Explaining the Varying Electoral Appeal of the Vlaams Blok in the Districts of Antwerp

Explaining the varying electoral appeal of the Vlaams Blok in the Districts of Antwerp

Peter Thijssen and Sarah L. de Lange

SUMMARY. The Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) has been among the more successful of Europe’s far-right parties. But there is still a good deal of statistical analysis which might be done to help identify the factors in their success. This study looks at the best available data from electoral returns in the nine districts of Antwerp, which has been the locus of the Vlaams Blok’s support. A statistical comparison is made between various social and economic factors, and the level of support for Vlaams Blok in an attempt to identify significant correlations.

INTRODUCTION

Since their resurgence in the 1980s, far-right parties in Western Europe have received a great deal of attention from the scholarly community. Many theories have been formulated which might account for the electoral successes of these parties. For instance, we now have a fairly detailed sociological profile of the average extreme-right voter. Nonetheless, it remains a challenge to the discipline to explain inter- and intra-national variations in the support for far-right parties. This statistical study aims to fill in a part of the second lacuna, and to outline the varieties of far-right support at the local level. Through an analysis of both the demand for, and the supply of, far-right parties in (sub-)local elections, we believe we can gain a better understanding of the shadings of the support for far-right parties in general. The object of our study will be the Vlaams Blok, a party of the extreme right which has fared particularly well in Flanders since the early 1990s. Its main stronghold is the city of Antwerp, where a third of the population has voted for

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 12, no. 2 (2005): 231-258. © 2005 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2005 the party (33.0%). However, support for the Vlaams Blok is unevenly distributed across the nine districts of Antwerp. It gets its highest level of support in Deurne (37.9% share of the vote), while Berchem is the party’s weakest district (25.3%). To explain these variations, we will first look into the demand for a party like the Vlaams Blok at the meso level. Does the Vlaams Blok have more fertile soil in some districts than in others? Secondly, we will analyze what the Vlaams Blok has to offer to the voters in the districts of Antwerp. Although the party contests (sub-)local elections with a single political pro- gramme, it runs different lists in the districts. Thus, we will pay special attention to the candidates who represent the Vlaams Blok at the district level.

THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN ANTWERP

Antwerp has long been the stronghold of the Vlaams Blok. In 1982, the party participated for the first time in the Flemish local elections. In Antwerp, the Vlaams Blok managed to secure 2 of the 55 seats in the city council. The big breakthrough came in 1988, when the party increased its share of the vote to 17.7%, winning 10 seats in the city council thereby. In 1994, the Vlaams Blok progressed even further, winning 28.0% of the votes and thus sending 18 members to the city council. The local elections in 2000 brought a novelty to Antwerp. Not only were there direct elections for the city council, but for the first time citizens could also vote for the newly introduced district councils. In the elections for the city council the Vlaams Blok secured 33% of the vote, and consolidated its leading position. The elections results of the Vlaams Blok in the districts of Antwerp are presented in Table 1. Table 1. – Election results of the Vlaams Blok in the nine Antwerp districts (in %) District Election results 2000 Antwerp 28.1 Berchem 25.3

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Bezali 29.0 Borgerhout 35.3 Deurne 37.9 Ekeren 29.4 Hoboken 37.3 Merksem 34.6 Wilrijk 26.2

Table 1 shows that the election results of the Vlaams Blok vary considerably over the nine districts of Antwerp. As mentioned above, in Berchem the party nets its lowest percentage of votes (25.3% of the popular vote), and in Deurne its highest (37.9%), which makes the range of the Vlaams Blok score 12.6%. The average Vlaams Blok score over the nine districts is 31.5%, the standard deviation is 4.84%. There are five districts in which the Vlaams Blok performs below the average, namely Antwerp, Berchem, Bezali (Berendrecht-Zandvliet-Lillo), Ekeren, and Wilrijk. In four districts the party achieves a score above the average, namely Borgerhout, Deurne, Hoboken, and Merksem. In Figure 1, the geographical distribution of the Vlaams Blok vote shares in the various districts is presented. The districts in which the party scores below average are light grey, the districts in which it scores above average are dark grey. One can see that Antwerp is not build up of con- centric circles like most large cities. It is therefore difficult to state that the success of the Vlaams Blok is concentrated in the outskirts of Antwerp. Most districts in which the Vlaams Blok results are above average are clustered on the east side of the city. Here we find the neighboring districts of Borgerhout, Deurne and Merksem. The fourth district in which the Vlaams Blok performs above average, Hoboken, is isolated on the south-west side of Antwerp. In the following sections, we will try to explain why the Vlaams Blok achieves higher results in certain districts than in others. In order to for- mulate a satisfactory explanation, we will make a twofold analysis of both the demand for, and support of, the Vlaams Blok in the nine districts of Antwerp. First, we will analyze the relationship between the socio-eco-

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Figure 1. – Geography of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp nomic characteristics of the districts and the success of the Vlaams Blok. It is possible that these contextual factors will make some districts better breeding ground for right-wing extremism than others. Second, we will assess the appeal of the Vlaams Blok in the various districts. That is, we will analyze whether the party has presented itself with better lists and candidates in some districts than in others.

