Politics of Conservatism in Turkey

Turkish Studies

ISSN: 1468-3849 (Print) 1743-9663 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20

Ersin Kalaycioğlu

To cite this article: Ersin Kalaycioğlu (2007) Politics of Conservatism in Turkey, Turkish Studies, 8:2, 233-252, DOI: 10.1080/14683840701312211 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840701312211

Published online: 16 May 2007.

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Turkish Studies Vol. 8, No. 2, 233Ð252, June 2007

Politics of Conservatism in Turkey

ù ERSIN KALAYCIOG[ve]br LU Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Isik University, Istanbul, Turkey

[email protected]_A_231122.sgm10.1080/14683840701312211Turkish1468-3849Original200782000000JuneDr ErsinKalaycõo[gbreve] and& StudiesArticle Francis (print)/1743-9663Francis 2007 Ltd lu (online)

ABSTRACT The 1990s have witnessed growing electoral support for parties to the right of the political spectrum in Turkish politics. As the political left shrunk, the political gravity in electoral and party politics shifted toward the Islamic revivalist and ultra-nationalist Turkish parties. This article examines the nature of this ideological shift, with special focus on the politics of conservatism. The findings of major survey research conducted in AprilÐMay 2006 on the sociopolitical orientations and values of Turkish voters are utilized to delineate the characteristics of conservative voting behavior. A major finding of this survey is that most voters tend to support a conservative party such as the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkõnma Partisi, AKP) out of expected economic benefits rather than purely ideological beliefs.

Introduction Turkey began its transition to democracy in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Since 1946, the country has experienced 15 general elections. In these elections, political parties that stood for traditional and conservative values boasted a remarkable record of winning 11 times, six as landslide victories. In fact, the performance of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950 and 1954, the Justice Party (AP) in 1965 and 1969, the Motherland Party (ANAP) in 1983 and 1987, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2002 general elections constituted milestones in the democratic politics of Turkey. Students of Turkish politics have defined the DYP, ANAP, and other right-of-center political parties as representing the “periphery” and have labored to demonstrate their credentials as “political conservatism and economic liberalism” in the 1990s.1 It seems as if there is a definite popular attraction of “conservatism” (muhafazakarlõk) in Turkish politics, which can be converted into remarkable electoral support at the polls. Why do political parties Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 that appeal to traditional and conservative values receive so much support at the polls in Turkey? Why specifically from among the conservative, traditional political parties did the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gain so much from the rising tide of traditionalism, conservatism, Islamism, and nationalism, while other political parties and movements failed? Those two sets of questions will be scrutinized and answered in this essay.

Correspondence Address: Dr. Ersin KalaycõoGBR[EgVE]ùlu, President, Isik University, Kumbaba Mevkii, Sile 34980, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

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In the first part of this paper, the political attitudes, values, and beliefs that tap right-of-center thinking in Turkish politics will be empirically delineated. The second part of the essay is allotted to an analysis of political conservatism in Turkey and its role in defining and delineating right-of-center values and thinking in Turkey. In the third and final part of the paper, using the results of a national survey conducted in April and May 2006, the sources that determine favoring the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics will be analyzed and assessed.

Conservatism as the Core Value of Rightist Politics Turkish politics experienced a major shock and entered a daunting adaptation process at the end of the Cold War, during the 1989Ð91 period. The emergence of a “New World Order” (yet undefined) seemed to still be continuing, and Turkish politics again seemed to be caught in the vortex of all of the major changes that were affecting world politics at the time. Such a shock pushed Turkey toward more political instability and democracy. Furthermore, it caused Turkish voters to shift away from the more established political movements towards new political movements and parties. New political parties emerged to represent the values of the periphery, which had been cloaked in tradition. At the core of these values were some form of religiosity, awe and suspicion of the state, and local heterodoxy which, in turn, bred decentralization as well as avoidance of the government, its officials, and their alien culture. Indeed, when Turkey was pushed to live in the post-Cold War world—surrounded by the regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East—Turkish voters increased their support for the traditional and conservative right-wing political parties (see Figure 1). It seems as if the ideologies, messages, cadres, and symbols of right-wing political parties and movements attracted Turkish voters at times of political change or democratization, or both. So, what seems to be defining the core values of right-of-center politics in Turkey?

Figure 1. The distribution of the leftÐright spectrum in Turkey, 1990Ð2006. Source: Ali Çarko[GBRluEVE] and Ersin Kalaycõo[GBRlu,EVE] 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey.

Conservative Belief System in Turkey Portraying themselves as “democratic conservatives,” the AKP, a political party that had been established merely 14 months before the November 2002 general elections, was able to win the plurality of the vote. It seems as if the AKP had come up with a combination of two concepts, which stood for yet another drive for “democ- Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 racy” and “conservatism” in Turkish politics, to win the most votes in 2002. In fact, two decades before then, Turgut Özal, the leader of ANAP, had used the same concept of “conservatism” alongside “economic liberalism” and “social justice” when ANAP swept to power in the 1980s. Often used as shorthand for defining the political creed of a political leader, movement, or party, “conservatism” emerged as a political code that signified the gist of right-wing ideology in Turkish politics. The right-wing movements and parties have been quite tempted to present themselves as possessing a conservative ideology that seems to host a relatively large number of different traits, preferences, likes, and dislikes. In Turkey, conservatism

Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 235

Figure 1. The distribution of the leftÐright spectrum in Turkey, 1990Ð2006. Source: Ali

ÇarkoGBR[gEVE]ùglu and Ersin KalaycõoGBR[EVE]ùlu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey.

