NEPAL ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013

The Missing Middle Examining the Armed Group Phenomenon in Nepal

Introduction the CPA the Government has been (Advocacy Forum, 2010, p. 13; Nepal- wrestling with a conceptual challenge News, 2009; OneIndia, 2009), recent 21 2006 On November , the Communist in its efforts to distinguish so-called official estimates indicate that only Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN-M), and ‘political’ actors from those that have about a dozen groups are still active, 1 the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), signed a more ‘criminal’ orientation. It is this while about twenty have given up the the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), categorization that has primarily in- armed struggle and are negotiating officially ending an armed conflict that formed the Government’s disposition with the government (Giri, 2012).5 2 had lasted ten years. After nearly two towards particular groups, ensuring While government officials and the decades of social and political instabil- that those armed actors characterized media are quick to point to the decline 3 ity, the CPA inspired hope that a ‘New as ‘political groups’ are more likely to of armed groups, they rarely explain Nepal’ might bring political stability be engaged with through dialogue what changes have caused it. Nor do and socio-economic development. Six while ‘criminal groups’ are dealt with they tend to analyse the characteristics, years on, that optimism has diminished, through heavy-handed police tactics. organization, and conduct of contem- as it has been realized that Nepal’s Despite the problematic nature of porary armed groups, or the recent problems before and during the con- the categories and the state responses increase of other forms of armed vio- 4 flict have not disappeared. they have generated, the official stance lence and criminality in both rural and Moreover, armed activity contin- is that armed group activity has de- urban areas.6 ued in the years immediately after the creased. Compared to 2009, when the This Issue Brief analyses the phe- CPA and levels of violence in the coun- Ministry of Home Affairs claimed that nomenon of armed groups in Nepal. It try increased. Much of the blame for more than one hundred armed groups examines their history, their initial pro- this continued unrest has been attrib- were operating throughout Nepal liferation following the signing of the uted to so-called ‘armed groups’ that proliferated primarily in the Terai (low- land) region but were also present in other parts of Nepal (IDA et al., 2011). Often decried as exponents of South Asia’s shadowy underworld and beholden to Nepal’s political elite, armed groups have been blamed for many of Nepal’s current troubles. Though rumours abound about their influence and intentions, however, com- paratively little systematic information is available about their origins, geo- graphic concentration, and motivation. In the past few years the Govern- ment of Nepal has openly recognized the threat that armed groups repre- sent and has combined heavy-handed policing and softer conflict mediation techniques to deal with them (Advocacy Forum, 2010, pp. 11–21; OneIndia, 2009). The reason behind this two-pronged strategy can be understood only if it A masked devotee holds a toy gun as he takes part in a parade during a religious festival, indicating the salience of is recognized that since the signing of armed groups in Nepali society, in Lalitpur, August 2012. © Navesh Chitrakar/Reuters

www.nepal-ava.org 1 CPA, their development and overlap and policy-oriented works that address is often dealt with by ‘mainstreaming’ with other societal groups, the reasons the issue indirectly. The lack of informa- them, which implies negotiating with behind their recent decline, and their tion is not surprising, given the politi- the government and disarming. Groups relationship to the state. It finds that: cally sensitivity surrounding the issue perceived to be motivated by economic of armed groups—and the fact that gain, in contrast, are judged to be a The overall number of armed most groups seem to have clandestine law and order problem and are treated groups in Nepal has decreased links with some local political parties accordingly (Advocacy Forum, 2010, in the past few years despite con- and law enforcement agencies.7 p. 14). These groups often engage in tinuing political instability in the In addition, armed groups in activities such as kidnapping or extor- country. They have declined even Nepal tend to be transient, splinter tion, and may use or threaten to use more since the implementation of frequently, and have a fluid member- improvised explosive devices or IEDs. the Special Security Plan (SSP) in ship base. Even the better organized If such groups subsequently articulate 2009 and the corresponding enhance- and more established groups seem to political goals, officials tend to assume ment and increased presence of reinvent themselves continuously. To they do so to conceal their economic state authority in rural areas. illustrate, several groups active in the motives.10 Nepal is still home to a wide array Terai region emerged from the Maoist A simple binary distinction between of armed groups, which range from insurgency. Taking issue with the slow political and economic armed groups local strongmen (leaders who rule pace of change regarding the recogni- quickly collapses under closer scrutiny. by threat or violence, also referred tion of minority rights in the country, Recent changes in global political and to as dons or goondas) to social or these groups were initially perceived economic relations have played a signifi­ ethnic movements, small criminal to have a coherent political ideology. cant role in this regard. In the absence groups and politically affiliated Since 2007, however, they have largely of external or domestic patrons, for youth wings. splintered into smaller criminal syn- example, most armed groups in Nepal Rather than being a direct threat to dicates. Similarly, in the early 1990s, and elsewhere must draw on a wide the state, armed groups in Nepal groups in the Eastern Hills of Nepal array of revenue streams and illicit occupy a middle ground, neither demanded the recognition of indig- networks if they are to remain solvent. overtly for nor against the govern- enous rights and territorial integrity. Groups often adopt opportunistic strat- ment. Instead, they operate either Feeling excluded during the second egies to survive, expanding and con- in association with some political period of parliamentary democracy,8 tracting according to the environment. leaders and security personnel or in the late 1990s some groups turned In these terms, many ‘political’ armed under the radar of law enforcement. to the Maoists for help (Lawoti, 2012, groups are also ‘economic’ or ‘criminal’, The highest concentration of armed pp. 135–137). After the CPA, however, and vice versa. Their dynamic evolu- group activity is in the Terai; the a number of groups have repositioned tion defies hard-and-fast categorization. Eastern Hills; and Kathmandu Valley, themselves as political outfits (and have This does not mean that such cat- which consists primarily of Kath- even joined forces with local political egorization is unhelpful or should not mandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur. parties pushing for indigenous rights), be attempted. It does imply, however, Policies to address the problem of while others have continued their that any such analysis must proceed armed groups should move away ‘underground’ armed operations.9 with caution and be attentive to the from the ‘political versus criminal’ A tendency to focus on the motiva- blurry lines and underlying interests distinction. They should focus tions and activity of armed groups is shaping labels. Moreover, it must also instead on the structural character- a third reason why it has been diffi- be aware of the political implications of istics of specific groups, including cult to categorize them. When talking ascribing the ‘political’ or ‘economic’ their emergence and history, their about armed groups in Nepal, the or ‘criminal’ label to a group, which can relations with the state and the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate seems serve to either legitimize or marginal- community, their involvement in to dominate the discussion as groups ize the group and its leader. In order to the legal economy, their use of vio- are readily divided into two distinct address these shortcomings the authors lence, and group extensiveness. types: those that are perceived to be undertook four phases of fieldwork economically motivated and others which involved key informant inter- Problems of conceptualizing that are perceived to be more politi- views and site visits undertaken in cally oriented (Sharma, 2010, p. 245). Nepal (see Box 1). armed groups It appears that only those groups per- In Nepal, as elsewhere, it is exceed- ceived to have a clear political agenda ingly difficult to comprehensively (which in the case of Nepal usually History of armed opposition document and categorize the country’s implies an ethnic/regional one) and Armed opposition to the state can be various armed groups. A principal direct their activities against the politics traced back to at least the middle of reason for this is the paucity of in- of the state (more recently this revolves the eighteenth century, a period when depth research. The information that is around the question of federalism) are the Nepali state was undergoing ter- available comes primarily from official treated as armed groups. The threat ritorial and political consolidation.11 and media sources and a few scholarly that ‘political’ groups pose to the state Since then, armed group activity in

