DOCSLIB.ORG

Governmental Power Sharing: Imperative? a Comparative Case Study on Decentralization and Its Influence on Public Support for Secessionism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Governmental Power Sharing: Imperative? a Comparative Case Study on Decentralization and Its Influence on Public Support for Secessionism Governmental power sharing: imperative? A comparative case study on decentralization and its influence on public support for secessionism Andrés Durante Master’s Thesis Uppsala University, 2020 Department of Government Supervisor: Moa Mårtensson Abstract Scholarly debates about the merits of decentralization have long been central in comparative politics. However, there is a lack of consensus in the existing literature on its relationship with secessionism, and previous scholarship on autonomy and power sharing suffers from several shortcomings that make it difficult to evaluate the influence of decentralization on secessionist conflict. To address this research gap, a new theoretical framework is proposed which suggests inclusion for regional elites within the state’s national decision-making institutions is imperative for the prevention against secessionism in established democracies. Utilizing an innovative comparative process tracing method, a theory-driven within-case empirical analysis and between-case comparison is conducted between Spain and Catalonia, and the United Kingdom and Scotland. The findings illustrate that decentralization with a higher degree of governmental power sharing (shared rule) is associated with a lower degree of public support for secessionism, and this association is produced through a social mechanism of power. Keywords: decentralization, power sharing, secessionism, Spain, Catalonia, UK, Scotland Table of contents LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ......................................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 2 THEORY ..................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Literature review............................................................................................................................ 4 2.2 Theoretical framework .................................................................................................................. 7 3 METHOD ................................................................................................................................. 10 3.1 Operationalization of dependent and independent variables .................................................... 10 3.1.1 Dependent variable: public support for secessionism .......................................................... 10 3.1.2 Independent variable: decentralization................................................................................ 11 3.2 Case selection .............................................................................................................................. 13 3.3 Control variables .......................................................................................................................... 17 3.4 Comparative Process Tracing (CPT): a two-step methodological approach ............................... 19 3.4.1 Within-case step.................................................................................................................. 20 3.4.2 Between-case step .............................................................................................................. 23 3.5 Empirical material and data ......................................................................................................... 25 3.6 Validity and reliability .................................................................................................................. 25 4 WITHIN-CASE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.......................................................................................... 26 4.1 Spain and Catalonia ..................................................................................................................... 26 4.1.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism ..................................... 26 4.1.2 Implementation phase (a); 1978-1980 ................................................................................. 28 4.1.3 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 29 4.1.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1980-2010 ......................................................................................... 30 4.1.5 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 33 4.1.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2010-present ................................................................................... 34 4.1.7 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 37 4.2 United Kingdom and Scotland ..................................................................................................... 37 4.2.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism ..................................... 37 4.2.2 Implementation phase (a); 1997-1999 ................................................................................. 39 4.2.3 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 41 4.2.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1999-2011 ......................................................................................... 42 4.2.5 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 45 4.2.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2011-present ................................................................................... 45 4.2.7 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 47 5 BETWEEN-CASE COMPARISON ................................................................................................. 48 5.1 Implementation phase (a) ........................................................................................................... 48 5.2 Bargaining phase (b) .................................................................................................................... 49 5.3 Mobilization phase (c).................................................................................................................. 49 6 RESULTS .................................................................................................................................. 