THE DEMAND SIDE OF SUPPORT FOR THE VLAAMS BLOK AT THE (SUB-)LOCAL LEVEL

There are numerous (and sometimes conflicting) theories aiming to explain the current success of far-right parties. In large part, the focus of theories is

—234— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP on the demand for far-right parties, that is, on the questions of who is attracted to the far right, and why. Demand-side theories offer explanations for the success of far-right parties at the micro, meso, and macro levels (e.g. Coffé, 2004; Eatwell, 2003; Lubbers, Scheepers & Billiet, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1998). For the focus of our research, the districts of Antwerp, only meso-level or contextual variables are available. Since demand-side meso-level theories have hitherto been underdeveloped, we will also translate some micro-level explanations to the meso level. A first group of demand-side theories attempts to explain why underprivileged social groups (blue-collar workers, low-ranking white-collar workers, the less-educated, those with lower incomes, and the unemployed) are over-represented in the electorates of the extreme right.1 Various lines of reasoning are used to account for this over-representation.

A first argument holds that the underprivileged see ethnic minorities as their economic competitors, because ethnic minorities work in the same sectors as manual and lower white collar workers, share a low level of education with underprivileged autochthones, and are more commonly unemployed than the average citizen. The underprivileged therefore per- ceive ethnic minorities as a threat and become increasingly xenophobic, which makes them more likely to vote for the far right. A second line of reasoning holds that the underprivileged feel more threatened by societal developments, such as globalization and post-industrialization, than do other social groups. These developments intensify the subjective depriva- tions of the underprivileged, which stimulates a heightening political dissatisfaction, and re-enforces authoritarian attitudes. Both political dissatisfaction and an authoritarian outlook increase the likelihood of voting for the extreme right. The arguments presented above attempt to account for the over-representation of underprivileged voters in the electorate of the far right at the individual level. When one transposes these individual-level theories to the meso level, the hypothesis becomes:

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Hypothesis 1: The far right will have more success in areas (in this case, districts) with high percentages of underprivileged inhabitants than in areas with low percentages of underprivileged inhabitants.

Meso level theories identify two factors that may explain variations in the success of far-right parties. The first is the presence of ethnic minorities; the second is the level of unemployment. When an area has a large number of ethnic minorities, or has seen an increase in this number, ethnic minorities are more likely to be perceived as a threat and xenophobia will be on the rise. This will benefit the extreme right. The same goes for unemployment: when an area has a large number of unemployed, or has seen an increase in this number, subjective deprivation is more likely to be experienced. Feelings of deprivation nourish political dissatisfaction, and the support for more authoritarian solutions and political dissatisfaction and hence favor the extreme right. 2 Thus, two hypotheses can be formulated on the basis of the meso- level theories presented above.

Hypothesis 2a: The far right will have more success in areas with high percentages of ethnic minorities than in areas with low percentages of ethnic minorities.

Hypothesis 2b: The far right will have more success in areas where there has been an increase in the percentage of ethnic minorities than in areas where there has been a decrease in the percentage of ethnic minorities.

Hypothesis 3a: The far right will have more success in areas with high percentages of unemployment than in areas with low percentages of unemployment.

Hypothesis 3b: The far right will have more success in areas where there has been an increase in the percentage of unemployment than in areas where there has been a decrease in the percentage of unemployment.

A second group of demand-side theories points at the role that social disintegration plays in explaining the far-right vote. These theories state that a growing number of voters lack social ties, for example to churches,

—236— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP unions and intermediary groups, and therefore feel socially isolated. Voters that are especially likely to feel socially isolated are the young and non-religious. To compensate for their lack of social ties these voters try to find alternative allegiances. These are found in the nationalism and eth- nocentrism advocated by far-right parties. These micro-level theories need to be transposed to the meso level in order to test whether social disintegration and isolation can help explain the variation of Vlaams Blok success in Antwerp. At the meso level the hypotheses generated by the social disintegration theory become:

Hypothesis 4a: The far right will have more success in areas with a high percentage of socially isolated inhabitants than in districts with low percentages of socially isolated inhabitants.

Hypothesis 4b: The far right will have more success in areas with high percentages of young inhabitants than in areas with low percentages of young inhabitants.

TESTING THE DEMAND-SIDE THEORIES

To test hypothesis 1 we will look at the relationship between the election results of the Vlaams Blok in the districts of Antwerp, on the one hand, and the percentages of various underprivileged social groups in the districts, on the other hand. The broad concept of underprivileged social groups will be divided into the variables of occupation, income, and unemployment. Unfortunately, no data were available on educational levels in the districts. We cannot therefore analyze the relationship between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the rates of people with lower levels of education in the districts.

