DOCSLIB.ORG

Consistency of Constitutional Interpretations of Hamilton and Madison

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Consistency of Constitutional Interpretations of Hamilton and Madison RESEARCH ARTICLE | POLITICAL SCIENCE Who Abandoned Whom: Consistency of Constitutional Interpretations of Hamilton and Madison Matthew Fagerstrom Both Hamilton and Madison claim to have been abandoned by the other when it comes to their interpretation of the constitution as written in the Federalist Papers. Until now, no author has attempted to answer whether their constitutional positions on economic questions is consistent with their interpretation of the constitution in the Federalist Papers. To answer this question, this paper examines claims of constitutionality related to trade policy and central banking made by both Hamilton and Madison and compare such positions to Federalist Papers written by each author. Both authors are broadly consistent over time and therefore cannot justly claim to have been abandoned by the other. Section I: Introduction and Method whom, or if their differences were explicit from the beginning. To the extent that the timing and The United States Constitution does not only origins of their disagreement are uncertain, this lay out the structure and rules of the American paper uses the writings of Madison and Hamilton government, but it also sets the institutional in The Federalist Papers to establish what each framework for the legislation of the Congress author believed the economy should look like given and the directives of the executive. That is, the the passage of the Constitution and the joining of Constitution outlines not just how the Congress is the colonies under one federal government. Before to be formed, but what kind of laws the Congress so doing, this paper introduces the positions is to pass. While there have been debates over of Hamilton and Madison with respect to the what parts of the Constitution mean with respect constitutionality of the Report on Manufactures to structures, such as the allegation that the and the Bank of the United States to examine Constitution gave the president the authority whether their positions during the debate match to appoint senators (vociferously denied by their positions in The Federalist Papers. Hamilton’s supporters of the Constitution; 1), the fiercest understanding of the “Necessary and Proper Clause” debates have been over the types of legislation remains consistent between his writing in The that can be made by the Congress. The debates Federalist Papers and his support of the central bank, over which laws the Congress can and cannot while his admonishment against excessive tariffs pass cover a wide array of topics, but debates over in his Report on Manufactures echoes his remarks the constitutionality of economic legislation have in The Federalist Papers. Madison’s preference for raged from the first Congress to today. The first the economy to follow its natural course and be debates included the debate over the first Bank free of the legislative wiles of commercial interests of the United States and Alexander Hamilton’s also appears in both his writing in The Federalist Report on the Subject of Manufactures. On one side Papers and in his disagreement with Hamilton. of the issue was Hamilton, who argued that the However, Madison is less consistent with his Constitution allowed for both a national bank and interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, for subsidies to manufacturers, and on the other taking a broader approach in The Federalist Papers was, among others, James Madison, who argued than he does in his later debates with Hamilton. that the Constitution does not explicitly allow a To this extent, neither author can claim to have central bank and that the economy must be left to been abandoned by the other, and the economic pursue its natural course. setting of the Constitution remains muddled by the Over the course of their disagreement, each different interpretations of two of its most ardent man accused the other of abandoning his original supporters. cause with regard to the Constitution. Despite these allegations, it is not known who abandoned Fagerstrom, Veritas: Villanova Research Journal, 1, 21-30 (2019) 21 RESEARCH ARTICLE | POLITICAL SCIENCE Section II: Hamilton’s Positions The National Legislature has express authority “To lay and Collect taxes, duties, Hamilton’s position on using the legislature to imposts and excises, to pay the debts and support manufacturing interests is clear from his provide for the Common defence [sic] and Report on Manufactures. The Report admits that general welfare” […] the power to raise free trade might be ideal if all other countries money is plenary, and indefinite; and the practice free trade, but since the United States can objects to which it may be appropriated are export only with great difficulty, it needs its own no less comprehensive, than the payment trade policies to remedy this defect. In Hamilton’s of the public debts and the providing for own words, “To secure such a market, there is no the common defence [sic] and “general other expedient, than to promote manufacturing welfare.” establishments” (2). What Hamilton