Strategic Reset Reclaiming Control of U.S. Security in the

June 2007 Strategic Reclaiming Control of U.S. Security in the Middle East Reset By Brian Katulis, Lawrence J. Korb, and Peter Juul

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

ith the war well into its fi fth year, the Bush adminis- tration still lacks a realistic plan for the Middle East and WIraq. The must reclaim control of its core interests by taking active steps to stabilize the entire Middle East and abandon the delusions at the heart of President Bush’s policies. Otherwise, U.S. security will continue to suffer by weakening the U.S. and draining resources away from de- stroying terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda.

The current Iraq strategy is exactly what Al Qaeda wants—the United States distracted and pinned down by Iraq’s internal confl icts and trapped in a quagmire that has become the perfect rallying cry and recruitment tool for Al Qaeda. The United States has no good options given the strategic and tactical mistakes made on Iraq since 2002, but simply staying the course with an indefi nite military pres- ence is not advancing U.S. interests.

Instead, the United States must reset its strategy by looking beyond the deteriorating situation in Iraq in order to counter the threat from global terrorist groups and ensure stability in the entire Middle East and Gulf region. To do this, we need to develop a new overall Middle East strategy, not just a series of tactics focused heavily on Iraq. Retired Marine Corps General John Sheehan succinctly identi- fi ed the main problem when turning down the Bush administration’s offer to serve as the White House “czar” for Iraq and :

1 “What I found in discussions with current and former sponsors of terrorist groups threatening members of this administration is that there is no democracies worldwide. More than four agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or years later it is clear that the opposite has in the region…the current Washington decision-making fact happened—terrorist attacks continue to process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region rise, tensions between countries in the region and how the parts fi t together strategically.”1 are growing, Middle East autocrats are more deeply entrenched in power, and the Arab- In 2003, the president and his top support- Israeli confl ict continues to rage. ers argued that the road to peace in the Middle East ran through and that By 2006, when Secretary of State Con- the would stabilize the Middle doleezza Rice described the confl ict be- East. By getting rid of Saddam Hussein, tween and the Lebanese terrorist the United States would set into motion a group as the “birth pangs of a democratic wave that would topple Middle new Middle East,” it was clear that a new East dictators and autocrats who were state Middle East was emerging: one less stable

Strategic Reset: Our New Plan

Accept the Reality of Iraq's Political Initiate Regional Security and Diplomatic Fragmentation Efforts to Contain Iraq’s Confl icts

n Immediately phase out the unconditional n Promote collective security efforts with ac- arming, equipping, and training of Iraq’s tive working groups on counterterrorism, security forces. refugees, and security confi dence-building measures. n Shift reconstruction, governance, and security assistance to provinces where practical and n Use the forthcoming review of the United possible. Nations mandate for Iraq to secure formal commitments from other countries to help Implement a Phased Military Redeploy- Iraq as the United States redeploys from Iraq. ment from Iraq within One Year Develop a Strategy to Resolve the Arab-Is- n Extract U.S. troops from Iraq’s civil wars raeli Confl ict and Stabilize the Middle East before the end of 2008. n Appoint a special Middle East envoy with n Make counterterrorism our country’s support from two senior ambassadors who No. 1 priority. would work on two key tracks—containing and managing Iraq’s multiple confl icts and n Redeploy U.S. troops to neighboring coun- resolving the Arab-Israeli confl ict. tries and temporarily station 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers in the Kurdish region of northern n Work with partners in the Middle East Iraq until 2009 to prevent a cross-border Quartet as well as regional organizations such confl ict involving our key ally , and as the Arab League to manage and resolve to protect the region from an expansion of confl icts in the region. intra-Iraqi violence

2 and less favorable to U.S. national security The United States cannot stabilize Iraq interests. What’s worse, President Bush without serious action by Iraq’s leaders. The has placed the well-being of U.S. troops “no end in sight” strategy fosters a culture of in the hands of Iraq’s squabbling national dependency among Iraqis by propping up leaders—essentially giving a divided Iraqi certain members of Iraq’s national govern- leadership a veto on when and where to use ment without fundamentally changing Iraq’s U.S. military forces. political dynamics. It does so at the cost of grinding down the strength of U.S. ground The fundamental premise of Bush’s surge forces, as the readiness of these forces strategy—that Iraq’s leaders will make key continues to decline. Our ground forces are decisions to advance their country’s political so overstretched that many of our soldiers transition and national reconciliation—is and Marines are being sent to Iraq without at best misguided and clearly unworkable. proper training and equipment, some mul- Neither U.S. troops in and around Baghdad tiple times; our National Guard has become nor diplomats in the Green Zone can force an operational rather than strategic reserve. Iraqi leaders to hold their country together. As Major General Richard Lynch, currently The consequences of President Bush’s stub- commanding the Third Infantry Division, bornness are dire. Many events that some noted last month, even if the security situa- fear would result if U.S. troops left Iraq are tion does improve, there will not be signifi - unfolding now just as the U.S. troop presence cant progress on the government side.2 is getting larger—vicious ethnic and sectar-

