United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs

Berkeley model united nations Welcome Letter Hello delegates! My name is Kevin Tuok, and it is my honor to be serving as your UNOOSA Head Chair for the sixty-eighth session of BMUN. I am a sophomore studying Molecular and Cellular Biology and Business here at UC Berkeley. I was born in Florida, but grew up in King of Prussia, PA, near Philadelphia. I participated in Model UN throughout high school, so I know how challenging and stressful, but also how rewarding and fun MUN can be. Outside of MUN, I work at the Berkeley Food Institute, love watching new TV shows, hiking, and trying new foodie spots in the Bay. I chose these topics because of how relevant I believe they will be in the very, very near future. As we look towards this fnal frontier, we must ensure some sort of legal foundation exists to anchor our journey, lest we have a chaotic, and perhaps violent, mad dash for the stars. As the pinnacle of international cooperation and peace, the United Nations stands in a prime position to lead such efforts. 2018 signifed the fftieth anniversary of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Formed in response to the Space Race during the Cold War, its mandate was to prevent the militarization of space. My wish is that our committee will be able to uphold this tradition, and produce realistic and agreeable treaties to ensure the continued peaceful use of space, for the shared beneft of all. I hope these topics will encourage you to think more proactively about the state of our world — to deal with issues before they arise. I am ecstatic to have this opportunity to lead BMUN’s frst rendition of UNOOSA, and we can’t wait to read your papers on these incredibly captivating topics. Feel free to reach out to us at [email protected] with any questions, good jokes, or sci-f recommendations, and see you at Cal in March! Annalise Fox is so thrilled to be one of your vice chairs for BMUN 68! She currently serves as BMUN’s USG of Special Events, in which she manages the club’s philanthropy. She is majoring in Glob- al Studies and triple minoring in child development, education, and public policy. Other than BMUN she teaches lessons in a Head Start preschool through Americorps, is a Research Assistant at Zhou Family and Culture Lab’s Dual Language Learner’s project, and works as a Teacher’s Assistant at Berke- ley’s Early Childhood Education Center. Outside of school, she enjoys birdwatching, hiking, watching movies, and drinking coffee. She is super stoked for this committee because she is a die hard Star Wars and Star Trek fan and feels these topics reanimate them in a realistic lens. Sabina Nong is a senior majoring in political science and minoring in political economy. This

berkeley model united nations 1 year marks her seventh year in MUN and her fourth year in BMUN. Other than BMUN, Sabina spent most of her time in different research projects and extracurricular activities centered around human rights issues. She works as a team manager at Human Rights Investigation Lab in Berkeley Law School, leading research projects on online open-source data investigation. She works with the Chinese Initia- tive on International Law, an NGO in China, to organize seminars on LGBTQ-related legal issues and to conduct research on business’s impact in promoting diverse working environment. Besides academic passions, she is also interested in hiking, reading and shopping in vinyl and vintage shops. She is more than excited to serve as one of the vice chairs for UNOOSA at the sixty-eighth session of BMUN! She hopes that she can provide her perspectives from the disciplines of political science and political economy and learn a lot more from the contributions of all the intelligent and diligent delegates. Jalen Gelb is a freshman at Berkeley, studying Political Science. Jalen was born and raised in West Los Angeles and participated in Model United Nations all four years of high school, and even attended BMUN in his sophomore year. He will be a vice-chair for UNOOSA this year. When Jalen is not being a decorous delegate, he is probably in his room listening to music, going to some concert, or eating out with his many friends.

See you in March! Kevin Tuok

Head Chair, United Nations Offce for Outer Space AffairsS

berkeley model united nations 2 TOPIC A - Preventing Space Militarization TOPIC BACKGROUND

More than 2,000 active satellites are in orbit around Earth, providing the foundations necessary for almost every modern service in our lives. We rarely think about it, but components of our national security, economic vitality, and quality of life, all heavily depend on a metal box foating thousands of miles into the sky. Indeed, the extent to which space pervades our daily lives is unfathomable and cannot be overstated. However, the instruments that form these satellites and the orbits they occupy are extremely fragile and delicate. Thus, they present easy and strategic targets for militaries, many of whom have already begun research and development into anti-satellite weaponry. A focused laser or a piece of metal debris the size of a penny is all that is needed to disable a satellite, and with it, whatever critical services it provided to Earth. As nations seek ways to inconspicuously improve their strategic position, the fnal frontier is at risk of becoming merely another war-fghting domain. The continued productive use of outer space requires commitment to peaceful cooperation on the part of all actors. Over eighty nations currently operate satellites, a number that is rapidly growing. But only a few need to see space as potential domain for aggression for a chain reaction to occur — and many are already on edge. So much so, that current international debates in fact centers on whether an arms race in outer space is already ongoing, and fears that existing frameworks will be insuffcient to regulate such activity are numerous. To that end, an effcacious resolution will not only need to address anti-satellite (ASAT - note that a glossary of key terms can be found at the end of this synopsis) technologies, but all types of offensive technology that could be placed or is already present in space, as well as include instruments for verifcation and enforcement. This is necessary to prevent space from being treated as simply another possible warfghting domain, which may precipitate a dangerous arms race.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The Soviet Union was the frst nation to launch an artifcial satellite – Sputnik, on October 4th, 1957. In the midst of the Cold War, the achievement heightened fears of possible Soviet technolog-

