it came to moving personnel and materiel between the islands of the NEI as no other form of transport was available to them.

212 necessities of military forces such as food, uniforms, weapons, munitions and medical

supplies. In addition their heavy weapons-tanks, artillery and aircraft-required fuel, ammunition and servicing. In short, as they had few long-range aircraft, the Japanese were dependent on shipping for supplying the troops and maintaining their weapons.

They also required ships to move troops between the islands to reinforce bases should they be invaded or to guard the vital sources of raw materials. The destruction of construction facilities and ships prevented the troops being supplied or consolidating or reinforcing their positions. Moreover, as the Strategic Bombing Survey noted the NEI was "most vital to the Japanese Empire as the main source of raw materials". 16 The raw materials included nickel, phosphate and oil, substances which could be transported only by ship.

As the allies advanced towards Japan, priorities changed. Odgers points out the

Japanese planned to move troops from the islands to the north of Australia. . The garrisons on islands such as Ambon, Boeroe and Ceram were "out on the end of a limb where they could be oflittle strategic value to the Japanese". 17 They had to be moved to fight against an allied advance that had by-passed them. This meant the Japanese planned to move 21,000 troops from the NEI to Malaya and Indo China-the places where the Japanese expected an allied attack. The move was to take place in early

1945. At the same time the RAAF' s anti shipping effort intensified.

The Japanese regarded the shipping losses seriously and took steps to guard against it.

They transferred fighter aircraft from their depleted forces to airfields within range of

16 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Air Campaigns of the Pacific War. US Govt Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1947. p. 56. In May 1942 the Directorate of Intelligence reported that the Japanese could be supplied with oil, nickel, tin and rubber from the NEI; scrap iron, iron ore, aluminium, tin and rubber from Malaya and phosphate from Christmas Island. See AA A5954/l/402/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. South West Pacific Area. Directorate of Intelligence. Intelligence Summaries, serial numbers I to 16. Intelligence Summary Serial No.3; May 26, 1942. AAF Intelligence estimated Japan's need for 1943 to include 100,000 tons of phosphate from Christmas Island, 150 tons of salt and 150-180,000 tons of nickel ore from the NEI. See AA A5954/l/411/1 AAF Intelligence Summary Serial No. 177, January 29, 1944. 17 Odgers Op cit. p. 403.

213 shipping lanes. There were attacks made on RAAF bombers and some were shot

down. 18 The Japanese, having found their ships vulnerable to day light attack, began

moving at night and sheltering during the day, often under a camouflage of foliage on a

shoreline. 19 AAF Intelligence reported that the Japanese made maximum use of natural

cut foliage (brush, branches and palm trees) to cover their vessels so, as one pilot

described, they looked "exactly like a small island."20

In one instance, to distract the RAAF from the shipping campaign, the Japanese sent

aircraft to bomb the allied airfields on Morotai and Biak on March 22, 1945. The

RAAF retaliated with raids on the Japanese airfield at Kendari. The distraction was

only temporary, "For the cost of two sorties the enemy bought for himself some immunity from attack for eight days". 21

By February 1944 AAF Intelligence reported that Japan was becoming more dependent on coal and minerals from north China, on locally produced synthetic oil and food from Manchuria. The reasons given were that Japan now had insufficient shipping to move raw materials from the far reaches of its empire and that the lines of communication between China and Japan were much shorter than those between Japan and the NEI and relatively free from attacks by allied bombers. 22 It appears from this statement that the allied campaign against shipping (and thus the RAAF's NW Area based effort) was starting to have an effect in the SWP A The allies obviously needed another means to deny Japan raw materials from other sources. The answer was found in a successful mining campaign directed at Japan's home waters. 23

18 In addition to gunfire, the Japanese interceptors also attempted to destroy B-24s by dropping phosphorus bombs on them. See AA A5954/1141111 Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence' Summary. Serial No. 179. February 5, 1944. 19 Nelmes Qlutt. p. 98. 20 AA A5954/11416/1 Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 242. September 15, 1944. 21 Odgers Op cit. p. 405. 22 AA A5954/l/411/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 179. February 5, 1944. China was a source of coal, iron ore, salt cotton, wool and food stuffs. 23 Hallion Op cit. pp. 43-48.

214 The Strategic Bombing Survey concluded "The war against shipping was perhaps the most decisive single factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy and the logistic support of Japanese military and naval power". 24

79 Wing

79 Wing, commanded by Group Captain C Eaton and with its HQ at Batchelor, comprised the medium bomber squadrons (2 SQN flying Hudsons, then Beauforts and finally B-25 Mitchells; 13 SQN returned to the area equipped with Venturas; and 18

SQN also with Mitchells) together with appropriate support units. In March 1944 the

Beaufort equipped 1 SQN was transferred to the area and was placed under the command of 79 Wing.

Cole directed that the primary roles of the medium bombers be the destruction of enemy surface forces within range; the destruction of Japanese stores, equipment and personnel on nearer bases or on the Australian mainland; and day and night reconnaissance over the Arafura and Timor Seas. Convoy escort was to be a secondary role. Attacks on Japanese shipping were to be made at mast head height. 25

This method of attack had been tried and proven successful by the Fifth Air Force in the Bismarck Sea and at Rabaul.

The targets with the highest priority were large aircraft carriers and tankers followed by large troop transports, merchant vessels, small tankers, cruisers, seaplane tenders, convoy escorts and finally small ships such as barges and luggers. However this final

24 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey The War Against Japanese Transportation 1941- 1945. Quoted in Hallion Op cit. p. 24. Wing Commander Cresswell put it more simply "Once the Japanese had their supply lines destroyed they'd lost the bloody war." Interview with Wing Commander Cresswell; December 12, 1996. 25 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 11/43, September 5, 1943, "Employment of Medium Bomber Aircraft."

215 group were to be destroyed whenever sighted unless their destruction interfered with

whatever task the aircraft was undertaking at the time the vessel was sighted. 26

By January 1945 the wing again comprised 2, 13 and 18 SQNs. Its bombing activities

had been restricted due to a lack of targets (in that month 2 SQN flew 67 sorties, 13

27 SQN flew 72 and 18 SQN flew 36 ). With a few exceptional instances this was to be

the situation for the medium bombers for the remainder of the war.

1 Squadron

1 SQN had been virtually wiped out during the fall of Singapore. It was reformed at

• Menangle, NSW, on December 1, 1943. Five days later four Bristol Beauforts were

delivered. During its time in the NW Area the squadron operated with an

establishment of 19 of these aircraft. The NW Area deployment at Gould airfield

started in February/March 1944 and, while there, the unit was under the command of

Squadron Leader D Campbell DFC. It was one of the two RAAF squadrons to

operate Bristol Beauforts in the area. The squadron's tasks were shipping patrols and

bombing raids. On March 20 the squadron became semi-operational and two search

flights were flown. Twenty-four similar sorties were flown during the remainder of

that month. 28

Three Beauforts, each carrying 6 x 250 lb bombs, flew the first bombing raid on the

night of April 4. The target was Lautem on the north east coast of Timor. The aircraft

encountered slight medium and heavy AAA fire over the· target. Subsequent

reconnaissance flights revealed that two bombs fell in the target area. Two nights later

four Beauforts attacked Lautem. Three Beauforts attacked Dili on the night of April

9. All these flights were of over five hours duration.

26 AA A1196/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 11/43, September 5, 1943, "Employment of Medium Bomber Aircraft." 27 A WM 66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. January 1945. 28 A WM 64 ORMF 0118 Rolli, History Sheets A50, No. 1 SQN.

216 On April15 the first large scale action took place as eleven Beauforts joined 18 SQN's

B-25s in a night raid on Koepang. Two B-25s acting as "pathfinders" dropped incendiary bombs which started fires and thereby guided the Beauforts to their targets?9 The Beauforts dropped 120 lb fragment clusters in addition to 250 lb GP bombs. Once again this raid was over five hours in duration and several aircraft were forced to land at Drysdale on the return flight to refuel. The first daylight strike was flown to Soe, on Timor, by 15 Beauforts (together with aircraft from 18 and 31 SQNs) on April 19, 1943. The target was the Japanese barracks and the Beauforts were armed with anti personnel weapons including 120 lb and 150 lb fragment clusters, containers of fragment and incendiary bombs and 500 lb incendiary bombs. All aircraft located the target and it was noted that several fires were started, the smoke from one was visible from 65 miles on the return flight. 30

Six bombing raids were flown during May 1943. Targets were usually Japanese barracks and the Beauforts were appropriately armed with incendiary, anti personnel and general purpose bombs. The first was flown on May 2 to Penfoei by six aircraft.

A similar raid was flown two days later and subsequent reconnaissance photographs showed five buildings destroyed by the bombers. The barracks at Koepang were bombed by six Beauforts on May 6. This time some aircraft were armed with 250 lb bombs fitted with six or 12 hour delay fuses. The barracks at Penfoei were struck again on May 8 and 11. On this latter occasion the squadron's seven Beauforts were joined by B-25s from 18 (NEI) SQN. The aircraft refuelled at Drysdale on the outward leg of the flight. The operation was planned to be flown in such a way so as to confuse the Japanese radar which was thought to control the search lights and AAA at the target. The aircraft took off individually and flew low, climbing to 1,000 feet as

~ they approached the target. Photographic reconnaissance after the raid showed 31 buildings destroyed. 31

29 Odgers Op cit. p. 2I7 .. 30 AWM 64 ORMF 0118 Rolli, History SheetsA50, No.1 SQN. 31 AWM 64 ORMF 0118 Rolli, History SheetsA50, No.1 SQN.

2I7 On May 20 two raids were flown against the radio station and barracks at Tepa village

on Babar Island. Six Beauforts initially bombed the target. Later that day two more

aircraft bombed and strafed the same area. As well as flying bombing raids the

Beauforts flew shipping searches, supply drops, searches for missing aircraft and anti

submarine patrols. These were the squadron's main activities during its time in the

NW Area with between three and seven such sorties flown daily by single aircraft. The

shipping searches and anti submarine patrols almost invariably resulted in no sighting

of Japanese activity.

Bombing missions commenced again on July 18 with a raid on Dili harbour where two

. 1,500 ton merchant vessels were reported to be unloading at the jetty. The raid was

flown by eight Beauforts in two flights. As they reached the harbour at night the two

vessels were not sighted so Dili town was bombed as an alternative. On July 18 a

Japanese troop encampment on Timor was bombed by eight Beauforts flying at 7,000

feet. Once again anti personnel weapons were used.

In August that year 1 SQN flew shipping patrols at night, using Air to Surface Vessel

(ASV) radar fitted to the Beauforts. The night patrols, from Gould and Truscott,

continued until the squadron left the area. 32 Shipping patrols were also flown from

Gave and four aircraft were deployed there to assist 13 SQN with this task. In

September raids were made on a Japanese camp at Soe on Timor. On September 8

anti personnel bombs in the form of 1,080 four pound incendiaries and 333 twenty

pound fragmentation bombs were dropped together with 9,500 leaflets. 33 On October

10 and 21 anti personnel raids were flown against the barracks at Lahane and 40 pound

GP and four pound incendiaries were dropped. 34 The squadron also flew numerous

combined shipping search/bombing raids. A single aircraft would be tasked to fly a

search in a specific area. If it resulted in a nil sighting the aircraft then flew to a nearby

32 S Wilson Beaufort, Beaufighter and Mosquito in Australian Service. Aerospace Publications, Weston, ACT, 1990. p. 52. 33 A WM 66 15/811 Bombs Gone. August 1944. 34 AWM66 15/811 Bombs Gone. October 1944.

218 Japanese occupied island and bombed and strafed the facilities there. Leaflets were usually dropped on these occasions-each Beaufort carried 3,000 leaflets. 35 The

October 21 raid was the last such operation flown by 1 SQN in the NW Area. For the remainder of its time there it mostly flew shipping searches such as those just described.

On January 9, 1945 the squadron received mobility orders and ceased operational flying in the NW Area. 1 SQN departed the NW Area on January 13, 1945. It moved to Kingaroy, Queensland, where it was re-equipped with de Havilland Mosquitoes. 36

2 Squadron

During 1943, 2 SQN continued to fly operations similar to those of the previous year ie. bombing raids on the NEI, armed reconnaissance and attacks on surface vessels, training flights, convoy escorts and anti submarine patrols. As an example of these tasks, during April 1943 the Hudsons flew 42 armed reconnaissance and enemy. shipping searches; nine anti submarine patrols; four attack; four searches for missing vessels; one supply drop; seven transport; and 11 searches for Allied vessels. In between flights squadron personnel attended concerts and participated in tennis, football and cricket matches. 37 While the squadron was based at Hughes from May 12,

1943, Hudsons also operated from an advanced base at Millingimbi.

The Hudsons were replaced by Bristol Beauforts. These aircraft were delivered to the squadron in small numbers so that Hudsons and Beauforts were operated concurrently until May 1944. Regardless of the aircraft type, daily shipping searches and maritime patrols continued. Between February and June 1944 these numbered up to six per day.

Enemy activity was rarely observed. 38

35 A WM 64 ORMF 0118 Rolli, History Sheets A50, No. 1 SQN. 36 Vincent Op cit. p. 120.. 37 A WM 64 l/13 Operations record book. No. 2 (GR) Squadron. 38 A WM 64 l/13 Operations record book. No. 2 (GR) Squadron.

219 The inadequacies of the Beaufort in the long-range role were apparent from the time

the aircraft reached the NW Area. The aircraft were armed with the unsuitable

offensive load of one 250 lb bomb under each wing because the bomb bay had been

filled with a long-range fuel tank. This modification was also found to be unsuitable

for night raids where it was found that aircraft needed to carry the maximum number

of small bombs. 39 One 2 SQN veteran remembered an innovative approach to extending the Beaufort's range:

we'd been given a target in Java and the only way we could reach it from Darwin was to take fuel down to a little bush strip at Drysdale Mission across the W A border. One flight flew bombs, one flew fuel, in the early hours of the morning. 40

The Beaufort was also found to have inadequate defensive armament (four or five .303 machine guns) and thus Cole had relegated it to reconnaissance duties. 41 It had no auto pilot which resulted in pilot fatigue, especially in bad weather. Cole advised that he was not prepared to recommend any modifications as the aircraft was considered obsolescent. 42 In short the Beaufort was an inappropriate aircraft for most of the tasks required of it in the NW Area.

The Beauforts were replaced by B-25 Mitchells in mid 1944. Of the 50 B-25s issued to the RAAF (30 B-25Ds and 20 B-25Js), all but nine served operationally with 2 SQN from its Northern Territory and NEI bases. Most of those received were former

NEIAF aircraft. 43 With a range of over 1,200 miles and defensive armament of up to

39 AA A705/l/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciations. Monthly Tactical Appreciation, January 1, 1944. . 40 S Owen (ed) 10-Course WAGS. FS Owen, Newcastle, NSW, 1986. p. 115. 41 AA A705/l/501/471 Monthly Tactical Appreciations. Monthly Tactical Appreciation, January 1, 1944. 42 A WM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; February 1, 1944. 43 S Wilson Boston, Mitchell and Liberator in Australian Service. Aerospace Publications, Weston Creek, ACT, 1992. p. 72.

220 12 fifty calibre machine guns, 2 SQN at last had a weapon capable of carrying out substantial raids on Japanese held territory.

2 SQN operated either as an individual unit or in formation with 18 SQN or other units. One activity it was now able to perform more successfully was bombing Japanese shipping. In one period of intense activity in August 1944 the B-25s destroyed 11 vessels, damaged seven others and dropped 132,000 lbs of bombs. In April 1945, 12 B-25s from 2 SQN and ten from 18 SQN together with RAAF B-24

Liberators bombed the Japanese cruiser Isuzu and its escorts. Aircraft from 2 SQN scored at least one direct hit on the cruiser. Japanese fighter attacks damaged some of the B-25s while two B-24s were shot down. 44 Apart from this sudden period of excitement the squadron continued to fly training and shipping searches. This latter task became almost fruitless as 1944 progressed. The operational record book notes that during October 1944 "enemy shipping having almost abandoned the search area". 45

The squadron was combined with 13 and 18 SQNs to form No. 79 Wing. The wing's operations were conducted mainly in the Timor area, and, using Truscott as a forward base, targets in the NEI. The Wing moved to Balikpapan to support the Borneo campaign. 46 2 SQN spent June and July preparing for the move northwards and finally arrived at Balikpapan several days after the cessation of hostilities.

