I JPandRPP 1965-1971 233 important of the new parties was tru;Justice Party, created under the leadership of Rag1p Giimii§pa]a,a retired genera)} The NUC had decided against forming a party of its own, but at the same time it had not relinquished its aim of trying to guide the CHAPTER IX new parties in a direction that would not be revanchist. It therefore encouraged former dissident Democrats like Ekrem Alican to form THEJUSTICE PARTY AND THE one of the new parties. Alican had been exn.e,lled.Jro�DP in 1955 and become a founding member of the.jFreedomyartyJ After REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY 1965-1971 the May revolution he entered the cabinet as Finance Minister and resigned on 24 December 1960 in order to make preparations for new political activity. In February he announced the formation of The Justice Party has emerged from the bosom of the Turkish the ew Tur efPart which was set up as successor to the DP of nation ... Like everything which has emerged from the bosom of the early years, be orejt abandoned democrac and li eralis . The the Turkish nation up to the present, it is beautiful, vivacious and party represented the 'intellectual', elitist, and urban wing of the full of life. former DP and included high bureaucrats, proi�sson,__ and -professio als. At the same time, some of its electoral strength was SilleymanDemirel, at the Justice Party Congress, 28 November 1964 based on alliances with local landowning elites in eastern Anatolia,_ Initially it seemed as though the NTP would inherit the 'five If only the Justice Party on the right of centre would put up a wall million Democrat votes' and become the successor party. But against the Right as the Republican People's Party has extreme ... precisely �e aus� th.e_e.litis na.tJJ!e of its leadership�nd its done against the extreme Left, democracy would have the oppor­ limited opu1 ar ase the art failed to achieve !bis pQsiti.on. Too tunity of a continuous existence. many former emocrats, st loyal to the deposed leadership, had Biilent Ecevit, Cumhuriyet, 28 October 1966 neither forgotten nor forgiven the expulsion of these men, and finally, their merger with the ¥nemy' he RPP. Therefore the role of successor party (miras P�{'assed almost automatically to the other new organization,� Siileyman Demirel'sJustice Party The formation of the Justice Party was announced on 11 February 1961. Its leader, Rag1p Gi.imi.i§pala, had been Comman­ EVEN before the Democrat Party was officially dissolved, the der of the Third Army at the time of the coup of 27 May. Contrary military rulers of became aware of the problem of the 'five to the rumours about him-that he had been pro-Menderes and million' DP voters in the country. As soon as parliamentary opposed to the revolution-Gi.imii§pala had communicated his democracy was restored its future would be in their hands. Some �yaJJt to _General Madanoglum"7tfikara w1tfim�holal.-_,,,,._...... __ members of the proposed that the CQ1!J2.;. He was appointe Chief of the General Staff on 3 June and Committee form a party with former Democrats who had been retired in August, in accordance with the rejuvenation programme independent of the Bayar-Menderes group in order to harness this in the armed forces. Nothing more was heard of him until the vote. There were various reports that such an organization would founding of the JP, when his leadership came as no surprise since be called the National Unity Party (Milli Birlik Partisi) or the many other retired generals were also taking to politics. Revolution Party (lnkilap Partisi) . . But the senior officers, who T,bere seems little doubt that initially t�e JP e,gLoyed the full wanted to restore power to the civilians, insisted on the principle c_onfidence of the NOC. Gene�k1 Ulay revealed a few days that the NUC was above politics and intended to remain so.1 before the general election o�hat the army had laid the

The ban on party activitie�imRosed on 27 May 1960, had been foundations of the Justice Party5 and entrusted the duty of leading partially lifted on 13 January--..:l9.6J). The formation of new parties it to an honourable soldier. It must have seemed a good idea to was permitted and within a month at least fourte.en were the High ommand to counter the threat of revanchism by placing registered, though most of tliem proved ephemeral. The most men loyal to the regime at the head of the political parties. But

.t UniversitY ,, ,.'n'!'iJX"/ I JP and RPP 1965-1971 235 become Bilgi�'s only serious rival. At the A_!l� Pro�� Con ress it was reported t at former Democrats �were tu�lJ!g_ �amst "Bilgi9, who had. adopted-the.... slQ an 'new _art -new ol"cies'. Dernirel had become the candidate of those who_ �anted_ continuit . , uni��nd mo erat10n n_ it wason those slogans tha.!_ .fi0:ampaigned. T e General Congress began on 27 November 1964 and after much debate between the three candidates (Bilgic;, Demirel, and Anburun) \..Siileyman Dernirel was elect�.JD'....an ovswhelrning �o�_�st 552 for Bili i and 39 for Anburun. Oernirel's vTcfoiywasa great surprise since B" gic; a een the clear favourite. He was strong in the organization, described as courageous and a man of principles who followed a direct course instead of zigzagging. His firm reaction to Sunats warning to the JP regarding the increase of reactionary activity1 had strengthened his po.sition in some quarters, but had also shown him to be inflexible. �ad been supported by the cons�rvativ� b�!LlliP that_group let him down. Moreover, he was not supported by the part 's 'intellec_tuals', who considered him a traditiQnal polit�ian out of touch with the times. ,J)emire.L�ntr�t, was considered more m d�E_? 'krtew about economics' and a so liad the characteristics of a 1 I�. is s ppor came from the party's �enators an? Repres�n­ 'fatives and he was put forward as enderes s man, which won him Competition forParty LeadershiJ{jjjj) the favour of the Democrat faction. It islikelyiliat this faction considered that he would be easier to manage than Bilgic;-both Giimii§pala died on 5 Ju� two days before the partial came from Isparta but Bilgic; also had a political base there_JHJ.JL. Senate elections, which his party won by a comfortable margin. He could therefore afford to be independent. Because of his experience had been the unchallenged leader and his death threw open the in busme�s and.management, he is said to have had the con!iden�e whole question of the leade s · · ilgic;, the younger oJ big business, Turkish and foreign. Dernirel's one handicap m brother of Sait Bilgic; ormer hard-line Democra :whohad served seelcmg:-to Jead a p,artx which depended on the_ votes _of . ..!h_ e in the Investigating Committee m _ pn 1960, was considered the reli ious:fonseryatiy... e LiY�s_ his personal secular background._Jle_ most likely successor. He was made acting chairman until the ...w.as a t deed as a 'fa;eemasqn, which was almost as b_ad as beigg2_. question was decided at the general congress. communist in the e es of religious Right. But this did not turn. out Bilgic;, however, was not the onl candidate. The group of to e a serious o stac eand Demirel was able to counteract it retire o icers in . nte to elect a man who would be s1a.1ing: 'Latn..IlQ.La so ; was born Tnfo-afarnily that d-9�� 1 able to wi the confidence of the armed forces. Tekin Anburun, a s·t down to breakfas�� reildingthe Holy Qur'an.' 1' former Air Force omman er an resi en ayar's aide-de-camp, It is also pro a e that General Sunay's letter of 12 November seemed a good choice. As a former officer he would be acceptable 1964, cautioning the parties-especially the JP-not to criticize the to the High Command;8 his service with Bayar would appeal to the 27 May revolution or the armed forces, was timely and benefited former Democrats. B Se tember, new personalities were intro­ Demirel. '[he delegates, intimidated by the threat of military duced into the contest. The extrerrns s were re arin Pro essor intervention, decided to vote for the mooeraTean f ex1 e F_ua_g Ba§gi to oppose gic;, while the youn t Demirel. lfan'!'