INSPECTION OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary INSPECTION OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary CONTENTS �

1. INTRODUCTION 4 � Terms of reference 4 � Methodology 4 � Acknowledgements � 5 2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 6 � Headquarters RAF Police 6 � Operational environments 7 � 3. LEADERSHIP 8 � Strengths 8 � Work in progress 8 � Areas for improvement 9 � 4. MANAGING INTELLIGENCE 10 � Strengths 10 � Work in progress 11 � Areas for improvement 11 � 5. CRIME INVESTIGATIONS 13 � Strengths 13 � Work in progress 14 � Areas for improvement 14 � 6. FORENSIC SERVICES 16 � Strengths 16 � Work in progress 16 � Areas for improvement 17 �

2 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch Contents

7. CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSES 18 � Strengths 18 � Areas for improvement 18 � 8. HUMAN RESOURCES 19 � Strengths 19 � Work in progress 19 � Areas for improvement 19 � 9. TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT 21 � Strengths 21 � Work in progress 21 � Areas for improvement 21 � 10. EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY 23 � Strengths 23 � Work in progress 23 � Areas for improvement 24 � 11. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 25 � Strengths 25 � Areas for improvement 25 � 12. CONCLUSION 26 �

RECOMMENDATIONS � 27 LIST OF ACRONYMS � 28 ENDNOTES � 29

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 3 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION �

1.1 Following the 2006 Her Majesty’s ■ to inspect SIB specialist policing Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) functions in the investigation of major inspection of the Royal and serious crimes, including Special Investigation Branch (RMP SIB) as investigations conducted on operations part of an ongoing process to inspect the (overseas), and to identify any areas for Service Police,1 Ministry of Defence (MoD) improvement in the context of current Director of Business Resilience (DBR) good practice; Robert Rooks commissioned the ■ to identify any other transferable good inspection of the Royal Air Force Police practice emerging from the inspection; (RAFP) Special Investigations Branch (SIB). ■ to alert the Service Provost Marshals to 1.2 The commission was accepted on the issues that may affect the conduct of a understanding that the inspection would live investigation; and

not review individual operations or cases, ■ to deliver a draft report to the PM(RAF) but would focus on an assessment of for his consideration on behalf of the processes and procedures for major and Minister for the Armed Forces, and to serious crime investigations. DBR, in order to deliver a final report for the PM(RAF). 1.3 HMIC is honoured to conduct this inspection and trust it will confirm how HMIC supports the MoD in the wider Methodology context of service policing. 1.5 The inspection was conducted in three distinct phases: Terms of reference ■ analysis of written documents supplied; 1.4 The terms of reference were agreed with the Office of the DBR and the Office ■ interviews with RAF officers and of the Provost Marshal (Royal Air Force) personnel; and (PM(RAF)): ■ interviews with those who engage with or have an impact on the SIB in the course of investigations.

4 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch Chapter 1: Introduction

1.6 These phases were conducted by the Acknowledgements inspection team, which included current 1.11 HMIC would like to express its sincere practitioners who are experts in their appreciation for the assistance provided relevant disciplines and in the best by the Office of the Provost Marshal. The practices applicable. personnel of the Specialist Police (SPW), within which the SIB sits, displayed 1.7 The SIB gave HMIC a very helpful a high level of appreciation of their public selection of documents prior to the service role, which they fulfil in a inspection that were supplemented by professional and highly trained manner; additional documents as the inspection everyone was open to the full potential progressed. of the inspection process. This report is intended to contribute to developments 1.8 The SIB interview phase was that will enable them to make an even conducted in March 2009 by a team of greater contribution to the RAF and the officers with specialist knowledge.2 communities they protect. 1.9 HMIC recognises that interviews can be disruptive and is grateful to all concerned for finding the time to see the inspection officers.

1.10 This inspection follows the RMP SIB inspection of 2006. The methodology of report writing mirrors that used for the Home Office Police Forces (HOPFs) inspections of 2008 for major crime.

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 5 CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2.1 This is an inspection of the RAFP SIB Headquarters RAF Police capability and capacity to investigate 2.4 The PM(RAF) is responsible to the Chief major and serious crime and to be of the Air Staff and the proactive in intelligence gathering to through the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff prevent such criminality. It looks at for the delivery of effective policing to relevant areas of business that impact on enable the RAF’s operational capability. this function, but it is not a full inspection of the RAFP. 2.5 To deliver policing effectively, the RAFP has three wings: the Specialist Police Wing 2.2 The inspection recognises that the (SPW), upon which the inspection focused; RAFP is not an HOPF and therefore is not the Police Wing; and the Tactical Police subject to statutory inspection by HMIC. Wing. The SPW includes the SIB, the Inspection criteria in the areas of major Counter-Intelligence (CI) and the and serious crime and intelligence are not Security Services Squadron. The SIB universally applicable to this inspection. conducts investigations into criminal and HMIC understands that the RAFP SIB is security offences committed by British responsible for policing RAF uniformed service personnel or other persons subject and service personnel in the UK and to the Service Discipline Acts. The CI overseas, and its estate and critical Squadron provides intelligence for both infrastructure. It faces real threats to the security and crime investigations. physical security of sensitive and high- value assets and of criminality or critical 2.6 The Military Criminal Justice System incidents that may harm the good addresses criminal offending through reputation of the RAF. This inspection the court martial system, which complies recognises that these policing services with the European Convention on will benefit from regular inspection by a Human Rights. competent authority. 2.7 The headquarters (HQ) of the RAFP 2.3 The request for this inspection arose is at RAF Henlow, Bedfordshire, and from an MoD review of service policing. intelligence and investigative functions A voluntary request for this level of operate from there. The RAFP also scrutiny by an external body is rare. contributes, with the Army and Royal Navy, to the Service Police Crime Bureau, which is located separately, as is the Defence Police College, which provides investigative training.