Table 2. – Occupation and the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp (in % of the active population) District Blue collar White collar Civil servants Self-employed workers workers Antwerp 28.60 37.84 14.56 18.91 Berchem 22.84 45.67 14.90 16.47 Bezali 41.82 30.83 19.19 7.96

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Borgerhout 37.28 35.01 16.27 11.36 Deurne 34.55 37.17 17.31 10.90 Ekeren 26.83 42.40 18.68 11.90 Hoboken 38.49 33.02 20.56 7.86 Merksem 33.42 38.15 17.20 11.17 Wilrijk 23.49 45.32 15.90 15.18 Correlation .677* -.606 .498 -.646 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Source: Databank Sociale Planning3

The professional structure of the districts is varied (see Table 2). The districts in which the Vlaams Blok scores above average have relatively high percentages of blue collar workers and civil-servants and relatively low percentages of white collar workers and self-employed. The inverse pattern can be found in the districts where the Vlaams Blok performs below average, relatively low percentages of blue collar workers and civil servants and relatively high percentages of white collar workers and self- employed. One district breaks this trend, namely Bezali. This district has relatively high percentages of blue collar workers and civil servants and relatively low percentages of white collar workers and self-employed. Despite this occupational structure favorable to far-right success, the Vlaams Blok achieves an electoral score below average in Bezali. The relationship between the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok and the occupational structure is remarkably strong. However, only one correlation, that between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the percentage of blue collar workers in a district, is significant. This is the result of the relatively low number of cases that we have to calculate the correlations on. With only 9 districts or cases, correlations have to be higher than 0.666 or lower than -.666 to be significant at a level of a =.05. The positive and significant correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the percentage of blue collar workers in a district tells us that in the districts with high percentages of blue collar workers the Vlaams Blok receives more votes than in districts with low percentages of blue collar workers. Of course this observation does not imply that blue

—238— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP collar workers vote more for the Vlaams Blok than do white collar workers, civil servants or the self-employed (this statement would be an eco- logical fallacy). What we can deduce from this observation is that the occupational structure of a district can have a strong positive effect on the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok. The direction this effect takes is partly congruent with hypothesis 1. The Vlaams Blok is more successful in underprivileged districts with high percentages of blue collar workers.

Table 3. – Income in Euro and the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp District Income Antwerp 16,800 Berchem 16,580 Bezali 20,280 Borgerhout 16,380 Deurne 17,890 Ekeren 20,280 Hoboken 17,510 Merksem 18,480 Wilrijk 18,390 Correlation -.139 Source: Databank Sociale Planning

At first sight there is no clear relationship between the success of Vlaams Blok and the median income in the districts. The districts in which the Vlaams Blok scores above average have both relatively high and relatively low median incomes. In the districts where the Vlaams Blok performs below average we also find both relatively high and relatively low median incomes. This picture is confirmed by the very low and insignificant correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the median income in the districts. It is therefore not possible to make any solid observations on the basis of this correlation. We can conclude that we do not find additional support for hypothesis 1 on the basis of an assessment of the relationship between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the median income in the districts.

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To test the hypotheses 2a and 2b we will analyze the relationship between the electoral results of the Vlaams Blok, on the one hand, and the percentage of ethnic minorities and the change in this percentage over time, on the other hand. It should be noted that it remains problematic to interpret data on ethnic minorities. Here, we use the number of non-EU foreign- ers as recorded by the Databank Sociale Planning in Antwerp. These numbers only indicate the nationality of the inhabitants of Antwerp and do not reflect the popular sentiments and categorizations of minorities deemed important in theories of ethnic competition and xenophobia. At this point, however, more suitable data are unfortunately not available.

Table 4. – Ethnic minorities and the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp (in % and percentage point) District Ethnic minorities Change in ethnic minorities 1996-2000 Antwerp 13.68 - 0.31 Berchem 8.26 - 0.62 Bezali 1.96 - 0.48 Borgerhout 19.70 + 0.09 Deurne 5.24 + 1.18 Ekeren 1.14 + 0.20 Hoboken 6.58 - 0.71 Merksem 3.10 + 0.39 Wilrijk 4.40 - 0.10 Correlation .131 .488 Source: Databank Sociale Planning

The districts have very different percentages of ethnic minorities (see Table 4). No clear pattern can be discerned regarding the relationship between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the percentage of ethnic minorities in the districts. Some districts where the Vlaams Blok scores above average have a high percentage of ethnic minorties, while other districts where the Vlaams Blok scores above average have a low percentage of ethnic minorities. The same goes for the districts in which the Vlaams Blok performs below average. The absence of a clear relationship between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the percentage of ethnic minorities in the districts is

—240— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP reflected by the very low and not significant correlation between the two variables. Thus, we find no support for hypothesis 2a. Almost all districts in which the Vlaams Blok performs above average have seen an considerable increase in the percentage of ethnic minorities in the 4 years preceding the 2000 municipal elections (with the exception of Hoboken). However, one of the districts in which the Vlaams Blok performs below average has also seen a considerable increase in this percentage, namely Ekeren. The ambivalence of the relationship between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the change in the percentage of ethnic minorities in the districts is also observable in the correlation between these two variables. The correlation is relatively high, but not significant. This implies that do not find univocal support for hypothesis 2b, although a look at the data district per district gives some indication that an analysis of more cases could lead to confirmation of this hypothesis.

To test hypotheses 3a and 3b we analyze the relationship between the success of the Vlaams Blok, on the one hand, and the level of unemployment and the change in this level over time on the other hand.