2 Nepal Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013 Box 1 Methods and key informant interviews Under the leadership of the Nepali Congress, opposition to Rana rule Fieldwork was conducted in 2011 and 2012 in Kathmandu as well as the districts of Banke, Bardia, Dhanusa, emerged and sought to establish a Mahottari, and Siraha in Terai.12 The fieldwork was designed to establish how different stakeholders (inter- multi-party democracy and constitu- national organizations, local civil society, political elites, local government officials, and formal security tional monarchy. Though it called for personnel) perceive the problem of armed groups in Nepal, and how individuals from different regions, a peaceful transition, the party secretly ethnicities, and occupations explain their emergence and continued activity. recruited an armed force named the JanaMukti Sena (the People’s Liberation Interviews and informal discussions Army), which was expected to help 18.09.2012 An international human rights representative working in Nepal. overthrow the regime. The JanaMukti 18.09.2012 Two security sector advisors (one international and one local). Sena was mobilized on the Nepal–India 19.09.2012 A local political and security consultant. border, from where it went on to cap- 19.09.2012 A local security analyst (former army officer). 19.09.2012 A political and security consultant based in Kathmandu. ture several cities in the eastern and mid- 20.09.2012 A local security expert from the Terai. western regions of the country (Basnett, 24.09.2012 An international civil society leader and political analyst for South East Asia, based in 2009, p. 16; Phatak and Uprety, 2011, Kathmandu. p. 25). The anti-Rana movement is often 25.09.2012 A leader of a local civil society organization representing indigenous groups, Limbuwan. dismissed because it did not succeed 26.09.2012 A former Minister engaged in negotiations with armed groups. in completely transferring state power 26.09.2012 A journalist covering armed group issues in the Terai. to the political party (Whelpton, 1997, 27.09.2012 A university lecturer, working on conflict and development, including armed groups in the p. 45), and because the period of de- Eastern Hills. mocracy that followed lasted less than 27.09.2012 A staff member of an international civil society organization working on issues of human a decade.14 Nevertheless, the JanaMukti rights, conflict resolution, violence and development. Sena was the first armed force that 28.09.2012 A freelance political analyst, former member of the UCPN-M Central Committee. opposed the state in which people 30.09.2012 A high-ranking female member of the CPN-M. from all backgrounds participated— 01.10.2012 A civil society leader on youth issues, who is also a teacher and a businessman, and comes including women, indigenous groups, from the Terai. and members of lower castes. It can 02.10.2012 Three journalists, based in Kathmandu and working on private sector issues. thus be seen as a precursor to the Maoist 02.10.2012 A local academic from Terai working on Maoist and security issues in Nepal. conflict of the late 1990s and its armed 03.10.2012 A Madhesi civil society leader. wing, the People’s Liberation Army 03.10.2012 A senior leader in CPN-M, dealing with youth issues. (PLA) (Basnett, 2009, p. 16).15 04.10.2012 A senior commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The next significant phase of armed 04.10.2012 Informal meeting with two high-ranking officers in Nepal Police. rebellion was led by a communist move- 04.10.2012 A Maoist analyst, also works as a journalist. ment, which drew its inspiration from 05.10.2012 Informal meeting with high-ranking APF officer. political and social changes taking 05.10.2012 Informal meeting with APF officer. place in India (Bowans, 2003). With 05.10.2012 A local civil society leader, who is also a security and peace process analyst. active assistance from Indian commu- 07.10.2012 A former general working on integration of the PLA. nists, the Communist Party of Nepal 08.10.2012 A local journalist and political analyst who works in Kathmandu. (CPN) was established in 1946 in 08.10.2012 A female former Maoist commander, a member of CPN-M Central Committee. Calcutta. It spread during the first 10.10.2012 A staff member of an international civil society organisation working on security issues phase of Nepal’s democratic experi- in Nepal. 1950 1960 10.10.2012 A local civil society leader monitoring human rights abuses and security issues. ment ( – ) and even competed in the 1959 election. During the party- less Panchayat system (1960–1990), the country has ebbed and flowed in a number of upheavals took place in the party continued to operate clan- response to political conflicts within response to the state’s repressive poli- destinely despite the fact that many of and across Nepal’s borders. In the cies and discrimination against indig- its cadres were jailed or imprisoned. Eastern Hills, episodes of armed group enous populations. Indeed, between The prosecution of cadres and suspen- activity occurred in the late eighteenth 1900 and 1950 at least six rebellions sion of democratic politics led to the and early nineteenth century, when occurred in Nepal, most of which had first communist uprising in 1971. Limbuwan groups rebelled against the an ethnic or religious character. The Influenced by the Naxalite movement Gorkha state in response to its attempt majority were swiftly suppressed by in West Bangal, a group of communist to erode local autonomy (ICG, 2011, the ‘Rana Oligarchy’ (1846–1950), cadres attacked and killed several indi- pp. 3–4). During the Sino–Nepalese which executed, expelled, or impris- viduals perceived to be ‘class enemies’ War (1788–1793), some members of the oned dissidents and rebels (Lawoti, in Jhapa district (Lawoti, 2010, p. 5; indigenous Limbu and Bhote groups 2007, p. 33). Karki and Seddon, 2003b, p. 10). The even assisted China in its fight against The departure of Britain from India movement became famous as the Jhapa the Nepali state (Lawoti, 2007, pp. in the late 1940s13 paved the way for a uprising, and was the first attempt by 31–34). In the early twentieth century, new political awakening in Nepal. Nepal’s nascent Communist movement

www.nepal-ava.org 3 Map Nepal CHINA

HUMLA CHINA INDIA DARCHULA H BAJHANG (TIBET) MUGU BAITADI BAJURA I DOTI li JUMLA DADELDHURADADELDHURA na ACHHAM ar KALIKOT M Dipayal K ki DOLPA a d n a KANCHANPURKANCHANPUR A G MUSTANG DAILEKH li JAJARKOT a KAILALI K RUKUM L Birendranagar MANANG MYAGDI Annapurna SURKHET (8,091 m) A BARDIYA SALYAN Y G ROLPA BAGLUNG KASKI GORKHA h LAMJUNG A a g PARBAT h Pokhara Mt Everest a BANKEBANKE RASUWA r GULMI a (8,848 m) DANGDAN TANAHU DHADING NUWAKOT ARGAKHACHI SINDHUPALCHOK PALPA NAWALPARASINAWALPARASI KATHMANDU DOLKHA Kanchenjunga ni C Kathmandu BHAKTAPUR SOLUKHUMBU (8,586 m) ROLPA Maoist stronghold KAPILBASTU Naraya SANKHUWASABHA RUPANDEHI CHITWAN e KAVREPALANCHOK MAKAWANPUR LALITPUR TAPLEJUNG International boundary n RAMECHHAP Hetauda OKHALDHUNGA DANO t E District and boundary r SINDHULI BHOJPUR TERHATHUM PARSA a a KHOTANG National capital l s t DHANKUTA PANCHTHAR BARA SARLAHI e r n H i T MAHOTTARI UDAYAPUR Kosi l l Regional headquarters RAUTAHAT e s r a Dhankuta ILAM Land over 3,000 m i INDIA DHANUSA SIRAHA MORANG SUNSARI 500–3,000 m SAPTARI JHAPA Land below 500 m 0 km 100

to pursue a revolutionary armed ern Hills regions. Indeed, during the led to a dramatic increase in the level struggle. The campaign, however, first three years of the insurgency, the of violence and further rapid deteriora- was brutally suppressed by the state. Maoists concentrated on consolidating tion of the security situation (Human Nepal’s most famous armed oppo- their support base, recruiting combat- Rights Watch, 2005). The Maoists sition to the state emerged after parlia- ants (known as full-timers) and local responded by forming the People’s mentary democracy was re-established supporters (part-timers) from socio- Liberation Army (PLA), setting the in 1990. As in many other parts of the culturally excluded groups (rural stage for the final phase of the conflict, world, democracy in Nepal was not peasants, women, lower castes, and which ultimately resulted in a political able to address all of the shortcomings indigenous communities) in many victory for the Maoists, despite a mili- of the preceding (Panchayat) regime parts of the country but especially tary stalemate between the warring (Sharma, 2006, pp. 1244–45). A lack of from the Rolpa, Rukum, Sindhuli, and parties (see Box 2). social and economic change in the Gorkha districts (Sharma, 2004, pp. 43– countryside, coupled with constant 44). The Maoist insurgency was largely political infighting and splintering at ignored by the Government at this Characteristics of Nepal’s national level, created conditions that point and was treated primarily as a were conducive to a popular revolt. law and order problem rather than a armed groups It is against this backdrop that the serious threat to the state. The Govern- Nepal is home to a wide array of groups. Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist ment relied on the ill-equipped and They include local strongmen, social (CPN-M) emerged and initiated the under-trained Nepal Police to subdue or ethnic movements, small criminal People’s War (jana yuddha).16 The goal it, and did not deploy the Royal Nepal groups, state-sponsored vigilante of the Maoist conflict, which began on Army (RNA) (Hutt, 2004b, p. 6). groups,18 and politically affiliated 13 February 1996 when the CPN-M By 1999, the military and organiza- youth wings (see Table 1). The con- attacked two police posts in the mid- tional capacity of the Maoists rivalled temporary preoccupation with armed western districts and one in the cen- or exceeded that of the Nepal Police. groups in Nepal is largely due to the tral region, was to wage a protracted Still reluctant to deploy the army, in persistence of real and perceived inse- war that would encircle the cities from 2001 the Government of Nepal estab- curity since the country’s civil war in the countryside and finally establish lished the Armed Police Force (APF). In 2006. Specifically, national and district a People’s Government (jana sarkar) November of the same year, however, authorities have been alert to the threat (Hutt, 2004b, pp. 5–6).17 as the security situation deteriorated they pose since the so-called Madhes Maoist strongholds were concen- further, the King declared a state of movement paralyzed the country for trated initially in its ‘base regions’ in emergency (Hutt, 2004b, pp. 11–17) three weeks between January and the mid-western districts, and only and ordered the Nepali armed forces February 2007. This protest revealed spread later to the Terai and the East- to crush the rebellion. This decision the tensions between the capital and