berkeley model united nations 3 ical superiority in the United States, triggering the infamous Space Race. Although technology from the race resulted in a massive leap forward for civilian standards of living, it also saw some of the ear- liest research into space-military technology. Estimating that the Soviet Union would soon be able to deploy photo-reconnaissance satellites, the CIA promptly commissioned research into systems that could destroy such satellites. The 1957 SAINT (SAtellite INTerceptor) killer satellite project, the ASM- 135 ASAT missile, and the Boeing X-20, a spaceplane bomber and satellite destroyer. Not to be left behind, the Soviets responded with the frst test of a DA-ASAT, the Polyot-1, as well as the offensive robotic satellite-killers Almaz and Istrebitel Sputnikov. This back and forth would eventually culminate in Reagen’s infamous “Star Wars” speech, which called for the development of lasers, particle beam weapons, and space-based missiles (Zak). Despite the premature end of the U.S. programs due to costs, the USSR successfully launched the frst, and only, weaponized satellite to ever be put in orbit, armed with a 23mm autocannon (Mowthrope, 2004). In 1983, then Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov publicly declared an end to such tests, but secretly, engineers continued improving their killer satellites, as well as formulating grand plans for orbital space battle stations. In more recent history, the power of modern, informatized space-assisted warfare has already been exhibited. The 1991 Persian Gulf War saw U.S. Coalition forces rapidly dismantle Saddam Hus- sein’s military in a blitzkrieg-esque assault. It is known as “the frst space war” by historians due to heavy use of satellites and other technological assets to support ground operations (Greenemeier). Without GPS, the hundreds of miles of bare, landmark-less desert battlefelds of Kuwait would have made maneuvering nigh impossible. Precision bombing, artillery support, and decisive troop maneuvers all relied on GPS guidance. This is a section of history and science that is rarely discussed. We are drawn to grand depic- tions of militarized space in popular science fction, à la Star Wars and The Expanse, and are glad we don’t have to experience such catastrophic violence, but it is already starting to happen. Since the Cold War, space military tech has only become more destructive and frightening. There are now hundreds of military-oriented satellites, for purposes such as reconnaissance, communications, and target acquisition. Four nations have successfully tested direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, and countless nations possess formidable jamming and cyberwarfare capabilities.

berkeley model united nations 4 The following section will highlight current capabilities of major players.

Infographic detailing current military equipment in space. Cameron Tulk, Canadian International Council.

berkeley model united nations 5 Russia

“Only with support from space will it be possible for the Armed Forces to reach maximum effectiveness. . . The Russian President has repeatedly stressed that our army and navy must not only meet the requirements of today, but to [sic] be pre- pared for tomorrow’s means of conducting armed struggle. The solution. . . a modern orbital constellation of military satellites.” –Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, March 6, 2018

Russia views itself as a long-time leader in space, from the launch of the frst satellite, to placing the frst human into orbit, to the reliance of the international community on its Soyuz shut- tles. Although post-Cold War setbacks and competing military priorities has left its space program budget-constrained and narrowly focused, Russia has continued to develop a host of counterspace weapons. Unlike the US and China, almost all space activities are conducted by the state via the Roscosmos (the Russian space agency), meaning Moscow sets priorities for and has much greater control of its space industry. It views America’s heavy reliance on space for precision strike capabilities and missile warning capabilities as its Achilles heel. Thus, ASAT development is integral to achieving confict goals and deterring space-reliant adversaries for the Russian Armed Forces. However, Russia still publicly sup- ports space arms control agreements along with China, likely to combat the US military’s utilization of space. In 2015, Russia merged its Air Force and Aerospace Defense Troops branches to form the Aerospace Forces, whose mission is to conduct all aerospace related activities. Electronic Warfare (EW) systems to counter GPS and jam communication satellite (SATCOM) have been detected, as well as DEW laser weapon systems, and a working DA-ASAT system (see glossary for a full explana- tion of terms and acronyms). In October 2017, Russia launched an “inspector” satellite to closely observe malfunctioning satellites that is suspected to be a test of the practicality of a co-orbital “attack satellite” (“2019 Challenges”).

berkeley model united nations 6 China

“Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. . . China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.”

–Defense White Paper, State Council Information Offce of China, May 2015

After recovering from political turmoil in the 1960s and 70s, China has devoted signifcant economic and political resources to growing its space program. Despite starting decades later than the US and Russia, it is now second only to the US in number of operational satellites. The China Na- tional Space Administration (CNSA) is a source of national pride – becoming a premier space power is part of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” for a powerful and prosperous China (Rajagopalan, 2011). It plans to assemble an independent space station by 2022, and an automated research station on the Moon by 2025. Although it publicly advocates for improved space arms control agreements along with Rus- sia, China has continued to develop its counterspace capabilities. In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) integrated its cyber warfare, electronic, and space divisions into its own branch, the Stra- tegic Support Force (SSF). Similar to Russia, it views space superiority and the ability to sabotage the information gathering capabilities of an enemy crucial in modern, “informatized” conficts. Beijing is investing heavily in modernizing the PLA by 2035, and ensuring that it is capable of fghting and winning wars anywhere by 2050. Future strategic guidelines entail “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors” in order to “blind and deafen the enemy.” China possesses EW jamming capabilities, including those that can target military extreme high frequency bands, which are resistant to many forms of jamming. The PLA also possess much experience in cyberwarfare, which can easily disrupt the fow of information. In 2008, alleged Chinese hackers gained access to NASA’s Terra Earth observation satellite, rendering it unresponsive (Wolf). China possesses a DA-ASAT system and similar to Russia, has tested “inspector satellites” that can maneuver close to other satellites. An ASAT laser weapons system is also in development and is slat- berkeley model united nations 7 ed for mid-2020 deployment. Although lasers are diffcult to employ, as they require massive bursts of power and complex optics to compensate for atmospheric aberrations. However, if functional, it can easily damage expensive photo reconnaissance satellites (“Challenges to...”).