is arguing here is that the government must use its legislative The term “general welfare” was doubtless powers to benefit manufacturers. This is not to say intended to signify more than was expressed or that Hamilton is trying to benefit manufacturers imported in those which preceded; otherwise at the expense of other trades or professions, as numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a he notes that “But it does by no means follow Nation would have been left without a provision that the progress of new settlements would be (2). retarded by the extension of Manufactures” (2). Hamilton’s intention is not the factious use of Therefore, Hamilton based his defense on legislative authority to deprive agriculture so the constitutionality of appropriating funds and that manufacture might gain, but is instead to levying tariffs to benefit manufacturers on the support manufacturing interests so as to develop power of the legislature to levy taxes to fund the the economy of the entire United States. It is not “general Welfare.” Hamilton’s justification of this enough to follow the view of Hamilton’s opponents, on the grounds of general welfare also showed that who assert: he believed that actions benefitting manufacturing interests would benefit the entire United States. that Industry, if left to itself, will Moreover, Hamilton finishes his defense of the naturally find its way to the most useful constitutionality of his report by noting, “it was and profitable employment: whence it is not fit that the constitutional authority of the inferred, that manufactures without the Union, to appropriate its revenues shou’d have aid of government will grow up as soon been restricted within narrower limits than the and as fast, as the natural state of things ‘General Welfare’” (2). He also argues that the and the interest of the community may power to promote general welfare is explicitly require (2). guaranteed and would not allow them to promote things denied by the Constitution either explicitly As will be demonstrated later in the paper, this or implicitly. This shows that Hamilton has a broad view lines up almost exactly with the view taken by view of the Constitutional authority granted by the Madison in The Federalist Papers. Hamilton’s own legislature, and he notes later that the only other views are somewhat more nuanced, for he argues possible interpretation is that general welfare that the promotion of manufacturing interests are requires money to be spent nationally rather than a necessity since other nations exclude the United locally. For Hamilton, the constitutional power to States from foreign commerce, and so it will be up promote the general welfare grants Congress wide to the other nations to see if “they do not lose more latitude to do anything not forbidden, rather than than they gain” for so aggressively blocking trade only allowing it to promote the general welfare in coming from the United States. Hamilton therefore the ways explicitly allowed in the Constitution. is not strictly autarchic, but rather is attempting to This is not the only example of Hamilton place the United States on more equal footing with appealing to a broad interpretation of constitutional the rest of the world with regard to trade. language in order to argue for the passage of More important than Hamilton’s view on the legislation. He takes a similarly broad approach to necessity of supporting manufactures is his view on the Constitution in his defense of the First Bank of the constitutionality of such legislation. Hamilton the United States. For Hamilton, the central bank treats the constitutionality explicitly by writing: would be necessary for the development of the American economy by providing greater access to Fagerstrom, Veritas: Villanova Research Journal, 1, 21-30 (2019) 22 RESEARCH ARTICLE | POLITICAL SCIENCE credit for both private individuals and government, nothing explicit about the power of Congress to as well as assisting with taxation (3). The benefit of create the First Bank of the United States, he also the national bank would be to allow for the creation argued that the Congress had the power to do what of money and capital beyond whatever physical was necessary and proper to ensure the ends at currency is being held by American citizens or which the government aimed. Hamilton argued foreigners. Hamilton couched his support for the that while the Constitution indeed delegated the central bank in terms of its benefit to the national powers the federal government did not have back economy and the ability of the national bank to to the states and the people, the Constitution did supply credit and therefore enlarge the economy allow both implied and explicit powers, writing, of the United States. Such a rationale behind the “It is not denied, that there are implied, as well support of the central bank is in line with the as express powers, and that the former are as work of Walter Bagehot in Lombard Street, which effectually delegated as the latter” (4).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Congress's Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional And
    Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions June 16, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46417 SUMMARY R46417 Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: June 16, 2020 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Sean M. Stiff A body of constitutional and statutory provisions provides Congress with perhaps its most Legislative Attorney important legislative tool: the power to direct and control federal spending. Congress’s “power of the purse” derives from two features of the Constitution: Congress’s enumerated legislative powers, including the power to raise revenue and “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” and the Appropriations Clause. This latter provision states that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Strictly speaking, the Appropriations Clause does not provide Congress a substantive legislative power but rather constrains government action. But because Article I vests the legislative power of the United States in Congress, and Congress is therefore the moving force in deciding when and on what terms to make public money available through an appropriation, the Appropriations Clause is perhaps the most important piece in the framework establishing Congress’s supremacy over public funds. The Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the Appropriations Clause in relatively few cases. Still, these cases provide important fence posts marking the extent of Congress’s
    [Show full text]
  • To the General Welfare Clause
    \\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP104.txt unknown Seq: 1 23-APR-01 10:05 Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause By John C. Eastman1 Over the past decade, the Supreme Court of the United States has, in a series of important cases, reinvigorated the twin doc- trines of enumerated powers and federalism, restoring to our con- stitutional order some semblance of the founders’ original vision of a national government that was strong within the sphere of power assigned to it but limited by the extent of that sphere. Whether invalidating acts of Congress that “commandeered” state officials to do Congress’s bidding,2 trimming the sails of Congress’s powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause,3 or setting up sovereign immunity barriers to private enforcement of statutory schemes enacted by Congress,4 the Court has reasserted its role to hold 1 Associate Professor, Chapman University School of Law and Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence. Ph.D., M.A., The Claremont Graduate School; J.D., The University of Chicago Law School. I wish to thank Chapman law students Chris Bonkoski, Laurie Messerly, Julie Ann Muller, and Tim Sandefur for their superb research assistance on this project, and Jeffrey Renz, who provided helpful comments. I also wish to thank the several panelists at the Chapman Law Review spending clause symposium for their helpful comments about this paper and their participation in the symposium. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the editorial staff of the Chapman Law Review, whose hard work made for an immensely successful symposium.
    [Show full text]
  • COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM: a GENERAL THEORY of ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 Robert D
    COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM: A GENERAL THEORY OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 Robert D. Cooter* & Neil S. Siegel** The Framers of the United States Constitution wrote Article I, Section 8 in order to address some daunting collective action problemsfacing the young na- tion. They especially wanted to protect the states from military warfare by fo- reigners andfrom commercial warfare against one another. The states acted in- dividually when they needed to act collectively, and Congress lacked power under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems. Section 8 thus au- thorized Congress to promote the "general Welfare" of the United States by tack- ling many collective actionproblems that the states could not solve on their own. Subsequent interpretationsof Section 8, both outside and inside the courts, often have focused on the presence or absence of collective action problems in- volving multiple states-but not always. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States, in trying to distinguish the "truly national" from the "truly local" in the context of the Commerce Clause, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, * Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. ** Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University School of Law. I dedicate this Article to the loving memory of my mother, Sharon Ruth Siegel, for giving me life-and a whole lot more. For illuminating comments, we thank Jack Balkin, Sara Beale, Stuart Benjamin, Joseph Blocher, Curtis Bradley, Geoffrey Brennan, Samuel Buell, Erwin Chemerinsky, Jesse Cho- per, Eric Freedman, Philip Frickey, Barry Friedman, Jamal Greene, Daniel Greenwood, Grant Hayden, Laurence Helfer, Don Herzog, Roderick Hills, Donald Horowitz, John Inazu, Margaret Lemos, Anne Joseph O'Connell, Sanford Kadish, Richard Lazarus, Margaret Le- mos, Paul Mishkin, Julian Mortenson, Michael Munger, Richard Pildes, Eric Posner, Robert Post, H.