4 Nepal Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013 Box 2 Nepal’s Maoists: armed actor no more? of the formal security forces (Small Arms Survey, 2010, p. 257). The field- The Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M)19 and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army work done for this study suggests (PLA),20 waged an armed conflict from 1996 to 2006, the goal of which was to overthrow the monarchy and that the armed groups active in post- establish a people’s republic. During the conflict, the party claimed large swathes of territory, especially conflict Nepal occupy this ‘middle outside Kathmandu. It has been estimated that some 13,000 people were killed during the conflict, and ground’. Through the juxtaposition of about 1,300 went missing (OHCHR, 2012, p. 14). Following the largely peaceful Jana Andolan II (People’s their political and economic activities, Movement II) in April 2006,21 the UCPN-M entered negotiations with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and such groups both undermine law and ultimately signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) on 21 November 2006. The CPA brought the Maoists order in the country and, through back into mainstream politics, paving the way for their success in the first post-war elections, held in 2008.22 their covert associations with local It is important to stress that, although it negotiated and agreed a peace settlement, the UCPN-M never political leaders, influence the state’s formally renounced the use of violence to achieve its ends. Its leaders frequently spoke of using revolts, responses and policies towards armed even as they led a coalition government. Some argue that their stance will evolve as the party changes group activity. from a military force into a political party. The UCPN-M experienced strong internal disagreements and Moving away from a simple political– much infighting before and after the peace settlement, including with its partners in trade unions, the economic distinction and acknowledg- Young Communist League and former combatants. The scission in 2004 of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti ing the heterogeneity of armed groups Morcha (JTTM) is one example. The party splintered again in June 2012, when a more hardline faction led in Nepal is an important first step by Chairman Mohan Vaidya (commonly known as Kiran) separated from the faction led by Pushpa Kamal towards dealing with the problem in Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai (the Prime Minister), respectively the Chairman and Vice-Chairman a more effective manner. The field- of the UCPN-M. work for this report suggests that the After the 2006 peace agreement, the Maoist People’s Liberation Army cadres were stationed in seven following characteristics are relevant ‘major’ and twenty-one minor cantonment sites scattered across the country. In 2007, the United Nations to understanding the nature of the Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) screened and verified roughly 19,600 combatants; another 4,000 minors and late problem. recruits were judged after screening to be ineligible for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegra- tion programme. Some 3,000 weapons were collected and stored in cantonment sites. Roughly 7,000 former combatants have been provided with cash settlements. Though the country’s political parties had Group emergence agreed to integrate 6,500 former combatants in the Nepali armed forces, just 1,388 former combatants The groups that have mushroomed were selected for non-officer positions in the Nepal Army; 71 Maoist commanders became officers.23 since the CPA have not emerged sud- The UCPN-M had a youth wing, the Young Communist League (YCL). In the run-up to the 2008 Constituent denly; their origins lie in the cultural Assembly elections, the YCL was implicated in numerous criminal activities, including extortion, intimida- endowments and recent historical expe- tion, and harassment (Carter Center, 2011). The YCL also mobilized supporters for key strikes and protests riences of Nepali society. While cul- when needed. Indeed, it was a driving force behind the mobilization of some 200,000 Nepalis for a week- tural differences in Nepal are highly long strike in May 2010 (Carter Center, 2011, p. 20). Ostensibly for ‘economic’ reasons that reflected the contentious, interlocutors consistently party’s ideology, the YCL provided communal living arrangements for its members. After it was dismantled in 2010, however, the UCPN-M acknowledged that the YCL operated paramilitary structures. highlighted regional differences in population dynamics. The ease with which armed groups cross the Nepal– peripheral areas of the Terai and the to the state, and place them along a India border, for example, has been potentially destabilizing effects of direct spectrum of pro- and anti-government attributed to the fact that the popula- citizen action, as well as those of groups groups. Such a spectrum would dis- tions living on either side are cultur- such as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha tinguish, at one end, armed groups ally and linguistically similar—to the (JTMM). Since then, national and re- and actors that are directly opposed extent that villages and even single gional authorities have perceived armed to the government and seek to over- houses straddle the frontier. This is a groups to be one of the principal threats throw it (such as the Maoist insur- favourable environment for the emer- to governance and development. It gency) and, at the other, groups that gence and proliferation of armed was alleged, for example, that armed explicitly support and defend the groups (especially those of a more groups planned to disrupt the Con- state (such as the army and the police criminal orientation), since groups can stituent Assembly elections of April forces) (Small Arms Survey, 2010, retreat across the border when they 2008, though this proved not to be the p. 257). Between these two poles is a need to escape the police. Historical case. Fuelled by breathless media re- ‘middle ground’, often missing from experiences also seem to play a role. porting, concern about armed groups analysis, which is occupied by armed For example, the genesis of most has continued to grow. groups that can be characterized as groups in the Eastern Hills can be The government’s description of neutral or ambivalent towards the traced back to the re-establishment of the threat and its emphasis on groups government. democracy and ethnic awakening in in the Terai do little to clarify the dif- Groups active in this ‘middle the early 1990s.24 For groups in the ferences between armed groups in ground’ do not necessarily seek to Terai, in contrast, the Maoist insur- Nepal. Rather than rely on rigid catego- challenge the state, and do not overtly gency, the state’s counter-insurgency ries, it might be better to conceptualize support it (see Figure 1). They pursue measures, and the appearance of a the phenomenon of Nepal’s armed their own goals, operating within the political vacuum after the CPA, appear groups in terms of their relationship state’s confines and under the radar to be more relevant.

www.nepal-ava.org 5 Figure 1 Armed groups spectrum In the Kathmandu Valley, the public seems to have even more precarious HIGH relations with the various goondas, who HIGH HIGH operate protection rackets in many of MAOISTS FORMAL SECURITY the commercial and tourist areas. PROVIDERS Groups and the legal economy GROUP CAPACITY FOR VIOLENCE EXTENSIVENESS Armed groups that are currently active in Nepal tend to be engaged in legal and illegal activities. Almost all groups LOW seem to engage in the collection of EXAMPLES: SMALL CRIMINAL GROUPS, EXAMPLES: SMALL CRIMINAL LOCAL STRONGMEN, SOCIAL AND GROUPS, VIGILANTE GROUPS, ‘voluntary donations’. This form of LOW ETHNIC MOVEMENTS AND YOUTH WINGS financial extraction can be traced back to the Maoist insurgency. Individuals SEEKING TO OPPOSE OR OVERTHROW NEUTRAL SEEKING TO DEFEND OR SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT THE GOVERNMENT (usually prosperous) are telephoned RELATIONSHIP TO THE GOVERNMENT and asked to make a donation to the group or its associated political wing. Source: Small Arms Survey (2010, p. 258) This act is not in itself illegal, but becomes so when individuals cannot refuse. Nevertheless, interviews with 26 State–group relations political leaders. Finally, groups in the local business owners suggest that the Eastern Hill region claim to be more success and incidence of this form of None of the contemporary groups in interested in obtaining local autonomy fundraising have decreased in recent Nepal directly threaten the state’s sur- and ethnic or indigenous recognition years. Interlocutors frequently under- vival. While some groups have launched than waging armed rebellion, although lined that most of the groups in the attacks against government officials, they have made clear that, if state proc- Terai are driven primarily by economic or police posts and personnel, most esses for achieving these goals fail, motives, and use tactics such as extor- either operate in association with spe- ‘peaceful armed rebellion’ against the tion and kidnapping to make a profit. cific political leaders or try to avoid Government is an option.27 Like goondas in urban centres, they contact with security officials in order seem to engage in other forms of illicit to pursue their illegal activities. Despite activity, such as trafficking in drugs efforts to suggest that some of the Community–group relations and people and smuggling weapons groups in the Terai region threaten the Whereas the Maoists tried to ‘win the and natural resources. Some are aligned Nepali state, as the Maoist insurgency hearts and minds’ of the Nepali popu- with political leaders and help to finance did, most of the groups operating there lation (especially in the first years of their political activities and ensure have not reached the level of organi- the conflict), contemporary groups voter compliance. These services seem zation and threat that this implies.25 operating in Nepal seem to have little to be provided in exchange for politi- Moreover, toppling the state does not or no support among the local popu- cal protection, specifically from law seem to be among their objectives. lation. One exception: in 2007, when enforcement. In the Kathmandu Valley, According to interlocutors and inter- the Madhesi Movement was in full local dons own ‘luxury’ industries, views conducted in the region, armed swing, certain groups in the Terai did including bars, restaurants, hotels, groups are more interested in working receive popular support because they and casinos. within the state’s confines to achieve were seen to defend the interests of their goals (only one of which is to the local Madhesi population against make a profit) and they are willing to the encroachment of the Hill peoples. Use of violence negotiate with the state when they wish Once the Hill peoples were displaced, Armed groups in Nepal rarely attack to enter mainstream society or politics. however, these groups turned their each other; most violence is directed Nor do armed groups in other attention to and predatory behaviour at the local population. This was most regions seem to pose a greater threat. on the local Madhesi population. evident in the Terai region after the CPA, The continued Maoist presence (and In the Eastern Hills, on the other when various armed groups targeted local support for it) in the mid-western hand, it has been argued that local individuals of Hill origin with support and western regions, for instance, is said people support politically oriented from elements of the local population.28 to explain the low (or non-existent) level groups rather than those that aim to Owing to the activities of some armed of armed group activity in the area. It is achieve their goals through violence. groups and the general sense of inse- presumed that no space exists for new The decline in armed group activity curity, thousands of individuals left groups to emerge. The rise in crime and in this region has thus been attributed or were forcefully displaced from the prevalence of goondas (local don; thug) in not only to the effectiveness of police region. Since then, the attention of Kathmandu and other urban centres has operations, but to the willingness of armed groups has shifted back to the been attributed to the close relationship local people to collaborate with law local population. Though levels of between some of these actors and certain enforcement. homicide in the Terai region remain