United States

“. . .potential adversaries are now advancing their space capabilities and actively developing ways to deny our use of space in a crisis or confict. It is imperative that the United States adapt its national security organizations, policies, doctrine, and capabilities to deter aggression and protect our interests. . .” -United States White House, Space Policy Directive-4, February 19, 2019

The United States of America has a long history of dominance in space. Their armed forces currently possess the largest number of military satellites at 129, regularly conducts space war games, and often utilizes space capabilities for overwhelming military success. However, many military analysts say there is now an overreliance on space assets – from which (according to Chinese analysts) up to 90% of U.S. military intelligence is derived (Firth). This piece of information has not gone unnoticed by major American adversaries — as previously detailed, many other world powers’ reasons for developing counterspace technology is the increasing informatization of warfare, led by the US. In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a directive ordering the reorganization of the United States Space Command (the colloquial “Space Force”) as a unifed combatant command under the Air Force, giving it greater and full responsibility for space warfghting and support. The Pentagon has also advocated its space priorities around four pillars: “transforming to more resilient space architectures; strengthening space deterrence and warfghting architectures; improving foundational capabilities, structures, and processes; and fostering conducive domestic and international environments.” (“Global Counterspace”). This policy also marks the frst classifcation of space as a clear warfghting domain.

berkeley model united nations 8 A comparison of civilian and military satellite imaging capabilities of the 2019 Iranian Safr Rocket launch failure. The highest quality commercially available satellite image (bottom); a classifed military satellite image with resolution over twice as high tweeted by President Trump (top). Satellite image ©2019 Maxar Technologies (bottom); Twitter @realDonaldTrump (top)

USAF and NASA have conducted several close-approach “interceptor” satellite missions, including the XSS-10, DART, GSSAP, and others, and can likely quickly develop a model with offensive capabilities. The US has successfully tested tested DA-ASATs and currently possesses interceptor

berkeley model united nations 9 missiles that can reach LEO satellites. The US also owns imposing counterspace electronic warfare systems, including a $288 million Counter Communications System (CCS) jamming program, and systems to counter other adversaries’ jamming systems, known as the Navigation Warfare (NARWAR) program. High energy lasers that can dazzle satellites have also been tested, and can likely be quickly operationalized.

Other Country Involvement

Although we have primarily focused on China, Russia, and the United States, many other nations have fought to keep up with this advancing technology. Iran has publicly brandished its communications and GPS jamming capabilities, and has also sold its jamming systems to other states. Its successful space program accomplishes both civilian and military goals, and has independently developed robust space launch vehicles (SLV) and other ballistic missiles. North Korea, a wildly unpredictable player has signifcant counterspace technologies. It possesses jamming and hacking capabilities, missiles, and SLVs that could be co-opted to target satellites. They have placed two satellites in space, although the lack of detected signals indicate their launches were likely guises for ICBM testing. France and Israel each have 8 military satellites. Israel works in conjunction with the Unit- ed States Mainland Defense and their Communications System, which funds the majority of their programs. India began heavily investing in their space militarization after China created their ASAT system, and very recently tested their own DA-ASAT, detailed in a below case study (Rajagopalan, 2011). Additionally, while India claims their military and space programs are kept separate, it seems that “civilian technology acquired through foreign sources is being diverted for military use” (Para- cha, 2013). Other key players include the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Japan, all of which have at least 5 operational military satellites (World Atlas, 2019).

berkeley model united nations 10 An infographic of the largest space agencies by budgets. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty February 2019.

Non-Governmental Organizations

The majority of NGOs spend their time working to inform policy makers and United Nations affliates of the dangers space militarization poses to our future stability with research-based ev- idence. Many have banded together to form the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security: Outer Space Division for the purpose of advocating for clearer international laws regarding space travel. Their members include the Space Security Project, who focuses on wording of interna-

berkeley model united nations 11 tional documents to ensure maximum comprehensibility, and lobbies national space programs for the creation of safe practices (CSIS, 2018). Another member organization is the Federation of Amer- ican Scientists, who work to spread awareness and provide expert panels on the dangers of the current state of space militarization (Federation of American Scientists, 2017). They also publish analyses discussing the possible implications of policy decisions and statements by leaders (DeFrieze, 2014). The Union of Concerned Scientists, Arms Control Association, Western States Legal Foundation, Archimedes Institute of Space Law and Policy Library, and the Institute for Cooperation in States aid in further advocacy and awareness efforts.

PAST AND CURRENT ATTEMPTS AT TREATY-BUILDING

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the only space-related treaty that has been signed by all major spacefaring nations. However, it is extremely dated and limited in scope in regards to the militarization of space, prohibiting solely the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in space. A number of treaties have been proposed in recent years by several blocs to attempt to expand upon the OST. However, self-interests of larger nations mean the chances of a legally binding international treaty being passed soon are slim. The United States, for example, has vehemently opposed any treaty that may restrict its future access to space. The major treaties and proposals are as follows:

Established Treaties Outer Space Treaty (1967)

The preeminent space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty (OST), was drafted and adopted in the midst of the Cold War, establishing the basic principles of international space law. The few countries with developed space programs at the time pushed for a treaty that would provide disarmament and arms control policies in space, as an extension of the principle of mutually-assured destruction between the U.S. and Soviet Union. After years of tedious discussion on issues including the scope of the treaty and the extent of mandatory reporting of space activities, the two superpowers at the time agreed to a series of constructive measures. The treaty especially focuses on prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons or any WMDs in the whole outer space environment. It also restricts any military use of the moon or other celestial bodies, including “building military bases, testing weapons, or con-

berkeley model united nations 12 ducting any military maneuvers” (“Outer Space Treaty”). Over ffty years later, the treaty is restrained by the political bipolarity and technological level of its era — the ban of space weapons is strictly limited to “nuclear weapons” and “other weapons of mass destruction” as they were the greatest concern under Cold War narratives. It does not take into account the present day technology and concerns including geospatial intelligence, electronic warfare, satellite services, as well as the increasing number of nuclear powers, which leads to increasingly complicated negotiations (Defrieze, 2014). Moreover, when the OST was frst established, it did not clarify the liability of actors due to side effects from space activities, such as debris. This liability issue was however improved by the widely-adopted Liability Convention in 1972. This convention holds that states are responsible for any damage caused by an object it launches, either due to re-entry or orbital collisions (Johnson, 2018).

