Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul Instituto De Filosofia E Ciências Humanas Programa De Pós-Graduação Em Relações Internacionais

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Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul Instituto De Filosofia E Ciências Humanas Programa De Pós-Graduação Em Relações Internacionais UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL INSTITUTO DE FILOSOFIA E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS TANIRA BOLIVAR LEBEDEFF “ONDE ESTÁ O VOTO DELES?” CIBERATIVISMO E DIFUSÃO DE PODER NAS ELEIÇÕES PRESIDENCIAIS NO IRÃ EM 2009 Porto Alegre 2013 TANIRA BOLIVAR LEBEDEFF “ONDE ESTÁ O VOTO DELES?” CIBERATIVISMO E DIFUSÃO DE PODER NAS ELEIÇÕES PRESIDENCIAIS NO IRÃ EM 2009 Dissertação apresentada como exigência para a conclusão do curso de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Orientadora: Profa. Dra. Ondina Fachel Leal Porto Alegre 2013 AGRADECIMENTOS Dedico esta dissertação a todo aquele que, parafraseando Dabashi (2009), “utiliza o ciberespaço para transformar uma política de desespero numa dramaturgia de esperança” – como fizeram os iranianos naquele verão de 2009. Agradeço a todos que de alguma maneira contribuíram para esta pesquisa. Minha orientadora, meus mestres e professores, minhas fontes de informação e meus entrevistados: muito obrigada por sua generosidade. Meus colegas de Mestrado, obrigada pela oportunidade de aprender com vocês também! Às minhas irmãs e ao meu irmão, ao meu amado, aos meus cunhados, aos meus amigos velhos e novos, agradeço pelo carinho, pelo incentivo e pela acolhida. “O importante na vida é poder voltar...” Aos meus pais, Sérgio e Ula, pelo apoio incondicional em todos os capítulos da minha vida, minha eterna gratidão. “Os filhos de Adão são membros uns dos outros, Foram criados de uma mesma essência. Quando um membro é afetado pela dor, Os outros membros também sofrem. Se não tens empatia pela dor dos outros, Não és digno de ser chamado humano.” (Bani Adam, ou “Filhos de Adão”, do poeta persa Saadi – séculoXIII. O poema está inscrito na entrada do prédio da ONU, em Nova York. Tradução da autora.) RESUMO A revolução nas Tecnologias de Comunicação e de Informação afeta as relações interpessoais e, numa esfera mais ampla, as relações internacionais. Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar como as mídias sociais da Internet permitem uma maior inserção da sociedade civil em movimentos de cunho político e social, tendo como objeto de estudo as eleições presidenciais no Irã em 2009. Ao contestar o resultado do pleito numa série de manifestações denominadas Movimento Verde, os iranianos utilizaram as mídias sociais da Internet para mobilização e para engajar atores externos, como iranianos expatriados e outros simpatizantes. Assim esses manifestantes ultrapassaram as barreiras territoriais e transformaram uma questão local num movimento de apelo internacional. Adotando os conceitos teóricos de contrapoder de Manuel Castells e de difusão do poder de Joseph Nye, aponto como a digitalização do ativismo político provoca mudanças em paradigmas da política mundial. Também abordo como o ciberespaço tem sido utilizado por Estados para o exercício do hard power e do soft power. Palavras-chave: Ciberativismo. Internet. Irã. Mídias Sociais. Poder. Relações Internacionais. ABSTRACT The Internet Revolution affects interpersonal relationships and, in a wider spectrum, international relations as well. The goal of this dissertation is to analyze how social media allows for a greater inclusion of civil society in social and political movements, based on the case of the 2009 presidential elections in Iran. The disputed outcome of the elections caused a series of demonstrations known as the Green Movement, in which Iranian voters used Internet’s social media to mobilize and to engage external actors, thereby overtaking territorial boundaries and turning a local issue into a global cause. Using theoretical notions such as Manuel Castells’ counterpower and Joseph Nye’s power diffusion, I suggest that online political activism incites changes in the paradigms of world politics. I also discuss how soft and hard powers are being implemented in cyberspace. Keywords: Cyberactivism. Internet. Iran. Social Media. Power. International Relations. LISTA DE FIGURAS Figura 1: Apoiadores de Mousavi se mobilizam via Twitter após a votação ................... 17 Figura 2: “Canetas falsas serão distribuídas”, alerta a campanha de Mousavi ................ 57 Figura 3: @persiankiwi comenta manifestações noturnas em Teerã ............................... 59 Figura 4: Mobilização da campanha de Mousavi via Facebook ...................................... 60 Figura 5: “Todos votem na sexta feira”, pede a campanha de Mousavi via Twitter ........ 62 Figura 6: Campanha de Mousavi via Twitter, “uma pessoa = um emissor” .................... 65 Figura 7: Militantes relatam censura à imprensa estrangeira ........................................... 