By the end of June 1945, 2 SQN's B-25s had completed 712 strike sorties and 720 shipping sweeps/attacks which involved over 90,000 operational flying hours. Over 1,000,000 lbs of bombs were dropped on Japanese targets and over 300,000 rounds of ,, ammunition fired. After the Japanese surrender they flew search and rescue, supply

44 Interview with MV Nelmes; A WM, June 13, 1995. 45 A WM64 1/13 Operations Record Book ofNo. 2 (GR) Squadron. 46 For details of and a commentary on the Borneo campaign see G Waters ; Air Operations over Borneo, 1945. APSC, Canberra, 1995.

221 and POW evacuation flights. 47 2 SQN ceased operations in the NW Area in November

1945 and the following month moved to Laverton where it flew Mosquitoes until it

was disbanded in May 1946. 48

13 Squadron

After its withdrawal from the NW Area, 13 SQN moved to Canberra where it began

converting to Lockheed Ventura aircraft. While this was taking place, detachments .

from the squadron flew Beauforts on anti submarine patrols from Camden and Coffs

Harbour. Fully equipped with Venturas the squadron moved to Cooktown in far north

· Queensland where it flew anti submarine patrols before moving to Gave (and thus

back into the NW Area) in August 1944. A contemporary report of 13 SQN's first

raid with its new aircraft stated it "made its debut by attacking Dobo at tree top height.

A good introduction to the Ventura which is suited to low level attack by its useful

burst of speed". 49 This was to be the only RAAF squadron to fly V enturas in the

SWPA. 50 One of the squadron's navigators was Flight Lieutenant ,

later to become Prime Minister.

The Venturas operated from Gave and Truscott. The aircraft's long range (2,671 km)

and reasonable speed allowed it to fly long-range bombing and reconnaissance

missions to such targets as Lombok, Timor and Ambon. With a reduced bomb load

the Ventura was able to operate well beyond the range of the. other medium bomber

types. 51 On at least one occasion a Ventura undertook a return flight from Gave to

Morotai Island, a distance of over 1, 800 km. The V enturas also flew anti submarine

47 Wilson Military Aircraft of Australia. p. 154. 48 RAAF Museum, 2 SQN box file. History ofNo. 2 Squadron. 49 AWM 66 lS/811 Bombs Gone. August 1944. 50 Venturas were flown by 459 and 464 SQNs in Europe. In the SWPA the RAAF received 75 aircraft which were flown by No. 4 Communications Unit and operationally by 13 SQN. RAAF plans for December 1945 showed one Ventura squadron still operational, had the war continued. Supply of the aircraft had ceased by October 1944 and it was unlikely another squadron would receive similar aircraft. See AA A705/l/501/533 Acquisition of heavy bomber aircraft from overseas. Memorandum to Minister, October 1944. 51 A WM 66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. March 1945.

222 and shipping patrols as well as attacks on enemy installations. As a former 13 SQN

Wireless/Air Gunner wrote:

When a shipping search resulted in 'nil enemy sightings', nearby islands or enemy installations were bombed and strafed on the way home. The average time airborn (sic) on a sortie was about 6 hours, but some missions exceeded 9 hours. 52

Shipping patrols and convoy escorts were to be the main task of 13 SQN. In January

1945, they numbered 57. During the same month armed reconnaissance sorties were

flown to the Aroe and Kai Islands and to Timoeka in New Guinea. The following

month 27 shipping patrols and 23 armed reconnaissances sorties were flown. In

addition, a Ventura operating from Batchelor dropped leaflets over towns on the Solor

and Alor Islands. Venturas staged through Truscott to carry out strikes on Japanese

shipping at Soemba and Soembawa.

Only six maritime patrols were flown during March. Raids were flown against targets

at Soembawa and Rakit. On these occasions a small number of Japanese fighters

attempted unsuccessful intercepts. During the course of the war the squadron did not loose a Ventura to Japanese fighters but several were lost in accidents. 53

On April 1, 1945 the squadron moved from Gove to Morotai and thence to Labuan.

However, it did not become operational at the new base until the day after the

Japanese surrender. The Venturas were then used to evacuate POWs and to transport other service personnel back to Australia. Courier flights between Darwin and

Singapore were also flown until the squadron was disbanded at Labuan on January 11,

1946. 54

52 RAAF Museum, 13 SQN file. J Green Versatile Ventura. 53 Grantham Op cit. pp. 83-84. 54 As a non flying RAAF reserve unit, 13 SQN reformed at Darwin on July 1, 1989 under the command of Flight Lieutenant B Thomas. In June 1990 the squadron was finally presented with the Presidential Unit Citation which had been awarded 48 years previously.

223 18 (NED Squadron In July 1943 the squadron, together with other NW Area based units, participated in

the RAAF's bombing campaign in the NEI, attacking targets on MacArthur's flank and

protecting his New Guinea advance. 55 For the remainder of that year the B-25s were

used for shipping searches and, when weather permitted, bombing raids on a variety of

targets to the limits of their range. Other activities such as supply drops, "fighter"

cover for allied convoys and searchlight co-operation exercises were also flown.

Excursions to Japanese held territory were in the form of photo reconnaissance flights

and on these occasions Japanese fighters were sometimes seen. 56

The shipping searches were usually flown each day by single aircraft to a pre arranged

course. The courses were given code names which in mid and late 1943 were those of

animals such as "jackass," "horse" or "giraffe". The majority of flights resulted in no

sighting of Japanese activity.

The squadron had a break from the mundane activities of maritime patrol with a

strafing raid, in the company of six Beaufighters, on villages on Traugan Island. There was also a single bombing sortie by one B-25 on Penfoei and four shipping attacks.

On one of these latter attacks seven B-25s were accompanied by five Beaufighters.

December was a busy month as 58 shipping searches were flown together with one photo reconnaissance and one transport sortie and two convoy exercises. In addition bombing raids were flown against Penfoei, Koepang, Atamboea and shipping was attacked at Wessel Lakes in New Guinea. 57

In relation to the administrative arrangements, the RAAF was responsible for the maintenance of aircraft flown by the NEI squadrons (18 and 120 SQNs) while RAAF

55 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan. p. 12 .. 56 A WM 64 Roll20, History sheets A50. No 18 SQN. 57 AWM 64 Rol120, History sheets A50. No 18 SQN.

224 Command exercised operational control over them. However, the RAAF was not

responsible for the control of the NEI base at Canberra. 58

Despite receiving the most modem medium bomber to be operated by the allies in the

NW Area 18 SQN still ran into difficulties with its aircraft. While the B-25 was an

improvement over the Hudson, the early models (B-25B and C) originally allocated to

18 SQN were found to be lacking when it came to self defence. In January 1944 Cole

advised RAAF Command that B-25s flying daylight raids were highly vulnerable to

fighter attack; the .303 waist guns were inefficient; and there was no defence for the

rear or undersurface of the aircraft. 59 He considered the modification of existing

Mitchells or the replacement of all existing Medium and GR bombers in the area with

B-25D-20-N aircraft to be an urgent requirement.

One month later Cole's request was partially satisfied with the delivery to 18 SQN of

eight B-25D-20-Ns, each armed with 12 machine guns. He reported "I consider that these aircraft are the best twin-engined G.R./Light Bomber type yet developed". 60 The training of aircrew at the RNMFS in the USA meant that gradually the RAAF flying contingent decreased. However, throughout the war, ground crews remained predominantly Australian with Dutch senior mechanics. 61

During January 1944 the B-25s flew several bombing strikes directed at Japanese facilities in the NEI. Nine aircraft were used for two raids on shipping near Tenau on

58 AA A705/12/501/301 CAS Conferences. Air Officers Commanding. Minutes of CAS Conference, June 20, 1944. For NEI forces in Australia the NEI government was to bear all costs of their forces with the exception of defence requirements which were made available from supplies obtained from the US under Lend-Lease. See AA A705/36/501/492 rt Tactical Air Force (No. 10 Operational Group) Minute from Finance Member to AOC 1st TAF, January 5, 1945. 59 A WM 66 617/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; January 1, 1944. Cole noted that the lower turret originally fitted to the B-25 had been removed and replaced with a fuel tank. He considered the aircraft more suitable for low level strafing than bombing. 60 A WM 66 617/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; February 1, 1944. These B-25s had been flown to Australia from the RNMFS by their crews. See Avery Op cit. p. 86. 61 Avery Op cit. p. 85.

225 January 4. Three B-25s, together with eight Beaufighters, set out to attack two cargo

and four escort vessels thought to be west of Kisar Island on January 7. The vessels

were not sighted and the B-25s returned with their full bomb loads. Bombing raids were flown to Koepang on January 9 (six aircraft), Lautem on January 10 (four

aircraft) and Laha on January 17 (four aircraft). 62 Laha was a target again in February

1944 as was Toeal and Tanimbar Island. On February 16 eleven B-25s attacked Ambon.

During March 1944 the squadron planned to stage mast high attacks on Japanese

shipping in Manomere harbour. Four aircraft set out but the mission was cancelled

when they reached Drysdale and could go no further due to mechanical problems. The

B-25s flew a similar mission three days later but this also was unsuccessful as the

Japanese ships could not be located. Greater success was achieved in bombing and two attacks, each by seven aircraft, were flown against Penfoei. During the same month elements of 18 SQN were deployed to Pot Shot and flew shipping searches from that base. 63

During April and May 1944 the squadron's main activities were photo reconnaissance

sorties and bombing raids, with targets including Penfoei, Lautem, Dili, Koepang,

Langoer, Wissell Lakes, Tanimbar Island and Soemba Island. After this period of combat the squadron returned to flying shipping searches. Bombing raids were flown again on June 19 when 15 aircraft attacked Cape Chater airfield. This was to be the target for an eight aircraft raid on June 24 and a seven aircraft raid on June 26. On

June 28 Cape Chater was bombed again, by eight B-25s while another three bombed

Dili. For the remainder of 1944 the squadron flew shipping strikes, photo reconnaissance sorties and offensive sweeps. 64

62 A WM 64 Roll 20, History sheets A50. No 18 SQN 63 ibid. 64 ibid.

226 In March 1945, 18 SQN flew shipping searches and destroyed barges and motor launches. One B-25 crew had been trained in the operation of the Sperry bomb sight and it was decided to use this crew in the lead aircraft of bomber formations. The squadron also participated in attacks on Cape Chater, Ende and Goerita Bay, where heavy AAA fire was encountered. 65 However, similar to the other medium bomber squadrons, 18 SQN found that the important targets had moved out of their range. During April 1945 some B-25s were deployed to Truscott. There were few offensive operations by 18 SQN mounted from the NW Area after this point. In fact no operation was flown at all in July 1945. As part of the OBOE operations the squadron was moved to Balikpapan but did not arrive until September 1945, after the end of hostilities. 66

Following the end of the war the RAAF relinquished control of 18 SQN. The unit remained in the NEI and continued to fly operations against Indonesian nationalists until 1949. 67

Dive Bombers

12 SQN spent May 1943 flying shipping patrols and anti submarine searches. They went into combat again on June 18, when 11 Vengeances, escorted by Beaufighters of 31 SQN, attacked the villages of Lingat' and Werain in the Tanimbar Islands

(approximately 350 miles north of Darwin). Photo reconnaissance had detected the construction of an airfield on Selaru Island. The construction workers were believed to be accommodated in these villages. It was therefore decided to bomb the villages as a means of terminating the airfield construction. The squadron encountered minimal

AAA fire and one Japanese aircraft. 68 Later that month the squadron was ordered to

65 A WM 66 15/8/1 Bombs Gone. March 1945. 66 A WM 64 Roll 20, History sheets A50. No 18 SQN. 67 Avery~. p. 85. 68 RAAF Museum, 12 SQN file 12 Squadron.

227 move to Merauke in Dutch New Guinea. The ground staff travelled by sea, via Hom

Island while the air echelon and a nucleus of ground staff moved to Cooktown,

Queensland, from where they continued to fly patrols.

The ground staff arrived at Merauke on July 8, 1943, and spent the following three

months constructing a camp site amongst swamps. They were employed also on road building, stevedoring, laying cables, timber cutting, saw milling and other construction

activities. By September they had succeeded in building the camp site "into one of the most comfortable and attractive in the area". 69 On September 28 the squadron began· patrol flights from their new base.

Operations from Merauke were similar to those flown from the Northern Territory.

That is, anti submarine patrols, convoy duties, searches, food and supply drops and occasional strikes to support the Army. On October 9 a Japanese floatplane was sighted and fired upon, but it escaped into cloud. The last sortie with Vengeances was flown on July 5, 1944.70 By the end of July all aircraft had been ferried to lAD and the squadron had moved to Strathpine, Queensland, where it became non operational and based out of a tropical area for the first time in five years. 71

By February 1945 the RAAF would not have a requirement for a dive bomber. 72

69 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing file A Brief History of No12 Squadron RAAF Fighter defence of Merauke was provided by 23 P-40s of 86 SQN which arrived there on July 2-3, 1943. See Odgers Op cit. pp. 114-116 and Thursday Island State High School Torres Strait at War. TI State High School, 1987. pp. 28-31. 70 Shores and Smith Op cit. p. 37. 71 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing file. A BriefHistory No12 Squadron RAAF. 72 AA A705/1/501/437 Home Defence Expansion 73 squadron plan, Aircraft Requirements. Message from RAAF HQ to Austair Washington, February 27, 1945. An allocation was made of 150 Curtis A-25 Shrike dive bombers (a land based version of the Curtis SB2C Helldiver) to the RAAF. Ten of these reached Australia in November 1943. In January 1944 the Australian air representative in Washington was asked to withhold further deliveries. SeeK Meggs Vengeance! in Flightpath. Vol. 1, No. 4. p. 80.

228 Heayy Bombers

For the RAAF in the SWP A the heavy bomber was the Consolidated B-24 Liberator.

The first bombers of this type based in the NW Area were those belonging to the

USAAF' s 319th Bombardment Squadron (90th Bombardment Group), operating from

Fenton. In addition to bombing, the squadron flew photo reconnaissance missions,

sometimes with RAAF photographers as part of the aircraft's crew. 73 The 319th

Squadron was succeeded by the 380th (H) Bombardment Group. This Group

comprised the 528th, 529th, 530th and 531 81 Bombardment Squadrons which were based

at Manbulloo, Fenton and Long. The NW Area did not have the necessary

, infrastructure to cater for a full USAAF bombardment group so some of the aircraft

were kept at Charters Towers until the facilities at Fenton and other bases were

finished. 74 Even then, not all the aircraft could be based at Fenton. The aircraft at

Manbulloo staged through Fenton for operations. 75

The 3 80th (H) Bombardment Group was the main long-range bombing force to operate

from the NW Area until the RAAF acquired its own B-24s. Therefore they were

responsible for dropping the greatest tonnage of bombs on Japanese positions during

their time in the area. In May 1943 the group began its first Australian based missions

with bombing and reconnaissance sorties to targets in the NEI including the Celebes,

Ambon, Lombok and Halong. For long distance missions, such as those to Soerabaya,

the B-24s were staged through Corunna Downs (inland from Port Hedland) in Western

Australia. 76 Odgers notes that because of their great range and heavy bomb capacity

the B-24s made the most effective contribution achieved by the NW Area. The

geographic location of the Group enabled it to strike at locations well behind the

Japanese front lines which were out of reach of New Guinea based Fifth Air Force

73 Nelmes Op cit. p. 53. 74 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Minute from AOC NW Area to RAAF Command, April 7, 1943. 75 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Minute from Bostock to Kenney, Apri114, 1944. 76 Nelmes Op cit. p. 56.