6 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch Chapter 2: Background and context

2.8 The experience and expertise of 2.11 Investigating crime overseas, HOPFs is available to the RAFP SIB particularly in operational environments, through direct liaison with individual presents challenges rarely experienced forces and through its links with the NPIA by HOPFs: and the ACPO Homicide Working Group. ■ SIB investigators deploy alongside 2.9 The SIB operates from bases in the UK fighting forces in locations where and has personnel in Germany. The SIB levels of hostility place them under also contributes personnel to joint units deadly threat. in Cyprus, Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands ■ The maintenance of crime scene and Diego Garcia. Numbers of RAFP security requires a major logistical personnel and civilian staff are set in exercise if examiners are to achieve consultation between the PM(RAF) and even a limited search opportunity. HQ Air Command within the Some scenes are not accessible for Government’s authorised establishment days, with consequential loss or for the RAF and in accordance with degradation of evidence. budget allocation. ■ The cultural aspects of caring for the dead place an obligation on the SIB to Operational environments understand issues of language, faith 2.10 The SIB investigates all crimes up and custom. to a certain level committed within its ■ The political implications of action jurisdiction on UK bases. For the most have to be taken into account in areas serious of crimes, such as rape or of conflict. homicide, in the UK the responsibility to investigate rests with the host HOPF. ■ SIB actions are open to interpretation The SIB provides two levels of overseas by the media both locally and in deployment. The first supports the UK. operational theatre deployments in Iraq ■ In addition to the specific rules of and , led by the RMP SIB. The engagement set for a particular second level applies where the RAF is theatre, service personnel are subject either the largest UK military force at the to the laws of England and Wales, location (Oman, Bahrain and Qatar) or wherever they are serving, by virtue of where it is agreed that the RAFP SIB the Air Force Act 1955. should lead and run a serious and/or complex investigation, for example 2.12 Operating conditions in Iraq have where RAF personnel are involved as previously been seen first hand by suspects or victims. They are deployed members of the inspection team. on a case-by-case basis and cases include major crimes such as rape and investigations of fatalities.

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 7 CHAPTER 3: LEADERSHIP �

3.1 The SPW is led by an 3.4 There is a culture of command Commanding of rank resilience in the RAFP SIB, provided by who reports to the PM(RAF). The SPW is cover from flexible and adaptable supported by a second-in-command and officers, both commissioned and non- by three specialist squadrons, each under commissioned, and other personnel the command of a squadron leader. The within the organisation. SIB is one of these specialist squadrons and consists of 114 RAFP personnel, 3 RAF 3.5 The SIB’s mission, vision and values photographers and 14 civilian support are published by the RAFP command staff based at 10 locations in the UK team in written and electronic format and Germany. under administrative procedures and are reinforced through verbal instruction Strengths and example. An RAFP intranet site is available along with CD-ROMs for 3.2 The inspection team found a rank- overseas outstations. oriented, structured organisation, as is necessary for military order. The 3.6 Standing core priorities of , executive leadership team is terrorism, extremism and crime have been approachable by the staff. set in response to the continuing nature of threats facing the RAF. 3.3 The restructuring of the RAFP and the SIB, in particular under Project Darwin and Project Beagle, is seen as a sound choice Work in progress for the realignment and streamlining of the 3.7 It is planned that the RAFP SIB will force and should enable it to deliver more mirror the police district boundaries of effectively and be better at adapting to the General Police Duties squadrons in demand. In 2008, Project Darwin 2 the Police Wing to reduce the SPW reorganised the former fragmented presence in Germany, following the structure under the command of station drawdown of SIB D in 2011/12. commanders into three wings under the The SIB is also redistributing a layer of single command of the PM(RAF). There command at flight lieutenant rank from was some feeling that a period of stability HQ to three of the four SIB flights in was now required to embed these order to provide support for each changes and reap their benefits. investigative team and to improve the quality of supervision.