.one coul_d _Hl!l?rovethe. par y's standing wiffi Siileyman15errnret · y e egmning of November, Dernirel had ...1��litarviLw.as_he,, 7 f) / �,./...... I 236 The Turkish Experiment in Democracy JPandRPP 1965-1971 237 SiileymanDemirel subordination of the military to the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister became a fiction. The General Staff, claimed Suleyman Demirel was forty-four years old when he became Kurtbek, went as far as to prepare the Defence Ministry's budget, Chairman of the Justice Party and was young by Turkish standards the Defence Ministry became the General Staff's secretariat, and for such a position. He was born into a lo e mid e class famil in the minister became a cipher. Kurtbek may have exaggerated the western ato ian villa e of 1slamkoy in t e provmce of Demirel's role in the growing autonomy of the army and Demirel sparta. s is quite common m ur s society, Demirel had may have merely acquiesced in the de facto situation. 15 Be that as clianged his status through�� He entered Istanbul Techni­ it may, within a short time J)emirel succeeded in winning the cal University in 1942 and graduated in 1949 with a diploma in confidence of the High Command and established a worlffiig engineering. Between 1950 and 1960 he worked for the Depart­ retattonsrup whiclirasteaJmJi! tzfilarch r2 '!S ment of Hydraulic Works, becoming the director m 1955. During Demirel's election was...only.-t he..lirsLst.e: n the establishment of these ears he was in close contact with Menderes and that cost his control oyg_!he party. The pmce,Ss_ as not an easy one and he im his post after t e co11J1..For the next eighteen months Deilllrel always had to take care n..ouo fragwent the JP b unco · dere was for�ed to do his military service, which he had managed to �oundTng, the JP had been divi ed into a number delay for so long. After that, unable to return to state service, he orTactwns�uiietoart isci� was "ieiiiiret' worked independently. Durin these ears he established contacts t s �Git aiiidentity an ena the fact1ona ism:-innecemoer with speculators like i ir i Selefya and foreign firms like he struck a further blow at the Bilgi� group by noCpermitting_its Morrison-Knuds�n, whic employe im for a while. These leeder to be elected del?l!!); cltairman,,. 6 liaisons were used against him politically and he was even given But Demirel was cautious. With a general election in October the sobriquet 'Suleyman Morrison'. 13 1965 he had to strive for unity and prepare the par�y for power. Demirel e itomized he new ur is Ii ·cian. He did not come We have already seen how he forced Inonu to resign and then from the traditiona tar - ureaucFatic intelli entsia which had became the dominant 12artner in the Fourth Coalition. Demirel now adopted �erate and conciliatoryp osition w aim was dominated politics in Turkey since t e Tanz1ma period in the "" m ose nineteenth century. He was a technocrat, the 'dam king', who rose tp avoid controversy m the parfy'. He ay have told the NUG that to power on his own merit. He was a leader with whom the he was mdependent of 1fie DFTaction, but he had to make full use of it and its following in the country inorder to win votes. In July _'ordinaryTurk', especially the ambitious rural migrant who lived in one of the new shant towns could identify himself, for he 1965 the JP abandoned its emblem of the lette.s AP on eithe_ s· e � symbolized the ��ma)e man) This proved a great asset in o ,_- 9pen book of laws and replaced it with a prancing?-i!_iite� elections, and Demrrel was able to reach this ty12e of voter because . usin '11 semaiitic_e..nd symbolic device to identify it wi'ttr e he was an insider while leaders like Inonu, and even the socialist m�bJJnd-Dem9cratParty. 1t tlius. convinced the-majority of_ili (' 17 AJbar, remamed outsiders. �orate of itsJoya ty to tne old order.� At the same time tbe JP Demirel's first task as party leader was to allay all suspicion in began putting up re afives of former Democrats as candidates. For the armed forces concerning the alleged revanc · of the JP and example, Ba ar's dau hter Nilufer Gurso , Menderes's son, generally to win their confidence. He met the ife Senato who Yuksel deres Koralta ' Q1l Orhan oraltan amet were the most vocal and ardent guardians of the 27 May o us wife Nermin and siste� (Stirear,-Namik Ge wife, ea t-all these as e as re atlons O- 0 a an revolution, and assured them that he was not a crypto-Democrat, ---- that he did not depend on the former Democrat group in the JP, Y}l.raimci, were fightingthe elect'o on the JP slate. 18 and that he had his own programme and his own cadres. 14 Seyfi Except for its constant proclamations against t e Left, Demirel's K�rtbek noted that, as...; his ood faith, Demirel abandoned party refused to C2!Jlm· itself id_splogie-a.!.ly. ·� are against '111 the practice of visiting Bayar (in prison at Ka sen as soon as "isms" includin 1i6eralism and c(nitalism)announced Demirel to ��m Pnme imster e ave the press. e are or a ie ar i eo ogy or system. We all attempts to brin t under civilian control and esta51ish our economic view in accordance with the conditions of opte e po cy of virtual a the da):-.'19 The election manifesto emphasized nat10nal umty ancr the need for a strong state as its principal points.It called for the- I JPandRPP 1965-1971 239 238 The Turkish Experiment in Democracy suspicious of the post-27 May regime. As though to emphasize the formation stable_ government, without which Turkey would US · change that had just been brought about by the election, the head for anarc .. his led es oning of the electoral system, Development (AID) also announced that based on ro ortional · which would have to be Agency for International it would no longer funnel aid through the Turkish22 government, amended if coalition governments were to be avoided. The JP directly with the private sector. A few days ex loited the country's desire for stabi ·t . preferring to deal . ·w� later an AID mission amve · ara to iscuss urkey's needs are not a party ependent on any class. We are the nation would be increased if internal resources with its peasant, farmer, worker, artisan, and merchant. As· the and promised that aid were mobilized. The press reported that Demirel's23 election had Ju�ti�e Party we shall defend the rights of all these classes.' The made. a favourable irnyress10nin the UnitedStates. pnncip�l ap.real was to the �ountryside, where 75 per cent of the ' ------populat10n hved. The pr�IDise was of a rarian reform, i.e. the reform of outmodecl-ntr-·· · gues and the introduction o Prime Minister Demirel mod.em-te"Emfoo y, rat er tan land reform wh meant confidence to the business · If Demirel was quick to bring ctistnB an s, an id not de a rarian forces, he was not able to do the same ref-onrr:-'f e ustice ar y a so promise aid and credits for t e community and the �rmed within his paFty... The cabinet he picked was not the cabinet of farmer, the artisan, and the craftsman. of his conciliation, and neither Sadettin24 Bilgi� himself nor members The party appealed to the ambition and the drive of the man in Without the Bilgi� group, the cabinet the middle rather than the man at the bottom. This was true both group were given portfolios. �as weak and had to Jace strQng op£osition in the Assem�y in the countryside and in urban areas, where its promises found a the party, ot;gly 4 parliamentary democracy. capitalism andillllonsiltlke. o- -·----- Yet in the party Demirel's position remained strong. At the ragmentation of the Right was Qemirel's failur . He also Fourth General Congress which opened in on 29 Novem­ proved incompetent in ealing witb wor ihg c ass ffil 1tancy that ber 1968 he retained full control-although the