229 units. These activities assisted MacArthur's advance along the north New Guinea coast by destroying installations and forcing the Japanese to retain defences well to the rear and thereby weakening their front lines. 77

The arrival of the 380th had not escaped the Japanese attention and on June 30 they attacked Fenton. The B-24 strikes had become significant enough for the Japanese to focus their air attacks almost wholly on Fenton and the USAAF base was to remain their primary target for the majority of bombing raids up until November 1943. 78

Bladin was obviously aware of the attention the B-24s would attract. In early July

1943 he requested reinforcement ofthe area's fighter Strength with the deployment of an additional squadron to Fenton. 79 Bostock was unable to provide the extra squadron but directed that the construction of 18 ground protective pens at Fenton be given a high priority. 80

While in the NW Area the Group came under the operational control of the RAAF. 81 The aircraft were often flown with either RAAF or USAAF crews. RAAF radar operators flew aboard specially fitted out aircraft. The RAAF also provided pilots and gunners. 82 In general there was a good mixture of experienced and inexperienced RAAF aircrew aboard the B-24s. Some pilots had flown on operations in Europe or

North Africa while several wireless operators and air gunners had completed operational tours on Catalinas. The crews were volunteers, in so far as one crew

77 Odgers Op cit. p. 120. 78 Clayton Op cit. p. 44. 79 AA A1969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Minute from AOC NW Area to RAAF Command, July 5, 1943. 80 AA A1969/l00/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Minute from Bostock to AOC NW Area, July 7, 1943. 81 RAAF Museum, Darwin documents box file. 38dh Bombardment group USAAF Association to "invade" Darwin. 82 When the 380th (H) Bombardment Group started training in the NW Area, Cole asked 16 gunners "to proceed to the gunnery school". They were replaced by experienced RAAF gunners. See A WM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; February 1, 1944.

230 member advised "When you joined the R.A.A.F. you automatically volunteered for the lot". 83

Fallowing the example of his predecessor in experiencing bombing raids the AOC NW

Area flew at least once on a sortie over the NEI. On November 8, 1943 Cole departed from Fenton with the 380th Group for Corunna Downs and then for a raid on

Soerabaya. He returned to Darwin two days later. 84

The continual long range operations made their mark on the crews of the 380th Group.

In April 1944 Bostock reported instances of fatigue amongst the USAAF crews and requested that the 90th (H) Bombardment Group be sent to Darwin to relieve the

3 80th. 85 As it happened, the 90th remained in the NE Area and the 3 80th was eventually replaced by RAAF B-24 squadrons.

The B-24 was one of the three heavy bombers used in large numbers by the USAAF

(the other two were the Boeing B-17 and the Boeing B-29 Superfortress). The B-24 was produced in greater numbers than the other two, even though the B-17 was the aircraft more favoured by the European based . This preference resulted in the availability ofB-24s for the allied forces in the Paci:fic. 86

General Kenney proposed that, as there was a surplus of B-24s emerging from the

Ford Motor Company's production line at Willow Run, 87 the RAAF should form seven

83 Correspondence from Mr AD Sieber, December 7, 1995. Mr Sieber noted occasionally an American photographer would fly with the RAAF crews. This, he claims, was to gain extra pay for flying a certain number of hours per month. 84 RAAF Museum, World War Two Australia box file. ED Plenty A Brief History of North-Western Area at Darwin. 85 AA Al969/100/6/320/5K3 Allied Air Force units under RAAF control. Minute from RAAF Command to Commander AAF, April24, 1944. 86 Kenney Op cit. p. 214. Mr AD Sieber pointed out the B-24 "was the one Allied heavy bomber suited to the Asian War because of its range. This before the B-29". 87 Despite Henry Ford's fanatical anti-semitism and his opposition to the war in Europe, partially on the grounds that he believed it was part of a conspiracy against him and his company, the Ford Motor Company built 8,685 B-24s at their Willow Run plant. See D Sherman Willow Run in Air & Space. Vol. 7, No.3. August/September 1992. pp. 74-84.

231 bomber squadrons. Kenney could then transfer the 3 80th (H) Bombardment Group

from the NW Area and move it north with the Fifth Air Force while the newly formed

RAAF squadrons could take over the USAAF's role in bombing targets in the NEI. 88

By late 1944 the Group's role had been largely met by the RAAF's newly formed B-24

squadrons. However the Group remained in the NW Area until mid January 1945 when they were ordered to join the Fifth Air Force units in the Philippines. 89

For the RAAF's needs Air Vice Marshal Jones requested 226 heavy bombers,

sufficient to equip seven squadrons and an Operational Training Unit (OTU).90

Initially ten ex USAAF B-24Ds were supplied to the RAAF (and were flown at

Tocumwal) while crew training was undertaken with USAAF B-24s at Nadzab, New

Guinea.91 In May 1944 the first of the new model B-24Js were delivered from the production lines to the RAAF. The RAAF would eventually receive 287 Liberators in different versions. 92 The B-24 was to be an interim weapon. The Australian

Government had planned to manufacture Avro Lancaster aircraft in Australia and the type was to be operated in the Pacific theatre by the RAF. 93

88 Kenney Op cit. p. 341. 89 Nelmes Op cit. p. 64. 90 AA A705/l/501/533 Acquisition of heavy bomber aircraft from overseas. Minute from CAS to Allied Air Force HQ, June 9, 1944. The squadron establishment for heavy bomber units was 12 aircraft. 91 AA A705/231/9/1251 Establishments General-Heavy Bomber Squadrons. Minute from CAS to D ofT, June 27, 1944. It was decided that training of B-24 crews should take place in an area similar to that in which they were to fly. Darwin was considered unsuitable while Nadzab in New Guinea was more appropriate. See also AA A705/1/501/533 Notes of meeting June 30, 1944. General Kenney confirmed that up to 28 RAAF crews per month could be trained at Nadzab. Jones agreed to 120-150 RAAF ground staff being provided to assist with maintenance. Some of the RAAF aircrew selected for training on B-24s travelled to Townsville by train and then flew to the training areas in New Guinea aboard C-47s. 92 For a very comprehensive account of the acquisition of the B-24s and their service with the RAAF see Nelmes. .Qp__g!. The operations of the 380th (H) Bombardment Group are described in G&G Horton King of the Heavies. 93 AA A705/l/501/533 Acquisition of heavy bomber aircraft from overseas. Minute from CAS to Minister for Air, August 1, 1944. As the Lancaster was to be produced in Australia and was likely to be flown by the RAF in the Pacific Theatre, Jones recommended the RAAF acquire a flight of four aircraft to gain experience in their use. He requested the aircraft be supplied with fully trained crews, ground .staff and spares and be funded in a similar manner to the Spitfires. They would be attached to the RAAF's heavy bomber wing. For comments on the RAAF's proposed use of the Lancaster see Stephens Power plus Attitude. p. 80. McCarthy notes that it was

232 The question that must be raised is how did the RAAF intend to deploy the heavy bombers in the NW Area? In September 1943 Cole issued a directive on the employment of heavy bomber aircraft. Their first task was to conduct adequate reconnaissance of sea routes and enemy bases, with the intention of giving at least 3 6 hours notice of sea borne attacks on the NW Area and Torres Strait. The second task was the location and destruction of Japanese forces and installations wherever possible in order to prevent a concentration of enemy forces capable of conducting offensive operations. In relation to the second task, the method of attack was dependent on the nature of the target and the strength of its defences and would be decided by the attacking squadron's CO. However, the instruction was given "Shipping, barges and other surface borne vessels are to be bombed and strafed from mast head height. "94

While it seems strange to use a strategic asset such as a heavy bomber for early warning it should also be kept in mind that the threat of invasion was still present.

Cole had issued a directive, in September 1943 stating "the main role ofthe R.A.A.F. is to defend the North West of Australia and Torres Strait Area". 95 He was still issuing instructions and conducting exercises to counter invasions as late as January 12, 1944.

As noted earlier, it was not until January 18, 1944 that Cole announced that the threat of invasion was no longer anticipated. 96

proposed that the RAF would have ten squadrons of Lancasters based on Okinawa. See McCarthy A Last Call of Empire. p. 126. So far as Australian production was concerned, the Lancaster's successor the was built by GAF at Fishermans Bend. See S Wilson Lincoln, Canberra and F-Ill in Australian Service. Aerospace Publications, Weston, ACT, 1989. 94 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 10/43, September 10 1943, "Employment of Heavy Bomber Aircraft". 95 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 7/43, September 5, 1943. 96 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Addendum to Operational Policy Directive 7/43, January 18, 1944. The fear of invasion of northern Australia should not be looked at in isolation. As has been noted elsewhere in this thesis there were fears of an invasion at Perth in March 1944 and as late as February 22, 1944 Cabinet approved funding for the construction of anti-tank defences at Sydney, Newcastle and Port Kembla. See AA A5954/46/810/1 Cabinet minute 3340; February 22, 1944. On March 24, 1944 Japanese reconnaissance aircraft were sighted over Broome and Derby. See AA A5954/l/412/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 194. This was in spite of the opinion of the JCS that Australia was no longer in danger of invasion following the Japanese defeats at Midway and Coral Sea in 1942. However, in 1943 Admiral

233 Cole issued instructions prioritising targets. In the vicinity of Ambon, Ceram and Babo the highest priorities were dock installations and shipping; in the vicinity of

Balikpapan, Tjepoe and Wonokromo it was oil refineries and power plants; while in the vicinity of Sourabaya, Macassar and Batavia it was to be dock installations and shipping. All bombers were to attack targets of opportunity such as shipping, stores and concentrations of aircraft. If there was a choice of shipping, aircraft carriers and large tankers had the highest priority, followed by troop transports, merchant vessels, small tankers, small craft, barges, cruisers, seaplane tenders and convoy escorts.

Cole's instruction added "Small ships, barges and similar light craft are to be destroyed whenever sighted providing such action can be carried out without jeopardising the success of the operation for which the aircraft were briefed". 97 Cole noted that heavy bombers would not normally operate in daylight in the vicinity of Japanese fighter air fields in formations ofless than three aircraft.

Despite the large number of Liberators received, the RAAF tended to deploy them in small numbers. Unlike the hundreds of B-24s arid B-17s flown over Europe on daylight raids by the 8th Air Force or the thousand bomber raids conducted by the

Lancasters, Stirlings and Halifaxes of the RAF' s , the RAAF operated its strategic bombers in small numbers-either individually or in flights of three, six or twelve aircraft. The question asked is why? Stephens provides an answer by pointing out that unlike Europe, targets in the SWP A were small, dispersed and remote from allied bases. There were few large cities worth attacking outside Japan.

Those small targets did not require the mass or area bombing tactics employed in

Europe. This was a legitimate use of the heavy bombers as their capabilities (very long range with a heavy bomb load) were suited to their role. 98

King told a journalist that he would welcome a Japanese occupation of Darwin as it would spread their resources. 97 AA A1196/6/60/501/142 North Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Policy Directive 10143, September 10, 1943, "Employment of Heavy Bomber Aircraft". 98 Stephens Power Plus Attitude. p. 80. It is interesting to note that the USAAF also used B-24s in small numbers against some targets in the NW Area and single aircraft for shipping patrols. See

234 Initial RAAF plans were for each heavy bomber squadron to fly 516 hours per month.

Early in 1945 Charlesworth asked for this time to be increased to 1,000 hours. He pointed out that 516 hours was insufficient for heavy bomber squadrons in the NW

Area to perform their designated functions. Aircraft from these squadrons were required to fly three daily patrols, each of 11 hours. For two squadrons, flying time would be approximately 1,000 hours. There would be no flying time left for training or operational strikes. He noted the consequent drop in morale. Charlesworth added the average duration of operational sorties equalled twelve hours. This meant 43 sorties per month could be flown and as there were 14 crews per squadron each crew flew three sorties per month. 99 The DCAS replied by stating an increase to 1, 000 hours was not possible because no increased provision for aircrew, aircraft or maintenance personnel could be made. There was no objection to an increase to 800 hours. 100

Planning started in May 1945 for the movement ofNo. 82 (Heavy Bomber) Wing from Darwin to Balikpapan. Planning for the move continued until the war's end. Such a move was a serious logistics exercise. For example, adequate transport for the wing's personnel and materiel was four liberty ships. 101 On December 7, 1945, orders were given to move the wing to Tocumwal.

AA A1966/5/49 Allied Air Force Intelligence Summary-No. 176126 January 1944 to No. 189111 March 1944. Intelligence Summary Serial No. 177, January 29, 1944. 99 AA A705/36/501/461 Proposal to increase rate of effort of heavy bomber squadrons­ Organisational aspects. Minute from AOC NW Area to Secretary Air Board. February 1, 1945. 100 AA A705/36/501/461 Proposal to increase rate of effort of heavy bomber squadrons­ Organisational aspects. RAAF Organisational Memo 680 of February 13, 1945. 101 AA A705/50/501/74 Movement of 82 Heavy Bomber Wing. Message from RAAF Command Advance HQ to AOC inC PAC ECH, May 5, 1945.

235 Table 8.2 RAAF B-24 Units.

UNIT WING MAIN BASE ADVANCE BASE

70TU Tocumwal NSW

12 SQN 85 Darwin NT Truscott WA

21 SQN 82 Fenton NT Truscott WA

MorotaiNEI Palawan

23 SQN 82 Long NT Truscott WA

24SQN 82 Manbulloo NT Truscott WA

Fenton NT Palawan

Morotai NEI

25 SQN Cunderdin W A Corunna Downs

Truscott WA

Learmonth WA

99SQN 85 Darwin NT

102 SQN Queensland

200 Flight Leybum Qld Darwin NT

Morotai NEI

201 Flight Darwin NT

The Oil Fields

The US Strategic Bombing Survey notes that the most strategic targets in the SWP A were the Borneo oil fields, especially those at Tarakan and Balikpapan. 102 Kenney was well aware of the importance of the oil fields and claimed if he could destroy them the

Japanese would be unable to sustain their war effort. 103 Kenney noted the concentration· of Japanese aircraft in the Philippines and stated if the AAF could destroy the refineries at Edelanu and Pandasari the fuel supply to the Philippines would

102 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan. p. 8. 103 Kenney Op cit. pp. 341-342.

236 Map 9.1 The Netherlands East Indies us· 130. 135.

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A u s T R "' A ----;------~'~~~~------tos• -uo· ns· 1zo· 1zs· 130" 135. Map copied from AAF SWP A Intelligence Summary Serial No 176. be curtailed and the Japanese would be unable to use their air forces to oppose the allied invasion. 104 Kenney's plan was to obtain a number of Boeing B-29s and base them in Darwin. With their long range and heavy bomb load they would have been ideal for raids on the Borneo oil fields. Unfortunately this plan did not eventuate.

General Arnold told Kenney the B-29s were to be based in China and the Mariana

Islands (following their capture by the US Navy). No B-29 would be available for

Kenney. Furthermore Palembang, on Sumatra, was considered to be a bigger producer of aviation fuel and it could be reached by India based bombers. 105 In the meantime the 380th Group's B-24s operating to their limits flew the 16 hour round trip from

Darwin to Balikpapan. Both Cole and Bostock were keen to use the B-24s to attack

Balikpapan-the only important refineries within range of SWP A based aircraft. The 380th Group flew their raid on the night of December 11-12, 1943. Cole wanted a further attack, this time in daylight, to gain better results. This proposal had Kenney's support but was opposed, on the grounds of possible heavy losses, by the 380th

Group's commander. The raid did not occur because Cole and Bostock agreed against staging attacks against well defended rear facilities as the risks were too great. 106

Further attacks on the oil fields came after the RAAF received its own B-24s and operated them from advanced bases.

12 Squadron

In December 1944 the squadron's personnel and vehicles moved from Strathpine to

Cecil Plains, Queensland where the first B-24 arrived on February 5, 194 5. 107 By the end of that month 12 SQN had 80 officers, 506 other ranks and ten aircraft under the command of Wing Commander NG Hemsworth (a sudden growth from one officer, four airmen and no aircraft in the preceding December).