6 Nepal Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013 low, groups use other forms of intimi- Disaggregating Nepal’s ons, have run criminal activities in the dation to control the population and capital since at least the 1990s. They extort resources, including kidnapping armed groups have extended their links to other urban and IEDs. Armed groups do not have The ‘middle ground’ in which the centres across the country, where they sophisticated weapons at their dis- various groups in Nepal operate is pursue similar activities, including posal. This is clear from the types of best conceptualized by disaggregating extortion and smuggling (of people, weapon surrendered to the govern- armed group activity by region. Areas narcotics, and natural resources such ment. In the Terai, the weapon of choice of Kathmandu and the Terai and as sandalwood). is the IED, which are often detonated in Eastern Hills regions are regularly At the same time, because they are public areas to create fear and insecu- singled out as hotbeds of organized also routinely involved in ‘legitimate’ rity. Similar tactics are used by groups violence and vice. There are obvious forms of business (such as restaurants, in other parts of the country, such as reasons for this: both Kathmandu and bars, and construction companies), the Eastern Hills, but to a much lesser the Terai have high levels of economic their classification is tricky not just extent. Since the conflict ended in2006 , activity; parts of the Terai and Eastern intellectually but in terms of libel. the police have strengthened their pres- Hills suffer from social and economic Such groups are often for hire, and are ence and armed groups all over Nepal exclusion; and both are also peripheral willing to sell their services to settle appear to have responded by prefer- and under-governed areas of the coun- family and commercial disputes ring psychological forms of pressure try. Interviewees routinely described (Sangraula, 2010). In some cases, they over physical violence.29 The emergence the Terai, and a few areas in the Eastern have been involved in contract killings; of ‘vigilante groups’ in the period lead- Hills hilly areas, as rife with arms traf- or extorting resources from business ing up to the CPA was an exception to ficking, trade in illicit commodities, and leaders, real estate magnates, and this trend. These groups were appar- 30 predatory criminal activity. The Nepal major educational facilities.31 Police ently fostered by local security forces police are aware that a lively industry officers contend that many groups (and allegedly even by Indian intel- and trade in craft or home-made weap- are protected by politicians, and the ligence services) to counter the Maoist ons exists across the border in India, threat in the Terai; but they have become police themselves are often criticised and have seized single-shot firearms much less evident in recent years. for having underworld connections in growing numbers (Adhikari, 2011; (Saferworld, 2012, p. 8). Some of the Kharel, 2011). police officers interviewed confided Group extensiveness Many analysts in Nepal and abroad that 400–500 criminals on Nepal’s Armed groups in Nepal exhibit differ- also agree that the unpredictable politi- ‘most wanted’ list were to be arrested, ent degrees of territorial control and cal climate in the country also promotes but did not indicate when or where this the formation of armed groups. The reach. Those in the Eastern Hills appear might occur; they also admitted that Government’s inability to promulgate to act locally, while those in the Terai such an operation would be opposed a new constitution (as recently as operate on both sides of the border with by certain political leaders.32 May 2012) and continuing inter-party India (where allegedly their leaders Links between armed groups and disagreements create an environment also reside). The reach of Terai groups politicians in Kathmandu are widely of impunity, while a deteriorating seems to have changed after a crack- decried. Some claim that a feudal economy and chronic lack of employ- down on criminal activity in the Indian relationship between the two sets of state of Bihar, which caused a number ment make it easy for organised crim- actors reaches back to the Panchayat of actors to move permanently to the inal groups to recruit new members. system and has been further woven Terai, other Indian cities, or even the Power struggles between political elites into Nepal’s social fabric since the Kathmandu Valley. The goondas who in the capital and in specific districts introduction of parliamentary democ- operate in the capital also seem to be are also alleged to have driven up mem- racy in 1990 and 2006.33 At various territorially concentrated, though this bership, albeit temporarily (Jha, 2008, times, all political parties have been does not necessarily imply control pp. 3–4). Many of those who join such shown to have connections with con- over territory. groups believe they are fighting for troversial individuals and businessmen. In interviews, police officers empha- goals such as better political representa- However, the situation is apparently sized that (unlike their peers in some tion, removal of language barriers, and worsening. In 2011, the then Home other parts of the world) the police can access to services, but they are never- enter any neighbourhood in Kathmandu theless put to use for a wide variety of Minister declared to the Parliament’s and other main cities. ends (Pathak and Uprety, 2009). State Affairs Committee that the nexus Though inter-group conflicts and between politicians and criminals is a threat to law and order (Kathmandu competition have occurred in the past, Kathmandu Valley groups appear to be specializing; Post, 2011). Indeed, the proximity of some focus on human trafficking, Being the political and economic certain governmental ministers to others on arms or drugs. Some groups centre of the country, the Kathmandu local dons is often cited as evidence of seem to have established networks Valley has long been affected by vio- the close relationships between crime in other urban centres in Nepal and lence and armed group activity. Local and politics in Nepal’s cities. Goondas abroad, but their range and sophisti- goondas, with relatively stable organi- and their members finance certain cation remain unclear. zational structures and access to weap- politicians and parties, help to ‘get out

www.nepal-ava.org 7 Table 1 Types of group active in Nepal

Type of group Geographic Date of origin Composition and other features Political allegiances and activities and examples concentration

Clandestine Most are active Became more Most of these groups are loosely While not directly active in politics, the leaders groups in Kathmandu prominent after organized around a leader, often often have clandestine links with politicians and Kaji Sherpa, and other urban 2006, but some referred to as a ‘don’ or ‘goonda’. They security personnel. The groups are sometimes Ramesh Bahun, centres. emerged as range in size: from bigger groups with used as private security providers and are relied Raju Gorkhali, early as 1990 hundreds of members to small criminal on during election periods. 35 34 (if not before). gangs with just a few. Milan sexy. These groups often engage in illegal activities, such smuggling small arms, trafficking drugs and persons, extortion, and kidnapping.

Politically Most are based Emerged under These groups are of similar composition These groups emerged during the Panchayat affiliated in Kathmandu the Panchayat to the clandestine groups mentioned years, when they were used by the state to counter groups and Terai. system, but above. Their leaders are considered to democratic activities. Since the re-establishment Ganesh Lama, became more be local strongmen and the size of the of democracy in 1990, the leaders of these groups Deepak Manange, prominent during group varies from a few dozen to a few have become increasingly affiliated with political Dinesh Adhikari the 1990s and hundred. parties, and at times have held political positions. ‘Chari’, Kumar after 2006. These groups have been known to help gather Ghaite, Parshuram votes, provide protection, coerce opponents, Basnet. and provide financial support for local (and at times national) political parties to which they are affiliated. These groups are engaged in illicit activities such as extortion and racketeering. They are also involved in the legal economy (and own restaurants, hotels, casinos, construction companies, etc.).

Political Regional Emerged after After the CPA, these groups were All these groups proclaim a political agenda that outfits36 presence. 1990, though relatively large, with a membership often focuses on ethnic recognition and territorial Various groups some existed base of a few hundred. More recent autonomy. While some groups operate ‘above- operating in the before. These estimates suggest that most now have ground’ (in the sense that they have held peace Terai37 and the groups became no more than 50 followers. They attempt talks with the government), others continue to Eastern Hills,38 especially visible to imitate the organization and structure operate ‘underground’ and engage in violent activi- as well as Hindu after 2006. of the Maoists, as well as their tactics, ties (such as extortion, kidnapping, and attacks on Fundamentalist and are often organized around a single government and law enforcement officials). 39 leader referred to as the commander. groups. Since the CPA, ‘above-ground’ groups have largely claimed to be legitimate political outfits and some have even joined local political parties. These groups have actively engaged in national and local discussions of ethnic and indigenous issues, have distanced themselves from ‘underground’ factions and condemned their activities. At the same time, some have said that, should the political process fail to achieve their goals, ‘armed rebellion’ would be an option.

