The Madman Nuclear Alert Themadmannuclear Scott D

The Madman Nuclear Alert TheMadmanNuclear Scott D. Sagan and Alert Jeremi Suri Secrecy,Signaling,and Safetyin October 1969

Onthe evening of October10, 1969, Gen. Earle Wheeler ,the chairmanof the JointChiefs ofStaff (JCS), senta topsecret message to majorU.S. militarycommanders around the worldinforming themthat the JCS hadbeen directed“ by higher authority”to increaseU.S. militaryreadiness “ torespond to possible confrontationby the Soviet Union.”The StrategicAir Command(SAC) wasordered to stand down allaircraft combat training missions and to increase the number ofnuclear- armedB-52 bombers on ground alert.These readinessmeasures were implemented onOctober 13. Even moredramatic, on October 27 SAC launched a seriesof B-52 bombers, armed with thermonuclear weapons, on a “showof force”airborne alert, code-named Giant Lance. During thisalert operation, eighteen B-52stook off frombases in Californiaand W ashingtonState. The bomberscrossed Alaska, were refueled in midairby KC-135tanker aircraft, andthen ew in ovalpatterns toward the Soviet Union andback, on eighteen- hour“ vigils”over the northernpolar ice cap. 1 Why did the U.S. militarygo on a nuclearalert in October1969? The alert wasa loudbut secretmilitary signal ordered by President RichardNixon. Nixonsought to convinceSoviet andNorth Vietnamese leadersthat he might doanything toend the warin Vietnam,in accordancewith his “ madmantheory”of coercive diplomacy .The nuclearalert measures were therefore specically chosen to be loudenough tobe picked up quickly by the Soviet Union´sintelligence agencies.The militaryoperation was also, however ,delib- eratelydesigned toremain secret from the Americanpublic andU.S. allies.In-

ScottD. Saganis Professor of PoliticalScience and Co-director of theCenter for International Securityand Cooperation at StanfordUniversity. Jeremi Suriis Assistant Professor of History at theUniversity of Wis- consin,Madison.

Drafts ofthis article were presented atseminarshosted byStanford ´sCenter forInternational Se- curity andCooperation, International Security Studies atY ale University,andthe 2002annual meeting of the Society forHistorians of American ForeignRelations. Theauthors thank the follow- ingindividuals fortheir helpful comments: Alison Alter, Bruce Blair,William Burr,Lynn Eden, M. TaylorFravel, John Lewis Gaddis,Jeffrey Kimball, StanleyKutler ,JohnWilson Lewis, Xue Litai, Vojtech Mastny,ToddSechser, and Kathryn Weathersby .

1.LynnPeake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”SAC History Study 136, January1970, Headquarters of U.S.Strategic Command,Freedom of InformationAct Release (henceforth FOIA),p. 1; andHistory of the Strategic Air Command,FY 1970,Headquarters of U.S. Strategic Command,FOIA, p. 155.

150 TheMadman Nuclear Alert 151

deed, the nuclearalert operation was so secretive that even the seniorU.S. militaryof cers implementing the orders—including the SAC commander himself—were notinformed ofits purpose. nuclearsignals in theoryand history Cloaksof secrecystill shroud this mysterious event, but asufcient number of governmentdocuments have now been declassied topermit aseriousexami- nationof the October1969 nuclear alert. This article both explains why Presi- dent Nixonordered this secret nuclear operation and uses the historyof the event tohelp illuminate the dynamicsof nuclear weaponsdecisionmaking and diplomacy.The emerging informationprovides new insightsboth about the nuclearhistory of the ColdW arand about broader political science theories concerning the roleof nuclear weaponsin internationalpolitics. Fourcommon assumptions exist in the historicaland political science litera- ture aboutnuclear weaponsdiplomacy .First,scholars generally agree that rough Soviet-U.S. strategicparity in the 1960s,and a sharedsense of nuclear danger afterthe Cuban missilecrisis, led toahigh degree ofrestraintin the use ofnuclear threats. Under conditionsof mutually assured destruction, leaders in Moscowand W ashingtonavoided explicit threats,exerted tightcentral controlover their nuclearforces, and used directcommunications to defuse ten- sionsthat could escalate into a militaryconfrontation neither side desired. McGeorge Bundy,forexample, argued thatafter 1962 there was“ greatcaution onthe partof allstates possessing nuclear weapons, caution not only withre- spectto their use, but alsowith respect to anystep thatmight lead to a conict in which someoneelse mightbe tempted touse them.”2 Thisconventional wis- domis challenged by evidence that,well intothe period ofstrategic parity , U.S. leaderscontinued tomakenuclear threats more often andfor less purely “defensive”motives (i.e., todeter enemy attacks)than previously acknowl- edged. The well-known historyof the U.S. nuclear alertduring the October 1973Arab-Israeli W ar,for example, shouldnow be seen asconsistent with a

2.McGeorge Bundy , Danger andSurvival: Choices about theBomb inthe First Fifty Y ears (New York: RandomHouse, 1988), p. 542. See alsoBarry M. Blechmanand Stephen S.Kaplan, Forcewithout War: U.S. Armed Forces as aPoliticalInstrument (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1978), pp. 47–49; MarcT rachtenberg, AConstructedPeace: The Making of theEuropean Settlement, 1945– 1963 (Prince- ton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999),p. 398;Robert Jervis, TheMeaning of theNuclear Revolu- tion:Statecraft andthe Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca,N.Y .:Cornell University Press, 1989),p. 36; andJohn Lewis Gaddis, TheLongPeace: Inquiries into the History of theCold War (New York:Oxford University Press, 1987),p. 231. International Security 27:4152

pattern,rather than an aberration,in the diplomacyof Nixonand his national securityadviser, Henry Kissinger. 3 The secondcommon assumption is that the United Statesbehaves asauni- taryactor in the arenaof nuclear weapons signaling. Many scholarshave explained whatpresidents already know: A chief executive ´sfreedom toact is seriouslyconstrained by bureaucraticpolitics and competing domesticactors, even onforeign policy issues. 4 Nuclearweapons operations, however ,haveof- ten been treatedas an exception. “ Bureaucraticpolitics ourished,”Jonathan Bendorand Thomas Hammond argue, “ largely when the president andaides paidlittle attention to an issue or lacked clear policy preferences aboutit.” 5 Given apresident ´sstrongpreferences andattention to nuclear weapons, if there isone areawhere the U.S. commanderin chief really shouldcommand, nuclearalert operations would be it. The historyof the 1969alert supports this assumption in one importantway . Nixonordered an increasein the alertlevel ofU.S. strategicforces— to support hismadman theory— and he wasable toget hisbasic order implemented, despite the ambiguity of purpose tomany within the bureaucracyand the unacceptabilityof the purpose forothers in the know.The historicalrecord alsodemonstrates, however ,thatdomestic politics and bureaucratic con- straintssigni cantly in uenced bothNixon ´sdecisionand the outcomeof his orders.Indeed, they helped tocause the nuclear alert.Domestic and bureau- craticopposition to further escalationof the VietnamW arled Nixonto con- clude thathe couldnot implement his rststrategic preference, whichwas to launcha massivebombing campaignagainst North Vietnam. He therefore re- sortedto a secretnuclear signal in anattempt to convince the Sovietsthat he woulddo what he had,in fact,decided notto do— launch a majorbombing attack,perhaps even anuclearattack, against North Vietnam— in the fall of1969.

3.On the October 1973U.S. nuclear alert, see HenryKissinger , Years of Upheaval (Boston:Little, Brown,1982), pp. 575–599; Anatoly Dobrynin, InCon dence: Moscow ´sAmbassador to America ´s Six ColdWar Presidents (New York:Random House, 1995), p. 297; Scott D. Sagan, TheLimits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents,and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 215–224; and Richard Ned Lebow andJanice GrossStein, We AllLost theCold War (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1994),pp. 226–288. 4.Graham T. Allison andPhilip Zelikow, Essenceof Decision:Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed.(New York:Longman, 1999 ); MortonH. Halperin, BureaucraticPolitics and Foreign Policy (Wash- ington,D.C.: Brookings, 1974); and Richard E. Neustadt, PresidentialPower andthe Modern Presi- dents:The Politics of Leadershipfrom Roosevelt to Reagan, 5thed. (New York:Free Press, 1990). 5.Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond,“ RethinkingAllison ´s Models,” American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 86,No. 2 (June 1992),p. 316. See alsoStephen D.Krasner,“ Are Bureaucracies Important? (orAllison Wonderland),” ForeignPolicy, No.7 (Summer1972), pp. 168–179. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 153

Nixonhoped thathis nuclear bluff wouldcompensate for his domestic and bureaucraticconstraints, convincing Moscow to put pressure onthe Hanoi governmentto sue forpeace onterms acceptable to the United States. In addition,the historyof the October1969 alert demonstrates that even in thishigh-politics arenaof nuclear diplomacy,presidentialorders were actively fought against,sometimes manipulated or ignored,and often honoredonly in part.Other orders were interpreted andimplemented in amorevigorous man- ner thatbest suited the organizationalinterests of the militarycommanders doing the interpretation.The resultwas that many important details of the militaryactivities undertaken in October1969 re ected the operationalinterests of the militarycommanders and the goalsof lower-level bureaucraticactors as much asthe strategicobjectives ofthe president. In thisimportant sense, the nuclearalert was “ looselycoupled” to the president ´s orders.6 Athirdcommon assumption— about how statesmen manipulate nuclear risk—is also challenged by the secrethistory of October1969. Scholars have long argued thatnuclear crisesshould be treatedas competitionsin risktaking in which leadersdeliberately acceptsome danger that military mobilization couldget outof controland lead to accidents or inadvertent escalation. 7 Be- causepolicymakers cannot credibly threatento takeactions that would be sui- cidal,they mustresort to making what Thomas Schelling called“ the threat thatleaves something to chance.” 8 The riskthat military preparations could createan accident or escalateout of controlis one ofthe factorsthat makes mil- itarymobilization a potentiallyeffective wayof signaling resolve. The historyof the 1969alert complicates this view in three ways.First, as we show,Nixonand Kissinger didnot treat this nuclear alert as a competitionin risktaking. Instead they attemptedto makethis an immaculate,risk-free alert operation,ordering the U.S. militarynot to take any provocative actions or threatening movesagainst the Sovietsand ruling outsome speci c operations, suchas increasesin peripheral reconnaissance,which they feared mightlead to anincident oranaccident. Second, despite these efforts,a number ofdanger- ousmilitary activities occurred, completely off the radarscreens of U.S. politi-

