The United States-Japan Security Treaty of 1951: an Essay on the Origins of Postwar Japanese-American Relation
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Portland State University PDXScholar Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 11-17-1993 The United States-Japan Security Treaty of 1951: An Essay on the Origins of Postwar Japanese-American Relation Christopher S. Johnson Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds Part of the Political Science Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Johnson, Christopher S., "The United States-Japan Security Treaty of 1951: An Essay on the Origins of Postwar Japanese-American Relation" (1993). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 4596. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.6480 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: [email protected]. AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Christopher S. Johnson for the Master of Science in Polical Science presented November 17, 1993. Title: The United States-Japan Security Treaty of 1951: An Essay on the Origins of Postwar Japanese-American Relations. APPROVED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: / David Horowitz The early September day in 1951 that brought the Pacific War to an official end, with the signing of a treaty of peace, concluded as representatives of Japan and the United States signed the Bilateral Security Treaty. The security treaty symbolized new realities of international relations, just as the peace treaty had buried the old. By cementing into place a strategic alliance between the former Pacific antagonists, the treaty represented the great and lasting achievement of postwar American diplomacy 2 in Asia. Nevertheless, the treaty was both the outcome and the perpetuation of a stereotyped and lopsided relationship, now fixed firmly into place, as a Japan diminished by defeat acceded to the necessity of a security embrace with its former conqueror, and the United States enlisted a most valued, albeit a most reluctant ally for the ongoing struggle to meet and defeat the Soviet threat. At the end of the Pacific War such an outcome had been beyond the pale. The security treaty was the product of years of crisis adaptation. Hopes that the U.S. could make China the great power of Asia were dashed by revolution. As cherished verities of U.S. diplomacy fell by the wayside, new truisms, based upon strategic interests inherited from victory in the Pacific and the cold war policy of containment, staunchly rose to assume their place. As a result, U.S. attitudes towards Japan underwent a tortuous reassessment. The initial occupation policies of disarmament and reform were replaced by the urgent need to enlist Japan as a vital cold war asset. However, this reorientation was not easily accomplished. Competing interests within the U.S. Government clashed over the means necessary to insure Japan's security and stability, while also guaranteeing the creation of a reliable ally -- a debate that became ever more heated as the cold war intensified. The Japanese, at great disadvantage, skillfully attempted to negotiate a role for themselves in the postwar world, eager for an alliance, yet fearful of domination. The goal of this thesis is to chart and document the evolution of this policy transformation, in all its twists and odd turns. To accomplish this task I turned to an older tradition of political science, one widely practiced at the dawn of the discipline. To be sure, judicious use was made of 3 many of the theories and methodological approaches prevalent currently. Yet while useful at times, these methods often failed to adequately explain those indeterminate moments of idiosyncratic chance and contingency of events upon which so much, to my mind, the final outcome depended. I turned therefore to a more historical approach. My primary sources became the diplomatic record as revealed in the Foreign Relations of the United States and the memoirs of those who participated in the fashioning of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. By the time the security treaty was concluded, the agreement reached was not one of shared joint purpose, but one which defined and gave sanction to diverging national aims that could not, nonetheless, be realized in isolation. The continued U.S. military presence in Japan had been the goal of a policy process ultimately defined in military terms, as the final bastion of cold war containment on the rim of Asia. The Japanese understood the need for security in a volatile world, but not the necessity of providing it for themselves, as the postwar political system slowly organized around emerging economic priorities. It was an odd arrangement, but one which met respective needs and desires. Yet its lack of reciprocity and mutual commitment has ensured through the years the continuation of an ambiguous and uncertain alliance. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY OF 1951: AN ESSAY ON THE ORIGINS OF POSTWAR JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS by CHRISTOPHER S. JOHNSON A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE in POLITICAL SCIENCE Portland State University 1993 TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES: The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Christopher S. Johnson presented November 17, 1993. Melvin Gurt¢, Chair Gil La APPROVED: G cott, Chair, Department of Political Science Roy W. Kflch, Vice Provost for Graduate Studies and Research ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Since brevity has so much to recommend it, and yet I so seldom comply with its dictates, here at least I shall be brief. I would first wish to thank the unsung librarians and staff of the Portland State Library Department of Inter-Library Loans for their remarkable efforts to procure faraway books in the timeliest way. Betty Cox, Office Coordinator of the Department of Political Science, held my hand more often than I would want to recall, as she helped me arrange many of the details which I was too incompetent to see through for myself. I wish to thank the efforts of my committee: Mohamed Wader, Gil Latz and David Horowitz (scholars all), who devoted precious time on my behalf. My advisor, Melvin Gurtov, is due special words of praise for guiding me, ever so gently, through an enterprise which at times I am sure he felt had no end. My devoted and long suffering wife, Katherin Kirkpatrick endured much of the worst with genuine, I believe, good humor and understanding. And finally, an immense bundle of gratitude is due my parents, Stephen and Joan Johnson, who most generously bankrolled the entire venture. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................. iii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION . 1 II LEGACIES OF WAR . 7 Marshall and China . 8 The Occupation and Article IX . 11 Notes ............................................. 19 III THE EARLY PEACE . 21 The Prime Minister and the Japanese Past . 28 Policy Planning . 36 The Ashida Notes . 40 PPS/10 ............................................ 44 Notes ............................................. 47 IV REORIENTATION: THE KENNAN MISSION AND NSC 13/2 .................................................... 50 Notes ............................................. 66 V "PENTAGONIZATION" . 70 Permanent Neutrality ............................... 94 Notes ............................................. 104 VI MR. SECRETARY ....................................... 108 The Soviets in Asia .................................. 111 A Counteroffensive ................................. 116 The Ikeda Mission .................................. 133 A New Cast of Characters ............................ 139 Notes ............................................. 145 v CHAPTER PAGE VII JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND THE IMPACT OF KOREA ... 149 "Saved" ............................................ 161 A Gift of the Gods .................................. 163 The End of an Impasse .............................. 172 Despair ........................................... 180 Notes ............................................. 185 VIII THE AMBIGUITY OF COMPROMISE ..................... 190 Endgame .......................................... 192 Rearmament ....................................... 204 Finishing Touches .................................. 208 Ceremony ......................................... 213 Notes ............................................. 216 IX CONCLUSION .......................................... 220 Notes ............................................. 229 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 230 APPENDIX A Article IX of the Japanese Constitution ............................ 236 APPENDIXB Text of the United States-Japan Bilateral Security Treaty ......................................... 238 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Relations between nations seldom arrange themselves fortuitously solely by the happy caprice of history. Of recent years the fashioners of U.S. foreign policy have come to term this country's relations with Japan as "the most important bilateral relationship in the world." What they mean to convey by this dry diplomatic phrase is something more than the somewhat grim ritual asseverations of determined friendship. It is rather the reassuring confirmation of a long standing strategic and political arrangement. The mo~t important bilateral relationship in the world is centered upon fundamental military considerations which economic disputes, however serious, have not as yet undone. It is one of the bedrocks of United States foreign