(Muhafazakarlõk) has always been opportunely associated with another “m” word, Müslüman (Muslim); thus, it:

has stressed adherence to religious values, and social customs and traditions, as opposed to reasoning and rational inference in reforming the established institutions and practices of socio-political life. In a rapidly changing environment conservatism functioned in converting and adapting old concepts and practices into the new social milieu Turkey has come to experience.2

For Turkish conservatives, sociopolitical change is best to be avoided; yet if such an Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 option fails to materialize, then the next best option is to tolerate slow change that does not undermine the continuity of traditions, customs, and established practices.3 Conservatism also easily connotes “parochialism, reactionary isolationism, which often slides into xenophobia, introversion, small town mentality, that is ignorant about other cultures and peoples, and often ignores and shuns contact with alien cultures and foreign peoples in the Turkish culture.”4 As such, conservatism is purported to host a slant toward nationalism—or even chauvinism and xenophobia—in Turkey. It should be added that most students and proponents of conservative ideology in Turkey argue that the predominant motive in conservatism has been to defend “the

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old against the new, the past against the future the East against the West, traditions against the encroachment of modernism.”5 It seems as if Turkish conservatism receives its inspiration from the OttomanÐIslamic past of Turkey, which often appears as a cultural and aesthetic nostalgia for a golden age of traditional, Islamic, Ottoman, and Turkic customs, as well as even the eroding local traditions.6 Under these circumstances, conservatism becomes no more than a systematic effort in preserving “the traditions, culture, religion and all those institutions that emanated from such sources.”7 In the preceding paragraphs, it has been argued that the currently preponderant conservative belief system in Turkey seems to host a myriad of attitudes, values, and beliefs that are not necessarily reconcilable, yet any political force that vies for power can only ignore such a complex of attitudes at its own political risk. The most salient feature of Turkish conservatism seems to be its emphasis on traditionalism, at the crux of which stand local and even parochial customs, mores, folklore, and orientations, most of which are cloaked in religiosity. These values, attitudes, and orientations seem to reinforce each other and often exist in a certain location and/or community as the model style of life, which is passed on from one generation to the next. Social conformity and concomitant mechanisms of solidarity, such as a religious order (tarikat) or some other interest group, often help to sustain, transmit, and support traditions cloaked in the garb of religion. The inci- dents that occurred in late 20068 seem to provide more insight into traditional solidarity groups and religious orders in Turkey, which seems to indicate that they also extend to cover elaborate economic activities, credit institutions, commercial networks, and the like as well. Indeed, the conservative belief system in Turkey

seems to provide for a cultural milieu within which religious, territorial (hem]csel[di¸ehri),

familial (asc[]e¸dli iret or akrabalõk), and other primordial groups congregate and pool their resources to improve their chances of survival and even in helping participants to thrive.9 The rapid social mobilization that has taken Turkish society and polity into its grips since the 1950s10 has introduced new expectations for a “good life” for all. However, such standards of lifestyle as encapsulated in the new definition of a “good life” in Turkish society also introduced new constraints as to what sorts of credentials would enable one to attain such standards. A degree in engineering, business administration, medicine, law, and the like earned from a college with a sound reputation, fluency in English and, increasingly, additional command of a second Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 foreign language, and preferably a master’s degree in business administration (MBA) provided for the highest paying jobs in the country. For the overwhelming majority of Turkish society, such ambitious standards are simply unattainable. There are very few primary and secondary schools that provide sound instruction in English and other foreign languages, and similarly, few secondary schools that provide sound instruction in mathematics, science, and humanities. Under the circumstances, what rapid social mobilization and democratization of Turkish society draws up as images of a “good life” becomes a source of frustration for huge majorities of Turkish society. Few resign to their “fate” and develop a deep feeling

Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 237

of alienation or apathy towards the socioeconomic and political regimes of the country. However, others are offered two paths to trek. One path to take is negation. This path orients the individual who is willing or socialized to trek it to an alternative definition of a “good life.” Drawing upon the heritage of Ottoman culture, local folklore, social isolation, and even the receding agricultural, nomadic society of the Anatolian heartland, they provide for an alternative ideology that refutes mutation and even upholds a Platonic perspective on change.11 Such an image upholds the moral standards of religion of an agricultural society, which stresses separation of the sexes in social life, guild-based production standards and habits, and the adherence to an orthodox interpretation of religion on daily practices ranging from dietary to sanitary practices. This draws up an alternative image of a “good life.”12 Such a belief system condemns most fruits of modernity as “evil” and prohibits its adherents from watching movies, purchasing TV sets and VCRs, hanging pictures on the walls of their residences and places of work, opening bank accounts, and gaining interest on capital. Such a lifestyle is anti- modern and regressive in nature. It seeks salvation in some “golden age” of the past and hopes to preserve the moral standards of an agricultural society in an age when Turkey is rapidly transforming into an industrial society. Such reactionary calls ú have not fallen on deaf ears in Turkey. The Aczimendi, Hizballah, I skenderpaSC[EsDL¸]I a cemaati, and other similar groups have all attracted some followers. Each has presented different images of past “golden ages.” Some, such as the Aczimendi, offered to go back to the “basics” with simple clothing, long walking sticks, and small dwellings—whether they are caves or brick buildings that look more like huts than houses—as the sole material possessions in life. Other brotherhoods tolerated German-made cars, palatial houses, and lucrative trade and business practices for their followers. They have existed in a realm of illegality, though as interest groups, some of them have flexed enormously powerful political muscles, especially in times when the right-wing political parties came to control the government.13 An alternative path for upward social mobility for those who are born to humble, traditional families also exists. This time a whole new and ingenious formula is on offer for those who would like to consider climbing up the ladder to the same modern “good life” projected by rapid social mobilization and democratization in Turkish society. What there is to offer is the creation of “modern traditionalists,” which sounds like an oxymoron yet is very attractive and has turned out to be a stellar success story. Humble small town and village families are offered the opportu- Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 nity to enroll their children in programs that will eventually provide them with the opportunity to become professionals with high paying jobs or even to become government officials with political clout and prestige while maintaining their traditional, local, and family values. What more can poor peasant parents want than to have sons as engineers, doctors, or even as provincial governors, yet not to lose touch with their parents, to still pay them respect, and to uphold the same agricultural moral values that their parents cherish? The potentially corrupting influences of upward social mobility, college education, professional, and even political careers would be balanced with an education that stresses the traditional values and

