THE “NEW ” NARRATIVE AND PUBLIC POLICY CHANGE IN TURKEY1

Dr. Fethi Ufuk OZISIK*

Introduction

AKP and the Evolution of Its Rule since 2002’s Legislative Elections

The Justice and Development Party (“Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi”), abbreviated JDP in English and AK PARTİ or AKP in Turkish, is a social conservative political party in Turkey. It has developed from the of , but has officially abandoned this ideology in favor of "conservative " (Duran, 2008; Akdogan, 2006). The party is the largest in Turkey, with 312 members of parliament. Its leader, Ahmet Davutoglu, is Prime Minister, while former party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan is President of Republic since 2014.

Founded in 2001 by members of a number of existing conservative parties, the party has won three general election victories in 2002, 2007 and 2011, winning 34.3%, 46.6% and 49.8% respectively. Having almost won a two-thirds majority of the 550 parliamentary seats in 2002, the party won 341 seats in 2007 and 327 in 2011. The party currently forms a third- term majority government since 18 November 2002, having had their electoral success mirrored locally in the municipal elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014.

Shortly after formation, the AKP portrayed itself as a pro-Western and pro- American2 party in the Turkish political spectrum that advocates a liberal market economy including Turkish membership in the European Union3. The party has been described as a “broad right-wing coalition of Islamist, reformist Islamists, conservatives, nationalists, centre- right, and pro-business groups.” (Soner, 2014). The party has for a long time been supported by the Cemaat Movement of exiled Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, whose influence in the judiciary has helped to weaken the opposition against the AKP.

1 International Conference On Public Policy, 1-4 July 2015, Milan-Italy *Assistant Professor, Marmara University, Faculty of Political Sciences 2 http://www.iuee.eu/pdf-dossier/12/VsjcpWMGTq1zMjSMgwnh.PDF 3 New to Turkish ? Here's a rough primer". Turkish Daily News. 2007-07-22. Retrieved 2008-07-22. 1

Controversies over whether the party remains committed to secular principles enshrined in the Turkish constitution despite their Islamist origins have dominated Turkish politics since 2002 and has resulted in numerous unsuccessful closure cases. 4 Critics have accused the AKP of having a 'hidden agenda' despite their public endorsement of . Both the party's domestic and foreign policy has been perceived to be Pan- Islamist or Neo-Ottoman, advocating a revival of Ottoman culture often at the expense of secular republican principles, while increasing regional presence in former Ottoman territories5.

Reforming the Constitution was one of the main pledges of the AK Party during the 2007 election campaign. The main opposition party CHP was not interested in altering the Constitution on a big scale, making it impossible to form a Constitutional Commission (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu).6 The amendments lacked the two-thirds majority needed to instantly become law, but secured 336 votes in the 550 seat parliament – enough to put the proposals to a referendum. The reform package included a number of issues: such as the right of individuals to appeal to the highest court, the creation of the ombudsman’s office, the possibility to negotiate a nation-wide labor contract, positive exceptions for female citizens, the ability of civilian courts to convict members of the military, the right of civil servants to go on strike, a privacy law, allowing legal authorities to judging military officials of the putsch of 1980 and the structure of the Constitutional Court. The referendum was agreed by a majority of 58% in 2011.

Nationwide protests (“Gezi Park” Protests) broke out against the alleged of the AKP in 2013, with the party's heavy-handed response receiving international condemnation and stalling the party's once championed EU accession negotiations.7 Since then, the party has brought about tighter regulations on internet use, abortion and alcohol consumption, having temporarily blocked access to Twitter and YouTube in March 2014.8 Especially after the government corruption scandal involving several AKP ministers in 2013, the party has been increasingly accused

4 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/30/turkey.nato1

5http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/haber-davutoglu-neo-osmanlici-degil-pan-islamist-162144/, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/akp- great-neo-ottoman-travesty-201451974314589207.html

6 "AKP'nin Anayasa hedefi 15 madde". NTVMSNBC. 2009-02-17. Retrieved 2009-02-17

7 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23044600, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Gezi-Park-protests-The-AKPs- battle-with-Turkish-society-316870

8 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/turkey-blocks-twitter-prime-minister 2 of crony capitalism. The AKP favors a strong centralized leadership, having long advocated a presidential system of government and significantly reduced the number of elected local government positions in 2013.9

In the presidential election of 2014, the AKP's long time leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected President. In the party's first extraordinary congress, former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu was unanimously elected unopposed as party leader and took over as Prime Minister on 28 August 2014.