8 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch Chapter 3: Leadership

3.8 Project Darwin 2 is currently at the representation by a specialist police ‘test and adjust’ phase, to assess whether officer of air commodore rank. This is the current structure can meet demand not a reflection on any individual, but an levels. HMIC looks forward to the observation based on the breadth and outcome of this Darwin 2 review phase. depth of the RAFP’s responsibilities, particularly in light of the statutory 3.9 The inspection team found that the requirement for investigations arising management team had now to manage from the Armed Forces Act and the the impacts of overseas deployment, interpretation across the forces of post- previously the remit of Air Command. to-rank comparisons. This has led to a Staff goodwill enabled inevitable gaps drop in interest in roles in ACPO positions caused by overseas deployment to be such as air support, where RAF experience filled, but their transfer to the PM(RAF) would be of undoubted benefit. presents a real shift in choice of personnel for operational benefit. 3.12 Arising from the RMP SIB inspection, the link between the RMP and the ACPO Areas for improvement Homicide Working Group is a good example of what might be possible, 3.10 All personnel may suggest though the benefits are yet to be fully improvements by upward briefing. exploited by the RAFP and RMP. HMIC However, lower ranks displayed some considers that benefits are deliverable for reticence in ‘challenging’ senior officers, the RAF, particularly in relation to ACPO’s no matter how respectfully this might air support and organised crime portfolios. be achieved. This experience should not be underestimated, and further encouragement in this regard will Recommendation 1: yield dividends. Regular and close liaison between the RAFP and ACPO’s Air Support 3.11 The RAFP is led by a group captain, Working Group and Organised and the suggestion was made that the Crime Programme Board is needed. organisation would benefit from

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 9 CHAPTER 4: MANAGING � INTELLIGENCE �

4.1 Police forces use the National 4.4 There was some evidence of Intelligence Model (NIM) to identify emerging threats3 that currently sit threats to the communities they police outside the Control Strategy. Appropriate and to assign their resources to maximum consideration is given to these, with effect. This section of the report includes indications of new intelligence both the intelligence function itself and requirements being set. While such some of the individual teams in this threats outside the control of the RAFP sensitive area. are identified, it is not clear whether action is taken to offset these by Strengths requesting support from other agencies and forces. 4.2 The SPW has embraced the NIM, with assistance from the NPIA and Kent Police. 4.5 The intelligence function, the Force Its implementation is in progress. Intelligence Bureau (FIB) and covert assets such as the Covert Operations Team 4.3 The inspection team found a (COT) are generally well resourced and functional Strategic Assessment (SA) and highly trained. These units come under Control Strategy with clear priorities in the CI Squadron and are responsible for place. These were well informed and conducting intelligence operations in considerable effort had been made to alignment with the core priorities of elicit information from a wide range of espionage, terrorism, extremism and sources. A great deal of effort had gone crime. In particular, the Dedicated Source into writing the SA and it goes a long way Unit and its wider team are beginning to towards informing decision makers and deliver, following a period of staff operational personnel about the most turbulence, and will be ideally suited to significant threats faced by the RAF. It respond to intelligence requests. The alludes to a lack of specific RAF-related COT has assisted others such as the data in respect of a number of threats, MoD Police. but draws proper inferences from the information available. HMIC looks forward 4.6 The nature of the CI commitment has to reading the reviewed document and created a highly secure environment, the associated Control Strategy and operating up to and including top-secret Force Intelligence Requirement in clearance, that is more than fit for purpose. September 2009.

10 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch Chapter 4: Managing intelligence

Work in progress relevant timescales and definitions of success. Without these changes, the 4.7 The CI Squadron is developing the SA RAFP may not develop as fast as it for the RAFP and must bear in mind the should. The RAFP needs to be satisfied following points: that the SA has identified the appropriate Control Strategy priorities ■ The SA is not a performance review, to manage the risks of identified threats. but performance should be reviewed by evaluating progress against 4.8 The discipline of the NIM, as adapted previously set Control Strategy for the RAFP, is being rolled out to all priorities. A review of force assets and members of the RAFP. This will improve organisational threats, such as forensic understanding and intelligence flows to capability and systems deficiencies, the benefit of decision makers. that affect the ability to deliver the Control Strategy is essential. Including this review within the SA will allow Areas for improvement decision makers to assess RAFP 4.9 The FIB and its Intelligence Analytical capability and capacity against Cell are not co-located and do not use priorities and to recommend changes fully compatible software, resulting in in provision or priorities. Some some disconnect and reduced capability. recommendations will align with The related assets of the COT and prevention, intelligence and Dedicated Source Unit require sensitive enforcement activities; and the input co-location within HQ as their work is of subject experts, such as intelligence often aligned. While they remain analysts, crime prevention leads and separate, they must have access to the investigators, will help make FIB and the intelligence requirements recommendations more complete. they seek to fulfil.

■ The SA should detail specific intelligence that links threats to RAPF 4.10 The inspection team found limited activities and reveal the likelihood or engagement of the FIB and the covert probability of each threat occurring, assets in relation to some criminality, along with the impact of such an and only a limited understanding of event. This will help to define gaps the intelligence requirements. in resources and to refine priorities There should be closer liaison between within the Control Strategy in an criminal investigators and the FIB’s auditable fashion. intelligence experts.