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virtues of an agricultural society. Sons of peasant families would also become rich and powerful yet still feel, act, live, talk, and think like peasants; they would also refrain from disowning their peasant origins and parents, help the latter to improve their well-being, and care for their parents when they grow old and frail. The magic of this path to the modern “good life” is socialization and solidarity, provided by the schools and eventually by the communal networks of religious orders to which the peasant boys are recruited. In the 1950s, such a formula was on offer by the Imam Hatip Schools, which often functioned as boarding schools, where the traditions and the moral virtues of agricultural society were preserved through religious and extracurricular instruction and the daily lifestyle provided to the students.14 Eventually, more sophisticated socialization methods were designed and implemented. Private schools offered students success at university entrance examinations in such subjects as math, phys- ics, biology, and chemistry while they kept their pristine form of peasant or small town culture, psyches, and virtues. The students were encouraged to take part in religious instruction and ceremonies, instructed in creationism, and participated in extracurricular indoctrination in the virtues of Ottoman grandeur and heavy criti- cism of Republican Turkey, which often instilled a hatred of the values of the Republic. When the Soviet Union collapsed, cheap labor from Russia provided new opportunities for such establishments; they were able to get science and math teachers from Russia to instruct students in math and science, while Muslim teachers provided them with traditional and agricultural values and virtues through religious and social science instruction. Many handpicked and carefully educated students could and did succeed in getting high marks on the university entrance examinations. Eventually, a whole breed of “traditionalist-conservative” professionals emerged to fill the ranks of the governments and private corporations. Upon graduation, the new tradition-bound professionals found themselves in the company of associations established by the religious orders, which had provided for them all the way through college. A whole new network of interest groups emerged to hire them as lawyers and corporate employees, to provide them with credit and venture capital, to offer them captive customers—which enabled them to thrive in no time—and to establish families and upper middle-class lifestyles. In all the major cities of Turkey as well as in the more humble towns of Anatolia, a new class of commercial and business interests emerged to vie for political power. They represent bastions of religiosity and traditional-agricultural values, yet they are also keen Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 on promoting modern, and even global, professional, economic, and technological practices. Thus, a new path of upward social mobility has been established for many to trek in order to reach the “good life” strongly projected upon the society since the beginning of rapid social mobilization and democratization in the 1950s. It is the latter road to a “good life” that comes as a realistic and attractive alternative option for most in Turkish society. Many members of such business associa- ú ú tions as Müstakil ]dI[ o t SsC[E¸gDL]I adamlarõ DerneGBR[EVE]ùi (MÜS]dI[ o t AD), small commercial enterprises of small town Anatolia, seem to be quite ready to engage in practices that stride between conservative interest groups and modern capitalist economic practices.15 It

Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 239

is small wonder that the bench of the AKP emerged from within the ranks of those associations.

AKP: The New Conservative Powerhouse The current champion of conservatism in Turkish party politics is the Justice and Development Party (AKP),16 which scored the highest percentage of votes in the 2002 national elections, enabling the AKP to occupy a record number of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). The stellar rise of support for the AKP in 2002 is indicative of the fact that its leadership and symbolism produced a movement of political attractiveness in the eyes of the tradition-bound, conservative masses of the Turkish right. What also seems to be new in the stellar rise of the AKP is its relative position on the ideological spectrum in Turkey. It seems as if, in the eyes of Turkish voters, the AKP has consistently been a party of the far right since its establishment (see Figure 2). Figure 2. TurkishIn voters’ spiteself-placement of parties on ofthe left–right spectrumthe (2002–6). Sourcefact: Ersin Kalaycõo[ GBRlu,EVE]that Turkish Dynamics: Bridgeit Across had Troubled Lands (New occupied York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.140, and Alia Çarko[ GBRluEVE] andrelatively Ersin Kalaycõo[GBRlu,EVE] 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political right-wing Orientations in Turkey. position on the Turkish ideological spectrum, the AKP was able to attract votes from the right-of- center and emerge as the vanguard party of the right. Evidence and observations seem to clearly indicate that Turkish voters moved right, to where the AKP stands,

rather than the AKP emerging from within the cloak of the Milli GörüSC[EsDL¸]I (National Outlook) Movement, the Welfare Party (RP) and the Virtue Party (FP), and sharply moving toward the center to occupy a right-of-center position in the ideological spectrum in Turkey (see Figures 1 and 2). It seems as if the Cold War had been Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017

Figure 2. Turkish voters’ self-placement of parties on the left–right spectrum (2002–6).

Source: Ersin KalaycõoGBR[gEVE]ùlu, Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands (New York:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.140, and Ali ÇarkoGBR[gEVE]ùglu and Ersin KalaycõoGBR[EVE]ùlu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey.

