David F. Schmitz. and the War: The End of the . Vietnam: America in the War Years Series. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefeld, 2014. 186 pp. $38.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-4422-2709-5.

Reviewed by Jefrey Kimball

Published on H-Diplo (September, 2014)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

David F. Schmitz, Skotheim Chair of History at This shift from a strategy of seeking “military Whitman College and author of several books on victory” to one of de-Americanization and Viet‐ U.S. foreign relations, begins his history of namization, Schmitz maintains, had become Richard Nixon’s views about and management of American strategy “by default” (p. 102); that is, it the U.S. war in Vietnam with Nixon’s vice presi‐ had been made necessary by the failure of Nixon’s dency in the 1950s. He continues through Nixon’s madman strategy and the absence of a viable al‐ ofce-seeking years during the 1960s, and con‐ ternative. The author suggests that his discovery cludes with his conduct of the war as president of this strategy shift warrants “a new periodiza‐ from January 1969 to his resignation in August tion of the war” (p. xv). Apparently because of the 1974. The author’s main thesis is that the exit of importance he places on this supposedly distinct U.S. forces from in June 30, 1970, initi‐ shift, the author’s focus is on the years 1953 to ated a “distinct” transition from Nixon’s initial 1971—from Nixon’s vice presidency to the U.S.- madman strategy to a quite diferent strategy by supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos mid-1971. The purpose of the madman theory, from February into April 1971. The critical period Schmitz stipulates, had been to achieve a “victory from that 1971 date to late January 1973 and the on the battlefeld” (p. xv); but the new strategy signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and consisted in the “de-escalation of American forces Restoring Peace receives much less attention, ap‐ and maintenance of the Saigon government intact proximately thirteen pages, less than 10 percent until after his reelection” (p. xiv). “The year 1970,” of the book. he concludes, “was to Nixon’s Vietnam policy Schmitz concludes that in the end Nixon was what 1968 had been to [Lyndon B.] Johnson’s, and unable to fulfll his “plan” to “support and supply Cambodia was his Tet Ofensive” (p. 104).[1] Saigon and to employ airpower to protect” South Vietnamese armed forces from Viet Cong and H-Net Reviews

