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A Commentary on the March 2011 Iran Operational Guidance Note

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THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. August 2011 A commentary on the March 2011 Iran Operational Guidance Note This commentary identifies what the ‘Still Human Still Here’ coalition considers to be the main inconsistencies and omissions between the currently available country of origin information (COI) and case law on Iran and the conclusions reached in the March 2011 Iran Operational Guidance Note (OGN), issued by the UK Border Agency. Where we believe inconsistencies have been identified, the relevant section of the OGN is highlighted in blue. An index of full sources of the COI referred to in this commentary is also provided at the end of the document. This commentary is a guide for legal practitioners and decision-makers in respect of the relevant COI, by reference to the sections of the Operational Guidance Note on Iran issued in March 2011. To access the complete OGN on Iran go to: http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/countryspecificasylum policyogns/ The document should be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. This document should not be submitted as evidence to the UK Border Agency, the Tribunal or other decision makers in asylum applications or appeals. However, legal representatives are welcome to submit the COI referred to in this document to decision makers (including judges) to help in the accurate determination of an asylum claim or appeal. The COI referred to in this document is not exhaustive and should always be complemented by case-specific COI research. Contents 3.7 Political opponents and opposition supporters p. 2 3.8 Christians/Christian converts p. 10 3.8.6 Other religious and ethnic minorities p. 17 3.9 Adulterers p. 35 3.11 Women p. 40 3.12 Kurds and supporters of Kurdish political parties (KDPI, Komala, or PJAK) p. 46 3.13 Smugglers p. 64 4.3 Minors claiming in their own right p. 68 Index of sources p. 77 1 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. 3.7 Political opponents and opposition supporters Excerpt from March 2011 Iran OGN 3.7.19 Conclusion. There is a real risk that high profile activists and political opponents who have come to the attention of the authorities would on return to Iran face a real risk of persecution and should be granted asylum for reason of his or her political opinion. 3.7.20 Depending on the particular circumstances, some persons who do not have a political profile - which would include for example student demonstrators or other anti-government protestors -are likely to be perceived by the authorities in Iran to oppose the regime and may similarly face a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment on return. Caseowners must consider carefully whether the personal circumstances of the individual concerned are such that he or she would face a real risk of persecution on return to Iran. 3.7.21 Those who have engaged in opposition political activity in the UK might depending on their level of involvement similarly face a real of risk of persecution on return to Iran on account of that activity and in such cases a grant of asylum will also be appropriate. The test to be applied in such cases is set out in detail in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) – see above. In the conclusion of this section highlighted above, the OGN identifies ‘student demonstrators’ and ‘other anti-government protestors’ amongst those persons who do not have a political profile but may be perceived as government oppositionists, and therefore may be at risk of persecution in Iran. It is considered that the following COI supports the contention that ‘family members of perceived political opponents’ should also be included within this risk category: Amnesty International, Iran: "Arbitrary arrests, torture and executions continue, 20/05/2011 *...+ Amnesty International is concerned by the Iranian government’s continuing clampdown on dissent including arbitrary arrests and the torture or other ill-treatment of people who express view opposed to those of the government. Some of those arrested have even been executed, after apparently unfair trials, including at least one minor. *…+ Amnesty International continues to call on the Iranian government to end the continuing cycle of repression and fully respect Iran’s obligations under international human rights law. In particular, Amnesty International urges the government to: - release immediately and unconditionally anyone held solely for the peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, or solely on account of their family links to individuals who oppose the Iranian authorities; *…+ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011, 12/05/2011 *…+ The constitution prohibits public demonstrations that “violate the principles of Islam,” a vague provision that was regularly invoked in 2009 and 2010 to deny permit requests. Vigilante and paramilitary organizations that are officially or tacitly sanctioned by the government—most notably the Basij and Ansar-i Hezbollah—regularly play a major role in breaking up demonstrations. Heavy mobilizations of these forces helped to prevent large-scale opposition rallies during 2010. The effort included intimidation, physical attacks, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement targeting opposition leaders and their families. *…+ Human Rights Watch, Investigate Reported Killings of Demonstrators, 29/04/2011 [...] Iranian security forces should immediately halt the use of excessive force against demonstrators in an ethnic Arab province of southwestern Iran, Human Rights Watch said today. The authorities should open independent and transparent investigations into all alleged killings there since protests began on April 14, 2011, Human Rights Watch said. *…+ 2 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. Iranian rights activists and international media have reported that Iranian security forces fired live ammunition as well as teargas at largely peaceful protesters on a number of occasions, killing several dozen protesters since the demonstrations began. Human Rights Watch also received reports that authorities have arrested several hundred protesters and rights activists in Khuzestan and severely curtailed communications in the area. *…+ A resident of the city of the Ahvaz told Human Rights Watch that security forces including Basij, armed police, plainclothes agents, and intelligence agents surrounded and infiltrated several Arab-majority areas in Ahvaz a week prior to planned demonstrations on April 15. He said that for about a week prior to the protests Ahvaz appeared to be under martial law. Movement between Arab neighborhoods in Ahvaz became extremely restricted as security forces set up checkpoints throughout the city, and masked security forces began launching home raids and arresting targeted individuals including rights activists. The resident told Human Rights Watch that he witnessed several dozen young Arabs being picked up by plainclothes security officers during some of these raids. According to the witness, clashes broke out on April 14 between security forces attempting to arrest several individuals in the Homa neighborhood of Ahvaz and the residents' families and neighbors. The clashes led to the deaths of three individuals. The resident told Human Rights Watch that the next day, Friday, hundreds of Ahvazi residents filled the streets of Ahvaz but because of the heavy security presence protests remained isolated and scattered within the various Arab neighborhoods. *…+ US Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran, 08/04/2011 [...] Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: [...] f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence [...] There were reports during the year that the MOIS arrested and harassed family members of political prisoners and human rights activists, banning them from speaking to foreign media or traveling abroad, blocking their telephone conversations, making false criminal charges against them, and blocking their access to higher education. From early February to March 9, authorities detained Saleh Noghrehkar, the nephew of former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi and the head of the legal team for Mousavi's campaign, in Evin Prison, reportedly to intimidate Mousavi and his wife. [...] On January 13, authorities released from prison Nushin Ebadi, a professor of dentistry and sister to Nobel Prize-winning human rights lawyer and activist Shirin Ebadi. Intelligence officers arrested Nushin, who was not involved in human rights issues and did not participate in any of the postelection protests, in December 2009. There were also reports that authorities threatened and arrested family members of expatriates who posted critical comments about the country on social networking Web sites such as Facebook. According to media
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