51 6.1 Consistency with the hypothesis ................................................................................................. 51 6.2 Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 51 6.3 Alternative explanations .............................................................................................................. 51 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 53 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 56 APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................. 67 List of figures and tables FIGURE 1. Theoretical argument.............................................................................................................. 8 FIGURE 2. Theoretical framework............................................................................................................ 9 FIGURE 3. Reverse causation ................................................................................................................. 52 TABLE 1. Controlled comparison............................................................................................................ 14 TABLE 2. Theoretical social mechanisms in a decentralization process ................................................ 22 TABLE 3. Public opinion on Catalonia’s political status within Spain .................................................... 27 TABLE 4. Public opinion on how Scotland should be governed............................................................. 39 "Seré curioso / señor ministro / de qué se ríe / de qué se ríe / (...) Aquí en la calle / suceden cosas / que ni siquiera / pueden decirse" Mario Benedetti 1 Introduction Public support for secessionism is on the rise throughout the world. Eight movements pursued an independent state in 1915, in comparison with 59 in 2015 (Fazal 2018). To make matters worse, consolidated democracies are not immune to secessionist tendencies. The Scottish independence referendum held in 2014, the current implications of Brexit on Scotland and the UK’s national cohesion, the Catalan independence referenda held in 2014 and 2017, and the eruptions of violence experienced in Spain after the sentencing of nine Catalan leaders in 2019 are all recent examples of manifestations provoked by underlying secessionist tensions in modern decentralized states with regional minority populations. Scholarly debates about the pros and cons of decentralization have long been central in comparative politics. However, despite the ongoing secessionist growth, there is little consensus in the existing literature on the relationship between autonomy concessions and secessionism (see
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Independentism and the European Union
    POLICY BRIEF 7 May 2014 Independentism and the European Union Graham Avery Independentism1 is a live issue in Europe today. In the European Union separatist parties have gained votes in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders and elsewhere2, and referendums are in prospect. In Eastern Europe Crimea's referendum has led to an international crisis. This note addresses some basic questions raised by these developments: • What is the European Union's policy on independentism? • Is the division of a member state into two states bad for the EU? • How is the organisational structure of the EU relevant to independentism? BACKGROUND The situation on the ground in the EU today may be summarised as follows: Scotland: a referendum on independence will take place in Scotland on 18 September 2014. The Scottish National Party, which won a majority of seats in the Scottish elections of 2011 and formed a government, is campaigning for 'yes'. Although the British parliament agreed to the referendum, the main political parties in London are campaigning for 'no'. Opinion polls show that 'no' has more supporters than 'yes', but the gap has diminished, many voters are undecided, and the result may be close.3 Catalonia: in regional elections in 2012 the alliance Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió) won 31% of the vote and formed a coalition government, which has announced a referendum on independence for 9 November 2014. Since Spain's Parliament has declared it unconstitutional, the referendum may not take place. But the next regional elections may effectively become a substitute for a referendum. Belgium: the New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie) gained ground in national elections in 2010 on a platform of independence for Flanders.
    [Show full text]
  • “Behind-The-Table” Conflicts in the Failed Negotiation for a Referendum for the Independence of Catalonia
    “Behind-the-Table” Conflicts in the Failed Negotiation for a Referendum for the Independence of Catalonia Oriol Valentí i Vidal*∗ Spain is facing its most profound constitutional crisis since democracy was restored in 1978. After years of escalating political conflict, the Catalan government announced it would organize an independence referendum on October 1, 2017, an outcome that the Spanish government vowed to block. This article represents, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first scholarly examination to date from a negotiation theory perspective of the events that hindered political dialogue between both governments regarding the organization of the secession vote. It applies Robert H. Mnookin’s insights on internal conflicts to identify the apparent paradox that characterized this conflict: while it was arguably in the best interest of most Catalans and Spaniards to know the nature and extent of the political relationship that Catalonia desired with Spain, their governments were nevertheless unable to negotiate the terms and conditions of a legal, mutually agreed upon referendum to achieve this result. This article will argue that one possible explanation for this paradox lies in the “behind-the-table” *Attorney; Lecturer in Law, Barcelona School of Management (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) as of February 2018. LL.M. ‘17, Harvard Law School; B.B.A. ‘13 and LL.B. ‘11, Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Diploma in Legal Studies ‘10, University of Oxford. This article reflects my own personal views and has been written under my sole responsibility. As such, it has not been written under the instructions of any professional or academic organization in which I render my services.