North Vietnamese (VC/NVA) forces, because the le‐ documentary record clearly demonstrate that af‐ gal and political fallout from the Watergate break- ter Tet 1968, Nixon understood that a military vic‐ in forced the president from ofce (p. 143). He tory was not in the cards. When, for example, also emphasizes two other themes: Nixon’s war in Nixon received reports in late March 1968 about Vietnam can only be properly understood within President Johnson’s recent meeting with his Wise a context; and Nixon’s default Viet‐ Men, he confded to his campaign speech writers namization strategy signifed “the end of the that “there’s no way to win the war.” By this he American Century” (p. 109). It did so because “the meant that there was no way to defeat the other U.S. military could achieve only a stalemate in side militarily. Yet, like Johnson’s Wise Men, he Vietnam, thus leading to a defeat for its policy of continued to hope for a successful political out‐ limited war to contain communism,” which was come, and to this end, he needed “bargaining also accompanied by internal division within the leverage” to conclude the war “promptly on a ba‐ , Americans’ loss of “optimism and sis consistent with the strategic interests of the confdence,” and U.S. economic decline after the United States and the free Asian nations.”[3] An‐ most “turbulent and divisive moment” of the Unit‐ other example: while talking to Kissinger about ed States in the twentieth century (pp. 110, 41). President Nguyen Van Thieu’s suggested revisions Schmitz’s proposed “new” periodization of of the semifnal draft of a speech that Nixon was Nixonian strategy and his discussion of the mad‐ scheduled to deliver on May 14, 1969, he said: “In man theory are problematic. Nixon, Henry Saigon the tendency is to fght the war to victory. Kissinger, , and some journalists and It has to be kept in mind, but you and I know it historians have previously written about the tran‐ won’t happen—it is impossible. Even Gen. Abrams sition in U.S. strategy from one of trying to force agreed.”[4] an early end to the war on U.S. terms by some The madman theory was not about military point in 1970 to a “long-route” strategy emphasiz‐ victory but about coercing one’s opponent to com‐ ing de-Americanization and .[2] ply with one’s demands—in this case, attempting Furthermore, both major options—the short-route to coerce the Politburo in to accept the and the long-route strategies—were present in Nixon administration’s terms at the negotiating Nixon and Kissinger’s overall game plan from the table by threatening to unleash sudden and exces‐ start of the administration in late January 1969. sive force against should the Polit‐ As time passed, the detailed components of the buro fail to comply. The administration delivered game plan were flled in. It evolved in response to such threats via public statements; secret diplo‐ the circumstances of the war, the political climate matic channels; third parties; direct messages to on the homefront, the actions of Hanoi and the Hanoi; and escalated military operations, includ‐ National Liberation Front at the negotiating table ing the expansion of bombing in Laos and the and on the feld of battle, ’s response to bombing of VC/NVA base areas along the Cambo‐ Washington’s carrot-and-stick diplomacy, and in‐ dian border. For Nixon and Kissinger, extraordi‐ ternal debates within the administration. nary military measures not only had military pur‐ Nixon’s madman theory was indeed an im‐ poses but also were intended to signal the presi‐ portant element in the overall strategy, but dent’s “mad” willingness to do the unexpected Schmitz is incorrect in suggesting that the pur‐ and the possibility of his spinning “out of con‐ pose of the madman strategy was designed to trol.”[5] When coupled with implicit threats of nu‐ achieve “military victory” or a “victory on the bat‐ clear force, the madman theory was similar to the tlefeld.” The extant recollections of aides and the of former President Dwight Eisen‐

2 H-Net Reviews hower and his secretary of state John Foster while highlighting his program of gradually and Dulles, Nixon’s foreign policy mentors. unilaterally withdrawing U.S. troops, coupled Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger were not with Vietnamization. seeking a political victory; or at least they under‐ In the days and weeks that followed, and well stood that such a victory was unlikely or impossi‐ before the invasion of Cambodia at the end of ble. Schmitz does at some level, I think, under‐ April 1970, he and Kissinger began the transition stand this. On at least two occasions, he implies or to the long-route strategy. The invasion was main‐ hints that the military force Nixon and Kissinger ly an efort to protect Vietnamization and the deployed or threatened to launch was primarily long-route withdrawal strategy—not by achieving intended to keep Thieu’s government in power a military victory, as Schmitz elsewhere suggests, until at least the end of 1972 or for a fnite period but, as he also acknowledges here and there (e.g., after Nixon’s reelection (pp. xiv, 110-111). In other pp. 88 and 91), setting back possible VC/NVA ef‐ words, its purpose was not to bring about and en‐ forts to launch ofensives into in sure a real military or political “victory”: the de‐ the near future. The invasion of Cambodia was feat of VC/NVA armed forces and the establish‐ not, however, a failure in the sense Schmitz ment of a permanently independent South Viet‐ claims, and it was not equivalent to the impact of nam. But the author’s frequent use of the term Tet 1968 on President Johnson, Congress, and the “military victory” and the absence of a substan‐ U.S. public.[6] In addition, it was not the defning tive analysis of the kind of war ending that Nixon moment in Nixon’s or the end of the and Kissinger actually sought and planned for “the American Century.”[7] creates the impression that by “military victory” De-Americanization and Vietnamization were the author means military victory. default strategies only in the sense that DUCK As for strategic periodization, the most likely HOOK, the centerpiece of the short-route strategy, date for a major alteration in administration strat‐ had been abandoned by Nixon in the face of sev‐ egy was not during the period after the U.S. exit eral considerations: negative analyses of its poten‐ from Cambodia in June 1970 but rather during tial for success by Laird, the Joint Chiefs of Staf, and after the weeks from early October into No‐ and several of Kissinger’s own staf; Hanoi’s resis‐ vember 1969, when Nixon aborted the planning tance to his threats; Soviet noncooperation with and implementation of his long-threatened min‐ Washington; and Nixon’s concerns about his abili‐ ing-and-bombing assault against North Vietnam, a ty to hold the government and nation together for plan often referred to in the historical literature the six months or more projected for the opera‐ as DUCK HOOK. This prospective operation had tion to succeed (assuming it could succeed). The been tentatively scheduled to begin in early No‐ alternative long-route strategy was not a default vember should Hanoi fail to meet Nixon’s Novem‐ strategy in the sense of Nixon having been forced ber 1 deadline for yielding to his threats and ac‐ by circumstances to withdraw in a haphazard, un‐ cepting his negotiating demands. In his televised planned manner. It was an alternate strategy of speech to the nation on November 3—an address choice. There was a method, purpose, and that was originally intended to announce the timetable associated with the withdrawal, as commencement of DUCK HOOK—President Nixon Schmitz acknowledges in several places. On the not only appealed to the “” for sup‐ advice of Kissinger, Nixon’s stretch-out of U.S. port, criticized opponents of the war, and castigat‐ troop withdrawals was keyed to the 1972 U.S. ed North Vietnam’s belligerence, but also touted presidential election and the signing of a suitable his own eforts to achieve a negotiated settlement negotiated settlement. At the same time, Nixon