6.On tight andloose coupling, see CharlesPerrow , Normal Accidents:Living with High-Risk T echnol- ogies (New York:Basic Books,1984), pp. 93–96. 7.Thomas C. Schelling, Arms andIn uence (New Haven,Conn.: Y ale University Press, 1966), pp. 92–125; Jervis, TheMeaning of theNuclear Revolution, pp. 82–95; and Robert Powell, Nuclear De- terrence Theory:The Search for Credibility (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1990). 8.Thomas C. Schelling, TheStrategy of Conict (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960),pp. 187–203. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 154

calauthorities. Compromises in peacetime nuclear weaponssafety regulations were institutedas part of the alert,and there wasa near-accidentwith a nuclear-armedB-52 bomber onairborne alert. Third, Nixon and Kissinger ordered the increasein readinessof U.S. nuclearforces with minimal attention to the evidence thatthe Soviet Union andChina were stillin the midstof aseri- ouscrisis over their borderdispute andthat, indeed, inOctober1969 Chinese politicalleaders were evacuatedfrom Beijing andtheir smallnuclear arsenal wasplaced onalert.There were, in fact,multiple crisesoccurring at the same timein October1969, and key politicalactors in Washingtonwere notsuf - ciently attentiveto what was happening in adversaries ´ capitals.The U.S. nuclearalert thus took place in the middle ofa setof looselycoupled crises,a globalenvironment that increased the risksof misperception andinadvertent escalation.In short,Nixon made a nuclearthreat that left somethingto chance; but thatwas not his intent, nor did he even appearto havebeen awarethat this hadoccurred. Afourthcommon assumption challenged by the secrethistory of October 1969concerns crisis signaling. The politicalscience literatureon thistopic dif- ferentiates“ costlysignals” (i.e., signalsthat provide strongindices ofresolve) from“ cheap signals”(i.e., signalsthat can be mere rhetoric). 9 Scholarsand defense analysts,however, too often simply assumethat increases in military readinessare public eventsand therefore create“ audience costs”that can en- hancethe credibility of the threatto use force.Bruce Blair,for example, dis- playsthis common assumption when he writes:“ By alertingits military establishment,each side conveysconcern and determination to the adversary, thussupporting verbaldiplomacy .Amethodof indirect or tacit communication,alerting emits loud signals of resolve.”10 Thiscase study ,however,shows thata majornuclear alert occurred in amannerthat was not made public. On the one hand,the factthat the nuclear alertdid not produce the intended effect

9.Robert Jervis, TheLogic of Images inInternational Relations (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1970);James D. Fearon,“ Domestic Audience Costsand the Escalation of InternationalDis- putes,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol. 88,No. 3 (September 1994),pp. 577–592; James D. Fearon,“ SignalingForeign Policy Interests: TyingHands versus SunkCosts,” Journal of Conict Resolution, Vol. 41,No. 1 (February1997), p. 69; and Kenneth A.Schultz, Democracy andCoercive Di- plomacy (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2001). 10.Bruce G.Blair,“Alerting in Crisis andConventional War,”in Ashton B.Carter,JohnD. Steinbruner,and Charles A. Zraket, ManagingNuclear Operations (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1987),p. 75. See alsoPeter D. Feaver, Guardingthe Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in theUnited States (Ithaca,N.Y .:Cornell University Press, 1992),pp. 32–36. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 155

onthe Soviet leadership maysupport James Fearon ´stheorythat signals with “domesticaudience costs”are likely tobe moreeffective, especially in ade- mocracy.11 Onthe otherhand, this case suggests that theorists need torethink their assumptionsabout the linkage between talkand action in diplomaticand militarysignaling. In internationalrelations, actions do not always speak louder thanwords: There canbe “cheap signals”of militaryreadiness prepara- tionsthat are suggestive ofbluffs, and“ costlytalk” that produces public com- mitmentsand thus creates domestic and international pressures to take action if necessaryto maintain one ´sreputation.Public threatsmay not only reect resolve;they canalso create commitments that did not previously exist. 12 Secret militarymaneuvers, however, are more likely tobe cheap signalsin that they avoidpublic commitments,can be explained awayif discoveredas mili- taryexercises, and therefore donot raise the stakesthat leaders face if they backdown in acrisis. The articlehas four parts.First, we briey discussthe historiographyand al- ternativeexplanations that exist about the October1969 alert. Second, the body ofthe articleis an analytical narrative, not only showingwhat happened but alsodemonstrating the different motivesof variousactors and the outcomes thattheir interactioneventually produced.Third, we discussnuclear safety problemsand crisis diplomacy counterfactuals that provide asense ofthe risks involvedin the nuclearalert. Finally ,the articleconcludes with observations aboutthe signicance of the October1969 alert for understanding the roleof nuclearweapons today .The factthat Richard Nixon placed U.S. nuclearforces onahigh stateof alert to support his madman theory has major implications forhow scholars and practitioners should think aboutdemocratic control of nuclearweapons. It also has important implications for how they shouldthink aboutthe consequences ofnuclearproliferation. The ColdW arisover ,but with nuclearweapons technology spreading intothe handsof more governments in South Asia,the Middle East,and East Asia, the temptationsand dangers of nu- clearsignaling arelikely toreemerge witha vengeance. Whatlessons should be derived fromthis new anddisturbing evidence aboutU.S. nuclear saberrat- tling in 1969for understanding how new nuclearweapons states may behave in the future?

11.Fearon, “ Domestic Audience Costsand the Escalation of InternationalDisputes.” 12.See Scott D. Sagan,“ TheCommitment Trap:Why the United StatesShould Not Use Nuclear Threatsto Deter Biological andChemical WeaponsAttacks,” International Security, Vol. 24,No. 4 (Spring2000), pp. 85–115. International Security 27:4156

TheMadman Theory, Vietnam, and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

The October1969 alert was kept secretfrom both the Americanpublic and fromscholars of Cold W ardiplomacy for many years. Hints about the alert operationand its purpose have,however, surfaced. Nixon ´schief ofstaff, H.R. Haldeman,wrote in his1978 memoirs that Nixon believed President Dwight Eisenhowerhad convinced North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union toend the KoreanW arin 1953by issuing anuclearthreat. Nixon planned toapply the sametactics in Vietnam.Haldeman quoted Nixon as telling him in the summer of1968:“ Icallit the MadmanTheory ,Bob.I wantthe NorthV ietnameseto believe that I´vereachedthe pointthat I mightdo anything tostopthe war.We ´ll justslip the wordto them that ‘ forGod ´ssake,you knowNixon is obsessed aboutCommunism. W ecan ´trestrainhim when he isangry— and he hashis handon the nuclearbutton ´—andHo Chi Minh himself will bein Parisin two daysbegging forpeace.” 13 In 1983journalist Seymour Hershpublished anim- portantaccount, based on twointerviews with military personnel involvedin the October1969 operation, in which he reportedthat Nixon and Kissinger had ordereda secretnuclear alertas “ adirectmilitary signal to the Soviet Union andits allies” to end the VietnamW ar. 14 Hershstated that SAC B-52shad been placed onDEFCON 1,the highest stateof nuclear alert,for a whole monthand thatnuclear-armed air-to-air missiles had been secretlyplaced onF-106 inter- ceptoraircraft at civilianairports throughout the country.Reviewersof Hersh ´s bookwere skepticalabout such claims and the reportof asecret1969 alert was notmentioned, much lessanalyzed, in the scholarlyliterature on nuclear crises published in the 1970sand 1980s. 15 In 1985Nixon himself hinted atanother crisis in 1969that could have produced adecisionto alertU.S. strategicnuclear forces.In a Time magazineinter- view,Nixonstated that he had“ consideredusing nuclear weapons”during the 1969“ bordercon icts” between Chinaand the Soviet Union:“ Henry

13.H.R. Haldemanwith Joseph DiMona, TheEnds of Power (New York:Times Books,1978), p. 83. See alsoJeffrey Kimball, Nixon´sVietnam War (Lawrence: University Press ofKansas,1998), pp. 82– 85;and Kenneth W.Thompson, ed., TheNixon Presidency (Lanham,Md.: University Press of Amer- ica, 1987),pp. 82–83. 14.Seymour M. Hersh, ThePrice of Power: Kissingerin theNixon White House (New York:Summit Books,1983), p. 124. 15.Stanley Hoffmann, “ TheKissinger Antimemoirs,” New York Times, July 3,1983, sec. 7,p. 1; RichardK. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail andNuclear Balance (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Blechmanand Kaplan, Forcewithout War, pp. 47–49; Bundy , Danger andSurvival, pp. 525–542; and Scott D. Sagan,“ Nuclear Alerts andCrisis Management,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring1985), pp. 99–139. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 157

[Kissinger] used tocomeand talk about the situation.. ..Henry said,‘ Canthe U.S. allowthe Soviet Union tojump the Chinese? ´—thatis, to takeout their nu- clearcapability .Wehadto let the Sovietsknow we wouldnot tolerate that.” 16 In August andSeptember 1969,the Soviet pressand journalists abroad had hinted atthe possibilitythat Moscow would launch a preventive conventional ornuclear attackon China ´snuclear facilities.Scholars had known for many yearsthat a Soviet KGBintelligence ofcer had privately approached a U.S. diplomatto ask how the United Stateswould react to such an attack. 17 Based onan interview witha SAC B-52pilot, New YorkTimes reporterPatrick T yler argued thatthe United Stateshad secretly gone onahigh-level nuclearalert as asignalto Moscow— and perhaps alsoto Beijing— that the Nixonadministra- tionwould oppose any such attack on China. 18 In October1992, the StrategicAir Command released aportionof its top secrethistory of the “IncreasedReadiness Posture of October1969.” This docu- mentdemonstrated conclusively that SAC hadindeed assumeda heightened nuclear alertposture, but itprovided no evidence onthe motivesbehind the operationfor the simple reasonthat the SAC commanderwas not told why he wasbeing orderedto increase readiness for nuclear war. Faced with this continued absence ofevidence, scholarscould only speculate onthe causesof the alert.Some largely acceptedHersh ´saccount,arguing thatthe alertwas Nixon´seffort,under the madmantheory ,toscare the Sovietsand North Viet- nameseinto thinking thathe wasgetting readyfor a majorconventional or even nuclearattack on North Vietnam if anegotiatedsettlement was not reachedimmediately . 19 Othershave speculated that Nixon may have been telling the truthin his Time interview:U.S. politicalauthorities might have ordered anuclear alertto underscore their public andprivate statements that they wouldnot condone a Soviet nuclearor conventional attack on China. 20 The secondexplanation— to deter anattack on China— appears logically to be the mostlikely one.After all,many deterrence theoristswould argue that

16.Roger Rosenblatt, “ ANationComing Into Its Own,” Time, July 29,1985, p. 53. 17.The best analysesare William Burr,“ Sino-American Relations, 1969:The Sino-Soviet Border WarandSteps towards Rapprochement, ” ColdWar History, Vol. 1,No. 3 (April 2001),pp. 80–86; and RaymondL. Garthoff, Détente andConfrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixonto Reagan, rev. ed.(W ashington,D.C.: Brookings, 1994), pp. 236–238. 18.Patrick Tyler, AGreat Wall:Six Presidents and China (New York:PublicAffairs, 1999),p. 68. 19.Kimball, Nixon´sVietnam War, p.164; and Paul Bracken, Firein the East (New York: HarperCollins,1999), p. 102. 20.Scott D.Sagan,“ Proliferation Pessimism andEmerging Nuclear Powers,” International Secu- rity, Vol. 22,No. 2 (Fall1997), p. 197; Burr, “ Sino-American Relations, 1969,”pp. 80–86; and Bruce G. Blair, TheLogic of AccidentalNuclear War (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1993), p. 180. International Security 27:4158

nuclearthreats are most effective, andperhaps canonly be used,to deter another state´snuclear attack.According to this logic, the October1969 alert was asignalof U.S. oppositionto Soviet aggressionand preventive war.This expla- nationalso appeals to a commonperception thatU.S. nuclearweapons serve defensive purposes,and indeed, one couldeven argue thatdeterring Russian aggressionin thismanner was a responsible use of extended nucleardeter- rence. Using anuclearalert, under the alternativeexplanation, to in uence eventsin Vietnamappears convoluted, at best. How would the sightof nuclear-armedB-52s ying towardSiberia convincethe Sovietsto procure con- cessionsfor the United Statesin SoutheastAsia? How could Nixon have thoughtthat secret nuclear threatswould force the NorthV ietnameseto accept anegotiatedpeace onU.S. terms? Despite the strainedlogic, newly availableevidence demonstratescompel- lingly thatNixon ordered a nuclear alertin October1969 to inuence eventsin Vietnam,not China. In October1969, Alexander Haigwas a colonelserving as Kissinger´smilitaryassistant on the NationalSecurity Council(NSC) staff.He coordinatedthis secret military operation. According to Haig, “ The discussion ofU.S. alertsand other options was related to Vietnammatters. I donotrecall ourdoing anything regarding the Sino-Soviet bordermatter other than the diplomaticinitiatives.” 21 Secretaryof Defense Melvin Lairdsimilarly recalls that“ Nixonthought it [the nuclearalert] would help in Vietnam.. ..Nixon saidthings like, Ijustwant to keep themoff balance.Keep themquestioning whatI will do.”22 The declassied evidence, providedbelow ,fully supports Haig´s and Laird´srecollections.

