CROSSING OCEANS WITH WORDS: DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, 1945-1969 Chloe Koscheva-Scissons A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS May 2015 Committee: Michael Brooks, Advisor Dwayne Beggs © 2015 Chloe Jean Koscheva-Scissons All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Michael Brooks, Advisor From the start of the First Indochina War to the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, Vietnamese and Americans (each with their many allies) fought to claim Vietnam in the name of communism or democracy. While violent bloodshed and constant miscommunication did occur quite frequently, both parties attempted to cross cultural boundaries in hopes of negotiation. This project focuses upon cross-cultural communication from 1945-1969. I highlight letters and telegrams between the following American presidents and North, South Vietnamese leaders: Ho Chi Minh and Harry Truman, Ngo Dinh Diem and Dwight Eisenhower, Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy, Ho Chi Minh and Lyndon B. Johnson, and Ho Chi Minh and Richard Nixon. I use more personalized forms of communication to create interconnections rather than continue to emphasize cultural disconnect and misunderstanding. Specifically, I argue that despite ideological and socio-cultural differences, each leader did strive and hope for something other than war. Unfortunately, these individuals remained steadfastly devoted to the idea of ideology and victory more than peaceful resolution. Letters, telegrams, memorandums, and meetings serve as the main primary sources for this project. Since the release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, government documents pertaining to the Vietnam War have been declassified, transcribed, and made public. In particular, this project utilizes the National Archives’ digital collection of the Pentagon Papers and Office of the Historian’s digital Foreign Relations of the United States. iv For My Parents and Sister, Mia v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I owe a debt of gratitude to the support, guidance, and inspiration of the people around me and only wish I could do them more justice in this short section. This project would not have been possible without Dr. Michael Brooks. I first discovered the many rich histories of the Vietnam Wars through his undergraduate course. Throughout this project (and in other courses), he has offered invaluable insight, wisdom, and endless advice while encouraging me to develop my own scholarly voice. The extremely helpful comments and careful reading by my committee, Dr. Dwayne Beggs, were also key to the project’s completion. To the scholars and staff of the Office of the Historian’s FRUS series and National Archives’ Pentagon Papers, thank you. Without the compilation and digitization of thousands of memorandums, letters, telegrams, and meetings, I could not imagine writing this thesis. Finally, to my family, who were a bedrock of support during this process, a simple thank you does not suffice. During all the research, revisions, and formatting, you never allowed me to forget my own potential and proved to be my greatest source of inspiration. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page “CROSSING OCEANS WITH WORDS:” AN INTRODUCTION………………………. 1 RESEARCH METHODS AND LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………. 2 CHAPTER ONE: “SPEAKING THROUGH SILENCE:” HARRY TRUMAN AND HO CHI MINH ……………………………………………………………….. .................................. 20 From Communist Foe to Catholic Friend ………………………………………….. 32 CHAPTER TWO: “FALLING DOMINOES ON DIEN BIEN PHU:” DWIGHT EISENHOWER AND NGO DINH DIEM… ................................................................................................... 37 CHAPTER THREE: “A WORLD ON THE BRINK:”JOHN F. KENNEDY AND NGO DINH DIEM ……………………………. ....................................................................................... 51 From Diem and Back ……………………………………………………………… 69 CHAPTER FOUR: “AN ENDLESS QUAGMIRE:” LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND HO CHI MINH ……………………………………………………………… .................................... 72 CHAPTER FIVE: “NON-NEGOTIABLE NEGOTIATIONS:” RICHARD NIXON AND HO CHI MINH ………………………………………………………………………………… 85 “CROSSING OCEANS WITH WORDS:” A CONCLUSION …………………………. ... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………… ............. 100 APPENDIX A: LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS FROM HO CHI MINH TO HARRY TRUMAN ………………………………………………………............................................................ 115 APPENDIX B: LETTERS AND MEMORANDUMS BETWEEN DWIGHT EISENHOWER AND NGO DINH DIEM ……………………………………………………….. ................ 121 vii APPENDIX C: LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS BETWEEN JOHN F. KENNEDY AND NGO DINH DIEM ……………………………………………………………. ............................ 