Turkish Studies ISSN: 1468-3849 (Print) 1743-9663 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20 Politics of Conservatism in Turkey Ersin Kalaycioğlu To cite this article: Ersin Kalaycioğlu (2007) Politics of Conservatism in Turkey, Turkish Studies, 8:2, 233-252, DOI: 10.1080/14683840701312211 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840701312211 Published online: 16 May 2007. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 706 View related articles Citing articles: 21 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ftur20 Download by: [SOAS, University of London] Date: 06 December 2017, At: 05:42 Turkish Studies Vol. 8, No. 2, 233–252, June 2007 Politics of Conservatism in Turkey ˘ ERSIN KALAYCIOG[ve]br LU Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Isik University, Istanbul, Turkey TaylorFTUR_A_231122.sgm10.1080/14683840701312211Turkish1468-3849Original20078kalaycie@isikun.edu.tr2000000JuneDr ErsinKalaycıo[gbreve] and& StudiesArticle Francis (print)/1743-9663Francis 2007 Ltd lu (online) ABSTRACT The 1990s have witnessed growing electoral support for parties to the right of the political spectrum in Turkish politics. As the political left shrunk, the political gravity in electoral and party politics shifted toward the Islamic revivalist and ultra-nationalist Turkish parties. This article examines the nature of this ideological shift, with special focus on the politics of conservatism. The findings of major survey research conducted in April–May 2006 on the sociopolitical orientations and values of Turkish voters are utilized to delineate the characteristics of conservative voting behavior. A major finding of this survey is that most voters tend to support a conservative party such as the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) out of expected economic benefits rather than purely ideo- logical beliefs. Introduction Turkey began its transition to democracy in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Since 1946, the country has experienced 15 general elections. In these elections, political parties that stood for traditional and conservative values boasted a remarkable record of winning 11 times, six as landslide victories. In fact, the performance of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950 and 1954, the Justice Party (AP) in 1965 and 1969, the Motherland Party (ANAP) in 1983 and 1987, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2002 general elections constituted milestones in the democratic politics of Turkey. Students of Turkish politics have defined the DYP, ANAP, and other right-of-center political parties as representing the “periph- ery” and have labored to demonstrate their credentials as “political conservatism and economic liberalism” in the 1990s.1 It seems as if there is a definite popular attraction of “conservatism” (muhafazakarlık) in Turkish politics, which can be converted into remarkable electoral support at the polls. Why do political parties Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 that appeal to traditional and conservative values receive so much support at the polls in Turkey? Why specifically from among the conservative, traditional politi- cal parties did the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gain so much from the rising tide of traditionalism, conservatism, Islamism, and nationalism, while other political parties and movements failed? Those two sets of questions will be scruti- nized and answered in this essay. Correspondence Address: Dr. Ersin KalaycıoGBR[gEVE]˘lu, President, Isik University, Kumbaba Mevkii, Sile 34980, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected] ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/07/020233-20 © 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14683840701312211 234 E. Kalaycıog˘ lu In the first part of this paper, the political attitudes, values, and beliefs that tap right-of-center thinking in Turkish politics will be empirically delineated. The second part of the essay is allotted to an analysis of political conservatism in Turkey and its role in defining and delineating right-of-center values and thinking in Turkey. In the third and final part of the paper, using the results of a national survey conducted in April and May 2006, the sources that determine favoring the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics will be analyzed and assessed. Conservatism as the Core Value of Rightist Politics Turkish politics experienced a major shock and entered a daunting adaptation process at the end of the Cold War, during the 1989–91 period. The emergence of a “New World Order” (yet undefined) seemed to still be continuing, and Turkish politics again seemed to be caught in the vortex of all of the major changes that were affecting world politics at the time. Such a shock pushed Turkey toward more political instability and democracy. Furthermore, it caused Turkish voters to shift away from the more established political movements towards new political move- ments and parties. New political parties emerged to represent the values of the periphery, which had been cloaked in tradition. At the core of these values were some form of religiosity, awe and suspicion of the state, and local heterodoxy which, in turn, bred decentralization as well as avoidance of the government, its officials, and their alien culture. Indeed, when Turkey was pushed to live in the post-Cold War world—surrounded by the regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East—Turkish voters increased their support for the traditional and conservative right-wing political parties (see Figure 1). It seems as if the ideologies, messages, cadres, and symbols of right-wing political parties and movements attracted Turkish voters at times of political change or democratization, or both. So, what seems to be defining the core values of right-of-center politics in Turkey? Figure 1. The distribution of the left–right spectrum in Turkey, 1990–2006. Source: Ali Çarko[GBRluEVE] and Ersin Kalaycıo[GBRlu,EVE] 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey. Conservative Belief System in Turkey Portraying themselves as “democratic conservatives,” the AKP, a political party that had been established merely 14 months before the November 2002 general elec- tions, was able to win the plurality of the vote. It seems as if the AKP had come up with a combination of two concepts, which stood for yet another drive for “democ- Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 racy” and “conservatism” in Turkish politics, to win the most votes in 2002. In fact, two decades before then, Turgut Özal, the leader of ANAP, had used the same concept of “conservatism” alongside “economic liberalism” and “social justice” when ANAP swept to power in the 1980s. Often used as shorthand for defining the political creed of a political leader, movement, or party, “conservatism” emerged as a political code that signified the gist of right-wing ideology in Turkish politics. The right-wing movements and parties have been quite tempted to present them- selves as possessing a conservative ideology that seems to host a relatively large number of different traits, preferences, likes, and dislikes. In Turkey, conservatism Politics of Conservatism in Turkey 235 Figure 1. The distribution of the left–right spectrum in Turkey, 1990–2006. Source: Ali ÇarkoGBR[gEVE]˘glu and Ersin KalaycıoGBR[EVE]˘lu, 2006 Field Survey of Socio-political Orientations in Turkey. (Muhafazakarlık) has always been opportunely associated with another “m” word, Müslüman (Muslim); thus, it: has stressed adherence to religious values, and social customs and traditions, as opposed to reasoning and rational inference in reforming the established insti- tutions and practices of socio-political life. In a rapidly changing environment conservatism functioned in converting and adapting old concepts and practices into the new social milieu Turkey has come to experience.2 For Turkish conservatives, sociopolitical change is best to be avoided; yet if such an Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 05:42 06 December 2017 option fails to materialize, then the next best option is to tolerate slow change that does not undermine the continuity of traditions, customs, and established practices.3 Conservatism also easily connotes “parochialism, reactionary isolationism, which often slides into xenophobia, introversion, small town mentality, that is ignorant about other cultures and peoples, and often ignores and shuns contact with alien cultures and foreign peoples in the Turkish culture.”4 As such, conservatism is purported to host a slant toward nationalism—or even chauvinism and xenophobia—in Turkey. It should be added that most students and proponents of conservative ideology in Turkey argue that the predominant motive in conservatism has been to defend “the 236 E. Kalaycıog˘ lu old against the new, the past against the future the East against the West, traditions against the encroachment of modernism.”5 It seems as if Turkish conservatism receives its inspiration from the Ottoman–Islamic past of Turkey, which often appears as a cultural and aesthetic nostalgia for a golden age of traditional, Islamic, Ottoman, and Turkic customs, as well as even the eroding local traditions.6 Under these circumstances, conservatism becomes no more than a systematic effort in preserving “the traditions, culture, religion and all those institutions that emanated from such sources.”7 In the preceding paragraphs, it has