Table 5. – Unemployment and the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp (in % and percentage point change) District Level of Change in level unemployment of unemployment 1996-2000 Antwerp 11.90 - 2.71 Berchem 7.04 - 3.08 Bezali 5.56 - 3.65 Borgerhout 11.90 - 2.32 Deurne 7.09 - 2.88 Ekeren 4.28 - 2.13 Hoboken 6.40 - 2.97 Merksem 5.75 - 2.63 Wilrijk 4.52 - 2.73 Correlation .158 .154 Source: Databank Sociale Planning

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In the districts where the Vlaams Blok scores above average, the level of unemployment is relatively high. However, this is also the case in the district of Antwerp and to a lesser extent Berchem, districts in which the Vlaams Blok scores below average. The correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the level of unemployment confirms this pattern. The correlation is very low and not significant and it is therefore not possible to find support for hypothesis 3a. All districts have seen a decrease in the level of unemployment between 1996 and 2000. The magnitude of this decrease is roughly equal in all districts. Due to the little variation on this variable it is impossible to see a clear pattern between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the change in the level of unemployment. This is also shown by the very low and not significant correlation between the two variables. Therefore we cannot confirm hypothesis 3b. To test hypothesis 4a reliable date on certain important indicators is lacking. Data on church involvement, union membership and participa- tion in intermediary groups are not available at the district level. To have some indication of the level of social disintegration, we turn to the number of associations in the districts.4 These data give us a rough indication of the social fabric in the districts, though they cannot tell us how many people actually participate in the tallied associations.

Table 6. – Social disintegration and the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp District Associations per 1000 inhabitants Antwerp 5.60 Berchem 3.84 Bezali 7.66 Borgerhout 3.74 Deurne 3.50 Ekeren 6.25 Hoboken 4.60 Merksem 4.59 Wilrijk 3.85 Correlation -.299

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No clear relationship exists between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the number of associations in the districts. Some districts in which the Vlaams Blok performs above average have a low number of associations, as was theorized, but this is also the case in some of the districts where the Vlaams Blok performs below average. Three of the five districts where the Vlaams Blok performs below average do indeed rank at the top of the list in terms of number of associations in the districts, but they are immediately followed by two districts where the Vlaams Blok performs above average. The absence of clear pattern between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the number of associations in a district is also visible in the relatively low and not significant correlation between the two variables. Therefore we cannot endorse hypothesis 4a.

To test hypothesis 4b we turn to the age structure in the districts. We analyze the relationship between the success of the Vlaams Blok and four age categories: age 18-24, age 25-39, age 40-64, and age 65+.

Table 7. – Age and the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp (in % support) District 18-24 25-39 40-64 65+ Antwerp 8.70 23.29 28.53 19.87 Berchem 8.07 21.35 29.68 22.83 Bezali 7.98 22.21 33.15 12.28 Borgerhout 8.60 20.56 27.95 20.24 Deurne 7.12 20.97 32.39 22.07 Ekeren 7.42 22.57 31.65 16.37 Hoboken 8.25 20.15 32.63 17.60 Merksem 7.62 20.62 32.29 20.52 Wilrijk 7.66 21.23 31.10 21.51 Correlation -.139 -.627 .275 .026 Source: Databank Sociale Planning

The variation in the age category 18 to 24 is very small. Given this low variation, no clear pattern can be observed between the success of the Vlaams Blok and this age group, which is reflected by the very low and not significant correlation between these variables. The districts in which

—243— ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2005 the Vlaams Blok scores above average have the lowest percentages of inhabitants aged 25 to 39. The correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and this age category is strong, and close to the threshold of significance (-.666 at the level of a =.05). It could very well be that the correlation between these two variables becomes significant once tested on a dataset with a larger number of cases. Three of the four districts in which the Vlaams Blok performs above average also have relatively high percentages of inhabitants aged 40 to 64. However, the highest score on this variable is for Bezali, a district in which the Vlaams Blok scores below average. The contrary position of Bezali (and that of Borgerhout, which combines a relatively low percentage of inhabitants aged 40 to 64 with an above average score for the Vlaams Blok) leads to a relatively low and not significant correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the percentage of inhabitants aged 40 to 64. Absolutely no pattern can be observed in the last age category. The districts where the Vlaams Blok performs above average have both high and low percentages of inhabitants aged 65+, the same goes for the districts in which the Vlaams Blok scores below average. The correlation reflects this; it is very low and not significant. The overall conclusion is that there is little support for hypothesis 4b. The only significant correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the age structure is based on the age category 25 to 39. This correlation is negative and tells us that the Vlaams Blok achieves more success in districts with low percentages of inhabitants aged 25 to 39. This finding contradicts hypothesis 4b, if we consider inhabitants of 25 to 39 to be ‘young’.

Given the small number of cases, we find only one significant correlation in our analysis of the demand-side, namely that between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the percentage of blue-collar workers in the districts. This correlation gives some support to our first hypothesis that the Vlaams Blok will be more successful in areas with high numbers of under-

—244— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP privileged inhabitants. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that other demand-side variables will also have a significant impact on the success of the Vlaams Blok when we base the same analysis on a larger number of cases. We think here primarily of the other variables that are related to the professional structure of the districts, but also of the variables ‘change in ethnic minorities 1996-2000’ and ‘age 25-39’. If the correlations between these variables and the success of the Vlaams Blok were to remain the same when calculated on the basis of 20 cases or districts, they would all be significant.5

THE SUPPLY-SIDE APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK AT THE (SUB-)LOCAL LEVEL

In the second part of this study we will establish to what extent the individual candidates of an extreme-right party such as the Vlaams Blok are responsible for the relative success of their party in their respective con- stituencies. The question of the supply side of electoral success has not received the attention it deserves. Most researchers seem to assume that the appeal of an extreme-right party is only a matter of its ideology on the one hand and the availability of a charismatic leader, or charismatic leaders on the other hand.

