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A New Nation Struggles to Find Its Footing: Power Struggles, 1789-1804

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A New Nation Struggles to Find Its Footing: Power Struggles, 1789-1804 William Kaufmann “Fail-Deadly” “Brinkmanship” is the practice of The Madman theory was a Wrote in 1950 “Limited War”, a A concept in nuclear military strategy pushing a dangerous situation to the primary characteristic of the paper that argued for the expansion which encouraged deterrence by verge of disaster in order to achieve foreign policy conducted by of Western European conventional guaranteeing an immediate, automatic the most advantageous outcome. This Richard Nixon. armies instead of a reliance on and overwhelming response to an maneuver succeeds by forcing the His administration attempted nuclear weapons to forestall an attack. opposition to back down and make to make the leaders of other invasion by the Soviet Union. An example may be found concessions. Done through diplomatic countries think Nixon was imbedded in second strike strategy, means after creating the impression mad, and that his behavior “Countervalue” refers to targeting wherein following a first strike, the that one is willing to use extreme was irrational and volatile. civilian infrastructure (cities, dams, policies and procedures controlling methods rather than concede. Fearing an unpredictable bridges) the retaliatory second strike will The dangers of brinkmanship is American response, leaders authorize launch even of the evident. In order for it to be of hostile Communist Bloc “Deterrence” is a strategy by which existing command structure had effective, the threats used must be nations would avoid governments threaten an immense been neutralized. credibly and are continuously provoking the United States. retaliation if attacked, such than For this to be an effective deterrent, escalated. This runs the risk of The administration employed aggressors are deterred if they do not it is necessary for ones opponents losing control. the "Madman strategy" (as it want to suffer great damage as a result to have foreknowledge of the plan. was later dubbed by of an aggressive action. The Soviet Union’s plan was “Military-Industrial Complex” Haldeman) to force the North The weakness of this approach is codenamed ‘Perimetr’ and relied Commonly used to refer to policy Vietnamese government to that 1. it presumes a rational upon submarines for the retaliatory relationships between governments, negotiate a peace to end the adversary and does not deter the strike. national armed forces, and industrial Vietnam War. Along the suicidal or psychotic opponent, support they obtain from the same lines, American and 2. encourages an arms race. “Nuclear peace” argues that under commercial sector in political approval diplomats (Henry Kissinger some circumstances nuclear weapons for research, development, production, in particular) portrayed 1970 “Appeasement” is a policy of settling can induce stability and decrease the use, and support for military training, incursion into Cambodia as a quarrels by admitting and satisfying chances of crisis escalation. weapons, equipment, and facilities symptom of Nixon's grievances through rational In particular, nuclear weapons are within the national defense and security supposed instability. negotiation and compromise, thereby said to have induced stability policy. It is a type of iron triangle. Nixon's use of the strategy avoiding the resort to an armed during the Cold War, when both the Eisenhower initially used the term during the Vietnam War was conflict which would be expensive, U.S. and the U.S.S.R. possessed military-industrial-congressional problematic bloody, and possibly dangerous. (in mutual second-strike retaliation complex, and thus indicated the political circles, it has become capability, eliminating the essential role that the United States “Essentials of Post-Cold War synonymous for cowardice). possibility of nuclear victory for Congress plays in the propagation Deterrence" The team is most often applied to either side. Proponents of the of the military industry. But, it is This is a document produced in Neville Chamberlain and Adlai nuclear peace argue that controlled said, that the president chose to 1995 as a "Terms of Reference" Stevenson. nuclear proliferation may be strike the word congressional in by the Department of Defense. beneficial for inducing stability. order to placate members of the The article is notable not "Peace through Strength" is the Critics of the nuclear peace argue legislative branch of the federal only for its significance in doctrine that military strength is a that nuclear proliferation not only government. outlining current United primary/necessary component of increases the chance of inter-state It involves a class of military, States military strategy and peace. It is the opposite