    [Show full text]
  • Catalonia, Spain and Europe on the Brink: Background, Facts, And
    Catalonia, Spain and Europe on the brink: background, facts, and consequences of the failed independence referendum, the Declaration of Independence, the arrest and jailing of Catalan leaders, the application of art 155 of the Spanish Constitution and the calling for elections on December 21 A series of first in history. Examples of “what is news” • On Sunday, October 1, Football Club Barcelona, world-known as “Barça”, multiple champion in Spanish, European and world competitions in the last decade, played for the first time since its foundation in 1899 at its Camp Nou stadium, • Catalan independence leaders were taken into custody in “sedition and rebellion” probe • Heads of grassroots pro-secession groups ANC and Omnium were investigated over September incidents Results • Imprisonment of Catalan independence leaders gives movement new momentum: • Asamblea Nacional Catalana (Jordi Sànchez) and • Òmnium Cultural (Jordi Cuixart), • Thousands march against decision to jail them • Spain’s Constitutional Court strikes down Catalan referendum law • Key background: • The Catalan Parliament had passed two laws • One would attempt to “disengage” the Catalan political system from Spain’s constitutional order • The second would outline the bases for a “Republican Constitution” of an independent Catalonia The Catalan Parliament factions • In the Parliament of Catalonia, parties explicitly supporting independence are: • Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (Catalan European Democratic Party; PDeCAT), formerly named Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya
    [Show full text]
  • Differentiating Pro-Independence Movements in Catalonia and Galicia: a Contemporary View
    TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY School of Business and Governance Department of Law Anna Joala DIFFERENTIATING PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN CATALONIA AND GALICIA: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW Bachelor’s thesis Programme: International Relations Supervisor: Vlad Alex Vernygora, MA Tallinn 2018 I declare that I have compiled the paper independently and all works, important standpoints and data by other authors have been properly referenced and the same paper has not been previously been presented for grading. The document length is 9222 words from the introduction to the end of summary. Anna Joala …………………………… (signature, date) Student code: 113357TASB Student e-mail address: [email protected] Supervisor: Vlad Alex Vernygora, MA: The paper conforms to requirements in force …………………………………………… (signature, date) Chairman of the Defence Committee: Permitted to the defence ………………………………… (name, signature, date) 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... 4 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 5 1. EXPLANATORY THEORY OF SECESSIONISM ............................................................... 8 1.1. Definition of secessionism ................................................................................................ 8 1.2. Sub-state nationalism .......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Catalan Independence Referendum: an Assessment of the Process of Self-Determination
    Zurich Open Repository and Archive University of Zurich Main Library Strickhofstrasse 39 CH-8057 Zurich www.zora.uzh.ch Year: 2017 The Catalan Independence referendum: An assessment of the process of self-determination Turp, Daniel ; Caspersen, Nina ; Qvortrup, Matt ; Welp, Yanina Abstract: This report addresses different aspects of the proposed referendum in Catalonia. In chapter one, Profes- sor Yanina Welp analyzes and presents a political sociological perspective on the respective evolutions of the Catalan support for or rejection of independence. This chapter also summarizes the events that led to the demand for a referendum. In chapter two, Professor Nina Caspersen presents a comparative and historical overview of the political context of the demand for independence for Catalonia and draws up a number of scenarios for the future, depending on the outcome of the referendum. In the subse- quent chapter, Professor Matt Qvortrup analyzes when referendums are held and what determines their outcome; as well, he analyzes the legislation governing the conduct of the proposed referendums. He concludes, with some reservations, that the current legislation meets international standards. Finally, Professor Daniel Turp analyzes and assesses the legality of the proposed referendum. Professor Daniel Turp examines the right to decide of the people of Catalonia in light of rules found in international, Eu- ropean, Spanish, Catalan and comparative law. Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-143018 Published Research Report Published Version Originally published at: Turp, Daniel; Caspersen, Nina; Qvortrup, Matt; Welp, Yanina (2017). The Catalan Independence refer- endum: An assessment of the process of self-determination.