Youth All regions, but After 2006, Membership of these groups is in the All political parties have associated youth wings. organizations most prominent though some thousands. Many members are young Their primary function is to support the political Young Communist in urban areas, can be traced males, though female membership is parties, especially in urban areas (though they are League (YCL), especially back to the also significant. active in all parts of Nepal). They are often mobilized Youth Association Kathmandu. 1990s and even for political demonstrations, strikes (banda), and Nepal (YAN), the 1950s. other cultural and political activities. Tarun Dal. Youth organizations have also been used as a more coercive force. They have been known to turn on each other or supporters of other political parties, and have been involved on occasion in extortion and ‘donation’ collection. Some groups have fulfilled security functions and acted as paramilitaries.

8 Nepal Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013 the vote’, and may even determine the repeatedly factionalized and reformed, groups, on the grounds that such outcome of elections.40 In exchange often adopting the name of their leader reporting helps groups to mobilize they receive political protection and are or area of operation (Manandhar, 2009).42 support and de facto legitimizes them.47 able to continue their illegal activates Despite reported attempts to unify Some interviewees even hinted that unharassed by local law enforcement (Telegraph Nepal, 2011),43 many armed entering negotiations with govern- agencies. groups appear to be highly personal- ment gives groups immunity for a The number of groups active in ized, using their ‘brands’ to extract period, allowing them to organize and Kathmandu oscillates in response to rents from people, narcotics, arms, or expand their activities without obstruc- external pressure and local political natural resources. As noted, their tion by the police.48 This controversial and economic conditions. Applying growth and activity is facilitated by claim warrants further exploration. the categories in Table 1, consultations the open border with India, ineffec- with the Nepal Police, the Armed Police tive and under-resourced law enforce- Eastern Hills Force, and various journalists and local ment (including the close relationship security analysts suggest that as many between crime and policing), and sim- Compared to groups in the Kathmandu as 20 goondas operate in Kathmandu. mering public hostility to the govern- Valley and the Terai, groups in the More than half (13 or so) are relatively ment in Kathmandu, which is perceived Eastern Hill region are perceived to large, having a membership of about to be both remote and negligent by have a more political orientation. Many 300 individuals. While the goondas large numbers of Terai residents— advocate recognition of local indig- themselves are often well off, due to especially young adults (International enous groups and their inclusion in their links with political and economic Alert, 2008). state institutions. While the struggle elites, members tend to be young Groups in the Terai appear to have for local recognition and autonomy in men from marginalized and socially comparatively fixed territorial areas the Eastern Hills has a long history, it excluded communities and districts of operation. Activities are focused in became more visible after the demo- (Saferworld, 2012, p. 7). eight districts of central and eastern cratic transition of 1990 and the CPA. Terai (Parsa, Bara, Rautahat, Sarlahi, During the conflict, however, local Mahottari, Dhanusa, Siraha, and grievances and groups were drawn Terai 49 Saptari) and two districts in the west- into the Maoist movement. Allegedly The Terai region is Nepal’s most ern Terai (Banke and Bardiya).44 In to cement their influence in the Eastern heavily populated area, accounting virtually all cases, a group’s relative Hills, the UCPN-M offered local lead- for 20 of the country’s 75 districts but influence in a particular district or ers high-ranking positions within the 50 close to half of Nepal’s almost 30 mil- division is contingent on the origins party in exchange for their support. lion citizens (Government of Nepal, of its leaders, even if the latter reside In the post CPA environment groups

2011). The region is also the agricul- elsewhere. Moreover, most of the resurfaced in the Eastern Hills. They tural and industrial heartland of the cadres of armed groups in the Terai can be divided into two broad social country and sits along an open border appear to have similar demographic or ethnic movements, both of which with India. In contrast to the crime profiles. Members tend to be aged demand recognition of and territorial groups of Kathmandu, the Terai between 15 and 30 and come from autonomy for the local indigenous features remnant insurgent factions, lower castes and poorer socio-economic populations, the Limbuwan and the Rai. groups that are politically oriented, strata.45 Many said that they joined Three factions of the Federal Limbuwan and smaller clusters of smugglers and groups to acquire status and money, State Council (FLSC)51 have been the petty criminals. The Madhesi Rastriya while professing dissatisfaction with most active Limbuwan groups in the Mukti Morcha (MRMM) and its break- the national political status quo (Inter- districts of Dhankuta, Tehrathum, away groups are widely considered to national Alert, 2008, p. 11). Sankhuwasabha, Sunsari, Panchthar, have been the driving force behind Research indicates that the average and Taplejung. These groups call for the growth of armed group activity in Terai-based armed group is compara- an autonomous Limbuwan state and the region (Jha, 2008, p. 3). The MRMM tively modest in size, having between recognition by the Nepali state of indig- was a Maoist faction that operated 5 and 20 members.46 Despite the fact enous culture, language, and religion.52 out of the Terai. In 2004 the Maoist that these groups have increasingly While the FLSC advances this political leadership replaced the head of the engaged in negotiations with the agenda, its associated youth wings MRMM, Jaya Krishna Goit, with a Nepali Government, the majority are (referred to as the Limbuwan Volunteers) new leader. Goit subsequently created perceived to be motivated by monetary provide security for political leaders his own group, the Janatantrik Terai gain. Interviews suggest that officials, and would form the backbone for the Mukti Morcha (JTMM). Unhappy national and district-level police, security structure of a Limbuwan state, with JTMM’s leadership, a group of and local security analysts commonly were it established (ICG, 2011, p. 14). disgruntled members led by Nagendra believe that the ideological or political Other important groups are the Kumar Paswan (‘Jwala Singh’) then motives these groups profess are sim- Khambuwan Rashtriya Morcha (KRM) formed a new faction under the name ply a cover for their illegal and money- and the Kirat Janabadi Workers Party JTMM-Jwala.41 making activities. They also believe (KJWP), both of which operate in the This splintering is characteristic. that media and activist reports on the Khambuwan area of the Eastern In the past decade, armed groups have Terai are biased in favour of armed Hills. The KRM was founded in 1992

