DOCSLIB.ORG

Security Council Distr.: General 18 January 2019

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Security Council Distr.: General 18 January 2019 United Nations S/2019/61 Security Council Distr.: General 18 January 2019 Original: English Identical letters dated 18 January 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council I am writing to set the record straight and shed light upon the false accusations against Israel in the context of the defensive measures that Israel has taken in the north of the country to curb the mounting threats that Hizbullah, the Iranian proxy, poses to Israel’s security and sovereignty. Those false accusations were designed to divert the conversation away from Hizbullah’s acts of aggression on both the Israeli and Lebanese sides of the Blue Line. Israel has taken protective steps to curb the very real threats that Hizbullah presents, such as the terrorist organization’s construction of terror attack tunnels from Lebanon into sovereign Israel. Israel has always taken such defensive measures on its side of the Blue Line, when its security and sovereignty are questioned. Israel’s actions starkly contrast Hizbullah’s aggressive acts of terror that violate Israel’s sovereignty, the Blue Line and Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). At the meeting of the Security Council, on 19 December 2018, I presented member States with recently declassified information that revealed Hizbullah’s grand plan to take control of the Israeli Galilee. As part of its strategy, Hizbullah has, inter alia, constructed at least six in southern Lebanon that cross into Israel underneath the Blue Line in order to conduct terror attacks. The tunnels clearly and unambiguously threaten Israel and violate its sovereignty. Moreover, as senior officials of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and several Security Council member States have confirmed, the tunnels are a breach of resolution 1701 (2006). In the face of those threats, Israel launched Operation Northern Shield, a protective measure to secure its northern border and ensure the safety of its citizens. The operation took place solely on Israel’s side of the Blue Line. To date, Israel has uncovered and is working to neutralize six Hizbullah terror attack tunnels. Hizbullah’s modus operandi has become clear. Backed by Iran, Hizbullah continues to establish its military presence throughout southern Lebanon, in the areas in which UNIFIL is deployed, and in towns and villages. By using private properties as bases for its military and terrorist activities, Hizbullahis able to shield its actions from scrutiny. With the conclusion of Operation Northern Shield, Israel is continuing its ongoing efforts to counter the threat of Hizbullah above ground by building a physical land barrier entirely on the Israeli side of the Blue Line. In this context, I recall the statement by the president of the Security Council of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), 19-00918 (E) 230119 *1900918* S/2019/61 confirming Israel’s full withdrawal from southern Lebanon to the south of the Blue Line. Israel has completed approximately 11 km of this defensive barrier and will continue this essential construction. Contrary to the false accusations, Israel’s construction of this barrier is both entirely warranted and justified, considering Hizbullah’s real and physical threats, along with the inability of the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL to prevent those actions. Moreover, contrary to certain claims, the construction of Israel’s security barrier on its side of the Blue Line is no surprise. Israel has repeatedly informed all of the relevant parties, including those within the framework of the tripartite mechanism, of its intention to build this physical land barrier to prevent the real and concrete threat posed by Hizbullah. Israel, once again, stresses that it does not wish for any escalation to take place along the Blue Line. Recent actions by Israel – destroying the terror attack tunnels and constructing the land barrier on the Israeli side of the Blue Line – are purely defensive measures with the clear purpose of protecting its citizens. Israel, as any sovereign nation, has both the prerogative and the duty to defend its people. In this context, Israel will continue to take the necessary protective measures unhindered, so long as the threat of Hizbullah remains an unchecked reality. The State of Lebanon and the Lebanese Army have a clear responsibility to preserve calm, prevent provocation and stop the illegal and destabilizing activities of Iran and Hizbullah in the region. UNIFIL must uphold its mandate robustly, to the fullest extent possible, in line with Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 2373 (2017) and 2433 (2018), to prevent hostile activities of any kind in its area of operation and ensure that no armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL are found in the area of its deployment. As stated in resolution 2433 (2018), the Security Council must be provided with prompt and detailed reports on the restrictions to the freedom of movement of UNIFIL, as well as reports on specific areas where UNIFIL does not have access and on the reasons behind those restrictions. UNIFIL must also provide Security Council members with full, accurate and detailed reports on all situations in which it is barred from taking action to fulfil its mandate. I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) Danny Danon Ambassador Permanent Representative 2/2 19-00918 .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Hizballah's Vision of the Lebanon-Israel Border by Avi Jorisch