3 H-Net Reviews and Kissinger continued to apply military force four additional citations from volume 9. These and the madman stratagem to achieve their ends. three volumes were published between 2006 and During the next three years, for example, their 2010 and include U.S. records for the periods Jan‐ mad signaling included “protective reaction” uary 1969 to January 1972 and October 1972 to strikes in southern North Vietnam and the LINE‐ January 1973. The author points out in his intro‐ BACKER II operation in December 1972; Nixon duction that they contain “the most recently de‐ also issued madman threats in relation to other classifed documents” (p. xv). But a qualifcation events—for example, the Jordanian crisis of Sep‐ should be added: they contain only some of the tember 1970. most recently declassifed documents. FRUS vol‐ In addition to emphasizing U.S. troop with‐ umes are convenient, indispensable, and much drawals and Vietnamization, Nixon and Kissinger appreciated. Unavoidably, however, FRUS editors stepped up their eforts to extend the carrots of must make decisions about what documents or détente to the and foster rapproche‐ portions of documents to include or exclude—de‐ ment with the People’s Republic of , in part cisions with which other editors and historians to enlist their assistance in persuading Hanoi to may disagree. The key issue for historians is the compromise on Washington’s negotiation terms. relationship between their own research needs Although the author makes much of placing and these editorial choices. Nixon’s Vietnam War within a Cold War context, Also missing from Schmitz’s sources are other he gives little attention to the Great Power game important and relevant volumes published by the Nixon and Kissinger were trying to play, which in‐ Historian’s Ofce; for example, Vietnam War cluded such tactics as not only détente and rap‐ FRUS volume 8, which covers, even if partially, prochement but also triangular diplomacy and the crucial months of January 1972 through the . Nor does he defne the nature of the Cold frst week of October 1972; FRUS volumes 12, 13, War or its evolution from Nixon’s early encounter 14, 17, and 19 in the Nixon series having to do with it in the 1940s and 1950s compared to his with the Soviet Union, China, and National Securi‐ perceptions in the 1960s and 1970s, by which time ty Policy (2006-11); and Soviet-American Rela‐ Moscow and Beijing were engaged in a bitter feud tions: The Détente Years, 1969-1972 (2007), which and the Soviets had achieved nuclear parity with includes both USSR and U.S. transcripts of conver‐ the United States. Was the Cold War merely a sations between Anatoly Dobrynin and Kissinger. Great Power struggle based mainly on considera‐ All of these sources reproduce documents that tions of the “balance of power” and generalized have a critically important bearing on Nixon ad‐ “national interest” or was it also cultural and eco‐ ministration policy and strategy toward the Viet‐ nomic in nature? Were Nixon’s concerns about nam War. Other omissions from Schmitz’s cita‐ the fate of South Vietnam only about falling domi‐ tions include English-language histories and docu‐ nos, “commitment,” and “credibility” or also mentary collections concerning the Vietnamese. about perceived threats of anticapitalist revolu‐ In addition, there are many still-valuable and in‐ tion to U.S. hegemony? These Cold War issues are formative memoirs, biographies, and histories not discussed. about all sides in the confict that are not cited at In telling his story, Schmitz draws mainly on all or not often enough; they include information, newspapers, Nixon’s Public Papers, and U.S. docu‐ analyses, interpretations, perspectives, anecdotes, ments in volumes 6 and 7 of the Foreign Relations interviews, and conjectures unavailable in raw of the United States (FRUS) about the Nixon ad‐ documentary collections. ministration’s handling of the Vietnam War, with