■ The Control Strategy should have SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timed) objectives and a separate delivery plan that indicates who is responsible,

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 11 4.11 The inspection team believes that the RAFP is facing a real threat from serious Recommendation 2: organised criminality at a level not The Office of the PM(RAF) should previously understood. Acceptance of continue to implement the NIM this fact should prompt the deployment with sufficient resources to deliver of the best RAFP investigators to combat future SAs, Control Strategies and the threat. The size and complexity of Force Intelligence Requirements. such investigations may require diversion Where threats with potential for of investigation and intelligence staff significant harm are identified early, from other duties to take a more appropriate resources should be proactive role against organised criminals. swiftly and proactively tasked and co-ordinated. The NPIA has agreed to advise the Office of the PM(RAF) on the NIM.

12 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch CHAPTER 5: CRIME � INVESTIGATIONS �

5.1 Responsibility for the investigation of range of predominantly lower-level higher-level crime and for other specialist crimes, although some have investigated investigations rests with the RAFP SIB, major crimes such as murder and rape which operates from HQ and from flights abroad. With this limited exposure, it is stationed at nine bases in the UK and one not possible to make a comparison at Rheindahlen in Germany. The UK and between the RAFP and HOPFs in respect Germany are treated as one operational of major and serious crimes. area. The SIB provides a worldwide call- out facility for investigations that require 5.4 The SIB operates a call-out system RAF expertise. Major crimes such as providing 24-hour cover, 365 days of the murder and rape committed in the UK are year. The goodwill and personal investigated by the HOPF with jurisdiction commitment of SIB members adds a for that location. HMIC has applied the further valuable layer of support. same standards to this inspection as would be used elsewhere. 5.5 There are five fully trained Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs), and those 5.2 During 2008 there were 1,594 interviewed were competent and capable investigations undertaken by the RAFP, of investigating at Level 3. They are of which 184 were conducted by the trained to HOPF standards but are yet to RAFP SIB; 53 of these were categorised as be accredited. The RAFP SIB has displayed Level 34 crime. During 2007 the RAFP SIB a high degree of confidence in the conducted 117 investigations, and 56 cases abilities of SIOs deployed abroad to resulted in court martial proceedings. locations where the RAF is the lead Of these, 43 cases produced a guilty plea, military service. At such times, SIOs have a further 5 cases were convicted and equipped themselves well, using a 8 cases were acquitted: 86% of all the number of the key strategies and impact cases referred to a court martial resulted assessment techniques that an HOPF SIO in a conviction. would adopt. SIOs participate in the Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire SIO Strengths Development Programme. 5.3 The inspection team found a well 5.6 RAFP SIB investigators are deployed in motivated and highly trained team with a theatre alongside the RMP SIB on good basic skill set and experience of a extremely difficult and challenging

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 13 enquiries, including those relating to fatal Areas for improvement incidents. In these deployments, the RAFP 5.11 The greatest risk to investigations SIB investigators have been found to be appears to be the RAFP SIB’s ability to competent Level 3 investigators capable cope with a quickly escalating or of working without supervision, under prolonged major crime investigation pressure and in adverse conditions. abroad. Limited experience of such cases means that the SIB can find it difficult to 5.7 The quality of files and investigations estimate the length and complexity of is reported to be at a high standard by the this kind of investigation. Shadowing RAFP Legal Adviser. The RAFP also has SIOs in a busy HOPF would provide access to a former SIO with considerable some of this experience. Staff and experience in an HOPF as an independent equipment contingencies made available case reviewer. Learning from these to the SIO on such deployments would reviews is ongoing. help mitigate the risk while providing extra capacity during the early stages of Work in progress any investigation. 5.8 As reported above, the RAFP SIB plans to realign flights following the 5.12 Members of the RAFP are not drawdown from Germany, taking the deployed in theatre as SIOs, as this role opportunity to confirm demand and is undertaken by the RMP SIB. As a allocate resources proportionately. result, necessary levels of experience in supporting operations abroad are not 5.9 The Professional Standards being acquired. As well as shadowing, Department or PSD (which is not part of creating Deputy SIO roles could the SIB) has developed a self-assessment provide opportunities to develop the tool to review serious crime necessary skills. investigations. This will be rolled out to SIB flights, its effectiveness monitored 5.13 The RAFP currently uses a Microsoft and feedback provided. Excel-based incident room management system known as SANDMAN (Statements, 5.10 The RAFP and its SIB are clearly Actions, Nominals and Documents ideally placed to support HOPFs in Management) for complex cases, not investigations that have flying and/or RAF the HOPF-favoured HOLMES 2 (Home elements. The SIB is encouraged to Office Large Major Enquiry System 2) continue to offer this expertise as it has database. SANDMAN is yet to be tested no equal in this area. Offers of help and deployed, and the inspection team should be made via the ACPO air support questioned the necessity and portfolio lead and should seek to tailor functionality of this system, given the assistance extended to meet the specific potential need to transfer any database needs of the SIO. to another incident room. HMIC noted that the RMP has invested in mini HOLMES systems that utilise laptops for flexible deployment.