WhatHappened in October 1969?

The rstsix months of the Nixonadministration saw no progress in the four- partynegotiations in Paristo reach a peaceful settlementof the VietnamW ar. OnJuly 15,1969, President Nixonsent a letterto NorthV ietnameseleader Ho Chi Minh througha secretcourier (Jean Sainteny,aFrench gure withlong- standingVietnamese connections)promising to be “forthcomingand open- minded”in workingtogether for “ ajustpeace.” Nixon also asked Sainteny to tell the Hanoigovernment that “ unless someserious breakthrough hadbeen

21.Gen. Alexander M.HaigJr .,U.S.Army (ret.), correspondence with authors,June 27,2002. 22.Melvin Laird,telephone interview with author(Sagan), December 9,2002. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 159

achieved by the November 1deadline [the one-year anniversaryof the U.S. bombing cease-re], Iwouldregretfully nd myself obliged tohave recourse tomeasures of greatconsequence andforce.” 23 Kissinger reinforced thismes- sagein hissecret meeting withNorth V ietnameserepresentatives in Parison August 4.Kissinger offered tostartcon dential bilateral negotiations aimed at ending the war,but alsothreatened that “ if by November 1,nomajorprogress hadbeen madetoward a solution,we will be compelled—with great reluc- tance—to take measures of the greatestconsequences.” 24 Ho nallyreplied toNixon ´sletteron August 25.In whatNixon later char- acterizedas a“coldrebuff” of hisoffer ,the NorthVietnamese leader refused to budge fromhis earlier negotiatingposition calling for immediate U.S. with- drawal.Ho stated that that the Vietnamese people “were determined to ght tothe end, withoutfearing the sacrices and dif culties in orderto defend their countryand their sacrednational rights.” 25 duck hookand internal opposition to escalation Ho´sletterled Nixonand Kissinger toabandon carrots for sticks. The NSC staffbegan workingin earnestwith military planners atthe Pentagonto for- mulatea secretconventional strike plan calledDuck Hook.According to the plan,the United Stateswould launch a four-day airattack on twenty-nine mili- taryand economic targets and mine virtuallyall of the seaportsunder North Vietnamese control. 26 “Boldnessof action,surprise, and mass attack are key el- ementsof the conceptplan,” a JCSpaper explained in itsoverview of proposed militaryoperations. If these planswere implemented, U.S. forceswould de- stroyan unprecedented number of targetsin NorthVietnam, providing a

23. See PublicPapers of thePresidents of theUnited States, RichardNixon: 1969 (Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Ofce, 1971),p. 910; Richard M. Nixon, RN: TheMemoirs of RichardM. Nixon (New York:Grosset andDunlap, 1978),pp. 393–394; Kimball, Nixon´sVietnam War, p. 153; and LarryBerman, No Peace,No Honor: Nixon,Kissinger, and Betrayal inVietnam (New York:Free Press, 2001),p. 40. 24.Memorandum of Conversationbetween HenryKissinger ,VernonW alters, TonyLake, Xuan Thuy,MaiV anBo et al.,4 August 1969,Folder: Camp David– HAK Background Material and Memconsthru April 1970[3 of 4], Box 121, Kissinger Ofce Files, NSCles, RichardNixon Presi- dential Materials Project, NationalArchives, College Park,Maryland [hereafter Nixonpapers]. See alsoHenry Kissinger , WhiteHouse Years (Boston:Little, Brown,1979), p. 280. 25. Nixon, RN, p. 397; and PublicPapers of thePresidents of theUnited States, RichardNixon: 1969, p. 910. 26.The best discussions of Duck Hookplanning are Kimball, Nixon´sVietnam War, pp. 158–165; William P.Bundy, ATangledWeb: The Making of ForeignPolicy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill andW ang,1998), pp. 80–81; and Berman, No Peace,No Honor, pp. 54–60. International Security 27:4160

“strongpsychological shock to the enemy.”27 Duck Hookwould not defeat the NorthVietnamese, but itwould— according to Nixon and Kissinger ´s logic— convinceleaders in Hanoithat they needed tobe much moreforthcoming in the proposedpeace negotiationswith the new administration. Nixonwas strongly inclined toorder this massive conventional attack on NorthVietnam, and he began toprepare the Soviet Union fora potentialesca- lationof the waragainst its ally .OnSeptember 27,the Soviet ambassadorto the United States,Anatoly Dobrynin, revealed toKissinger thatthe NorthV iet- namesehad told Moscow about the secretAugust 4meeting in Paris.Kissinger held outthe prospectsof tradeliberalization and talks over the statusof Berlin withDobrynin, but notedthat “ the Soviet Union shouldnot expect anyspecial treatmentuntil Vietnamwas solved. . ..Assoon as Vietnam was out of the wayand especially if the Russianstook an understanding attitude, we could gofurther .”Nixonmade a prearrangedphone callto hisnational security ad- viserduring thismeeting withthe Soviet ambassador,andKissinger passedon the followingthreat: “ Itwas a pity thatall our efforts to negotiate[with Hanoi] hadfailed. The President hadtold me in hiscall that the trainhad just left the stationand was now headed downthe track.Dobrynin responded thathe hoped itwas an airplaneand not a trainand would leave somemaneuvering room.I saidthe President chooseshis words very carefully andthat I wassure he meanta train.”28 Nixoncalled again after Dobrynin hadleft. Kissinger suggested thatthe leadersin Hanoimust have taken his threat in Parisseriously; otherwise they wouldnot have told the Sovietsabout it. He further stressedthat “ ifwe gothe hardroute [execute Duck Hook],”it was important to keep Moscow“ quiet.” Nixonasked Kissinger: “ Youhaveno doubtthat he [Dobrynin] isreminded of the factthat we aregoing the hardroute?” Kissinger answered,“ Yes;he had been very toughon him.” In thiscontext, Nixon asked Kissinger if he could change the schedule forthe Duck Hookattack to before October15, 1969— the dateof the nationwideVietnam Moratorium protest— because he did not “wantto appear to be makingthe toughmove after the 15thjust because ofthe riotingat home.”Kissinger replied thatthe attackcould occur before then, but cautionedthe president togive the Vietnamese moretime to make a concilia-

27.JCS to Secretaryof Defense (JCSM-600–69) 1 October 1969,pp. 1,4, Folder: JCSM 401– 69 to 694–69, Box 185, Records of the Chairmanof the JCS,Record Group 218,National Archives, Col- lege Park,Maryland [hereafter NA]. 28.Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger andDobrynin 27 September 1969,pp. 1–4, Folder:Dobrynin/ Kissinger 1969[Part 1], Box 489, Nixon papers. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 161

torymove on the negotiations:“ Hisonly worryis thatif wewentahead with the toughmove before the 15th—and there wasa 10%chance Hanoi might wantto move,if wehitthem before they havea chanceto move,it will lookas if we trickedthem.” 29 Nodecision was made, but NSCofcials drafted a speech in which the president wouldannounce tothe nationthat “ the United Stateshas no choice but totakeaction to prove toHanoi that we meanto have anhonorablepeace in Vietnam.. ..Ourmilitary action has been measured.It is swift,concentrated and punishing.” 30 During the rstweek of October,Kissinger clearlywanted Nixon to order the attackon NorthVietnam. Nixon spent October3 athisKey Biscayneretreat discussingVietnam, while lounging in hisswimming trunks and sport shirt, witha group ofhisclosest advisers. Haldeman, in hisdiary entry ,describesthe meeting as“ sortof one of thosemystic sessions which he [Nixon] hadobvi- ouslynot thought through ahead of time.”According to Haldeman ´s diary, Kissinger toldNixon that the United Statesonly hadtwo options, to “ bug out oraccelerate— and that we mustescalate or [the] president islost.” When Nixonobserved that he “wouldbe lostanyway if thatfailed— which itwell may,”Kissinger saidthat his main concern was “ whether the president can holdthe governmentand people togetherfor the sixmonths it will take.”31 Nixonshared this concern. He toldHaldeman on October 9 thathe didnot rule outKissinger ´splan,but thathe worriedthat “ itwill take6– 8 months” andfeared “thathe can ´tholdthe countrythat long.” On October 11, Haldemannoted that Nixon had told him thathe “will goahead with the No- vember 3speech plan—agrees with my recommendationto stay clear of war fromnow until then.”32 The president confrontedwhat he described in his memoirsas mountingpublic oppositionand worries about a serious“ internal disruption”if he proceeded withplans for military escalation. 33 Opponents of

29.Transcript of telephone conversation between Nixonand Kissinger, 27September 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 30.Draft of aPresidential Speech 27September 1969,Folder: Vietnamese War—Secret Peace Talks [“Mr.S File”] (5),9/ 1/69–9/ 30/69,Box 34, National Security Adviser Kissinger–Scowcroft West WingOf ce Files, 1969–1977, Gerald R. FordPresidential Library,AnnArbor ,Michigan. 31.3 October 1969,Handwritten Journalsand Diaries of HarryRobbins Haldeman [hereafter Haldemandiaries], Nixonpapers. The published version of these diaries—H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Insidethe Nixon White House (New York:G.P .Putnam ´sSons,1994)— excludes a numberof important passagesrelated to foreign policy,andthe October 1969alert in particular. Wehaverelied onthe more complete, original handwritten version ofHaldeman ´s diaries. 32.9 October 1969and 11 October 1969,Haldeman diaries. 33. Nixon, RN, p.414. See alsoKimball, Nixon´sVietnam War, pp. 164–176; Bundy , ATangledWeb, pp. 80–81; and Berman, No Peace,No Honor, pp. 56–57. International Security 27:4162

Duck Hookincluded high-ranking members ofthe administration,particu- larlySecretary of Defense Lairdand Secretary of StateWilliam Rogers. Nixon laterrecalled that he feared Lairdand Rogers would resign if he attacked Hanoiin 1969:“ Ijustwasn ´treadyfor that.” 34 Nixonpersonally favored Duck Hook,but he rejected militaryescalation because ofdomesticprotests and internal opposition within his cabinet. Nixon andKissinger, however ,were notyet willing togive up onusing threatsof forceto achieve their objectives.It was necessary to nd anew militarymaneu- ver thatmight intimidate adversaries without antagonizing the American public. nixon’s nuclearalert orders Nixonbelieved thatEisenhower had successfully used nuclear threatsto coerce the NorthKoreans, Chinese, andRussians into agreeing tothe armistice thatended the KoreanW arin 1953.He laterclaimed that Secretary of State John FosterDulles ´spurported warningthat “ unless the logjamis broken it will leadto the use ofnuclear weapons” had ended the war.“ Itworked,” Nixonargued. “ Itwas the bomb thatdid it.” 35 Nixonwas not alone in holding thisview .Eisenhowerhad made this claim in hismemoirs, and Nixon pri- vatelyrepeated the argumentnot only toHaldemanbut alsoto a group ofdel- egatesat the 1968Republican NationalConvention, suggesting thathe might similarlybring anend tothe VietnamW ar. 36 Nixonlater stated that he learned fromobserving Eisenhower ´sactionsthat it is important to be an“ unpredictable president”: “If the adversaryfeels thatyou areunpredictable, even rash, he will be deterred frompressing you toofar .The oddsthat he will fold will in- creaseand the unpredictable president will win anotherhand.” 37 Although he hadnot yet rmlydecided againstthe Duck Hookconven- tionalbombing campaign,Nixon took the rststeps toward implementing the madmantheory when he calledSecretary of Defense Lairdon October6, 1969.