104 ibid. p. 426. Kenney wrote that these refineries were producing most of the Japanese aviation fuel. 105 ibid. p. 378. 106 Odgers~. p. 120-121. 107 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing file. A BriefHistory No 12 Squadron RMF. Following the squadron's arrival at Strathpine most personnel had been posted to other units in their home states leaving only a nucleus strength in anticipation of reforming as a heavy bomber unit.

237 An advanced party arrived in Darwin on March 21, 1945. The remainder of the

squadron moved to the NW Area during April and the first week of May. Operational flying began with a search on May 24. Three days later the squadron's B-24s strafed

three vessels, heavily damaging one. 108 A detachment from 12 SQN was sent to Fenton where it operated alongside aircraft from 21 and 24 SQNs. The B-24s

undertook strikes against shipping in the Timor, Banda and Arafura Seas. 109

Following the Japanese surrender, all armament, armour plating and unnecessary

equipment were removed from the Liberators. Freight panniers were fitted in the

bomb bays and 12 SQN became a transport unit. Food and medical supplies were

dropped to POW camps in Java; and medical evacuations and POWs were flown south_ no

In early 1946 12 SQN's tasks in the NW Area were complete and the unit moved to

Amberley in March. The following month the squadron became part of 82 (Bomber) Wing.n 1

21 Squadron

21 Squadron was formed as a Citizen Air Force unit at Laverton in 1936. In 1940, equipped with Wirraways it was transferred to Singapore. Early the following year and re-equipped with Buffalos the squadron moved to Malaya. Following the defeat in Malaya the squadron returned to Australia and was reformed as a dive bomber unit at

Gawler, South Australia with Vengeances in 1943. The next major re-equipping was in September 1944 when the unit received its first B-24s at Leyburn. At the end of that month the squadron had a strength of 51 officers and 415 airmen.

108 Nelmes Op cit. p. 120. 109 Wilson Boston, Mitchell and Liberator in Australian Service. p. 122. 110 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing file. A BriefHistory No 12 Squadron RAAF. 111 RAAF Museum, 12 SQN file. 12 Squadron.

238 Orders for the move to the NW Area were received on October 31. (The advance echelon had departed for Fenton three days earlier.) Squadron equipment, accompanied by a loading party, was delivered to Brisbane for transport by ship while the main body of personnel travelled by road and rail to Mount I sa and then by road to

Fenton. The advance echelon had two months in which to prepare the base for the squadron. Work included repairs to some existing buildings and the reconstruction of others and the installation of a water supply. The move by the main body occupied the squadron from December 4. While still at Leyburri, on November 11, two Liberators were used as part of the fleet of aircraft used to convey films of the 1944 Melbourne

Cup to troops in operational areas ofthe SWPA. One B-24 was sent to , the other to Darwin. The films were screened in forward areas the day after the race. 112

21 SQN's HQ, at Fenton with Group Captain Parker as CO, commenced to function on December 28, 1944 and at the end of that month personnel had increased to 91 officers and 485 airmen. The squadron was equipped with 12 Liberators, one Tiger

Moth, 45 vehicles of different makes and configurations, nine trailers and four Indian motor cycles. Most of the B-24s arrived from Leybum on January 3, 1945 and operational flying commenced eight days later.

During January 1945 21 SQN flew 739 hours which included 49 operational sorties.

Operations were similar to those flown by the other Liberator squadrons-armed reconnaissance and shipping searches. The shipping searches were usually flown by a single aircraft, with a crew of ten or 11, over a pre-determined search area. These flights were up to 13 hours duration. If no vessel was detected the B-24 photographed

Japanese installations or attacked a secondary target. Secondary targets included

Laha, Cape Chater and Maomere. On a typical shipping search on January 30, the B-

112 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll22. 21 Squadron.

239 24 found no Japanese ship in its area and bombed Viqueque from 4,200 feet. It then flew several strafing runs at 1, 000 feet. 113

Occasionally the B-24s were attacked by Japanese fighters. On March 1 six aircraft set out from Truscott to bomb wharf installations, warehouses and oil tanks at

Bandjoewangi. Due to bad weather only one aircraft bombed the target. The other five attacked the alternative target, Ampenam, and were intercepted by three "Oscars", one "Ramp" and one "Irving". The B-24s claimed one "Oscar" damaged and suffered no damage to themselves. 114 Eleven days later six aircraft from 21 SQN together with six B-24s from 25 SQN attacked the barge staging point at Mapin on Sumbawa Island.

On this raid 21 SQN's aircraft dropped 64x500 lb, 60x125 lb and 16 incendiary cluster bombs. 115

On April6, four B-24s, flying with aircraft from other squadrons (B-24s from 24 SQN and 50 B-25s) participated in an attack on a Japanese convoy made up ofthe 5,700 ton cruiser Isuzu and four escort vessels. Despite opposition from fighters (21 SQN claimed one "Oscar" shot down) and AAA, the B-24s attacked at 10,000 feet and dropped 28x500 lb bombs but failed to score a hit on the ships, some of which were later sunk by the submarines USS Gabilan and Charr. 116 Odgers notes that the reason for the Isuzu' s voyage was to pick up troops and equipment on Timor. He states that its presence was "a direct challenge by the Japanese Navy to Allied aircraft in the

Northern Territory". 117

113 ibid. 114 An interesting mixture of aircraft. "Oscar" was the Nakajima Ki-43 army fighter; "Ramp" was the Mitsubishi A6M3 navy fighter and "Irving" the Nakajima JlNl navy night fighter or reconnaissance aircraft. Given the differences between the two Japanese services it is unusual that army and navy aircraft were encountered at the same location. Perhaps the B-24 crews mistook the identity of the interceptors. 115 RHS History Sheets A50, Rol122. 21 Squadron. 116 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing box file. 21 Squadron. 117 Odgers Op cit. p. 405.

240 In addition to the shipping searches the B-24s flew anti submarine patrols and harassing missions. A typical example of the latter occurred on the night of April 12 when a single B-24 dropped 10x100 lb bombs and two cases of beer bottles on Kendari. 118

Also in April, a detachment of personnel from 82 Wing was transferred to Morotai

Island to service B-24s that flew operations from that island under the direction of the

151 Tactical Air Force (TAF). During April eight B-24s were attached to the TAF and

21 SQN flew 495 hours from Fenton and 352 from Morotai. Later in the war the squadron had a permanent detachment operating from Morotai. The first operation from there was flown on April 13 when six aircraft from 21 and 24 SQNs attacked personnel areas at Tawao. The raid was repeated two days later. On April 17 six Liberators attacked barracks on Tarakan. 119

A detachment of 21 SQN aircraft was based at Palawan, the western most island of the Philippines to cover the landings at Brunei Bay and Labuan. This brought them further north than any other Pacific based RAAF aircraft with the exception of the Catalinas. 120

Instructions for the squadron to move as part of 82 Wing from Fenton were received on May 31. The squadron HQ ceased to function on June 8 and personnel were accommodated closer to Darwin at army camps at 40 Mile and 51 Mile. On June 17 the Northern Territory based component of the squadron embarked aboard the liberty ship Louis Arguello for Balikpapan. In the meantime the Morotai detachment continued operations which usually took the form of single aircraft shipping searches or flights of three B-24s attacking targets such as Labuan and Brunei Bay. Several

118 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll22. 21 Squadron. 119 Odgers Op cit. p. 454 and Waters OBOE-Air Operations over Borneo 1945. pp. 32-33. 120 Nelmes Op cit. p. 111.

241 missions were flown by flights of three and six aircraft against Balikpapan in that same month. 121

The squadron's last offensive mission was flown on August 12 1945 when three B-24s bombed Halmahera. Following the Japanese surrender the aircraft were used in a transport role to ferry personnel south. In December 21 SQN moved from the NW Area to Tocumwal, NSW. 122

23 Squadron

23 SQN, commanded by Wing Commander RA Dunne, exchanged its Vengeances for

Liberators at Leyburn in November 1944. Following the re-equipping, the personnel moved to the NW Area in two groups. The aircraft were flown from Leyburn,

Queensland, to Long by skeleton crews. Ground personnel and the remaining aircrew travelled between Leyburn and Mt Isa by train. From Mt Isa they went by truck to

Birdum, where they boarded a train to Adelaide River. The final part of the trip to Long was by truck. 123

In the NW Area the squadron flew shipping patrols and attacked Japanese vessels whenever they were located. On occasions this was done by gun fire. As one former

23 SQN member advised "so we became fighter bombers. On this type of operation were carried only a few bombs but extra ammunition for the guns". These patrols were flown during daylight by single aircraft and their duration could exceed 13 hours. 124 On these long flights the pilot and co-pilot would normally take shifts at flying the aircraft. Some crew members would rest while others kept watch. The navigator, however, was on duty for the entire flight, monitoring the LORAN long-

121 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll22. 21 Squadron 122 RAAF Museum, 82 Wing box file. 21 Squadron. 123 Correspondence from Mr AD Sieber, December 28, 1995. 124 ibid.

242 range radio set which gave location "fixes" on beacons at places such as North West Cape.125

When not flying on operations, B-24 crew undertook bombing and gunnery practice.

For recreation they swam at Mendil Beach, read, played cards, wrote letters and did

crossword puzzles. 126

24 Squadron

24 SQN was formed at Amberley and flew Wirraways, Airacobras and Vengeances before moving to Lowood, Queensland in March 1944. On May 22 the squadron's advance echelon arrived in the NW Area and for the remainder of the month personnel and equipment was moved to Manbullo. The squadron was placed under the control ofthe 380th (H) Bombardment Group.

The first five Liberators were received on June 3 of that year and Wing Commander

JB was appointed CO on June 27. During that month more aircraft were delivered and were flown to Manbullo. Thus 24 SQN became the first RAAF unit to operate the B-24 in the NW Area. The first operational mission, a supply drop in

Western New Guinea was flown on July 6. 127 The first combat mission was in early

August, when a B-24 made three bombing and strafing attacks on a 1,500 ton vessel near the Bandar Islands. 128

A total of 53 operational missions was flown the following month. These were shipping searches and raids on targets in the NEI. Unfortunately, on August 5, the squadron suffered its first casuality when a B-24 crew member was killed by AAA fire from a ship near Banda Island.

125 MV Nelmes Australia, the RAAF and the Liberator. Paper presented at the A WM History Conference, 1990. p. 13. 126 Correspondence from Mr AD Sieber, December 28, 1995. 127 RAAF Museum, 24 SQN file. BL Thomas No. 24 Squadron, A Short History. 128 Wilson Boston, Mitchell and Liberator in Australian Service. p. 118.

243 At the beginning of September, 24 SQN moved to Fenton. During the remainder of the month 34 operations were flown from the new base, including raids on targets in

Java and Borneo. 129

On November 13, 1944 the squadron came under the control of No. 82 Wing. The wing, under the command of Group Captain D Kingwell, was formed in August 1944, with its HQ at Fenton and comprised 21, 23 and 24 SQNs. 130 On January 23, 1945 the first RAAF Liberator to be lost in combat against the Japanese was shot down by AAA during an attack on Cape Chater. 131 The following month another aircraft was lost, this time through an accident while landing at Fenton. A third was lost soon after take off from Truscott on March 23. 132 During February and March the squadron flew 60 and 76 operations respectively.

24 SQN participated in the April6 attack on the cruiser Isuzu. The squadron lost two aircraft, shot down by Japanese fighters.

In keeping with the other No. 82 Wing flying units, a detachment of 24 SQN

Liberators was deployed to Morotai during May, to operate with the 1st TAF. In the meantime 24 missions were completed by the aircraft remaining at Fenton. 133

The remaining squadron elements departed Darwin on June 17 for the voyage to

Morotai. Meanwhile the Morotai detachment completed 113 · missions that month, attacking targets on Borneo, the Celebes and the Philippines. Two more aircraft were lost in combat the following month, one over Balikpapan, the other at Timboney. The squadron's ground detachment left Morotai on July 12 and reached Balikpapan 12 days later. Fallowing the cessation of hostilities the squadron was engaged in shipping

129 RAAF Museum, 24 SQN file. ED Plenty A BriefHistory ofNo. 24 (City ofAdelaide) Squadron. 130 Nelmes Qg__Q!. p. 91. 131 RAAF Museum, 24 SQN file. BL Thomas No. 24 Squadron, A Short History. 132 RAAF Museum, 24 SQN file. ED Plenty A BriefHistory ofNo. 24 (City ofAdelaide) Squadron. 133 ibid.

244 escorts, patrols and transport of personnel. On December 7 the squadron began

moving from Morotai to Tocumwal. 134

99 Squadron

The final B-24 unit to move to the NW Area was 99 SQN. This squadron was formed

at Leyburn, Queensland on February 1, 1945 under the command of Squadron Leader

JH Marshall. The first aircraft arrived on March 8 and later that month the squadron

moved to Jondaryan.

The movement of the squadron's 700 personnel and 14 aircraft to the NW Area began in May 1945 but this had not been completed before the war's end. Instead the B-24s were put to work ferrying released Australian POWs south and returning with cargo.

Thus 794 former POWs and 85,368 pounds offreight were moved. 135

In the NW Area the squadron was based at Darwin and came under the direct control of No. 85 (HB) Wing HQ on September 22, 1945. 136 No. 85 (HB) Wing ceased to function on November 25, 1945 and it was disbanded within the NW Area. 137 The two squadrons that comprised that Wing were absorbed into No. 82 (HB) Wing. 138

On November 13, 1945 the order was given for 99 SQN to move from Darwin to

Tocumwal. It then came under the command of HQ Eastern area, with its establishment reduced to eight aircraft. 139 99 SQN was disbanded on June 5, 1946.

134 ibid. 135 RAAF MuseUm., 99 SQN file. 99 Squadron. 136 No. 85 Wing comprised 12 and 99 SQNs and was to replace No. 82 Wing in the NW Area when this latter unit moved to Balikpapan. See Odgers Qn...m. p. 4 77 and Nelmes Op cit. p. 119. 137 AA A705/151/2/1109 Disposal of Units in the North-Western Area. RAAF Organisation Memorandum No. 863. November 13, 1945. 138 Nelmes Op cit. p. 143 .. 139 AA A705/151/2/1109 Disposal of Units in the North-Western Area. RAAF Organisation Memorandum No. 863. November 13, 1945.

245 201 Flight

201 Flight was a secret radio and radar experimentation unit, intended to continue the

pioneering work of the 380th (H) Bombardment Group's radar countermeasures

section. 140 The flight was formed at Laverton on March 10, 1945 under the command

of Wing Commander CS Davis DFC. Two B-24s were allotted to the flight and these were sent to 1 Aircraft Performance Unit, at Laverton, for modifications which included the removal ofthe lower and the installation of AN/APR1 receivers

(which were replaced by AN/APR4 receivers). Squadron personnel were trained in the use of the receivers at Laverton.

A detachment from the flight comprising eight officers, 88 personnel and two B-24s was transferred to Darwin on April 17. The war ended before any operational flying was undertaken. The detachment returned to Laverton on October 27 and 201 Flight was disbanded on March 15, 1946. 141

Reconnaissance Units

In November 1943 Cole reported that the Trimentron photographic installation would be fitted to six B-24s of the 380th (H) Bombardment Group. A specialist flight was formed to undertake "all photographic commitments which are out of range or uneconomical to carry out by other types of ai~craft available in the Area". 142

However, this plan was to run into problems. The B-24s were used to photograph targets at distances greater than 550 miles from Darwin. Six B-24s would fly in formation with one to take the photographs and the other five for defence. (There was no fighter in the NW Area with the necessary range and the five escorting B-24s

140 Ne1mes Op cit. p. 133. 141 RHS History Sheets A50, Roll 118. No. 201 Flight. 142 A WM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; November 30, 1943.