Key leaders of Iraq’s fragmented national leadership. Top row: Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini Al-Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr, Tariq al-Hashimi, and Massoud Barzani. Middle row: Nouri Al-Maliki, Abdul Aziz Hakim, Adnan Dulaimi, and Jalal Talibani.

The leaders of Iraq’s neighboring countries. Bottom row: Syrian President Bashar Assad, King Abdullah II, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahma- dinejad, and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. (AP)

3 ian confl ict, growing tensions on Iraq’s bor- n Develop a realistic strategy to resolve ders, increasing provocative actions by , the Arab-Israeli confl ict and stabilize the and the largest refugee crisis in the Middle broader Middle East East since 1948. Iraq currently suffers from four major internal confl icts and tensions: U.S. Policies Must Accept the Shi’a vs. Shi’a in the south; Sunni vs. Shi’a Reality of Iraq’s Fragmentation in the center and east; Sunni vs. Sunni in the west; and Arab-Kurd tensions in the north Iraq’s leaders are fundamentally at odds over (see map on page 6 for more details). what Iraq is, how power should be distrib- uted, and who should control the nation’s oil A recent National Intelligence Estimate on wealth. To advance its own national security Iraq noted that “the term ‘civil war’ does not interests, the United States needs to come to adequately describe these multiple, overlap- grips with this new reality of Iraq’s frag- ping confl icts in Iraq or adequately capture mentation and respond by diversifying our their complexity as they also include extensive military, diplomatic, and development pres- Shi’a, Al Qaeda, and Sunni insurgent attacks ence in and around Iraq. We need to build on U.S. forces, and widespread criminally-mo- on the efforts of the Bush administration to tivated violence.”4 The United States cannot put more emphasis on provincial and local settle Iraq’s many internal confl icts even with leadership rather than on working primarily its considerable conventional military power, with the national government. particularly since the use of this military power is employed in an overall approach to The United States should mitigate the the Middle East and the threat of global ter- increasingly violent fragmentation in Iraq rorist networks that is partial and incomplete. by ceasing the unconditional arming and training of Iraq’s national security forces Instead of passively waiting for Iraq’s national until a political consensus and sustainable leaders to make a series of political decisions political solution is reached. As the United that they have shown themselves fundamen- States redeploys its military forces, it should tally incapable of making amid multiple inter- immediately phase out its training of Iraq’s nal confl icts, the United States should adopt national security forces and place strict limits a more active stance to advance its interests on arming and equipping them. Spending throughout the Middle East. In short, the billions to arm Iraq’s security forces without United States needs to implement a strategic political consensus among Iraq’s leaders reset aimed at using U.S. power to protect our carries signifi cant risks—the largest of which core national interests. The four simultaneous is arming faction-ridden national Iraqi units steps our country must now take are: before a unifi ed national government exists that these armed forces will loyally sup- n Adopt policies to accept the reality of port. Training and equipping Iraqi security Iraq’s fragmentation forces risks making Iraq’s civil war even bloodier and more vicious than it already is n Implement a phased military redeploy- today. It also increases the dangers that these ment from Iraq in one year weapons will one day be turned against the United States and its allies in the region. n Initiate regional security and diplo- matic efforts to contain and resolve Iraq’s Furthermore, the United States should confl icts while reshaping the geopolitical discard its plan to build the world’s larg- balance in the region est embassy in Baghdad and instead make

4 plans to reassign diplomatic and intelligence States should reassign U.S. personnel to personnel throughout Iraq and neighbor- secure consulates around Iraq in order to ing countries with adequate protection. We assist in local efforts to address Iraq’s prob- should encourage Middle East leaders and lems more effectively. The localities of Iraq the United Nations to continue working with are where politics shape Iraq’s future, not Iraq’s national leaders to peacefully settle in the isolation of the Green Zone. Finally, their differences over power-sharing, but the to fulfi ll a key moral obligation to the Iraqi United States should not unilaterally continue people, the United States should increase to try to force an immediate resolution of the number of Iraqi refugees and internally Iraq’s political disputes. displaced persons it might accept annually from the current level of 7,000 to 100,000. Where security conditions permit and where it is practically possible, the United