www.nepal-ava.org 9 by Gopal Khambu with the aim of groups operating in the Eastern Hills. for the UCPN-M. Since the party has forming an autonomous Khambuwan To take this step, the KRM has report- become the largest in the Constituent state. Throughout the 1990s, the KRM edly transformed some of its armed Assembly and has been in and out of engaged in violent activities that were units into political teams, who engage government since 2008, local leaders primarily directed at symbols of ‘for- in outreach rather than intimidation have been able to influence national eign occupation’ and ‘suppression’ of (ICG, 2011, p. 16).56 policies as well. Because of inclusion, the Rai peoples (such as schools and The notion of distancing from the local people have not had reason to police posts) (ICG, 2011, p. 15). As the activities of the underground groups organize or revolt.63 Maoist movement extended into the was emphasised by all the interlocu- There is nevertheless concern that Eastern Hills, the KRM, and Gopal tors from the Eastern Hills. They argued a recent split in the UCPN-M might Khambu in particular, played a criti- that underground activity and politi- lead to unrest in the Western Districts.64 cal role in spreading its ideology and cal violence discredit the legitimate The ideologically more ‘radical’ faction mobilizing local people in support of demands of indigenous groups and of the Maoists, led by Mohan Vaidya the People’s War. Indeed, it was only their political parties for territorial (‘Kiran’), has accused the UCPN-M of after he was promised a high position autonomy and cultural and ethnic ideological compromise and failure to in the Party that Gopal Khambu (and recognition. After the deadline for promote the goals of the insurgency. a faction of the KRM referred to as the creating a new constitution passed in A new party, the Communist Party of Kirat Workers Party) eventually affili- May 2012, local parties and groups in Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M),65 has actively ated with the Maoists.53 Following the the Eastern Hills seem to have focused voiced its dissatisfaction with the CPA, this group of combatants broke their attention on the elections to a government, led by the UCPN-M, and away from the Maoists and formed the new Constituent Assembly in 2012. recently announced steps to remedy Kirat Janabadi Workers Party (KJWP). Interviewees from the Eastern Hills the situation. Interestingly, these par- Since its formation, the group has said that the elections offered an oppor- allel the tactics adopted by the Maoists experienced a number of splits. Some tunity to achieve their goals through in the months leading up to the decla- leaders joined mainstream political peaceful means but they also noted that ration of the People’s War in 1996.66 parties, while others continued to work recourse to ‘armed rebellion’ remains They include breaking away from the underground (ICG, 2010, p. 15; ICG, an option if the electoral route fails.57 bigger communist party, emphasising 2011, p. 15).54 Despite their commitment Notwithstanding this threat, research Nepali nationalism, taking a sharper to indigenous rights and identity, and suggests that, in line with the national position with respect to India (by ban- declaring that they are legitimate politi- trend, armed group activity has declined ning Indian movies and vehicles in cal organizations, some factions of the in the Eastern Hills. Interlocutors attrib- Nepal), and mobilizing and training KJWP have been involved in attacks uted this primarily to the effective- party cadres (by reorganizing former on police posts, kidnapping, extortion ness of the Special Security Plan (SSP, YCL and PLA members within the and property seizure. The group and introduced in 2010).58 Faced by an in- National Youth Volunteers Bureau) its various factions seem to have been creased police presence, some armed (Dahal, 2012). While it is unlikely that considerably weakened in 2010, when groups appear to have been forced to the CPN-M will be able to mobilize a some of its members were arrested fol- come together,59 while others gave up fighting force capable of threatening lowing KJWP attacks on government the armed struggle and merged with the Nepali state,67 rumours of a re- officials and police personnel. Since local political parties60 or ceased activ- newed insurgency affect the already the KJWP’s membership is drawn pri- ity altogether.61 The only active groups volatile political and security situation marily from a close-knit group, most at this time are the Limbuwan State in the country. of whom are from a specific area in Force and a small faction of the KJWP. the Eastern Hills and share blood ties, Both seem to be engaged primarily in the arrests had a strong impact on the low-level extortion and other criminal Responding to armed groups cohesion and membership of the group. activities.62 Of the original leadership, only Binod The Government of Nepal has adopted Rai and his sister, Mina Rai, remain; a mixture of hard and soft tactics to all the others have either been arrested Western Districts defeat armed groups. Predictably, in or have ‘mainstreamed’, by joining During the conflict, the UCPN-M was confronting a poorly known or defined local political parties.55 most deeply entrenched in the districts enemy, this approach has achieved One KRM faction did not affiliate of Rolpa, Rukum, Sindhuli, and Gorkha mixed results. Though it has varied itself with the Maoists during the con- (Tiwari, 2001). Their influence contin- its tactics in specific ways, between flict and continued to operate inde- ues to be strong in these areas, pre- the Kathmandu Valley and the Terai, pendently. Since the CPA, this group venting the emergence of forms of for example, certain shared features has claimed to have ceased all armed armed group activity that are present can be identified. It is common, for activity and is pushing for the creation in other parts of the country. Because example, to organize sweeps which of a Khambuwan state within a federal local communities (the poor, Dalits, concentrate a heavy police presence Nepal and inclusion in state institu- and other excluded ethnic groups) at key locations, arrest and imprison tions. The KRM has also distanced have been incorporated into local suspects, and confiscate weapons and itself from the armed activities of other state structures, there is local support ammunition. Security sweeps often

10 Nepal Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013 focus on young itinerant males, at the groups have risen. In 2010, the Office grievances. Although local activists risk of stereotyping (and alienating) of the UN High Commissioner for remain deeply sceptical of the process Nepal’s unemployed youth. Many of Human Rights reported an ‘alarm- and fear retribution by the Nepal Police, the Government’s interventions mirror ingly high number of reported deaths and group members have continued strategies adopted by other governments, in custody or deaths of individuals to be stigmatized in some cases,75 from Latin America to South Asia.68 during “encounters”’ (OHCHR 2010, they feel that the security dividends In a bid to combat the threat that p. 4).71 According to the Democratic of peace talks nevertheless outweigh armed groups represent, in 2009 the Freedom and Human Rights Institute their costs. Ministry of Home Affairs announced (DFHRI), between early 2008 and Alongside these government-led a far-reaching NR 3.8 billion Special mid-2011 132 individuals were killed initiatives are numerous government Security Plan (SSP). Ostensibly, the by security forces and 149 by so-called and non-governmental activities de- Plan was introduced to improve law armed groups in 20 of Terai’s districts signed to promote peace and reconcili- and order across the country by con- (Jha and Aryal, 2011, pp. 6, 23).72 ation in areas affected by armed groups. siderably expanding the local pres- Despite frequent changes in gov- It is expected that the incentive to ence of the Armed Police Force (APF) ernment coalitions and ministerial resort to armed force will diminish if (Chapagain and Gautam, 2009). It was representation, the Government of underlying grievances and structural designed to combat organized crime, Nepal has pursued peace talks with causes of insecurity are addressed. eradicate highway blockades, address at least 18 armed groups over the past At the forefront of these efforts is the impunity, ensure public service deliv- five years (see Table2 ). Several rounds Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, ery, restrict forced closures of public of negotiations were undertaken with which has supported the establishment and educational offices, and increase (non-Maoist) armed groups as early of so-called Local Peace Committees the participation of civilians in their as 2008 during a period of instability (LPCs). Composed of prominent com- own security (Chapagain and Gautam, outside of Kathmandu (ICG, 2008a, munity representatives, including 2009). The SSP also helped raise the p. 7). These talks stumbled amid con- political parties, the LPCs are expected quality of coordination at sub-national fusion over whether or not the groups level, under the authority of Chief constituted formal entities. The Minis- Table 2 Armed groups engaged in peace talks District Officers (CDOs). According try of Home Affairs claimed to be with the Government of Nepal73 to key informants in the Kathmandu ‘studying’ the question in 2009 to Valley and selected districts of the determine whether the groups with 1 Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha Terai, a more visible police presence, whom the government claimed to be (Establishment group) improved coordination between negotiating were political or criminal 2 Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha (Goit) security entities, and cross-border co- in nature. According to interviews with ordination with Indian counterparts a former Government Minister involved 3 Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Rajan) sharply reduced the activities of armed in negotiations with armed groups, 4 Kirat Janabadi Workers Party groups (also see Small Arms Survey, talks are held only with armed outfits 2011; Jha, 2008). that have a political character, not 5 Liberation Tigers of Terai Ealum Despite the SSP’s apparent success, with groups involved in criminal 6 Madhes Mukti Tigers the Government’s heavy-handed activities.74 As already discussed, the approach has been widely criticized. mixed identity of many armed groups 7 Madhesi Virus Killers CDOs, for instance, were granted quasi- and their involvement over time in both 8 Nepal Defence Army judicial powers to detain, for up to political and criminal activities has three months without charge, individ- made this position difficult to sustain. 9 Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parisad uals who infringed the Small Arms Act. Nevertheless, peace talks are cred- 10 Sanyunkta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha Moreover, CDOs were not obliged to ited with having improved the security file criminal charges or start an investi- situation in some areas of the Terai. 11 Sanyukra Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha gation until the three-month deadline Typically, the Government delegation, (Aajad) approached. Owing to the state of the led by the Minister of Peace and 12 Sanyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha local judiciary, investigations may Reconstruction, meets the leadership (Pawan) take up to two years to complete, and of the armed group in question. A pre- during this time individuals were liminary phase of meetings tends to 13 Terai Sanyukta Janatantrik Party (TSJP) likely to remain in custody (Advocacy focus on the surrender or ‘handover’ 14 Sanyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha (SJMM) Forum, 2011).69 As mentioned above, of weapons and an agreement by police agents are reported to have leaders of the armed group to discon- 15 Terai Janatantrik Mukti Morcha ( Kautilya) promoted ‘vigilante groups’, with the tinue violent activities. In return, the 16 Janatantrik Madhes Terai Mukti Morcha aim of fuelling dissent between armed government grants an amnesty and (Pratap) groups to weaken their ties and effec- initiates the release of key leaders and tiveness.70 However, the biggest con- cadres, permanently withdrawing legal 17 Khambuwan Mukti Morcha (Samyukta) cern with regard to the SSP is that, cases against them. Subsequently, both 18 Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha since its introduction, extra-judicial parties focus on resolving more sys- (Bhagat Singh) killings of alleged members of armed temic issues that fuel the armed group’s