internal opposition led to strikes, and with student agitation whic a l;}(_sed univer­ was becoming better organized to challenge him. In JanuaQ( 1968 sities and often spilled into th_e �t reets, creatin an atmos he e of the former Democrats had formed a olitical club known as Bizim _anarchJ.ilnd mililbility. He had failed to s ence the nationalist and Ev (Our Home , e y e a ar w ose os ens1 e aim was to lett'-wmg clamour, manifested in bloody demonstrations against ag1 a e or t e po tica ng ts of its members. In fact it soon the VISitmg Os Sixth"Flee1, for an i.ndependen oreign p@liGy. Nor turned mto a pressure group agamst Demirel, with the aim of had he been able to curb the s irallin inflation which created undermining his position in the party. The guestion of restorin tension and insecurity�µ)) s.. ctors of Turkish socie_t . Unable to ROlitical ri hts to former Democrats which Demirel side-stem;ied deal with tlifsi fiTation, Demim.I ].:!.lamed the institutions of the with consummat k.i.1 to t e resignations from the JP ,£L_ Second Renubhc for his proBiems. avfng amended the Electoral Ba ar's dau hter a t gao�lu's w e. a ar a so issued a Law, which, he claimed, create o itical instability, he turned his rrective asking former SU_£ orters39 of the DP not to vote in t e attent10n to t e constitution, whos · era! c aracter (he argued), general election of Octobere 1 9. a use t t· t e CQOsti.tutional Court, emrre won e ec 10n u his vote had been edu� the ���������e�i�t.v�ir:.,t.:;:U;.:,al�ll.-:.im��ossible for the Assembl to people who benefited were the Independents, who receive 5·6 per le isl d the RT w c ad ecome a state wit in a t: cent of the votes. Equally alarming for Demirel was the drop in the As early as May t ere were signs that Tur ey s usmess- votes cast, from 71· 3 to 64·3 per cent of the registered voters. And men were beginning to have grave reservations about Demirel's in spite of his dominance and his electoral victory, which made his policies. At a meetin Union of Chambers (of Commerce control over the party stronger, Demirel was losing the confidence and Industry) on 18 ay 1968 Demirel's policies were criticized · of those whose interests he claimed to serve: ------the business commun- by a r . d b i:.b.akan, who _i!L claimed that ;Jurkey had come to be an open market for Europ� 0 ne of the outcomes of the rapid social and_economic transfor- and America'. After much acrimonious debate the president of die matiooiii-°Turke was the fragmentation of the 12a t' s which Union, Enver Srrn Batur, declared that 'this economic order will su s� italism n t e a e sixties all the parties except the not be altered'.41 WPT, and erha s the Unit Party (Birlik Partisi), supported A ear later on 24 Ma 1969 Professor Erbakan with the votes capitalism but the differed in t err a roac . The RPP, for of t e Anatolian merchants defeate n the lectio for the example, upheld the view that the capita 1st ought not to be nc o t e ruon of Chambers of Commerce and Industr .42 directly involved in politics, which should be left to the party and ore important t an this set- ac or Demirel was a speech made the state. Tus; J:t on the other hand.z believed �t by Vehbi Ko9, Turkey's leading industrialist. He expressed alarm �s.tin the stru_ggle for eolitica wer and at the growing economic crisis, which, he said, would threaten the .!_he formulation of po�· wa a s the major difference regime unless measures were taken. ije confessed that he had lost and it ade the --1 •. atic in 't appr.qa.c to rofli olitics _faith in JP rule.f3 What was needed, sug ested was a viable and economics. The Justice Party spoke for big busmess; the RP .,alternative for 6emire)'s JP. It could be another politic��y,.., ------_ JP andRPP 1965- 1971 246 The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 247 / and if none fitted the bill, a bureaucratic-technocratic, above-party As_ early as the su�er of 1970 the dissidents had spoken of government would be an alternativ . - leavu�g the JP �nd form� a new art)'.. But they intended to do so ,. only 1f they failed to dislodge Demirel, preferring to capture the party and maintain unity. When that proved impossible, they Emergence of the Democratic Party announce� the formation of the Democratic Party (DP­ I Demokrat1k Part1_) After the general election, the tide be an to turn ra idJr against on 18 December, the day after the motion to Demire . e composition o 1s new cabinet suggested tliat ffie open an invest�a f o against Demirel was defeated. Ferruh who had resigned as Chairman of the Assembl�9 compromise he had concluded in April 1967 had broken down and �' 45 uctooer and from the JP on 13 November, was elected Chair­ that the dissidents were out of his control once more. This was 53 confirmed three days later when the party's Assembly and Senate man. Groups met jointly to discuss the government's programme and �e dispute � the Justice Party was not merely the result of 146 dissident members refused to ic·� 46 By the end of hostlhty to Dem1rel or a struggle for leadership. It was also the Decem er t ere were reports that , Chairman of result of a decade of development marked by rapid social and the Assembly, would challenge Demirel's leadership at the next economic change in the� mere@)and a raria ectors, which congress.47 Disciplinary measures leading to the expulsion of two had been dominant throughout the fifties and were now being dissidents in January 1970 brought the crisis to a head. Some of the forced to make way for the expanding ·ndustrial sector. leading dissidents, all members of the General Executive Council, T�� dissidents, as lsmail Cem's ana ysis shows, belonged to the walked out of the meeting where the matter was being discussed.48 declmmg sectors, essentially the landowners and provincial On 4 February five of them, plus Cihat Bilgehan, resigned from the notables who opposed Demirel's schemes to speed up the General Executive Council, and exactly a week Iater Qemircl:s_ modernization of the economic structure by such measures as land or agrarian reform and the taxation of farm wealth. If Demirel was draft budget was defeated in the Assembly, and this defeat forced- him to resign.49 permitted to carry out such reforms, these groups would become as Ihe pnnc1pal charge against Demirel was that under his anachronistic as the Anatolian tradesmen and artisans. It is leadership the JP had become a party dominated by his clique: therefore not surprising that there was an attempt to bring these eleme�ts together to form a olitical coalition against .Demirel's therefore he had to be replaced as Party Chairman. President g4 Sunay, however, asked Demirel to form a new cabinet and he 't - ca jtalism'. 1 presented exactly the same cabinet as that which had just been After the founding of the DP there were defections from the forced to resign. With 41 dissident Representatives capable of Justice Party and Demirel was left without a majority in the voting against the government, Demirel's position was always Assembly. His position had been completely eroded and he had threatened. The dissidents had demonstrated their_J.lo · was_ bec�me a 'factor of instability'. As early as 13 January 1971 · now a uesfion o · · Demi 's gos·t" a eatin_g_ �s1dent Sunay eigiressed p atel the view that 'it would be him at the congress to be held in October. · Meanwhile, they use�ul if De�el withd�ew f�r a while, or e ao lJrougnf the launched a campaign to discredit him by accusing him of corrupt entire estabhshment agamst him .... [but Sunay said that he] had practices, of peddling influence to obtain large credits for his only the power to recommend.' The commanders, looking at the brothers.50 Judged by the outcome of the Fifth General Congress, exam les of 27 Ma an s · ion in reece sa1 e would cer.t�_y__not � up democracy, s e ·rel's . overnment was the cam ai� amst Denriteldid lifrte amage an e mam ame - 