14 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch Chapter 5: Crime investigations

5.14 The inspection team believes that there is a real opportunity to develop a Recommendation 4: proactive capability by widening the The RAFP should explore the investigative focus to defeat geographical potential of the latest HOLMES or themed threats. This opportunity developments for its own needs, � could, when time is available, test in liaison with the NPIA National investigative skills against obvious risks Co-ordinator. If adopted, all SIB such as theft. Investigators currently carry investigators should be trained to an average of three cases at any one time, access the system and a much and HMIC believes that this provides smaller number of individuals scope for a heavier workload. Such should be trained to input. � proactivity would raise visibility of the SIB’s investigative capabilities and also increase subject-matter expertise when investigating RAF systems. This topic has Recommendation 5: been tasked to the Officer Commanding The Office of the PM(RAF) should SIB, but options are yet to be developed. consider the proactive deployment of SIB investigators – and appropriate support – to determine Recommendation 3: the reality of some threats at an The Office of the PM(RAF) should early stage and as a means of test its response to short-term developing skills. deployments to critical incidents in terms of management, records, handover and the ability to provide resilience if the incident is prolonged.

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 15 CHAPTER 6: FORENSIC � SERVICES �

6.1 The RAFP has a forensic unit based at Work in progress RAF Henlow that reports to the SIB 6.5 The inspection team found the command. The inspection team assessed forensic team in the process of the service provided against the standards reorganisation, with the establishment of expected of a small HOPF. a Forensic Warrant Officer, a Scientific Support Manager, a Forensic Laboratory Strengths Manager and a dedicated team of five 6.2 The RAFP has good forensic facilities, Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs), brought including separate crime scene training together with three RAF photographers scenario rooms, situated in a secure who are already in post. This should single-purpose building considered produce benefits for the RAFP, including a suitable for the level of demand currently more professional CSE provision, force- experienced. The equipment levels are on wide continuation training and greater a par with those in an HOPF in terms of laboratory technician cover. The dedicated crime scene investigation requirement for CSEs to be SIB trained vehicles and a fully functional chemical and rank specifications have been treatment laboratory. A digital removed to ensure that the CSE posts photography laboratory provides timely are open to all non-commissioned photographic services. members of the RAFP, subject to competitive selection. 6.3 Forensic services are provided by committed staff dedicated to the role, 6.6 CSEs in the RAFP are not currently including hi-tech crime examiners trained accredited. The RAFP is monitoring the to ACPO standards in computer forensics. national accreditation arena, currently in a state of flux, and expects to follow new 6.4 The Forensic Support Team has guidelines as they are published. developed a good working relationship with Bedfordshire Police, with which the 6.7 Work is continuing to agree an SLA RAFP has a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with HOPFs to provide CSE capabilities for fingerprint submissions. at units, such as RAF Valley in North Wales and RAF St Mawgan in Cornwall, where there are limited numbers of RAF personnel, the crime levels are low and the travelling time from RAF Henlow would be prohibitive.

16 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch Chapter 6: Forensic services

Areas for improvement adding value to the operations it supports. HOPFs frequently review their 6.8 The RAFP does not appreciate the services to ensure that best value is true nature of forensic demand internally offered. The RAPF should review its and externally, nor the scene attendance forensic services once the new structure policy and submission standards it wishes is embedded, but should not delay this to apply, or how and when to deliver the beyond 12 months. best possible contribution to the intelligence or investigation effort. The RAPF needs to better understand the Recommendation 6: outputs and outcomes of its service The Office of the PM(RAF) should delivery. consider the potential for an internal review of forensic services 6.9 In the absence of the above data, in order to maximise the benefits to HMIC is not convinced that the forensic be gained. provision is gainfully employed and

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 17 CHAPTER 7: CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSES

Strengths Areas for improvement 7.1 The RAF has placed a Legal Adviser 7.3 The requirement for investigators to within the HQ RAFP. This officer produce a file of evidence that covers provides timely professional advice to every eventuality has been the subject of investigators, in a similar way to the comment; however, there is opportunity station-based Crown Prosecution to reduce unnecessary work and create Service representatives found within investigative freedom in future cases. HOPFs, and also advises the PM(RAF) on The Regional Legal Service has played a service issues. critical role in this regard, as identified in a recent case review, and it is planned 7.2 The role creates a strong link between that such early engagement will be the RAFP and the Service Prosecuting adopted by the new Service Authority, which allows for swift tasking Prosecutions Authority. and learning pre- and post-trial. The knowledge of the post holder aids the work of the investigators by introducing a new layer of quality control in relation to documentation and files submitted.

