Strategic Reset Reclaiming Control of U.S. Security in the Middle East June 2007 Strategic Reclaiming Control of U.S. Security in the Middle East Reset By Brian Katulis, Lawrence J. Korb, and Peter Juul INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ith the Iraq war well into its fi fth year, the Bush adminis- tration still lacks a realistic plan for the Middle East and WIraq. The United States must reclaim control of its core national security interests by taking active steps to stabilize the entire Middle East and abandon the delusions at the heart of President Bush’s policies. Otherwise, U.S. security will continue to suffer by weakening the U.S. military and draining resources away from de- stroying terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. The current Iraq strategy is exactly what Al Qaeda wants—the United States distracted and pinned down by Iraq’s internal confl icts and trapped in a quagmire that has become the perfect rallying cry and recruitment tool for Al Qaeda. The United States has no good options given the strategic and tactical mistakes made on Iraq since 2002, but simply staying the course with an indefi nite military pres- ence is not advancing U.S. interests. Instead, the United States must reset its strategy by looking beyond the deteriorating situation in Iraq in order to counter the threat from global terrorist groups and ensure stability in the entire Middle East and Gulf region. To do this, we need to develop a new overall Middle East strategy, not just a series of tactics focused heavily on Iraq. Retired Marine Corps General John Sheehan succinctly identi- fi ed the main problem when turning down the Bush administration’s offer to serve as the White House “czar” for Iraq and Afghanistan: 1 “What I found in discussions with current and former sponsors of terrorist groups threatening members of this administration is that there is no democracies worldwide. More than four agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or years later it is clear that the opposite has in the region…the current Washington decision-making fact happened—terrorist attacks continue to process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region rise, tensions between countries in the region and how the parts fi t together strategically.”1 are growing, Middle East autocrats are more deeply entrenched in power, and the Arab- In 2003, the president and his top support- Israeli confl ict continues to rage. ers argued that the road to peace in the Middle East ran through Baghdad and that By 2006, when Secretary of State Con- the Iraq war would stabilize the Middle doleezza Rice described the confl ict be- East. By getting rid of Saddam Hussein, tween Israel and the Lebanese terrorist the United States would set into motion a group Hezbollah as the “birth pangs of a democratic wave that would topple Middle new Middle East,” it was clear that a new East dictators and autocrats who were state Middle East was emerging: one less stable Strategic Reset: Our New Plan Accept the Reality of Iraq's Political Initiate Regional Security and Diplomatic Fragmentation Efforts to Contain Iraq’s Confl icts n Immediately phase out the unconditional n Promote collective security efforts with ac- arming, equipping, and training of Iraq’s tive working groups on counterterrorism, security forces. refugees, and security confi dence-building measures. n Shift reconstruction, governance, and security assistance to provinces where practical and n Use the forthcoming review of the United possible. Nations mandate for Iraq to secure formal commitments from other countries to help Implement a Phased Military Redeploy- Iraq as the United States redeploys from Iraq. ment from Iraq within One Year Develop a Strategy to Resolve the Arab-Is- n Extract U.S. troops from Iraq’s civil wars raeli Confl ict and Stabilize the Middle East before the end of 2008. n Appoint a special Middle East envoy with n Make counterterrorism our country’s support from two senior ambassadors who No. 1 priority. would work on two key tracks—containing and managing Iraq’s multiple confl icts and n Redeploy U.S. troops to neighboring coun- resolving the Arab-Israeli confl ict. tries and temporarily station 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers in the Kurdish region of northern n Work with partners in the Middle East Iraq until 2009 to prevent a cross-border Quartet as well as regional organizations such confl ict involving our key ally Turkey, and as the Arab League to manage and resolve to protect the region from an expansion of confl icts in the region. intra-Iraqi violence 2 and less favorable to U.S. national security The United States cannot stabilize Iraq interests. What’s worse, President Bush without serious action by Iraq’s leaders. The has placed the well-being of U.S. troops “no end in sight” strategy fosters a culture of in the hands of Iraq’s squabbling national