55 his hold_�y r _� n.artx.:'._ perm o lmger on for another two months. The dissidents had only one card left to play in order to force As the wee�s wen y 1t ecame �lear t at Demirel had virtually lost all authonty. He was totally echpsed by events and forced into �emi�el's resignation:�eed in p�uading the As_s_embly to mvestigate the c es of corru t10n a amst him. This request had the background, in the shadow of the commanders. It is worth a ea y een reJecte y t e JP majonty and tlien overruled by the noting that, when the urban guerrillas released the four American Constitutional Court. The motion came before the Assembly again servicemen th�Y had kidnapped, Ambassador William Handley thanked opposition. leader 1smet lnonii and not Premier Demirel. on 16 December and after a seventeen-and-a-half hour debate it 56 was defeated by 309 votes to 276.52 This was not lost on the press. In February Demirel spoke to the 248 Th e Turkish Experiment in Democracy JP and RPP 1965- 1971 correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of the generated by the 27 May movement; therefore as soon as political possibility of an earl general election, which would give him a activity was permitted again it began recruiting students and �7 new mandate to rule. But there was to be no spot election. Even youths as well as retired officers and academics; the enrolment of r 59 after the split in the party there were reports of groups who wanted youth into the party proved particularly significant. But, apa,rt Demirel to resign. The candidate who was expected to replace from those moves, the Republicans made no attempt to change the Demirel was Defence Minister Ahmet Topaloglu, who would be character of their party. The emphasis on officers and academics ( acceptable to the armed forces. There was a meeting on 8 March suggests that they wanted to strengthen the element of the 1971 at which this question was discussed but Demirel was able to traditional 'civilian-militaryintellig_entsia' in the party. retain control, dismissing the remaining dissidents led by Aydm The procee mgs of the Fifteenth General Congress (24-8 Yal9m as political opponents bent on destroying party unity.58 August 1961) amply demonstrate that little had changed in the Four da s later the Commanders presented their memorandum to upper levels of the RPP. A Republican sympathizer observed that, resident una ani t e airmen o :fie ssem6I an t e 'Citizens in search of peace and stability expected many things Senate, and Stile e e was orce o res1 n. Tfie o · · from the Fifteenth Congress, which was meeting at a time when future o Demirel and of his party were in grave doubt in the· the one-and-a-half year old revolutionary regime was coming to an peno t at followed. end and the general election was approaching. It was expected that the Republican People's Party would take power at the coming general election and the citizens were waiting with curiosity to see Evolution of the 'New' RPP the new policy which the party would adopt.' He continued, 'The Th e 'Old Guard' Persists, 1960- 1965 Congress opened in Ankara on Thursday 24 August 1961 and destroyed all hope from the very_ first day. It began and ended as a The coup d'etat of 27 May 1960 froze political activity and with demonstration af persona] rivalries�� it the developments which had been taking place in the RPP since The rivalry Giritlioglu refers to is the inonii-Giilek rivalry we ffl:>There was much elation in the party, for overnight it had witnessed in the fifties. Giilek, having been ousted as Secretary­ been transformed from a party threatened with investigation and General in 1959, was determined to make a comeback. He began possible closure, to a party exercising indirect but dominant to prepare the ground for the contest with lnonii by publishing a influence on the policies of the interim regime. Some members of newspaper, !he Tanin in which he carried out his propaganda. But the National Unity Committee, notably Turke§, were opposed to he was no match for fnonii, even though his supporters dominated 1nonii but they were soon ousted from the Committee, and even the congress. lnonii's threat to resign, along with his implied while they were there the party was able to exercise influence ultimatum of 'either me or Giilek', clinched the issue. He was through the civilians (professors and technocrats) rri,_ost of whom re-elected Chairman and his candidate 1smail Rii§tii Aksal was were sympathetic to the RPP's policies and ideas. JMany of the elected Secretary-General, defeating Giilek by 957 votes to 335; features of the Second Republic ( the bicameral parliament, Giilek was not even elected to the General Administrative Coun­ proportional representation, the Constitutional Court, and cil. 61 economic planning) had been proposed by the RPP� This was no The party had been weakened by behaviour of the factions accident since the Constituent Assembly, which played the major and even lnonii became a factor of discor rather tha unit The role in determining the shape of the Second Republic, was revolution may have ushered in a new era for Turkey bu not for dominated by Republicans. If the Republicans suffered any the RPP, which continued in its old ways. The results of the 1961 . y_ setback from the:'.rou:Yit w�s thei.uailure to have an_yjlrl g�neral general election demonstrated the voters' coolness62 towards the election. befor� the countr:)'- had had time- to recover- - from--- the shoe- RPP, which did worse in this election than in 1957. of 21. _M ay...,_ ) The three e rs o he · nonii-led coalitions caused even more With the military in power, lnonii was able to establish absolute druna e. he constant dilution of the reforms to which the party control in the party. He was a factor of strength and stability but was committed undermined its standing, and large numbers of its his leadership also made for conservatism and stagnation. younger supporters defected to the Workers' Party. During these However, the party could not entirely ignore the dynamism years the RPP was divided and confused, unable to do anything to I 250 Th e Turkish Experiment in Democracy JP and RPP 1965- 1971 25 1 revive its fortunes with the voters, as the local elections of prope so.c.io�conomic policies, read the declaration, would the November 1963 proved. The party's rank and file was at odds with extreme Righ.tt and 'extreme Leff be countered.65 the party organization and with the government./ During the years bservers followed the proceedings with great interest to see in opposition, the leadership had promised to implement a broad how !nonti's party would react to the challenge of the sixties, and and radical programme of reform as soon as it came to power. The what measures would be taken to revitalize its moribund structure. rank and file now pressed for action but th RPP coalitions were The results were not reassuring. The congress repeated tired cliches unable to implement _such a programme. Not only had the and promised reforms which it had failed to carry out while in government failed to carry out the major reforms, land reform for power. The election of Kemal Sahr as Secretary-General, with Sim example, but the country was actually moving towards gre�ter Atalay and Cihat Baban as his deputies, suggested that the party conservatism. The party acquired the reputation of the rhetoncal intended to retain its conservative character despite its lip service reformer: always promising reforins, it was in fact successfully to reform.66 sabotaging them. That is why, later on, the party in opposition was often exposed to the Justice Party retort: 'Why are you criticizing 63 Th e Party Moves Left of Cen tre [our proposal]? Earlier you also delayed this law.' / After !nonu's government was defeated in February 1965 the l.The set-back in the local elections (NovemberRPP 1963) and the partial Senate election (June 1964) forced