The emphasis on ideological factors seems legitimate given the results of electoral studies at the level of individual voters. As was recounted in the first part of this paper, two of the most important determinants of the voting for a far-right party such as the Vlaams Blok seem to be its line of reasoning on the issues of ‘immigration’ and ‘insecurity’. But obviously the Vlaams Blok’s ideological stance becomes much more attractive if it is somehow embodied in appealing personalities. This claim is substantiated by the fact that more and more voters are using personal heuristics instead of, or together with, fully-fledged ideological reasoning (Popkin, 1994). In electoral systems where a voter can choose between a vote for a party on

—245— ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2005 the one hand (list vote) or a vote for one or more candidates on a party list on the other hand (preference vote), the second type of voting is steadily becoming more popular (Wauters, 2000: 15). This probably has something to do with the increasing level of education and the decreasing party loyal- ty of the electorate (Marsh, 1985). In a way a preference vote conveys more information than a list vote. A preference voter not only endorses the ideological stance of a certain party, but additionally selects who is the best embodiment of this ideological stance. A rational voter who does not agree with the predetermined order of the candidates and who wants to maximize his political impact will therefore use a preference vote. By choosing a candidate who has a distinct profile on some items the preference voter is able to make a difference in the general party profile (King, 1981). Especially in a mass party which incorporates different factions preference votes play an important role in gauging differential support.

Nevertheless, the literature on far-right parties does not pay a great deal of attention to the impact of individual candidates. The only exception in this respect is the importance of charismatic leaders. Many authors seem con- vinced that the electoral support for the FN and for the FPÖ would crumble if Le Pen or Haider were to disappear. We can not deny that a leader such as Filip Dewinter does indeed play an important part in the success of Vlaams Blok. But obviously, it is not possible to put Dewinter on every list of the Vlaams Blok. This is especially relevant for local elections since candidates must reside in the ward in which they run. It is therefore very interesting to assess the electoral appeal of the local candidates of the Vlaams Blok.

TESTING A SUPPLY-SIDE THEORY: PREFERENCE VOTE AND DIFFERENTIAL SUCCES OF THE VLAAMS BLOK

We will first of all look at the number of voters who chose to cast one or more preference votes instead of a list vote. In a proportional elec-

—246— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP toral system such as exists in Belgium, voters can either choose to cast one or more preference votes for candidates on some party list or cast a list vote which reveals a preference for a political party. By choosing for a list vote one implicitly agrees with the ordering of the list. Therefore a preference vote to some extent contains more information than a list vote. By choosing one or more candidates on the list one might be able to alter the order of the list as presented by the party and elect lower ranked candidates to office. But of course this is only relevant for those voters who know candidates on the list and want to support them. In principle one could say that a preference vote shows an involvement with one or more of the candidates on the list. We do not speak of personal knowledge because sometimes acquaintance with certain socio-demographic characteristics of the candidate such as gender, place of residence, or age can be enough to create the involvement. But it seems reasonable to assume that the number of voters casting a preference vote based on this sort of low-information shortcut would be a fixed proportion of the number of party votes. In Figure 2 we depict the electoral results for the Vlaams Blok in terms of proportions in the different districts of Antwerp and compare those with the proportions that would have been obtained if the results were based solely on the list votes on the one side and solely on the preference votes on the other side. We see that the discrepancies between the party vote-result and the preference vote-result are certainly not uniform in the respective districts. While the proportion of list votes for the Vlaams Blok in most districts manifestly exceeds the proportion of preference votes the discrepancy is much smaller in the case of Deurne and Borgerhout. In one district, Ekeren, the order is even reversed. In Ekeren the Vlaams Blok would be more successful if the elections were based solely on preference votes. This is a first indication that preference voting for Vlaams Blok is not exclusively a matter of personal involvement, based on low-information shortcuts, but also depends on factors that pertain to a varying familiarity with the candidates.

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Figure 2. –Party List vote result versus Preference vote result for Vlaams Blok

In order to get a more detailed description and explanation of the relation between the number of preference votes and the actual electoral result of the Vlaams Blok we will focus on some figures. Because of the differing size of the electorates in the districts the absolute number of preference votes is misleading. Therefore we will first look at a relative statistic, in casu the percentage of voters casting one or more preference votes instead of a party vote (Table 9).

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Table 9. – Percentage of voters in different parties casting one or more preference votes AGALEV SP CVP VU-ID VLD Vlaams Weighted Blok Average City Council 71.88 79.72 72.68 64.69 69.47 71.62 72.83 Antwerpen 66.35 71.31 75.10 62.22 58.53 54.69 63.25 Berchem 58.30 61.99 68.35 68.52 53.42 50.25 57.52 Bezali 66.53 86.31 80.48 76.12 83.11 72.09 78.68 Borgerhout 68.64 59.03 71.61 68.30 52.75 58.45 61.57 Deurne 56.43 62.48 59.00 60.56 55.63 57.56 58.31 Ekeren 54.31 62.39 77.93 72.47 62.22 70.39 67.28 Hoboken 58.29 65.94 81.77 66.85 57.76 56.18 62.40 Merksem 63.69 63.84 77.49 68.36 61.43 58.00 63.64 Wilrijk 50.48 65.15 72.12 73.76 52.99 53.91 59.12 Unweighted 60.34 66.49 73.76 68.58 59.76 59.06 61.91 Average

