Policy Brief August 2015
State control of religious activity in southern Mali following the 2012 crisis By Tone Sommerfelt and Kristin Jesnes Executive summary
Faced with the fear of radicalisation, Malian authorities are attempting to regulate an increas- ingly complex religious field. Political initiatives include the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, collaboration with Morocco over the education of imams and renewed debate over the incorporation of Quranic schools into the public school system. This policy brief exam- ines attempts by the state to regulate religious matters and the implications of these efforts. Inevitably, these regulatory initiatives entail the reshaping of state-religion relations. The secu- larity of the state is being renegotiated and the Malian state is approaching the Moroccan model of state control of religious life.
Introduction At the same time the state’s formal involvement in religious Following the transition to democratic rule in 1992 the matters is increasing, which reflects a fear of radicalisation freedom of association that was introduced enabled the in religious milieus, which has become urgent since the multiplication of religious organisations across Mali. Over advances of militant Islamist groups in northern Mali and the following years the number of Muslim associations and the subsequent crisis in 2012. The attack on a restaurant in mosques increased steadily. In more general terms, March 2015 in the centre of Bamako by the jihadist group religion has become more visible in public space in south- al-Mourabitoun, which left five people killed and eight ern Mali, evident, for instance, in the more active participa- wounded, shows that the threat of attacks from militants in tion of Muslim religious leaders in the political scene the south is real. In response to concerns about religious (see Thurston, 2013). In Bamako, religious leaders have milieus hiding extremist elements and religious leaders contributed to making Muslim virtues explicitly relevant in promoting aggression in the name of Islam, the govern- public debates about family law, authority structures and ment is seeking control over the religious sphere in more gender politics, and they manage to mobilise supporters to general terms. an extent that political leaders are unable to do (cf. Schultz, 2003; Soares, 2004; Sommerfelt & Jesnes, 2015). Based on interviews with religious leaders, politicians, experts and lay people in southern Mali in June 2014, this These developments, combined with the advances of policy brief examines attempts by the state to regulate militant Islamic groups and the sporadic application of religious matters and the implications of these efforts. sharia criminal penalties in 2012 in northern Mali, evoked Political initiatives include the establishment of the fear among both Malians and foreign commentators that Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2012, the education of the country is moving away from the principle of state Malian imams in Morocco and debate over incorporating secularism – “laïcité” – as enshrined in the 1960 Malian Quranic schooling into the formal school system. constitution and reaffirmed in the 1992 constitution.1 The way that laïcité has been understood in Mali is a direct The state’s wish and concerted efforts to control the reflection of its French conceptualisation, which entails the radicalisation of religious milieus entail increased involve- absence of religious engagement in government affairs and ment in the religious sphere and religious affairs. This is the absence of government involvement in religious affairs. interpreted by many Malians – especially those urbanites
1 Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mali states that “Mali is an independent, sovereign, indivisible, democratic, secular, social republic”. For an English translation of the constitution, see
who have pursued an education in the French-speaking stream form of Islam in Mali, many Malians are returning schooling system – and commentators abroad as a sign of from Egypt with a religious education in other, more the “Islamification” of the state. In effect, the state has to conservative traditions. The number of mosques sponsored balance its own wish for control of radical or extremist by Saudi Arabia is rising in Mali and the Dawa congregation activity in the religious sphere against these concerns. – a conservative Muslim group of Pakistani origin – has built up a following in Bamako (cf. Sommerfelt et al., 2015). Moreover, there is concern among Muslims in Mali that Controlling religious practice Salafist Islam (referred to as Wahhabism in Mali) is gaining The establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and popularity (cf. Sommerfelt & Jesnes, 2015). By sending Worship in 2012 has been seen by some observers as imams to Moroccan facilities that teach Sufist Islam the a sign of Mali becoming a more religious state or of the state seeks to balance the influence from Egypt, Saudi intention to base political processes on religious principles Arabia and Pakistan. (Daniel, 2012; Diabate, 2014). The minister of religious affairs and worship, Thierno Amadou Omar Hass Diallo, to The 2013 religious affairs agreement represents a more whom we spoke in June 2014, emphasised that the man- general orientation towards Morocco by the Malian govern- date of the ministry is to regulate religious matters. This ment. In Morocco, where Islam is the state religion, the process of regulation includes control of preachers through state exercises control over religious affairs. The Moroccan the development of guidelines for the contents of prayers state requires ministry certification of all imams, regulates and sermons presented in mosques and broadcast on mosque hours, and seeks to screen sermons and exclude Malian radio stations. It also includes the active shaping of extremist messaging from them (Sakthivel, 2014). The the education of imams and overseeing the educational accord with the Moroccan government also encompasses contents in the many Quranic schools in the country. a partnership between the ministries of religious affairs of the two countries in order to “cooperate on Malikite juris- The regulation of religious matters by the Ministry of prudence and interpretation in order to promote moderation Religious Affairs and Worship is partly done in close and fight hard-line ideologies” (Sakthivel, 2014). In March cooperation with the national body of the High Islamic 2015 the king of Morocco opened a large educational centre Council of Mali (HCIM), a religious association established in Rabat offering religious education to imams from abroad, in 2000 and intended to serve as an intermediary between and Morocco appears to be attempting to establish itself as the various Muslim communities and the state. This body is “the African Muslim