34.3 October 1969and 9 October 1969,Haldeman diaries; andW alter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York:Simon and Schuster ,1992),p. 248. 35.Quoted in Rosenblatt,“ ANationComing Into Its Own,”p. 50. 36.Dwight D.Eisenhower, TheWhite House Years, Vol. 1: Mandatefor Change (New York: Doubleday,1963),p. 181; for Nixon ´sstatements in 1968,see Kimball, Nixon´sVietnam War, p. 82. Thisinterpretation of the endof the KoreanW arhasbeen widely challenged.See David Holloway, Stalinand the Bomb (New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994),p. 334; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know:Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1997),pp. 107–110; andRosemary J. Foot,“ Nuclear Coercion andthe Endingof the KoreanCon ict,” International Security, Vol. 13,No. 3 (Winter 1988/89),pp. 92–112. 37.Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York:Warner Books, 1980), pp. 254–256. International Security 27:4163

He informed Laird,according to a subsequent topsecret summary ,thathe wishedto “ initiatea seriesof increasedalert measures designed toconvey to the Sovietsan increasingreadiness by U.S. strategicforces.” Laird promised to send the White Housea setof proposed actions the next day. 38 Thisconversation between Nixonand Laird triggered asetof complex bureaucraticmaneuvers between the White House,the Pentagon,and U.S. militarycommands about whether andhow to implement the president ´s orders.The StateDepartment was excluded fromthe plansand preparations and thusdid not contribute to the ensuing debate.Laird, who had opposed the Duck Hookescalation option, also was opposed to brandishing nuclearweap- onsas an alternativecoercive move. Although the JointChiefs ofStaff were by necessitytold of the purpose behind the president ´splan,U.S. militarycom- mandersin the eld were deliberately kept in the darkabout why they were being askedto increasetheir readinessto use nuclearweapons. The resultwas aglobalnuclear alert that was ambiguous in itspurposes, poorly coordinated in itsoperational details, and inadequately analyzedin termsof itsgeopolitical implications. Problemsbecame apparentas early as October 7, 1969, when Col.Robert Pursley,Laird ´smilitaryassistant, delivered the Defense Department ´s re- sponseto Nixon ´srequest foran increase in the alertlevel ofU.S. nuclear forces.Haig complained to Kissinger thatthis plan “wasmerely aresume ofan alreadyapproved East Coast air defense exercise, whichwas not responsive to the president ´sinstruction.”Haig therefore gavePursley amorespeci c— though stillsomewhat ambiguous— set of criteriafor the desired nuclearalert: “[1] be discernible tothe Sovietsand be bothunusual andsigni cant; [2] notbe threatening tothe Soviets;[3] notrequire substantialadditional funding orre- sources;[4] notrequire agreement withthe allies;[5] notdegrade essentialmis- sions;[and 6] have minimum chanceof public exposure.”39 Pursley responded thatevening witha moreextensive menu ofnuclearalert options:“ [1] Implementationof radioand/ orother communications silence in selected areasor commands,e.g., in SAC andPolaris forces; [2] Stand-downof ying ofcombat aircraft in selected areasor commands, e.g., for 48 hours in SAC andEUCOM [European Command];[3] Increasedsurveillance of Soviet shipsen routeto North Vietnam; [4] Increasedreconnaissance sorties around

38.Haig to Kissinger 14October 1969,Folder: Haig Chron, October 1–15, 1969 [1 of 2],Box 958, NSCles, Nixonpapers. 39. Ibid. International Security 27:4164

the periphery of the Soviet Union;[5] Increasedground alertrate of SAC bombersand tankers; [6] Dispersalof SAC aircraftwith nuclear weapons to only militarydispersal bases, with or withoutdispersal of CONAD [Continen- talAir Defense Command]forces; [and 7] Alerting orsending toseaof SSBNs [nuclear ballisticmissile submarines] currently in portor by tender.”In closing hismemorandum, Pursley conceded thathe wasdrafting military plans in the dark:“ The signicance of the costsand risks entailed by the militaryactions outlined abovemust be relatedto the over-alleffect desired,which is not knownat this time.” 40 OnOctober 9, after discussing the optionswith the JointChiefs ´ planners, Pursley sentHaig an additional memorandum, evaluating the “possible ad- vantagesand disadvantages” of eachalert activity .The moststartling element ofthisdocument is itsrepeated refrain thatthe Sovietswere likely tosee many ofthe proposedU.S. alertactivities as part of an obvious bluff. Forexample, Pursley cautionedagainst a stand-downof SAC combataircraft because “lack ofsupporting action,such as recall of personnel onleave anddispersal of forces,might expose the overall-actionas a sham.”41 Yet these supporting ac- tionscould not be takenwithout increasing the likelihood ofpublic knowledge ofthe alert.The operationwas in danger ofbecoming whatwe havecalled a “cheap signal.”Although Pursley did notbelieve thatNixon was really preparing touse nuclear weapons,he sharedLaird ´sconcernsthat alerting the U.S. nucleararsenal to spook the Sovietsunder the madmantheory was inap- propriate.42 He nevertheless didhis best to follow orders. Y et he found it difcult to design operationalmilitary measures that would appear serious to the Sovietswhile remaining secretfrom the Americanpeople. Despite these problems,Haig and Kissinger recommended thatNixon order allof the measuresimplemented immediately,excluding the increasedrecon- naissancearound the periphery ofthe Soviet Union andthe dispatchof U.S.

40.Pursley to Haig8 October 1969,Folder: Schedule of Signicant Military Exercises, Vol. 1,Box 352,NSC les, Nixonpapers. 41.Pursley to Haig9 October 1969,Folder: Items to Discuss with President, 8/13/69–12/ 30/69, Box334, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 42.Lt. Gen. Robert Pursley,U.S.Air Force (ret.),telephone interview with author(Sagan), Novem- ber4, 2002. Haldeman later alsostated thathe did not believe thatNixon ever intended to use nuclear weapons:“ Hebelieved conceptually thatit was important thatthe enemyand those counseling orcontrolling the enemy,asthen perceived in Vietnam,have, if not aconviction, at least aconcern thathe mightbe pushed to apoint where hemightdo somethingtotally irrational. Thatwas astrategic concept, not aplannedintent, andthere was never anyconsideration given to doinganything to carryout the ‘madman ´ theory....Yes,it wasa bluff.”Quoted in Thompson, TheNixon Presidency, p. 83. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 165

strategicnuclear submarines. 43 The rejected actionsare as revealing asthe rec- ommendations.Pursley hadnoted that Soviet “shorespotters” would easily detectand promptly report on SSBNs leaving their submarinebases, but he alsowarned that the Americanpublic wouldlearn about the alertas crewman rushed totheir submarinesfor previously unscheduled duty. 44 Itis also note- worthythat Haig and Kissinger acceptedthe recommendationto disperse SAC bombersto additional satellite military air bases, but toexclude dispersalto civilianairports, which were in the plansto be utilized(as they hadbeen during the Cuban missilecrisis) at high statesof alert. Use ofthe civilianairports on SAC´sbomber andtanker dispersal plan— JFK, Dulles, Logan,and O ´Hare were allscheduled tohost B-52s in anemergency—would have quickly led to pressreports on the operation,which the NixonWhite Housewanted to avoid atall costs. 45 Finally,Kissinger rejected aerialreconnaissance activities on the periphery ofthe Soviet Union afterPursley cautionedthat they wouldincrease the riskthat it or “otherRed countries” would shoot down a spy plane. 46 Dur- ing the previousdecade, a seriesof incidents with American reconnaissance planes overor near enemy airspaceincreased Cold W artensions: the Soviet shoot-downof anAmericanU-2 on May1, 1960;the destructionof an Ameri- canU-2 by Soviet surface-to-airmissiles stationed in Cuba during the last weekend ofthe Cuban missilecrisis (October 27, 1962); the accidentalU-2 ight intoSoviet airspaceduring the sametense day(October 27, 1962); and mostrecent, the NorthKorean shoot-down of anAmericanEC-121 reconnais- sanceplane onApril 14,1969. 47 The White Housewanted to frighten Soviet leaderswithout producing aprovocation,an accident,or apublic controversy. Ironically,increasedaerial reconnaissance activity near the Soviet Union was seen ascreating too many risks in the madmannuclear alert that Nixon and Kissinger hoped totightly control.

43.Kissinger to Nixon9 October 1969,Folder: Schedule of Signicant Military Exercises, Vol. 1, Box352, NSC les, Nixonpapers; and Haig to Kissinger 9October 1969,Folder: Items to Discuss with President, 8/13/69–12/ 30/69,Box 334, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 44.Pursley to Haig9 October 1969,Folder: Items to Discuss with President, 8/13/69–12/ 30/69, Box334, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 45.HAA-1666, SAC Recap of Msgs,FOIA. 46.Pursley to Haig9 October 1969,Folder: Items to Discuss with President, 8/13/69–12/ 30/69, Box334, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 47.On the U-2crisis of 1960,see Michael R.Beschloss, Mayday:Eisenhower ,Khrushchev,and the U-2 Affair (New York:Harper and Row ,1986).On the U-2incidents duringthe Cubanmissile crisis, see AleksandrFursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of aGamble”: Khrushchev,Castro, andKennedy, 1958–1964 (New York:W.W .Norton,1997), pp. 277–287; and Sagan, TheLimits of Safety, pp. 135– 142.On the EC-121crisis, see Kissinger, WhiteHouse Years, pp. 313–321. International Security 27:4166

implementationof the secret nuclear alert Nixonapproved Kissinger ´srecommendationson October 9, and the Joint Chiefs were immediatelytold to prepare “anintegrated plan ofmilitary ac- tionsto demonstrate convincingly tothe Soviet Union thatthe United Statesis getting readyfor any eventuality onor about 1 November 1969.”48 The next morningGeneral Wheeler sentthe following topsecret message to the com- mandersof all U.S. unied andspeci ed commands: Wehavebeen directedby higher authorityto institutea seriesof actionsdur- ing the period 130000Z-250000ZOct. [October 13– 25] to testour military readinessin selected areasworldwide to respondto apossible confrontationby the Soviet Union.These actionsshould be discernable tothe Soviets,but not threatening in themselves.They mayinclude, but arenot necessarily limited to,the followingtypes ofactions: A.stand-downof combat aircraft in selected areasor command, to im- prove operationalreadiness. B.Implementationof radioand/ orother communications silence in selected areasof commands. C.Increasedsurveillance of Soviet shipsen routeto Vietnam. D.Increasedground alertrate of SAC bombersand tankers. 49 Wheeler then requested thatindividual militarycommanders “ nominatefur- theractions compatible with the guidance herein, andcognizant of localprob- lemspeculiar toyour areas, allies, and environment.” 50 He immediatelysent a follow-onmessage to SAC headquarters,however ,directing SACtostand downtraining ightsand put B-52bombers that had been takenoff day-to-day alertbecause ofcrewshortages (caused by the VietnamW ar)back on their reg- ularSIOP (single integratedoperations plan) alert“ to[the] maximumextent possible”by October13. 51 The JCSthusordered SAC (andother U.S. militarycommands) to take specic alertmeasures that Soviet intelligence organizationswere likely topick up andconsider signi cant. The JCS alsorequested thatcommanders nomi-