Moon Treaty (1979)

Opened for signature in 1979, the Moon Treaty is a follow-up of the Outer Space Treaty, and drove discussion to the jurisdiction on the use of the moon and other celestial bodies in the solar system. The treaty not only reasserts the previous provision on the “exclusively peaceful use” of these bodies, but further adds that the United Nations should be notifed of the location and purpose of any station established on these celestial bodies. Additionally, extraterrestrial property cannot be owned by any organization or private individuals, unless the organization is international and governmental. These two clauses close loopholes in the original Outer Space Treaty, and by clarifying surveillance functions of the United Nations, the treaty offers an effective layer of auditing state actions in outer space. However, the treaty is most contentious in its discussion of resources on the Moon, which uses notoriously vague language to introduce an “international regime” to regulate exploitation of natural resources found on the Moon. It is viewed by developed countries to be unfair. They fear such an international regime would resemble “the Enterprise,” an entity established in the 1994 Agreement of the Laws of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) to govern the distribution of deep sea mineral resources in the world’s oceans. It regulates private companies and government exploitation of deep sea resources while distributing a portion of the mined wealth to developing countries. This facet is further explored

berkeley model united nations 13 in the second topic of this committee. Moreover, developed countries feared the Moon Treaty would require they share established and classifed space technology in favor of cooperative exploration with developing countries, there- by decreasing their strategic projection in space. Due to such concerns, nearly all countries with advanced space agencies have rejected the treaty. The U.S., Russia and the People’s Republic of China have shunned the Moon Treaty, sabotaging the practicality and enforcement of the treaty on a serious scale. In practice, it is a failed treaty having only been ratifed by eighteen nations, none of which have major space programmes (Listner, 2011).

A map showing countries who have ratifed the Moon Treaty (purple), signed but not ratifed (red), and neither (white). United Nations Treaty Collection.

Ongoing Attempts The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) - International Solution

This proposal was frst introduced in the 1980s by an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, an international body that works closely with, but is not part of the UN. Less powerful states sought to supplement the OST, widely thought to be insuffcient to ensure peace in space. Con- cerns revolved around the fact that the OST failed to consider neither future development of space weapons nor diversifcation of space programs in developing powers. The proposal further promotes berkeley model united nations 14 prevention of an arms race in outer space under the framework of Outer Space Treaty (“NTI: Proposed Prevention”). The proposal was voted upon annually until 1994, when the U.S. stated its vehement opposition due to fears of limits placed on “its large missile defense program and technical advantages in potential space weaponry.” Despite objections from the U.S., China, Russia and several other countries agreed to reconvene and discuss other issues with the proposal several times from 2005 to 2010. This impasse demonstrates that unequal power projection in space is by far the largest barrier in advancing regulation of state behaviors in space (Defrieze, 2014). This treaty has largely been superseded by other draft treaties, such as the PPWT and EU proposal.

Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) - China/Russia Joint Solution

On 11 January, 2007, China conducted the world’s frst experimental kinetic DA-ASAT test, shooting down an ageing weather satellite and renewing concerns of space militarization. Despite condemning the test, the US would quickly respond with its own frst DA-ASAT test on 20 February, 2008. Possibly in response to international backlash and uptick in fears of an arms race, a legally-binding draft treaty was jointly proposed by China and Russia to the Conference on Disarmament the same month. It is an evolution of the previous PAROS treaty, and signals that as space technology advance- ment becomes more visible, new concerns amongst rising powers will surface. This proposal attempts to broaden the scope of PAROS and update the defnition of prohibited weapons in space besides nuclear weapons and other WMDs with modern technologies. Moreover, it aims to provide preventive measures that regulate not only the types of weapons but also the militaristic activities of states in space (Zhang, 2017; Defrieze, 2014). Key components of the treaty include: • Redefning the term “weapon in outer space” to include any physical device placed in outer space specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space or on Earth, or to target Earth, populations, or the biosphere. • Parties will not place any ASATs in orbit, and not engage in the threat or use of force against outer space objects • Parties will participate in regular confdence-building measures to promote transparency,

berkeley model united nations 15 and any disputes must be settled amongst states, or referred to an executive organization that will arbitrate. Both these components would be implemented in additional protocols. The frst drawback of the treaty is that despite its efforts to update the defnition of space weapons, the distinction between peaceful and military use is hard to distinguish. Secondly, the draft treaty cannot prevent states from building arsenals and developing a readily deployable space-based weapons break-out capability, if states decide to withdraw from the treaty, such as in the event of war. Moreover, the treaty omits any discussion over terrestrially-based ASAT systems, since the treaty only prevents placement of weapons in outer space and does not ban DA-ASAT, EW, or DEW systems. With only four countries with DA-ASAT capabilities, namely China, Russia, the U.S. and India, this provision unfairly favors these countries who will still be able to utilize offensive weapons to launch strikes in space without violating the treaty. Moreover, due to vehement domestic opposition, the treaty is un- likely to be ratifed in the U.S. due to concerns over the security of its space assets. It would thus lack the regulation of one of the most advanced space powers (Foust, 2014; Su, 2010; Krepon, 2016).