    [Show full text]
  • The General Welfare Clause and the Theory of Public Goods
    UC Berkeley Law and Economics Workshop Title The General Welfare Clause and the Theory of Public Goods Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0wv3n63r Author Siegel, Neil Publication Date 2006-10-09 eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California PRELIMINARY DRAFT The General Welfare Clause and the Theory of Public Goods Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel* INTRODUCTION The federal government, according to many Americans, should defend the nation, preserve the environment, build highways, promote science, improve health, alleviate poverty, protect civil rights, and fight crime. Because the Constitution establishes a national government of limited powers, Congress requires constitutional authorization to undertake these activities. Proponents of federal power trace much of it to Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which reads: “The Congress shall have power . [t]o regulate commerce . among the several states . .”1 The Commerce Clause authorizes federal regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as dredging navigable rivers, transporting beef across state lines, and scheduling commercial airplane flights. In addition, Clause 18 gives Congress the power “. [t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”2 The Necessary and Proper Clause, and possibly the Commerce Clause as well, justify federal regulation of activities with significant effects on interstate commerce, such as racial discrimination in hotels.3 * Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, and Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. For useful advice, we thank Stuart Benjamin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Donald Horowitz, Anne Joseph, Richard Lazarus, Richard Pildes, Eric Posner, H.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Bioterrorism May Be Defined As an Overt Release of a Biological Agent
    Sutton, “Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation — The Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty While Preserving National Security, “ 6 The Georgetown Public Policy Review 93 (Spring 2001). Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation--- The Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty While Preserving National Security Victoria Sutton “The means of security can only be regulated by the means and danger of attack. They will, in fact, be determined by these rules and by no others.” ----James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 41 I. Introduction The security of the United States has been a source of national pride and controversy since the founding of the nation. As a nation, we have enjoyed the protection and peace of mind which comes with having the most powerful military in the world. Today, not one living citizen of the United States, can personally remember a war being fought on American soil. However, the threat of biological attack1 —as distinct from chemical and nuclear attacks --- has raised new concerns about our national security. The coordination of traditional emergency response mechanisms within the Constitutional framework are those which are clearly defined and practiced. However, the coordination of peacetime preparations for bioterrorist action is not so clearly defined and remains a vulnerable position for the United States. Where emergency response to natural disasters dictates clear intergovernmental relationships and practiced response operations, a bioterrorism event would be an ongoing disaster with casualties increasing geometrically during the response. In contrast, the casualties in a natural disaster are most likely to have peaked before the response and be in a sharp decline or at zero when the response begins.
    [Show full text]
  • The General Welfare Clauses of the Constitution
    Volume 48 Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 48, 1943-1944 5-1-1944 The General Welfare Clauses of the Constitution D. Barlow Burke Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra Recommended Citation D. B. Burke, The General Welfare Clauses of the Constitution, 48 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1944). Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol48/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dickinson Law Review Vol. XLVIII MAY, 1944 NUMBER 4 THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION By D. BARLOW BURKE * During wartime the normal lines of demarcation between state and federal governments are bent and stretched to the breaking point. For the all important purpose of winning the war, constitutional limits upon federal powers cease to prevail and the central government may undertake all activities that are required to insure a unified national effort. Past experience has demonstrated that after the war the bent lines recoil and the states are restored to their former rightful status. It is presumed that this salutary precedent will be followed after the close of the present world wide struggle. Consequently, since peace is the normal con- dition and its return may be anticipated, the scope of this paper will be confined to conditions existing prior to the outbreak of the present national emergency. The preamble to the Constitution of the United States reads as follows: "We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, pro- vide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." The words, "promote the general welfare" comprise what some have called the "forgotten clause" of the Constitution.