2015’s Legislative Election and the “Second Leap Period” through New Turkey Narrative

Representatives of the AKP define the period of 2002-2015 as First Leap Period (“Birinci Atilim Donemi”) for Turkey. The first AKP government was formed in 2002 and governments of the AKP hold power since then without interruption. The governments of the AKP, since 2002, have carried out various political, democratic, economic, social, and institutional reforms. Certainly, the frequency and intensity of these reforms have been characterized and altered in different contexts and political strategies, obviously connected with the processes of political competition. The reformist character of the governments of the AKP has attracted growing support of a fairly diverse electorate bringing the popular classes, conservatives, nationalists, emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie, various groups of businessmen as well as some of liberal-democrats. The latter, until recently, more precisely until the Gezi protests (2013), have provided to the AKP a strategic support that nurtured his legitimacy among Kemalist voters and senior civil and military bureaucracy, anxious to preserve the secular and democratic character of the state. The support of these liberal democrats, -mostly from the revolutionary leftist movements of the 1960s and 1970s-, was also a significant source of legitimization beside the and other international forces as the . Furthermore, during the first mandates of the AKP, a narration entitled "The Second Republic" ("Ikinci Cumhuriyet") has been mobilized by those liberal democrats, praising the reforms of the AKP that allowed finally make its "democratic character" to the Turkish Republic, hitherto marked by a repressive government and Jacobin logic conveyed by the bureaucratic and military elite, inspired by an official ideology of the state, Kemalism.

9 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/presidential-system-tops-akps-election-campaign.aspx?pageID=238&nID=77644&NewsCatID=338 3

Political legitimization changed course after Gezi protests. The support of some liberal democrats declined and even many of them have become fervent opponents of Erdogan’s regime, now described as "authoritarian". During this break, some representatives of the AKP also indicated that they will continue to not align with the guidelines of these liberal democrats and their legitimacy would be based more on values and aspirations of the people and / or the nation called "millet” and/or “millî irade”. Indeed, the AKP, having consolidated his power and his electorate, following many political struggles against the military tutelage and against its illegal components (the trials of Ergenekon and Balyoz etc.), had to eliminate some of its political partners highlighting a political speech less consensual but more exclusive, favoring the more traditional, local, nationalist, and religious values that refer more to the legacy of the (as the glorious past of the Empire), as well as in the subconscious of Turkish society who always dream of a Turkey that would become a regional or even international economic force. According to the AKP, this would be possible in revitalizing the values and symbols of the past and rejecting the political and societal alienation caused by the authoritarian policy of Westernization implemented since the reforms (1839) and continued to more radically by the Kemalist regime. To the extent that the AKP tends to consolidate and legitimize its power around a political ideology that is based on conservative and nationalistic references devaluing the Westernization policy implemented since the 19th century, the break with these liberal democrats appear obvious since they claim that Turkey remains and must remain a westernized country and that Western values and standards must maintain their predominance in the political and social imagination.

Thus, the new Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu puts forward a political narrative that situates and defines the period 2002-2015 as First Leap Period. The parliamentary elections will be held on June 7, 2015 and these elections signify a new stage, a crucial step for the country's future. This classification of the political process makes particular reference to the election of Erdogan by universal suffrage as President of the Republic in 2014. The presidency led by Erdogan depending on his strong collaboration with the executives of the AKP challenges the institutional and constitutional structure of the regime. We can agree that the current system is more like a semi-presidential system –à la française- than a parliamentary system, which was the case in Turkey until Erdogan's election as President of the Republic. So it is possible to claim that the new period, defined as Second Leap Period (“Ikinci Atilim Donemi”), will be marked by debates and political battles that would result or not with institutional and constitutional reforms. In fact, the “New Turkey” will be

4 institutionalized or not, and translated or not into public policies through a political context that will also be characterized by political legitimization processes during which contentious values, symbols and discourses will compete constantly.

The Analysis of “New Turkey” as a Policy Narrative

Meanings and Usages of the Term “New Turkey”

The use of the word "new" in Turkish political terminology is not a recent development. The founding elite of the Turkish Republic had already started, at the beginning of the 20th century, to use the term "New Turkey". The term "new" states clearly a rupture with the past. The founders of the Republic, especially Atatürk aimed to end the religious character of the Ottoman regime. The dominant role of religion in the imaginary and identity of the population appeared to be an obstacle to the revolutionary goals of the new regime. In this sense, the abolition of Sultanate and Caliphate and then the acceptance of secularism as a constitutional norm were the decisive steps of the establishment of the new regime who seek to find its place in the western world. Moreover, the challenge was also to create a "new" nation whose main components are the Turks in the ethnic sense, and Sunni Muslims. In this perspective, the new system was also intended to reduce the multi-ethnic and multi-identity structure of Ottoman society in order to finalize the creation of a new and unitary nation-state. Indeed, the new Kemalist regime was characterized by a radical policy of westernization despising somehow the tradition ("gelenek"), and by the promotion of a sort of positivist modernism reducing the role and place of religion in the public space. In doing so, the state chose to act "for the benefit of the people, despite the people," and therefore, to act in an authoritarian and unitary manner by gradually reducing the rights and freedoms of ethnic, religious and non-Muslim minorities. Thus, the new Turkey was certainly more "modern" in the institutional and cultural sense, but it was democratic? The answer is still discussing. These remarks are important in the understanding of the term “Old Turkey”, however the new Turkey cannot be conceived without reference to the “Old Turkey”.