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Imposed brevity may be the reason that some that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable source citations are absent and why Schmitz’s chance to survive as a free people?” (p. 121). narrative is truncated for the period after Giving Thieu a “reasonable chance” was quite mid-1971. His volume is one in the Rowman & Lit‐ diferent from preserving him in power indef‐ tlefeld series on the Cold War span from the nitely. Kissinger, for example, told Dobrynin in mid-1950s to mid-1970s—a series that by design April 1969: “We are not committing ourselves to consists in “brief and engaging volumes” preserve the present Saigon administration forev‐ (frontispiece). Even considering that, Schmitz er,” but a negotiated agreement should stipulate might have chosen to compress the frst two chap‐ that South Vietnam would be “a separate and in‐ ters about Nixon’s pre-presidential years (1953 to dependent” entity “for at least fve years.” To 1968)—perhaps cutting back, for example, on quo‐ Haig, Nixon said on October 3, 1972: “Call it cos‐ tations from Nixon’s public speeches—in order to metics or whatever you want. This has got to be more fully or adequately deal with the second done in a way that will give South Vietnam a half of 1971 and the crucial months of 1972 into chance to survive. It doesn’t have to survive for‐ 1973. ever. It’s got to survive for a reasonable time. Furthermore, important events and issues for Then everybody can say ’goddamn, we did our the years 1969 to 1973—aside from détente and part.’” By 1972, three years after Kissinger’s com‐ rapprochement—receive scant mention or go ment to Dobrynin, the prospective interval had missing altogether. Among these are the original shrunk to one or two years. In an Oval Ofce con‐ July 1969 DUCK HOOK plan for mining Haiphong; versation between Nixon and Kissinger on August the nuclear alert of October 1969 and its relation‐ 3, 1972, Kissinger reminded the president of the ship to the mining-and-bombing concept plan value of holding “the thing together a year or known as DUCK HOOK; and PRUNING KNIFE, the two.”[8] These are just a few of the many docu‐ Joint Chiefs’ alternate concept to DUCK HOOK. mented statements recorded on tape or in state Also receiving little attention are the 1972 LINE‐ papers made by Nixon and Kissinger about the BACKER operations, the crucial U.S. negotiations strategy but not addressed or ex‐ with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during plored in this book. the last months of the war, and an analysis of the The decent interval thesis also helps explain Nixon-Kissinger relationship. the apparently paradoxical strategy that Nixon I would be remiss if I did not point out that and Kissinger pursued and that Schmitz believes there is also no specifc mention in his narrative was indeed contradictory: combining madman of Nixon and Kissinger’s decent chance/decent in‐ threats and military force with troop with‐ terval exit strategy, with the exception of one ref‐ drawals, yet placing a political and policy empha‐ erence on page 146, where the author comments sis on maintaining U.S. credibility in support of al‐ on two of my books. This despite the author’s ar‐ lies. The decent interval solution was designed to gument in one or two places that Nixon’s preserve the appearance of Nixon’s credibility de‐ post-1970 default strategy became one of keeping spite his having withdrawn from South Vietnam Thieu in power until the 1972 U.S. presidential while leaving Northern forces in the South and election. He also quotes a 1971 public speech by acknowledging the Provisional Revolutionary Nixon in which the president said: “The issue is ... Government’s political authority in the territory it this: Shall we leave Vietnam in a way that—by our occupied or controlled. Such credibility was own actions—consciously turns the country over achieved not only by the passage of an interval of to the Communists? Or shall we leave in a way a little over two years before Thieu’s fall but also