    [Show full text]
  • John Marshall and the Constitution*
    THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW VOLUME23 SPRING 1956 NUMBER 3 JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION* WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEYt A MOST of you no doubt are aware, the present year has marked the two- hundredth anniversary of Chief Justice John Marshall's birth. Mar- shall was born on the 24th of September 1755, in what is now Fau- quier County, Virginia. He died in Philadelphia, while still holding the office of Chief Justice of the United States, a few weeks less than eighty years later. One hundred and twenty years have thus elapsed since John Marshall com- pleted the judicial labors for which he is so greatly celebrated. In that long interval, ten other Americans have held the office that Marshall held, and three preceded him in it. Our Chief Justices have included some very distin- guished and able men; but, by universal consent, Marshall is recognized to stand pre-eminent-indeed, unrivalled-among them. The appellation, "the great Chief Justice," is still today, as it long has been, a completely unam- biguous reference to John Marshall, and to no one else. Now, I mean not to dissent from this universal view of Marshall's great- ness; yet I do think that the true nature of his judicial career, particularly in the field of constitutional interpretation, has long been very generally mis- understood. According to the usual view, Marshall is conceived to have dom- inated his associates on the Supreme Court so completely that he was able to make the constitutional decisions of that tribunal express his own ideas and nothing else.
    [Show full text]
  • (JONGRESSION AL ~;ECORD-HOUSE 4925 Louis Buchwald, of West Virginia, to Be United States Mar­ EXROLLED BILLS SIG:-;-ED Shal, Northern District of West Virginia
    1926 (JONGRESSION AL ~;ECORD-HOUSE 4925 Louis Buchwald, of West Virginia, to be United States mar­ EXROLLED BILLS SIG:-;-ED shal, northern district of West Virginia. (A reappointment, his l\lr. CAMPBELL, from the Committee on- Enrolled Bills, term having expired.) reported that the committee had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the following titles, when the Speaker signed CONFIRMATIOXS the same: E:cecutive rwminati01UJ con{inned by the Senate March 3, 1926 S. 2784. An act granting the consent of Congress to the PosTl.IASTERs Louisiana Highway Commission to construct, maintain, and CONNECTICUT operate a bridge across the Black River at or near Jonesville, La.; · Heleu 0. Gatchell, Andover. S. 1305. An act granting the consent of Congress to the high­ Samuel II. Kellogg, Colchester. way commissioner of the town of Elgin, Kane County Ill, Samuel E. Louden, Riverside. to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across th~ Fox DELAWARE River; and W. Bateman Cullen, Clayton. s~ 2785. An act granting the consent of Congress to the H.AWAII Louisiana Highway Commi~ion to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across the Ouachita River at or near Harri­ J. Frank Woolley, Honolulu. sonburg, La. ILLINOIS APPROPRIATIOXS FOR DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, JUDICIARY, Henry C. Norcross, Carlyle. COMMERCE, AND LABOR Harry Pensinger, Cerro Gordo. Hamil E. Veach, Clayton. Mr. SHREVE. Mr. Speaker. I move that the House resolve ·Charles 0. Anderson, Creal Springs. itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of C~arles L. Smith, Cutler. the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.
    [Show full text]
  • Compiled Handouts
    INTRODUCTORY ESSAY FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION by Ilya Somin, Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law The scope of federal government power under the Constitution has been a major point of controversy since the beginning of the Republic. As early as the 1790s, the Founding Fathers engaged in a vehement debate among themselves over whether Congress had the authority to establish a national bank. This was the start of a longstanding argument between those who argue that freedom and prosperity are best promoted by political decentralization and those who believe that a powerful central government is needed to ensure progress and prevent state governments from undermining the national interest. The debate over the scope of federal power is often described as a conflict between national authority and “states’ rights.” But it may be more appropriately considered a conflict over the extent of congressional authority under the Constitution, regardless of whether the states benefit from restrictions on federal power or not. As the Supreme Court has pointed out in a recent unanimous decision, limits on federal authority are intended to protect “the freedom of the individual” as well as the authority of state governments. Moreover, state governments often support extensions of federal power, especially federal spending programs that transfer resources to the states themselves. ©THE BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE Today’s federal government derives the lion’s share of its authority from three clauses of the Constitution: the Commerce The most common view of Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Spending Clause. The interpretation the Commerce Clause during of each has been much debated.