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 368 Hizballah's Vision of the Lebanon-Israel Border by Avi Jorisch Mar 4, 2002 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Avi Jorisch Avi Jorisch is an adjunct scholar of The Washington Institute and author of its new monograph and CD-ROM Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah's al-Manar Television (2004). As the Institute's Soref fellow from 2001 to 2003, he specialized in Arab and Islamic politics. More recently, he served as an Brief Analysis n February 28, Hizballah fired 57mm antiaircraft missiles at Israeli planes flying over the Shebaa Farms O area. According to Hizballah information officer Hassan Azzedin, "the current line of Israeli withdrawal ('blue line') is not consistent with the international boundary and not recognized by the Lebanese government. That's why we're pursuing the path of resistance." Indeed, Hizballah claims that Israel continues to occupy sovereign Lebanese territory, and the organization makes this claim the basis for what it considers legitimate resistance. What, then, is Hizballah's vision of where the Lebanon-Israel border should lie? Background Between 1920 and 1924, French and British negotiators delineated the border between Le Grand Liban and Mandatory Palestine. After the 1948 war, the Lebanese and Israelis established the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL), which coincided with the 1924 international border. From 1982 to 2000, Israel occupied a section of southern Lebanon, and, upon his election in July 1999, then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak announced his intention to withdraw the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from Lebanon, which he did on May 25, 2000. Before the Israeli withdrawal, Hizballah maintained that if Israel were to retain even "one inch of Lebanese land," resistance operations would continue.
    [Show full text]
  • Avoiding Another War Between Israel and Hezbollah
    COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah By Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War ABOUT THE SCOWCROFT MIDDLE EAST SECURITY INITIATIVE The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region. Through all of the Council’s Middle East programming, we work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs at www.atlanticcouncil.org/ programs/middle-east-programs/. May 2020 ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-099-7 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. This report is made possible by general support to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................2
    [Show full text]
  • For Free Distribution Not for Sale
    For Free Distribution Not For Sale January 2010 - no.06 Editorial Understanding UNIFIL three years on At the launch of ‘Al-Janoub’ in 2007 we hoped to have it serve as a platform for exchange of information between UNIFIL and the people of south Lebanon. We believed, and still do, that human relationships are best founded on a well informed appreciation of mutual concerns and sensibilities. Now, more than three years since the UN Security UNIFIL must therefore blow the whistle every time there is Council resolution 1701, the need remains more than any side violating any element of their agreement on the ever for UNIFIL to explain to the people what the cessation of hostilities. UNIFIL does this in an impartial mission is about and to in turn better understand the and factual manner, making its observations with full needs and expectations of the people. One would think transparency and ultimately deferring the judgment to the that after more than three decades of UNIFIL’s existence UN Security Council. [since 1978], the Lebanese would know all there is to Third, UNIFIL is NOT the agency that has primary know about it. However, the situation over these years responsibility for security in south Lebanon: the has evolved and so has UNIFIL. Lebanese Army is. Having facilitated the deployment Perceptions carried forward from the long years of of the Lebanese Army in south Lebanon, UNIFIL now presence, multiple UN involvement on issues related to, supports the Lebanese Army in ensuring security in the but often outside, UNIFIL’s remit and the plethora of UN area.
    [Show full text]
  • Insights from the Second Lebanon War
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Browse Reports & Bookstore TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. All Glory Is Fleeting Insights from the Second Lebanon War Russell W. Glenn Prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office.