246 constituted the minimum defensive formation acceptable due to the lack of efficient air gunnery control and the untrained state of air gunners.) Cole considered such reconnaissance to be extremely extravagant and unproductive as it was a waste of resources using such a large formation and it depleted the strength of the available strike force. He asked that a more suitable aircraft be sent to the area. The criteria for suitability included a minimum radius of action of 1, 100 miles and the ability to operate at an altitude in excess of20,000 feet. He suggested the most suitable aircraft was the

. 143 M osqmto.

No.1 PRU and 87 (PR) Squadron

By the end of 1943 No.1 PRU's aircraft strength comprised two Wirraways. The

Buffalos and Lancers had been transferred from the area earlier that year. One of the

F-4s had been sent to Townsville for an engine change that would take two months to complete. On its return to the NW Area it suffered accident damage. The other F-4 crash landed at Batchelor on December 9 due to an undercarriage failure. 144

Production of the had started in Australia in 1943. The fighter/bomber version, the FB Mk40 was built at Bankstown NSW. It was proposed that de Havilland modify one of the FB Mk40s for the reconnaissance role. 145 The conversion was successful and the RAAF gave instructions to convert up to six more aircraft for reconnaissance.

143 A WM 66 6/7/6 RAAF Command. Tactical Appreciations, North-Western Area. Monthly Tactical Appreciation; March 2, 1944. 144 Vincent Op cit. p. 134. 145 The modifications included the removal of cannon and machine guns and the installation of two F24 split vertical cameras in their place, while an F52 camera was placed in the bomb bay. Two additional fuel tanks were placed in the bomb bay and the aircraft's oil and oxygen reserves were increased.

247 The first converted Mosquito (A52-2) arrived at Coomalie Creek on May 29, 1944 and three days later, on June 1, 1944, this aircraft flew its first operational mission-a

seven hour flight to Ambon. 146

The Mosquito was a marked improvement over its predecessors. During its first

month in the area it flew nine operations over targets such as Flores, Soemba Islands,

Kendari, Ceram and Namlea. 147 On June 25, on a flight over Sourabaya the aircraft's

port engine failed. The remainder of the flight-900 miles to Broome-was flown on

the other engine.

The aircraft undertook a four day deployment to Biak (July 15-19) to photograph

Davao Gulf in the Philippines. Eleven days later the unit's CO, Squadron Leader S

Hermes, 148 flew the Mosquito on a 2,235 mile flight from Truscott to Balikpapan. An

hour and a quarter after the aircraft's return it was sent, with a different crew, to

Ambon. 149

A second Mosquito (A52-4) was delivered in August 1944. This aircraft was deployed to Noemfoor Island on August 22 to photograph Leyte Gulf Bad weather delayed the reconnaissance until September 4. Unfortunately, the bad weather

conditions had an adverse effect on the aircraft's performance and it ran out of fuel and crashed on the return from the target. The crew saved the film, destroyed the aircraft

and, two days later, were rescued by a USN Catalina. 150 The Noemfoor deployment was the last operation flown by No. I PRU. On September 10, 1944, 87 (PR) SQN was formed at Coomalie Creek. Squadron strength was one Mosquito and two

Wirraways. 151 During that month the Mosquito flew sorties over Koepang, Macassar

146 RAAF Museum 87 SQN file. A History of87 (PR) Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. 147 The remaining F -4 flew four operational sorties during that month. 148 Squadron Leader Hermes took over from Squadron Leader Lawrie as CO during July 1944. 149 Vincent Op cit. p. 137. · 150 RAAF Museum 87 SQN file. A History of87 (PR) Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. 151 The last surviving F-4 (A55-l) was destroyed on September 1 as a result of a structural failure.

248 and the Masel Islands. A third Mosquito (A52-6) was delivered on September 27 and

flew its first mission three days later.

During October 1944 the squadron flew sorties over the Celebes, Flores and Pare Bay.

Whilst Japanese Navy assets were photographed, the squadron's main interest was

Japanese airfields. The squadron was responsible for aerial reconnaissance in the NEI

(excluding western Java) including the Celebes and the Halmahera Islands and all other islands where airfields were known to exist. In November 1944 this area contained six major bases, 47 secondary air bases, six staging air fields as well as many other inactivate or emergency airstrips. 152 A big task for two Mosquitoes.

Generally the Japanese constructed several runways at each location, a short distance apart. The number of airfields and their multiple runways produced several advantages for the Japanese; it gave them flexibility in the movement of aircraft and it delayed and dispersed the allied air effort. That is, to maintain air superiority the AAF would need to render inoperable each of the multitude of runways otherwise the Japanese could move aircraft the short distance between runways and continue operations. In addition, during 1944, as the allies advanced towards the Philippines the Japanese started to move their aircraft from the NW Area to the North-Eastern Area using these airfields as part of a ferry route that ran through the Jefman Bay/Sorong region of New

Guinea. Thus the reconnaissance flights not only kept the AAF informed on the construction and use of airfields but they also provided advice on the movement of aircraft towards MacArthur's forces.

152 RAAF MuseUm 87 SQN file. A History of 87 (PR) Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. AAF intelligence reported the location of Japanese airfields as-14 on islands in the Arafura and Banda Seas, 17 on Borneo, 7 on the Celebes Islands, 12 in Dutch New Guinea, 12 on Java, four on Halmahera, six on Lesser Soenda and 12 on Timor. See AA A5954/l/411/1 Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 179. February 5, 1944. Two months later it was reported that there were 35 confirmed airfields in the Ceram-H.almahera area. See AA A5954/l/412/l Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 194. March 29, 1944.

249 87 SQN operations increased in November. More mrcrew were posted to the squadron and new aircraft were received. Sorties numbered 25 and of these 15 were over the Celebes Islands. For the first time east Java (using Broome as a staging point), Bali and the Kangean Islands were photographed. Occasionally AAA fire was encountered but was reported as inaccurate. On one occasion a l\:fosquito was found to have been hit by shell fragments. 153

By mid December the Squadron had received the last of the modified FB Mk40

Mosquitoes. However, bad weather hampered operations during that month and only four successful flights were made before the onset of the wet season. On December 20

Squadron Leader H Gamble took over as CO. There was a period of limited activity during the first three months of 1945. Unfortunately a Mosquito was lost in late

February and another in early March, leaving the squadron with three Mosquitoes and two Wirraways. 154 However the first of 23 imported Mosquito PR XVIs began arriving in March. These aircraft were from RAF stock and previously had been flown by the USAAF in Britain. They were fitted with high altitude Packard-Merlin 69 engines. 155 The first operation by the new aircraft was a five hour fifty minute flight over the Flores Islands.

Fourteen sorties were flown during April including five shadowing the cruiser Isuzu. It was during one of these sorties that the oniy attempt to intercept a Mosquito by

Japanese fighters was made. It was unsuccessful as the Mosquito easily outran the two "Oscars".

Operations increased during May (although four flights were cancelled due to bad weather). The highlight for that month was two flights to central Java, an area never

153 Vincent Op cit. p. 140. 154 Vincent Op cit. p. 142 .. 155 Wilson Beaufort, Beau:fighter and Mosquito in Australian Service. p. 186. The PR XVI used more fuel and thus had a shorter range than its Australian built counterparts.

250 before photographed. The following month a record 33 sorties were flown. Between

June 10 and 22 three Mosquitoes were deployed to Cocos (Keeling) Islands to photograph Singapore. The aircraft flew from Learmonth. Fuel shortage caused one

Mosquito to crash on North Keeling Island. Due to bad weather only one sortie was flown from Cocos (Keeling) Islands and this was over Christmas Island. 156

A flight over Timor on June 2 brought back photos that were of immediate interest to the RAAF. The Japanese had deployed a small number of medium bombers to Cape

Chater. These aircraft presented an implicit threat to northern Australia. The RAAF' s response was to send four B-24s from 23 SQN and six Spitfires from 548 SQN to destroy them.

The squadron's successful sortie was flown on July 23. This was a nine hour flight to

Semarang on Java. 157 In August two Mosquitoes were deployed to Morotai Island and came under the command of the AOC 1st TAF. From this base they flew 11 sorties between August 6-22 while nine sorties were flown from Coomalie Creek.

The squadron flew its last wartime sortie on August 15 when a Mosquito started to fly to Timor. The aircraft was recalled as the news of the Japanese surrender was received. In October 87 SQN moved from Coomalie Creek to Parkes NSW. Two

Mosquitoes were sent to Labuan on Borneo in January 1946 to photograph the island.

This proved unsuccessful due to the weather. The squadron was disbanded on July 24,

1946. 158

156 Christmas Island had been occupied by the Japanese since early 1942. Allied aircraft photographed the Island for the first time since the occupation in early 1944. The photographs suggested that the phosphate quarry was not being worked. AAF intelligence interpreted this to mean that Japan's phosphate needs were being met by Nauru and Ocean Island. Shipping from these two islands was at the time out of the range of allied bombers. If this was the case it would be reasonable to speculate that the allied anti shipping effort from the NW Area had helped to deny phosphate to the Japanese. See AA A5954/1/411/1 Headquarters Allied Air Forces. SWPA. Intelligence Summary. Serial No. 179. February 5, 1944. 157 RAAF Museum 87 SQN file. A History of87 (PR) Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. 158 Wilson Beaufort, Beau:fighter and Mosquito in Australian Service. p. 186

251 Transport Units

6 Communications Unit

The scheduled transport service intermingled with SAR flights continued to be the unit's main tasks for the remainder of 1943. The latter task was often successful. For example, on three separate occasions in early July, Walrus, Dragon and Tiger Moth aircraft participated in the rescue of six Spitfire pilots. In mid 1943 Cole asked

Bostock for twenty C-47s to transport food and equipment to his units scattered through the NW Area. The request was not met because of the need for these aircraft in the campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons. 159

On August 3, 1943 the unit's CO, FLTLT C Fenton, was promoted to Squadron

Leader. He continued to fly operationally and was himself the subject of SAR flights.

The unit continued to operate from Batchelor for the remainder of the war, under the direct operational control of HQ NW Area. Cole directed the unit to undertake tasks including mail flights (flown by Tiger Moths); drogue towing (Vengeances); H1F DIF calibration (Ansons); a bi-weekly supply flight to Gove and Truscott (Ansons); supply flights to radar stations and Millingimbi (Dragons); supply flights to radar stations not accessible to land-based aircraft (Walrus); and long distance transport flights

(Hudson). In addition two Catalinas were transferred to the unit for air sea rescue flights. 160

159 Odgers Op cit. p. 104. 160 AA All96/6/60/501/142 North-Western Area. Operational Policy Directives and Operational Instructions. Operational Instruction No. 25, November 1944, "Operational Employment of No.6 Com. Unit."

252 Chapter 10. Conclusion

This thesis set out to argue tha:t the RAAF' s campaign in the NW Area was neither a sideshow nor a misuse of air power. Instead it was vital to the overall allied Pacific war strategy and deserves greater recognition in contemporary and subsequent accounts of the war. It is hoped this thesis goes some way towards achieving this recognition.

At the end of the Second World War the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was the world's fourth largest air force, 1 with squadrons and personnel serving in Europe,

India, Burma and the Pacific theatres. Of the 49 flying squadrons in the SWP A, 23 had been stationed in the North-Western Area of Australia. 2

It has been demonstrated that the air campaign was conducted in several phases: the establishment of an RAAF presence in the NW Area; the defence of Darwin; the protection of MacArthur's western flank during his New Guinea campaign; shipping interdiction; and pinning down Japanese assets to ensure that they could not be deployed to other theatres. While the relevance of those operations as part of the NW Area campaign has been explained it would be an interesting topic for future research to compare them with other campaigns, such as the defence of Darwin with the ; shipping interdiction with RAF Coastal Command's operations against German shipping; or even the pinning down of Japanese forces with the RAF's air control practices in the Middle East in the 1920s and 30s.

Given the concentration of Australia's population and industry in the south east, the establishment of an RAAF presence in the north-west of Australia was a slow process

1 M Lax A Short History of the RAAF in M Lax (ed) Air Power Presentations 1995. APSC, Canberra, 1995: p. 161. 2 By February, 1945 the RAAF had a strength of 2,702 aircraft based in SWPA. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan. Military Analysis Division, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1947. p. 2. At June 1 that year there were 115,516 trained RAAF personnel (male and female) in SWPA. AA A5954/1/240/10 Allied Air Forces in Southwest Pacific Area. Comparison of USAAF and RAAF-strength at the· apex. At the war's end in August 1945 the total RAAF strength was 173,622 personnel and 5,585 aircraft. A Stephens Demobilisation and the Interim Air Force. Paper presented at the 1996 RAAF history conference. p. 4.

253 prior to 1939-41. Even after the outbreak of the war in Europe the RAAF still remained in the south-training aircrew for EATS and escorting shipping. The outbreak of war with Germany meant that three squadrons, however, were deployed to Darwin. This was a significant move given the scarcity of combat aircraft.

It was the first Japanese air raids which drew attention nationally to the NW area and saw the transfer of fighter squadrons to the area to conduct a defensive campaign. The defence of the NW Area may be judged a success in terms of numbers of aircraft destroyed in air to air combat. The Japanese lost 174 aircraft while the allies lost 68 interceptor fighters. Japanese personnel losses were much higher than those of the AAF as more than half their aircraft losses were multi crew bombers and allied , personnel, flying in a defensive role near their own bases, had a better chance of returning to them. However, there are other considerations. Despite a strong defensive fighter presence sporadic raids by large bomber formations continued up until November 12, 1943, well after the bombing of Port Moresby (the other major northern allied base in the SWP A) had ceased. The Japanese air forces, in this case, achieved some successes by attacking Australia while being on the defensive in other theatres. 3

Darwin started the war as a vital port and air base, used to reinforce the allies fighting

in the Philippines and the NEI. As the war moved back towards Japan and RAAF

units were transferred north, Darwin became a strategic backwater. This led to morale

problems with the personnel remaining in Darwin, especially the Spitfire pilots.

However the situation should be looked at in a contemporary light. The RAAF was

uncertain as to whether Darwin would be attacked again even in the later stages of the

war, as a means of diverting allied attention from their advances towards Japan. Given

their network of airfields the Japanese were capable of such actions. Therefore it was

important that Darwin was defended until the war's end.

3 Clayton Op cit. p. 44-45.

254 In the early stages of the Pacific war the RAAF had attempted an offensive campaign

from the NW Area. This was constrained by the availability of aircraft and the

bombload and serviceability of the few available aircraft. This situation started to

change with the arrival in late 1942 of an attack squadron of Beaufighters. Their

arrival marked a turning point in the air war as the RAAF was able to take the war to

the Japanese. The Beaufighters established an impressive reputation for destruction as

during their time in the area they destroyed numerous Japanese vessels, motor vehicles

and aircraft.

The main allied advance in the SWPA was along the north east coast ofNew Guinea.

There was no similar allied amphibious campaign through the NEI. Instead the RAAF conducted an offensive campaign directed at denying the Japanese the resources of the

NEI; destroying their installations and shipping, and generally harassing the troops occupying the islands. To undertake this task the RAAF used four heavy bomber squadrons and a medium bomber wing. These aircraft ranged far and wide attacking shipping, airfields, military installations and the sources of raw materials. Together with the US Navy's submarines they stemmed the sea borne flow of raw materials from the NEI. The bombers prevented the consolidation and movement .of tens of thousands of Japanese military personnel. Had the campaign not been conducted there seems no doubt that these personnel would have been available for use against the main allied advance.

Another anti-shipping initiative used by the RAAF was mine laying by Catalina flying boats. These aircraft flew at maximum range to lay mines in heavily defended harbours and shipping lanes to deny their use to the Japanese. Richard Hallion's comments best

255 sum up the mine laying operations; "aerial mining risked fewer lives, used fewer resources, and proportionally, achieved far more with less than the much-heralded submarine campaign". 4

The final conclusion is that the RAAF's North-Western Area campaign was an appropriate use of air power and was very important to the allied victory in the SWP A.