18 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch CHAPTER 8: HUMAN RESOURCES

Strengths and redeployments and at end of service present difficulties, particularly when 8.1 The inspection team was impressed by investigations are mid-term, and the the positive attitude of the vast majority ability to post in would benefit from of the personnel. The nature of their roles analysis to identify options. Management and the culture of this organisation allow is progressing work for CSE arrangements, for real flexibility of working at short has reduced seniority requirements notice. for the FIB, has reduced the rank requirements for computer forensics, and 8.2 The adaptability and goodwill of the is allowing acting to join the staff is instrumental in the organisation RAFP SIB. fulfilling its role when personnel are deployed on operations. At times, their 8.5 In respect of civilian posts, HMIC goodwill masks the true nature and would like to see a more creative extent of absent staff and allows the approach to the retention and organisation to function, albeit not at development of staff. Measures such full strength. as job evaluation and pay comparison uplifts could be employed, as seen in the 8.3 There is recognition and recent enhancement of the civilian understanding in the leadership team of analysts grade. the importance of the welfare of all personnel and their families. The planning and thought processes followed when Areas for improvement posting and deploying personnel were 8.6 HMIC is surprised that formal exit impressive. interviews are not the norm for civilian staff who choose to leave. Consequently, Work in progress there is little understanding of the experiences of staff and, in some cases, 8.4 HMIC sees an opportunity to improve of their genuine reasons for departure. the process of succession planning and This represents a lost opportunity to job rotation in some areas. The team understand how better to retain key recognises that some departments have staff in critical areas. The same formal, already accepted this, and that work is in mandatory exit interviews given to progress to identify key and critical posts Service personnel should also be given and to strengthen mechanisms to keep to civilian staff. these staff. Gaps created by promotion

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 19 Recommendation 7: Recommendation 8: Mission-critical posts, for example Formal exit interviews should be put crime analysts, should be identified in place for all staff who leave. to ensure appropriate recruitment and retention of such posts.

20 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch CHAPTER 9: TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Strengths and Level 2 investigations. Level 3 high- level investigation would prove difficult 9.1 There is a good level of investment in to substantiate for SIB investigators staff training for investigation and because of the low level of crime intelligence. The Training Needs Analysis investigated by them in the UK. is reviewed for these areas, and courses are allocated to individuals as required, 9.5 The RAFP has recognised a need for to enhance their skills base. crime prevention capability in every police station, and 22 non-commissioned 9.2 All personnel interviewed were officers will attend training courses in clearly highly motivated and 2009, with further courses allocated for acknowledged a responsibility to develop 2010. The benefit of this training will be of themselves in order to perform at the great interest to HMIC in the future. highest levels in their role. There is an awareness of the need to develop investigators beyond the basic level and Areas for improvement to equip staff, particularly for operational 9.6 In HMIC’s opinion, the SIOs in the SIB deployment overseas. show the skills required of Level 3 investigators when dealing with cases 9.3 Learning from reviews is triggered by overseas, which are often serious, a request from one of four sources: the complex and sensitive. HMIC believes RAFP chain of command; legal staff, in that a formal approach by the PM(RAF) respect of a specific investigation or due should be made to Skills for Justice, to an emerging trend; as a result of requesting that the work of Level 3 adverse comment during a trial; or from investigators be formalised and accredited an external source. to a national standard. This would recognise the unique skill and level of Work in progress expertise in these investigations, while also providing a standard to work to and 9.4 The inspection team noted that the maintain that is more appropriate to the introduction of a ‘Professionalising the role and work. Investigative Process’ (PIP) model based on the Cumbria Constabulary experience 9.7 While the inspection team did note is being considered. This would give some excellent models, including the accreditation to investigators at different PSD’s technical evaluation and self- levels and access to a national standard assessment systems and the independent of investigative knowledge. HMIC’s case reviewer, the ability to capture and opinion is that this is achievable at Level 1 develop the lessons learned during an

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 21 investigation or following the legal This is of particular note in some units in process through the formal structure was the SPW, where some individuals will not universally applied. Evidence suggests probably never be deployed under the that informal learning from issues that present structure and ethos, and where arise can be presented in many forms, equipment has been purchased but no including verbal advice to an individual one has been trained to use it. Better use or a group ‘cascading’ email. Without a of the NIM process would match these formal review, individual ownership areas together in a more robust and (with timescales and an evidenced meaningful way, and the use and outcome to validate the learning) was deployment of units and individuals not forthcoming. HMIC believes that would improve, particularly in proactive formalising debriefing and operational investigations as discussed above. reviews, including using the PSD’s self- assessment tool, will improve processes and investigative choices. Recommendation 9: The formal learning process in place 9.8 HMIC is concerned that in some units within the PSD should be engaged there are a number of individuals who across other parts of the SPW to have been trained to a very high standard enhance learning and the adoption by attending numerous courses but are of best practice in an auditable not then exposed to operational manner that preserves corporate deployments where they can use the memory. skills they have acquired or the equipment they have been trained on.