5 H-Net Reviews by Nixon, Kissinger, and the political Right’s nar‐ 1972 (a political goal). Thus Nixon’s policy aim of rative of portraying the 1973 cease-fre-in-place exiting Indochina with honor and credibility agreement as a victory and of blaming others for came down to giving Nguyen Van Thieu a chance the in 1975; namely, the antiwar to survive for a decent interval after the U.S. exit; movement, the press, and Congress.[9] whereas his military and diplomatic strategy vis- Concerning the role of Congress in the fall of à-vis Hanoi, Moscow, and Beijing to achieve this Saigon, there is, however, no credible evidence to goal—ofering carrots and brandishing sticks, for my knowledge that its supposed paucity of sup‐ example—constituted his and ’s port for Saigon or its pursuit of the Watergate in‐ strategy. It is perhaps a fne point but one that, I vestigation had any impact on the fate of Saigon think, facilitates understanding. or that Nixon had an actual “plan” to reenter the [2]. Among works by historians that discuss fray in the event of a North Vietnamese invasion the transition in strategy are my books Nixon’s of the South. To a large extent, the proof is in the Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kan‐ pudding: neither President nor Secre‐ sas, 1998) and Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the tary of State Kissinger resumed the bombing of Sceret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: NVA forces in 1974 or 1975 or seriously consid‐ University Press of Kansas, 2004), as well as a ered doing so. Nor is there any evidence that number of anthology chapters, journal articles, Nixon would have done so had the Watergate in‐ and reviews published before and after these vestigation not been carried out or had he re‐ books. In all of these publications (and with in‐ tained the presidency; and there is no way of creasing reliance on recently declassifed docu‐ demonstrating that such bombing could have ments and tapes and a better understanding of changed the outcome. this history), I discuss the evolution and transition Schmitz’s book has some good and useful pas‐ of Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy from one initial‐ sages in the frst two chapters about Nixon’s views ly placing more emphasis on a madman strategy on the war before he became president, and with than on Vietnamization to one after November a few important revisions, this volume could 1969 of placing increasing emphasis on a strategy serve as a convenient summary account of that included prolonged U.S. force withdrawals Nixon’s role in the Vietnam War. But as an inter‐ timed to the 1972 election, Vietnamization, trian‐ pretation of Nixon’s Vietnam strategies and poli‐ gular diplomacy, and the decent interval solution cies, it raises more questions than it answers. —but without dismissing military force and mad‐ man ploys. Schmitz kindly mentions my books in Notes his conclusion and somewhat accurately de‐ [1]. Schmitz often uses the word “policy” for scribes my thesis but states that his account repre‐ what I and perhaps others would consider to be sents a “richer understanding” (p. 146). “strategy” and “tactics.” “Policy,” I think, should [3]. Nixon quoted in Richard J. Whalen, Catch refer mostly to state goals, while the military, the Falling Flag: A Republican’s Challenge to His diplomatic, and political methods and means with Party (Boston: Houghton Mifin Co., 1972), 26. which state actors attempt to achieve their goals constitute their strategy. It seems to me, for exam‐ [4]. Telcon transcript, Nixon and Kissinger, ple, that Vietnamization and the threat or actual 11:30 p.m., May 12, 1969, Henry A. Kissinger Tel‐ escalation of military force were strategies aimed cons, Richard Nixon Presidential Library (RNPL). at achieving the administration’s policy goals in At the Nixon-Thieu meeting on Midway on June 8, Indochina—viz., exiting with “honor” while pre‐ 1969, Thieu conceded—rhetorically at least—that serving “credibility” and winning reelection in “neither side can win militarily”; MemCon, Nixon,