4 Hallion Op cit. p. 47.

256 APPENDIX A

MEMBERSHIP OF THE Affi BOARD

1939-19451

Chief of the Air Staff

Air Commodore (temp Air Vice Marshal) SJ Goble CBE, DSO, DSC, Croix de Guerre

Feb 28, 1939-Jan 9, 1940

Air Commodore WH Anderson CBE, DFC, Croix de Guerre (Belgium)

Jan 9, 1940-Feb 11, 1940

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett KCB, CBE DSO Feb 11, 1940-May 5,1942

Air Vice Marshal G Jones CBE, DFC May 5, 1942-Jan 14, 1952

Air Member for Personnel

Air Commodore JC Russell DSO Feb 28, 1939-Mar 11, 1940

Air Commodore WH Anderson CBE, DFC, Croix de Guerre (Belgium)

Mar 11, 1940-Nov 25, 1940

Air Commodore HN Wrigley DFC, AFC Nov 25, 1940-Aug 31, 1942

Group Captain (Ag Air Commodore) FWF Lukis OBE

Aug 31, 1942-Nov 30, 1943

Air Commodore WH Anderson CBE, DFC, Croix de Guerre (Beigium)

Nov 30, 1943-0ct 11, 1944

Air Commodore (Ag Air Vice Marshal) AT Cole CBE, DSO, MC, DFC

Oct 11, 1944-Jan 3, 1945

Group Captain (Temp Air Commodore) FRW Scherger DSO, AFC

Jan 3, 1945-May 9, 1945

1 RHS records. See also Coulthard-Clark The Third Brother. pp. 466-468.

257 Group Captain (Temp Air Commodore) JE Hewitt OBE

May 9, 1945-Nov 24, 1948

Air Member for Supply

Air Commodore WH Anderson CBE, DFC, Croix de Guerre (Belgium)

Jan 1, 1938-Mar 11, 1940

Air Member for Organisation and Equipment (AMOE)

Air Vice Marshal (Ag Air Marshal) R Williams CB, CBE, DSO

Mar 11, 1940-Sep 8, 1941

Air Commodore (Ag Air Vice Marshal) WH Anderson CBE, DFC, Croix de Guerre

(Belgium) Sep 8, 1941-May 15, 1942

Air Vice Marshal G Jones CBE, DFC May 15, 1942-Jun 4, 1942

Director General of Supply and Production (DGSP)

RLawsonOBE Mar 18, 1940-Jun 4, 1942

Air Member for Supply and Equipment (AMSE; replaced DGSP)

Wing Commander (Ag Air Commodore) GJW Mackinolty2

Jun 4, 1942-

Finance Member

MCLangslow Jul27, 1936-Jul1, 1940

CVKellway Jul1, 1940-Aug 25, 1941

HC Elvins Aug 25, 1941-Jun 26, 1946

2 Wing Commander Mackinolty died on February 24, 1951. His successor as AMSE was Group Captain JE Hewitt.

258 Business Member

WS Jones Dec 13, 1940-Feb 1, 1944

RMNesbitt Feb 1, 1944-Jan 31, 1948

Air Member for Engineering and Maintenance (AMEM, replaced AMOE)

Wing Commander (Ag Air Commodore) EC Wackett OBE

Jun 4, 1942-0ct 31, 1949

Air Board-Historical Background

Initially the RAAF had been administered by a structure that comprised, in descending

order, the Minister for Defence, the Air Council and the Air Board. Prior to the

formation of the RAAF, Australia's defence was undertaken by the Navy and Army.

The existing two service departments (those administering the Navy and Army) were

merged into the Department of Defence in 1921. Following its formation the Air

Force was placed under the Department's control.

The Air Council comprised the Minister for Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff, the

Chief of the General Staff, the Controller of Civil Aviation and two members of the Air

Board (one nominated by the Naval Member, the other by the Army Member).

McCarthy argues that the Air Council was formed as a compromise between the

exclusive control of Australian Air Power by either the Navy or the Army. 3 The

Council was constituted to advise the Minister on Air Force provisions necessary for the defence of Australia, on the general direction of air policy in its naval and military

aspects, and on the coordination of civil aviation. 4

McCarthy also notes that the powers of the Council were very wide and involved all aspects of the employment of air power. It considered recommendations made by the

3 Me Carthy Australia and Imperial defence: A Study in Air and Sea Power. p. 28. 4 Gillison op cit. p. 15.

259 Air Board and controlled finances. While the Air Council functioned it was clearly

impossible for the Air Force to propose any policy which was not tailored to meet

Navy or Army requirements. 5 The position of the Air Council, between the Air Board

and the Minister meant that the Board was unable to function as an autonomous entity,

nor did it have a direct line of communication to the Minister or Secretary of the

Department ofDefence.

The Air Council functioned until 1926 when the Defence Committee was created.

This Committee comprised the three Chiefs of Staff and a finance member. There was

a line of communication to the Minister through the Secretary. However, despite the

formation of the new body, the influence of the Navy and Army remained both in the

new Committee and the Supreme defence planning body the Council for Defence.

Fortunately for the RAAF and the CAS (Sir Richard Williams) this latter body seldom

met. 6

The Board was constituted on November 9, 1920 and comprised four members (of

whom three were RAAF officers) -The Director of Intelligence and Organisation

(DIO), Director ofPersonnel and Training (DPT) the Director ofEquipment (D of E)

and the Finance Member. 7 Membership and the titles of members changed in the years

leading up to the War. On March 11, 1940, the War Cabinet approved reconstruction

of the Air Board as a war time measure. 8 Under Air Force Regulations - Statutory

Rule 53/1940 the Board was restructured to comprise the:

• Chief of the Air Staff;

• Air Member for Personnel (AMP);

• Air Member for Organisation and Equipment (AMOE);

• Director-General of Supply and. Production (DGSP); and

5 McCarthy op cit. pp. 28-29. 6 Me Carthy ibid. pp. 29-30. 7 Coulthard-Clark The Third Brother. p. 26. 8 AA A5954/46/803/2 War Cabinet meeting February 28, 1940. Agendum No. 5211940.

260 • Finance Member.

The reasons behind the restructuring were that the RAAF had increased in size due to

its commitments with the Empire Air Training Scheme. This had in turn led to problems in organisation, personnel management, supply, maintenance and works.

The means of solving the problems were the reconstitution of the Air Board, from a peace time structure to one better suited to wartime, and the formation of Area

Commands. 9

As the War progressed the composition of the Board underwent change. Statutory

Rule 86/1940, of December 13, 1940, allowed for the appointment of a Business Member. In June 1942 (Statutory Rule 254/1942) the AMOE was replaced by the Air

Member for Engineering and Maintenance and the DGSP by the Air Member for

Supply and Equipment. 10

9 AA All96/35/502/13 Prime Minister's Statements- Opening of Parliament, April1940. Briefing by MC Langslow Secretary, Dept of Air to FG Shedden Secretary, Dept of Defence Co-ordination, April 15, 1940. 10 RHS Records.

261 APPENDIXB

LIST OF SQUADRONS AND LOCATIONS-193911

Lavert on 1SQN (Bomber) 2SQN (General Reconnaissance) 12 SQN (General Purpose)-one flight only (The Secretary of the Air Board anticipated that Wirraways would be available to replace the Hawker Demons equipping this flight by September 1, 1939) 21SQN (General Purpose)

Richmond 3SQN (Army Co-operation) 6SQN (General Reconnaissance) 9SQN (Fleet Co-operation)-less three aircraft embarked on cruisers 22SQN (General Purpose)

Point Cook lOSQN (General Reconnaissance)-equipped with training aircraft while awaiting the delivery of Sunderland aircraft from Britain

Pearce 14SQN (General Reconnaissance) 25 SQN (General Purpose)

Darwin 12 SQN (General Purpose)-in transit on August 27, 1939. (The Secretary of the Air Board anticipated that the aircraft would be operational the day after their arrival, August 28)

Brisbane 23 SQN (General Purpose)-one flight.

11 AA All96/35/502/6 Precautionary and War Stage Measures Taken Immediately Prior to an Outbreak of War, 1939-48. Reply to Secretary, Department of Defence by Secretary of Air Board, August 27, 1939.

262 APPENDIXC

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING NORTH-WESTERN AREA 1942-1945

Air Commodore Douglas EL Wilson commenced January 15, 1942

Air Commodore Francis M Bladin CB, CBE, MID, Silver Star (US) commenced March 25, 1942

Air Vice-Marshal Adrian T Cole CBE, DSO, MC, DFC commenced July 16, 1943

Air Commodore Alan M Charlesworth CBE, AFC commenced September 23, 1944

263 · APPENDIXD

NORTH-WESTERN AREA1

BASES AND UNITS 1939 - 1945

ADELAIDE RIVER

No 2 Base Personnel Staff Office 29.03.43 - 10. 5.44 No 24 (Base) Wing 7.12.42- 15.3.43 No 161 Radar Station 10. 2.44- 30. 4.44 No 321 Radar Station 28. 6.43 - 27. 7.43 No 44 RDF Wing 14.12.42- 22. 8.44 No 11 Signals Unit 6.12.42 - 22. 8.44 No 8 RAAF Postal Unit 15. 3.43 - 22. 2.46 HQ NW Area (rear echelon) July 42- 1945

USAAFUNITS 43rd Materiel Sqn 6. 5.42 709th Ordinance Co (AV) 24th Sig Platoon (AV) 33rd QM Co (AVN) T 2nd QM Co (AVN) Det

ALICE SPRINGS

No 57 Operational Base Unit 20. 5.42- 30. 4.46 No 24 Inland Aircraft Fuel Depot 20. 5.42- 30. 4.46

USAAFUNITS 4th Air Depot Group Servicing Det 6. 5.42 Weather Observer/Forcaster Unit 6. 5.42

BATCHELOR

No 2 Air Ambulance Unit 8. 5.42- 16. 1.43 (Detachment) 12. 2.43 - 22. 3.43 16. 9.43- 11. 1.44 No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron 15.12.42-26. 1.43 (No 1 Flight) No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron 21.12.43-9. 3.44 (Detachment) Batchelor Road 9. 3.44- Jul44

1 RAAF Museum Darwin documents box :file. No 6 Communication Flight 28.2.43-7.10.45 (No 6 Communication Unit- 29.10.43) No 53 Operational Base Unit 18. 3.42-20. 2.46 No 54 Operational Base Unit 23.10.42-24.11.42 No 83 Operational Base Unit 1. 1.45- 6. 3.45 No 5 Replenishing Centre 22. 6.42- 14. 7.42 29. 2.44- 19. 4.45 No 9 Replenishing Centre 22. 6.42- 26. 7.42 No 2 Torpedo Maintenance Unit 6. 4.43 - 17. 2.44 No 79 Wing Headquarters 20.11.43 - 29. 6.45 No 2 Wireless Unit 8.10.43- 28. 3.45 No 3 Wireless Unit 19. 1.44-27.11.45 No 208 Radar Station 2. 3.43 - 1. 4.43 No 318 Radar Station 4. 6.43 - 21. 8.44 2SQN 18. 8.42- 9. 4.43 12 SQN 13. 2.42- 2. 7.43 18 (NEI) SQN 8. 5.43 - 14. 8.45 31SQN 26.10.42- 2.11.42 77 SQN 19. 8.42- 15.10.42 34SQN 13.5.42- 14.7.42

USAAFUNITS

19th (H) Bombardment Group 20.12.41-30.12.41 HQ Far East Air Force 29.12.41- 15. 1.42 19th (H) Bombardment Group 30.12.41- 9. 3.42 (Ground Echelon Det) 27th (L) Bombardment Group 9. 2.42- 9. 3.42 38th (M) Bombardment Group May 42 - Aug 42 (Ground echelon only) HQ & HQ Squadron (Det) 445th Ordinance Co (AVN)- 4th Platoon 43rd (M) Bombardment Group 6. 5.42 -Aug 42 (Ground Echelon only) Servicing Detachment USACDet 6. 5.42 Weather Observers & Forecasters 6. 5.42 46th Air Base Group: 15. 7.42- 14. 9.42 43rd Materiel Squadron 709th Ordnance Co (AVN) 24th Signal Platoon (AVN) 73 3rd Quartermaster Co (A VN) 2nd Quartermaster Co (AVN SUP)- Det BATHURST ISLAND No 38 Radar Station 14. 8.42- 18. 4.46

BERRIMAH

Air Defence Headquarters, Darwin 21. 1.45- 18. 4.46 No 7 Convalescent Depot 16. 8.43 - 21. 8.44 (No 7 Medical Rehabilitation Unit) No 150 Radar Station 13. 7.45- 18. 4.46

BERRY SPRINGS No 7 Convalescent Depot 21. 8.44- 25. 8.45 (No 7 Medical Rehabilitation Unit)

BIRDUM No 2 Base Personnel Staff Office 8. 6.42- 29. 3.43 No 8 WIT Station 15. 7.44- 16. 3.46 (WIT Station NW Area) (NWA Headquarters Telecommunications Unit) No 9 WIT Station 15. 7.44- 26. 7.45 (WIT Station Birdum) (Birdum Telecommunications Unit) No 55 Operational Base Unit 20. 5.42- 18. 1.44

BROOKS CREEK No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 10. 8.42 -7.10.42 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron)

CAPE DON No 46 Radar Station 28. 3.42- 18. 4.46 No 318 Radar Station 21. 8.44- 7. 4.45

CAPE VAN DIEMEN No 60 Radar Station 7. 2.44- 21. 1.46 No 318 Radar Station 7. 4.45 - 13. 8.45

COO MALlE (COMALIE CREEK) No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron 1. 9.42 -8.12.42 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) Detachment 16. 7.42 -1. 9.42 . No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron Detachment 6. 9.43 - 28. 6.44 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit) No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron Detachment 17. 3.44- 16. 4.44 (No 14 Mobile Works Squadron) No 1 Medical Receiving Station 13. 9.42- 30. 7.44 No 3 Wireless Unit 12. 1.44- 17. 9.45 No 61 Works Wing Headquarters (No 61 Airfield Construction Headquarters) 3. 2.43 - 17. 9.44 31SQN 2.11.42- 26.11.44 No1PRU 6.12.42-30.10.45 (87 PRU) (87 SQN) No 150 Radar Station 27. 4.44- 13. 7.45

CORUNNA DOWNS WA Detachments ofRAAF and USAAF Liberators 1943 - 1945

DALY WATERS No 2 Air Ambulance Unit 16. 3.42 -9. 4.42 (Detachment) 25. 4.42 -8. 5.42 No 1 Medical Receiving Station 18. 3.42- 12. 9.42 No 56 Operational Base Unit 18. 3.42- 30. 7.43 RAAF Station Daly Waters 18. 3.42- 15. 3.42 No 1 Repair & Salvage Unit 18. 3.42- 31. 8.42 (No 1 Repair & Servicing Unit) -1.1.45 No 9 Stores Depot 10. 8.42 -6.10.44 13 SQN (A & B Flights) 8. 2.42 -2. 5.42 34SQN 5 3-42- 12.5.42

USAAF UNITS: 43rd Bombardment Group: 6. 5.42- Aug 42 (Ground Echelon only) 441 st Ordnance Co (AVN) (1 Platoon) 46th Air Base Group: 6. 5.42- 14. 7.42 Headquarters & Headquarters Squadron Weather Observers & Forecasters- Det