    [Show full text]
  • THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict Between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing for It
    ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Copyright © 2011 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford Table of Contents Executive Summary . iii Acknowledgements . vi The Authors . vii Introduction . 1 Potential Return to Arms . 3 Hizballah Prepares for War . 6 Israel Prepares for War . 14 Conclusion . 20 THE NEXT WAR The Saban Center at BROOKINGS ii Executive Summary ebanon and Israel have enjoyed a rare calm waged between them, and both sides have been in the five years since the August 14, 2006 feverishly preparing for the next war ever since the ceasefire that brought an end to that sum- last one ended. Lmer’s month-long war, the fiercest ever action waged between Hizballah and the Israel Defense Hizballah’s Posture Forces (IDF). Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizballah has under- Both sides drew sharp lessons from the 2006 conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel
    UNiteD StateS iNStitUte of peaCe www.usip.org SpeCial REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPO R T Frederic C. Hof Commissioned in mid-2008 by the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, this report builds upon two previous groundbreaking works by the author that deal with the obstacles to Syrian- Israeli peace and propose potential ways around them: a 1999 Middle East Insight monograph that defined the Mapping peace between phrase “line of June 4, 1967” in its Israeli-Syrian context, and a 2002 Israel-Syria “Treaty of Peace” drafted for the International Crisis Group. Both works are published Syria and israel online at www.usip.org as companion pieces to this report and expand upon a concept first broached by the author in his 1999 monograph: a Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve under Syrian sovereignty that Summary would protect key water resources and facilitate Syrian- • Syrian-Israeli “proximity” peace talks orchestrated by Turkey in 2008 revived a Israeli people-to-people contacts. long-dormant track of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the talks were sus- Frederic C. Hof is the CEO of AALC, Ltd., an Arlington, pended because of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, Israeli-Syrian peace Virginia, international business consulting firm. He directed might well facilitate a Palestinian state at peace with Israel. the field operations of the Sharm El-Sheikh (Mitchell) Fact- Finding Committee in 2001. • Syria’s “bottom line” for peace with Israel is the return of all the land seized from it by Israel in June 1967.
    [Show full text]
  • United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
    CASE STUDY DR. ROBERT U. NAGEL, MS. KATE FIN, MS. JULIA MAENZA MAY 2021 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Conflict history Israel supported the Maronites to establish a friend- Following the events of Black September in 1970, in ly Christian government and destroy the PLO, which which Jordan expelled members of the Palestinian carried out attacks against Israel from Lebanon. Liberation Organization (PLO), the PLO established a state within a state in the south of Lebanon. A full- One of these attacks, the Coastal Road Massacre, scale civil war began in Lebanon in 1975, with Ma- killed 38 Israeli civilians and wounded over 70 on March ronite Christians fighting Muslim militias and the PLO. 9, 1978.1 On March 14, 1978, Israeli forces invaded UNIFIL peacekeepers from the Mission’s Female Assessment/Analysis and Support Team (FAST) carry out a community engage- ment walk in the Tyre souk, south Lebanon. FAST activities vary from operational activities to community outreach, including foot and market patrols, school visits, as well as community engagements such as this one. Tyre, 6 November 2019. / Photo by: Pasqual Gorriz/UN Lebanon. In response, the UN Security Council passed withdrew to the “security zone,” an 850 km area of Resolutions 425 and 426, calling for Israel to withdraw Lebanese territory made up of checkpoints operated and creating the United Nations Interim Force in Leba- mainly by members of the SLA, due to the increasing non (UNIFIL). Israel’s withdrawal was to take place over Hezbollah attacks on IDF troops in 1985. As Israeli four stages, though they maintained a presence in the scholar Nitza Nachmias put it, “Israel assumed wrong- area by ceding the final zone to the South Lebanon ly that Operation Peace for Galilee would eliminate the Army (SLA), a militia they created and armed.