48.Lt. Col. William Lemnitzer to GeneralWheeler 9October 1969,Records of the Chairmanof the JCS,Earle Wheeler Papers,FOIA. Originally cited in William Burrand Jeffrey Kimball, “Nixon ´s Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam WarDiplomacy andthe Joint Chiefs of StaffReadiness Text, October 1969,” ColdWar History, Vol. 3,No.2 (January2003), pp. 113–156. We thankWilliam Burrfor providing us with this declassied document. 49.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture of October 1969,”p. 1. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 167

nateother alert readiness measures for implementation. The historyof the October1969 alert demonstrates the problemsthat can occur in managingmili- tarysignals when the president ´spenchant forsecrecy is so high thatthe U.S. militarycommanders implementing the actionare only able toguess atthe ba- sicpurpose of the operation. 52 Italso demonstrates how dif cult it is to ne tune militaryreadiness operations, including nuclearalerts, given the com- plexity ofthe activitiesand the parochialinterests of the implementing militaryorganizations. OnOctober 13 Gen. Bruce Holloway,the commanderin chief ofSAC, reportedthat SAC hadcanceled mostof itsaircraft training ightsand reinstated manynuclear-armed B-52 and B-58 bombers on ground alertto tryto meet the 40percent SIOP warplan guidance level (thisincreased the number from110 to174bombers on alert). 53 Heacknowledged thathe hadapproved limited ex- ceptionsto the JCSorder,continuing whathe consideredessential combat crewtraining and routine rotational ightsbetween SAC bases.Holloway also refrained fromplacing 20B-52bombers stationed at Andersen AirForce Base (AFB) onGuam back on their scheduled SIOP nuclearalert. 54 SAC did not explain thisdecision to the JCS, but internalcommunications demonstrate thatSAC did thisto protect parochial organizational interests. The SAC vice commanderprivately informed Hollowaythat nuclear weapons and addi- tionalB-52s were availableat Andersen AFB, but itwould be operationally easierto use B-52sback in the continentalUnited States.Moreover, SAC had been complainingthat the demandsof the VietnamW arwere reducing itsabil- ityto meet its“ real”mission requirement— to provide nuclear deterrence throughSIOP readinessat home. It would therefore embarrassthe organiza- tionto admit that SAC couldhave addressed this problem onitsown. As the vice commanderwarned Holloway ,placing B-52son nuclearalert at Andersen AFB“couldraise questions about why ,withexcess resources and substantial SIOP degrade,we haven ´talreadyestablished some alert sorties on Guam.”55

52.According to the SAChistory ,SAC ´scommanderin chief, Gen.Bruce Holloway,hadrequested informationfrom the JCSonthe purpose of the readinesstest, but was given noclari cation. Ibid., p.12. Hershreports thatLt. Gen. Ray Sitton (U.S.Air Force) alsoasked Haig to clarify the objective of the operation, but Haiganswered cryptically: “You ´re doingall youneed to do.”Hersh, The Priceof Power, p. 124. 53.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”p. 2; andHistory of Strategic Air Command,FY 1970,Historical Study117, 20 April 1971,pp. 153–154, FOIA. We thankWilliam Burrfor providing uswith acopy of the latter document. 54.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”p. 2. 55. Ibid. International Security 27:4168

Thiswas an importantdecision, made off the radarscreens of White House ofcials in Washington.Had President Nixonreally been preparing tolaunch nuclear weaponsagainst North Vietnam, the B-52sat Andersen AFBwould havebeen the mostlikely aircraftused inthe attack.If Soviet basewatchers or Soviet navyelectronic and communication intelligence collectors(known tobe operatingin the Pacic atthe time 56)learned thatno nuclear weaponswere being loadedon to those B-52 bombers, then itwould be apparentto Moscow thatwhile the United Statesmight be preparing fora globalmilitary con ict, it wasnot getting readyto use nuclearweapons in NorthV ietnam.SAC ´s unilat- eraldecision potentially exposed Nixon ´s bluff. SAC´sdecisionwas not over- turned bythe JCS, andthere isno evidence inthe availablerecords that White Houseof cials were even informed ofthisimportant detail of the nuclearalert operation. General Hollowayalso recommended three further readinessmeasures, “withinthe objectives ofthisexercise asunderstood here.” First, he proposed thatSAC “increaseperipheral reconnaissanceas feasible.” Second, he suggested thathe couldplace extraSAC bomberson runways in the United States withnuclear weapons on board, but withoutaircrews. This special “ mainte- nancereadiness posture” would permit SAC tohave an increased number of B-52and B-58 aircraft visible outon runways, though there were noaircrews availableto ythemif necessary.Third,and most important, Holloway recommended thatSAC receive authorizationto launch B-52s with nuclear weapons onboardon aspecialairborne alert mission called SEAGA (selective employ- mentof airand ground alert). 57 SEAGA wasa new crisisalert concept that had replaced the peacetime SAC airborneChrome Dome alertoperation after two seriousB-52 crashes: the January1966 crash in Palomares,Spain, andthe Janu- ary1968 accident in Thule, Greenland.As a consequence of these accidents, seven crewmen died; one nuclearweapon was lost at seafor three months;and radioactivematerials spread over wide areasrequiring expensive cleanup efforts.58 After the Thule accident,political authorities decided, againstSAC ´s objections,that the commandcould no longer place nuclearweapons on any

56.Adm. John S. McCainJr .,Commanderin Chief of the Pacic Command(CINCP AC)to General Wheeler 12October 1969,Folder: 381 W orld-Wide IncreasedReadiness Posture (October 1969), Box109, Records of the Chairmanof the JCS,EarleWheeler Papers,NA, released underFOIA, p. 3. WethankWilliam Burrfor providing us with this document. 57.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”p. 2; and History of Strategic Air Command,FY 1970,pp. 153–154. 58.Randall C. Maydew, America´sLost H-Bomb: Palomares, Spain,1966 (Manhattan,Kans.: Sunower University Press, 1997);and Sagan, TheLimits of Safety, pp. 156–203. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 169

airbornealert exercise orothertraining missions. 59 Thisrestriction reduced the risksof serious accidents, but SAC complainedthat it also limited its ability to trainunder realisticwar conditions. If accepted,Holloway ´srecommendation tolauncha SEAGA alertwith weapons would permit SAC toloadthermonu- clearwarheads on airborne alert missions for the rsttime since the January 1968accident, undoing aresented restrictionon SAC ´soperationalautonomy . Thisspecial nuclear alertactivity went well beyond the readinessmeasures contemplatedby Pursley in hisOctober 7 militaryoptions memorandum and thoseordered by President Nixonon October 9. Finally,Hollowayinformed the JCS thathe “stronglyrecommended against dispersalfor the currentreadiness test,” on the groundsthat dispersing aircraft wouldreduce SAC ´sability“ toimplement further readinessactions in anac- tualemergency .”60 Thisargument was a trumpcard: It would be exceedingly difcult for higher authoritiesto insistthat SAC takealert actions that the com- mandersaid would reduce readinessif warbecame morelikely .The SAC his- toryreports simply that“ the JCSdid notpursue the matterfurther .”61 Holloway´sargumentalso suggests that he suspected the purpose ofthe alert wasnot actually to prepare foran imminent confrontationwith the Soviet Union. Backin Washington,bureaucratic resistance to Nixon ´sorderswas growing. OnOctober14, Haig angrily wroteto Kissinger thatthe JointChiefs hadfailed toimplement “twoof the originalitems directedfor execution ”by the president: Dispersalof SACaircraftand increased surveillance of Soviet shipsen routeto NorthVietnam had been “held in abeyance because ofadditional costs and widespreadimplications.” 62 Secretary ofDefense Lairdwas also not cooperat- ing. When rstasked by Nixonto prepare anuclear alertto signalthe Soviets, he hadresponded by suggesting minorchanges in anongoing militaryair defense exercise.Now he wasusing the existence ofanother military exercise—HIGH HEELS— as a rationaleagainst implementing new nuclearalert measures.This exercise wasdesigned totest the abilityof majorU.S. military

59. Statusof U.S . StrategicPower, Hearingsbefore the PreparednessInvestigating Subcommittee of the Committee onArmed Services, U.S.Senate, 90th Cong., 2d sess.,April 30–May 10, 1968, p. 237; andDepartment of State,Message 126481, 7 March1968, Nuclear Overights, RG 59,StateDepart- ment Records, CentralForeign Policy Files, 1967–1969, Political Affairs andDefense, DEF12 1/ 11/ 68,Box 1673, NA. 60.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”pp. 4–5. 61.History of Strategic Air Command,FY 1970,p. 154. 62.Haig to Kissinger 14October 1969,Folder: Haig Chron, October 1–15, 1969 [1 of 2],Box 958, NSCles, Nixonpapers (emphasisin original). International Security 27:4170

commandsto react to a simulatedSoviet andChinese attackon the United Statesand its allies. It also sought to familiarize senior W ashingtonof cials, including the secretaryof state and secretary of defense, withthe SIOP execu- tionprocedures. 63 Lairdobjected tofurther alertmeasures on the groundsthat the HIGHHEELS activities,if mixed withreal alert measures, “ wouldresult in confused signalsto the Soviets.”He further argued thatthe exercise should continue asplanned, because signicant funds hadalready been spent in preparationand should not be wasted. 64 Finally,Gen. Andrew Goodpaster— commanderin chief of U.S. forcesin Europe andNA TO ´ssupreme allied commanderin Europe—also objected toNixon ´salertorders because they in- volvedU.S. forceson allied territorieswithout allied consultations. 65 OnOctober 14, Haig advised Kissinger thathe wouldhave to discuss the problemsof implementation with President Nixonimmediately: Informthe President ofMel Laird ´sreluctanceto proceed withthe alertmea- suresbecause ofthe conict with exercise HIGHHEELS andthe view ofGen- eralGoodpaster that consultation with allies should precede the stand-down ofmilitarytraining ights.T ell the President thatyou areconvinced that these objectionsare not overriding and that you will meet withLaird and Wheeler thismorning to make the necessaryadjustments in bothHIGH HEELS and alertmeasures to ensure thatthe alertsare carried out this week. Emphasizeto the President thatevidence ofreluctance in Defense mayrequire some“ tail twisting”which you areprepared todoproviding you canrely onstrongsup- portfrom the President. 66 “Itwould appear ,”Haigwrote, “ thatthe primaryproblem isthe failure ofall concerned tounderstand the timesensitiveness of the measuresdirected by the President andthe reasonsfor which they havebeen directed.”67 The real explanation,however, was the opposite:Laird understood precisely that Nixonwas implementing the madmantheory and thought it would be, atbest, ineffective withrespect to the VietnamW ar,and potentially “ dangerous”if the

63.CM-4614– 69, JCS to Secretaryof Defense 6October 1969,“ Brieng on Exercise HIGHHEELS 69,”Folder: 381 Exercise HIGHHEELS 1969, Box 108, Records ofthe Chairmanof the JCS,Record Group 218,NA; andL.M. Mustin, Vice Admiral U.S.Navy to Assistant to the Chairmanof the JCS 4November1969, ibid. 64.Haig to Kissinger 14October 1969,Folder: Haig Chron, October 1–15, 1969 [1 of 2],Box 958, NSCles, Nixonpapers, p. 3. 65.Ibid.; and Haig to Kissinger 14October 1969,Folder: Items to Discuss with President, 8/13/ 69–12/ 30/69,Box 334, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 66.Haig to Kissinger 14October 1969,Folder: Items to Discuss with President, 8/13/69–12/ 30/ 69,Box 334, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 67.Haig to Kissinger 14October 1969,Folder: Haig Chron, October 1–15, 1969 [1 of 2],Box 958, NSCles, Nixonpapers. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 171