    [Show full text]
  • Catalonia Vs Spain: a Desire for More Autonomy Has Led to a Surge of Independentism and a Divided Catalan Society
    Department of Political Science Chair of Political Sociology Catalonia vs Spain: A desire for more autonomy has led to a surge of independentism and a divided Catalan society SUPERVISOR CANDIDATE Noé Meiler Prof. Michele Sorice Matr. 0792 ACADEMIC YEAR 2017-2018 Table of Contents 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 3 2 History .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Early History of Catalan Institutions: ........................................................................................................... 3 The Generalities .......................................................................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 The rise of “Catalanism” ............................................................................................................................. 4 Republicanism and Federalism.................................................................................................................................................... 5 2.3 The Franco Regime ..................................................................................................................................... 6 Primo De Rivera ..........................................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Inside Spain Nr 124 16 December 2015 - 20 January 2016
    Inside Spain Nr 124 16 December 2015 - 20 January 2016 William Chislett Summary Fresh election on the cards as parties fail to bury differences and form new government. Catalan acting Prime Minister Artur Mas quits to avert new elections. King Felipe’s sister the Infanta Cristina on trial for tax fraud. Registered jobless drops to lowest level since 2010. Santander acquires Portugal’s Banco Banif. Domestic Scene Fresh election on the cards as parties fail to bury differences and form new government… One month after an inconclusive election, parties struggled to form a new government, raising the prospect of a fresh election. The anti-austerity Podemos and the centrist Ciudadanos broke the hegemony of the conservative Popular Party (PP) and the centre-left Socialists (PSOE), the two parties that have alternated in power since 1982, but the results of the election on 20 December created a very fragmented parliament with few coherent options to form a government. The PP of Mariano Rajoy won 123 of the 350 seats in parliament on close to 30% of the vote, way down on the absolute majority of 186 it obtained in the 2011 election and its lowest number (107) since 1989 (see Figure 1). The Socialists captured 90 seats, their worst performance since 1988 (118). Podemos captured 69 seats (27 of them won by its affiliated offshoots in Catalonia, Valencia and Galicia which went under different names) and Ciudadanos 40. 1 Inside Spain Nr 124 16 December 2015 - 16 January 2016 Figure 1. Results of general elections, 2015 and 2011 (seats, millions of
    [Show full text]
  • Leaders for Social Change
    Ignasi Carreras, Amy Leaverton and Maria Sureda Leaders for social change Characteristics and competencies of leadership in NGOs Esade‐PwC Social Leadership Program 2008‐09 ESADE-PwC Social Leadership Program This publication forms part of the ESADE-PwC Social Leadership Pro- gram, organised by ESADE’s Institute for Social Innovation and the PricewaterhouseCoopers Foundation. It is a joint initiative aimed at gen- erating and spreading knowledge about leadership in NGOs and other non-profit organisations, as well as creating an area where social lead- ers can reflect and exchange experiences. The program’s objectives are: ► To generate knowledge on leadership in the NGO and non-profit or- ganisation sector. ► To help develop leadership capacities in Spanish non-profit organisa- tions. ► To spread the knowledge generated to all organisations in the sector. ► To help reinforce the credibility of the organisations in the third sector. In order to achieve this, the program combines the following elements: ► Leadership Forums: Working and exchange sessions with the manag- ers participating in the program ► Research ► The creation of case studies ► Annual publication with results ► Public engagements ► Regular diffusion. Ignasi Carreras, Amy Leaverton and Maria Sureda Leaders for social change Characteristics and competencies of leadership in NGOs Leaders for social change: Characteristics and competencies of leadership in NGOs Authors: Ignasi Carreras, Amy Leaverton and Maria Sureda With the collaboration of PricewaterhouseCoopers Foundation Revision and correction: Marita Osés Edition and Design: Institute for Social Innovation, ESADE, 2009 www.socialinnovation.esade.edu [email protected] Front and back cover images: © Ackley Road Photos - Fotolia.com ISBN: 978-84-88971-31-9 The contents of this document are the property of their authors and may not be used for com- mercial purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
    ___________________________________________________________________ Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Application against Spain by Carles Puigdemont, President-Elect of Catalonia Lodged 1 March 2018 __________________________________________________________________ PUIGDEMONT -v- SPAIN SUMMARY: In this application Mr. Carles PUIGDEMONT alleges that Spain is guilty of violating its international treaty obligations through the cumulative imposition of disproportionate and unjustified restrictions with the exercise of his political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Spain is a State Party to both treaties. It is also a signatory, without relevant reservations, to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which provides for the right of individual petition. Spain has not notified any relevant derogation to the provisions of the ICCPR which thus remain fully in force. It is legally bound by treaty obligation to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ICCPR, throughout the territory of Spain, and to all those who fall within its jurisdiction. Mr. PUIGDEMONT brings this individual petition to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in order to vindicate his right to stand for elections (article 25, ICCPR); his right to freedom of association with other secessionist politicians and political parties in pursuit of a common goal of securing independence from Spain for Catalonia (article 22, ICCPR); and his right to freedom of peaceful political expression in support of the cause of independence for Catalonia (article 19, ICCPR). He invites the Committee to hold that these rights have been violated by cumulative and continuing conduct of the Kingdom of Spain.