the to reconsider party became more radical and the general election in October its policiesin order to P-!Qjectan image which would d1fterenhate if - became its principal concern. �e was, h_<;�eve£, a stron _ reaction in the partugainst the 'turn to the left . According to a _ lroWPm_ he JP and rovide an alternative to the socialism of t1ie Once more the party reverte to t e r etonc of its old conservative Re ublican Bulent Ecevit's speech before the party's reformist, Kemalist image. It proclaimed itself the party of reform. ymfli con ress m ay, wit i_ts reference to nationalization, was a clear m c hon o t e new orientation. The enrolment of three of 'Those who are not on the side of reform', Turhan Feyzioglu told 67 his audience in Konya, 'are people opposed to the well-being of the t e Fourteen' s a o en invitation to radicals to join the party. Turkish nation. ... As our name proclaims, we are the People's But the reaction was also an indication of how the opposition Party. We believe in social justice. The only way to defeat parties iitd ::""oe a 5Ie o ex 01t the RPP's reformism, especially communism is by implementing ocia ushce. We are oppose� to .9nceit adop.,ts:d the slogan 'left of centre' ( ortamn solu) to describe \ its position in Turke 's olffical spectrum. The Republicans were backward ideas which are so unaware o t e world as to believe � , that it is sinful even to talk of social justice.' In Bursa, Kemal Sahr, i�)! - e e ens1ve. the party's Secretary-General, stated that 'an office boy paying tax The term 'left of centre' was introduced to the public in !nonti's '\' on 200 liras while someone who earns hundreds of thousands pays statement published in Milliyet on 29 July 1965. The controversy nothing is no different from putting dynamite under social which resulte.d.from._th.is_proved_�_tremely costly at the polls on 10 justice'.64 October. The o position parties, especially the JP, immediately began to use the so an as a weapon against the RPP. In logic The Seventeen ess of 16-18 October I 964 was intended remm1scent o Alice in Wonderland, being left of centre was tobe a oint of de arture. It was to be an mtellectual con ress explained a�b! :_ing Ln tne §.:ntre of the left w_!i il� .!_h e jingle 'ortanm and for the first time the Yonth and Women's wmgs o t e party solu,711Toskova ycilu (Teft of centre is the road to Moscow) was P.artici ated. The most si nificant feature was the declaration -inten e o arouse · e an i:Commu mst -response conditioned by sm,titled 'Our Ideal of an Advanced Turke)( { 1erL T.iJJ;J£.1J:£.. .. the wor ' oscow . t could not ave been otherwise68 in a country Vlk iiz · ch was ado12ted b;>: the con ress. e decla t on where 'democra was symbolized by the 'white horse'. e zio-lu and · e t Ecevit the two . The Republicans were caught by their own ruse, designed to rising stars of the RPP, with the intention of modernizmg t e undermine the osition of their socialist rival, the WPT. They were Etrty's principles and brin�ing them in line wit� c1ont�mporar_ y forced to explain eft of centre an tli.at proved particularly needs( It dealt with such to 1cs as land reform, social JUStlce, social difficult in the countryside, where counter-propaganda using securi , economic develo ment e o ti, ah e ucat10n traditional factors like religion and private property was far more secularism, t e me arts, nationalism, and outh Only through the effective. Few people outside the urban areas were comforted by

I

The RPP ought to have concentrated on keeping alive its new personality and purged all those who tarnished it by their associations with the past. But the congress did the reverse. The Ecevit group made concessions, believing that time was on their side and that their first task was to keep the party intact. They forgot that the provincial organizations and the voters were more radical and less opportunistic. 'The recent congress', concluded Soysal, 'could have been used as an opportunity to strengthen convictions that the party would remain steadfast in its new course. The opportunity was missed. Now, groups of this or that colour, by-products of the congress, appear more out of place or incongruous than ever in comparison with92 the concrete and worthy ideas expressed in the policy statements.' As the general election drew near, the party turned more and more to its traditional politics. In May 1969 1nonii did a somersault and supported the government's motion to restore political rights to former Democrats. It was only a political tactic to counteract Dernirel's manoeuvre. But this unprincipled approach to politics by a party which had always claimed the monopoly of principles-to the extent of being93 self-righteous-shocked public opinion and led to resignations. Inonu did not stop at that; he took the logical step and held meetings of reconciliation with Celal Bayar, designed to draw Democrat votes to the RPP.94 Three weeks before the election, the party organ Ulus (20 September 1969) published a banner headline: 'A General Amnesty when the RPP Comes to Power.' The party's campaign strategy was to avoid controversy, and a secret circular instructed its officials to keep away from disputes on past political differences and resentments; to eschew speeches which could be interpreted as being against the national will; and to avoid controversial words like 'progressive' and 'reactionary', �nd topics such as religion and secularism . . Insfeacl e party should ut forward the thesis of 'reform from die economic and, social P.oint of view', describing opponents as socia95 conservatives U!Jhe th.a ' tionar);' or 'anft-Afafurlc"". cevit's radical r-rornises of 'land to the tiller, water 'for tlte user' were in�� contrast to the general tone of the campaign,96 and mcreased the co_nfusion and cynicism of the voters. 1 he result was that tlie­ �PP's support in the count remamed vtrtuall static, droJl:RI�- from 28·7 per cent o t e votes m 967 to 7-4, while the JP vote oro ed from 52·9 to 46-2 er cent.91 Just as the partisans of the 'left-of-centre' slogan had been

---- rur I Notes to Chapter IX 261 the memorandum could not be described as democratic, nor did it fi:elp the cause of democracy.. Wfiat made matters worse was t e · armedPrime forces' decision t.Q.l!. Nihat Erim as the ' -pa t ' Minister, his claim to impartiality depending RPPon nothing stronger than the requirement that he resign from the before accepting office. This appointment was a blow to Ecevit and the new policy. Erim had initially supported the left-of-centre policy and was described as one of its original partisans. In time, however, he had sided with the conservatives and had even led this faction against Ecevit. As Prime Minister of what was to be a national coalition he would have great power, which he could use on behalf of Ecevit's rival Kemal Sahr. Had 1nonti decided not to support the Erim government, Ecevit's position in the party might have remained tenable. Being a man of principle as well as sound political calculation, Ecevit resigned as Secretary-General on 21 March, the day 1nonti proclaimed his support for the government. _O ne of the main features of the.Jeft:of-ceptre llQ· had been · the abandonment of the n,arJy's 'alliance' with-the, armed forces an d the bureaucrac . That c1aimed the le t-o -ce re theor.eticians, wou restore t e party's Qo11ta1.t with the people and increase its cfiances of winning elections. Their desire to brea own t e barriers between the party and the people was made incapable of fulfilment by 1nonti's decision, which immediately identified the RPP with the intervention, as in 1960. The only way to salvage the new policy, and prevent it from being devalued in the eyes of its supporters, was for the radicals to resign their party posts. Only � t1!_en would they be able to continue the struggl_f.i.,an g, if the · restore the .e..oiicy designed to introduce radical reform.