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helping Turkish politics to establish parity between left- and right-wing ideologies and to sustain a center that kept the two ideological camps apart at a relatively stable balance. The end of the Cold War seemed to have led to the decline of popular support for the left-wing ideologies and parties in Turkish politics and rendered the right and even the far right as legitimate and attractive political choices at the polls (see Figures 1 and 2). It seems as if both the ANAP and the DYP had vied for the championship of right-of-center ideology, which seemed to espouse two relatively irreconcilable clusters of ideas. ANAP since the 1980s, and later the DYP, tried to stand for economic liberalism, on the one hand, while they also promoted traditional values of religion, family, and past grandeur. They thus promoted nationalism on the other hand. However, the tug-of-war between those two political parties turned out to be relatively dysfunctional for their political sustainability. Instead, new forces emerged to challenge their credentials as the champions of right-wing ideology in Turkey. The Welfare Party (RP)—and when it was legally banned from politics, the Virtue Party (FP)—and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) were quite successful at leveling their challenges against the ANAP and the DYP in the 1990s. However, none could manage to succeed to the extent that the AKP did in the 2002 elections. The AKP ideologues pronounced that what Turkish society understood from conservatism was no more than “respect and adherence to religious and spiritual values.”17 One of the main spokespersons for the AKP, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fõrat, further elab- orated the point that the AKP represented:

an understanding of conservatism that does not carry the past into today[;] yet its roots are established in the past, its face is turned to the future, contempora- neous and novelty seeking in essence, so that it provides for the co-existence of the local and the universal, tradition and modernity, and produces change while preserving continuity and thus seek[ing] the objective of opening up to the contemporary world.18

What Fõrat argues is quite confusing not only for conservatives but also for students of politics, for what he seems to suggest is that the AKP stands for a conservatism that stresses and even reveres change. It seems as if the current ideological back- ground of the right in Turkey consists of a peculiar amalgam of expectations of upward social mobility, improved social welfare, and economic growth, married Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 with a moral order encompassing agricultural society and its traditional values, mores, and customs, among which religiosity is definitely predominant, and where parochialism and nationalism—which often extend to cover chauvinism and xenophobia—also occupy a part. Any political movement that seeks to attract the support of the plurality of Turkish voters seems to be hard-pressed to come up with a political message that combines elements of such a perspective on conservatism and a concomitant, credible commitment to rapid socioeconomic change. The peculiar and irreconcilable relationship between a longing for rapid economic growth and social welfare, yet a simultaneous and similarly strong yearning to cling

Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 241

to the traditional, religious values of a bygone agrarian society has overwhelmed the Turkish polity. Only those political movements and parties that could create the illusion of standing for preserving the moral order of traditionalism while providing for rapid improvement in socioeconomic welfare seemed to enjoy the mass support of the plurality at the polls in the Turkish political system. If such a claim is true, first and foremost it is necessary to find evidence that attitudes that are supportive of both rapid economic change and traditionalism and religiosity go together in Turkey. Second, it is necessary to observe statistically significant corre- lations between such a combination of attitudes supportive of economic change, sociopolitical traditionalism, and religiosity on the one hand, and identification with the AKP on the other.

Data In this essay, the data used were collected in a field survey of sociopolitical attitudes and political choices conducted during late March, April, and early May 2006 in 23 of the 81 provinces of Turkey.19 Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,846 respondents at the age of 18 and above. The sample of respondents was determined through a multi-stage stratified cluster sampling technique, which provided equal probability of selection per voting age population (18 years and older) among citi- zens in Turkey. The primary sampling units were the regions of Turkey, which were grouped according to their population sizes into equal-sized strata of regions, which in turn were divided into various strata of sub-districts (ilçe) according to population size. From each stratum, sub-districts were selected according to their proportion of population residing in them (PPS). Of the 200 sub-districts selected, it was ú requested of the Turkish Statistics Institute (TUdI][ o t K) to randomly select census tracks according to PPS and then to select households randomly per census track, again according to PPS. The interviewers were then requested to randomly select a respondent per household. At the end of the sampling procedure, the total of randomly selected nationally representative respondents participating in the study was 1,846. The margin of error for the sample was ±2.2 percent, with a 95 percent level of confidence.

Measuring Conservatism

Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 The core values of the right-wing belief system in Turkey seem to be traditionalism, religiosity, localism, and other pertinent attitudes corresponding with an agricultural society. Such a belief system may best be summarized as conservatism. Turkish conservatism seems to stress the upholding of traditions, mores, and customs, as well as institutions that value and sustain patterns of behavior, which are tied to traditions. Family, religion, localism, and nationalism seem to be tied to such a system of core values of conservatism. For any measure of such a multidimensional concept as conservatism in the Turkish context, a clustering and classification method needs to be implemented.