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Thieu, Kissinger, Nguyen Phu Duc, June 8, 1969, quires more precise conceptualization and fuller Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, analysis. vol. 6 (2006), doc. 81, p. 249. [8]. Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, April 12, 1969, [5]. Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, March 20, subject My Talking Points with Dobrynin, Soviet- 1969, subject Vietnam Situation and Options, fold‐ American Relations: The Détente Years, er 7, box 89, National Security Council Files: Viet‐ 1969-1972, ed. David C. Geyer, Douglas E. Selvage, nam Subject Files, RNPL. and Edward C. Keefer (Washington DC: U.S. De‐ [6]. Tet 1968 was a Viet Cong ofensive that partment of State, 2007), doc. 17, p. 50nn3, 5; Tele‐ was turned back or militarily defeated after hard gram (Extremely Urgent), Dobrynin to Soviet For‐ fghting, but it produced signifcant political and eign Ministry, April 15, 1969, in ibid., doc. 19, pp. psychological consequences in the United States; 53-56; Executive Ofce Building Conversation no. e.g., a critical mass of U.S. citizens, opinion mak‐ 371-19, Nixon and Haig, October 23, 1972, White ers, and politicians were persuaded that the war House Tapes, RNPL; and Oval Ofce Conversation was not being won and could not be won militari‐ no. 760-6, Nixon and Kissinger, 8:28-8:57 a.m., Au‐ ly. It was a major factor in Johnson’s withdrawal gust 3, 1972, White House Tapes, RNPL. from the presidential race, and it emboldened dis‐ [9]. In my view, Schmitz’s association of de- sent against the war. In contrast, the 1970 U.S./ Americanization and Vietnamization with the South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia met with constitutes another paradox for some success in destroying or damaging VC/NVA these reasons: (a) Nixon announced the “doctrine” headquarters and munitions stores. It was not a in July 1969, but it was not until July 1970 and af‐ decisive success, but it was not designed to be terward, according to Schmitz, that he empha‐ that. In any case, it was not a military, political, or sized Vietnamization over a victory strategy; (b) psychological defeat for the administration. Reac‐ according to the author, Vietnamization was a de‐ tions in the United States were mixed. On the one fault strategy, i.e., one forced on Nixon because of hand, Nixon’s political base supported the opera‐ the failure of his previous strategy, which contra‐ tion. On the other hand, the killing of students at dicts the argument that it followed from “doc‐ Kent State and Jackson State, coupled with mass trine”; and (c) in any case, I do not regard the so- demonstrations across the United States, troubled called Nixon Doctrine as a doctrine (see my arti‐ Nixon but did not cause him to resign or pull out cle, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunder‐ of the 1972 election or alter his strategy. The long- standing,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 route Vietnam strategy he had already embarked [March 2006]: 59-74). upon continued; indeed, the invasion had been designed to protect this strategy. Moreover, al‐ most a year after the invasion, Nixon and Kissinger initiated and supported a South Viet‐ namese invasion of Laos. [7]. Assuming there was such a thing as an “American Century,” other writers have men‐ tioned 1968 as a turning point or at least the be‐ ginning of U.S. hegemonic decline, a decline relat‐ ed not only to U.S. reversals in Vietnam but also to global economic changes extending over decades. In any case, Schmitz’s claim is problematic and re‐

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Citation: Jefrey Kimball. Review of Schmitz, David F. Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. September, 2014.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=41755

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