hub” for a “tolerance-based religious an overarching structure that instructs its subcouncils at model” (Alaoui, 2015). the regional and local levels on religious issues. In our conversations with the HCIM at the local level in two A third initiative to control religious matters can be seen in regions, Mopti and Sikasso, imams of the two councils the debate over the possibility of incorporating current explained how they focused on practical matters concerning Quranic education into the formal school system. This prayer, the regulation of prayer and the timing of Ramadan. mirrors longstanding interests by the state in controlling They also instruct preachers who they consider to be out of informal religious schools in Mali (cf. Brenner, 2001: line. In Mopti, council members had taken issue with 209ff.). It goes beyond the Ministry of Religious Affairs and preachers who had encouraged youngsters in the area to go Worship’s current mandate of overseeing educational to the north to participate in the armed struggle and who contents and potentially entails an attempt to eradicate the considered the war in northern Mali to be a holy war (jihad). informal schooling sector. They had been successful in correcting preachers in this regard, but explained that hypothetically they would report The educational system in Mali is complex, with four irregularities of this kind to the national body of the HCIM. parallel models of schooling. Currently, the formal educa- In this sense, the HCIM at the local level enables state tional system consists of French language secular schools influence in religious matters through its cooperation with and French Arabic schools. The informal educational the national HCIM. The different levels of the HCIM will sector consists of two types of private schools (madrasas), become central in the state’s development and application one of which offers an education in Arabic and Islamic of guidelines for sermons and religious messaging. studies, while the other only offers religious education. The madrasa sector is growing as a result of the return of A second initiative to control religious life is the education many religious leaders from religious education in Arabic- of imams in facilities encouraged by the state. In late 2013 speaking countries. With limited opportunities for employ- Mali signed a religious affairs accord with Morocco for the ment in the French-speaking school system and unable to training in that country of 500 Malian imams selected by further their studies in Malian universities, many establish the Malian government (see Waterman, 2013). According to their own small religious schools or offer their services to Minister Diallo, this programme is intended to work against already established madrasas (Soares, 2005: 85). Many extremist viewpoints. Moreover, the initiative should be parents send their children to madrasas in order to provide regarded as a way to strengthen the influence of Sufist them with religious training, which is not offered in the Islam, which has traditionally been the main orientation of formal education system at present, given the Malian Muslims in Mali. Even though Sufism is still the main- formulation of state secularism (laïcité).
2 NOREF Policy Brief – August 2015
According to a survey carried out by Fafo in 2014, as many References as 29% of the population see madrasas as an alternative to Alaoui, A. 2015. “Why Morocoo wants to become a major other schooling options (Coulibaly & Hatløy, 2015). Many of Islamic training hub.” Forbes, March 31st. the children currently attending madrasas miss out on
Diabate, R. 2014. “Laïcité du Mali en péril: le ministre Conclusions délégué chargé des affaires religieuses et le président du The religious affairs accord with Morocco opens up the Haut Conseil Islamique font le lobbying d’une république possibility of the Malian state more heavily influencing the islamique.” Le Prétorie/Malijet, January 23rd. religious sphere. This – as well as other processes cur-
With this in mind, any attempt to support the Malian Soares, B. 2004. “Islam and public piety in Mali.” In E. government in its efforts to control the religious sphere Salvatore & D. F. Eickelman, eds. Public Islam and the should consider the following: Common Good. Leiden: Brill.
• The debate on the incorporation of informal religious Soares, B. 2005. “Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era.” schools in the formal schooling sector must be based African Affairs, 105(418): 77-95. on a better knowledge of the current curriculums in the madrasas and of differences in educational quality. Sommerfelt, T. & K. Jesnes. 2015. Laïcité in Southern Mali: Current Public Discussions on Secularism and Religious • This debate and other initiatives to tighten state control Freedom. Fafo Report 2015: 05 (EN)/ 2015:15 (FR). Oslo: over the religious sphere – and the viewpoints of Fafo. various Malian actors regarding these processes – must be understood within a broader political and regional Sommerfelt, T. et al. 2015. “Wahhabiyya paranoia in context. Bamako and the new intolerance of the tolerant.” The Broker, July 10th.
3 Waterman, S. 2013. “Morocco trains 500 imams to counter spread of radical Islam.” Washington Times, November 25th.
THE AUTHORS
Tone Sommerfelt holds a PhD in anthropology from the University of Oslo and is a senior researcher at the Oslo-based Fafo Research The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Foundation. She has considerable field experience of Muslim West Norsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging Africa, including three years of fieldwork in The Gambia. She has recently worked on a project commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled “Religious Reorientation in The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) is a resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen Southern Mali” that investigates the politico-religious dynamics peacebuilding policy and practice. Established in 2008, it collaborates following the crisis in northern Mali. In addition to Mali, she has and promotes collaboration with a wide network of researchers, conducted fieldwork in Morocco. policymakers and practitioners in Norway and abroad.
Kristin Jesnes is a researcher at the Fafo Research Foundation, Read NOREF’s publications on where she works on questions relating to countries in transition, www.peacebuilding.no and sign up for notifications. business and human rights, industrial relations and the provision of decent work. She holds a master’s in international security from Connect with NOREF on Facebook or Sciences Po Paris and a bachelor’s degree in comparative politics @PeacebuildingNO on Twitter from the University of Bergen. She is a member of the research Email: [email protected] - Phone: +47 22 08 79 32 team on the Mali project.
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