Iraq’s Internal Conflicts and Border Tensions: Fragmentation and Conflict that is Worse than Civil War

TURKEY Iraq’s Northern Border with Turkey and Iran Turkey and Iran have conducted cross-border strikes aimed at IRAN disrupting activities of the Northern Iraq Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Free Life Party Ethnic violence and (PEJAK), Kurdish rebel groups that tensions are growing use northern Iraq as a base for between , , attacks inside of Turkey and Iran. and Turkmen groups as a referendum aimed at defining the status of the disputed northern city of and more clearly delineating the boundaries of the Baghdad autonomous Kurdis- tan Regional Govern- Western Iraq ment is planned for the end of 2007. Violence and attacks by Sunni Iraqis and foreign fighters linked to Al Qaeda affiliates continue against Iraqi security forces and govern- ment officials. Southern Iraq Intra-Sunni clashes SAUDI ARABIA have grown, with Intra-Shi’a disputes have broken out Iraqi tribal leaders into street violence involving armed targeting foreign militias of Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi fighters. Army, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Central Iraq Council’s Badr Organization, and the armed partisans of the anti-Iranian A Sunni – Shi’a civil war has been taking Islamic Fadhila Party. place in the mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad and the surrounding central regions including the eastern Diyala province.

5 Comparison of Alternative Iraq Plans

n The Bush Iraq Plan. This plan involves in Iraq through continued training and sup- sending more U.S. troops to Iraq to stabilize port for Iraq’s national army and police and the country so that its national leaders have focused efforts aimed at getting Iraq’s national breathing space to strike political deals on leaders to advance their country’s political Iraq’s constitution, oil- and revenue-sharing transition and national reconciliation process. laws, and other unresolved questions. The Alas, the ISG’s set of recommendations aimed fundamental problem with the Bush strategy is at Iraq has been overtaken by events—the ISG that it focuses heavily on maintaining a large, was examining an Iraq that simply does not prolonged, open-ended U.S. military presence exist anymore. In addition, several military in Iraq, which harms U.S. strategic interests by analysts note that embedding more U.S. troops weakening U.S. ground troops and serving as with Iraqi forces to train and assist them is im- a rallying cry for global terrorist groups. The practical because it would create unmanage- strategy also fosters Iraqi and regional depen- able force protection problems for U.S. troops. dency on the United States. n Our Plan. The new alternative from the n The . This promising Center for American Progress recognizes the proposal offered a bipartisan consensus plan grim realities of Iraq’s fragmentation and the for transitioning the mission in Iraq. It stressed fundamentally changed regional dynamics. the need for new diplomatic and political We recommend shifting U.S. priorities from approaches in the entire Middle East as key refereeing Iraq’s multiple confl icts to ag- missing ingredients to resolving and containing gressive counterterrorism alongside multiple Iraq’s confl icts. These diplomatic recommen- efforts to stabilize the region (see summary dations remain relevant, but Iraq’s internal points on page 2). We advance a more prag- dynamics have changed dramatically since matic approach aimed at garnering necessary the release of the study late last year. The ISG international support for Iraq while taking focused on building up the national authority the fi ght to our real terrorist enemies.

Phased Military Redeployment Getting U.S. troops out of Iraq’s multiple from Iraq in One Year confl icts and positioning troops in neigh- boring countries puts the United States in The United States should immediately a better position to prevent Iraq’s multiple begin redeploying its troops from Iraq sectarian confl icts from spreading beyond its and declare it does not intend to maintain borders and gives Iraq and its neighbors the military bases permanently in Iraq. A swift right incentive to help resolve Iraq’s internal strategic redeployment from Iraq, coor- confl icts. It also would increase U.S. capac- dinated with Iraq’s government, gives the ity to confront threats from global terrorist United States the best chance to revitalize groups more effectively than our massive its ground forces now stretched too thin to troop presence in Iraq currently does. U.S. address growing threats on other fronts in armed forces need to regroup to fi ght the the fi ght against global terrorist groups in enemies we have, not referee Iraqi combat- Afghanistan and elsewhere. ants with other scores to settle.