NOTES l Cumhuriyet, i6 June and l Dec. 1960; Seyhan, Golgedeki Adam, 96. Alparslan Turke§ told the author that he was engaged in forming a party with Ekrem Alican and Abdullah Goziibiiyi.ik, both cabinet ministers, when he was ousted from the NUC in Nov. 1960. 2 See MER 1961, 532 ff.; TY 1962, 326-32; Tokin, TiirkTarihi, 103. 3 On the NTP see Eren, Turkey Today-and Tomorrow, 68 and 98; MER 1961, 539-41; TY 1962, 331-2; Tokin, Tiirk Tarihi, 106-7; and Nimet Arz1k, 'YTP Nastl Kuruldu', Yon, 28 Feb. and 7 and 14 Mar. 1962. 4 Cerna! Madanoglu, C. Madanoglu lnkilabi Anlat1yor, ed. Cevat Oktay (n.d. [1960]), 16. 5 Refik Erduran's column in Milliyet, 5 Oct. 1965. 6 Cumhuriyet, 16 July 1961. ..l I Notes to Chapter IX 263 262 Th e Turkish Experiment in Democracy Ethem Erdinc;: (Public Works); Macit Zeren (Trade); Edip Somunoglu 7 Ibid., 28 Feb. 1961 quoted in MER 1961, 537. (Health and Social Assistance); lbrahim ..Tekin (Customs. and Mono� 8 Cumhuriyet, 13 June 1964. polies)· Bahri Dagda§ (Agriculture); Seyfi Ozttirk (Commumcations); Ah 9 Ibid., 9 Sept. 1964. Naili Erdem (Labour); Mehmet Turgut (Industries); lbrahim Deriner 10 Stileyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Gene] Ba§kanl1gma Adayligum (Energy and Natural Resources); Nihat Ktir§at (Tourism a d Infor­ Neden Koyuyorum? Son Havadis, � (1964 ); 9 Nov. 19?4. This was the first mation); Haldun Mente§e9.glu(B uilding and Resettlement); Sab�t Osman time in Turkey's political history that the leadership of any party was Avc1 (Rural Affairs). See Ozttirk, Hiikiimetler, 609- 10; the Turkish press, decided by contest. 28 Oct. 1965. See below, n. 32. 11 See above, ch. 7. 25 Cumhuriyet, 6 Nov. 1965. Apparently Aydm Ya!c;:m refuse� to enter 12 Cumhuriyet, 29 Nov. 1964. The sec��d part of the �:J.l�Ota_tio� i�. n�t Demirel's first cabinet because Demirel would not defme the duties of the given in the party pamphlet, Adalet Partis1, Adalet PartlSI lkin c1 Buyiik Ministry of State he was being offered. Professor Yalc;:m writes that he also Kongresinde Gene] Ba§kan Adaylanmn Konu§malan (n.d. [1964]), 8. disliked the general composition of the cabinet. He says that, Ahmet Conversation with Aydm Yalc;:m. Dalli was offered a post in the cabinet but was too ill to accept. (Private 13 Demirel's official biographical sketch is given in his pamphlet, Gene] communication from Professor Yalc;:m. ) Ba§kan, a 8. For a more detailed and cri.tical ?iograp�y see Or� � 4, 21 26 Kadri Brogan's statement in DP, 72 '1er Har�keti ve Demo1?"�tik June 1971, 12-15. Turke§ tried to discredit Demirel by g1vmg out Parti (1971 ). See also Milliyet, l Nov. 1965 which reported sirrular unflattering information about him after the coup of 27 May 1960. See accusations. Va tan, 5 Oct. 1965. 27 Milliyet, l-2 Nov. 1965. . 14 Conversation with Seyfi Kurtbek, who said that one of his sources of 28 Demirel read the programme on 3 Nov. See the Turkish press, 4 information was Orhan Erkanh. Kurtbek was one of the deputy leaders of Nov. 1965 and Ozttirk, Hiikiimetler, 611-70. For a detailed and critical the JP and a member of the General Executive Council. analysis by seven experts see Cumhuriyet, 6-12 Nov. 1965. 15 Ibid. Seyfi Kurtbek claims that all governments since 1961 have been 29 'Program', Cumhuriyet, 5 Nov. 1965. responsible for increasing the autonomy of the armed forces, and not one 30 Va tan, 20 Jan. 1966. has tried to bring the situation back to normal. The Assembly Group 31 The Tur�sh press, 27-30 Nov. 1966 and the JP pamphlet, AP, protested against the government's lack of control over the commanders. Adalet Partisi U9iinciiBiiyiik Kongresi: Raporlar ( 1966 ). See Cumhuriyet, 6 Jan. 1966. 32 The other new ministers were: Husamettin Atabeyli (State ); Vedat 16 Milliyet, 21 and 22 Dec. 1964. . . . Ali Ozkan (Health ); Ahmet Turkel (Commerce); llhami Ertem 17 N. Abadan, 'Election of 1965', Government and Oppos1t10n 1/3 (Education); Orhan Alp (PuJ?.lic Works); Turgut Toker (Rural Affairs). (1966 ), 341. As Professor Abadan explains, in Turkish a whi�e horse _is 'k� See Milliyet, 2 Apr. 1967 and Ozttirk, Hiikiimetler, 609-10. at'. The popular pronunciation of the word J?emocrat m Tur�1sh 1s 33 Cumhuriyet, 14 June 1967, quoting Osman Turan's speech. Demirkrrat, which means a white horse made of iron. See Cumhunyet, 22 34 Milliyet, 31 Oct. and I Nov. 1967. July 1965. 35 Cumhuriy et, 11 Sept. I 966. 18 Cumhuriyet, 21 July and 17 Aug. and Milliyet, 31 Aug. 1965. 36 Ibid., 4 Dec. 1966. 19 Va tan, 15 Sept. 1965. 37 Ibid., 31 July 1967, 7. 20 AP, Se9im Beyannamesi (Ankara, 1965), and the Turkish press, 19 38 Milliyet, 15 Jan. I 968. Sept. 1965. 39 Cumhuriyet, 16 Sept. 1969. . 21 Milliyet, 13 Oct. 1965. 