    [Show full text]
  • Catalonia's Legitimate Right to Decide
    CATALONIA’S LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO DECIDE PATHS TO SELF-DETERMINATION A REPORT BY A COMMISSION OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS NICOLAS LEVRAT Professor at the University of Geneva, coordinator of the Report SANDRINA ANTUNES Professor at the Universidade do Minho GUILLAUME TUSSEAU Professor at Sciences Po, Paris PAUL WILLIAMS Professor at American University in Washington, DC CATALONIA’S LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO DECIDE | PATHS TO SELF-DETERMINATION ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AER Assembly of European Regions ANC Assemblea Nacional Catalana AVANCEM Espai socialista BL Basic Law C Constitution CDC Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya C’s Ciudadanos CiU Convergència I Unió CoR Committee of the Regions CSQP Catalunya Sí que Pot CUP Candidatura d’Unitat Popular DC Demòcrates de Catalunya ICJ International Court of Justice ECHR European Convention of Human Rights ECtHR European Court of Human Rights ECJ European Court of Justice ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya EU European Union ICV-EUiA Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida I Alternativa IU Izquierda Unida JxS Junts pel Sí MES Moviment d’ Esquerres OC Ómnium Cultural P Podemos PDD Plataforma pel Dret a Decidir PP Partido Popular PSC Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol TEU Treaty on European Union TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union UCD Unión de Centro Democrático UDC Unió Democràtica de Catalunya 1 CATALONIA’S LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO DECIDE | PATHS TO SELF-DETERMINATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Nicolas Levrat is a Professor of European and International Law at the University of Geneva. He’s the Director of the International Law and International Organization Department of the Law Faculty since 2016.
    [Show full text]
  • Sijstermans2019.Pdf (3.020Mb)
    This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 1 Political Party Learning in the European Free Alliance: Inspiration and Information in the (Trans)Nationalist Family Judith Sijstermans PhD in Politics University of Edinburgh 2019 2 Declaration I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, Judith Sijstermans, and that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text. I declare that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. Judith Sijstermans 26 February 2019 Edinburgh, Scotland 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….6 Abstract…………………………………………………………………………......7 Lay Summary……………………………………………………………………….9 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….11
    [Show full text]
  • In Spain, Implications of Catalan Elections Summary David
    Sample Article: In Spain, Implications of Catalan Elections Summary David Ramos/Getty Images A supporter of the Catalan Convergence and Union party on Nov. 25Elections held Nov. 25 in Catalonia showed that the pro-independence movement in the autonomous region is strong but complex and contradictory. Although the ruling Convergence and Union party won the elections, it now controls just 50 of 135 seats -- 12 fewer than in 2010. The emergence of a weaker Catalan government will exacerbate political tensions across Spain, likely hindering Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy's attempts to combat the country's economic crisis. Moreover, disagreements among Catalan separatist parties will complicate negotiations for a possible referendum on independence, which is unlikely to occur in the medium term. Analysis In calling for the early elections, Catalonian President Artur Mas hoped to obtain a political majority that would allow his Convergence and Union party to organize a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. However, austerity measures implemented in 2012 by the Catalan government were similar to those applied by the central government in Madrid, and the voters expressed their discontent with them and punished the ruling party at the Nov. 25 polls. Catalans leaned instead toward a mix of left-wing parties that support secession but reject austerity. The biggest winner of the election was the Republican Left, the oldest Catalan pro-independence party, which jumped from 10 to 21 seats. The Catalonia Greens-United and Alternative Left, a left- wing pro-referendum coalition, also made gains, from 10 to 13 seats. Notably, the Popular Unity Candidacy, a pro-independence and anti-capitalist party, will debut in the regional parliament after winning three seats; the party previously was represented only at the municipal level.
    [Show full text]