Secondly, two political parties calling themselves "The New Turkey Party" existed in Turkish politics. One is chaired by Ekrem Alican in 1961, and the other one is chaired by

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Ismail Cem in 2002. These parties represented different ideologies and they have not had considerable resonance among the public and had a relatively short political life.

Third, a journal of social and political sciences entitled "Yeni Türkiye" (New Turkey) began to be edited by Hasan Celal Guzel since 1994. Following an economic judgment, the journal is published again since 2013. This journal is published as a publication of the “New Turkey Strategic Research Center”. It seems that Hasan Celal Guzel is easily aligned to new usage and new meanings of New Turkey, piloted and exploited hence by the AKP.

The different uses of the term "New Turkey" in different fields have existed but its recent use since 2013 by Erdogan and the AKP, but also by the media and various organizations of had an impact more sophisticated and remarkable. "New Turkey”, which is largely conceptualized by Erdogan and his collaborators, appears more as a social construction than a simple political and strategic appellation. Especially, to understand its practical sense, it is necessary to consider and explain the term “Old Turkey" and its political and imaginary signification.

“New Turkey” versus “Old Turkey” through Stories, Texts and Narrations

« (…) Until the AKP governments, the main political approach was as follows: "The survival and the interests of the state are of paramount importance, the society’s preferences are of secondary importance." We arrived in power, and we reversed this logic. Most of our problems that arise and persist since the founding of the Republic are due to the system's resistance to change. (...) The cause of the horrific events that took place in the East to the 1930s is that of the system's resistance to demands for change. The rights claimed by the people have been denied. The closure of mosques to the 1940s, the prohibition of religious education, carelessness about national and moral values, and hence the alienation of the people to the state... All this is due to the resistance of the system to change requests. (...) The writers who have been imprisoned, writers and artists who have been forced into exile, assassinations whose perpetrators are not caught ... (...) The ban on in public space and discrimination of women wearing (...) the fact that 40,000 people died during the war against the PKK terrorists cannot be understood without understanding the non-tolerance of the status quo to cultural diversity, and its negligence to the rights and public freedoms... (…) Our Sunni brothers, Alevi brothers, Christians, Jews, all minorities, various political and ideological groups, writers, artists, thinkers ... These people have suffered because the system has chosen not to listen to societal demands ... (...) the State has constantly afraid of freedom, the status quo has always wanted to avoid change, the regime designed the change as a threat to its existence. A small minority which was supported and promoted by the state, the regime and the status quo, could lead a prosperous life and increase his wealth while the masses were despised... (…) Before we came to power in 2002, political stability does not exist. Once per 16 months, the country was brought to elections. In such

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countries, stability and trust cannot exist. Especially if during the 12 years of our power, the Old Turkey’s actors were not so resisted to the dynamics of change, the country would have been much developed... Old Turkey was perceived as an obscure Turkey for the majority of the population, except elitists and mafia gangs that had surrounded the state. We all have suffered. Today, I am pleased to declare to you that the Old Turkey no longer exists. The state is now conscious of the dynamics and change requests. Change is inevitable and it is running. This change does not affect the citizens who vote for t he AKP but our entire population. Every Turkish citizen is affected by this change. People who do not vote the AKP are also the winners of this change and will remain so. "

These extracts are from a speech that was made by Erdogan in July 2014 during his presidential campaign, addressing to a group of diversified people: artists, intellectuals, writers, and actors representing different social classes and backgrounds. It is possible to see the establishment of a narrative. A narrative that represents a logical and discursive practice, a temporal narrative that takes the reader or spectator to realize the differences between the past and the present situation, a moral story since it sets up a critical assessment of the past and the eventual values of the present and the future, a strategic and visionary story that talks about the preferences and objectives of a new regime.

