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Religious Reorientation in Southern Mali Tone Sommerfelt, Anne Hatløy and Kristin Jesnes – a Summary

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Religious Reorientation in Southern Mali Tone Sommerfelt, Anne Hatløy and Kristin Jesnes – a Summary Religious reorientation in Southern Mali Tone Sommerfelt, Anne Hatløy and Kristin Jesnes – A summary While the increasing significance of radical Salafist Islam in the North of Mali is well known, religious reorientation in the South has received much less public attention. In a series of Religious reorientation reports, we focus on changes in views on politics, religion and social conditions among Muslims in Southern Mali. The studies are based on data collected in Mali in June 2014, both in Southern Mali during in-depth interviews with religious and political leaders, and in a perception survey among 1210 adults in Southern Mali. The study was funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. – A summary Other reports in this series are: • Religious reorientation in Southern Mali – Tabulation report • Religious issues and ethnicity in Southern Mali • ’Laïcité’ in Southern Mali: Current public discussions on secularism and religious freedom All reports are available in English and French. P.O. Box 2947 Tøyen Fafo-report 2015:19 N-0608 Oslo ISBN 978-82-324-0203-8 www.fafo.no ISSN 0801-6143 20424-omslag-omløpende.indd 1 26.10.2015 15:00:54 © Fafo 2015 ISBN 978-82-324-0203-8 ISSN 0801-6143 Cover page photo: Tone Sommerfelt Design: Fafo Information Office Tone Sommerfelt, Anne Hatløy and Kristin Jesnes Religious reorientation in Southern Mali – A summary Fafo-report 2015:19 Abstract Following the advances of militant Islamist groups and the French intervention in Northern Mali in 2012, popular discussions about the spread of “Salafist” versions of Islam have flourished in the Malian web-based media. Claims about the increasing popularity of versions of Islam that originate in the Arab Middle East, variably referred to as Wahhabism and Salafism in Mali, tend to conflate Muslim reformist movements with “terrorism”. Some of the Islamist groupings in the north, for instance AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) claim adherence to Salafism. However, the popularity of Salafist Islam has also become a subject of popular debate with reference to southern Mali. As in other countries on the African continent, religion takes up an increasingly large part of public space in Mali. This is seen in the popular appeal of religious associations, the multiplication of religious schools and organisations, an increase in media coverage and the use of media for religious messages, the participation of religious leaders in political debates, and a more active role of women in religious life. However, Islam has become more important in daily life among Muslims in general – and not only in reformist or religiously conservative circles. Based on data from a quantitative survey of perceptions of religion and politics carried out in Southern Mali in 2014, and data from interviews and conversations during a qualitative fieldwork, this report discusses some of the ways in which the religious scene has changed in recent years. We address what the changes entail in terms of the practice of state secularism, conditions of religious pluralism and women’s participation, and some implications for the engagement with Malian authorities and civil society. A main point is that the religious revival seen in Mali cannot be interpreted as a one-way process of “radicalisation” or adoption of extremist views. Foreword This report is the result of research commissioned the numerous fieldworkers of GREAT in Mali, by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign A ffairs. for all their input during the project. We would The project has been a collaboration between also like to thank all those Malians who agreed The Fafo Research Foundation and the Mali- to participate in interviews and discussions with an research institution GREAT (“Groupe Tone Sommerfelt and Kristin Jesnes during our de Recherche en Économie Appliquée et fieldwork in Mopti, Segou, Bamako, Koutiala and Théorique”). The findings build on empirical Sikasso. The different regional councils of the material produced during fieldwork carried HCIM (High Islamic Council of Mali) deserve out in Mali in May and June 2014, using both particular words of thanks for participation and quantitative and qualitative techniques. GREAT facilitation in the field. Finally, we are indebted Mali, led by Massa Coulibaly and Moussa to Mr. Mamadou Konaté for his participation Coulobaly, were responsible for carrying out the during the qualitative fieldwork and to Jon quantitative survey. They collaborated closely Pedersen and Mark Taylor for input during the with researchers in Fafo, and especially with Anne various stages of the research process. Hatløy and Jing Liu. The qualitative fieldwork Needless to say, our words of thanks do not was carried out by Tone Sommerfelt and Kristin reduce the authors’ responsibility for arguments Jesnes from Fafo. and analysis in this text. The authors would like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their