Sovietsmisinterpreted U.S. militarypreparations as part of an imminent attack.Laird later recalled in aninterview: “ Iwasusing abit of the delay tac- tic.. ..Ihadsome questions about whether it[the nuclearalert] would help at allon Vietnam. I didn ´twantthe SAC trainingprogram to get allfouled up. The JointChiefs were notenthusiastic; neither wasWheeler. ...[The alert]was dangerous,however...if they [the Soviets] thoughtwe wouldgo allthe way.”68 Nixonbacked Kissinger ´s“tailtwisting.” The readinessof U.S. military forcesfor war was heightened aroundthe globe. All militarymovements in exercise HIGHHEELS were canceled onOctober 14, with only asimulated decisionmakingexercise in the Washingtonarea continuing. 69 OnOctober 17 the JCS orderedSAC toimplement itsproposal for “ increasedmaintenance readiness”of B-52and B-58 bombers and to prepare toexecute aSEAGA airborne alert,“ Show ofForce” option with weapons, starting on October 26. 70 The Pacic Commandwas ordered to “enhance SIOP navalforces” (on aircraft carriersand SSBNs in the Pacic), increase the alertlevel ofconventionally armedtactical and air defense aircraftthroughout the FarEast and Paci c, and increasesurveillance of Soviet vesselsenroute toNorth Vietnam. 71 General Goodpaster´sobjectionswere alsoapparently overruled because U.S. aircraft in Europe became activelyinvolved in the subsequent alertingactivities. 72 Kissinger informed Nixonon the morningof October17 thatthe JCS andLaird hadstarted “ acomplete scenario”of alertactions that would “ intensify up to October30 and will be monitoredcarefully” for signs of Soviet reaction. 73 signalsand the soviets Laterthat day ,Soviet AmbassadorDobrynin suddenly requested ameeting withPresident Nixon.“ Kissinger hasall sorts of signal-type activitygoing on aroundthe worldto try to jar the Sovietsand NVN [NorthVietnam],” Haldemannoted in hisdiary ,addingthat it “ appearsto be workingbecause Dobrynin hasasked for an earlymeeting.” Kissinger surmisedthat there “is[a] goodchance of [this] being the big break.President ismore skeptical.” 74

68.Laird, telephone interview with author(Sagan) December 9,2002. 69.JCS message141822Z October 1969,Folder: 381 Exercise HIGHHEELS, 1969, Box 108, RG 218 Records of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff,Earle Wheeler Papers,NA. 70.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”p. 5. 71.JCS message17 October 1969,1800, available onthe NationalSecurity Archive website at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/nnp09.pdf(accessed February25, 2003). 72.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”pp. 5–7. 73.Haig to Kissinger 17October 1969,Folder: Items to Discuss with President, 8/13/69–12/ 30/ 69,Box 334, NSC les, Nixonpapers, p. 2. 74.See 17October 1969,Haldeman diaries. International Security 27:4172

Kissinger prepared Nixonfor what he hoped wouldbe abreakthrough on Vietnam:“ Dobrynin ´srequest tosee you comesagainst the backgroundof sev- eraldevelopments, including amongothers. . ..Moscow ´sundoubted awarenessof unusual militarymeasures on our part, preceded by the stern commentsI madeto Dobrynin onSeptember 27.”75 Kissinger reminded Nixon that“ yourbasic purpose will be tokeep the Sovietsconcerned aboutwhat we mightdo around November 1”76;“Should Dobrynin refer toourcurrent readinessmeasures, you shouldsimply tell him thatthese arecarefully controlled exerciseswhich in view ofthe uncertaintiesof the future you feel itincumbent onyou toundertake. They involveno threat.” 77 Nixonhad rejected Duck Hook because of domesticpressures, but Kissinger hoped thatthese crypticcom- mentsand the nuclear alertwould frighten the Sovietsinto putting pressure on the NorthV ietnamesegovernment to end the war.Kissinger closedhis brie ng by reminding the president that“ ourmain concern with the Sovietsat present istheir supportof Hanoi ´sintransigenceand their heavy strategicweapons program.”78 Meeting withNixon and Kissinger onOctober20, Dobrynin focusedon the latterissue— offering tostart the StrategicArms Limitation T alks(SAL T),in particular.The Soviet ambassadormade no mentionof “unusual”U.S. military activities.His aide-mé moire did, however, refer tothe “hintsby Americanrep- resentativesabout possible use by the United Statesof some‘ alternative ´ meth- odsof solving the Vietnamquestion” and issued the Soviet Union ´s own warning:“ Moscowfeels thatthe President shouldbe frankly toldthat the methodof solving the Vietnamquestion through the use offorce is not only withoutperspective, but isextremely dangerous.”Nixon responded that“ if the Soviet Union wouldnot help usto get peace, the U.S. wouldhave to pur- sue itsown methods for bringing the warto an end. ...Wewouldnot hold still forbeing ‘diddled todeath ´ in Vietnam.”79 After the meeting, Kissinger continued tobelieve thatU.S. threatsof force— including the nuclearalert— had colored Dobrynin ´scomments.Kissinger

75.Kissinger to Nixon18 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 76.Kissinger to Nixon(Brie ng) 18 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger,1969[Part 1], Box 489,NSC les, Nixonpapers. 77.Kissinger to Nixon18 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 78.Kissinger to Nixon(Brie ng) 18 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger,1969[Part 1], Box 489,NSC les, Nixonpapers. 79.Memorandum of conversation between Nixon,Kissinger ,andDobrynin 20 October 1969, Folder:Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers. See alsoKissinger, WhiteHouse Years, p.305; and Dobrynin, InCon dence, p. 202. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 173

wantedto continue these maneuvers,and he played toNixon ´svanity,telling the president thathe “hadthe gutsof ariverboatgambler ...hadplayed it very coldwith Dobrynin, giving him one backfor each he dished out.”80 Kissinger explained that“ Dobrynin ´sbasicmission was to test the seriousnessof the threatelement in ourcurrent posture and to throw out enough inducements (SALT,Berlin, directinformal contact with you) tomake it politically and psy- chologicallydif cult for you toplay itrough overVietnam.” Despite these So- vietinducements, Kissinger recommendedthat W ashingtonshould “ continue backing up ourverbal warnings with our present militarymoves.” 81 U.S. ofcials, including the president, greatlyvalued the agreement tostart the SALT negotiations.Kissinger lateracknowledged thatthe Sovietswere practicingtheir ownshrewd form of reverse linkage. 82 Moscow´s gambit worked.On October 25 Secretary of StateRogers announced that Soviet-U.S. nucleararms control talks would begin in November.Kissinger hadstrongly objected tothis,still hoping thatthe Sovietsmight put pressure onNorth Viet- nam,but Nixonfollowed the adviceof Rogersinstead. Although the possibilityof militaryescalation in Vietnamwas clearly closed, Nixon still held tothe madmantheory .Kissinger,however,hadgiven up faithin suchmaneuvers andapparently did notcooperate further. Accordingto his memoirs: Aswas his habit Nixon sought to compensate for his unwillingness toface downhis old friend [Rogers]by escalatingthe menace tothe Soviets.He immediately toldme thatI shouldconvey to Dobrynin thatthe President was “outof control”on Vietnam. In serving Nixonone owedit to him todiscrimi- nateamong the ordershe issuedand to give him anotherchance at thosethat were unfulllable ordangerous. This one wasin the lattercategory .Iknew thatNixon was planning totake no action on November 1.T outtera dire threatand then takeno action whatever would depreciate the currency.So I waitedto see whether Nixonwould return tothe theme. He did not. 83

Nuclear Operationsand Hidden Dangers

Despite these crucialpolitical developments, the secretnuclear alertoperations approvedpreviously continued unaffected by whatwas happening in Wash- ington.SAC hadlobbied successfully againstdispersal of its bomber forceto

80.20 October 1969,Haldeman diaries (emphasisin original). 81.Kissinger to Nixon21 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 82.Kissinger, WhiteHouse Years, p. 305. 83.Ibid., pp. 305–306. W ehavefound no evidence to corroborateor contradict Kissinger ´s account of his opposition to additionalU.S. threats after October 25,1969. International Security 27:4174

satellitemilitary bases in the United States.It had also procured approvalfor twocritical actions: the special“ maintenancegeneration” (placing thermonu- clearweapons on aircrafton the runwaysof mainSAC bases,despite havingno crewsavailable to ythe bombersif necessary)and the specialGiant Lance airborne alertoperation, “ showof force” option, with nuclear weaponson board. SAC headquartersissued its maintenance generation instructions on Octo- ber 23.By October25, approximately 65 percent ofthe non-alertSIOP aircraft were loadedwith nuclear weaponsand placed outon SAC runways. 84 On Oc- tober26, SAC alsobegan the GiantLance airborne alert. Thermonuclear weaponswere loadedon toB-52sat MarchAFB in southernCalifornia and Fairchild AFBinWashington.KC-135 refueling aircraftwere deployed toEielson AFB in Alaska.Between October27 and 29, eighteen nuclear-armedB-52s ew eighteen-hour missionsover the northernpolar cap. The bombers ew north,along the Canadiancoast, toward the Soviet Union.They crossedAlaska, were refueled in midairby the KC-135tankers, and ew ovalpatterns toward the Soviet borderand back. 85 Onthe night ofOctober 28, the JCS directedSAC andall other U.S. military commandsto terminate their specialalert activities effective October30. 86 Gi- antLance thus ended soonafter it had begun. Lt.Gen. Paul Carlton,commanderof the Fifteenth Air Forceat Fairchild AFB, commendedthe aircrews andweapons maintenance of cers, praising “ the qualityof maintenance achieved andthe factthere were noincidents involving weapons.”87 Atthe mostbasic level, given thatNixon had already decided notto bomb NorthV ietnamand Rogers had just announced the startof SALT,these nal SAC alertoperations were looselycoupled toU.S. diplomaticactivities at the end ofOctober. More important,when one looksclosely at the detailsof SAC operations,a number ofthe specic alertactions can be seen tohave created hidden risks,dangers that ran counter to Nixon and Kissinger ´sintentions. First,the president andnational security adviser had ordered that no reconnaissance ightstake place onthe periphery ofthe Soviet Union soas toavoid

84.History of the Strategic Air Command,FY 1970,p. 155. 85.History of the 92ndStrategic Aerospace Wing(Heavy) and 92nd Combat Support Group,14 September–31 December 1969,KWG-92-HI, AFHRC, Maxwell Air Force Base;and SAC to Eielson, March,and Fairchild Air Force Bases21 October 1969,FOIA. 86.History of the 92ndStrategic Aerospace Wing(Heavy) and 92nd Combat Support Group,14 September–31 December 1969,pp. 142–144; and History of Strategic Air Command,FY 1970, p. 156. 87.Quoted in the Historyof the 92ndStrategic Aerospace Wing(Heavy) and 92d Combat Support Group,14 September– 31 December 1969,p. 44. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 175

adiplomaticincident. Y et SAC ew B-52bombers over the Arcticice, onroutes towardthe Soviet Union andback, without the use ofground-based naviga- tionalaids from radar sites in Alaska. 88 Similar ightshad produced anincident earlier in the decadewhen aB-52accidentally strayed into the Soviet Union´sairdefense warningnet, a factnot known to W ashingtonof cials in 1969who had approved the new operation. 89 Second, althoughNixon and Kissinger wantedto avoid any nuclear weaponsaccident that would create public awarenessand alarm, SAC ´simprovisedmaintenance generation alert led tothe suspensionof some of the strictpeacetime nuclearsafety require- ments.At GrandForks AFB in NorthDakota, for example, SACissueda “tem- poraryexplosive safetywaiver,” so that noncerti ed personnel could participatein the alertoperation. 90 Similarly,SAC hadto issue a “quantitydis- tancewaiver” at another bomber base,permitting nuclearweapons there tobe placed in closerproximity to one anotherthan normal peacetime safetyrules permit.91 Finally,andmost signi cant, of cers in the 92dStrategic Air Wing discoveredthat the routesand timing of the nuclear-armedbombers were poorlyplanned in the SEAGA alert.“ Several B-52swere required toorbit in closeproximity with other aircraft, an airtraf c situationthat was considered unsafe,”the after-actionreport noted. 92 Although Nixonand Kissinger wantedthis to be a“safe”signal of U.S. readinessto use nuclear weapons,some increased risk of accidentsand inci- dentswas unavoidable. SAC recognizedthese dangers:It recommended that ground-based radarsbe used tohelp SACbombersstay on course in the future.The scheduled ight timesand orbit patterns for the bombersand tankers were changed in the 1970SAC GiantLance operational plans to avoid collisions. 93 Nixonand Kissinger never learned thislesson about the dangers ofnuclear weaponsalerts because they were never informed ofthe operational problemsand safety concerns that emerged during the rstnuclear alert oper- ationthey ordered,but did notreally control.