Space Code of Conduct - EU Solution

Proposed by the European Union in 2008 and revised in 2010, the Space Code of Conduct is a voluntary and non-binding agreement with no formal enforcement mechanisms among member states. It is built upon 3 pillars of principles including “freedom of exploration with peaceful purposes,” “security and integrity of space objects in orbit,” and “legitimate self-defense of each nation.” The proposal is meant to establish transparency and confdence-building measures to promote space de- militarization and development of peaceful space programs ( “A Code of Conduct for Outer Space”). Many developing countries raise their concerns over this proposal as they fear that such universal space code of conduct is a ploy to limit their future development of capabilities in space (Krepon, 2016; “A Code of Conduct for Outer Space”). Key principles of the document include: • The freedom of all states to access, explore, and utilize space without harmful interference, in a responsible manner • Promote peace in space, partially by forming a regime of transparency and conf-

berkeley model united nations 16 dence-building measures (TCBMs) among states. • These include prior notifcation of launches, risky maneuvers, predicted possible collisions, malfunctioning satellites, etc. It also requests states share information on their national space policies and programs, and establishes an annual conference to review the treaty • Establish guidelines for space operations to promote space safety and sustainability, and minimize the risk of space debris “The establishment of the EU, GGE, and COPUOS initiatives underscores the consensus that multilateral solutions are necessary to confront the challenges in maintaining stability, sustainability, and security. The overlap between their efforts emphasizes this point. However, overall progress toward establishing a framework of norms and TCBMs for space activities remains achingly slow. “ (Hitchens).

An Effcacious Treaty

To begin construction of an effcient treaty in today’s tense global environment, we must begin with small steps. There is virtually no cooperation between major space powers like the U.S., Russia, and China. The establishment of TCBMs among states is vital to promote trust and cooperation. Fortu- nately, the UN formed a working group in 2011 to explore this very topic, the Group of Governmental Experts on Space TCBMs. The group received worldwide support for helping to move forward dead- locked debate. They recommended a wide range of measures, including information exchange on space policies; information exchange and notifcations related to outer space activities; risk reduction notifcations; contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities; international cooperation; consulta- tive mechanisms; outreach; and coordination. Preparation of recommendations for implementation of these measures is currently under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. As you conduct your research, the actual treaties themselves, especially the more recent ones (PPWT, EU Code of Conduct) would be a great addition to your repertoire.

berkeley model united nations 17 CASE STUDIES The Failure of PanAmSat Galaxy IV

On May 19, 1998, the primary processor in the PanAmSat Galaxy IV communications satellite failed. Centrally located, the satellite formed a major portion of PanAmSat’s, a major US satellite communications company, constellation. Hundreds of ground station radar dishes, linked to the satellite, suddenly stopped receiving transmissions. In a cascading reaction, 80-90% of pager service in the United States went down (this is when pagers were the primary method of communication). Stockbrokers were unable to access market information, emergency response workers had no idea if they were needed — everyone was left in the dark. Doctors and medical personnel were forced to remain on duty 24/7 for several days at a time. Gas stations were unable to verify credit card information leading to massive lines, and hundreds of TV stations went off-air. After attempting remote repairs, the company began moving services to its single backup satellite. Radar dishes had to be manually realigned and recalibrated. In total, the event lasted from seven days to several weeks for some (Haller and Sakazaki 2001). This was a single unfortunate, isolated incident, caused by a faulty computer chip. Although satellite technology has defnitely advanced, and constellations are now equipped with more redundancy, so too has ASAT technology developed. What would happen if our satellites were targeted with malicious intent? If several of our most essential satellites, not just for civilians, but for the military, would be crippled instantaneously?

Mission Shakti

Last March, India unexpectedly tested its own ASAT weapon, taking many international ob- servers by surprise. Modifying an interceptor used for missile defense, India was able to target and destroy an Indian satellite in low earth orbit, about three hundred kilometres above the atmosphere. India faced widespread international criticism for the test. Some of the debris expelled from the explosion was sent into an apogee above the International Space Station, which orbits at four hundred kilometres, increasing the likelihood for collision by 44%. Most of the debris will deorbit and burn upon reentry safely. It is important to note that the widely condemned 2007 Chinese ASAT demonstration was conducted at eight hundred kilometres, and the resulting debris will remain for decades. However, In space, it doesn’t matter how small the debris is due to its high speeds in orbit

berkeley model united nations 18 — kinetic energy will do all of the damage. Regardless of the immediate consequences, this highlights a growing concern among countries, that they must develop space weaponry or be left in the dust. Viewing the situation through these lens, dangerous parallels to the cold war can be seen By far the major space powers, it makes sense that the United States, China, and Russia would develop and test anti-satellite weapons. To other nations, it is completely normal.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

Question 1: Is the militarization of space truly inevitable? Should the UN focus efforts on totally preventing the placement of weapons in space, or instead attempt to limit the types and amounts of weapons in space and promote confdence-building measures instead?

Question 2: In limiting/banning space weapons, what are the best methods for verifcation without infringing upon a nation’s sovereignty and security needs?

Question 3: Should the existing Outer Space Treaty be updated to modern standards, stag- nant/failed treaties such as the Moon Treaty or the PPWT/PAROS/EU proposals, be rewrit- ten and reintroduced, or completely new treaties be written?

Question 4: What types of weapons should be limited? Only kinetic, or also intangible, energy/cyber weapons as well?