6 Regional Security and Diplomatic plan launched in April of this year under the Initiatives to Contain and Resolve auspices of the United Nations with bench- Iraqi Confl icts marks for Iraq’s national reconciliation and economic reconstruction, as well as formal The United States should begin intense commitments of support from the interna- regional and international efforts to contain, tional community. manage, and ultimately resolve each of Iraq’s confl icts. The United States should Develop a Realistic Strategy to Resolve build on the suggestions of the Iraq Study the Arab-Israeli Confl ict and Stabilize Group and the steps already taken by the the Broader Middle East Bush administration in the fi rst half of 2007 to participate in regional security conferenc- The United States needs to pick up the es in Baghdad and and hold bilateral pieces left by President Bush’s fl awed discussions with Iran. Middle East strategy by building a com- prehensive sustained diplomatic approach All of Iraq’s neighbors have a stake in key across the region. We need to revive steady aspects of Iraq’s internal confl icts. The and regular diplomatic efforts to resolve consequences of an escalated confl ict in Arab-Israeli confl ict, stabilize Lebanon, Iraq could be dire for these countries—more more effectively manage our interests in refugees, the possible spread of attacks by Syria, and address the threat posed by Iran. global terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda All of these challenges are interlinked, far and its affi liates, and more crime and law- more than when the United States invaded lessness. A sustained set of regional initia- Iraq in 2003. tives could help lessen the violence within Iraq and help reduce the potential threat of The United States must fi nd ways to turn these confl icts spilling beyond Iraq’s borders. Middle Eastern interdependencies to our These initiatives include enhancing border advantage rather than disadvantage. One security, boosting cooperation on regional way to do so is by making strides toward counterterrorism efforts, and encouraging easing Arab-Israeli tensions. Key countries security confi dence-building measures to and people in the region view the United avoid more military confl ict. States more positively when it leads efforts aimed at addressing tensions between Israel The United States should also work with and its neighbors. Active engagement on other global powers and key allies in the resolving the Arab-Israeli confl ict will make Middle East to build consensus for a new it easier to obtain and maintain support United Nations Security Council Resolution from pragmatic leaders in the Arab world to replace the one that expires on Decem- and other key allies as our forces redeploy ber 31, 2007. This new U.N. resolution from Iraq. should ensure that other countries do their share, including sending troops to Iraq, to President Bush should appoint a special help stabilize Iraq and the Middle East. It Middle East envoy with support from two must include transparent, verifi able com- senior ambassadors devoted to resolving key mitments by Iraq’s neighbors not to under- Middle East confl icts. The special Middle mine Iraq’s security. The resolution should East envoy should be an individual who can incorporate the efforts made to create the represent the United States at the highest International Compact for Iraq, a fi ve-year levels and signal to the world that he or she

7 represents the president, and that the issue is By taking these steps, the United States will a top priority for the United States. be able muster its still considerable power to advance our long-term national security The end goal of a more realistic U.S. strat- interests in the region. egy in the Middle East is a more secure region developed without turning our backs Time to Act on democratic values. In the next year, the United States needs to focus its Middle East Over the past two years, President Bush has regional strategy by: ignored an alternative Strategic Redeploy- ment strategy5 fi rst proposed in 2005 by the n Developing crisis management strategies Center for American Progress and subse- to address more effectively the fallout quently embraced in large part by members from confl icts such as the intra-Palestin- of Congress on both sides of the political ian battles in the spring of 2007 aisle. At the end of 2006, President Bush squandered another opportunity to listen to n Using regional and international propos- the majority of Americans, his top military als to provide a diplomatic framework commanders on the ground at the time to move the Arab-Israeli confl ict toward in Iraq, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,6 and the resolution bipartisan Iraq Study Group.7

n Engaging in with U.S. rivals Isolated in the world and at home, President such as Iran and Syria similar to the way Bush committed more troops just as members the United States negotiated with the of the dwindling “coalition of the willing,” and in the including our most reliable ally, Great Britain, made plans to reduce their forces signifi cantly. n Offering smartly targeted rule-of-law as- As a result, the United States will have an sistance to reduce and eliminate security all-time high of at least 170,000 troops in vacuums and help foster democratic Iraq by the summer of 2007 trying to quell values from the ground up. multiple confl icts while risking the destruction of the all-volunteer U.S. Army.

President Bush can no longer ignore the realities in Iraq and around the region, and Congress and the country can no longer allow him to do so. The comprehensive plan that follows pro- vides the policy framework needed to restore U.S. power and prestige in the region and reset our national security priorities on the real terrorist threats to our country.