22 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch CHAPTER 10: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY

10.1 HMIC conducted an equality and Policy. This is monitored on behalf of diversity (E&D) impact assessment, as the PM(RAF) by the E&D Adviser (EDA), required by the Race Relations Amendment who reports by exception at monthly Act 2000, to assess compliance with PM(RAF) briefings. duties and responsibilities. Strengths 10.2 The assessment identified a “potential for the operations of the RAFP 10.7 The RAF E&D policy maintains that SIB to have a differential and/or adverse all personnel should be treated fairly impact to staff members and irrespective of race, ethnic origin, religion consequently on the perception of and and religious belief, gender, sexual quality and nature of service delivery of orientation or social background. The their investigations”. RAFP has access to an EDA to ensure that policies and activities comply with 10.3 HMIC determined to use the obligations. Where the policy is created inspection to promote E&D as and when centrally by the MoD or HQ Air the review process provided opportunities. Command, such a policy is also impact assessed centrally. 10.4 The RAF has a government-set target to achieve a representation from ethnic 10.8 When SIB individuals are deployed minority communities of 3.6% by the end on tours to theatre, they are given pre- of 2009 and of 8% by 2013. Currently, the deployment training and briefings that RAF has achieved 2.5%; however, within make them aware of specific issues they the SPW workforce, 99% are described may face. as white. Work in progress 10.5 Female representation is 10.9 The inspection team found that all approximately 2.5% lower within the SPW, RAFP personnel were provided with E&D at 11.36%, than in the wider RAF population training to ensure communication and and the small number of personnel implementation of diversity strategies, involved means that any improvement policies and objectives. Following would have a major impact. The RAF does completion of the initial training, and not recruit against gender targets. from October 2010, all RAF personnel will take part in refresher E&D discussions 10.6 The RAFP has an E&D action plan for on various E&D issues. This will be 2008–10, which is owned by the Air facilitated by EDAs and is mandated to Member for Personnel and managed by be completed every three years. the Assistant Chief of Staff Personnel

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 23 10.10 The inspection team found that 10.14 As RAFP increases its investigations, E&D issues were the subject of a review it will need to consider its ability to to identify trends. This will require organise to meet equality needs such as monitoring by the EDA. gold groups, family liaison officers and case-specific diversity training. Areas for improvement 10.15 Any impact identified within an 10.11 Currently, only policies created at a assessment requires the development of level above the PM(RAF) are subject to a transparent action plan in response. mandatory equality impact assessment. Actions must have a designated lead, In HMIC’s opinion, this creates a serious timescales and clear objectives. vulnerability to discrimination in the actions and conduct of personnel if impacts are not considered for all policies. Recommendation 10: It is strongly recommended that the 10.12 While the RAF is improving the EDA be invited to: representation of black and minority ■ review the current E&D strategy ethnic communities within the to ensure its integration into all organisation, the RAFP is yet to reap the RAFP activities; and benefits. A policy on positive action to monitor and improve equality of ■ advise on impact assessments of numbers and diversity of the workforce policies and strategies within is required. The development of the NIM RAFP, and SPW in particular, should highlight vulnerable communities where service delivery may have and may suggest more targeted and a significant impact on the perhaps direct recruiting. investigation’s outcome, on organisational reputation and 10.13 The SIB and RAFP do not have on public confidence. access to an Independent Advisory Group with which they can consult and test opinion. HOPFs have such groups and the RAFP may be able to utilise one of these, gaining from others’ experiences. The benefits of gaining the insights of the public – outside RAF bases and in personnel families – are to be tested, but experience has shown HMIC that the opportunity may well increase understanding and support.

24 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch CHAPTER 11: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Strengths many cases simply quantitative or

11.1 The inspection team found that relating to timescales. The 100-day investigator caseloads are reviewed at 28, review is not formalised by minute taking 60 and 100 days. These intervals focus the or by following up actions assigned investigator on compiling cases within set to individuals. timescales and produce consistent and timely investigations. 11.3 The inspection team could not find a process for quality checks against standards in the field of forensic Areas for improvement submissions, so it was difficult to assess 11.2 Where performance measures were the quality of work and how it in place, they were of a basic nature, in contributed to a successful outcome.

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 25 CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION �

12.1 The PM(RAF) and his executive team the RAFP and its SIB to become more identified issues of command resilience proactive with their criminal intelligence and communication within the structure of function – for example by valuing the RAFP. Through analysis and a succession surveillance resources – and to focus SIB of projects, the wings and flights have been resources on high-level proactive realigned, and now 75% of police personnel investigations rather than on low-level come under the direct command of the reactive investigations. To do this, the FIB PM(RAF). HMIC commends the leadership needs to be merged closer with the and direction given during these changes Intelligence Analytical Cell and re-energised and is confident that the recommendations to drive the process forward. The NIM made in this report will enhance and help structure needs to be able to identify build on the solid base that has been put emerging threats and to align resources at in place. an early stage, to prevent future serious criminality and critical incidents occurring. 12.2 As a result of the operating remit of It must be recognised that the new and the SIB in the UK, HMIC found the reactive developing understanding of threats and investigative remit and the commensurate risks brings with it a requirement for a level of investigation to be generally at the response that prevents and disrupts. lower levels of criminality and complexity. Investigations at these levels were 12.4 The introduction of a suite of thorough and competent. The SIB delivers performance measures, operated tactically competent high-level investigation and monitored strategically, would, in overseas in more serious and complex HMIC’s opinion, improve the ability of the enquiries on a case-by-case basis. In RAFP to understand the true nature of its conclusion, the RAFP SPW has the capabilities and capacity and its impact on necessary procedures, experience and skills the reputation of the RAF. required to investigate crimes at Levels 1 and 2. Some investigators are operating 12.5 The RAFP is a legitimate law well at Level 3. enforcement agency and should therefore be subject to regular inspection by a 12.3 The unique security aspects of competent authority if it is to continue to policing and the CI function drive the focus improve. The fact that the RAFP and the of the RAFP, the SPW and the SIB. HMIC MoD have made a voluntary request for understands these requirements but urges such an inspection is to be commended.