berkeley model united nations 19 Works Cited - Topic A

Borodavkin, Alexey N., and Wu Haitao. Draft Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). 12 June 2014. Challenges to Security in Space. Defense Intelligence Agency, Jan. 2019. ZoteroBib, https:// www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_ V14_020119_sm.pdf. “Defning and Regulating the Weaponization of Space.” National Defense University Press, 1 July 2014, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577537/defning-and-regulating-the-weaponization-of-space/. Firth, Niall. “How to Fight a War in Space (and Get Away with It).” MIT Technology Review, 26 June 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613749/satellite-space-wars/. Greenemeier, Larry. “GPS and the World’s First ‘Space War.’” Scientifc American, 8 Feb. 2016, https://www.scientifcamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-frst-space-war/. Harrison, Todd, et al. Space Threat Assessment 2019. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4 Apr. 2019. ZoteroBib, https://www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2019. Johnson, Christopher. “The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Space TCBMs: A Secure World Foundation Fact Sheet.” Secure World Foundation, Apr. 2014, https://swfound.org/media/109311/swf_gge_on_space_tcbms_fact_sheet_april_2014.pdf. Listner, Michael. “The Space Review: The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?” The Space Review, 24 Oct. 2011, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1. Macias, Michael Sheetz, Amanda. “China and Russia Are Militarizing Space with ‘energy Weapons’ and Anti-Satellite Missiles: Pentagon.” CNBC, 13 Feb. 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/ pentagon-warns-of-weaponization-of-space-by-china-russia-report.html. Mallick, Senjuti Mallick and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Senjuti. “If Space Is ‘the Province of Mankind’, Who Owns Its Resources?” ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the- province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/. Accessed 23 Nov. 2019. “Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty | Treaties & Regimes | NTI.” NTI, Nu- clear Threat Initiative, 29 Sept. 2017, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed- prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/.

berkeley model united nations 20 Spacefight, Doris Elin Salazar 2019-03-30T11:45:55Z. “India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Is a Big Deal. Here’s Why.” Space.Com, https://www.space.com/india-anti-satellite-test-signifcance.html. Weeden, Brian, and Victoria Samson. “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assess- ment.” Secure World Foundation, Apr. 2019, https://swfound.org/media/206408/swf_global_ counterspace_april2019_web.pdf. Wolf, Jim. “China Key Suspect in U.S. Satellite Hacks: Commission.” Reuters, 28 Oct. 2011. www. reuters.com, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-satellite-idUSTRE79R4O320111028. Zak, Anatoly. “The Hidden History of the Soviet Satellite-Killer.” Popular Mechanics, 1 Nov. 2013, https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/satellites/the-hidden-history-of-the-soviet-satellite-killer-16108970.

berkeley model united nations 21 Topic B: Addressing Inequality of Access to Space Topic Background

Throughout history, humankind has ventured into new and unexplored lands. We have cat- alogued nearly every frontier, except for one last, great unknown — outer space. Brimming with precious resources and unbridled scientifc opportunity, it will undoubtedly form the next chapter of human history. To put in perspective the massive opportunity space presents, a future NASA probe is set to observe 16 Psyche, an asteroid containing an estimated US$700 quintillion of precious minerals – enough to give every person on Earth $100 billion (Chow). Although asteroid mining at our current level of technology is cost-ineffective, the point at which it becomes proftable may be reached in just a few decades (Pellegrini). And when that happens, it will trigger the largest gold rush in history. However, without signifcant change, the ability to access this fnal frontier will be limited to a select few frst-world countries who possess the required resources and technology to launch costly expeditions. There will be no “Space Dream” to rival the California Dream of the 1849 Gold Rush, exacer- bating and sustaining an endless cycle of global inequality as smaller and developing nations are left in the dust. The strategic value of space resources and scientifc opportunities means this topic is also inti- mately connected to our frst topic. As space expeditions become cheaper, competition for resources may turn violent, especially as governments determine space to be a vital component of national security and sovereignty. Thus, the goal of this topic is to craft frameworks to promote international scientifc cooperation, the development of infant space agencies in second and third-world nations, and ensure regulation of the future space industry to ensure sustainable growth.

berkeley model united nations 22 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE ACTIVITIES

“. . .two years from now as we celebrate the millennium, people around the world, looking into the night sky from the vast plains of Central Asia, from the Rocky Mountains of North America, from the bustling streets of Tokyo or the broad boulevards of Berlin will be able to see a bright new star.

That star will be the international space station – a technological marvel orbiting the Earth with men and women living and working inside for the beneft of all humanity. . . the station serves as a very powerful symbol of what great nations can do through peaceful cooperation.”

-Remarks made at signing of the International Space Station Partners Agreement, Washington, D.C., January 29, 1998

Global inequality is the measure of wealth disparity between all individuals. In recent years, the global Gini index (which measures inequality) has stabilized around 0.65, and the mean per capita income has increased almost forty percent ($PPP). However, these metrics often misrepresent large groups of people. These changes, while positive, have largely been driven by massive growth in Asia (China, India, Vietnam, etc.). In fact, the number of people below half-the-global median income, a common measure for relative poverty, has increased by 300 million, mostly in African nations. Additionally, the UN Development Programme has identifed 1.3 billion people as multidi- mensionally poor (that is, also taking into account poor health, poor quality of work and the threat of violence). This combined with the rising share of global wealth of the top one-percent, indicates the world is still heavily polarised (Milanovic). Reducing inequalities is one of the seventeen UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Although the global Gini has stabilized, it is not yet signifcantly improving. The space economy, currently valued at about $330 billion, is estimated to grow to $1 trillion to as much as $2.7 trillion by the 2040s to make it one of the largest industries on Earth (Foust). Thus, leveraging space will be essential in achieving the SDGs and any future goals the UN enacts. However, space remains

berkeley model united nations 23 inaccessible to the vast majority of nations. Although there have been over 500 astronauts, they rep- resent only forty nations. Additionally, nearly 9,000 satellites have been launched since Sputnik, but only eighty countries operate one, and only eleven states, in addition to the European Space Agen- cy, have the capability to independently launch spacecraft (Chaturvedi).

