Affirmative and negative in Ibn S¯ına¯ Wilfrid Hodges Herons Brook, Sticklepath, Okehampton, Devon EX20 2PY, England
[email protected] 1 Dedication [Omitted] I thank Manuela Giolfo, Ruth Kempson, Amirouche Moktefi, Paul Thom and Kees Versteegh for helpful information and comments. There is a dif- ferent take on some of this material in Baeck [4]. 2 Aristotle on affirmative and negative Aristotle in his Categories 10, 13a37ff, De Interpretatione 4f, 17a8–37; 10, 19b5– 20b12 and Prior Analytics i.2, 25a1–13; i.46, 51b5–52b35 introduced a distinc- tion between affirmative and negative (kataph´atikos and apoph´atikos, or in noun form kat´aphasis and ap´ophasis). Aristotle’s views are not my concern here. But already Aristotle’s treatment of the notions raises some funda- mental questions: (a) What is the point of the distinction? (It is built into Aristotle’s predica- tive syllogisms through the classification of propositions, and hence into his modal syllogisms. But the notions appear in Categories and De Interpretatione without any reference to syllogisms.) (b) Is it just propositions that can be affirmative or negative, or can we also classify predicates as affirmative or negative? (The treatments in Categories and De Interpretatione seem to be about propositions, but the discussion in Prior Analytics i.46 extends the notions to predi- cates.) 1 (c) Among propositions, is it only predicative ones that can properly be called affirmative or negative, or does the classification also apply to compound sentences? (De Interpretatione 5 can be read either way.) (d) What is the basis for the distinction that Aristotle makes in De Inter- pretatione 10 between, for example, denying that a man is just and affirming that a man is not just? (The question seems to be about which sentences containing a negation are affirmative and which are negative; so an adequate answer to (a) should go some way towards answering (d) too.