    [Show full text]
  • Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel
    UNiteD StateS iNStitUte of peaCe www.usip.org SpeCial REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPO R T Frederic C. Hof Commissioned in mid-2008 by the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, this report builds upon two previous groundbreaking works by the author that deal with the obstacles to Syrian- Israeli peace and propose potential ways around them: a 1999 Middle East Insight monograph that defined the Mapping peace between phrase “line of June 4, 1967” in its Israeli-Syrian context, and a 2002 Israel-Syria “Treaty of Peace” drafted for the International Crisis Group. Both works are published Syria and israel online at www.usip.org as companion pieces to this report and expand upon a concept first broached by the author in his 1999 monograph: a Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve under Syrian sovereignty that Summary would protect key water resources and facilitate Syrian- • Syrian-Israeli “proximity” peace talks orchestrated by Turkey in 2008 revived a Israeli people-to-people contacts. long-dormant track of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the talks were sus- Frederic C. Hof is the CEO of AALC, Ltd., an Arlington, pended because of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, Israeli-Syrian peace Virginia, international business consulting firm. He directed might well facilitate a Palestinian state at peace with Israel. the field operations of the Sharm El-Sheikh (Mitchell) Fact- Finding Committee in 2001. • Syria’s “bottom line” for peace with Israel is the return of all the land seized from it by Israel in June 1967.
    [Show full text]
  • Peacekeepers: Will They Advance Any Prospective Arab-Israeli Peace Agreement?
    Fordham International Law Journal Volume 34, Issue 1 2010 Article 1 TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL PHILIP D. REED MEMORIAL ISSUE Peacekeepers: Will They Advance Any Prospective Arab-Israeli Peace Agreement? Justus Reid Weiner∗ Avinoam Sharony Michelle Morrisonz ∗ y z Copyright c 2010 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj Peacekeepers: Will They Advance Any Prospective Arab-Israeli Peace Agreement? Justus Reid Weiner, Avinoam Sharon, and Michelle Morrison Abstract The establishment of a peacekeeping force is widely accepted to be an essential part of any future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. The final status settlement proposed by the Clinton Admin- istration specified “[s]security arrangements that would be built around an international presence.” However, while the need for a peacekeeping force appears to enjoy broad support, it should be noted that the ”Road Map” proposed by the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, and the United States (together ”the Quartet”) in 2003 does not suggest the inclusion of peacekeeping forces, although it does envisage a monitoring mechanism for its interim phases. The authors set out to examine, from an Israeli perspective, the feasibility of establishing a form of multinational peacekeeping force as part of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. Part I of this Article as- sesses past successes and failures of peacekeeping missions in and around Israel. Part II discusses the reasons for the success and failure of those past peacekeeping missions. Part III identifies best and worst case scenarios when implementing peacekeeping missions. The Article concludes by suggesting that bilateral security cooperation with multinational oversight may be a better way of dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than peacekeeping missions.
