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Congress's Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional And Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions June 16, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46417 SUMMARY R46417 Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: June 16, 2020 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Sean M. Stiff A body of constitutional and statutory provisions provides Congress with perhaps its most Legislative Attorney important legislative tool: the power to direct and control federal spending. Congress’s “power of the purse” derives from two features of the Constitution: Congress’s enumerated legislative powers, including the power to raise revenue and “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” and the Appropriations Clause. This latter provision states that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Strictly speaking, the Appropriations Clause does not provide Congress a substantive legislative power but rather constrains government action. But because Article I vests the legislative power of the United States in Congress, and Congress is therefore the moving force in deciding when and on what terms to make public money available through an appropriation, the Appropriations Clause is perhaps the most important piece in the framework establishing Congress’s supremacy over public funds. The Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the Appropriations Clause in relatively few cases. Still, these cases provide important fence posts marking the extent of Congress’s power of the purse. The Court’s cases explain Congress’s discretion to decide whether to pay, through an appropriation, asserted debts owed to third parties. The Court’s cases also establish that executive branch officials may not exercise constitutional or statutory powers to compel, directly or indirectly, payments from the Treasury absent an appropriation passed by Congress, and the Court’s cases also provide support for the proposition that officials in the executive branch may not refuse to obligate funds when Congress has so mandated. Congress’s appropriations function has its limits, though. For one, the Court has held that the Clause does not apply to funds until they are deposited in the Treasury. The Constitution may also constrain Congress’s authority to control the other branches through its appropriations power, either through particular constitutional provisions or because of the Constitution’s framework of separate and coequal branches. Congress has not rested on the text of the Appropriations Clause, alone, to guard funds meant for or contained in the Treasury. Instead, Congress has chosen to enforce the Clause through a series of generally applicable fiscal control statutes, some of which practitioners and the Courts commonly refer to by informal names. These statutes govern federal funds from initial receipt through obligation and expenditure. Included among these statutes, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires agencies to deposit “as soon as practicable” any “money for the Government” that they receive, so that agencies remain dependent on Congress for budget authority. The Purpose Statute limits an agency’s use of appropriations to only those “objects for which the appropriations were made,” and a body of decisions explains how an agency may determine the express and implied authority that flows from a given appropriation. Congress also controls agency spending in how it structures appropriations and then, through transfer and reprogramming authority, constrains the agency’s authority to allocate funds between or within appropriations. The Antideficiency Act prohibits obligations or expenditures that exceed an agency’s total budget authority or violate a cap, condition, or other limitation placed on the agency’s use of budget authority. Finally, the Impoundment Control Act limits the executive branch’s ability to withhold budget authority from being available for obligation or expenditure, ensuring that agencies implement the budget authority that Congress has conferred. Besides these generally applicable fiscal control statutes, Congress controls Treasury funds through the text of annual, supplemental, and continuing appropriations acts themselves or in other provisions of statute that Congress passes in authorizing acts, apart from its periodic appropriations measures. Congress specifies the amount and objects of appropriations, but as important, Congress places requirements, called conditions, limitations, or appropriation riders, on the executive branch’s use of appropriations. Because it takes money to govern, Congress’s use of appropriation riders has the potential to shape executive power in important ways. As a result, the executive branch scrutinizes limits placed on appropriated funds and sometimes identifies riders that, according to the executive branch, are not controlling because the rider allegedly exceeds Congress’s legislative power. An understanding of the executive branch “precedent” on appropriation riders can help identify those likely to spark constitutional objections. Congressional Research Service Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Contents Overview of Key Terms and Concepts ............................................................................................ 3 The Appropriations Clause: Historical Background ........................................................................ 7 Supreme Court Interpretation ........................................................................................................ 10 Effects on Private Parties ......................................................................................................... 11 Effects on Executive Power .................................................................................................... 13 The Appropriations Clause’s Limits ....................................................................................... 17 Congress’s Fiscal Control Statutes ................................................................................................ 21 The Miscellaneous Receipts Act (MRA) ................................................................................ 22 The Purpose Statute ................................................................................................................. 27 Transfers and Reprogramming ................................................................................................ 32 The Antideficiency Act ........................................................................................................... 39 Limits on Obligations or Expenditures ............................................................................. 39 Apportionments and Reserves .......................................................................................... 43 Antideficiency Act Penalties ............................................................................................. 44 The Impoundment Control Act ............................................................................................... 46 Background ....................................................................................................................... 47 Rescissions ........................................................................................................................ 49 Deferrals ............................................................................................................................ 52 Congressional Action and GAO Oversight ....................................................................... 54 Appropriation Riders ..................................................................................................................... 57 Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 61 Appendixes Appendix. Glossary ....................................................................................................................... 63 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 64 Congressional Research Service Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions body of constitutional and statutory provisions provides Congress with perhaps its most important legislative tool: the power to direct federal spending. Known as Congress’s A “power of the purse,”1 the power flows, in part, from those legislative authorities enumerated in Article I, Section 8, including Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause to raise revenue and “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”2 The Spending Clause power complements, and in some cases enhances, Congress’s other enumerated legislative authorities.3 Congress has the authority to determine what constitutes the “general Welfare” and then allocate public money to advance the cause it has selected.4 Because the Constitution grants Congress the spending power, the document’s other provisions provide the only legal constraints upon the exercise of that power.5 As broad as the Spending Clause power is, it perhaps is not the most important feature of Congress’s power of the purse. One could devise a system of government in which the legislature and the executive each exercise independent control over revenue and spending. At the time of the Founding,
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