The same contents can be observed in many speeches of Erdogan but also in those of different political actors of the AKP. These are repetitive speeches that take place in different spaces; political forums, televised speeches, interviews with journalists, electoral meetings etc. The challenge is clear and sharp. The interest is to create a negative imaginary of the past during which democracy and economic development were paralyzed by the mistakes of the Kemalist regime and ideology. Secondly, the focus is on the benefits of the governments of AKP. AKP is defined as "the savior" of the masses who were despised until recently, and as the reformer of a corrupted political system which is diverted of its own origins. In this sense, the New Turkey means a renunciation of the past, and a transition to a new regime that would be more democratic, more efficient, more prosperous, and more liberal in economic sense and egalitarian in social terms. The first speech made by Ahmet Davutoglu, -who became the new Prime Minister and the new leader of the party in AKP’s congress held in August 2014-, allows us to observe the pillars and main objectives of the New Turkey:

(...) We are ready for the great march of the New Turkey. The psychological basis of the New Turkey is self-confidence. In 12 years, many and great revolutions were made in the policies of transportation, health, agriculture, foreign policy ... This success is based largely on the self-confidence of the Turkish nation. (...) We have a dream. This is the dream of the New Turkey. While some consider themselves

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excluded from this dream, they may be ashamed. So the first pillar of the New Turkey is the self- confidence. (...) Secondly, New Turkey will be based on socio-cultural integration. This shall be achieved with the process of resolution of the Kurdish problem which is defined as the “resolution process”. (…) The third restoration targets the political system. In the New Turkey, the government and the state are the servants of the nation. The of the political system can be completed with the drafting of a new Constitution which even exceeds the standards of the European Union. We need a new Constitution that would have a liberal and democratic character. This new Constitution will restore our political system. Fourth, we have worked for the lifting of bureaucratic-military tutelage over elected politicians. New Turkey will be governed not by bureaucratic, juridical and military elite but by the people and its representatives. Fifth, the restoration aimed values and moral foundations of the regime. We sought to build our power on transparency and on a style of government that cares about justice and equality. (…) Sixth, the New Turkey must restore its judicial system that had often the tendency to produce a juristocracy. Seventh field of restoration is that of our culture and civilization. (…) Eighth field of restoration is obviously that of the economy that would provide the necessary means to achieve the objectives set out above. And finally, the ninth restoration will concern foreign policy by strengthening Turkey's status in the international arena. (…) "

The use of the term "restoration" by Davutoglu immediately aroused the attention of some analysts, journalists and political scientists (Ozkan, 2015; Kepenek, 2014; Aktolga, 2014; Toprak, 2014; Insel, 2014 etc.) Until then, the term that characterized the policies of the AKP was that of reform while restoration or revitalization seems to mean the resurrection of a distant past. The historical period which is referred to Davutoglu's speech appears to be that of Sultan Abdulhamid II who ruled the Ottoman Empire between 1876 and 1909. Sultan Abdulhamid II is a political figure who has a very important place in the imaginary of Turkish conservative people. The Sultan had managed to keep the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire against the imperial forces during his term. He launched also the process of the establishment of various institutions which well allowed the formation of the modernist elite. He was overthrown in 1909 by the Committee of Union and Progress ("Ittihat ve Terakki Partisi"). Its most members have played a significant role in the Empire's entry into the First World War and therefore in the fall of the Empire following the war. It signifies the beginning of a political and historical rupture. In the imaginary of Turkish conservative people, the policy of Abdulhamid II was supposed to maintain the political and territorial greatness of the Empire. Indeed, the resumption of power by the Committee of Union and Progress and its political impact until the foundation of the Republic represent the beginning of the decline of the Empire and thus, the origins of an elitist logic of government which despises traditional values, adopting a Jacobin and modernist ideology. According to some analysts, when Davutoglu uses the term restoration,

8 he seeks to address to the imaginary of conservative voters. This situation allows us to detect hidden ideological assumptions beside the term of restoration (Fischer and Forester, 1993). So the question which can cause debate is: How should we perceive the term of “restoration”? Is that the restoration of the political system of Old Turkey as defined and recited in political discourse, or is it an attempt to restore and/or to revitalize the new Ottomanism through the promotion of the glorious Ottoman civilization and values at the expense of modernist principles and values of the Republic?

Beyond these official speeches, another significant use of the term New Turkey is still done by Prime Minister Davutoglu since 2014. In Turkey, the official TV channel of the state regularly broadcasts the speech of the Prime Minister, addressing to the nation. Since 2013, these speeches are titled as "On the Path of New Turkey" whereas previously the title of these speeches was "Addressing to the Nation."

Two extracts above are parts of the establishment of a political story but represent also the main fields of intervention of political power in the construction of the New Turkey. However, it is possible to see that these discursive practices also mean the setting up of a new scenography (Maingueneau, 2002) and a discourse coalition touching the emotions of the electorate.