DARWIN

Air Defence Headquarters 21. 1.45- 18. 4.46 No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) 7. 2.44- 11. 9.44 No 3 Flight 16. 1.43 - 9. 8.43 No 3 Airfield Construction Squadron 7. 5.42- 8. 3.44 (No 3 Works Maintenance Unit) (No 3 Mobile Works Squadron) No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron 18, 4.44- 29. 9.44 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit) No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron 15. 3.44- 20. 4.44 (No 14 Mobile Works Squadron) No 12 Aircraft Repair Depot 4. 8.44- 15. 8.46 No 14 Aircraft Repair Depot (Salvage Section) (No 7 Airframe Repair Depot)- Detachment 12.10.43 - 1. 6.44 No 112 Air-Sea Rescue Flight 23.12.44-6.11.47 No 8 Central Recovery Depot 1. 6.44- 3. 9.44 No 6 Communication Flight 7.10.45 - 19. 3.46 No 5 Fighter Sector Headquarters 25. 2.42- 21. 1.45 (No 105 Fighter Sector Headquarters) (No 105 Fighter Control Unit) No 1 Fighter Wing Headquarters 25. 1.43 - 24. 4.44 28. 8.44- 12.10.45 No 3 Malaria Control Unit 17.10.44- 24.11.45 No 25 Medical Clearing Station 18. 4.44- 21. 4.44 No 1 Medical Receiving Station 1. 8.44- 6. 4.46 No 10 Mobile Fighter Sector Headquarters 10. 5.43- 1. 4.44 (No.110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit) No 3 Mobile Torpedo Unit 9. 4.44- 4.10.45 North Western Area, Headquarters 15. 1.42- 17. 8.42 13.11.45-29.6.55 No 52 Operational Base Unit 1. 6.40 - 1. 8.44 No 58 Operational Base Unit 5. 3.43- 15. 4.46 No 85 Operational Base Unit 7. 6.45 - 17. 6.45 RAAF Station Darwin 1. 6.40 - 22. 8.42 1. 8.44 - 30. 6.52 No 38 Radar Station 25. 6.42- 14. 8.42 No 39 Radar Station 25. 6.42 - 17. 8.42 No 109 Radar Station 1. 6.42- 20.10.43 No 132 Radar Station 23.11.42- 18. 4.46 No 150 Radar Station 27. 6.43 - 27. 4.44 No 224 Radar Station 24. 5.43 - 18. 4.46 No 257 Radar Station 16.10.45- 18. 4.46 No 302 Radar Station 28. 8.44 - 1. 2.45 No 307 Radar Station 25. 1.43- 19. 3.43 No 308 Radar Station 13. 1.43- 2. 3.43 No 309 Radar Station 13. 1.43- 10. 3.43 No 351 Radar Station 28. 8.44 - 16. 1.45 No 4 Repair and Salvage Unit 11. 5.45- 10. 5.46 No 7 Repair & Salvage Unit 16. 2.44- 12.11.45 (No 7 Repair & Servicing Unit) No 9 Repair & Salvage Unit 17. 1.45-25. 1.45 (No 9 Repair & Servicing Unit) No 18 Repair & Salvage Unit 2. 9.44- 1. 3.45 (No 18 Repair & Servicing Unit) No 9 Replenishing Centre 1.10. 44-7.10.45 No 28 Air Stores Park 2. 7.44- 10. 8.44 No 31 Air Stores Park 13. 9.45 - 22.11.45 No 76 Wing Headquarters 27. 8.44- 21.11.45 No 85 Wing Headquarters 5. 6.45-27.11.45 No 61 Works Wing Headquarters May 44 - 31. 8.44 (No 61 Airfield Construction HQ)- Detachment 12. 9.44- 10.10.44 2SQN 10 .12.41 - 17. 8.42 12 SQN 24. 7.39 - 5. 2.42 1. 5.45- 9. 3.46 13 SQN 1. 6.40 -2. 5.42 20SQN 13. 9.44- 21.11.45 23 SQN 6. 6.45 - 11. 6.45 31SQN 18.10.43- 13.11.43 34SQN 6. 2.42- 3 . 3.42 42SQN 1. 6.44- 9. 7.44 43 SQN 9. 4.44- 1. 5.45 54 (RAF) SQN 25.1 .43 - 8. 6.44 21.12.44-31.10.45 99SQN 19. 7.45 - 27.11.45 452 SQN 4. 9.42- 12. 1.43 457 SQN 25. 1.43 - 31. 1.43 No 201 Flight 17.4.45- 16.10.45 No 6 COMM Unit 8. 10.4 5 - 19. 3 .46

USAAFUNITS A Co 91st QM BN (AVN) B Co 33rd QM Regt {AVN) T 1st Platoon 453rd Ord Co (AVN) 33rd Pursuit Squadron 15. 2.42- 19. 2.42 49th Pursuit Group: 16. 3.42- 12.10.42 Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 7th Pursuit Squadron 8th Pursuit Squadron 9th Pursuit Squadron 49th Interceptor Con. Squadron 445th Ordnance Co. (AVN) (1st and 3rd Platoon) 91st Quartermaster Battalion (AVN)- 'A' Coy 33rd Quartermaster Regiment (AVN) - 'B' Coy 453rd Ordnance Co (AVN)- (1st Platoon) No 1 US Air Command 5. 5.42 DERBYWA Detachments ofFlying Squadrons as required 1941 - 1944

DRIP STONE No 31 Radar Station 22. 3.42- 30. 9.43

DRYSDALE RIVER WA Advanced Operational Base Feb 41 No 154 Radar Station 23. 6.44- 2.11.44 No 161 Radar Station 30. 4.44- 13. 6.44 Detachments ofFlying Squadrons as required 1941- 1945

FENTON No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) No 1 Flight 3. 5.43 -9.08.43 No 2 Flight 5. 5.43 -9.08 43 No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron -Detachment 5. 8.43- Dec 43 (No 14 Mobile Works Squadron) No 24 Air Stores Park 12.11.44- 16. 6.45 No 27 Medical Clearing Station 16.10.44-21. 4.45 No 30 Medical Clearing Station 1. 5.45 - 17. 6.45 No 31 Radar Station 10. 2.44- 1. 7.44 (No 310 Radar Station) 1. 7.44- 13.11.44 No 3 09 Radar Station 10. 3.43- 3. 5.43 No 319 Radar Station 6. 6.43 - 30. 3.44 No 6 Repair & Salvage Unit (No 6 Repair & Servicing Unit) 23. 2.45 - 10. 6.45 No 18 Replenishing Centre 6.11.44 - 17. 6.45 No 82 Bomber Wing Headquarters 20.10.44- 18. 6.45 21SQN 28.12.44 - 18. 6.45 24SQN 1. 9.44- 16. 6.45

USAAFUNITS 319 Bombardment Squadron 12.42 380 (H) Bombardment Group: 1. 6.43- 10. 3.45 Headquarters 528 Bomb Squadron 530 Bomb Squadron 22 Support Group: 30 Service Squadron 895 Chemical Co AO - Det 404 Quartermaster Platoon ADG 1006 Signal Co SG (AVN) 2025 Quartermaster TRK CO (AVN) 1540 Ordnance SYM CO (AVN) 15 Weather Squadron- Det

GORRIE No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) No 1 Flight 15.11.42 -3. 5.43 No 14 Aircraft Repair Depot2 5. 5.43-25.10.45 No 55 Operational Base Unit -18. 1.44-25. 4.46 No 9 WIT Station 15. 3.45- 23.12.45 (WIT Station Birdum) 27. 7.45 - 23.12.45 (Birdum Telecommunication Unit) (Gorrie Telecommunication Unit)

GOULBURN ISLAND No 3 09 Radar Station 3. 5.43- 21. 2.45

GOULD No 9 Replenishing Centre lSQN 28. 2.44- 13. 1.45

GOVE (Melville Bay) No 56 Operational Base Unit 2.12.43 - 30. 4.46 13 SQN 24. 8.44- 12. 8.45 83 SQN 19. 1.44- 18. 8.44 No 8 Airfield Construction Squadron 25.10.43 - 29. 7.44

GREEN ANT CREEK No 5 Replenishing Centre 20. 8.43 - 29. 2.44

GROOTEEYLANDT No 51 Operational Base Unit 15. 5.42 -2. 9.44

HOWARD SPRINGS No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 5. 3.43 - 14.11.43 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit)

HUGHES No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 31. 3.44 -5.44 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit) No 54 Operational Base Unit 30. 5.42- 23.10.42 No 1 Fighter Wing Headquarters 23. 6.44- 28. 8.44 13 SQN 2. 5.42- 4. 4.43

2 Not Airframe Repair Depot. 34SQN 15. 7.42- 26. 8.42 2SQN 10. 4.43- 17. 3.45 No1PRU 19. 8.42- 5.12.42

KATHERINE No 5 Replenishing Centre 15. 7.42- 15.11.42 No 12 Survey & Design Unit 1. 2.43 - 22. 7.43

USAAFUNITS 808th Engineer Battalion (AVN) 9. 3.42

KNUCKEYSLAGOON No 5 Central Reserve 28. 9.44- 20.10.44 No 162 Radar Station 29. 8.44- 1. 2.45

LARRIMAH No 8 Replenishing Centre 10. 8.43-6.11.44

LEE POINT No 59 Radar Station 20.10.43- 18. 4.46

LIVINGSTONE No 1 Fighter Wing Headquarters 24. 4.44 - 8. 6.44 No 14 Repair & Salvage Unit 4. 4.44- 4. 5.44 Security Guards Unit 1.10.42- 12. 6.43 54 (RAF) SQN 9. 6.44 - 20.12.44 77 SQN 16.10.42- 10. 2.43 457 SQN 1. 2.43- 15. 5.44 548 (RAF) SQN 15.6.44- 31.10.45

LONG 23 SQN 6. 4.45 - 17. 6.45

USAAF UNITS: 380 Bomber Group: 529 Bomb Squadron 1. 6.43- 10. 3.45 531 Bomb Squadron 1. 6.43- 10. 3.45

MACDONALD No 54 Operational Base Unit 24.11.42-14.2.43 18 (NEI) SQN 18. 1.43 - 8. 5.43

MANBULLO No 8 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 1. 6.43- 19. 8.43 (No 8 Mobile Works Squadron) No 6 Communication Flight (No 6 Communication Unit) 8.12.42 - 27. 2.43 No 1 Repair & Salvage Unit 1. 9.42- 31. 5.43 24SQN 5. 7.44- 1. 9.44 34SQN 26, 8.42 - 2. 1.43 No 2 Air Ambulance Unit 25. 4.42- 8-5-42

USAAF UNITS: 380 Bomb Group: 529 Bomb Squadron 15 Weather Squadron - Det

MELVILLE BAY (GOVE) No 8 Airfield Construction Squadron 25.10.43 - 29. 7.44 (No 8 Mobile Works Squadron) Detachment 16.8.43-25.10.43 42 SQN (GR/FB) 11. 7.44- 30.11.45

MELVILLE ISLAND No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit) Detachment 6. 7.44 - Sep 44

MILLINGIMBI No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron- No 3 Flight 2. 5.43 -7. 8.43 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) No 59 Operational Base Unit 12. 4.43 -6. 9.44 No 308 Radar Station 1. 4.43 - 5. 2.45 No 9 Zone Filter Centre 23. 8.43 - 7. 2.45 83 SQN 13.11.43- 18. 8.44

NIGHT CLIFFE No 7 Convalescent Depot 25. 8.45- 19.10.45 (No 7 Medical Rehabilitation Unit) ·Security Guards Unit 12. 6.43 - 19.11.45 (No 1 Airfield Defence Squadron) 54 (RAF) SQN 25. 1.43 - 12. 6.44

NOONKANBAH WA Detachments of Heavy Bomber Squadrons as required 1943 - 1945

NOONAMAH No i Airfield Construction Squadron- No 1 Flight 6. 9.42- 15.11.42 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) 147th Field Artillery Regiment (AVN) USAAF 9. 3.42 ONSLOWWA Detachments ofNo 76 Sqn Oct 42 - Apr 43

No 14 Aircraft Repair Depot- Detachment 18.10.43 - 8. 6.44 No 4 Repair & Salvage Unit 26.12.42 - 11. 5.45 (No 4 Repair & Servicing Unit) No 7 Repair & Salvage Unit 13. 1.43- 15. 2.44 No 9 Replenishing Centre 26. 7.42-3.11.43 No 28 Air Stores Park 16. 8.44- 28. 2.45 12 SQN 15. 7.42- 14. 9.42

PERRON ISLAND No 307 Radar Station 19. 3.43 - 1. 5.44 No 61 Radar Station 1. 5.44- 18. 4.46

PINE CREEK No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron 1. 7.42 - 1. 9.42 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) No 11 Works Supply Unit 26.3.43- 15.11.43

POINT CHARLES No 105 Radar Station (Mobile RDF) 20. 4.42- 20. 1.43 No 310 Radar Station 1.10. 43- 10. 2.44

PORT KEATS No 39 Radar Station 17. 8.42- 20. 6.46

ROSS RIVER No 14 Repair & Salvage Unit 14. 5.44- 12. 3.45 (No 14 Repair & Servicing Unit)

SATTLER No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron- No 2 Flight 26. 1.43 -6. 5.43 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 20. 1.44- 15. 4.44 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit) No 22 Air Stores Park 10. 8.44- 25. 2.45 No 1 Fighter Wing Headquarters 8. 6.44 - 23. 6.44 No 3 Malaria Control Unit 15. 5.44- 17.10.44 No 25 Medical Clearing Station 21. 4.44- 18. 1.45 No 110 Mobile Fighter Sector Headquarters 1. 4.44- 16. 1.45 (No 110 Mobile Fighter Sector Headquarters) (No 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit) No 60 Operational Base Unit 4. 5.44-17. 1.45 No 161 Radar Station 1. 8.44 - 1. 2.45 No 310 Radar Station 14.11.44- 31. 3.45 No 343 Radar Station 11. 8.44-29. 1.45 No 352 Radar Station 2. 9.44-9. 1.45 No 9 Repair & Salvage Unit 8. 4.44- 16. 1.45 (No 9 Repair & Servicing Unit) 452 SQN 16. 5.44- 22. 1.45 457 SQN 16. 5.44- 22. 1.45 79 SQN 12. 1.45- 13. 3.45

STRAUSS 452 SQN 13. 1.44- 15. 5.44 549 (RAF) SQN 15. 6.44- 31.10.45

TINDAL No 8 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 1. 5.43 - 1. 7.43 (No 8 Mobile Works Squadron) No 5 Replenishing Centre 15.11.42-20. 8.43

TRUSCOTT WA (EX WEST BAY, ANJO) No 14 Mobile Works Squadron 25. 4.44- 21. 8.44 (No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron) No 58 Operational Base Unit 11. 7.44- 16 7 47 No 154 Radar Station 21.11.44- 18. 4.46 No 319 Radar Station 3.11.44-9.10.45 18 (NEI) SQN (Detachments) 10.44- 4.45 549 (RAF) SQN (Detachments) July44 Detachments of Fighter and Bomber Squadrons Jul 44 - Aug 45

VENN No 54 Operational Base Unit 15. 2.43 - 29. 3.43

WESSEL ISLAND No 312 Radar Station 23. 4.43- 6. 2.45

WYNNELLIE No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 9. 3.44- 31. 3.44 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit) No 4 Repair and Servicing Unit 11. 5.45 - 9. 1.46 No 2 Reserve Personnel Pool 12. 9.45 - 13. 2.46 No 28 Air Stores Park 9. 2.44- 2. 7,44 No 9 Stores Depot 6.10.44-21. 1.49 No 8 Transportation & Movements Office 1. 4.44- 1.10.46 No 1 Airfield Defence Squadron 23. 9.45- 13.11.45 WYNDHAMWA Detachments ofFlying Squadrons as required 1941 - 1945

YIRRKALA No 321 Radar Station 27. 7.43 - 21. 1.46

9 :MILE NT No 14 Mobile Works Squadron- Detachment 17. 3.44- 16. 4.44 (No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron) No 8 Central Recovery Depot 3. 9.44 -9. 1.46 No 11 Works Supply Unit 15.11.43 -4. 9.44 No 61 Works Wing Headquarters- Detachment 6. 4.43 -1. 6.43

10 :MILE NT No 5 Central Reserve 20.10.44- 12.12.45 No 9 Replenishing Centre 4.11.43-30. 9.44

34:MILENT No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron- Detachment 18. 6.44-3.10.44 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit)

38 :MILE NT No 14 Mobile Works Squadron- Detachment 5. 8.43 -12.43 (No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron)

40 :MILE NT No 9 Airfield Construction Squadron 2. 8.43 - 18. 4.44 (No 9 Works Maintenance Unit)