137 APPENDIX D: LETTER EXCHANGE BETWEEN LYNDON B. JOH NSON AND HO CHI MINH …………………………………………………………. ........................................... 162 APPENDIX E: LETTER EXCHANGE BETWEEN RICHARD NIXON AND HO CHI MINH ………………………………………………………............................................................ 165 1 “CROSSING OCEANS WITH WORDS:” AN INTRODUCTION The Vietnam War was a war of missteps, misunderstandings, and misconceptions. Ambiguity and complexity only begin to explain what seem like never-ending contradictions, whether in military strategy, ideological framework, or foreign policymaking. Even into the 21st century, scholars continue to debate the factors and individuals most responsible for the war. Was it Ho Chi Minh, fervent nationalist and communist despot? Ngo Dinh Diem, autocratic American puppet? Harry Truman, anti-communist traditionalist devoted to ideology? Dwight Eisenhower, absent leader and indefatigable Cold Warrior? Lyndon B. Johnson, egoistic and forever indecisive schemer? Or Richard Nixon, paranoid liar, manipulator, and aggressive game- player? Rather than engage in a continuation of the efforts to assign blame, this thesis examines and reinterprets these human embodiments of the Cold War, recognizing that all of their flaws, faults, and triumphs contributed to a deeply multifaceted war. In particular, this project analyzes the letters and telegrams of U.S. presidents and two Vietnamese leaders, exploring the nuances of policymaking and individual ideology instead of overlooking these documents for their more personal approach to diplomacy. The letters and telegrams between Diem, Ho, and the American presidents (albeit with some elements of diplomatic etiquette) reveal surprising similarities, which suggest that despite what seemed to be insurmountable differences – ideological and socio-cultural – each did hope and strive for something other than war. Unfortunately, these individuals remained steadfastly devoted to the idea of ideology and victory more than peaceful resolution and thus orchestrated1 one of the most devastating wars of the twentieth century. 1 Note: Ho, Diem, and the American presidents were certainly part of vast and complex networks of advisors, military leaders, citizens, etc., all who contributed to the war. However, given their authority and leadership positions, they were key components of the war - its processes, ideologies, and frameworks. 2 RESEARCH METHODS AND LITERATURE REVIEW During the Cold War, policymakers, presidents, and military leaders regularly communicated, whether through memorandums, telephone calls, telegrams and letters, or face- to-face conservations. These written communiqués have been recorded and transcribed for scholars and the public through such collections as the Office of the Historian’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and the National Archives’ Pentagon Papers. This project examines how diplomatic communication becomes personalized when two warring parties attempted to communicate with each other one-on-one, primarily in letters or telegrams. Interestingly, during the Eisenhower presidency, Ngo Dinh Diem was afforded the unique opportunity to visit the Oval Office, which provided not only in-person communication, but also resulted in in-depth written records. Ultimately, what made these forms of communication more personal was the direct contact between presidents and Vietnamese leaders as they exchanged ideas or tried to negotiate. While dialogue failed to support cooperation or at least prevent further prolonged warfare, it highlighted unique attempts to cross vast cultural and socio-political oceans with words of diplomacy. The process of composing letters and telegrams was not simply delegated by the various presidents, but by his networks of advisors, policymakers, personal confidants, and allies. Letter writing was collaborative; for example, after a meeting with Lyndon Johnson, Ngo Dinh Diem was encouraged to write a letter to John F. Kennedy. Given lingual differences - French, Vietnamese, and English - this letter crossed the boundaries between American and South Vietnamese administrations. Kennedy’s subsequent response ran through its own channels of approval with drafting and rewording by key advisors in the administration.2 Moreover, letters 2 William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 260-1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961, IV. Vice President 3 became rhetorical, tactical, and political devices, particularly those released to the public in the Department of State Bulletin. Publicized exchanges revealed to the American people that progress was being made (or at least attempted), alliances were forged, and negotiations were proposed. However, these political motives do not devalue the communication