www.nepal-ava.org 11 to defuse crises before they lead to of armed groups in the country. While The last point is especially relevant, violence (Odendaal and Olivier, 2008, much effort has been put into locating because the underlying reasons why p. 4; Ministry of Peace and Recon- ‘hot-spots’ of armed group activity armed groups have emerged in Nepal struction, 2009); but, precisely because (such as the Terai and Eastern Hills) have not been dealt with. Political of their composition, they are seen to and tackling threats (through security uncertainty (particularly on the ques- be politicized and likely to induce strategies or negotiation), little atten- tion of federalism) generates chronic conflict in certain circumstances. Their tion has been given to understanding instability and this, combined with the real and relative effectiveness has not the phenomenon. The purpose of this continued grievances of certain ethnic yet been studied. Issue Brief, therefore, was to inject some or indigenous groups and Nepal’s International and national organi- clarity into the issue of armed groups erratic and fragile economic outlook, zations have also stepped up their in Nepal. creates fertile conditions for armed engagement. For example, the Asia Reflecting studies of armed groups groups to re-emerge and flourish. The Foundation has launched a number in other parts of the world, the Issue state’s continued inability or unwilling- of community mediation projects in Brief finds that it is not a straightforward ness to establish law and order and selected districts to defuse conflicts and matter to characterize the nature of the persistence of youth unemploy- mobilize and empower peace enablers.76 Nepal’s contemporary armed actors. ment suggest that the threats that Organizations such as International First, unlike previous generations of armed groups pose are not likely to Alert and UNICEF have also worked rebels, more recent manifestations of go away. As a result, and despite the directly with affected populations, armed groups tend to lack a clear recent fall in their number, the issue including children, to promote protec- structure and are prone to splintering. should not be marginalized. It is a tion and enhance ‘community security’ Second, they are not a direct threat to problem that needs to be tackled, by (International Alert, 2007, 2008).77 the state but are content to work within strategies based on an informed and The Small Arms Survey recently its confines; sometimes they are even realistic appraisal. conducted a survey-based assessment, co-opted by it. Third, their character in association with Inter-Disciplinary and activities are not fixed but change- Analysts (IDA), to assess the impacts able; and they tend to overlap with Notes of such activities on real and perceived civilian and political organizations. 1 The Seven Party Alliance includes the insecurity, and detected some positive The Issue Brief finds that it is helpful Nepali Congress (NC); Communist Party dividends, though they were short- to analyse Nepal’s armed groups in of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi, lived and some initiatives did not terms of a ‘middle ground’, because NSP (A)); Nepali Congress (Democratic, target armed groups specifically most of them attempt to fly under the NC(D)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal Work- (Muggah, 2012). radar of law enforcement and keep ers and Peasants Party (NWPP); and United The extent to which such activities the state out of their affairs, and sur- Left Front (ULF). reduce the formation and activity of vive by adopting a mix of political 2 The conflict that took place in Nepal from 1996 to 2006 is referred to as a ‘civil war’ armed groups remains largely untested. and economic activities. The Issue or an ‘insurgency’. Since both terms are Though most recent estimates by Brief has illustrated this middle normatively loaded in the Nepali context, the Ministry of Home Affairs suggest ground by analysing armed group this Issue Brief will use the more neutral that the number of active armed activity by region and sketching the term ‘armed conflict’ throughout. groups in the country has decreased relationships that they have with the 3 The insecurity was fostered by competi- tion and conflict between political parties, from more than one hundred to about institutions of state. the increasing salience of class differences a dozen, and this decline has been The Issue Brief also outlined the and ethnic/caste identities, the ever- largely attributed to the mixture of character of armed groups in Nepal. present (and subsequently real) threat of approaches adopted by the Govern- Starting with the notion that most of suspension of democracy and the return of the Monarchy, and a Maoist insurgency ment and associated agencies, it is the country’s armed groups are not a (Karki and Seddon, 2003a; Hutt, 2004a; unclear whether this trend will neces- direct threat to the state, it went on to von Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan, 2012; sarily continue.78 The current political outline a number of characteristic rel- ICG, 2012a, 2012b). situation, and arguments around the evant to understanding them—focus- 4 Problems include, but are not limited to: new constitution and the federal char- ing on their emergence, relations with increasing poverty; unequal develop- ment between rural and urban areas; the acter of Nepal’s political system, will the community, links to the legal econ- continued salience of the caste system; and certainly influence their evolution omy, the use of violence, and the area ethno-regional identities. These problems and behaviour. of operation. Apart from generating have been reflected in public debates about more detailed insights about the the adoption of a new constitution and nature and threat of armed groups in the merits of a federal model for Nepal. Conclusions These debates have polarized politics Nepal, such criteria can help policy and led to the dissolution of parliament Motivated by the initial mushrooming makers and practitioners to identify key in May 2012. New elections were called, of armed actors in Nepal after the interlocutors, organize their responses, initially for November 2012. They have Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and measure their effectiveness in been postponed to 2013. 5 Officials interviewed for this Issue Brief was signed in 2006, the Nepali Govern- containing and eventually reducing the considered that between ten and two ment, police forces, and journalists presence and impact of armed groups dozen armed groups had been recog- have grappled with the phenomenon in the country. nized by the government. Author inter-

12 Nepal Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013 views conducted with local and interna- 16 In the 1994 mid-term elections, the United dominance of the Hill peoples. Author tional security advisors, high-ranking People’s Front Nepal (UPFN), a break­ interviews in the Terai in April 2012, and members of Nepal Police, as well as away communist faction led by Baburam with a civil society leader representing Armed Police Force (APF), Kathmandu, Bhattarai, was not recognized by the indigenous and Madhesi groups on 18 September, 4 October, and 5 October Election Commission. The UPFN was the 25 September and 3 October 2012. 2012, respectively. political front organization of the CPN- 29 Author interviews with senior Nepal 6 For a good overview of armed group Unity Centre led by Puspa Kamal Dahal Police and Armed Police Force officers, activity in the Terai, see the Advocacy (also known as Prachanda). In 1994 Kathmandu, 4 and 5 October 2012. Forum report on torture and extrajudicial Prachanda’s CPN-Unity Centre was re- 30 Author interviews with senior Nepal executions (2010, pp. 23–40). named the CPN-Maoist (Lawoti, 2010, p. 6). Police and Armed Police Force officers, 7 Author interviews with local police and 17 The Maoists announced the People’s War Kathmandu, 4 and 5 October 2012. political party leaders, Terai, April 2012. with the slogan: ‘Let us march ahead on 31 Author interviews with senior Nepal The links between criminals and the police the path of struggle towards establishing Police officers, Kathmandu,4 October 2012. have been acknowledged by officers of the people’s rule by wrecking the reac- 32 Author interviews with senior Nepal the Nepal Police and the Armed Police tionary ruling system of state’ (Sharma, Police officers, Kathmandu,4 October 2012. Force in Kathmandu. Author interviews 2004, p. 51). 33 Author Interview with a journalist and with senior Nepal Police and Armed Police 18 Vigilante groups were most active during political analyst working in Kathmandu, Force officers, Kathmandu,5 October 2012. later stages of the conflict, when civilians 8 October 2012. 8 The first wave of parliamentary democracy at village level retaliated against the 34 Groups often lack a specific name and in Nepal followed the anti-Rana move- Maoists (Amnesty International, 2005, are usually referred to by the name of the ment and lasted from 1950 to 1960. From pp. 3–7; ICG, 2004; OHCHR, 2012, p. 94). leader, reflecting the leaders’ central role 1960 to 1990 the Panchayat system domi- In interviews, both civilian and security in the formation, lifespan, and identity of nated Nepali politics. The 1990 Jana Andolan personnel frequently reported that state many groups. (People’s Movement) ushered in a second security forces were behind the formation 35 According to one interlocutor, some groups phase of democracy, which lasted until of these groups. They have been excluded emerged as early as the 1960s, when the proclamation of a state of emergency from Table 1 because it is widely assumed increased numbers of Western tourists and restoration of absolute monarchy in that vigilante groups are no longer active fostered the spread of ‘hippy culture’ in 2004. A third period of parliamentary in Nepal. Author interviews with senior Nepal. This brought with it a demand for democracy began when the CPA was Nepal Police and Armed Police Force offic- illegal goods, especially narcotics. The trend signed in 2006. ers, Kathmandu, 4 and 5 October 2012. continued after Nepal opened up politi- 9 Certain groups appear to have given up 19 From 1995 to December 2008, the party cally in the early 1990s, and again after the the armed struggle and handed their weap- was known as CPN-M. In January 2009, CPA. Author interview with a journalist ons to the government in exchange for it merged with the Communist Party of working in Kathmandu, 8 October 2012. central committee positions in some local Nepal (Masal) and became the Unified 36 Ideally, armed groups would be separated political parties. Author interview with Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN- into those that are ‘above ground’ and leaders of civil society organizations rep- M). In June 2012, a hardline faction broke ‘underground’. They have not been dis- resenting indigenous groups from the away from the UCPN-M, and adopted aggregated in this way because the informa- Eastern Hills and Terai, in Kathmandu, the original name of the Maoists. It has tion available is insufficiently precise, and on 25 September 2012 and 3 October 2012, since been referred to as the CPN-M. To because groups often switch their behav- respectively. prevent confusion, the rest of this Issue iour, moving from one status to the other. 10 This theme ran through all the inter- Brief will use the acronym ‘UCPN-M’ to 37 Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Goit views conducted in Kathmandu during refer to the Maoist party in general (and (JTMM-Goit); Janatantrik Terai Mukti September and October 2012 (see Box 1). not to the most recent splinter group). Morcha-Jwala (JTMM-Jwala); Janatantrik 11 Nepal was unified in 1743 by Prithvi 20 The PLA existed throughout the conflict, Terai Madhes Mukti Party-Bhagat Singh Narayan Shah, a descendent of Dravya but was officially established only in (JTMM-Bhagat Singh); Sanyukta Janatantrik Shah (1559–1570), from the ‘House of September 2001. Mukti Morcha-Pawan (SJMM-Pawan); The Gorkha’. 21 The Jana Andolan I (People’s Movement I) Madhesi Tigers; Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj. 12 Note that field research for this Issue Brief was a popular uprising that brought 38 Kirat Janabadi Workers Party-Nabin Kirati was not undertaken in the Eastern Hills. into being the second phase of democracy (KJWP-Nabin Kirati), Kirat Janabadi Interviews were nevertheless held with in 1990. Workers Party-Yalamber Kirat (KJWP- indigenous and ethnic political leaders 22 The UCPN-M became the largest party, Yalamber Kirat), Federal Limbuwan State from the Eastern Hills, as well as several winning 220 out of 575 elected seats. Council-Kumar Lingden (FLSC-Kumar local and international security experts 23 The Nepal Army was previously known Lingden). who work in the region. These interviews as the Royal Nepal Army. The name was 39 Such as the Nepal Defence Army. took place in Kathmandu. changed after the CPA, in 2006. 40 Author interviews with political consult- 13 India gained independence from British 24 Author interview with local security and ants in Kathmandu (19 September 2012), rule on 15 August 1947. political analyst, Kathmandu, 19 Septem- a former Minister (26 September 2012), 14 This first democratic period lasted until ber 2012. and senior Nepal Police and Armed Police 1960, when King Mahendra led a royal 25 Author interviews with senior Nepal Force officers (4 and 5 October 2012). coup that restored the monarchy’s executive Police and Armed Police Force officers, 41 The JTMM continued to splinter and, authority and established the Panchayat Kathmandu, 4 and 5 October 2012. despite claiming to represent the rights of system. 26 Author interviews (see Box 1). Almost the Madhesi peoples in the Terai, is now 15 This uprising was not the only precursor every person interviewed referred to believed to be motivated largely by economic of the Maoist movement. In the district of these relationships. interests rather than political objectives. Rolpa (a Maoist base area) at least three 27 Author interviews with a civil society 42 Of the 109 armed groups identified by armed rebellions against local land-owning leader representing indigenous groups, the Government, 38 appear to have ‘Terai’ and business elites occurred between 1950 Kathmandu, 25 September 2012. and another 15 ‘Madhes(i)’ in their name, and 1990. It has been argued that these 28 Interviews clearly revealed that, though suggesting a high degree of geographical rebellions raised political awareness in the local people do not overtly support the concentration. area, which led the community to be sym- actions of armed groups, they are sympa- 43 According to some reports, certain armed pathetic to the Maoist cause (Gidwani and thetic to them and their attempts to rid the group leaders met in Bihar (India) to plan Paudel, 2011; also see Shneiderman, 2003). Terai of ‘Kathmandu colonialism’ and the unification and joint activities (Sarkar,2008 ).