“New Turkey” Narrative through a New Scenography and Discourse Coalition

Erdogan’s Role and Impact

In the mobilization of the electorate and getting the latter in certain awareness, one of the important and main tools of the AKP and Erdogan is that of political communication. The electoral success of the AKP is significantly based on its ability to address voters in a rather animated and attractive way. Since 2002, the Turkish citizen has become accustomed to watching videos and TV statements prepared by AKP, in which the main actor and the star is Erdogan. Furthermore, at election meetings, during which Erdogan and Davutoglu speak to thousands and sometimes millions of voters, it is possible to observe electrifying moments and a sort of impressive emotional release. The AKP holds far more campaign rallies when

9 it’s compared to other political parties. To give an example, it must be emphasized that in the context of the legislative elections of June 2015, Davutoglu addressed the people in every city of the country, while other political leaders are far from this feat. Similarly, Erdogan, though now President of the Republic and who is supposed to be "neutral" towards political parties, never misses an opportunity to address the people. In these speeches, Erdogan explicitly asks voters to support for the AKP in the elections of 2015. In fact, Erdogan is omnipresent in the public and political spaces of communication. And this creates displeasure among the opposition parties who denounce the excessive presence of Erdogan as President in the media, in other communication areas, acting as the guarantor of the AKP. Beyond this political tension, the analysis must also focus on the practical reasoning and modalities of the President in his communicative actions.

The main strategy of Erdogan is related especially to the timing of these discursive interventions. At times of crisis, Erdogan did not hesitate in any case to communicate with the electorate. Whether it is the crisis of Gezi protests in 2013 or that of 17-25 December 2013, Erdogan seeks to consolidate his political camp and its electorate through public meetings during which he demonizes its enemies and tries to influence and shape the electorate towards his interests and his political strategy. In a way, it is a stigmatization of the opponents of the regime or even a political polarization. By linking its existence and political power in the interests of the nation, Erdogan tries to bring voters sensitive constantly to the threats. To do this, like his fellows and other charismatic leaders, he has a great ability to detect and / or creating enemies of the nation. In this perspective, according to Erdogan, the demonstrators of Gezi can easily have links with the German or Israeli secret services, and CHP (“Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi”, Republican People's Party) may become the main ally of the Islamic brotherhood of Fethullah Gulen. The brotherhood has targeted the overthrow of Erdogan in December 2014 following the denunciation of the corruption of some members of the AKP and its economic partners.

Indeed, Erdogan has a tendency to link the survival and the interests of the nation to his own political career and his own political existence. In this perspective, Erdogan uses his charisma constantly to ensure its legitimacy in the Weberian sense, and continues a fervent polarization strategy designating enemies and allies of its policy, in the Schmitt’s sense. We often hear not only from Davutoglu but also by Erdogan during the campaigns of the 2015 general elections, the destructive mission of this evil coalition formed by the CHP, the MHP ("Milliyetci Hareket Partisi", Nationalist Movement Party), the HDP ("Halklarin Demokratik

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Partisi", People's Democratic Party), and the Gulen brotherhood that was an important ally, but recently became an enemy of the regime. Even more, according to Erdogan and Davutoglu, that coalition is also supported by a coalition of international actors that aims to sabotage the country's economic growth to become a global force in the world. We never had the chance to learn the identity of these actors. But since Davos Crisis in 2009, and in 2013, and other major world’s economic powers appear to be the targets of these objections.

New Turkey Narrative beyond Logical Reasoning: Touching Emotions and Passions

(…) Emotions belong to the repertoire of rhetoric, and emotional display and the language of passion may very well coexist with argumentative and ethical discourse. This rhetorical position allows us to explore how speech and language provide the means by which emotions have their effects and therefore take on significance. Thus, this view emphasizes the interpretation of emotions as pragmatic acts and communicative performances, and thus as modes of argumentation. Emotions, then, should not be seen as “things” being carried by the vehicle of discourse and rhetoric, but as a form of rhetorical praxis that creates effects in the world (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990, 11–3; Lutz and White 1986).

If Erdogan and Davutoglu, during the election meetings, set up a political narrative that highlights particular success story of AKP's governments since 2002 through economic and social progresses, New Turkey narrative is also built through political practices that seek to activate the awareness and passions of Turkish voters. These practices are quite varied but the analysis will focus attention on particular examples.

The video clips prepared by the AKP are rich enough elements to understand and explain its communicative strategy. The main theme of these videos is to show a radiant and fraternal country's image. In this direction, the first objective is to show the images relevant of all regions of the country, representing the cultural and ethnic diversity. Various local and national symbols are displayed in a refined and touching way. All that indirectly refers to the resolution process of the Kurdish problem and to the appreciation of cultural diversity. Second, beyond fraternal union, these videos also show the economic development of the country through images that represent the implementation of major projects: bridges, dams, highways, airports, hospitals etc. Indeed, a kind of patriotic that refers to the

11 traditional values and historical symbols is appearing. It draws attention also to economic growth through a national solidarism. All these images contribute to the imaginary of the New Turkey narrative.