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Factors analyzing batteries of questions that tap attitudes toward religion, family, localism, and nationalism should yield a robust and comprehensive measure of conservatism. In the following, the outcome of the factor analysis run that taps conservatism in Turkey is presented (see Table 1). The factor scores produced by the factor analysis run, the results of which are presented in Table 1, are saved as separate dimensions or variables that comprise the measure of conservatism in Turkey. When the seven series of factor scores are added up, an overall measure of conservatism emerges, as shown in Figure 3. The factor scores of the “Overall Conservatism Scale” (OCS) of this study are correlated with Lane’s four-item conservatism scale,20 which is utilized as the criterion valida- tion of the OCS in this paper. The correlation coefficient indicates that the two scales are significantly correlated, which indicates that the OCS of this study is a valid measure of conservatism. Figure 3. OverallThe Conservatism Scaledistribution (OCS) in Turkey (2006). Criterion validity: r = 0.37 (significantof at 0.001the level). Pearson OCS product–moment correlation (see between Lane’s four-item Figure conservatism scale (ibid., pp.173Ð90)3) and theis above-presented highly measure of overall conservatism skewed (OCS), (both of which are factor scores).to Source the: Ali Çarko[GBRluEVE] andleft, Ersin Kalaycõo[GBRlu,EVE] 2006which Field Survey of Socio-political indi-Orientations in Turkey. cates that Turkey has a high concentration of conservative attitudes. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of the Turkish voting age population seems to adhere to conservatism. The overall distribution of the OCS scale is so skewed that not only the right-wing voters but also more moderate center and even moderate left-of-center voters seem to have a conservative demeanor. A better test of the relationship between conservatism and the leftÐright spectrum is possible. In the 2006 survey on sociopolitical choices, the respondents were requested to register their self-depicted ideological location on a ten point leftÐright scale (see Figure 2). When the leftÐright placement of the voters and their OCS scores are represented on the same bar chart (see Figure 4), it is clearly perceptible that conservatism increases as one moves to the right on the ideological spectrum, though the plurality of those who register some form of conservatism are located in the middle of the ideological spectrum in Turkey. Figure 4. OCSThe and the ideological spectrumcorrelation in Turkey (2006). r = 0.34 (significant at 0.001 level).between Pearson productÐmoment correlation betweenthe Overall Conservatism OCS Scale (factor scores) and theand leftÐright self-placement the scores of the votingleftÐright age population in Turkey. Source: Ali Çarko[ GBRluEVE] andself-placement Ersin Kalaycõo[GBRlu,EVE] 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey.scores as reported in the preceding figure (see Figure 4) indicates that higher scores of the OCS tend to associate with right-wing placement, and lower scores of the OCS tend to associate with left-wing placement of the voting age population in Turkey, as would be expected. Hence, such a finding indicates that the OCS employed in this paper has construct validity as well. Once the validity of the OCS is established, it is possible to turn to the test of the two hypotheses proposed earlier in this study.

Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 Economic Prospects and Conservatism in Turkey It was earlier hypothesized that having conservative credentials alone does not suffice in order for a political party to attract the support of Turkish voters at the polls, for most conservative voters also expect to be convinced that the party of their choice will help them improve their welfare standards. When six items pertaining to economic satisfaction and prospects of economic developments in Turkey are factor-analyzed, a single factor onto which all of them load emerges (see Table 2). The factor scores used are calculated from the same factor analysis run as the variable for economic prospects.

Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 243 0.723 0.695 0.149 0.003 0.008 0.002 − − − 0.730 0.805 0.1300.007 0.152 − − Traditional family values Authoritarianism 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.224 0.003 0.256 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.0050.0030.140 0.123 0.115 0.165 0.001 0.126 0.009 0.107 − − − − 0.690 0.713 0.636 0.630 0.006 0.110 0.231 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.160 0.222 0.207 0.001 − morality Religiosity Parochial 0.558 0.712 0.735 0.602 0.182 0.006 0.001 0.119 0.003 0.003 − − − Family values in child rearing 0.641 0.005 0.0090.002 0.282 0.294 − − − Overall Conservatism Scale (OCS) (Turkey, 2006) Scale (OCS) (Turkey, Conservatism Overall 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.192 0.003 0.104 0.006 0.153 0.004 0.154 0.006 0.008 0.103 0.132 0.112 0.164 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.123 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.003 − − able 1. T Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 Compared to our lives, the lives of parents were more comfortable Youth should learn not to obey orders that they do not believe in the truth of Children follow the correct path in life by adopting the customs and morals of their parents The best way to teach what is good and bad is to give severe punishment those who steer away from the path of good Children should not interrupt or object to parents Equality in the family is up to a point; father must have the last say Tourists undermine our morals 0.104 0.238 0.002 If no baby is born to a couple, marriage meaningless Component Faith Decadence Youth should visit the older members of family and show respect during religious holidays Alien residents undermine our cultureWomen should not wear miniskirts and expose their navels in the workplace Movies that contradict our morals should not be aired around the country 0.008It is disrespectful of a young person to drink 0.308 where elderly are present 244 E. Kalayciogù lu 0.276 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.002 − − − − − − n iterations. 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.199 0.004 0.005 0.148 0.008 − − Traditional family values Authoritarianism 0.794 0.813 0.005 0.001 − − 0.006 0.004 0.264 0.136 − morality Religiosity Parochial 0.006 0.198 0.2200.379 0.0100.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 − − (continued) Family values in child rearing able 1. T 0.663 0.636 0.588 0.609 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.110 0.104 0.0000.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.113 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.105 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.116 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.001 − − 0.556 0.774 0.770 0.821 0.915 0.901 0.850 0.006 0.237 0.008 0.003 0.155 0.170 0.002 0.130 0.133 0.003 0.003 0.001 − − − lu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey. ù ] e r g v [ b e g Belief in: Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 lu and Ersin Kalaycõo ù ] e r g v [ b e g : Ali Çarko Every day our lives change with increasing pace for the worse Irrespective of how frequently you pray, do you consider yourself religious? Frequency of practice praying When I listen to melodies, reminisce the old melodies and styles of music I frequently prefer the food know to tasting new food Discoveries make our life more difficult God Life after death Existence of devil Existence of spirit Apocalypse Heaven and Hell Sin Extraction method: principal component analysis; rotation Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; converged in seve Source Component Faith Decadence Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 245

Figure 3. Overall Conservatism Scale (OCS) in Turkey (2006). Criterion validity: r = 0.37 (significant at 0.001 level). Pearson product–moment correlation between Lane’s four-item conservatism scale (ibid., pp.173Ð90) and the above-presented measure of overall

conservatism (OCS), (both of which are factor scores). Source: Ali ÇarkoGBR[gEVE]ùlu and Ersin

KalaycõoGBR[gEVE]ùlu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey.

Table 2. Economic Satisfaction and Prospects

Item Economic prospects

How have the economic policies of the government been influencing 0.796 your FAMILY during the past one year? How have the economic policies of the government been influencing 0.836 TURKEY during the past one year? Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 How satisfactory do you find your current economic situation? 0.743 How do you expect the economic situation of your FAMILY to change 0.815 during the coming year period? How do you expect the economic situation of TURKEY to change 0.840 during the coming year? Economy will change for the better in the next five years 0.398

Extraction method: principal component analysis.

