The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the End of Détente
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Alliance in Turmoil: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the End of Détente DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Anthony Richard Crain Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2012 Dissertation Committee: Professor Peter Hahn, Advisor Professor Robert McMahon Professor Carole Fink Copyright by Anthony Richard Crain 2012 Abstract This dissertation examines how the feud between President Jimmy Carter and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt caused a decisive shift in U.S.-allied relations at the end of the era of détente. It looks at how differences in leadership style, geopolitical strategy, and ideology caused Schmidt to reject the legitimacy of the American-Soviet global Cold War. The chapters that follow explore several points of contention between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), including Carter’s use of human rights rhetoric, the neutron bomb debacle, SALT II negotiations, the clash over the international economy, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The first chapter provides background on U.S.-FRG relations, examines the rise of Schmidt and Carter, the friendship Schmidt developed with Ford and Kissinger, and the initial clash between Carter and Schmidt. Chapter two centers on the feud between Washington and Bonn over the proper economic policy to promote globally. The United States pressured West Germany to follow American advice and use Keynesian measures to increase the West German growth rate. Schmidt’s anger with American economic policy, however, caused Schmidt to promote the European Monetary System to shield West Germany from the consequences of American economic policy. The third chapter examines how public opposition to the neutron weapon in Europe and the United States constrained policymakers’ decisions on both sides of the Atlantic, causing a debacle that did lasting harm to U.S.—FRG relations. Chapter four discusses Schmidt’s ii dissatisfaction with arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and his advancement of what would become NATO’s Double-Track Decision. That Double-Track Decision declared that NATO would seek to negotiate with the Soviet Union to dismantle Soviet intermediate missiles targeting Western Europe but would deploy over five hundred intermediate missiles to Europe four years after the agreement was signed in 1979 if the Soviets refused NATO’s requests. The fifth chapter examines the collapse of détente, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the intensification of the clash between Carter and Schmidt. By 1979 and 1980, Schmidt became convinced that Carter and his advisors did not understand international economics or the Soviet Union. He thought that to follow Carter’s suggestions to implement economic boycotts would devastate the Federal Republic’s economy and its relations with the East. iii Dedication This document is dedicated to my parents, Richard and Kerry Crain. iv Vita June 2002 .......................................................Anderson High School 2006................................................................B.A. History, Political Science. Indiana University 2008................................................................M.A. History, The Ohio State University 2007 to present ..............................................Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University Fields of Study Major Field: History v Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Dedication .......................................................................................................................... iv Vita ...................................................................................................................................... v Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: The Lip and the Smile .................................................................................... 12 Chapter 2: Carter’s Train Collides with Schmidt’s German Austerity, 1977-1978 ........ 62 Chapter 3: Neutron Diplomacy, 1977-1978 .................................................................. 110 Chapter 4: Dual Ambitions, 1979-1980 ......................................................................... 153 Chapter 5: The Carter Doctrine versus Schmidt’s Divisible Détente, 1979-1980 ........ 210 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 256 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………..265 vi Introduction At the start of a White House dinner on March 5, 1980, President Jimmy Carter began an exchange of toasts with Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, by joking: “When I tapped on my glass nobody got quiet but when— (laughter)—when Chancellor Schmidt tapped on his glass instantly absolute silence.” Carter then reminisced on how strong of a friend Schmidt had been throughout his time in office and praised the Chancellor for his experience, erudition, strength, and bravery. “Our alliance is firm and the solidarity of it is vital,” Carter affirmed, “and it is also extremely important to let the public know that there is no division among us, that we do stand together to face challenges, crises, and opportunities for the future.”1 When it was his turn to speak, Schmidt amicably responded by saying that Carter had said not a single word with which he could disagree. Ironically, these toasts belied nearly four years of mutual antipathy between the two leaders. This dissertation examines how the feud between President Jimmy Carter and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt caused a decisive shift in U.S.-allied relations at the end of the era of détente. It looks at how differences in leadership style, geopolitical strategy, and ideology caused Schmidt to reject the legitimacy of the American-Soviet global Cold War. The chapters that follow explore several points of contention between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 1 Exchange of Toasts between the President and Helmut Schmidt, 5 March 1980, National Security Affairs (NSA)—Brzezinski Material (BM), Schecter/Friendly (Press File), box 2, Folder: 3/5/80 Schmidt (Germany) Visit, 1—3 /80. Jimmy Carter Library (CL) (Atlanta, GA). 1 including Carter’s use of human rights rhetoric, the neutron bomb debacle, the SALT II negotiations, the clash over the international economy, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Under Schmidt’s leadership, the FRG became more independent and self- confident—a major development in post-World War II European and German history. During the Carter administration, the West German leader criticized, ignored, and occasionally defied American leadership. Thomas Schwartz argues in America’s Germany: “To the extent that America ruled an empire after 1945, …the Federal Republic of Germany was one of its most important ‘provinces.’”2 If the Federal Republic was indeed a “province” of an American empire, the developments of the late 1970s demonstrated the limits of American imperial power in Europe.3 By the 1970s, the Federal Republic was the most powerful West European nation in every traditional measure except nuclear weaponry. It possessed greater economic might than any other West European nation, and its share of global exports rivaled that of the United States. Yet the Germans were also feared by many people on both sides of the Iron Curtain—not for what they were in the late 1970s, but for what they had been and, in some imaginations, what they could become again if left to themselves. As a consequence of both strengths and constraints particular to Germany, Schmidt’s challenge to American hegemony differed greatly from and had greater reverberations 2 Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), x. 3 The FRG, in other words, was beginning to withdraw its invitation to empire. For a discussion of Western Europe’s initial granting of an invitation of an American empire see Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945—1952,” Journal of Peace Research 23 (September 1986): 263—77. Also, see Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). This dissertation describes a pivotal episode in the transition from an American transatlantic “‘Empire’ by Invitation” to transatlantic drift. 2 throughout Europe and the world than Charles De Gaulle’s challenge of a decade earlier. De Gaulle’s France, which had lacked Germany’s foreign policy constraints caused by the legacy of the Nazi period and a shared border with Warsaw Pact nations, developed its own nuclear stockpile eschewing reliance on America’s nuclear arsenal. Such a road was closed to the Federal Republic, but this limitation meant that policymakers had to justify their actions through NATO to promote German interests and preserve German security. This necessity to depend on a supranational organization combined with the enormous political and economic leverage wielded by the Federal Republic gave the Germans both the motive and the means to thwart,