Apart from these official videos of the AKP, there is also other video clips in which the star is particularly Erdogan. During the campaign of the presidential elections, a video was displayed for days on TV. At the end of this video, the people from all over the country arrive in Cankaya (the district where the presidential residence is situated), and open the doors of the residence and somehow invade it, walking with Erdogan. At this point, it is important to emphasize that these pictures belong to a fairly strategic political symbolism. The invasion of the presidential residence by the people refers to the change in the election procedure of the President of the Republic. Until 2014, it was the National Assembly nominated the president of the republic. While in 2014, the system changed and the election of the President of the Republic is now done by universal suffrage. In the eyes of supporters of the AKP, the Presidency of the Republic was as the major fortress of political and administrative status quo in Turkey. For military and bureaucracy elite, there was no question of electing a president who was not one of them. So Erdogan's election by the people is perceived as a historical revolution in this video as well as the last fortress of the status quo fell and was captured by the people. Erdogan as being the charismatic and undisputed leader of the masses -which were abandoned by the Old Turkey-, has now become the President of the Republic.

Another recent video still represents the Erdogan communication strategy based on the emotions of the . As part of the centenary of the war of the Dardanelles, a video that highlights the sacrifices of young Ottoman soldiers (not only the Turkish soldiers, but also soldiers from Greek, Kurdish or Jewish communities of the Empire) and the integrating role of was aired for weeks in various TV channels. Towards the end of the video, Erdogan reads a religious poem written by a conservative writer and appears at the end by making a prayer in the Çanakkale Military Cemetery. The linking of a historic military victory and Islam still refers to the moral and emotional foundations of the New Turkey, which is being built by the AKP but also supported by a large enough audience without hesitation.

“(…) [There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence (ethos). . . . [There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion (pathos) by the speech. Persuasion occurs through arguments (logos) when we show the truth or the

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apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case”. Thus, in the Aristotelian perspective, the term ethos designates a certain quality of a speaker, but does not refer to any internal attitude or a system of abstract values. Ethos is a procedural phenomenon that comes into existence in action; it is a discursive praxis that is based on exchange and interaction and depends on the perception of audiences. On the other side is pathos, which emphasizes the importance of feelings and passions in the mobilization of opinion. Pathos refers to the fact that the knowledge of other people’s emotions is vital for politics. While logos convinces by itself, pathos and ethos are tied to specific circumstances and, above all, the persons implied in these situations (Fischer, 2007).”

It is possible to consider Erdogan as a charismatic political leader whose qualities and virtues are clearly indisputable beside its stable electorate. Erdogan, based on his charismatic authority, constantly creates communication areas to mobilize the population towards its political vision. Furthermore, touching and guiding the emotions and passions of his electorate are the other pillars of its communicational strategy that goes far beyond the discourses that focus only on a logo-centric argument. Erdogan also mobilizes other communication tools, such as described above.

New Turkey Narrative: The Role of Pro-AKP Medias and Intellectuals

Since the first use of the term New Turkey by Erdogan during a meeting held in Sakarya, in December 2013, the popularization of New Turkey was quickly realized. The AKP supporters did not wait too long to make it a political slogan that immediately invaded the political communication space. It is possible to allow the establishment of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) including many intellectuals and pro-AKP media.

Since 2013, the New Turkey is often made the headlines and television debates. Many analysts and intellectuals are seeking to conceptualize and give a practical and/or scientific meaning to the term New Turkey. In a way, the "New Turkey" has become a political and symbolic référentiel (Jobert, 1989; Muller, 1995) that influences and directs continually political and socio-cultural imaginary. In this sense, pro-AKP media and organic intellectuals, in the Gramscian sense of the term, act as médiateurs aiming and creating links between the political space and public space to legitimize and to make the New Turkey discourse efficient. The mediation role is not exclusive to the media or intellectuals. Political actors themselves, as in the case of Erdogan and Davutoglu, are working hard to spread the benefits of the New

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Turkey to the . However, the contribution of the media and intellectuals fulfill a more strategic and cognitive function.

