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The London School of Economics and Political Science Normalizing the Israel Asset. The Reagan Administration and the Second Cold War in the Middle East: Leverage, Blowback and the Institutionalization of the US-Israel ‘Special Relationship’ Andrea T. Dessí Thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, May 2018 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 107,560 words. This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number 1510562) I confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language and grammar by Carol Ross of Hyperlife Editing Services. 2 Abstract The US-Israel relationship reached a critical, institutionalizing juncture during the 1980s. Measurable in qualitative and quantitative terms, the Reagan administration had a transformative impact on bilateral ties, institutionalizing ad hoc forms of cooperation while modifying prevailing discourse to recognize Israel as an ‘ally’ and a ‘strategic asset’ in the Cold War. New bureaucratic agreements were signed, bilateral working groups formed and joint military exercises held throughout a decade that capped a long familiarization process between societies and political elites in the two countries. By the end of the 1980s, many of the bureaucratic frameworks that today still govern the US-Israeli relationship were institutionalized, as were those elements of preferential treatment commonly cited as proof for the ‘special’ or ‘unique’ nature of US-Israel ties. This study focusses on the institutional and bureaucratic dimensions of US support for Israel, examining the changing rationalizations for this support and the way this relates to the salient theme of a mutual struggle for influence and leverage over the policies of the other. Drawing on recently declassified documents, complimented with high-level interviews and other materials, the research answers three interrelated questions as to ‘why’ this institutionalization process was carried out, ‘how’ it would materialize and ‘what effects’ these processes would have on future US policy towards Israel and the Middle East. While predicated on an effort to enhance US leverage over Israel, the study argues that the institutionalization of the relationship would formalize interdependence between the two countries, consolidating a ‘policy straitjacket’ that has constrained presidential freedom of action towards both Israel and the broader Middle East. This has furthered the US’s ‘entrapment’ in a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel that has enhanced a process of ‘Israelization’ of US approaches and viewpoints on Middle East developments, harming US influence while transforming the US into an active participant and major obstacle to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the broader stabilization of the Middle East. 3 Table of Contents Introduction 7 Chapter 1 21 Framing US Foreign Policy Chapter 2 40 Anatomy of a ‘Special Relationship’: Domestic Constraints, Power Asymmetries and the Struggle for Leverage Chapter 3 66 The Reagan Revolution Chapter 4 84 The Second Cold War in the Middle East: Strategic Outreach to Israel and the Arab States in the 1980s Chapter 5 106 ‘Strategic Dissensus’: Debates and Dividends of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation Chapter 6 133 A Baptism of Fire: The Lebanon War and the Rebirth of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation Chapter 7 161 From Theory to Practice: Institutionalizing the US-Israel ‘Special Relationship’ Conclusion 188 Bibliography 201 Appendix 216 4 For Mom & Dad In memory of Tom Boyden 5 Acknowledgments This manuscript is the product of many years work and would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of family, friends and colleagues. Inspiration comes in many shapes and forms and the list of people who have helped me along the way is sadly too extensive to include in its entirety. My heartfelt appreciation goes to my supervisor, Prof. Fawaz Gerges, whose encouragement and insights have been irreplaceable in the long road towards submission. The many discussions, meals and exchange of views on the Middle East have been a constant source of inspiration and motivation and will be fondly remembered for many years to come. I owe a debt of gratitude to the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome and in particular to my colleagues and the present and former Directors, Nathalie Tocci and Ettore Greco, who opened the doors of the Institute to a young researcher in 2011 and have since been a key to my personal and professional development. Nathalie was instrumental in pushing me to embark on the PhD journey and for this I thank her immensely. This research would not have been possible without the support of a number of academics, former Reagan era officials and diplomats in the United States. Their interest and availability to be interviewed provided priceless insight into the inner working of the Reagan administration. The archivists at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library also deserve a mention of praise and will be fondly remembered. Friends and PhD colleagues at LSE and beyond have also been instrumental along the way. I wish to particularly thank Anissa Haddadi for the long discussions and debates about the Middle East, Richard Morris for kindly hosting me in London during the final phases of the research and Giulio Caperchi for our long and insightful discussions in London, Rome and the US. My deep appreciation and thanks go to Annabella Cuomo, whose patience, warmth and encouragement have carried me through the last years of this PhD journey. From London to Rome, her companionship has been priceless for me to reach this milestone. Finally, I would have never embarked on this journey had it not been for my parents. The love, freedom and encouragement given to me by mom and dad have been instrumental. This thesis is dedicated to them and my late uncle, Tom Boyden, one of the last actions of whom was to send me a book on the Middle East from San Francisco to Rome, a book that has served to deepen my fascination about the region and has in some way led me to this juncture. 6 Introduction The 1980s and the Reagan administration are commonly described as a ‘golden age’ for US-Israel relations. Reagan noted in his diary that Israel ‘never had a better friend’1 in the White House, and Moshe Arens, Israeli ambassador to the US and later defence minister in the right-wing Likud government at the time, agrees, remembering the 1980s as an ‘extended honeymoon’, 2 a decade when the US-Israel relationship reached a level of ‘friendship and alliance unprecedented in previous years’.3 Writing on the eve of Reagan’s death in 2004, Arens recalled how the president’s two secretaries of state were the ‘first to change’ the ‘traditional attitude’ towards Israel in the US State Department, adding that ‘when it comes to friendship for Israel, all occupants of the White House can be measured by the standard’ Reagan set.4 Beyond the pleasantries conveyed by such statements, one might be puzzled to find that the 1980s were marked by severe, even unprecedented, tensions between the United States and Israel. Crises ranged from Israel’s staunch opposition to the sale of US weaponry to ‘moderate’ Arab states, Israel’s bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and PLO headquarters in Beirut, the annexation of the occupied Golan Heights, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the 1985 arrest of Jonathan Pollard, to name but a few. While such events could be expected to severely test and even damage the US-Israel relationship, not least by calling into question the increasingly public portrayals of Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ and ‘loyal ally’ of the United States, disagreements were quickly overcome and the overall trend remained characterized by a profound institutionalization of the relationship and a growing interdependence between the national security policies of the two countries. By the end of the 1980s, many of the institutional frameworks that today still govern US-Israel ties were institutionalized in the US bureaucracy, as were those elements of preferential treatment that are commonly cited as proof for the ‘special’ or ‘unique’ nature of the US-Israel relationship. Adding to the twin pillars of shared Judeo-Christian values and political affinities that had defined US support for Israel since 1948, a third and most controversial pillar would be formally added to the relationship during the 1980s: that of ‘strategic cooperation’. This would represent the climax of a long, incremental process of institutional development that began in the late 1950s, was further augmented by a series of key bilateral agreements signed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, leading finally to the normalization of relations and their formalization during the second Reagan term in the mid-to-late 1980s (see Appendix A-F). An unprecedented number of 31 bilateral agreements were concluded during Reagan’s tenure, covering everything from cooperation in research and development to emergency medical assistance, anti-terror 1 Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, New York, Harper Collins, 2007, p.14. 2 Moshe Arnes, Broken Covenant. American Foreign Policy and the Crisis Between the US and Israel, Simon & Schuster Ltd., 1995, p.25.