Source: Ali Çarkogeb[vre] ùglu and Ersin Kalaycõogeb[vre] ùlu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey. 246 E. Kalaycõogù lu

Figure 4. OCS and the ideological spectrum in Turkey (2006). r = 0.34 (significant at 0.001 level). Pearson productÐmoment correlation between Overall Conservatism Scale (factor scores) and the leftÐright self-placement scores of the voting age population in

Turkey. Source: Ali ÇarkoGBR[gEVE]ùglu and Ersin KalaycõoGBR[EVE]ùlu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey.

In the earlier parts of this study, it was claimed that the conservatives in Turkey demand that the moral order of the agricultural society is preserved or at least still revered, though they do not necessarily ignore economic development and growth; on the contrary, they seem to demand rapid economic change as well. If that claim is true, then a systematic relationship between conservatism and satisfaction with economic growth and a demand for prospects for further economic development should be able to be observed. Indeed, when the scale of overall conservatism (OCS) and the economic satisfaction and prospects scores are correlated, a statistically significant and positive Pearson productÐmoment correlation coefficient (r) of 0.25 emerges. Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 Therefore, in the Turkey of 2006, the conservatives do not only seem to indicate that they are satisfied with the performance of the economy but also expect that the performance of the economy is set to improve in the upcoming one-to-five year period.

Conservatism and Voting Behavior in Turkey

In view of the findings of this paper so far, the use of the standard recursive model of voting behavior to explain the voting behavior of the Turkish conservative voters Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 247

is proposed. In the standard recursive causal model of voting behavior,21 party identification is alluded to as the most critical role in explaining voting behavior. In the preceding analysis, it was argued that two main factors seem to be essential in deter- mining the party identification of the Turkish electorate. One major source seems to accrue from the belief systems of the voters. In Turkey, the belief systems of the voters are shaped under the influence of the cultural cleavage of the secular/modern versus traditional/religious camps (or rather kulturkampf) that has been dividing Turkish society and politics for the last three centuries. Under the influence of the perennial cultural rifts, the political beliefs and values developed by the individual voters initiate their overall orientations toward such political objects as political parties, interest groups, political associations, leaders, and the political institutions of the country. Another source that helps to determine orientations of the Turkish voters toward political objects is their perceptions of how the economy performs, which is a combination of both expectations and prospects for economic benefits. Under the influence of those two factors, the party identification of Turkish voters is determined, and party identification in turn determines who votes for which party at the polls. Such a theoretical perspective enables the positing of a recursive causal model of electoral behavior in Turkey (see Figure 5). Figure 5. AIn recursive causalorder model of voting behavior to in Turkey. estimate this model, the measurement of the first of the two exogenous variables—belief systems by reference to the OCS factor scores that have been used in the preceding analyses of this study—and the second exogenous variable of the model—economic expectations by reference to the factor scores of economic expectations and prospects as presented in the preceding Table 2—is proposed. The measurement of the first endogenous variable of the model of party identification by

e3 e4 Belief System (X1)

Party Party Identification (Y3) Preference (Y4)

Economic Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 Expectations (X2)

Simultaneous Equations:

Y3 = p31 X1 + P32 X2 + P3e3 e3.

Y4 = p43 Y3 + p4e4 e4.

Figure 5. A recursive causal model of voting behavior in Turkey. 248 E. Kalaycõogù lu

means of the responses the interviewees registered for the question: “Do you identify22 with a political party? If so, which one?” is suggested. Finally, the depen- dent variable of party preference is measured by means of the responses registered by the same respondents to the question: “If there were national elections today which political party would you vote for?” Both of the endogenous variables were measured as dichotomies and the numeral “1” was assigned to those who identify with the AKP and “0” to those who identify with all other parties. The numeral “1” was also assigned to those who responded that they would vote for the AKP if the national elections were held today, and “0” to all of the other responses, and the same calculations were made. The results indicate that there is a slight change in the magnitude of the path coefficients, but they are still powerful in predicting the AKP vote (see Figure 6). Overall conservatism looks as if it matters much less than how economic prospects fare in the eyes of the voters in making up their minds in identifying with the AKP (see Figure 6). However, when the OCS values are correlated with the dichotomous measure of AKP preference, there seems to be a positive and statistically significant Pearson productÐmoment correlation of 0.26 between the two variables. Hence, the conservative credentials of the AKP still seem to matter for those who prefer that party over the other political parties of the right and left. Yet economic prospects and

(Estimation, 2006)

e3 e4 Political Ideology (X1) 0,12 0,96 0,71

Party 0,50 Party 0,25 Identification (Y3) Preference (Y4)

Economic 0,29 Expectations (X2) (Economic Prospects) Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 Simultaneous Equations:

Y3 = 0,12 X1 + 0,29 X2 + 0,96 e3.

Y4 = 0,50 Y3 + 0,71 e4.

Figure 6. A recursive causal model of voting behavior in Turkey. Source: Ali ÇarkoGBR[gEVE]ùlu and

Ersin KalaycõoGBR[gEVE]ùlu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey. Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 249

potential benefits seem to indicate that most voters tend to affiliate with the AKP out of expected economic benefits, and thus, their support for the AKP government seems to be more out of specific, rather than diffuse or ideological, support.

Figure 6. A recursive causal model of voting behavior in Turkey. Source: Ali Çarko[GBRluEVE] and Ersin Kalaycõo[GBRlu,EVE] 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey.