funding of Oslo, October 2015 this study, which otherwise would not have been Tone Sommerfelt, Anne Hatløy and made possible. We are grateful to the staff and Kristin Jesnes 3 Introduction Methodology The characterisation of Mali as a country that is This analysis is based on fieldwork carried experiencing a popular shift towards Wahhabist out in May and June 2014. One of the main versions of Islam forms part of a broader sources of data is a perception survey, involving descriptive tendency of and in West Africa and a representative sample of households in urban across the Sahel. In Mali, the political relevance of and rural areas of all the regions in Southern Wahhabism and Wahhabists is perhaps one of the Mali (Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Segou, Mopti hottest topics in online newspapers.1 In meeting and Bamako), six of the nine regions of the places in local neighbourhoods, people listen country, thus excluding the three regions of the to radio broadcasts from religious leaders and north. A total of 1,210 adults (18 years or older) politicians that debate the health of particular responded to the questionnaire, of which 56 per religious communities – Wahhabist communities cent were women. To do this, as many households in particular – and they discuss the role of Islam, were selected, and the total number of household religious institutions and organisations in members was 15,363. Fifty-one per cent of the national politics. Many people in Bamako worry household members were women and 56 per cent about the growth in the number of Wahhabist of them lived in rural areas. In each household, mosques, the relevance of Wahhabism in political the household head, or other person who was circles, in spite of Wahhabist minority status, available, was asked to respond to information and the economic backing from alliances with concerning all the household members. This was wealthy Arab countries – Saudi Arabia, Egypt information about gender, age, education and and the Gulf states. main activity (see details in Hatløy et al. 2015). This characterisation is not new, however. The Based on this list of household members, one distinction between Wahhabism (or “Salafism”), of the adults was selected randomly and asked and Sufi Islam, allegedly reflecting a distinction additional questions. The questionnaire used was between a “newly imported” version of Islam and a modified version of the questionnaire used as a traditional African practices of Islam, reflects background-survey for the World Development French colonial attempts to distinguish between Report 2011. While the 2011 questionnaire ”benign” Sufi practices and ”bad” Salafi / Wahhabi focused on the perceptions of conflict, security practices (see Soares 2013). Descriptions of and development, the 2014 questionnaire had a the increasing popularity of Wahhabist Islam larger emphasis on religious life. The results from in Bamako, and its spread from the merchant the survey are presented in full in a tabulation class to broader layers of the population, urban report (Hatløy et al. 2015). youngsters in particular, were published in the The second component of the research is mid-1980s (see, e.g. Amselle 1985). Against qualitative data from fieldwork that was carried this background, this report describes some of out in Bamako, Mopti, Segou, Koutiala and the changes in the religious scene in Southern Sikasso. Thirty interviews and ten focus group Mali during the past years, asking what the discussions (of four to twenty participants each) implications are of religious revival on the future were organised. The respondents included of the Malian secular state and religious freedom, religious leaders and teachers, political leaders, and with respect to gender issues and women’s community workers, government representatives participation. and laymen of both genders. The group settings included discussions with the regional and local 1 In Mali, the term Wahhabiyya is used to designate a wide category of branches of the High Islamic Council of Mali Muslim reformists. The term derives from the movement founded by (HCIM), and with groups of women taking Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in Saudi Arabia the late eighteenth century. Soares points out that many Malians use this term broadly, part in religious education organised in local also to designate people who do not necessarily follow the teachings communities through HCIM. Among the main of al-Wahhab (2005b: xii, 181). 4 topics during interviews and discussion were the that encourage moral transformation through notion of state secularism (“laïcité”), the religious personal piety (Schulz 2011). leaders’ involvement in political debates over In Bamako, it is a commonly held view that family law and the conflict in the north, views the new significance of Islam in public space on the different religious groupings in southern is an expression of a general rise in the number Mali today, and recent changes in religious life, of Wahhabist adherents and that this leads to especially with respect to gender and effects of “African Islam” gradually changing into a religious the advances of Islamists in the north.
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