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David F. Schmitz. Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: the End of the American Century

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David F. Schmitz. Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: the End of the American Century David F. Schmitz. Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century. Vietnam: America in the War Years Series. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 186 pp. $38.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-4422-2709-5. Reviewed by Jeffrey Kimball Published on H-Diplo (September, 2014) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) David F. Schmitz, Skotheim Chair of History at This shift from a strategy of seeking “military Whitman College and author of several books on victory” to one of de-Americanization and Viet‐ U.S. foreign relations, begins his history of namization, Schmitz maintains, had become Richard Nixon’s views about and management of American strategy “by default” (p. 102); that is, it the U.S. war in Vietnam with Nixon’s vice presi‐ had been made necessary by the failure of Nixon’s dency in the 1950s. He continues through Nixon’s madman strategy and the absence of a viable al‐ office-seeking years during the 1960s, and con‐ ternative. The author suggests that his discovery cludes with his conduct of the war as president of this strategy shift warrants “a new periodiza‐ from January 1969 to his resignation in August tion of the war” (p. xv). Apparently because of the 1974. The author’s main thesis is that the exit of importance he places on this supposedly distinct U.S. forces from Cambodia in June 30, 1970, initi‐ shift, the author’s focus is on the years 1953 to ated a “distinct” transition from Nixon’s initial 1971—from Nixon’s vice presidency to the U.S.- madman strategy to a quite different strategy by supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos mid-1971. The purpose of the madman theory, from February into April 1971. The critical period Schmitz stipulates, had been to achieve a “victory from that 1971 date to late January 1973 and the on the battlefield” (p. xv); but the new strategy signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and consisted in the “de-escalation of American forces Restoring Peace receives much less attention, ap‐ and maintenance of the Saigon government intact proximately thirteen pages, less than 10 percent until after his reelection” (p. xiv). “The year 1970,” of the book. he concludes, “was to Nixon’s Vietnam policy Schmitz concludes that in the end Nixon was what 1968 had been to [Lyndon B.] Johnson’s, and unable to fulfill his “plan” to “support and supply Cambodia was his Tet Offensive” (p. 104).[1] Saigon and to employ airpower to protect” South Vietnamese armed forces from Viet Cong and H-Net Reviews North Vietnamese (VC/NVA) forces, because the le‐ documentary record clearly demonstrate that af‐ gal and political fallout from the Watergate break- ter Tet 1968, Nixon understood that a military vic‐ in forced the president from office (p. 143). He tory was not in the cards. When, for example, also emphasizes two other themes: Nixon’s war in Nixon received reports in late March 1968 about Vietnam can only be properly understood within President Johnson’s recent meeting with his Wise a Cold War context; and Nixon’s default Viet‐ Men, he confided to his campaign speech writers namization strategy signified “the end of the that “there’s no way to win the war.” By this he American Century” (p. 109). It did so because “the meant that there was no way to defeat the other U.S. military could achieve only a stalemate in side militarily. Yet, like Johnson’s Wise Men, he Vietnam, thus leading to a defeat for its policy of continued to hope for a successful political out‐ limited war to contain communism,” which was come, and to this end, he needed “bargaining also accompanied by internal division within the leverage” to conclude the war “promptly on a ba‐ United States, Americans’ loss of “optimism and sis consistent with the strategic interests of the confidence,” and U.S. economic decline after the United States and the free Asian nations.”[3] An‐ most “turbulent and divisive moment” of the Unit‐ other example: while talking to Kissinger about ed States in the twentieth century (pp. 110, 41). President Nguyen Van Thieu’s suggested revisions Schmitz’s proposed “new” periodization of of the semifinal draft of a speech that Nixon was Nixonian strategy and his discussion of the mad‐ scheduled to deliver on May 14, 1969, he said: “In man theory are problematic. Nixon, Henry Saigon the tendency is to fght the war to victory. Kissinger, Melvin Laird, and some journalists and It has to be kept in mind, but you and I know it historians have previously written about the tran‐ won’t happen—it is impossible. Even Gen. Abrams sition in U.S. strategy from one of trying to force agreed.”