65 Figura 8: @persiankiwi sugere cuidados nas manifestações............................................ 66 Figura 9: @persiankiwi divulga planos de confundir a polícia ........................................ 66 Figura 10: Mensagem no Facebook sobre vídeo de manifestação ..................................... 67 Figura 11: Campanha de Mousavi pede boicote a Khamenei ............................................ 70 Figura 12: Tweet de @persiankiwi sobre agressão policial nas ruas ................................. 70 Figura 13: Manifestantes comparam violência iraniana à Tiananmen Square ................... 71 Figura 14: @persiankiwi solicitando servidores proxy ...................................................... 75 Figura 15: @persiankiwi oferecendo servidores proxy ...................................................... 76 Figura 16: Mensagem transmitida durante "tuitaço"pela advogada Soutoudeh ................. 85 Figura 17: @persiankiwi noticia a censura à imprensa ...................................................... 89 Figura 18: Militantes distribuem vídeo sobre violência policial ........................................ 91 Figura 19: Tweet comenta falha da rede CNN na cobertura da crise iraniana ................... 92 Figura 20: Tweet cobra presença da rede CNN nas ruas iranianas ..................................... 92 SUMÁRIO INTRODUÇÃO ...................................................................................................... 11 1 O PODER NA ERA DA INTERNET ................................................................... 17 1.1 ESTRATÉGIAS DE PODER EM UM MUNDO INTERDEPENDENTE .................. 19 1.2 ACESSO À INFORMAÇÃO E DIFUSÃO DO PODER .............................................. 22 2 IRÃ: NA ROTA DE “FURACÕES POLÍTICOS” ............................................. 26 2.1 O IMPÉRIO PERSA ......................................................................................................... 27 2.2 A ERA DO XÁ: SOB O VÉU OCIDENTAL ................................................................. 29 2.3 A ASCENSÃO DE KHOMEINI ..................................................................................... 34 2.4 UMA TENTATIVA DE DIÁLOGO ENTRE AS CIVILIZAÇÕES ............................ 41 3 O MOVIMENTO VERDE DE 2009 ..................................................................... 47 3.1 UMA BATALHA POR “CORAÇÕES E MENTES” .................................................... 48 3.2 CANAIS DE DISSIDÊNCIA ........................................................................................... 50 3.3 O REGISTRO DIGITAL DA MOBILIZAÇÃO ............................................................ 52 3.4 A CAMPANHA PELA PRESIDÊNCIA......................................................................... 54 3.5 DENÚNCIAS DE FRAUDE ............................................................................................ 62 3.6 “ONDE ESTÁ O MEU VOTO?” ..................................................................................... 65 3.7 A REAÇÃO INTERNACIONAL .................................................................................... 68 3.8 CRÍTICAS AO MOVIMENTO: A REVOLUÇÃO FOI “TUITADA”? ...................... 77 3.9 A OPOSIÇÃO EMUDECIDA ......................................................................................... 80 4 ATIVISMO 2.0: A SOCIEDADE CIVIL E A INTERNET ............................... 83 4.1 “TUITAÇO”: UM PIQUETE NO ESPAÇO VIRTUAL ............................................... 83 4.2 AUTONOMIA NO CIBERESPAÇO .............................................................................. 86 4.3 DESAFIANDO O “GRANDE IRMÃO” ........................................................................ 87 4.4 A EMERGÊNCIA DO “JORNALISMO CIDADÃO” .................................................. 89 4.5 A INTERNET: FERRAMENTA DE DENÚNCIA ........................................................ 93 5 A ERA DO CIBERPODER ................................................................................... 97 5.1 PODER E TECNOLOGIA ............................................................................................... 97 5.2 O “LADO ESCURO” DA LIBERDADE NAS REDES ................................................ 99 5.3 POLICIANDO O CIBERESPAÇO ............................................................................... 105 5.4 O SOFT E O HARD POWER NORTE-AMERICANO NA INTERNET .................. 108 CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS ............................................................................... 113 REFERÊNCIAS ................................................................................................... 116 11 INTRODUÇÃO The Whole World is Tweeting: a internacionalização dos movimentos sociais Comecei a escrever essa dissertação às vésperas das eleições municipais de 2012 no Brasil. Era a primeira eleição de que eu participava depois de quase
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