An infographic showing the drastic range in living conditions between the most and least fortunate countries. Data from OECD, OurWorldinData, Max Roser

The Offce of Outer Space Affairs is already acutely aware of the inequality of access to states, and has enacted several initiatives to try to alleviate the issue. These include the Programme on Space Applications (PSA), United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Man- agement and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), and Access to Space For All initiative. The PSA, launched in 1971, works to lessen the gap between developing and developed nations by provisioning knowledge capacity-building, education, research and development support, and technical advisory. It does this through fve key areas of work: biodiversity, climate change, global health, satellite services, as well as disaster management through UN-SPIDER. However, the PSA is limited to providing technical assistance on how to use modern satellite data through outreach sessions, organizing conferences, as well as maintaining a number of regional offces. Such missions

berkeley model united nations 24 are staffed by representatives from governmental agencies, scientifc organizations, university faculty, NGOs, and private companies, mostly volunteers. The PSA also arbitrates international cooperation and standardization through organizations such as the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG) (“Our Work”). While better than nothing, providing technical education is not helpful when the country does not have any satellites to pull data from in the frst place. The PSA is indeed unable to provide any independent satellite capacity. UN-SPIDER is able to fulfll emergency requests. Under UN-SPIDER, the international nonproft COSPAS-SARSAT satellite system provides for search-and-rescue target location, and the International Charter “Space and Major Disasters” initiative, which provides on-request, pro bono satellite data for rapid disaster response (“About the Charter”).

CONSIDERING RESOURCE EXPLOITATION IN OUTER SPACE

No discussion of wealth as it relates to outer space can take place without considering asteroid mining. As I briefy discussed in the topic background, asteroid mining may precipitate the largest gold rush in history, and the industry may come to fruition in just a few decades. A recent Gold- man Sachs report states the largest barriers to asteroid mining are neither technological nor fnancial, but purely psychological. It also predicts the world’s frst trillionaire to be made from space mining (Edwards). Celestial bodies contain large amounts of platinum group metals (PGMs), which make up some of the rarest minerals on Earth. Their iron-loving nature has caused them to be sequestered into Earth’s metallic core, leaving little in the crust. However, many asteroids, like 16 Psyche, are remnants of planet cores, whose fragile crusts have been stripped due to massive collisions. Packed with PGMs and other minerals, these bodies can be worth trillions of dollars. Because of this however, asteroid mining stands to signifcantly impact the global economy, but also assist in fulflling UN goals for sustainable development. Private corporations will most likely take a major position in space, but their role remains a controversial topic. The space economy, currently valued at about $330 billion, is estimated to be worth from $1 trillion to as much as $2.7 trillion by the 2040s. However, the majority of the current space industry is conducted by government and communications enterprises. Growth of the space

berkeley model united nations 25 market has slowed in recent years, increasing only 1% from 2016 to 2017. Thus, it is believed that private corporations will be what drives growth to the trillions (Foust).

An infographic showing the process of asteroid mining. Planetary Resources

An additional issue when considering the motivations of private companies in asteroid mining relates to the basic principle of scarcity. Flood the market with precious metals, and the price will crash. Although you will probably have made a hefty proft, hoarding the minerals and releasing them slowly, in the style of the De Beers’ diamond monopoly, will maximize earnings. This type of market manipulation can give private actors major infuence which may adversely affect the global balance of power. Before we discuss asteroid mining any further, we must ask consider the foundational legal- ity of the industry. Again, we look to the Outer Space Treaty. Besides non-militarization, the treaty prevents any claim of sovereignty in outer space. However, the treaty makes no mention of resource exploitation and ownership, meaning space is roughly akin to international waters. The Moon Agree- ment, passed in 1979, sought to resolve this issue by forming an international regime to regulate space mining, but failed to be ratifed on a practical scale. The US has already taken full advantage of this legal grayness, passing the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneur-

berkeley model united nations 26 ship (SPACE) Act in 2015. The Act entitles US citizens to full ownership of any resources they obtain in space, in action disregarding any international law. Luxembourg followed with a similar law in 2017. For the United Nations to leverage the nascent space mining industry as a vehicle for spurring sustainable growth for all nations, there should be at minimum four considerations for a relevant international framework. First, international collaboration must be encouraged between developing and developed nations.

Decline in launch costs to low Earth orbit, 1980-2100. Note the logarithmic scale. Second, an international body must be created to regulate asteroid mining, and ensure a single entity, private or governmental, does not overwhelm and monopolize the industry. This agency could accomplish this goal through the issuance of mining permits, as is the case of many nation-

berkeley model united nations 27 al mining agencies on Earth. This body could also levy royalties that would be used for expanding space programs in developing nations. Environmental impact and operational strategy statements could be required for every new venture, to minimize waste and premature exhaustion of asteroids due to wasteful extraction methods. Third, a clear set of international standards and labor rights must be established specifcally for extraterrestrial mining operations. Such policies should not only ensure the occupational well-being of all involved individuals, but also work to minimize the chance of incidents that could have catastrophic consequences in the space domain.

CASE STUDY Deep Sea Mining, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty, US Refusal to Ratify, and the Antarctic Treaty System

Developed in the 1980s, UNCLOS defnes the roles and responsibilities of nations with re- spect to their use of world oceans as the economic territory of nations. It establishes a set of guidelines as to the exploitation of natural resources, preservation of the environment, and the extent to which nations can claim sovereignty over ocean territory. Most pertinent to our topic however, is the Part XI of the treaty, which provides for regulation of deep seabed mining, beyond territorial waters, and established the International Seabed Authori- ty (ISA). Governed by a 36-member Council elected by all state parties, the ISA would control access of private and governmental mining operations, while distributing a portion of the wealth through royalties, to developing nations. Under the ISA, an international entity called “the Enterprise,” would mine the ocean foor with the assistance of party nations. Profts would go to the authority for appro- priate redistribution and funding further mining and scientifc operations. The ISA seeks to enable “fair and equal” access of the ocean space to nations without adequate capabilities to conduct deep sea operations. The U.S. has ratifed all parts of the treaty except for Part XI, despite leading efforts to develop the treaty in the 80s. Opponents argue that such an entity would discourage innovation, en- trepreneurship, and expressed concerns that distributed royalties might go to disputed states, such as Palestine and Eritrea. Proponents state that however, by failing to ratify the treaty as other major