26 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch RECOMMENDATIONS �

Recommendation 1: Regular and close reality of some threats at an early stage liaison between the RAFP and ACPO’s Air and as a means of developing skills. Support Working Group and Organised Crime Programme Board is needed. Recommendation 6: The Office of the PM(RAF) should consider the potential Recommendation 2: The Office of the for an internal review of forensic services PM(RAF) should continue to implement in order to maximise the benefits to the NIM with sufficient resources to be gained. deliver future SAs, Control Strategies and Force Intelligence Requirements. Where Recommendation 7: Mission-critical threats with potential for significant harm posts, for example crime analysts, should are identified early, appropriate resources be identified to ensure appropriate should be swiftly and proactively tasked recruitment and retention of such posts. and co-ordinated. The NPIA has agreed to advise the Office of the PM(RAF) on Recommendation 8: Formal exit the NIM. interviews should be put in place for all staff who leave. Recommendation 3: The Office of the PM(RAF) should test its response to short- Recommendation 9: The formal learning term deployments to critical incidents in process in place within the PSD should be terms of management, records, handover engaged across other parts of the SPW to and the ability to provide resilience if the enhance learning and the adoption of incident is prolonged. best practice in an auditable manner that preserves corporate memory. Recommendation 4: The RAFP should explore the potential of the latest Recommendation 10: It is strongly HOLMES developments for its own recommended that the EDA be invited to: needs, in liaison with the NPIA National ■ review the current E&D strategy to Co-ordinator. If adopted, all SIB ensure its integration into all RAFP investigators should be trained to access activities; and the system and a much smaller number of individuals should be trained to input. ■ advise on impact assessments of policies and strategies within RAFP, and Recommendation 5: The Office of the SPW in particular, where service PM(RAF) should consider the proactive delivery may have a significant impact deployment of SIB investigators – and on the investigation’s outcome, on appropriate support – to determine the organisational reputation and on public confidence.

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 27 LIST OF ACRONYMS �

ACPO Association of Chief Police MoD Ministry of Defence Officers NIM National Intelligence Model CI Counter-intelligence NPIA National Policing Improvement COT Covert Operations Team Agency CSE Crime Scene Examiner PM(RAF) Provost Marshal DBR Director of Business Resilience (Royal Air Force) E&D Equality and diversity PSD Professional Standards EDA Equality and Diversity Adviser Department FIB Force Intelligence Bureau RAFP Royal Air Force Police HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate RMP of Constabulary SA Strategic Assessment HOLMES Home Office Large Major SIB Special Investigations Branch Enquiry System SIO Senior Investigating Officer HOPF Home Office Police Force SLA Service Level Agreement HQ Headquarters SPW Specialist Police Wing

28 HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch ENDNOTES �

1 The Service Police are defined as the Forensics Subject Matter Expert; Mr Bob , Royal Military Police Youldon, NPIA Implementation Manager, and Royal Air Force Police (Armed Forces supported by Mr Everett Henry, NPIA Act 2006, Section 375). Individually they Head of Equality, Diversity and Human provide the policing, investigative and Resources; as well as Mr Huw Jones QPM. protective services unique to the needs of their Service. 3 ‘Threat’ for the purpose of this report describes the scope and intensity of the 2 The team included: Detective Chief demands that a force’s intelligence leads it Inspector Jeff Longrigg, National Policing to believe it faces. Improvement Agency (NPIA) Professional Practice Developer; Dr Peter Stelfox, Head 4 Level 3 investigations deal with serious of Investigative Practice, NPIA, and a offences or incidents reported to or member of the Association of Chief detected by the RAFP that, by nature of Police Officers (ACPO) Homicide Working their gravity or surrounding circumstances, Group; Detective Superintendent Jane demand investigation by experienced Tilzey, a member of the ACPO National SPW or RAFP SIB investigators. Case Co-ordinator’s Office for Organised management and oversight is provided by Crime; Mr Andy Williamson, NPIA a trained SIO.

HMIC Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police Special Investigations Branch 29 This report is available in alternative languages and formats on request. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Ashley House 2 Monck Street London SW1P 2BQ

This report is also available from the HMIC website: http://inspectorates.justice.gov.uk/hmic

Published in September 2009

Printed by the Central Office of Information

© Crown copyright 2009

ISBN: 978-1-84726-983-6

Ref: 298483