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Table of Contents Table of Contents BOUCHARD QUITS: ABLOW FOR SOVEREIGNTY? Introduction ..........................................................................................................5 A Coup de théâtre ..................................................................................................7 For the Record........................................................................................................8 The Significance of Being Bouchard ......................................................................9 Et je dirais même plus ..........................................................................................11 Maître chez lui......................................................................................................12 Heir Apparent? ....................................................................................................16 Discussion, Research, and Essay Questions ..........................................................17 BOUCHARD QUITS: A BLOW FOR SOVEREIGNTY? Introduction Canada was less than two weeks into the new as a remarkable political leader. They com- year of 2001 when the nation’s political mended Bouchard for his intelligence, scene was rocked by an unanticipated devel- dynamism, and considerable talents in opment; Lucien Bouchard, the premier of governing Quebec. During his tenure as Quebec, announced that he was resigning premier, he brought the province’s balloon- and leaving public life. The man who had ing government deficits under control, played a key role in federal and provincial restored the province’s economy to health, politics for over a decade, and under whose and demonstrated a clear-sighted vision and leadership the sovereignist movement had steady administrative hand that he was come within a hair’s breadth of victory in the convinced would eventually persuade a 1995 referendum, was stepping down for majority of Quebecers to follow his good. Bouchard gave the reasons for his sovereignist dream. By creating what he sudden and unexpected departure in an referred to as the “winning conditions” of emotional farewell speech to stunned and prosperity and fiscal stability, Bouchard visibly distraught members of the Parti thought he was setting the stage for an Québécois and government officials who inevitable referendum victory within the next gathered in the ornate Red Chamber of the few years. But, as he reluctantly confessed to Quebec National Assembly to say goodbye his followers, he no longer believed that this to their leader. Despite his continuing popu- was going to be possible in the immediate larity as Quebec’s premier, Bouchard had future under his leadership. For this, he become increasingly frustrated at the con- stated, he took full responsibility. Despite stant bickering and divisiveness plaguing his what he justly regarded as his government’s party. He was also deeply disappointed by many achievements, it was this failure that the poor showing of the pro-sovereignist represented his greatest political disappoint- Bloc Québécois in the November 2000 ment. federal election, which had seen its level of Within hours of Bouchard’s announce- voter support dip below that of Jean ment, political speculation was rife regarding Chrétien’s Liberals. But the determining its likely impact on the future of the factors in his difficult decision, he said, had sovereignist movement in Quebec. Many been personal. After a brush with death in federalists rejoiced at his departure, confident 1994, which had cost him a leg, he had that it would represent a major setback for become more aware of his mortality. How- their opponents’ cause. If a majority of ever many years remained to him, he in- Quebecers had not been persuaded to vote tended to spend them with his wife and for independence with a personable, elo- young sons, to whom he had previously quent, and inspiring leader like Lucien made and then broken a promise to leave Bouchard at the helm, they argued, then how public life after the 1995 referendum defeat. likely were they to rally en masse behind his Reaction to Bouchard’s resignation from most likely successor, the remarkably the rest of Canada was not slow in coming. uncharismatic finance minister, Bernard Political foes like Prime Minister Chrétien Landry? A number of sovereignists also and other provincial premiers, who had shared this view, and regretted the problems consistently opposed his sovereignist agenda, their party had created for Bouchard while he nonetheless paid tribute to their old adversary led it. Some commentators even went so far News in Review — 5 — February 2001 as to pronounce the Quebec sovereignty course as regards public finances, the movement “dead,” as had been done so economy, taxation, health care, education, many times in recent Canadian history. But social progress, and municipal organization. I others were not so hasty in their postmor- think you will admit that I have never hesi- tems. It was noted that the sovereignists had tated to face problems squarely and that I revived from equally devastating setbacks have always sought to advance Quebec’s before, and this time might be no exception. interests, with a constant concern to be the In any case, Bouchard’s resignation was Prime Minister of all Quebecers. I said that I seen as a victory for the hardline would accept the challenge and I believe that sovereignists within the Parti Québécois who I have done so to the best of my abilities. had long distrusted their leader’s commit- For more than 10 years, I have waged ment to the cause. Their hero was former through elective office the struggle for premier Jacques Parizeau, whose stock in the sovereignty. I must acknowledge that the party was expected to rise under Landry’s outcome of my efforts is less convincing as leadership. Despite what may be waning successes have alternated with setbacks. voter support for the sovereignty option at [I]n addition to his obligations as Prime present, the fact remains that Quebec is still Minister, a party leader is bound by the governed by a party committed to that ulti- political commitments he shares with his mate goal. And the province’s new premier party. In the case of the Parti Québécois, the is likely to pursue it with a far more zealous, first commitment is to achieve Quebec’s uncompromising stance than his predecessor, sovereignty. a man who was admired and respected by both I set myself the same goal when I assumed friend and foe, in Quebec and Canada, alike. the party leadership in 1996. We had just come out of a referendum campaign that brought us to the threshold of a new country. Excerpts from notes for a speech by It is true that bitter disappointment followed Lucien Bouchard announcing his on referendum night the exaltation that the resignation near certainty of victory had instilled in us. Nonetheless, the sovereignist advance was “I have devoted the Christmas holidays to a such that it justified our hope of soon reach- profound reflection on my commitment to ing our objective. public life. This respite has allowed me, This is not the time for lengthy analyses, above all, to take stock of the effectiveness of but the fact is these hopes have not yet been my contribution to the promotion of sover- fulfilled. eignty. We were undoubtedly faced immediately I have decided to end my participation in thereafter with pressing problems. We no public affairs and resign from my position as doubt succeeded in reaching the consensuses Prime Minister of Quebec. that enabled us to curb Quebec’s chronic It is with pride that I have performed my deficit, revitalize Montreal’s and the regions’ duties over the past five years. Despite what economies, and create jobs that, among other the task demands in terms of energy, open- things, have allowed many welfare recipients mindedness and endurance, assuming this to rejoin the labour market. role has given me a great deal of satisfaction. However, as has been rightly noted, we did It is not my intention today to review the not succeed for all that in bolstering government’s achievements. Suffice it to say sovereignist fervour.” that my government has set Quebec on a new February 2001 — 6 — News in Review BOUCHARD QUITS: A BLOW FOR SOVEREIGNTY? A Coup de théâtre The sudden resignation of Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard caught Canadians completely off-guard. While Bouchard’s frustration with what he regarded as extremist, disruptive ele- ments within his own party was mounting during the weeks before his announcement, almost no one expected he would quit. As the comments of other politicians across Canada made clear, Lucien Bouchard was a leader who could arouse strong passions, both positive and negative. To most Quebec sovereignists, he represented their best hope for the eventual realization of their dream of an independent state. To federalists, whether in Quebec, Ottawa, or other regions of Canada, Bouchard was their worst nightmare, the charismatic, inspiring champion of the sovereignist cause who had nearly succeeded in winning the 1995 referen- dum. But when one examines his public career, from his earliest forays into Quebec politics in the 1960s, through his years as a federal Cabinet minister in the government of Brian Mulroney, to his leadership of the sovereignist movement, both in Ottawa and later in Quebec City, it becomes clear that Lucien Bouchard is a remarkably complex and dramatic figure, in fact a man of many contradictions. As you watch this News in Review report, focus on the dramatic elements of Bouchard’s sudden
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