In this perspective, it is important to describe the recent profile of the media in Turkey. Since AKP’s first electoral victory in 2002, a polarizing discourse was put forward by opposition parties like CHP and MHP. All media components that greeted the victory of the AKP in 2002, and subsequently, its policies were considered as the AKP partners. Until 2002, in Turkey, the media were dominated largely by TV channels and newspapers that do not disagreed with the military tutelage and with the political status quo that was the guarantor of the Kemalist ideology and values: secularism, indisputable place of Ataturk in the imaginary of Turkish society, the Westernization policy of the state and the society, ban of the veil in public spaces etc... While after 2002, the monopolistic domination of the media which supporting the official ideology of the state - Kemalism- was questioned. Many newspapers, and later many TV channels, conservative but also liberal ones have emerged. Since recently, it is possible to observe the development and the relentless growth of pro-AKP media in the media sector. For example, a TV channel which was created in 1997 has recently changed its slogan as "the reporter of the New Turkey". Moreover, in a pro-AKP TV channel, a broadcast entitled "New Turkey" is diffused regularly in the form of debates bringing together journalists and pro-AKP intellectuals. There is also a TV channel that does not hesitate to adopt a posture that can bring the viewer to consider the channel as the official TV channel of the AKP. In this TV channel, before the 2015’s legislatives, series of documentaries were diffused, promoting AKP government’s policies and putting down the Old Turkey. There are also other TV channels of that character. Even the style of presentation of the news reflects a strictly partisan trend. Moreover, members of the AKP, Erdogan, deputies, even Davutoglu prefer to appear particularly in these partisan channels but rarely in other media that could bring them in embarrassing situations during the eventual interviews.

The situation is not so different in the opponent media to the AKP. Many of TV channels and journals follow a strategy which consists to criticize or even to demonize the AKP government and/or Erdogan's regime. Indeed, in Turkey, political polarization is also observable in the media. Is this a democratization process since these polarized media visualize political struggles through which every citizen can find, read and listen easily his fellows, or is it a reflection of a political degeneration that can be considered as the consequence of the excessive politicization of Turkish society? The debate is open...

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Second, the support of some analysts and intellectuals is of major importance in legitimizing the New Turkey. In recent years, this support has become more and more explicit. According to opponents of the AKP, these actors are considered not as journalists or intellectuals but as supporters of the AKP and the Erdogan regime. Some of them have become members of the AKP after the parliamentary elections of 2011 and some of them were candidates of the AKP in the 2015 general elections. Indeed, with regard to these actors, the job of political scientist or journalist tends to become a political counselor or political supporting function. Their opinions and political statements tend to become an explicit political support. One of those actors, for instance, wrote recently a series of articles called New Turkey in a pro-AKP daily newspaper and he also filled the political counselor function of the Prime Minister Davutoglu. Obviously, these actors seek to develop objective analysis as much as possible, but any critical stance against the government and/or Erdogan can easily cause the termination of their contract as journalist or analyst. This became the fate of many liberal democrats whose relationships with the AKP were presented above.

Visions of “New Turkey” and Policy Outcomes

As we noted above, the New Turkey emerges as a new référentiel of public policies in Turkey. This is a discourse that is becoming increasingly dominant and hegemonic, conveyed and promoted by various médiateurs in the political and public space. In fact, the different policy sectors are directly related to the progressive cognitive domination of this new référentiel. Since 2013, the AKP tends to align all its public policies, all its projects, and all its reforms to the référentiel global of New Turkey.

In this sense, the focus will be on a few specific examples. One of the major projects of the AKP and of Erdogan is that of the “resolution process” (“Çozum Sureci”). Under the appellation of resolution process, a radical approach has been mobilized by Erdogan to end the war which began in the early 1980s against the guerrillas of the PKK. Erdogan, during a speech made in Diyarbakir in 2005, declared that the Kurdish question does exist and that the state must now change his approach vis-à-vis this crucial issue. This declaration was the first official speech made by a representative of the state who had the courage to define and recognize the Kurdish issue as such, and not as a simple security issue. This recognition of the Kurdish issue by accusing the repressive and militaristic policies of the state was followed by

15 other initiatives undertaken by Erdogan and the AKP governments. Many democratic reforms respecting the liberties and civil rights of Kurds were realized. Actually, the state is negotiating with the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and the HDP (People's Democratic Party) to stop the PKK terrorism and seek a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question. The legitimization of this policy is quite difficult and contains numerous controversies. Turkish society is very sensitive to PKK terrorism and remains still very nationalist and needs to be reassured. Indeed, “New Turkey” reappears in the scene: "One of the pillars of the New Turkey is the resolution process!”. Erdogan and Davutoglu constantly create a relationship between the construction of the New Turkey and the resolution of the Kurdish problem. In this sense, Erdogan and AKP consider the resolution of the Kurdish problem and negotiations with Ocalan and HDP as a lever or a political project that would fulfill catalyzing role for the democratization of the country. Although recently some disagreements exist between the Davutoglu government and President Erdogan in terms of these negotiations with Ocalan and HDP, the resolution process appears to preserve its importance in the political agenda to be developed following the 2015’s legislative elections.

