Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs March 11, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Summary President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous administrations to contain Iran’s strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration’s characterization of Iran as a “profound threat to U.S. national security interests,” a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran’s government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has occurred since alleged wide-scale fraud was committed in Iran’s June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition “Green movement.” In December 2009, Administration statements shifted toward greater public support of the Green movement, but Administration officials appear to believe that the opposition’s prospects are enhanced by a low U.S. public profile on the unrest. Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition’s prospects. Yet, some experts saw the regime’s successful effort to prevent the holding of a large Green movement protest on “revolution day,” February 11, 2010, as an indication that the Administration should return to its engagement efforts. Even at the height of the Green movement protests, the Obama Administration did not forego diplomatic options to blunt Iran’s nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009. However, Iran did not accept the technical details of this by the notional deadline of the end of 2009, nor has it adequately responded to international concerns about possible work on a nuclear weapons program. These concerns have sparked renewed multilateral discussions of more U.N. sanctions. New sanctions under negotiation would target members and companies of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not only a pillar of Iran’s nuclear program but is also the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. Still, China, a major investor in Iran and consumer of its oil, is said to be resisting new steps to pressure Iran economically and politically. Additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Each chamber in the 111th Congress has passed separate legislation to try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline, which many Members believe could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement or undermine the regime’s popularity even further. Others believe such steps could help the regime rebuild its support by painting the international community as punitive against the Iranian people. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Casey L. Addis; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. Congressional Research Service Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Contents Political History..........................................................................................................................1 Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition ................................................................................2 The Supreme Leader, His Powers, and Other Ruling Councils...............................................2 The Presidency/Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ...............................................................................6 Ahmadinejad’s Policies and Popularity............................................................................7 June 12, 2009, Presidential Elections...............................................................................8 Election Dispute and Emergence of Green Movement .....................................................9 How Shaken and Divided Is the Regime?......................................................................10 Exiled Opposition Groups...................................................................................................12 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)/Camp Ashraf ....................................12 The Son of the Former Shah..........................................................................................13 Other Outside Activists .................................................................................................14 Ethnic or Religiously Based Armed Groups...................................................................14 Human Rights Practices ............................................................................................................15 Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs..................................17 Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force.....................................................17 Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy .......................................................19 Iran’s Arguments and the International Response...........................................................20 Establishment of “P5+1” Contact Group/June 2006 Incentive Package..........................22 Resolution 1696............................................................................................................23 Resolution 1737............................................................................................................23 Resolution 1747 and Results .........................................................................................23 Resolution 1803 and Additional Incentives....................................................................24 Resolution 1835............................................................................................................25 The P5+1 Process Under President Obama....................................................................25 Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles........................................................27 Ballistic Missiles/Warheads...........................................................................................27 Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups .......................................................................29 Relations with the Persian Gulf States .................................................................................29 Iranian Policy in Iraq...........................................................................................................31 Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups...............................................................................32 Iran and Hamas.............................................................................................................33 Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria.............................................................................................34 Syria .............................................................................................................................35 Central Asia and the Caspian...............................................................................................35 Afghanistan and Pakistan....................................................................................................36 Pakistan ........................................................................................................................37 Al Qaeda.............................................................................................................................37 Latin America .....................................................................................................................38 India ...................................................................................................................................39 Africa .................................................................................................................................39 U.S. Policy Responses and Options ...........................................................................................39 Clinton Administration Policy .......................................................................................40 George W. Bush Administration Policy .........................................................................40 Overview of Obama Administration Policy .........................................................................42 Congressional