[4] an early end to the war on U.S. terms by some The madman theory was not about military point in 1970 to a “long-route” strategy emphasiz‐ victory but about coercing one’s opponent to com‐ ing de-Americanization and Vietnamization.[2] ply with one’s demands—in this case, attempting Furthermore, both major options—the short-route to coerce the Politburo in Hanoi to accept the and the long-route strategies—were present in Nixon administration’s terms at the negotiating Nixon and Kissinger’s overall game plan from the table by threatening to unleash sudden and exces‐ start of the administration in late January 1969. sive force against North Vietnam should the Polit‐ As time passed, the detailed components of the buro fail to comply. The administration delivered game plan were flled in. It evolved in response to such threats via public statements; secret diplo‐ the circumstances of the war, the political climate matic channels; third parties; direct messages to on the homefront, the actions of Hanoi and the Hanoi; and escalated military operations, includ‐ National Liberation Front at the negotiating table ing the expansion of bombing in Laos and the and on the feld of battle, Moscow’s response to bombing of VC/NVA base areas along the Cambo‐ Washington’s carrot-and-stick diplomacy, and in‐ dian border. For Nixon and Kissinger, extraordi‐ ternal debates within the administration. nary military measures not only had military pur‐ Nixon’s madman theory was indeed an im‐ poses but also were intended to signal the presi‐ portant element in the overall strategy, but dent’s “mad” willingness to do the unexpected Schmitz is incorrect in suggesting that the pur‐ and the possibility of his spinning “out of con‐ pose of the madman strategy was designed to trol.”[5] When coupled with implicit threats of nu‐ achieve “military victory” or a “victory on the bat‐ clear force, the madman theory was similar to the tlefield.” The extant recollections of aides and the brinkmanship of former President Dwight Eisen‐ 2 H-Net Reviews hower and his secretary of state John Foster while highlighting his program of gradually and Dulles, Nixon’s foreign policy mentors. unilaterally withdrawing U.S. troops, coupled Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger were not with Vietnamization. seeking a political victory; or at least they under‐ In the days and weeks that followed, and well stood that such a victory was unlikely or impossi‐ before the invasion of Cambodia at the end of ble. Schmitz does at some level, I think, under‐ April 1970, he and Kissinger began the transition stand this. On at least two occasions, he implies or to the long-route strategy. The invasion was main‐ hints that the military force Nixon and Kissinger ly an effort to protect Vietnamization and the deployed or threatened to launch was primarily long-route withdrawal strategy—not by achieving intended to keep Thieu’s government in power a military victory, as Schmitz elsewhere suggests, until at least the end of 1972 or for a fnite period but, as he also acknowledges here and there (e.g., after Nixon’s reelection (pp. xiv, 110-111). In other pp. 88 and 91), setting back possible VC/NVA ef‐ words, its purpose was not to bring about and en‐ forts to launch offensives into South Vietnam in sure a real military or political “victory”: the de‐ the near future. The invasion of Cambodia was feat of VC/NVA armed forces and the establish‐ not, however, a failure in the sense Schmitz ment of a permanently independent South Viet‐ claims, and it was not equivalent to the impact of nam. But the author’s frequent use of the term Tet 1968 on President Johnson, Congress, and the “military victory” and the absence of a substan‐ U.S. public.[6] In addition, it was not the defining tive analysis of the kind of war ending that Nixon moment in Nixon’s Vietnam War or the end of the and Kissinger actually sought and planned for “the American Century.”[7] creates the impression that by “military victory” De-Americanization and Vietnamization were the author means military victory. default strategies only in the sense that DUCK As for strategic periodization, the most likely HOOK, the centerpiece of the short-route strategy, date for a major alteration in administration strat‐ had been abandoned by Nixon in the face of sev‐ egy was not during the period after the U.S. exit eral considerations: negative analyses of its poten‐ from Cambodia in June 1970 but rather during tial for success by Laird, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and after the weeks from early October into No‐ and several of Kissinger’s own staff; Hanoi’s resis‐ vember 1969, when Nixon aborted the planning tance to his threats; Soviet noncooperation with and implementation of his long-threatened min‐ Washington; and Nixon’s concerns about his abili‐ ing-and-bombing assault against North Vietnam, a ty to hold the government and nation together for plan often referred to in the historical literature the six months or more projected for the opera‐ as DUCK HOOK.
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