Secondly, according to Erdogan, the fate and success of New Turkey heavily depend on institutional and constitutional change of the current regime. The d rafting of a new constitution should allow a change in the executive structure of the government by adopting a presidential or semi-presidential system. According to Erdogan, the current parliamentary system is an institutional obstacle that paralyzes major objectives of New Turkey, declared under the name of 2023’s vision (the centenary of the Republic), 2053’s vision (600th anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople) and 2071’s vision (Millennium of the entry of Turks in ). Devaluing the parliamentary system of the Old Turkey due to its slowness and its potential short-circuits at the decision-making processes; Erdogan wants to take over the executive as the President of the Republic for achieving the great visions of 2023, 2053 and 2071.

While Erdogan defends a transition to the presidential or semi-presidential system, not on behalf of his political career but for the benefit of the national interests and therefore of New Turkey, the opposition parties consider Erdogan's policy as a risk that could accentuate and strengthen his authoritarian rule which seems harming Turkish democracy since the Gezi protests and judicial operations of the Gulen brotherhood displaying the corruption of some ministers of the AKP. Indeed, while Turkish citizens have still not had the opportunity to learn about the terms and characteristics of the presidential system promoted by Erdogan, big

16 pressure weighs on the AKP and on Davutoglu to reach the necessary majority in the Parliament, following the 2015’s legislative elections, in order to achieve the transition to the presidential system.

Yanow (1995) contends that places and physical space policy tell stories. The “New Turkey” is emerging also around big sophisticated construction projects of AKP and Erdogan.

Firstly, we can mention the construction of the Presidential Palace in 2014. Until Erdogan's election as President of the Republic in 2014, the presidents resided in Çankaya. Çankaya’s presidential residence is now inhabited by Davutoglu as Prime Minister. In 2012, Erdogan has started the construction of the new presidential palace in Ankara. The objective of Erdogan is to build a great presidential center which would be worthy of the greatness of the “New Turkey”. Moreover, Erdogan said recently that the presidential palace will not be named as such but as "Cumhurbaskanligi Kulliyesi". The Kulliye –Arabic term equaling to English “collection”-, in the Ottoman period, were as centers gathering mosques, bazaars, libraries, schools, bathhouses, the eating houses, and tombs. Indeed, this appellation is still a strong symbolism that makes a resonance in the Turkish ’s imaginary. Erdogan pursues its strategy to touching the emotions through the use of such connotations, symbolizing a significant return to the Ottoman tradition.

Secondly, the implementation of other big construction projects in the sectors of transport and of infrastructure reflects the ambitions of the New Turkey. The construction of the third bridge over the Bosphorus, the construction of the third international airport of or the Istanbul International Financial Center’s project are the most significant examples of these sophisticated projects. These examples are significant since these constructions are being presented as projects that would accentuate the economic development of the country and which would place Turkey among the great international powers.

Concluding Remarks

“ (…) If the AKP is governing the country for thirteen years, and aims to win the elections for a further ten years, the AKP has to adapt to this new political context characterized by societal demands of the change. To say that "I represent the new" may not be enough. It is time to reform the AKP itself. (...) Moreover, it is impossible to create a democratic and pluralistic social and

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political structure with reference to the old system which failed with all its institutions. First, the AKP has to reconstitute the old political system, around which its power and hegemony were established. In other words, the quest for novelty is more an obligation than a choice. This change seems to be increasingly supported by much of the population because people are aware of the absolute necessity of change. The strategy of political change that refers to the novelty seems to seduce the conservative part of society. However, this change is designed as a threat by the secular part of the population. They are not sure of their place in the new proposed political system, and again, they think they will be excluded from it. This can cause the extension of polarization that can be observed in the media, to the social arena. The distance and the gap lying between the conservative people and the secular part of the society may increase. And that can create government and political regulation’s crises at the expense of the AKP.” (Mahcupyan, 2014)

The findings and the statements made by the former political counselor of the Prime Minister Davutoglu are relevant. It's true that New Turkey is being built by the AKP but also by social dynamics. During the thirteen years of his term, the AKP created favorable conditions for a political and institutional transition. New Turkey will actually be the result of a long period of reforms carried out since 2002. In this sense, it is possible to accept that the AKP has been the vanguard of this change but it must be now more sensitive to social demands and dynamics that are becoming more demanding in terms of democratization, modernization and economic prosperity. Moreover, if political change tends to favor the conservative people, it also may stigmatize a considerable part of the population. The authoritarian drift of Erdogan is worrying the secular bourgeoisie, the kemalist middle classes, and a significant part of the Kurdish and also Alevi population. While in 2002, the democratization of the political system, and the social and political pluralism were the main pillars of the AKP’s policies, Erdogan's authoritarianism seems to have a detrimental effect on these preferences of 2002.

We will have the occasion to observe the success or failure of New Turkey narrative which will depend on AKP’s and Erdogan’s political capacity, and on the political struggle of the opposition movements. The new CHP’s approaches, including those of the HDP which is perceived as the new representative of the Turkish left will also be decisive after the 2015’s legislative elections.

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