The results in Table 9 teach us that the voters of the Vlaams Blok cast on average fewer preference votes than the voters of the other major parties. This finding makes clear that the proportion of preference votes obtained by the different political parties is not a good indicator for the general election result. Were this the case, the Christian-democrats of the CVP, Flemish nationalists of VU-ID, and to a smaller extent the Social-democrats of the SP would score rather better than they do, while the electoral result of the Vlaams Blok would be clearly worse. Nevertheless it is interesting to see that the proportion of preference votes for the Vlaams Blok is not significantly lower than that of the greens of Agalev or the liberals of the VLD. A longitudinal analysis in terms of the proportion of preference votes teaches us that the Vlaams Blok gradually closes in on the other parties. In the city council elections of 1994, only 56.32% of the votes for the Vlaams Blok were preference votes. In comparison with the last city council election, one sees an increase of more than 15 percentage points, a gain unrivalled by the other parties. But in order to understand why the Vlaams Blok performs much better in some districts than in others, a vertical comparison of the data in table 10 is clearly more illuminating. This shows us for instance that the

—249— ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2005 number of Vlaams Blok voters casting one or more preference votes is particularly elevated in Bezali and Ekeren. The explanation for these atypical results is however different in both cases. In Bezali we see that the voters of all political parties very often cast preference votes. Given that the district Bezali has clearly got the lowest number of inhabitants and is geographically somewhat isolated from the rest of Antwerp, the electoral candidates in Bezali are probably better integrated in the local community and therefore receive relatively more preference votes (Thijssen & Van Assche, 2002: 525). In Ekeren too, the overall average proportion of preference votes is relatively high but the difference with the other districts is not substantial. The unusually high number of Vlaams Blok voters in Ekeren casting preference votes is obviously related to the presence of Filip Dewinter, the charismatic leader of Vlaams Blok, on the electoral ballot. From the bottom position on the list, Filip Dewinter received 1562 preference votes, or 38% of all the preference votes on the Vlaams Blok list for Ekeren. In Table 10a we laid out the extent to which the proportions of preference votes (as opposed to list votes) on the Vlaams Blok candidate lists in the different districts are correlated with the global vote shares of the Vlaams Blok in the corresponding districts. This correlation is very low and not at all statistically significant. However, this does not come as a surprise given the particular geographical and socio-economic context of a district such as Bezali, and the Dewinter effect in the district of Ekeren. If we focus on the remaining seven districts the correlation rises substan- tially and is clearly statistically significant.

Table 10a. – Proportions of preference voting on Vlaams Blok ballots in the districts of Antwerp (%PV) District Proportion of preference votes Antwerp 54.69 Berchem 50.25 Bezali 72.09 Borgerhout 58.45

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Deurne 57.56 Ekeren 70.39 Hoboken 56.18 Merksem 58.00 Wilrijk 53.91 Correlation 0.03 Correlation without Bezali and Ekeren 0.85* * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

But the atypical results for districts such as Bezali, which pertain to the available data on the differential status of the social fabric, can be taken into account as it were by subtracting the average proportion of preference votes for all the major parties from the proportions of preference votes that Vlaams Blok received. These normed proportions of preference votes (N%PV) are shown in Table 10b.

Table 10b. – Normed proportions of preference voting6 on Vlaams Blok ballots in the districts of Antwerp (N%PV) District Normed proportion of preference votes Antwerp -8.56 Berchem -7.27 Bezali -6.59 Borgerhout -3.12 Deurne -0.75 Ekeren 3.11 Hoboken -6.22 Merksem -5.64 Wilrijk -5.21 Correlation 0.28 Correlation without Ekeren 0.65

As one would expect, based on the earlier results, Ekeren is the only district where the difference is positive. Since Ekeren is not by any means the district where Vlaams Blok obtained its best results, the correlation of the differences with the global vote shares is not all that high. But if we leave Ekeren aside and focus on the remaining eight districts the correlation again

—251— ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2005 increases considerably. The correlation coefficient equals 0.65 (P= 0,12). What does this teach us? Ekeren aside, Vlaams Blok gets more votes in those districts where Vlaams Blok voters, in comparison with the supporters of the other major parties, more frequently cast preference votes. This could mean that the Vlaams Blok candidates are better-appreciated and better-known in the districts where Vlaams Blok performs best. Of course, it is too early to conclude that the global electoral result of Vlaams Blok is better because their voters cast proportionally more preference votes. Unfortunately, this kind of causal relation is difficult to ascertain. We can only try to pinpoint a number of facts that might make this causal connec- tion more or less plausible. In this respect, we must not forget that two districts, Bezali and Ekeren, were in fact at odds with the correlation.