    [Show full text]
  • GREEN WITHOUT BORDERS the Operational Benefits of Hezbollah’S Environmental NGO
    THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ MAY 2020 ■ PN79 PHOTO CREDIT: REUTERS Matthew Levitt Samantha Stern GREEN WITHOUT BORDERS The Operational Benefits of Hezbollah’s Environmental NGO On April 14, 2020, two incidents occurred along the Israel-Lebanon border, although only one garnered significant attention. In the widely covered event, peacekeepers from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) broke up a “short standoff” between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in which the two sides pointed guns at each other. The intervention took place just south of the Blue Line marking the de facto international border, in the area between the Lebanese village of Adaisseh and the Israeli village of Misgav Am.1 In the second incident, four kilometers to the north, near the Lebanese village of Kfar Kila and the Israeli town of Metula, UNIFIL personnel trimmed back trees that were blocking security cameras’ line of vision along the border barrier. Four days earlier, Hezbollah media had published pictures of what it called an initiative by Green Without Borders (GWB), a Hezbollah-affiliated NGO, to plant dozens of trees obstructing “spy cameras” installed by the “Zionist enemy” on the border wall.2 UNIFIL acted only because the trees were planted on the Israeli side of the Blue Line, although this territory is claimed by Lebanon. © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. LEVITT AND STERN Recent provocations confirm that GWB is more Lebanon War.9 Jihad al-Binaa’s director-general, than an NGO; it is a Hezbollah front, providing Muhammad al-Hajj, attended the GWB inaugural the militant group cover for operational activities conference, billed “Southern Green Resistance,” and prohibited under UN Security Council Resolutions praised the new group for its planned contributions 1559 and 1701—from conducting preoperational to the overall resistance project.10 Al-Hajj and Nahle surveillance to firing rockets at Israel.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 2: the Middle East Conflict in Outline
    2 7KH0LGGOH(DVW&RQIOLFWLQ2XWOLQH Origins of the Conflict 2.1 The modern Middle East conflict between Israel and neighbouring Arab states could be said to have begun in 1897 when Theodor Hertzl convened the First World Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland. With Jews facing increased discrimination and pogroms in Europe and Russia, Dr Hertzl called for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 2.2 During the First World War, British officials in the Middle East promised independence to the Arabs in return for their support against Turkey. The 1916 Anglo-French (Sykes-Pikot) Agreement broke this promise and the region was divided into spheres of influence between France and Britain. Meanwhile, the campaign for a Jewish homeland continued, culminating in the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which stated that Britain viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. The Declaration, in the form of a letter from the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, was addressed to Baron Rothschild, a leader of British Jewry, following consideration in the Cabinet.1 The Declaration also indicated that, in supporting such an aim: … nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or 1 Historical material is this Chapter has been drawn from a number of sources, particularly— The BBC World Service website: www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/middleeast; the Avalon Project, Yale Law School website: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/; M Ong, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Current Issues Brief No. 6, 2000-01, The Middle East Crisis: Losing Control?, 5 December 2000; L Joffe, Keesing's Guide to the Mid-East Peace Process, Catermill Publishing, London, 1996; and The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: A Documentary Record, published by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington DC, 1993.
    [Show full text]
  • UNIFIL's Tangled Mission in Lebanon
    THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES IMES CAPSTONE PAPER SERIES REDEFINING ‘INTERIM’: UNIFIL’S TANGLED MISSION IN LEBANON DARREN CUNNINGHAM BETHANY ORLIKOWSKI MAY 2012 THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY © 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..3 Research and Methodology ……………………………………………………………………….4 Civil War ………………………………………………………………………………………….6 Amal and UNIFIL ……...………………………………………………………………………..14 Hezbollah and UNIFIL........……………………………………………………………………..20 Post-Withdrawal UNIFIL ……………………………………………………………………….30 UNIFIL II ………………………………………………………………………………………..34 Conclusions ……………………………………………………………………………………...36 2 INTRODUCTION Lebanon has never found itself far from the heart of Middle East conflicts. In recent decades, this small Mediterranean state has found itself dominated by sub-state militias, occupied by foreign powers, and divided by conflicting political currents in the region. The Lebanese government has repeatedly struggled to assert its authority inside of its borders, and the emergence of Hezbollah as a political force has compelled the government to cooperate and coexist with a non-state actor that provides social welfare and defense. Partially as a result of Hezbollah‟s strength, war with Lebanon‟s southern neighbor Israel never seems as if it should be written off. With the question of national sovereignty remaining a perennial issue in Lebanon and future war with Israel being a question of “when” and not “if,” the presence of international peacekeepers seems both an obvious solution and a complicating obstacle to Lebanon‟s path towards peace and stability. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 in 1978 and created the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), its mission was to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli forces that had recently invaded and to assist the Lebanese government in regaining its authority in this area.
    [Show full text]