88.Message 211841Z Nov 69, 15th Air Force to SAC,Subject: Problems Encountered in SEAGA Operation, FOIA. 89.On August 23,1962, an airbornealert B-52 ew 1,500miles off course, coming within 300miles of the Soviet coast.The incident was not reported to civilian ofcials in Washington.See Sagan, The Limitsof Safety, pp. 73–77. 90.Peake, “ Notes onIncreased Readiness Posture ofOctober 1969,”p. 8. 91.Ibid., p. 9. 92.92nd Strategic Aerospace Wingand 92nd Combat Support Group History,14September– 31 December 1969,pp. 44–45. 93.Ibid., p. 45. International Security 27:4176

politicaldangers: back to the sino-soviet conflict Wehavelittle evidence indicatingwhat the Soviet leadersknew aboutthe U.S. nuclearalert and how they interpreted it.Since the end of the ColdW ar,a number offormersenior Soviet ofcials have claimed that the Moscowleader- ship received intelligence reportsindicating that U.S. forceshad gone onalert in October1969. These formerof cials report that Soviet intelligence did not understandwhy the U.S. militarywas increasing its readiness for nuclear war.94 Such confusionabout the Americansignal is understandable. After all, the detailsof the alertoperation would not lead an objective observerto focus onNorthV ietnamas the potentialtarget: The B-52son Guamwere notplaced onSIOP runwayalert, the airbornealert was over the Arctic—not on the alter- nativePaci c orFar Eastern airborne alert routes outlined in SAC plans 95— andmilitary forces were alertedin Europe andthe FarEast as well asin the United States.Soviet intelligence ofcers might have thought that the global nuclearalert was an effort toheighten readinessto deter Soviet militaryinter- ventionor escalation elsewhere in the event ofa majorU.S. conventional bombing campaignover North Vietnam. But other aspects of the alert, specically details that were left outbecause ofthe adminstration ´s concern thatthe U.S. public wouldlearn of the action,would also have led anobjective observerto think thatthis was not a seriouspreparation for a nuclearconfron- tation:Many U.S. strategicnuclear missilesubmarines were left in port,where they were vulnerable toan attack, and U.S. bomberswere notdispersed to civilianairports, as they hadbeen in earlier crises. Wedonot know if thisled the Soviet intelligence agencies todeduce thatthe nuclear alertwas a bluff, acheap signalwithout intent to followthrough with militaryaction. More evidence fromthe Russianarchives is necessary to an- swerthat question. But one ofthe mostinteresting aspectsabout the U.S. declassied documentsis that they revealhow little White Houseof cials considered anobvious alternative interpretation that Moscow leaders might enter- tainwhen informed ofU.S. nuclearreadiness increases: a threatof American interventionin apotentialSino-Soviet bordercon ict. Largemilitary skirmishes between the twocommunist states dated back to March1969. A particularlyheavy seriesof engagements occurredin earlyAu-

94.The of cials areAmbassador Dobrynin, former Foreign Minister AleksandrBessmertnykh, anda former rst deputy commanderof the Strategic Rocket Forces,Col. Gen. Victor Esin (ret.). Blair, TheLogic of AccidentalNuclear War, p.180 and n. 16, p. 339; and Victor Esin,interview with the author(Sagan), December 3,2002. 95.History of the Strategic Air Command,FY 1970,p. 140. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 177

gust.96 Throughoutthe summerand early fall of1969, the Soviet Union threat- ened tolaunch a preventive strikeagainst Chinese nuclear facilities.Moscow even wentso far as to approach W ashingtonfor possible collaboration. 97 The Nixonadministration explicitly rejected these suggestions. 98 During August andSeptember ,Kissinger closelywatched events along the Sino-Soviet border, warningthe president aslate as September 29that the possibilityof expanded, potentiallynuclear, hostilities between the twocommunist states was still very much “alive.”99 Concernsabout Vietnam in Octoberdistracted Nixon and Kissinger from heightened tensionson the Sino-Soviet border.OnSeptember 30,following a militaryreport that “ the Soviet revisionistleadership” planned “tolaunch a quick waragainst China,” Lin Biao(Mao ´sdesignatedsuccessor) placed Chi- nese militaryforces on astateof “ rst-degree combatreadiness.” 100 On Octo- ber 17he wentone stepfurther andissued a “Number One Order,”instructing the armychief ofstaff (Huang Yongsheng) toprepare allunits for immediate action.Chinese militaryforces moved to forward positions throughout the country.Leadersand citizens evacuated cities in anticipationof Soviet air raids.All told,China moved more than 940,000 soldiers, 4,000 airplanes, and 600naval ships in preparationfor what the governmentcalled “ the comingof

96.See YangKuisong, “ TheSino-Soviet BorderClash of 1969:From Zhenbao Island to Sino-Amer- ican Rapprochement, ” ColdWar History, Vol. 1,No. 1 (August 2000),pp. 21–37; and Burr, “ Sino- American Relations, 1969,”pp. 80–86. 97.See Memorandumof Conversation,William Stearmanand Boris Davydov,18August 1969, Folder:Political Affairs andRelations, 3/1/69,Box 1973, POL CHICOM-US, RG 59,Central Files, NA;andDepartment ofState Telegram to American Embassy,HongKong et al.,21 August 1969, Folder:Political Affairs andRelations, 2/1/69,Box 1974, POL 1CHICOM-USSR,RG 59,Central Files, NA.See alsoKissinger, WhiteHouse Years, p.183; and Garthoff, Détente andConfrontation, p.237. In early August, U.S.intelligence agencies determined thatSoviet airforces in the FarEast hadentered aheightened state ofalert. Recent Soviet operational exercises suggestedpreparations fora preventive attack,possibly including nuclear weapons,against the Chinese nuclear weapons complex. See Hollowayto JCS8August 1969,FOIA; and Allen S.Whiting, “Sino-American Détente,” ChinaQuarterly, Vol. 82(June 1980),p. 336. For British speculation onthe KGB ´s role in spreadingrumors of aSoviet preventive strike, see Cambridgeto Giffard19 September 1969,FCO 28/800,Public Records Ofce, Kew,London[hereafter PRO]. 98.Kissinger to Nixon20 September 1969,Folder: USSR, V ol. 5,Box710, NSC les, Nixonpapers; Kissinger to Undersecretary of Statecirca 20September 1969,Folder: USSR, V ol. 5,Box710, NSC les, Nixonpapers; and Kissinger, WhiteHouse Years, p. 184. 99.Kissinger to Nixon29 September 1969,Folder: HAK/ RichardsonMeeting, May1969– December 1969,Box 337, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 100.Report byFour Chinese Marshals—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying,Nie Rongzhen,and Sxu Xiangqian—to the CCPCentralCommittee, “Our Views aboutthe CurrentSituation, 17Sept. 1969,” in ColdWar International History ProjectBulletin, Vol. 11(Winter 1998),p. 170; and Y ang,“ The Sino-Soviet BorderClash of 1969,”pp. 40–41. International Security 27:4178

war.”101 The Chinese militaryalso prepared touse the country ´ssmallnuclear arsenal,in the event ofa Soviet attack. 102 The documentaryrecord reveals that Nixon and Kissinger neglected this growingcrisis on the Sino-Soviet borderas they focusedon Vietnam. They paidlittle attention to Dobrynin ´scontinued probing ofWhite Housereactions toa potentialSoviet attackon China. 103 Indeed, despite the warscare on the Sino-Soviet border,Nixon and Kissinger were soobsessed with Vietnam that they barely discussedChina. In hisbrie ngs to the president before hisOcto- ber 20meeting withDobrynin, Kissinger didnot even mentionSino-Soviet tensions.104 When Dobrynin handed the president anaide-mé moire warning the United Statesagainst intervention in the Sino-Soviet conict, both Nixon andKissinger failed toaddress the possibilitythat Moscow (and Beijing) could interpret the nuclearalert in thislight. 105 In short,for all of their talkabout “ linkage,”Nixon and Kissinger treated their nuclearalert orders as isolated acts, only relevantto the VietnamW ar.

101.See Yang,“ TheSino-Soviet BorderClash of 1969,”pp. 40–41. For British evaluations ofChi- nese warpreparations, see Murrayto Wilford 8December 1969and Wilford to PermanentUnder- Secretary9 December 1969,FCO 21/483,PRO; and W aldento Appleyard 12January 1970, FCO 21/683,PRO. British ofcials emphasizedthat the Chinese warpreparations also served domestic purposes—helping MaoZedong to reassert central control afteryears of upheaval duringthe Cul- tural Revolution. 102.Lin Biao ´sOctober 17telegram to HuangY ongshengled to the ofcial declaration of the “NumberOne Order”to all armyunits onOctober 18.This orderincluded reference to combat readinessin the SecondArtillery ,responsible forChinese nuclear forces. Inlate September,China conducted two nuclear tests within six daysof eachother. Between 1964and 1978, the Chinese never againdetonated nuclear weapons in such quick succession. Anumberof authorshave interpreted the September 1969tests asBeijing ´ssignalto the Soviets thatChina had nuclear weapons it could use if attacked.See Tyler, AGreat Wall, p.73; and Burr, “ Sino-American Relations, 1969,” p.94. The most authoritative source onChinese nuclear developments duringthis period remains JohnWilson Lewis andXue Litai, ChinaBuilds the Bomb (Stanford,Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988),pp. 190–218, 244– 245. 103.On September 27,1969, Dobrynin asked Kissinger “whether he thoughtthey (the Soviets) were goingto attackthe Chinese.”Kissinger replied: “As ahistorian,he thought the Soviets were considering it.”T ranscript oftelephone conversation between Nixonand Kissinger 27September 1969,p. 2, Folder:Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC Files, Nixonpapers. Kissinger focused so little onthis comment thathe neglected to include it in the written account of his meet- ingwith Dobrynin.See Memorandumof Conversationbetween Kissinger andDobrynin 27 Sep- tember 1969,ibid. 104.Kissinger to Nixon18 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger,1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers; and Kissinger to Nixon(Brie ng) 18 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers. 105.Memorandum of conversation between Nixon,Kissinger, andDobrynin 20 October 1969, Folder:Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixonpapers; and Kissinger to Nixon21 October 1969,Folder: Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1969[Part 1], Box 489, NSC les, Nixon papers. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 179

They didnot consider how foreign leadersin Moscowor Bejing mightlink these militaryactivities to other dangerous crises, occurring at the sametime. Ironically,Nixonand Kissinger appearto haveassumed that the Soviet leadership wouldrationally analyze and clearly understand the strategicsignal sent by apresident whowanted to be seen asso irrational that he woulddo anything toend the warin Vietnam.