40 Conversation with Alparslan Turke§. A good example of the att1tu e 22 Cumhuriyet, 6 Nov. 1965. � of this group towards monopoly capitalism is given i� one of their 23 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1965. During his visit to the US President Sunay was journals, Yeniden Milli Miicadele, 54, 9 Feb. 1971 quoted m Toker, �ol ve informed by a group of businessmen that 'Turkey has become an ally, Sag, I05: 'Finance capital is by its nature and purpose not nat1onal. especially on account of the econo ic policy follow d by the JP _ � . . � . Banks, insurance companies and financial trusts that are attached to 1� are government. In particular, the restoration of sta�1hty, w1t�m th� short the mortal enemies of the national economy. In fact there 1s a time that Premier Demirel has been in power, will make 1t possible to contradiction between finance capital and all the elements of the national concentrate investment on a large scale in agriculture and tourism.' See economy. Finance capital is concernedwith weakening and d�stroy�ng the Cumhuriyet, 14 Apr. 1967. . national economy in all its aspects by robbing the banks, mampulatmg the 24 Stileyman Demirel (Prime Minister); Cihat Bilgehan, Refet Sezgm, stock exchange and by various other swin�les. It exploits all the Ka.mil Ocak, and Ali Fuat Ali§an (State); Hasan Dinc;:er (Justice); Ahmet . possibilities in Turkey through puppe� enterpnses "."h1ch speed up the Topaloglu (Defence); Faruk Stikan (Interior); thsan Sabri <;aglayangil productive economy. It makes the national wealth its own property by (External Affairs); lhsan Gursan (Finance); Orhan Dengiz (Education); ' · I 264 Th e Turkish Experiment in Democracy Notes to Chapter IX 26s setting up plants which encourage luxury and waste (Coca-Cola, Fanta, July 1970, respectively. Both are reprinted in Milliyet 1970, 39 and 42. etc.) and exploits the national wealth ( the plunder of minerals). There is Gevgilili notes that in 1945 the opposition to land reform was led by also a class of compradors which participates in these activities of this . A generatio.r later his son Ytiksel was in the ranks of anti-national capital, reaping large profits and sharing in the crime. They the new DP. See also Besim Usttinel's discussion of Deinirel's econoinic are virtually traitors. Thus the struggle between the national and the policy and its implications in Ulus, 13 Sept. 1970. anti-national economy is one between international capital and its 55 Aydm Yal9m reporting his conversation with President Sunay to the accomplices against the nation. What is needed now is to establish the JP Assembly Group on I June 1971. See Cumhuriyet, 2 June 1971. effect of these accomplices of the anti-national economy on our social 56 Ibid., 12 Mar. 1971. Cumhuriyet also reported rumours of a meeting groups and then to attack.' on 11 Mar. between the commanders, Ambassador Handley, and Richard 41 Cumhuriyet, 19 May 1968. Helms, Director of the CIA. The meeting was allegedly held at the US 42 See the chronology in Servet Ediboglu and others, eds., Salname Embassy. 1390/1970 Ytlhgi (1970), 29-30, 36-9, and 45; and Milliyet 1970, 155-7. 57 Cumhuriyet, 18 Feb. 1971, quoting the interview. 43 Vehbi Ko9's speech quoted by Kurthan Fi§ek, 'Odalar Birligi 58 Milliyet, 9 Mar. 1971. Conversation with Aydm Yal9m. Kavgas1', Emek, 16 June 1969, 3. 59 MER 1961, 533-4. 44 Ibid. This was prophetic in view of the developments following 12 60 Giritlioglu, Halk Partisi, ii, 236. Mar, 1971. 61 Ibid., 236-9; MER 1961, 534. 45 In this cabinet Demirel ignored the right wing of the party, which 62 For the election results see above, 172. See also Karaosmanoglu, 45 lost the portfolios for Finance, Interior, Communications, and Ind.�stries. Yil, 258-63, who holds lnonti responsible for the party's failure; and Only four ministers (Atabeyli, Topaloglu, <;aglayangil, and Ozkan ) Giritlioglu, HalkPartisi, ii, 260-5. retained their former ministries; others were reshuffled. Demirel intro­ 63 <;etin Altan quoting Nuri Bayar in his book, Ben Milletvekili lk en duced )5 new ministers: Gtirhan Titrek and Turhan Bilgin (State); Yusuf (1971), 195. Nadir Nadi, 'Eskisinin Kopyas1', Cumhuriyet, 3 Feb. 1966, Ziya Onder (Justice); Mesut Erez (Finance); Professor Orhan Oguz observed that had criticized the JP-budget which was a copy (Education); Turgut Gtilez (Public Works); Ahmet Dalli (Trade); Ahmet of earlier budgets he himself had prepared while Finance Minister lhsan Birincioglu (Customs and Monopolies); Niliat Mente§e (Communi­ (1962-5). Nadi concluded: 'Although governments change in Turkey, cations); Salahattin Kili9 (Industries); Necmettin Cevheri (Tourism and social and econoinic outlooks remain the same, and the budget which Information); Hayrettin Nakipogl�. (Building and Resettlement); Turhan reflects the government's policy does not vary from one government to Kapanh (Rural Affairs); Htiseyin Ozalp (Forests, a new ministry); lsmet another.' Sezgin (Sport and Youth, a new ministry). See the Turkish press, 4 Nov. 64 Both quotations are from Cumhuriyet, 13 Apr. 1964. 1969 and ME/ x.xiv/1 (1970), 69. 65 Giritlioglu, Halk Partisi, ii, 338-40; Kili, Kemalism, 188-90. 46 Milliyet, 7 Nov. 1969. 66 Milliyet, 21 Oct. 1964. 47 Cumhuriyet, 26 Dec. 1969. 