Firstly, Bezali only conforms to the general picture when the proportion of preference votes on the Vlaams Blok lists is related to the corresponding proportions for the other parties in the respective district. Because of the relative nature of the empirical findings, a slightly amended interpretation is also possible. Indeed, it is conceivable that the candidates of the other parties are less well-appreciated or less well-known in districts where Vlaams Blok scores best. According to this latter interpretation, the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok may not be a result of the strength of its own candidates, but may only reflect the weakness of the candidates of the competing political parties. In any event, in this situation too, the differential success of the Vlaams Blok may be attributed to the strong electoral appeal of the candidates on its lists. Secondly, the atypical result for Ekeren seems to confirm that a relatively high ratio of preference votes does not necessarily lead to a strong overall result. This does however seem to be the case where the preference votes go disproportionally to a single candidate. To check whether this finding has a more general relevance we investigate whether the global vote share of Vlaams Blok correlates to the variation of the numbers of preference votes for the different candidates on the Vlaams Blok ballot

—252— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP list. In this respect the inter-quartile range (IQR) seems an appropriate measure of variation, as it is less sensitive to extremes. The IQR takes the difference between the third quartile and the first quartile. We will illus- trate the IQR with a small example. If one has a voting list of fifteen candidates for which the numbers of preference votes are sorted in ascend- ing order, then the IQR of the number of preference votes is the twelfth score minus the fourth score. In Table 11, we find the IQRs of the preference votes for the different candidates on the party lists in the different districts. First of all, we notice that the largest districts in terms of population (Antwerpen, Deurne) generally have the most substantial IQRs. Therefore it is more instructive to interpret the table horizontally instead of vertically. In four districts (Borgerhout, Deurne, Hoboken, and Merksem) the IQRs of the Vlaams Blok-lists are larger than those of the other parties. This is interesting since it is precisely in those districts Vlaams Blok also recorded its best overall results.

Table 11. – Inter-quartile ranges (IQRs) of number of preference votes AGALEV SP CVP VU-ID VLD Vlaams Overall Blok Inter-quartile range City Council 577 749 453 102 370 426 529 Antwerp 322 258 216 101 271 212 268 Berchem 182 95 92 61 179 120 97 Bezali 30 144 23 21 94 122 84 Borgerhout 87 86 116 33 46 160 86 Deurne 131 167 92 58 140 307 148 Ekeren 54 68 189 24 81 98 72 Hoboken 40 131 80 26 78 164 121 Merksem 106 96 130 43 57 180 107 Wilrijk 73 96 153 18 103 131 101

In order to be able to compare across districts, we subsequently compute the ratios of the IQRs of the preference votes on the Vlaams Blok list, divided by the IQRs of the preference votes of all the candidates in the

—253— ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2005 respective districts (Table 12). The correlation between the resulting normed inter-quartile ranges (NIQRs) on the one hand, and the overall vote shares of the Vlaams Blok on the other hand, is very strong. In this case we need not eliminate the district Ekeren from the analysis.

Table 12. – Normed Inter-quartile ranges (NIQR)7 of the number of preference votes District Normed Inter-quartile range Antwerp 0.79 Berchem 1.24 Bezali 1.45 Borgerhout 1.86 Deurne 2.07 Ekeren 1.36 Hoboken 1.36 Merksem 1.68 Wilrijk 1.30 Correlation 0.706* * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

From this finding, we learn that the Vlaams Blok voter differentiates most between the respective candidates in those districts where the party scores best. In this respect it is important to point out that the large NIQRs in districts such as Borgerhout or Deurne are not caused by a small number of successful second-tier candidates. As a matter of fact, the preference votes for the middle fifty percent of the candidates are spread fairly even- ly over the interval delineated by the first and the third quartile. Earlier on, we established that more Vlaams Blok-voters cast preference votes in those districts with the highest overall score for Vlaams Blok. We can now add that this seems to have a positive effect on the number of preference votes for all candidates. But because some candidates profit more than others, this effect nevertheless contributes to a greater variation.

Unfortunately, we do not have enough information to specify a particular causal relation between global success and the electoral appeal of individ-

—254— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP ual candidates. Obviously, the candidates who somehow tend to catch the eye of the voter will get more votes as more constituents consider the candidates on the ballot list. In this respect, it would be interesting to have more information on the reasons why voters take an interest in the candidates on a ballot list. Some may have looked at every list to find the candidate of their preference. Others might only look at lists for the Vlaams Blok. In the first instance the preference vote might be called a first-order vote, while in the second instance the preference vote is a second-order vote. Hopefully, further research will shed some light on this intriguing question. In any event, since the casting of a preference vote often reveals a greater involvement by a voter than does a list vote, we may conclude that the quantitative success of Vlaams Blok in terms of overall electoral support seems to go hand-in-hand with a qualitative embedding in terms of preference voting.

CONCLUSION

In this study we have tried to explain the differential electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in the nine districts of Antwerp. Our analysis was based on the results of the first district council elections, held in 2000. For our explanations, we used two categories of independent variables. The first category referred to the particular socio-economic context of the districts. The second category related to the electoral appeal of the specific candidates of the Vlaams Blok in each district. In choosing the contextual variables, we relied upon extant micro- and meso-level demand-side theories. We asked to what extent do demand-side factors (e.g., age, income and occupational status), which have been proven effective at the micro-level, have a similar effect when applied at the meso level. And we considered whether classic meso-level factors can account for variations in the (sub-)local success of the Vlaams Blok. We found only one variable, the proportion of blue-collar workers,