dependency among Iraqis by propping up leaders—essentially giving a divided Iraqi certain members of Iraq’s national govern- leadership a veto on when and where to use ment without fundamentally changing Iraq’s U.S. military forces. political dynamics. It does so at the cost of grinding down the strength of U.S. ground The fundamental premise of Bush’s surge forces, as the readiness of these forces strategy—that Iraq’s leaders will make key continues to decline. Our ground forces are decisions to advance their country’s political so overstretched that many of our soldiers transition and national reconciliation—is and Marines are being sent to Iraq without at best misguided and clearly unworkable. proper training and equipment, some mul- Neither U.S. troops in and around Baghdad tiple times; our National Guard has become nor diplomats in the Green Zone can force an operational rather than strategic reserve. Iraqi leaders to hold their country together. As Major General Richard Lynch, currently The consequences of President Bush’s stub- commanding the Third Infantry Division, bornness are dire. Many events that some noted last month, even if the security situa- fear would result if U.S. troops left Iraq are tion does improve, there will not be signifi - unfolding now just as the U.S. troop presence cant progress on the government side.2 is getting larger—vicious ethnic and sectar- Key leaders of Iraq’s fragmented national leadership. Top row: Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini Al-Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr, Tariq al-Hashimi, and Massoud Barzani. Middle row: Nouri Al-Maliki, Abdul Aziz Hakim, Adnan Dulaimi, and Jalal Talibani. The leaders of Iraq’s neighboring countries. Bottom row: Syrian President Bashar Assad, Jordan King Abdullah II, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahma- dinejad, and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. (AP) 3 ian confl ict, growing tensions on Iraq’s bor- n Develop a realistic strategy to resolve ders, increasing provocative actions by Iran, the Arab-Israeli confl ict and stabilize the and the largest refugee crisis in the Middle broader Middle East East since 1948. Iraq currently suffers from four major internal confl icts and tensions: U.S. Policies Must Accept the Shi’a vs. Shi’a in the south; Sunni vs. Shi’a Reality of Iraq’s Fragmentation in the center and east; Sunni vs. Sunni in the west; and Arab-Kurd tensions in the north Iraq’s leaders are fundamentally at odds over (see map on page 6 for more details). what Iraq is, how power should be distrib- uted, and who should control the nation’s oil A recent National Intelligence Estimate on wealth. To advance its own national security Iraq noted that “the term ‘civil war’ does not interests, the United States needs to come to adequately describe these multiple, overlap- grips with this new reality of Iraq’s frag- ping confl icts in Iraq or adequately capture mentation and respond by diversifying our their complexity as they also include extensive military, diplomatic, and development pres- Shi’a, Al Qaeda, and Sunni insurgent attacks ence in and around Iraq. We need to build on U.S. forces, and widespread criminally-mo- on the efforts of the Bush administration to tivated violence.”4 The United States cannot put more emphasis on provincial and local settle Iraq’s many internal confl icts even with leadership rather than on working primarily its considerable conventional military power, with the national government. particularly since the use of this military power is employed in an overall approach to The United States should mitigate the the Middle East and the threat of global ter- increasingly violent fragmentation in Iraq rorist networks that is partial and incomplete. by ceasing the unconditional arming and training of Iraq’s national security forces Instead of passively waiting for Iraq’s national until a political consensus and sustainable leaders to make a series of political decisions political solution is reached. As the United that they have shown themselves fundamen- States redeploys its military forces, it should tally incapable of making amid multiple inter- immediately phase out its training of Iraq’s nal confl icts, the United States should adopt national security forces and place strict limits a more active stance to advance its interests on arming and equipping them. Spending throughout the Middle East. In short, the billions to arm Iraq’s security forces without United States needs to implement a strategic political consensus among Iraq’s leaders reset aimed at using U.S. power to protect our carries signifi cant risks—the largest of which core national interests. The four simultaneous is arming faction-ridden national Iraqi units steps our country must now take are: before a unifi ed national government exists that these armed forces will loyally sup- n Adopt policies to accept the reality of port.