www.nepal-ava.org 13 44 Author interviews in Kathmandu with a 61 The Limbuwan National Liberation Forum interviews with senior Nepal Police and local security expert from Terai (20 Sep- and Upper Kirat and Limbuwan Libera- Armed Police Force officers, Kathmandu, tember 2012), a former Minister (26 Sep- tion Army, for instance, have both dis- 4 and 5 October 2012. More recently, the tember 2012), a high-ranking female appeared since the SSP was introduced. prospect of a new round of elections in member of the UCPN-M and a senior 62 Author interview with an indigenous Nepal has prompted various mainstream UCPN-M leader (30 September 2012), and representative, Kathmandu, 25 September political parties, in an attempt to increase senior Nepal Police and Armed Police 2012. their support base and influence, to reach Force officers (4 and 5 October 2012). 63 Author interviews with former CPN out to armed groups. For instance, on 45 Author interviews with former members members, Kathmandu, 28 and 30 Septem- 1 February 2013, Samyukta Janatantrik Terai of armed groups in Terai jails, March 2012. ber 2012. Mukti Morcha (Pawan) formally merged 46 Many rank-and-file members are from 64 Author interview with senior leaders of with the UCPN-M. the margins of society, including un- and the CPN-M, Kathmandu, 3 and 8 October 74 Author interview with former Minister, under-employed males, petty criminals, 2012. Kathmandu, 26 September 2012. and drug traders. Interviews with a Terai 65 The CPN-M adopted the name used by the 75 Some groups were subsequently accused civil society representative, Nepal Police party during the insurgency, a significant of being cowards, informants, and traitors. officers, and Armed Police Force officers, choice because it indicates that members Author interviews with armed group Kathmandu, 3–5 October 2012. of the splinter group believe they are the members in the districts of Siraha and 47 A senior CPN-UML leader has claimed true Maoists, and that the UCPN-M faction Dhanusa, November 2011. that the media convert criminals into has been compromised. Author interviews 76 By using basic peacebuilding concepts heroes (Nagariknews, 2012). with CPN-M leadership, Kathmandu, and methods, community mediators are 48 Author interview with a local civil society September and October 2012. trained to respond to local conflicts and leader working on human rights and secu- 66 Author interviews with a local journalist address their underlying causes (Lederach rity issues, Kathmandu, 10 October 2012. (also working as a political analyst) and a and Thapa, 2010). 49 This does not mean that support for the former member of the CPN, Kathmandu, 77 International Alert has worked with youths Maoists was unanimous. There were 8 October, 2012. and other groups in different districts of pockets of local resistance to Maoist rule 67 In interviews, members of the UCPN-M, of Nepal to ensure access to justice and (Shah, 2008). other political parties, and police officers security. See International Alert reports 50 Author interview with a local academic argued that the CPN-M lacks the capacity (2007, 2008). Similarly, UNICEF works in working on groups in the Eastern Hills, and justification to declare an armed rebel- many districts of Nepal to support children 27 September 2012. lion. In terms of capacity, it is perceived affected by armed conflict (UNICEF,2009 ). 51 The three FLSC factions differ in the indi- to lack finance, weapons, and cadres. In 78 Author interviews with political elites viduals that head them, not in their political terms of justification, a rebellion would (Kathmandu, 30 September and 4 October, agenda or tactics. The three main leaders lack a clear purpose. During the Maoist 2012) and with senior Nepal Police and are Kumar Lingden, Sanjuhang Palungwa, insurgency, the monarchy was seen to be Armed Police Force officers (Kathmandu, and Misekhang Thamsuhang. The three an obstacle to Nepal’s social and economic 4 and 5 October, 2012). groups are therefore named FLSC-Lingden, development, but currently the CPN-M FLSC-Palungwa, and FLSC-Thamsuhang. can blame no single enemy. A revolt 52 Author interview with an indigenous repre- would be seen as an attack against par- sentative, Kathmandu, 25 September 2012. liamentary democracy and would make a Bibliography 53 According to interviews in September subsequent return to mainstream politics Adhikari, Navin. 2011. ‘Human Lives at Risk: and October 2012 with indigenous and extremely difficult. Small Weapons “Posing a Threat” to ethnic representatives from the Eastern 68 See Small Arms Survey (2010) for a review Nepal.’ The Kathmandu Post, Web edition, Hills, Gopal Khambu and the Maoist of global efforts to address organized 16 June. his support of the movement. (2010). Advocacy Forum. 2010. 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About the Nepal Armed Violence Credits Assessment Authors: Subindra Bogati, Jovana Carapic, and Robert Muggah The Nepal Armed Violence Assessment (NAVA) is a project Copy-editor: Robert Archer (Plain Sense) of the Small Arms Survey. It serves as an independent re- Proofreader: John Linnegar ([email protected]) search resource for Nepalese officials, civil society groups, Cartography: Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix and international partners. The NAVA combines primary and secondary data sources, but focuses on generating Design and layout: Richard Jones ([email protected]) original data and analysis through field research. Methods include in-depth interviews with key informants, archival media research, focus groups, and population-based surveys. Contact details Small Arms Survey The NAVA explores the following key themes: 47 Avenue Blanc Small arms transfers, trafficking, availability, and control; 1202 Geneva The types and characteristics of armed actors; Switzerland The distribution and scale of armed violence and t +41 22 908 5777 victimization; f +41 22 732 2738 Perceptions of armed violence and their economic impacts; e [email protected] Media depictions; and representations of armed violence.

NAVA publications, which include Working Papers and Issue Briefs, summarize research findings and insight into issues related to violence, its impact, perpetrators and vic- tims, and strategies for prevention and reduction.

NAVA publications are available in English and Nepali.

They can be downloaded at http://www.nepal-ava.org/.

Printed copies are available from the Small Arms Survey.

16 NepalSudan Issue Brief Number Number 6 1 April May 2007 2013