—255— ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2005 to be significantly related to the election results for the Vlaams Blok in the different districts. This means that constituents in districts with high percentages of blue-collar workers vote more for the Vlaams Blok than do those in districts with low percentages of blue-collar workers. The second explanatory category, which refers to familiarity with the Vlaams Blok candidates on the different lists, is also clearly related to the electoral success of the party. This may come as a surprise because individual (sub-)local candidates are generally not considered to be particularly important in the explanation of the success of the extreme right, excepting the charismatic leaders of this type of party. We did indeed find that supporters of the Vlaams Blok cast on average fewer preference votes and thus more list votes than the voters of other parties. Nevertheless, in some districts the differences with the overall proportion of preference votes are much smaller. As it happens, these are the districts in which the Vlaams Blok also obtains the best global results (which incorporate the list votes). Additionally, we found that the range of the numbers of preference votes of the middle fifty percent (the inter-quartile range) of the candidates on a Vlaams Blok is also clearly related to the overall electoral result. This last finding indicates that the Vlaams Blok voters do clearly differentiate between the candidates on the list, and sug- gests that a preference vote is not for them simply a personalized list vote. A comparison between the two factors that were investigated in this study, the demand for the Vlaams Blok at the meso-level on the one hand and the supply of Vlaams Blok candidates on the other hand, shows that both factors have a similar explanatory potential. The correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the percentage of blue-collar workers in a district has a value of 0.677. The correlation between the success of the Vlaams Blok and the Normed Inter-quartile range of the preference votes has a comparable value of 0.706. Nevertheless, most research on the success of the extreme right has so far focused rather exclusively on demand-side explanations. We must therefore conclude that the impact of the (sub-)local political personnel in the success of the Vlaams Blok

—256— THIJSSEN/DE LANGE – EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL APPEAL OF THE VLAAMS BLOK IN THE DISTRICTS OF ANTWERP merits more attention. Future research ought for instance to explore to what extent this finding can be generalized to other far-right parties.

REFERENCES

Coffé, H. Groot in Vlaanderen, klein(er) in Wallonië. Een analyse van het electorale succes van de extreem-rechtse partijen. Brussel: VUB, 2004. Eatwell, R. “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right” in The Revival of the Radical Right, 3th ed. Edited by P. Merkl and L. Weinberg. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Husbands, Ch. T. “De Centrum stroming in perspectief: hoe verschillend is Nederland?”, in Extreem-Rechts in Nederland, Edited by J. van Holsteyn and C. Mudde. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1998. King, A. “What do elections decide?”, in Democracy at the polls, a comparative study of compet- itive national elections, Edited by D. Butler. Washington, 1981. Lubbers, M. Exclusionistic Electorates. Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe. Nijmegen: Faculty of Social Science, University of Nijmegen, 2001. Lubbers, M., P. Scheepers, and J. Billiet. “Individual and contextual characteristics of the Vlaams Blok vote.” Acta Politica 35 (2000): 363-398. Marsh, M. “The Voters Decide? Preferential Voting in European List Systems.” European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985): 365-378. Popkin, S. The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Swyngedouw, M. “Verkiezingen in Antwerpen: het Vlaams Blok, Islamitische minderhe- den en kansarmoede.” Tijdschrift voor Sociologie 11 (1990): 401-430. Swyngedouw, M. “The subjective cognitive and affective map of extreme right voters: Using open-ended questions in exit-polls.” Electoral Studies 20 (2001): 217-241. Thijssen, P., and D. Van Assche “In het oog, in het hart? De Antwerpse districtraadsverkiezingen en de kloof tussen burger en bestuur.”, Res Publica 44 (2002): 523-549. Thijssen, P., and K. Jacobs “Determinanten van voorkeurstemproporties bij lokale verkiezingen. De Antwerpse districtraadsverkiezingen van 8 oktober 2000.”, Res Publica 46 (2004): 460-485. Wauters, B. De kracht van de voorkeurstem in stad en dorp. Leuven: Afdeling Politologie, 2000. Witte, R.B.J. “De onbegrepen verkiezingsuitslag voor extreem-rechts.” Acta Politica 26 (1991): 449-470.

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NOTES

1. For our description of available demand-side theories we rely on the theoretical overview of Lubbers (2001, pp. 41-79). 2. Prior research has tested whether the contextual variables ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘unemployment’ have an effect on the success of extreme right parties. This has been done to explain the success of the Vlaams Blok (e.g. Swyngedouw, 1990; Lubbers, 2001) as well as that of other European extreme right parties (e.g. Witte, 1991, Husbands, 1998). So far support for both hypotheses has been inconclusive and/or contradictory. 3. Databank Sociale Planning is part of the vzw SOMA, based in Antwerp. All variables taken from this database are from 2000, the year of the district election, with the exception of occupation, for which only data for 2001 are available. There is no reason, however, to assume that significant changes in occupation took place between 2000 and 2001. 4. The associations of the districts were inventoried for the FWO-project “Lokale netwerken en politieke werving. De “missing link” tussen politieke vraag en aanbod” (Thijssen and Jacobs, 2004). 5. Correlations calculated on the basis of 20 cases are significant when higher than .4438 or lower than -.4438. 6. N%PV= %PV – weighted average of the percentages of preference voting for the major political parties in the corresponding district. 7. Inter-quartile ranges of the number of preference votes on the lists for Vlaams Blok in the districts of Antwerp / The overall inter-quartile range of the number of preference votes on the lists of all major parties in the districts of Antwerp.

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