Conclusions: InCommand, but Out of Control

Thisarticle has looked behind the veil ofsecrecy that has surrounded the eventsof October 1969. Although manymysteries remain, the availableinfor- mationreveals a disturbing andseemingly anomalouspicture ofthe U.S. government´sdecisionmakingconcerning nuclearweapons threats. It is crucial thatscholars carefully studyevents that rstappear to be abnormal,however , foras ThomasKuhn hasnoted, such inquiry canspark scienti c advancement: “Discoverycommences with the awarenessof anomaly,i.e.,with the recogni- tionthat nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expecta- tions.. ..Itthen continueswith a moreor lessextended explorationof the area ofanomaly.And itcloses only when the paradigmtheory has been adjustedso thatthe anomaloushas become the expected.”106 Acloseexamination of the availablerecord from October 1969 can alter the paradigmaticassumptions aboutour nuclear history and perhaps even ournuclear future. First,contrary to most assumptions about crisis signaling, the October1969 alertdemonstrates that a majorincrease in militaryreadiness, even aglobal nuclearalert, is not necessarily a public event. Secret militaryalerts, however , donot create the kind ofcostlycommitments that can enhance the credibility ofathreatby placing the reputationof a leader atstake.The October1969 alert wascertainly a loudsignal of increasedmilitary preparedness forglobal nu- clearwar. But the existingevidence thatthe Soviet leadership didnot react in anymeaningful wayto this signi cant increase of U.S. militaryreadiness sug- geststhat it was also a cheap signal,one thatwas indicative of abluff, rather thanresolve. Second, Nixonand Kissinger didnot intend forthe nuclear alertto be “a threatthat leaves something to chance,”and yet their ordersnevertheless produced anumber ofdangerousnuclear weapons operations. Even inthe highly

106.Thomas S. Kuhn, TheStructure of Scientic Revolutions, 2ded.(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970),pp. 52–53. International Security 27:4180

centralizedworld of nuclearweapons management, the president commands but hedoesnot entirely control.Senior authoritiesin the White Houseendeav- ored,with commendable seriousness, to make the madmannuclear alert a safe andrisk-free operation.The U.S. militarywas told not to takeactions that were threatening tothe Soviet Union;potentially provocative reconnaissance ights nearSoviet borderswere notapproved; and Nixon and Kissinger even planned totell Soviet AmbassadorDobrynin, if he raisedthe issue,that the alertactions were “carefully controlledexercises” that involved “ nothreat” to the Soviet Union.Despite these efforts,however, nuclear-armed B-52s were ownoutside Soviet airspacein whatwas arguably a provocativeand threatening “showof force”posture, a setof strictpeacetime nuclearweapons safety regulationswere waivedby lowerlevel commanders,and B-52 bombers and tankersaccidentally ew very closeto eachother in whatSAC laterrecognized asan “ unsafe”orbit pattern. The compartmentalizedand complex nature of U.S. militaryorganizations meant that Nixon and Kissinger exerted far lesscontrol over the nuclearalert than they anticipated.Moreover ,the secre- tiveand specialized nature of U.S. militarymaneuvers meant that Nixon andKissinger never learned aboutthe limitsto their controlover nuclear operations. Taken together,these insightssuggest that the October1969 global nuclear readinessoperation produced the worstof allworlds. Nixon ´ssecretalert was bothineffective anddangerous. The eventsof October1969 should therefore be acautionarytale for scholars and practitioners of coercive diplomacy ,a strongwarning against the temptationto issuesecret, but cheap,signals of increasedmilitary readiness in crises. Third,the historyof the October1969 alert provides another important, but discomforting,insight into the natureof commandand control of nuclear weapons.Americans tend toassume that democratic institutions will make better decisionsabout war and peace thanless democratic alternatives. Check andbalances, it is assumed, assure that a single irrationaland ignorant gure cannotcreate disaster .In October1969, however, Richard Nixon deliberately exceeded the strategicactions that he believed Soviet leaderswould perceive asthose of a “rationalactor” with nuclear weapons. Nixon brandished U.S. strategicnuclear forces to appearas amadmanin hisendeavor to coerce coop- erationfrom the Soviet Union andNorth V ietnam.It is worth asking, in retro- spect,whether thisbehavior really wasmadness. Nixonobviously did notcreate a nuclear disasterin October1969. Indeed, until Soviet andChinese archivesare fully opened, itwill be impossibleto as- TheMadman Nuclear Alert 181

sessprecisely howdangerous his actions really were. Butthe factremains that seniorof cials in the U.S. government,including the secretaryof defense, rmlybelieved thatthe commanderin chief andhis national security adviser were takingunnecessary and risky actions with U.S. strategicnuclear forces. They couldnot, however, check the directorders of the president. Fourth,this new evidence thatthe United Stateswent on a secretnuclear alertin October1969 should produce signicant modesty about how much scholarsreally knowabout Cold W arnuclear diplomacy .Scholarstoo often haveassumed that nuclear crisesended withthe Cuban missilecrisis and that nuclear deterrence under strategicparity automatically assured stability . 107 The fear ofnuclear devastation may well haveencouraged cautionand helped to prevent warduring numerouscon icts over Berlin, the TaiwanStrait, and Cuba.And itmay also be true thatthe ColdW arcrises after 1962 were less dangerousthan the crisesbefore Cuba.This, however ,isonly the easilyvisible partof the story.When one liftsthe veil ofsecrecy ,one canalso see moments when the presence oflargenuclear arsenalsand faith in deterrence encouraged riskyand even belligerent behavior.October 1969 may only be one suchcase, andfuture researchshould be ahigh priorityto expand scholarlyknowledge ofother still secret moments of nuclear crisisduring the ColdW ar. 108 rogueregimes and the madman theory Finally,the evidence ofcavalier and imprudent White Housebehavior in the ColdW arhighlights the inherent riskscreated by nuclear weaponsprolifera- tion.109 The spreadof nuclear weaponscapabilities will createnew temptations forgovernments (and potentially nonstate actors) to exploit their military

107.For thoughtful examples of this approachto nuclear weapons andthe history of the Cold War,see Gaddis, TheLong Peace, pp. 229–231, 237– 243; and Kenneth N.Waltz,“ MoreMay Be Better,”in Scott D.Saganand Waltz, TheSpread of Nuclear Weapons:A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W.Norton,2002), pp. 3–45. 108.Cold W arincidents andcrises thatdeserve renewed attention include the Jordaniancrisis of 1970,the Indo-PakistanW arof 1971,the October 1973Middle Eastwar, the false-warningincidents of 1979and 1981, the SACalert following the assassinationattempt of President RonaldReagan in 1981,and the events surroundingthe 1983Able Archer NATOexercises. Onthe last two topics, see HerbertL. Abrams, ThePresidentHas BeenShot: Confusion, Disability, and the T wenty-fth Amendment inthe Aftermath of theAttempted Assassination of RonaldReagan (New York:W .W.Norton, 1992), pp. 118–125; and Jeremi Suri,“ Explainingthe Endof the ColdW ar:A New Historical Consensus?” Journal of ColdWar Studies, Vol. 4,No.4 (Fall2002), pp. 68–71. 109.See Peter D.Feaver,“ Proliferation Optimism andTheories of Nuclear Operations,” Security Studies, Vol. 2,Nos. 3/ 4(Spring/Summer1993), pp. 159–191; Scott D.Sagan,“ MoreWill Be Worse,”in Saganand W altz, TheSpread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 46–87; and Marc Trachtenberg, “Waltzingto Armageddon,” National Interest, Vol. 69(Fall 2002), pp. 144–152. International Security 27:4182

power forpolitical purposes. American policymakers and scholars often as- sume thatstates controlled by powerful dictatorshostile to the United States are“ rogue states”and thus pose unique dangersto global stability . 110 There are certainlygood reasons to question the degree ofprudence oreven rationality exhibited in someof the mysteriousdecisions made by key leadersin so-called rogue nationsthat seek orhaveacquired nuclear weapons since the end ofthe ColdW ar.Forexample, itis dif cult to nd the logicor prudence behind SaddamHussein ´s1991Gulf Wardecision to launch a Scud missileat Israel ´s Dimonanuclear reactor,given thata successfulstrike might have led toa widespreadrelease ofradioactivityand likely Israelinuclear retaliationagainst Baghdad.111 Butit is also dif cult to be condent thatreasonable nuclear crisis decisionmakingwill takeplace in moredemocratic proliferant countries. For example, Pakistan ´sdemocraticallyelected Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif ap- provedthe 1999military incursion into Indian-held Kashmirwithout considering the strategicconsequences ofthe attackand may have not even known thathis nuclear-capable missileforces were put onalert during the ensuing crisis.112 The emerging evidence aboutnew nuclear powersand the once-secrethis- toryof the ColdW arpointto the samedisturbing conclusion.Leaders in democratic,undemocratic, and mixed regimes canbehave irresponsibly with nuclearweapons. Leaders in bothdemocracies and nondemocracies are sus- ceptible topoor decisionmaking and pressures that induce dangerousactivi- ties.Both can give commandsthat produce complexmilitary operations that they cannotcontrol. If thisargument is correct, there isa continuing need todiscourage potential nuclearstates from abandoning the NuclearNonproliferation T reaty(NPT) andtaking steps to acquire their ownnuclear weapons. But creating a safer worldwill alsorequire thatexisting nuclear states take their NPTcommit-

110.The best explanationand critique ofthe roguestate concept is Robert S.Litwak, RogueStates and U.S. ForeignPolicy: Containment after theCold War (Washington,D.C.: W oodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000). 111.See Avigdor Haselkorn, TheContinuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons,and Deterrence (New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999),pp. 72–75; and Timothy V .McCarthyand Jonathan B. Tucker,“ Saddam ´sToxic Arsenal,”in Peter R.Lavoy,Scott D.Sagan,and James J. Wirtz,eds., Planningthe Unthinkable: How New Powers WillUse Nuclear,Biological,and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 2000),pp. 47–78. 112.See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eyeof theStorm (New Haven,Conn.: Y ale University Press, 2002),pp. 100–104; and Bruce Reidel, American Diplomacyand the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Policy PaperSeries 2002(Philadelphia: Center forthe Advanced Studyof India,University of Pennsylvania,2002), http:/ /www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm. TheMadman Nuclear Alert 183

ment—to workin goodfaith toward eventual nucleardisarmament— more se- riously.Itis not at all likely ,ofcourse,that the worldwill reachthat ultimate goalanytime soon. Still, morerestraint in U.S. nuclear policy—such as acom- mitmentnot to develop new tacticalnuclear weapons, the adoptionof ano- rst-usedoctrine, and improved security assurances to potential adversaries— couldsignal the good-faithefforts promised under the NPT andmake it less likely thatthe United Stateswould use nuclearweapons in the future. Abetter understandingof the dangerscaused by nuclearweapons operations in the ColdW ar,including the 1969alert, may be helpful forboth objectives. It could usefully reduce the hubris thatpermits many Americans to think thatother governmentscannot control nuclear weapons but their governmentcan safely holdon tothermonuclearweapons forever. A better understandingof the past mayalso inspire moremodesty and self-criticism in contemporaryU.S. nuclear nonproliferationefforts. W ashingtonof cials should advise other state leaders toactwith the nuclearprudence thatAmerican administrations have long es- poused,but havenot always followed.