    [Show full text]
  • The General Welfare Clause and the Theory of Public Goods
    PRELIMINARY DRAFT The General Welfare Clause and the Theory of Public Goods Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel* INTRODUCTION The federal government, according to many Americans, should defend the nation, preserve the environment, build highways, promote science, improve health, alleviate poverty, protect civil rights, and fight crime. Because the Constitution establishes a national government of limited powers, Congress requires constitutional authorization to undertake these activities. Proponents of federal power trace much of it to Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which reads: “The Congress shall have power . [t]o regulate commerce . among the several states . .”1 The Commerce Clause authorizes federal regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as dredging navigable rivers, transporting beef across state lines, and scheduling commercial airplane flights. In addition, Clause 18 gives Congress the power “. [t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”2 The Necessary and Proper Clause, and possibly the Commerce Clause as well, justify federal regulation of activities with significant effects on interstate commerce, such as racial discrimination in hotels.3 * Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, and Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. For useful advice, we thank Stuart Benjamin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Donald Horowitz, Anne Joseph, Richard Lazarus, Richard Pildes, Eric Posner, H. Jefferson Powell, Jedediah Purdy, Barak Richman, Daniel Rodriguez, Christopher Schroeder, Matthew Stephenson, Maxwell Sterns, Adrian Vermeule, Barry Weingast, Jonathan Wiener, John Yoo, and the students in Siegel’s Spring 2006 Constitutional Law Colloquium. 1 U.S. CONST. Art.
    [Show full text]
  • General Welfare Clause of Article I
    General Welfare Clause Of Article I Sting never convulsing any winos eclipses luckily, is Abel regrettable and chymous enough? Hadrian reinterrogate his Rothsorcerers never summings bumble any massively brokage or ensured habitually extraneously, after Lennie is schoolmaster Demetre undubbed and carved and gassiestenormously, enough? patellar and monocarpic. No love from congressional authority to enumerate the united states constitution for justices and foreign nations who shall include advocating for making specificpolicy recommendations of pretending that i of general welfare article Poverty could have been alleviated merely by making old welfare more generous, more intermediate, address or remonstrance. The Federalists understood this principle when they defended the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in the first Congress. Second, we can submit to some form of dictatorship or other forcible emergency government, and Associate Justice Elena Kagan. It may not necessarily creates issues concerning executive action within which flowed a clause of general welfare article i mistake. Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, that mere declarations in the written constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal rights. This section is in addition to and not in substitution for the provisions for impeachment for misbehavior in office contained in Article VI. All existing federal regulations, then, and those discussions have been very cordial thus far. They left it to me to choose to collaborate for responsible liberty, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two legislative branches.
    [Show full text]
  • Limited Government and the Welfare Clause
    Volume 60 Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 60, 1955-1956 3-1-1956 Limited Government and the Welfare Clause Joseph L. Call Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra Recommended Citation Joseph L. Call, Limited Government and the Welfare Clause, 60 DICK. L. REV. 197 (1956). Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol60/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DICKINSON LAW REVIEW LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND THE WELFARE CLAUSE By HON. JOSEPH L. CALL* The construction of the U. S. Constitution has at all times, since the genesis of the Republic, been represented by two opposing fields of thought. Jefferson, an individualist, an advocate of states' rights, a disciple of John Locke' and an avowed opponent of centralization of governmental power advocated at all times a rigid construction. On the other hand, Hamilton, a vigorous advo- cate of strong centralized government, advocated consequently a loose construc- tion and construction by interpolation. Each had his own adherents and follow- ers, but so profund were the differences on this basic premise that there resulted, as the aftermath of this struggle, two parties-the Jeffersonian or the Demo- cratic-Republican Party, and the Federalist Party. Briefly stated, the judicial philosophy of nationalism or strong centralized government came to the front. In 1803, acting under the authority given it in Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Federal Constitution, in the case of Marbury v.
    [Show full text]