Governmental power sharing: imperative? A comparative case study on decentralization and its influence on public support for secessionism Andrés Durante Master’s Thesis Uppsala University, 2020 Department of Government Supervisor: Moa Mårtensson Abstract Scholarly debates about the merits of decentralization have long been central in comparative politics. However, there is a lack of consensus in the existing literature on its relationship with secessionism, and previous scholarship on autonomy and power sharing suffers from several shortcomings that make it difficult to evaluate the influence of decentralization on secessionist conflict. To address this research gap, a new theoretical framework is proposed which suggests inclusion for regional elites within the state’s national decision-making institutions is imperative for the prevention against secessionism in established democracies. Utilizing an innovative comparative process tracing method, a theory-driven within-case empirical analysis and between-case comparison is conducted between Spain and Catalonia, and the United Kingdom and Scotland. The findings illustrate that decentralization with a higher degree of governmental power sharing (shared rule) is associated with a lower degree of public support for secessionism, and this association is produced through a social mechanism of power. Keywords: decentralization, power sharing, secessionism, Spain, Catalonia, UK, Scotland Table of contents LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ......................................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 2 THEORY ..................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Literature review............................................................................................................................ 4 2.2 Theoretical framework .................................................................................................................. 7 3 METHOD ................................................................................................................................. 10 3.1 Operationalization of dependent and independent variables .................................................... 10 3.1.1 Dependent variable: public support for secessionism .......................................................... 10 3.1.2 Independent variable: decentralization................................................................................ 11 3.2 Case selection .............................................................................................................................. 13 3.3 Control variables .......................................................................................................................... 17 3.4 Comparative Process Tracing (CPT): a two-step methodological approach ............................... 19 3.4.1 Within-case step.................................................................................................................. 20 3.4.2 Between-case step .............................................................................................................. 23 3.5 Empirical material and data ......................................................................................................... 25 3.6 Validity and reliability .................................................................................................................. 25 4 WITHIN-CASE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.......................................................................................... 26 4.1 Spain and Catalonia ..................................................................................................................... 26 4.1.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism ..................................... 26 4.1.2 Implementation phase (a); 1978-1980 ................................................................................. 28 4.1.3 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 29 4.1.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1980-2010 ......................................................................................... 30 4.1.5 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 33 4.1.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2010-present ................................................................................... 34 4.1.7 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 37 4.2 United Kingdom and Scotland ..................................................................................................... 37 4.2.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism ..................................... 37 4.2.2 Implementation phase (a); 1997-1999 ................................................................................. 39 4.2.3 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 41 4.2.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1999-2011 ......................................................................................... 42 4.2.5 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 45 4.2.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2011-present ................................................................................... 45 4.2.7 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 47 5 BETWEEN-CASE COMPARISON ................................................................................................. 48 5.1 Implementation phase (a) ........................................................................................................... 48 5.2 Bargaining phase (b) .................................................................................................................... 49 5.3 Mobilization phase (c).................................................................................................................. 49 6 RESULTS .................................................................................................................................. 51 6.1 Consistency with the hypothesis ................................................................................................. 51 6.2 Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 51 6.3 Alternative explanations .............................................................................................................. 51 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 53 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 56 APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................. 67 List of figures and tables FIGURE 1. Theoretical argument.............................................................................................................. 8 FIGURE 2. Theoretical framework............................................................................................................ 9 FIGURE 3. Reverse causation ................................................................................................................. 52 TABLE 1. Controlled comparison............................................................................................................ 14 TABLE 2. Theoretical social mechanisms in a decentralization process ................................................ 22 TABLE 3. Public opinion on Catalonia’s political status within Spain .................................................... 27 TABLE 4. Public opinion on how Scotland should be governed............................................................. 39 "Seré curioso / señor ministro / de qué se ríe / de qué se ríe / (...) Aquí en la calle / suceden cosas / que ni siquiera / pueden decirse" Mario Benedetti 1 Introduction Public support for secessionism is on the rise throughout the world. Eight movements pursued an independent state in 1915, in comparison with 59 in 2015 (Fazal 2018). To make matters worse, consolidated democracies are not immune to secessionist tendencies. The Scottish independence referendum held in 2014, the current implications of Brexit on Scotland and the UK’s national cohesion, the Catalan independence referenda held in 2014 and 2017, and the eruptions of violence experienced in Spain after the sentencing of nine Catalan leaders in 2019 are all recent examples of manifestations provoked by underlying secessionist tensions in modern decentralized states with regional minority populations. Scholarly debates about the pros and cons of decentralization have long been central in comparative politics. However, despite the ongoing secessionist growth, there is little consensus in the existing literature on the relationship between autonomy concessions and secessionism (see