41 :MILE NT (FRASER STRIP) No 12 Aircraft Repair Depot- Detachment 3. 8.44-22.10.45

54 :MILE NT No 2 Reserve Personnel Pool 12. 7.44- 12. 9.45 No 2 Base Personnel Staff Office 10. 5.44- 9.10.44

57 :MILE NT North Western Area Headquarters 17. 8.42- 13.11.45

58 :MILE NT No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron 20. 7.43 - 25. 9.43 (No 14 Mobile Works Squadron) No 5 Radio Installation & Maintenance Unit 22. 8.44 - 20. 1.46 58 Y2MILE NT No 161 Radar Station 13. 6.44- 1. 8.44 No 344 Radar Station 6. 2.44- 22. 3.44

59 MILE NT No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron 8.12.42 - 28. 8.43 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) No 60 Radar Station 20.10.43 - 7. 2.44 No 12 Survey and Design Unit 22 7.43 - 1. 9.44

109MILENT No 1 Airfield Construction Squadron 4.12.43 - 7. 2.44 (No 1 Mobile Works Squadron) No 3 Flight 7. 2.44 - 2. 6.44 No 8 Airfield Construction Squadron 7. 5.43 -25.10.43 (No 8 Mobile Works Squadron) No 14 Airfield Construction Squadron 25. 9.43 - 11.12.43 (No 14 Mobile Works Squadron) APPENDIXE

USAAF COMBAT UNITS IN AUSTRALIA, 1941-19451

Squadron Base Period at base Aircraft during years listed

FIGHTER GROUPS

8th Fighter Group

35th FS Brisbane 6 Mar 42 - 26 Apr 42 Woodstock 29 Jun42 Townsville 27 Jul42- 18 Sep 42 Mareeba 24 Feb 43 - 10 May 43 P-39 P-400 Relieved 75 SQN RAAF Port Moresby, Apr 42

36thFS Brisbane 6Mar42 Lowood 13 Mar42 Townsville 4 Apr 42-26 Apr 42 Townsville 30 Jun 42- 18 Sep 42 Mareeba 22 Feb 43 - 22 May 43 P-39 P-400 P-47 Relieved 75 SQN RAAF Port Moresby, Apr 42 (P-39s)

80thFS Brisbane 6Mar42 Lowood 28 Mar42 Petrie 10 May 42- 20 Jul42 Mareeba 6 Feb 43- 21 Mar 43 P-39 P-400 P-38

1 This document was prepared by Mr MV Nelmes, May 25, 1997.

278 35th Fighter Group

39th FS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 Ballarat 8 Mar42 Mount Gambier 16 Mar 42 Williamstown 3 Apr42 Woodstock 20 Apr42- 2 Jun42 Townsville 26 Jul42- 18 Oct 42 P-39 P-38

40thFS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 Ballarat 9Mar42 Mount Gambier 16 Mar42 Townsville Apr 42 - 2 Jun 42 Townsville 30 Jul42

41st FS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 Ballarat 8 Mar42 Mount Gambier 17 Mar 42 Bankstown 7 Apr 42 - c.20 Jul 42 P-39 P-400 Converted to P-47D during Nov/Dec 43

49th Fighter Group

7thFS Melbourne 2 Feb 42 Bankstown 16 Feb 42 Batchelor 9 Apr42 -19 Sep 42 P-40

8thFS Melbourne 2 Feb 42 Canberra 16 Feb 42 Darwin 17 Apr42- 25 Sep 42 P-40

9thFS Melbourne 2 Feb 42 Williamstown 14 Feb 42 Darwin 17 Mar 42- c.lO Oct 42 P-40

58th Fighter Group

68th FS Amberley 16 Mar 42- 16 May 42 P-40 P-39 P-38

69th FS Brisbane 21 Nov 43-29 Dec 43 P-40 P-47

279 311thFS Brisbane 21 Nov 43-28 Dec 43 P-40 P-47

348th Fighter Group

P-47s assembled in Australia (59 arrived by June 1943) and ferried to Port Moresby

475th Fighter Group

431st FS Charters Towers 14 May 43 Amberley c.1 Jul43 - 14 Aug 43 P-38

432nd FS Charters Towers 14May43 Amberley 11 Jun 43- 14 Aug 43 P-38

433rd FS Charters Towers 14 May 43 Amberley 17 Jun 43 - 14 Aug 43 P-38

BOMBARDMENT GROUPS

3rd Bomb Group

8thBS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 Charters Towers c.17 Mar 42-31 Mar 42 Charters Towers c.9 May 42 - 28 Jan 43 A-20 B-25 (Also A-24 in Darwin area)

13thBS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 Charters Towers 10 Mar 42- c.lO Jan 43 B-25

89thBS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 Charters Towers 8 Mar 42 - c.1 Sep 42 A-20 (Maintenance on 19 BG B-17s) B-25

90th BS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 Charters Towers 8 Mar 42 - 28 Jan 43 A-20 B-25

280 7th Bomb Group

9thBS Brisbane 22 Dec 41-4 Feb 42 (HQ only) B-17 LB-30 B-24

llthBS Brisbane 22 Dec 41 - 19 Jan 42 (HQ only) Melbourne c.4 Mar 42 - 6 Apr 42 B-17 LB-30

14th BS (Air echelon attached 19th Bomb Group) Batchelor c.24 Dec 41 - c.30 Dec 41 Melbourne c.4 Mar 42- c.14 Mar 42 B-17 B-24? LB-30?

22ndBS Brisbane 22 Dec 41 (no air echelon) Townsville c.20 Feb 42- c.14 Mar 42 (det) Melbourne c.4 Mar 42 - 6 Apr 42 B-17

436thBS Townsville 20 Feb 42- 14 Mar 42 (HQ Brisbane 22 Dec 41 - 4 Feb 42) B-17

19th Bomb Group

28thBS Batchelor c.24 Dec 41 -30 Dec 41 (no ground echelon) Melbourne c.4 Mar 42 Cloncurry c.28 Mar 42 Perth c.28 Mar 42- 18 May 42 (det) Longreach c.S May42 Mareeba 24 Jul42- c.18 Nov 42 B-17 LB-30 B-24?

30th BS Batchelor c.20 Dec 41 - c.31 Dec41 (no ground echelon) Melbourne c.S Mar42 Cloncurry c.27 Mar42 Longreach c.13 May 42 Mareeba c.24 Jul 42 - c.1 0 Nov 42 B-17 LB-30? B-24?

32nd BS (attached 7th Bomb Group) "Air echelon evidently departed for SWP A c. late Dec 41, concurrently dissolved and personnel assigned to other units." B-17

281 93rd BS Melbourne c.l Mar 42 Cloncurry 29 Mar42 Longreach 18 May42 Mareeba 23 Jul 42 - c.25 Oct 42 B-17 LB-30? B-24?

435thBS Townsville 14 Mar- c.15 Nov 42 LB-30 B-17

22nd Bomb Group

2ndBS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 (no air echelon) Ipswich 2Mar42 Townsville 7 Apr42 Reid River 9·Apr 42 - 9 Oct 43 B-26 B-25

19th BS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 (no air echelon) Ipswich 2Mar42 Townsville 29 Mar42 Woodstock 4 Jul42 Iron Range 15 Sep 42 Woodstock 4 Feb 43 - 11 Jul43 B-26

33rd BS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 (no air echelon) Ipswich 1 Mar42 Antil Plains 7 Apr42 Woodstock 20 Jul42 Iron Range 29 Sep 42 Woodstock 4Feb43 -15 Oct43 B-26

408thBS Brisbane 25 Feb 42 (no air echelon) Townsville 7 Apr42 Reid River 12 Apr 42 - 15 Oct 43 B-25 B-26

38th Bomb Group

69th BS Doomben 25 Feb 42 (no air echelon) Ballarat 8 Mar 42 (no air echelon) Amberley 30 Apr 42 - 20 May 42 (no air echelon) B-26 B-25

282 70thBS Doomben 25 Feb 42 (no air echelon) Ballarat 8 Mar 42 (no air echelon) Amberley c.20 Apr 42 - 23 May 42 (no air echelon) B-26 B-25 71th BS Doomben 25 Feb 42 Ballarat 8 Mar42 Batchelor c.30 Apr 42 Breddan 12 Aug 42 Townsville 1 Oct 42 - c.29 Oct 42 B-26 B-25

405thBS Doomben 25 Feb 42 Ballarat 8 Mar42 Breddan 7 Aug42 Townsville c.30 Sep 42 - c.25 Oct 42 B-26 B-25

822ndBS Australia 20 Apr 43 - c.20 Jun 43 B-25

43rd Bomb Group

63rd BS Sydney 28 Mar42 Charleville 15 Jun 42 Torrens Creek 3 Aug42 Mareeba 20 Aug 42 - 23 Jan 43 B-17

64thBS Sydney c.16 Mar 42 Daly Waters c.l6May42 Fenton 2 Aug - 25 Sep 42 Iron Range 12 Oct 42 Mareeba c.8 Nov 42 - 20 Jan 43 B-17

65thBS Sydney 28 Mar42 Williamstown 2JJun42 Torrens Creek 15 Aug42 Iron Range 13 Oct 42 Mareeba 7 Nov 42- 20 Jan 43 B-17

403rd BS Melbourne 27 Feb 42 Laverton 14 Mar42 Torrens Creek 27 Aug 42 Iron Range c.17 Oct 42-23 Nov 42 Mareeba c.21 Jan 43 - c.ll May 43 B-17 B-24

283 90th Bomb Group

319th BS Iron Range c.4 Nov 42 Darwin 2 Feb 43 - 8 Jul43 B-24

320th BS Iron Range c.4 Nov 42- 10 Feb 43 B-24

321st BS Iron Range c.4 Nov 42 - lO.Feb 43 B-24 400th BS Iron Range c.4 Nov 42 - c.22 Mar 43 B-24

380th Bomb Group

528thBS Fenton 28 Apr43 Darwin c.20 Aug 44- c.21 Feb 45 B-24

529thBS Manbulloo 28 Apr43 Long c.7 Nov 43 Darwin c.lO Jul44 - Feb 45 B-24

530thBS Fenton May43 Darwin 9 Aug 44- c.28 Feb 45

53 1st BS Manbulloo c.28 Apr 43 Long c.5 Dec 43 Darwin 21 Ju144-1 Mar45

MISCELLANEOUS

4th Photographic Group

4th Reconnaissance Squadron det Australia Jan 45 -May 45 B-24/F-7

284 APPENDIXF

SPECIFICATIONS OF ALLIED AND JAPANESE AIRCRAFT1

I Aircraft I Type I Performance I Dimension~ I Range I Armament

CAC Fighter, max speed s 36ft 930 miles 2x20mm Boomerang single engine 296 mph L 2511 ft 4 x.303 in CAC Trainer, max speed s 43ft 720 miles 3 x.303 in Wirraway single engine 205 mph L27ft lOin Bristol Bomber, max speed S57 ft 10 in 1, 60U miles 4-6 x.303 Beaufort twin engine 267 mph L44ft3in 2,000 lb bomb Bristol Fighter, max speed S57ft10in 1,500 miles 4x20mm Beaufighter twin engine 320 mph L41 ft4in 6 x.303 in Lockheed GR/Bomber max speed s 65 Y2 ft 2,160 miles 4-6 x.303 Hudson twin engine 246 mph L44ft4in 1,600 lb bomb Supermarine Fighter, max speed S36ft10in 470 miles 2x20mm Spitfire V single engine 374 mph L 29ft 11 in 4 x.303 in Supermarine Fighter, max speed S36ftl0in 660 miles 2x20mm Spitfire VIII single engine 408 mph L31ft3Y2 4 x.303 in Brewster Fighter, max speed s 35ft 1,680 miles 4 x.50 in Buffalo single engine 313 JJ!p_h L 26ft 4 in Curtis P-40 Fighter, max speed S 37ft 4 in 650 miles3 6 x.50 in Kittyhawk single engine 362 mph L3lft2in Consolidated Seaplane max speed s 104ft 2,535 miles various inc Catalina twin engine 190 mph L 63ft 10 in bombs, mines Vultee Dive bomber max speed s 48ft 2,300 miles 6 x.SO in Vengeance single engine 279 mph L 39ft 9 in 2,000 lb bomb Consolidated Bomber, max speed s 110ft 2,100 miles 10 x .50 in B-24 four engine 290 mph L 67ft 2 in 8,000 lb bomb NAB-25 Bomber, max speed S 67ft 7 in 1,355 miles 13 x .50 in Mitchell two engine 2721J!gh L 52ft 11 in 4,000 lb bomb Lockheed PR, twin max speed s 52ft 500+ miles Nil F-4 engine 395 m_Q_h L37ft lOin DH-98 PR, twin max speed s 54ft 2in 1,400 miles Nil Mosguito engine 415 meh L 40ft 10 in Dornier Seaplane, max speed S 88ft 7 in 2,049 miles 2 x.50 in Do-24 three engine 195 mph L 72ft 1 in 1 x20mm Republic PR, single 356 mph s 36ft 800 miles Nil P-43 engine L 28ft 6 in

1 Data contained in this Appendix was gathered from several sources including R Francillon Op cit; W Green Warplanes of the Second World War; Fighters. Vol 2, 3 and 4; S Wilson Militazy Aircraft of Australia; and R Gillett Qo...ill. 2 S= length of wing span; L= length of . 3 Range of many aircraft,. especially fighters, was increased by the addition of long range drop tanks. The figures shown here are for aircraft without these tanks.

285 I Aircraft I Type I Performance I Dimensions4 I Range I Armament

Mitsubishi Fighter 336 mph S 39ft 4Yzin 1,010 miles 2x7.7mm A 6M2 single engine L 29ft 8%in 2x20mm Mitsubishi Fighter 338 mph S 36ft lin 1,010 miles 2 x 7.7mm A 6M3 single engine L 29ft 8%in 2x20mm Nakajima Fighter 320 mph s 37ft 6Yzin 1,095 miles 2 x 12.7mm Ki.43 single engine L29ft2%in Mitsubishi Bomber 266 mph s 82ft 3,749 miles 3 x7.7mm G4M twin engine L 65ft 7Yzin 1, 764lb bomb Mitsubishi Reece twin 375 mph S 48ft 2%in 1,537 miles Nil Ki-46 engine L 36ft 1 in Nakajima Dive bomber max speed S 50ft lOin 679 miles 1 x7.7 mm B5N single engine 229 mph L 33ft 9 in 1,764lb bomb AichiD3A Dive bomber max speed S 47ft 2in 915 miles 3 x7.7 mm single engine 240 mph L 33ft 5 in 815lb bomb Nakajima Floatplane max speed S39ft4Yzin 714 miles 2x7.7mm A6M2-N single engine 270mph L 33ft 2 in 2x20mm

4 S= length of wing span; L= length of fuselage.

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Darwin Documents box file 34 SQN file World War Two Australia box file 42 SQNfile 82 Wing box file 43 SQNfile 12 SQN file 76 SQNfile 13 SQN file 83 SQN file 18 SQN file 87 SQNfile 20 SQN file 99 SQN file 24 SQNfile 452 SQNfile 6 Communications Unit file RAF Squadrons file

Interviews/Discussions

WGCDR R Cresswell DFC - former CO 77 SQN AIRCDRE AD Garrison OBE (Retd) Mr G Mierisch - former 30 SQN pilot Mr B Mitchell - RAN Historical and Records Section Mr MV N elmes - AWM Military Technology Section Mr F Parsons - former 20 SQN pilot Mr DM Stevens - DNHS; RAN Ms K Walker- former Royal Canberra Hospital staff Mr D Wilson - RAAF Historical Section

Correspondence received from

Mr AJ Cunningham MBE - formally 531 st SQN, USAAF and 24 SQN RAAF Mr RT McDonnell- formally No 132 Radar Station, RAAF Mr AH Pettett - formally 114 MFCU Mr AD Sieber - formally 531 st SQN, USAAF and 23 SQN, RAAF Mr K Stevens - formally 43 SQN RAAF

297