berkeley model united nations 28 nations as China, Russia, and members of the EU have, the U.S. has no claim to deep sea resources and interests in the Arctic and South China Sea. Moreover, the U.S. is tarnishing it’s respectability as an international steward. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Antarctic Treaty System is another example of a successful treaty governing exploitation of international resources, but is instead based upon heavy regulations and limitations. Signed in 1959 by every nation active in the Antarctic at the time, it bans all militaristic and economic activities, including mining. Only purely peaceful work is allowed, such as scientifc research, which must also be shared publicly (“Antarctic Treaty”). Nominal interest in seabed mining means UNCLOS is no longer under contentious debate, but it shows us some possible methods for ensuring fair access to diffcult-to-reach resources for all, as well as arguments against it. In brainstorming ideas for crafting an international treaty to govern the use of space as a scientifc and economic resource, these two systems are excellent and relatively successful frameworks to draw ideas from.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

Question 1: Will developed nations see any beneft from aiding in the growth of developing nations’ space programmes?

Question 2: How should exploitation of space resources be regulated such that all nations see at least some beneft?

Question 3: Free access to resources on Earth has at times led to unchecked environmental destruction and inequality. With this in mind, should the environmental impacts of space mining be considered? Or since it’s not Earth, is the “space environment” less important, and thus, does not matter?

berkeley model united nations 29 Works Cited Topic B

“A Trillion-Dollar Space Industry Will Require New Markets.” SpaceNews.Com, 6 July 2018, https:// spacenews.com/a-trillion-dollar-space-industry-will-require-new-markets/. About the Charter - International Disasters Charter. https://disasterscharter.org/web/guest/about- the-charter. Accessed 24 Nov. 2019. Access to Space for All. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/access2space4all/index.html. Accessed 21 Nov. 2019. Benefts Stemming from Space Exploration. https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/fles/fles/Bene- fts-Stemming-from-Space-Exploration-2013-TAGGED.pdf. Accessed 17 Nov. 2019. Chaturvedi, Aditya. “Do You Know How Many Satellites Are Currently Orbiting around the Earth?” Geospatial World, 20 Jan. 2019, https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/do-you-know-how-many-satellites-earth/. Dallas, J. A., et al. “Mining beyond Earth for Sustainable Development: Will Humanity Beneft from Resource Extraction in Outer Space?” Acta Astronautica, vol. 167, Feb. 2020, pp. 181–88. Sci- enceDirect, doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2019.11.006. Edwards, Jim. “Goldman Sachs: Space-Mining for Platinum Is ‘More Realistic than Perceived.’” Insid- er, https://www.insider.com/goldman-sachs-space-mining-asteroid-platinum-2017-4. Accessed 24 Nov. 2019. Mallick, Senjuti Mallick and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Senjuti. “If Space Is ‘the Province of Mankind’, Who Owns Its Resources?” ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the- province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/. Accessed 23 Nov. 2019. “Mission to Rare Metal Asteroid Could Spark Space Mining Boom.” NBC News, https://www. nbcnews.com/mach/science/mission-rare-metal-asteroid-could-spark-space-mining-boom-nc- na1027971. Accessed 18 Nov. 2019. “New UN Poverty Report Reveals ‘Vast Inequalities’ between Countries.” UN News, 11 July 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1042231. Our Work. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/index.html. Accessed 24 Nov. 2019. What Is Happening with Global Inequality? | VOX, CEPR Policy Portal. https://voxeu.org/content/ what-happening-global-inequality. Accessed 17 Nov. 2019.

berkeley model united nations 30 KEY TERMS Satellite constellation: Any system of satellites working together, most commonly for telecommuni- cations.

Communication Satellites (SATCOM): Provide voice, television, internet, mobile, and data services for civil and military users. Comprise the majority of satellites in orbit. Several nations also operate dedicated military SATCOM constellations.

Remote Sensing Satellites: Provide data on Earth’s land, sea, and atmosphere. Used for weather forecasting, resource searching, and military reconnaissance.

Missile Warning Satellites: Satellites dedicated to detecting missile launches, as they can detect before ground-based systems

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Satellites: Satellites that provide precise location and time i.e. GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou. Provide critical timings and navigation info. For militaries, PNT data allows for precise targeting for munitions.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs): Nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, or any other weapon that can cause signifcant harm to humans, structures (natural or man-made), or the biosphere

ASAT Weapon: Anti-Satellite weapon. Anything that destroys or physically damages a satellite or impacts its operation. Commonly separated into 4 categories:

Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs): Use directed energy (lasers, high-power microwaves, other radio/EM weapons) to disrupt, damage, or destroy enemy equipment. Diffcult for target to fnd the origin of/attribute the attack.

Electronic Warfare (EW): Use of jamming (clouding a signal) and spoofng (transmitting false signals to deceive receivers) techniques to impact satellite service, affecting all or just a few users, such as a single military unit. Very diffcult to attribute and distinguish from normal interference.

berkeley model united nations 31 Direct Ascent Kinetic Weapons (DA): Ground-based missiles to destroy target satellites through kinetic impact, either explosive or hit-to-kill (HTK). DA-ASATs can trigger a destructive cascade of space debris. Easily attributed.

Orbital Weapons: Offensive satellites that can target other satellites and spacecraft. Can use kinetic, electronic, or directed energy weaponry. Easily attributed.

Breakout capability: The ability of state to rapidly begin production of banned weapons, due to established infrastructure, technology, and resources. Commonly used in nuclear proliferation, but can also apply to other arms technologies.

Gini coeffcient: A measurement of inequality within a group on a scale of 0 to 1. A Gini of 1 indicates one individual possesses all the wealth, while a Gini of 0 indicates perfectly even wealth distribution.

berkeley model united nations 32