67 Ulus, 14 May 1965, reporting the statement of Kemal Karan, 48 Son Havadis, 8 Jan. 1970; Milliyet 1970, 30-48. Those who 'Yalked Representative for Amasya. The three who joined the RPP were Orhan out included: Sadettin Bilgi9, Faruk Stikan, Mehmet Turgut, Cevat Onder, Erkanh, Orhan Kabibay, and lrfan Solmazer. Karan's reaction is an Ali Naili Erdem, Talat Asal, and Ytiksel Menderes. indication of the confusion between radicalism and leftism which exists in 49 The Turkish press, 5, 12, 14, and 15 Feb. 1970; DP, 72 'Jer Hareketi, Turkey today. Not one of the three had any inclination towards socialism; also deals with this issue. See also Milliyet 1970, 30-48. The five were Solmazer even defected to the Reliance Party in 1967. Bilgi9, Turgut, Stikan, Asal, and Menderes. 68 The best discussion of this issue is in Btilent Ecevit, Ortamn Solu 50 Milliyet, 16 Feb. 1970. Giinaydm, an Istanbul tabloid, publicized the (1966 ), 11-13. See above, n. 17. issue and demanded an investigation against Demirel. 69 Niliat Erim's statement in Milliyet, 8 Aug. 1965. For the negative 51 The Turkish press, 22-4 Oct. 1970. reaction of the rural population see Cumhuriyet, 25 Aug. 1965, 4, which 52 Milliyet, 17 and 18 Dec. 1970. See also Demirel's speech of 12 Nov. was covering the election campaign. 1971 published as a JP pamphlet, Soru§turma lstiyorum (Ankara, 1971) 70 Ulus, 27 Aug. 1965. and AP, Soru§turmamn lfyiizii (Ankara, 1971). For the dissidents' case 71 Cumhuriyet, 8 Oct. 1965. see the DP pamphlet, DemireJ'den Hesap Sorahm (Ankara, n.d. [197 1]). 72 Diinya, 12 Oct. 1965. 53 Cumhuriyet, 19 Dec. 1970. DP, 72 'Jer Hareketi, 88-90 gives the 73 Cumhuriyet, 16 Oct. 1965 (Trabzon speech ) and 19 Oct. 1965 statement of the new party and the names of its 69 founders. See also (interview). Milliyet 1970, 157-8, and Muzaffer Sencer, Sosyal TemeJJer, 373-81. 74 Ul us, 20 Nov. 1965, reporting lnonti's speech before the Party 54 lsmail Cem's and Ali Gevgilili's columns in Milliyet, 7 Mar. and I Council. Th e Turkish Experiment inDem ocracy I 266 Notes to Chapter IX 267 75 Cumhuriyet, 18 and 19 Dec. 1965. 76 Ecevit, Ortamn Solu, 56-63. Atatiirk ve Devrimcilik (n.d. (1970]). The title is based on Ecevit's speech of 11 Nov. 1969 to the Federation of Social Democratic Associations on 77 Cumhuriyet, 17 and 18 Dec. 1965 (quotation). the anniversary of Atati.irk's death. 78 Ecevit, Ortamn Solu, 68 and 71-6. 99 Ulus, 27 and 28 Mar. and 1 Apr. 1970. 79 Ul us, 22 Oct. (1noni.i's election) and 25 Oct. 1966 (Ecevit's election); 100 Ulus, 2-7 July 1970 and CHP, CHP XX Kurultay1: Parti Medisi Kili, Kemalism, 190-4. Raporu (1970). 80 Speech at Kozan, Cumhuriyet, 27 Jan. 1967, an� inter.view with 101 Ak§am, 7 and 9 Dec. 1970. Abdi 1pek9i, Milliyet, 18 Jan. 1971. Author's conversat10n with Bi.ilent Ecevit. 81 Cumhuriyet, 4 Oct. 1970. 82 Cumhuriyet and Milliyet, 23 and 24 Dec. 1966. 83 Milliyet, 4 Jan. 1967; ME�_ 1967, 513-'16. 'The Eight' were: Turhan Feyzioglu, Emin Paksi.it, Orhan Oztrak, Si.ireyya Ko9, Ferit Melen, Turan �ahin, Fehmi Alparslan, and Co§kun Krrca. 84 Ak§am, 5 Feb. 1967 quoted in Kili, Kemalism, 193. 85 Ulus, 29-30 Apr. 1967; MER 1967, 515; Kili, Kemalism, 194-8. 86 Milliyet, 13 May 1967. Ferit Melen was elected a deputy leader. Judged by its programme, the RP wanted t? appear a �oderate_ party, emphasizing nationalism and the need to avmd class conflict. But 1t soon abandoned its moderation and adopted a position on the secular Right, bitterly opposed to radicalism and socialism. Even the left-of-centrists were described as people 'who want to drive Turkey into a communist adventure by moves disguised as "socialism" or "leftism" '. (Ankara Radio, 16 May 1967, in SWB, iv/2468/c/3.) A few months later, eighty-six members from the Istanbul organization left the party, claiming that owing to the influence of the JP, it had become like the 'Association to Combat Communism' and that Feyzioglu had become Demirel's shadow. Those who had complained of 1noni.i's dictatorship had set up their own Feyzioglu-Melen-Krrcajunta. (Milliyet, 11 and 12 Oct. 1967. ) 87 CHP, CHP XIX Kurultay1: Parti Meclisi Raporu (1968 ), 22-8 gives a detailed analysis of the results and a projection of trends. 88 Ankara Radio, 5 June 1968, in SWB, iv/2715/c/3. 89 Ulus, 19 Feb. 1968. 90 The best account of Ecevit's position is to be found in his Assembly speech (15 Feb. 1968) criticizing the budget. A revised and enlarged version was published under the title, Bu Diizen Degi§meli( 1968 ). 91 Milliyet, 6 Nov. 1968, 2. 92 Ibid. 93 Cumhuriyet, 12 May 1969. The resignations came from the younger group and included intellectuals like NerrninAbadan. 94 Milliyet, 15 May 1969 and Turhan Dilligil, Bayar-lnonii Yakmla§­ mas1 (Ankara, 1969 ). Pre-publication extracts from this book were serialized in the right-wing daily Adalet, 20 Sept.-6 Nov. 1969. 95 This circular, dated 26 July, was published in Cumhuriyet, 11 Aug. 1969. 96 Cumhuriyet, 15 Aug. and Ulus, 1 and 5 Oct. 1969. 97 For the results, see above, 201. 98 Cumhuriyet, 9 Dec. 1969. For a full exposition of Ecevit's views see