Issue No. 1303 23 February 2018 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1303 // Feature Item “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”. Written by Amy F. Woolf, published by the Congressional Research Service; February 13, 2018 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.- Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia’s greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower-yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long- range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed some U.S. weapons deployed in Europe, while the Obama Administration retired older sea-launched cruise missiles. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia’s weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons in response to challenges from Russia, China, and North Korea. Some believe the United States should twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 2 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1303 // reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. The 115th Congress may review some of these proposals. twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 3 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1303 // TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS S.C. Attorney General Alan Wilson: Ending MOX a 'Bad Idea' Future US Enrichment Needs Require Clarification: GAO Why the B-52 Bomber Will Fly for 100 Years SecAF Says B-21 ‘On Schedule’ As China Rises to Air Force’s Top Threat US COUNTER-WMD Get Ready for the Era of Hypersonic Flight — at Five Times the Speed of Sound Week Ahead: Pentagon Turns Focus to Missile Defense NORTHCOM Has ‘100 Percent Confidence’ U.S. Can Repel a North Korean Missile Attack US ARMS CONTROL Iranian President Pledges to Stick to Nuclear Deal Commitments U.S.-Russia Tension Flares over Nuclear Arms Control Now at Risk ASIA/PACIFIC German President: Unity Key to Handling North Korea Crisis China Reiterates Non-first-use Principle of Nuclear Weapons at Munich Conference US Open to Discussing Talks With North Korea EUROPE/RUSSIA U.S. Seeks European Commitment to ‘Improve’ Iran Nuclear Deal Russia Releases Video of its Modernized Ballistic Missile Defense System France Says Committed to Iran Deal, Will Keep Talking to European, U.S. Allies Escalate to De-escalate? US and Russia Trade Jabs on Nuclear Arms Use MIDDLE EAST Spain Reiterates Support for Iran Nuclear Deal, Urges Enhanced Ties McMaster: Time to Hold Syria Accountable for Use of Chemical Weapons Israel Successfully Tests State-of-the-Art Arrow 3 Missile Defense System U.S. Pursues Saudi Nuclear Deal, Despite Proliferation Risk INDIA/PAKISTAN How Israel and Pakistan Can Avoid a Nuclear Showdown India Test-fires Nuclear-capable Ballistic Agni-II Missile COMMENTARY The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem Diplomacy, Sanctions, Missile Defense: Use This Triad against North Korea Department of Energy Risking Nuclear Deterrence and National Security An Arms Race toward Global Instability Continuity from Ambiguity: The Real Role of Nuclear Posture Reviews in U.S. Nuclear Strategy The Grand Picture of Verifying Nuclear Disarmament: What Needs to Be Done? Nuclear Hawks Take the Reins in Tokyo twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 4 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1303 // US NUCLEAR WEAPONS Aiken Standard (Aiken, S.C.) S.C. Attorney General Alan Wilson: Ending MOX a 'Bad Idea' By Colin Demarest February 20, 2018 During a stop in Aiken, the state attorney general said he disagrees with President Donald Trump's budget request to defund the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, adding that he is pro-national security and pro-Savannah River Site. Attorney General Alan Wilson spoke to the Aiken Republican Club on Tuesday afternoon at the group's monthly meeting. Wilson was the the scheduled guest speaker. While the attorney general, who was first elected in 2010, primarily addressed crime in his keynote speech, he opened up about SRS and its facilities in a question-and-answer session with reporters. When asked about Trump's budget request, Wilson said Trump and Congress have the right to fund and defund MOX to their respective pleasure. But he doesn't have to like it. Wilson said ending the decade-long MOX project is a "bad idea." Trump's budget request includes $220 million to safely close MOX, an under-construction venture at SRS that would, upon completion, turn plutonium into commercial reactor fuel. The budget also includes $59 million for the pursuit of dilute and dispose, a MOX alternative. Dilute and dispose, also known as downblending, involves mixing plutonium with inert material and burying it elsewhere. MOX supporters – U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., for example — have said that method is unproven and violates a 2010 nuclear nonproliferation agreement with Russia. Wilson, when asked, said he does not know if Trump wants MOX killed because of its controversial nature, which is both time- and money-related. "I can't presume to know what's in his head," Wilson said. During the back-and-forth, Wilson also said he recently visited Washington, D.C. The attorney general said he met with "senior Department of Energy officials" during that trip. He said they discussed "a way to resolve this matter" and "a way to benefit both national security and the state of South Carolina." "We're having those conversations right now," Wilson added. Wilson said the best interests of Aiken and South Carolina are, of course, being considered. At the start of the month, U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry toured SRS and MOX. Wilson has sued the U.S. Department of Energy – and won – for not removing plutonium from South Carolina as was mandated. In December 2017, a federal court ordered 1 ton of defense plutonium be removed from the state in two years. https://www.aikenstandard.com/news/s-c-attorney-general-alan-wilson-ending-mox-a- bad/article_4ea8e0da-169d-11e8-b0ab-5f347d176bec.html Return to top twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 5 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1303 // World Nuclear News (London, United Kingdom) Future US Enrichment Needs Require Clarification: GAO Author Not Attributed February 19, 2018 The US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has extended its supply of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for national security needs for at least the next two decades but should clarify its longer term enrichment needs, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found. The NNSA is responsible for securing so-called unobligated LEU needed for purposes including the production of the tritium used in nuclear weapons.