Conclusion The end of the Cold War and the development of the New World Order seemed to have loaded the Turkish system with a considerable amount of resurfaced threats, tensions, stresses, and frictions in the three regions to which the country belongs— the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Enhanced uncertainty, fear, and threat perceptions precipitated a rally-around-the-flag syndrome, which led to a realignment of Turkish voters, as they gradually shifted their allegiances toward the parties to the far right of the ideological spectrum in Turkey. In the 1991 and 1995 elections, the Islamic revivalist and ultra-nationalist Turkish parties experienced stellar increases in their performances and electoral support. Just like the other late industrializing countries that had come under the spell of uncertainty, crisis, increased socioeconomic risks, and political threats, Turkish voters began to flock around conservatism and rally around traditions, religion, and what they considered to be the core values of their culture. The failed state of socialist ideas and models in the world further exacerbated the plight of the left-of-center parties in Turkey. As the left shrunk, the right gained momentum, and the center of political gravity on the Turkish ideological spectrum swiftly shifted further right. Under these circumstances, the chances of conservative political parties winning elections increased by leaps and bounds. Paradoxically, there were so many of them, and at least a couple of parties shared every ideological position possible in the ideological spectrum of the 1990s and the early 2000s. The votes were split quite evenly among them, which enabled the social democrats to survive and even thrive with a relatively small share of the vote. In fact, in the 1999 elections, the Democratic Left Party was even able to emerge as the party that obtained the plurality of votes. When the far right had their first crack at the government in the aftermath of the 1995 elections, the Welfare Party squandered its chance. They grossly mishandled the “Susurluk Affair,” which exposed the corrupt deals between politi- cians, security bureaucrats, and shady businessmen (mafia) and managed to create a showdown with the secular and military establishment. They also failed to manage the affairs of the state without causing any major conflict between the secular politi- Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 cal forces of the country and their party branches and government. The Welfare Party paid a stiff price for their lack of political acumen in running the government in 1997. They not only lost their grip on government, but the Constitutional Court also imposed a political ban upon their organization. Interestingly enough, the younger members of the Welfare Party seemed to have learned their lesson in the 1997 political crisis. They split from the old guard and established the AKP in 2001 while managing not to antagonize any major political forces, thereby winning the plurality of the votes and the majority of the legislative seats in the 2002 elections. In this paper, the reasons for the stellar rise to power of 250 E. Kalaycõogù lu

the AKP, merely 14 months after its establishment as a brand new political organization, were scrutinized. Two reasons seem to emerge to explain what makes the AKP such an exception and success story in Turkish politics. One of those is obvi- ous: they branded the AKP as a traditional-religious-conservative political party and thus solidly embedded it in the rising tide of conservatism in Turkey. However, that alone would not have made it so attractive, for there were other parties brandishing the same credentials. The AKP also presented another major credential, which was none other than their close connection to the emerging conservative business communities and companies ú (lions of Anatolia) and their organization, MÜS]dI[ o t AD. The rising Anatolian capital had complained of being unfairly restricted by the big businesses of Turkey and their international partners. They seemed to have seen the AKP as an opportunity and jumped on their bandwagon. The AKP seemed to have given the impression to the conservative masses that they are also the party of economic change. A cadre that has grown out of the traditional-conservative milieu of the country, yet also a party ready to provide the tradition-bound masses with economic benefits, seemed to be emerging under the cloak of the AKP. The prospects for economic change that would bene- fit the Anatolian lions and conservative masses seemed to have provided support at the polls and even forestalled identification with the AKP, which in turn led to the stellar rise of the AKP to political power in Turkey.

Notes

1. Ümit Cizre, “From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party,” in Barry Rubin and Metin Heper (eds.), Political Parties in Turkey (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002),

pp.86Ð91; and Ersin KalaycõoGBR[EVgE]ùlu, “The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party,” in Barry Rubin and Metin Heper (eds.), Political Parties in Turkey (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p.45.

2. Kemal Karpat, cf. Sinan Yıldırmaz, “Muhafazakarlık, Türk MuhafazakarlıGBR[EVgE]ùõ ve Peyami Safa Üzerine” [Conservatism, Turkish Conservatism and Peyami Safa], Journal of Historical Studies, Vol.1 (2003), p.10. ú 3. Ahmet DI[]O T nsel, “Muhafazakârlık, Reaksiyonerlik ve Zina” [Conservatism, Being Reactionary and Adultery], Radikal2 (supplement to daily Radikal), September 12, 2004. ú 4. ]DI[O T lber Ortaylı, “Milliyetçiler Türkiye’yi Tanımıyor” [Nationalists Do Not Know Turkey], www.turkdirlik.com, http://www.aksam.com.tr/arsiv/aksam/2005/01/31/ozel/ozel1.html. ú 5. See Muhafazakarlõk [Conservatism], Vol.22, No.292 (April 2003), available at www.DI[OI]T ktibas.info.

6. Bülent Aras, “Muhafazakar Demokrat Kimlik ve DıSC[EsDL¸]I Politika” [Conservative Democrat Identity and

Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 Foreign Policy], Zaman, January 17, 2004.

