NEPAL ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT Issue Brief Number 1 May 2013 The Missing Middle Examining the Armed Group Phenomenon in Nepal Introduction the CPA the Government has been (Advocacy Forum, 2010, p. 13; Nepal- wrestling with a conceptual challenge News, 2009; OneIndia, 2009), recent 21 2006 On November , the Communist in its efforts to distinguish so-called official estimates indicate that only Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN-M), and ‘political’ actors from those that have about a dozen groups are still active, 1 the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), signed a more ‘criminal’ orientation. It is this while about twenty have given up the the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), categorization that has primarily in- armed struggle and are negotiating officially ending an armed conflict that 5 formed the Government’s disposition with the government (Giri, 2012). 2 had lasted ten years. After nearly two towards particular groups, ensuring While government officials and the decades of social and political instabil- that those armed actors characterized media are quick to point to the decline 3 ity, the CPA inspired hope that a ‘New as ‘political groups’ are more likely to of armed groups, they rarely explain Nepal’ might bring political stability be engaged with through dialogue what changes have caused it. Nor do and socio-economic development. Six while ‘criminal groups’ are dealt with they tend to analyse the characteristics, years on, that optimism has diminished, through heavy-handed police tactics. organization, and conduct of contem- as it has been realized that Nepal’s Despite the problematic nature of porary armed groups, or the recent problems before and during the con- the categories and the state responses increase of other forms of armed vio- 4 flict have not disappeared. they have generated, the official stance lence and criminality in both rural and Moreover, armed activity contin- is that armed group activity has de- urban areas.6 ued in the years immediately after the creased. Compared to 2009, when the This Issue Brief analyses the phe- CPA and levels of violence in the coun- Ministry of Home Affairs claimed that nomenon of armed groups in Nepal. It try increased. Much of the blame for more than one hundred armed groups examines their history, their initial pro- this continued unrest has been attrib- were operating throughout Nepal liferation following the signing of the uted to so-called ‘armed groups’ that proliferated primarily in the Terai (low- land) region but were also present in other parts of Nepal (IDA et al., 2011). Often decried as exponents of South Asia’s shadowy underworld and beholden to Nepal’s political elite, armed groups have been blamed for many of Nepal’s current troubles. Though rumours abound about their influence and intentions, however, com- paratively little systematic information is available about their origins, geo- graphic concentration, and motivation. In the past few years the Govern- ment of Nepal has openly recognized the threat that armed groups repre- sent and has combined heavy-handed policing and softer conflict mediation techniques to deal with them (Advocacy Forum, 2010, pp. 11–21; OneIndia, 2009). The reason behind this two-pronged strategy can be understood only if it A masked devotee holds a toy gun as he takes part in a parade during a religious festival, indicating the salience of is recognized that since the signing of armed groups in Nepali society, in Lalitpur, August 2012. © Navesh Chitrakar/Reuters www.nepal-ava.org 1 CPA, their development and overlap and policy-oriented works that address is often dealt with by ‘mainstreaming’ with other societal groups, the reasons the issue indirectly. The lack of informa- them, which implies negotiating with behind their recent decline, and their tion is not surprising, given the politi- the government and disarming. Groups relationship to the state. It finds that: cally sensitivity surrounding the issue perceived to be motivated by economic of armed groups—and the fact that gain, in contrast, are judged to be a The overall number of armed most groups seem to have clandestine law and order problem and are treated groups in Nepal has decreased links with some local political parties accordingly (Advocacy Forum, 2010, in the past few years despite con- and law enforcement agencies.7 p. 14). These groups often engage in tinuing political instability in the In addition, armed groups in activities such as kidnapping or extor- country. They have declined even Nepal tend to be transient, splinter tion, and may use or threaten to use more since the implementation of frequently, and have a fluid member- improvised explosive devices or IEDs. the Special Security Plan (SSP) in ship base. Even the better organized If such groups subsequently articulate 2009 and the corresponding enhance- and more established groups seem to political goals, officials tend to assume ment and increased presence of reinvent themselves continuously. To they do so to conceal their economic state authority in rural areas. illustrate, several groups active in the motives.10 Nepal is still home to a wide array Terai region emerged from the Maoist A simple binary distinction between of armed groups, which range from insurgency. Taking issue with the slow political and economic armed groups local strongmen (leaders who rule pace of change regarding the recogni- quickly collapses under closer scrutiny. by threat or violence, also referred tion of minority rights in the country, Recent changes in global political and to as dons or goondas) to social or these groups were initially perceived economic relations have played a signifi- ethnic movements, small criminal to have a coherent political ideology. cant role in this regard. In the absence groups and politically affiliated Since 2007, however, they have largely of external or domestic patrons, for youth wings. splintered into smaller criminal syn- example, most armed groups in Nepal Rather than being a direct threat to dicates. Similarly, in the early 1990s, and elsewhere must draw on a wide the state, armed groups in Nepal groups in the Eastern Hills of Nepal array of revenue streams and illicit occupy a middle ground, neither demanded the recognition of indig- networks if they are to remain solvent. overtly for nor against the govern- enous rights and territorial integrity. Groups often adopt opportunistic strat- ment. Instead, they operate either Feeling excluded during the second egies to survive, expanding and con- in association with some political period of parliamentary democracy,8 tracting according to the environment. leaders and security personnel or in the late 1990s some groups turned In these terms, many ‘political’ armed under the radar of law enforcement. to the Maoists for help (Lawoti, 2012, groups are also ‘economic’ or ‘criminal’, The highest concentration of armed pp. 135–137). After the CPA, however, and vice versa. Their dynamic evolu- group activity is in the Terai; the a number of groups have repositioned tion defies hard-and-fast categorization. Eastern Hills; and Kathmandu Valley, themselves as political outfits (and have This does not mean that such cat- which consists primarily of Kath- even joined forces with local political egorization is unhelpful or should not mandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur. parties pushing for indigenous rights), be attempted. It does imply, however, Policies to address the problem of while others have continued their that any such analysis must proceed armed groups should move away ‘underground’ armed operations.9 with caution and be attentive to the from the ‘political versus criminal’ A tendency to focus on the motiva- blurry lines and underlying interests distinction. They should focus tions and activity of armed groups is shaping labels. Moreover, it must also instead on the structural character- a third reason why it has been diffi- be aware of the political implications of istics of specific groups, including cult to categorize them. When talking ascribing the ‘political’ or ‘economic’ their emergence and history, their about armed groups in Nepal, the or ‘criminal’ label to a group, which can relations with the state and the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate seems serve to either legitimize or marginal- community, their involvement in to dominate the discussion as groups ize the group and its leader. In order to the legal economy, their use of vio- are readily divided into two distinct address these shortcomings the authors lence, and group extensiveness. types: those that are perceived to be undertook four phases of fieldwork economically motivated and others which involved key informant inter- Problems of conceptualizing that are perceived to be more politi- views and site visits undertaken in cally oriented (Sharma, 2010, p. 245). Nepal (see Box 1). armed groups It appears that only those groups per- In Nepal, as elsewhere, it is exceed- ceived to have a clear political agenda ingly difficult to comprehensively (which in the case of Nepal usually History of armed opposition document and categorize the country’s implies an ethnic/regional one) and Armed opposition to the state can be various armed groups. A principal direct their activities against the politics traced back to at least the middle of reason for this is the paucity of in- of the state (more recently this revolves the eighteenth century, a period when depth research. The information that is around the question of federalism) are the Nepali state was undergoing ter- available comes primarily from official