8 IRAQ VIOLENCE GROWS AS IRAQ’S SECURITY FORCES INCREASE

Attack(s) on coalition Attack(s) on civilians Attack(s) on Iraqi security forces

Dec. 2005 Jan 2005 President Bush introduces “National Strat- 1st Iraqi national election egy for Victory in Iraq;” Iraq holds elections since the fall of Hussein for permanent government

Dec 2003 Apr. 2004 Nov. 2004 May 2006 Jan. 2007 Saddam Hussein 1st battle of Fallujah 2nd battle of Fallujah Iraqi government President Bush captured formed announces “surge” plan 6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

r. v. v. o ug. May July Oct. Jan. Feb. Ap May une July Oct. Jan. Feb. Mar Apr. May July Oct. Jan. Feb. Apr. May July Oct. Jan. Feb. Apr. June Aug. Sept. Nov. Dec. Mar. J Aug. Sept. Nov. Dec. June Aug. Sept. N Dec. Mar. June A Sept. No Dec. Mar. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Number of U.S. military forces in Iraq Number of Iraqi army and police trained and equipped (in thousands; fi gures (in thousands) do not include Kurdish peshmerga or Facilities Protection Service)

Total Number of U.S. and Iraqi forces 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

. v. y v. r o May July Oct. Jan. Feb. Apr. May July Oct. Jan. Feb. Mar Apr. May July Oct. Jan. Feb. Apr. May Jul Oct. Jan. Feb. Apr. June Aug. Sept. Nov. Dec. Mar. June Aug. Sept. Nov. Dec. June Aug. Sept. N Dec. Mar. June Aug. Sept. No Dec. Ma 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Sources: For attack numbers and Iraqi security force size to up 1/07: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07677.pdf, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t.pdf, and for Iraqi security force size from 1/07 to present: State Department Weekly Status reports, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/c20699.htm.

9 SELECT MAPS FROM THE FULL REPORT

Source: CIA maps, Perry-Castañeda Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin library.

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Inspector General for Iraq reconstruction.

10 Action Agenda for Strategic Reset in the Middle East in 2007–2008 1. Call for a redeployment of U.S. troops development and humanitarian assistance and closure of U.S. military bases in needs of Iraq from the Bush administration, Iraq by the end of 2008. Congress should a complete accounting of assistance pledged use the 2008 Defense Authorization and by other countries, and a plan to help Iraq Appropriations bills to call for an immediate garner support for economic reconstruction. redeployment of U.S. troops. 7. Create a new special envoy for Middle 2. Advocate for measures to enhance U.S. East diplomacy. Congress should require military readiness. The current Bush the president to appoint a seasoned high-lev- Iraq strategy has led to historic problems el envoy who can command attention in the with personnel and equipment in the U.S. region and the resources the State Depart- Army, Marines, and National Guard.8 Con- ment and other agencies may need to con- gress should include measures to re-equip tain and manage Iraq’s confl icts and resolve our armed forces and support U.S. military the Arab-Israeli confl ict. This senior diplo- personnel and veterans in the Defense Au- mat should provide Congress with quarterly thorization and Appropriations bills. reports outlining steps toward stabilizing the region and resolving its confl icts. 3. Cut off unconditional U.S. support for Iraq’s national security forces. Congress 8. Provide additional funding and sup- should stop training Iraqi national forces and port for collective security efforts in seek enforcement of the Leahy Amendment the Middle East and Gulf region. The (see page 20 for details on the amendment). United States should support cooperative security measures as it resets its military 4. Increase the number of Iraqis allowed presence in the Gulf region with confi dence- in the United States annually from 7,000 building measures such as enhanced border to 100,000. The United States has a moral security and increased communications and obligation to help Iraqis displaced by the con- early warning systems to prevent confl icts. fl ict, particularly those who risked their lives working with the U.S. military and diplomatic 9. Advocate for a new U.N. mandate for personnel. The Bush administration should Iraq. The United States should lead an raise the limit immediately and implement international dialogue on the mandate to re- measures to more effi ciently respond to re- structure international support for Iraq when quests for asylum. the current U.N. mandate authorizing the U.S.-led coalition expires at the end of 2007. 5. Downsize the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and diversify U.S. presence around 10. Prevent continued waste, fraud, and Iraq. Congress should use legislation to make corruption in Iraq. Congress should con- the U.S. embassy smaller without diminishing tinue to exercise increased oversight of the security for diplomatic personnel. billions of dollars lost in Iraq reconstruction projects. Working with the World Bank and 6. Put pressure on other countries to other international organizations, the United provide increased economic and hu- States should set good governance standards manitarian assistance to Iraqis. Con- for Iraq’s provincial, local, and national gov- gress should ask for a full review of the total erning authorities.

11