7. Mustafa TaSC[EsDL¸]I ar, “Muhafazakarlık” [Conservatism], in Türkiye’nin Dü]cs[eld¸i ünce Gündemi [The Agenda of Political Thought in Turkey], available at http://www.mustafatasar.gen.tr/yayinlar/dusunce_g/icinde- kiler.htm. 8. Amazing stories about a religious brotherhood (tarikat) started to capture the headlines of the Turkish dailies in the second half of September and October of 2006, when an imam belonging to the reli- ú gious gemeinschaft (cemaat) of DI[OI]T skenderpaSC[EsDL¸]I a was assassinated in their usual mosque of congrega- tion; the assassin was either murdered by lynching, or accidentally killed (the stories narrated in the press abound with no clarity, yet they were provided by the police or other security authorities). The emerging image of the tarikat is that of a secret society, which acts as an elaborately organized economic interest group cloaked in the garb of religion. Members are provided with credit; the Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 251

community is encouraged—to say the least—to shop from associated businesses. Financial deals of the community are protected with the vigilance of armed bands. Bad loans are collected through interrogations carried out in the cellars of the cemaat mosques, where guns and even hand grenades are brandished, and where victims are threatened with murder, unless they sign certain legal docu- ments. Illegal religious courts operate to resolve conflict among and between the members of the community and other businessmen. An illegal, secret economic interest group seems to operate more or less like the Italian mafia in the religious garb of a Muslim brotherhood. For details about the

brotherhood in question, see Nevzat Atal and Erdal S[ced]li¸simSC[EDL¸s]I ek, “Siyasetin Gözde Dergahı: IskenderpaSC[EDL¸]I a

Cemaati” [Favorite Convent of Politics: IskenderpaSC[EsDL¸]I a Community], Sabah, September 20, 2006.

9. For further on the state of civil society in Turkey in the 2000s, see Ersin KalaycõoGBR[EVgE]ùlu, “Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity and Change?” in Brian W. Beely (ed.), Turkish Transformation: New Century,

New Challenges (Walkington: Eothen Press, 2002), pp.59Ð78; and Ersin KalaycõoGBR[EVgE]ùlu, “State and Civil Society in Turkey,” in Amyn B. Sajoo (ed.), Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp.247Ð72. 10. For an elaborate analysis of how social mobilization took root in Turkish society and polity, see Ergun Özbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 11. Plato’s definition of political change as no more than decay in Republic had overwhelmed the Anatolian and Islamic culture of Ottoman society. For a thorough description and analysis of the matter, see Sabri ú Ülgener, DI[OI]T ktisadi Çözülmenin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Dünyası [The Moral and Mental World of Economic Decay] (Istanbul: Der Yayõnlarõ, 1981), pp.100Ð26. ú ú 12. Ülgener, DI[OI]T slam, Tasavvuf ve Çözülme Devri I] dI [ot ktisat Ahlakõ, pp.55Ð78. 13. The police seem to be totally powerless or unwilling to investigate and press charges in the case of

the last incident of a murder, lynching, or accidental death that occurred in the mosque in ÇarSC[EsDL¸]I amba, ú where DI[O] T skenderpa]cs[¸eldi a Cemaati met in Istanbul, Turkey. For more details, see Milliyet and Sabah, September 16Ð27, 2006. 14. On this point, see the observations made by J. Hinderink and Mübeccel Kıray, Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages (New York, London and Washington: Praeger, 1970). 15. MUSIAD is a businessmen’s association that was founded in May 1990 in Istanbul by a group of businessmen who were notable for their pious religious beliefs and practices. Its members are upwardly mobile businessmen, most of whom had not found a place among the ranks of the pro- secular big business association known as TUSIAD. 16. The AKP leadership and spokesmen have been systematically calling themselves a “conservative democratic” (Muhafazakar Demokrat) party and applied for membership in the conservative (Christian Democratic) People’s Parties network in Europe. Their application in the People’s Parties Network has been pending since 2004.

17. E. Fatih Bilge, AKP’nin Kimlik Arayı]cs[¸eldi Serüveni: Muhafazakar Demokrasi [The Venture of AKP for the Search of Its Self-identity: Conservative Democracy], available at http://www.cemaat.com/ ?q=node/321. 18. See http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber1.asp? haber_id=6550&kategori=3 (AKP “MUHAFAZAKAR- ú LIK VE DEMOKRASDI[OI]T SEMPOZYUMU,” 11 January 2004). Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 19. The data were collected in a study of sociopolitical orientations and values in Turkey during AprilÐ

May 2006 by Ali CarkoGBR[EVgE]ùlu of Sabanci University and the author of this paper. 20. R.E. Lane, “Political Personality and Electoral Choice,” American Political Science Review, Vol.49 (1955), pp.173Ð90. 21. What is referred to here is the classical psychological model of explaining voting behavior with reference to the partisan identifications of the individual voter. In this line of theorizing, it is argued that it is the affective attachment of the individual voter with a political object, such as a political party, that determines his/her long-term political behavior toward it. Choice of a political party emerges from such attitudinal attachments to a party, and the only factor that disturbs the link between party identification and party choice is the what the authors of The American Voter and 252 E. Kalaycõogù lu

V.O. Key called perceptions of success or failure of past administrations. See Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1976), p.39. The author adopts the same perspective here and uses the central premise of this theory, that “… party identification and the expectation that the affective bond or affiliation that each respective voter shares with his/her most preferred political party is likely to have a long-term stabilizing influence on voting choice …” See Mers Kanji and Keith Archer, “The Theories of Voting and Their Applicability in Canada,” in Joanna Everitt and Brenda O’Neill (eds.), Citizen Politics: Research and Theory in Canadian Political Behavior (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.171. 22. In Turkish, the concept of party identification is hard to formulate in a way the people in the street would understand. The author could not use the same format as the original study on party identification and voters’ choice of party as it was formulated in The American Voter, for what that study assumed was a long-term relationship between the voters and the parties in question. The major parties of Turkey have merely been established at most a couple of years ago; the most popular one, the AKP, was established on August 14, 2001. Hence, the author used the more popular concept of “parti tutmak” in lieu of party identification to define the bond between the voter and party, which is more like being a fan of a political party in the sense that one is a fan of a sports club. Therefore, “parti tutmak” may connote more emotional, passionate, and even more fanatic bonds between an individual voter and a party than what party identification stands for in the United States and other democratic contexts. Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017