of a policy of nuclear conflict, but increases the business, and political leaders, foreign policy, but also for appeasement. chances of nuclear material falling driven by mutual interests, were the its clear advocation/support This doctrine is a major into the hands of non-state groups real leaders of the state, and were of ambiguity regarding justification cited for large who are free from the threat of effectively beyond democratic "what is permitted" for other militaries, and also served as the nuclear retaliation. control. nations and its endorsement primary motivation behind the The major debate on this issue has of "irrationality", or more Cold War doctrine of mutually been between Kenneth Waltz, the “Stability-Instability Paradox” precisely, the perception assured destruction. founder of neorealist theory in Although nuclear weapons contribute thereof, as an important tool international relations, and Scott to stability at a strategic level, they can in deterrence and foreign “Counterforce” Sagan, a leading proponent of encourage smaller instances of policy. Proposed in 1960 by William organizational theories in instability that are not believed likely The document claims that the Kaufmann. A counterforce strategy international politics. Waltz to blossom into full-scale warfare. capacity of the United States avoided Soviet population centers generally argues that "more may be Best exemplified by the small wars in exercising deterrence while targeting its first volley of better," contending that new (small relative to the possibility of a would be hurt by portraying nuclear weapons at Soviet bomber nuclear states will use their nuclear exchange) that sprang up U.S. leaders as fully rational bases, submarine posts and other acquired nuclear capabilities to during the Cold War, such as and cool-headed, stating that military targets. By its’ avoidance of deter threats and preserve peace. Vietnam and Korea. "The fact that some elements civilians, it differed from Dulles’s Sagan argues that "more will be may appear to be potentially retaliation. worse", since new nuclear states 'out of control' can be His hope was that this limited often lack adequate organizational beneficial to creating and initial response would bring the controls over their new weapons, Cold War, 1950-1989 reinforcing fears and doubts war to a resolution shy of which makes for a high risk of Overarching Political Science in the minds of an annihilation. either deliberate or accidental Theory Applicable to Aspects adversary's decision makers. Counterforce targeting undermines nuclear war, or nuclear theft by This essential sense of fear is the theory of nuclear deterrence, in terrorists. of the Conflict the working force of that both sides are more likely to (page 1 of 2) deterrence. That the U.S. believe in the possibility of a first “Proxy war” is a war which results may become irrational and strike attack, possibly preempting when two powers use third parties as vindictive if its vital interests conflict. It is a prescription for substitutes for fighting each other Security Dilemma are attacked should be part of conducting strikes after fighting directly. The hope is that by striking the national persona we has begun. ones opponent through these third Decapitation strike project to all adversaries." parties (nations, terrorist groups), they can weaken their adversary within reverting to full-fledged war. “Operation Dropshot” The 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Major powers create and fund The United States Department of Operations is the current US doctrine international organizations Defense code-name for an internal on when and under which ➢ Spoken purpose: mutual defense document describing a possible circumstances to use nuclear weapons. and to promote peace offensive, nuclear and conventional The doctrine cites 8 reasons under ➢ Hidden purpose: to keep other war with the USSR in the Cold War. which field commanders can ask countries allied with them and to At the time the US nuclear arsenal for permission to use nuclear prevent national ‘defections’ to the was limited in size, based mostly weapons: other side. in the United States, and depended ➢ An enemy using or threatening on bombers to be delivered. to use WMD against US, Dropshot included mission profiles multinational, or alliance forces that would use 300 nuclear bombs or civilian populations. and 29,000 high-explosive bombs ➢ To prevent an imminent on 200 targets in 100 cities and biological attack towns to wipe out 85% of the ➢ To attack enemy WMD or its Soviet Union's industrial potential deep hardened bunkers at a single stroke. Between 75 and containing WMD that could be 100 of the 300 nuclear weapons used to target US or its allies. would be used to destroy Soviet combat aircraft on the ground. ➢ To stop potentially The scenario was devised
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