CANADA Canada Institute INSTITUTE JANUARY 2006 Occasional Paper Series The Foreign and THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC held a referendum on separation from Canada on October 30, 1995. It was not the first time this issue had been Defense Policies of brought before the provincial electorate, but this time the proposal was only narrowly defeated. For the first time, a majority of francophones voted for an Independent separation. The separatists lost because anglophones and speakers of other lan- guages voted overwhelmingly against separation, and their votes were just Quebec barely sufficient to tip the balance. The result strengthened the separatists and endowed them with a sense of momentum—while English-speaking DWIGHT N. MASON Canadians were left with pessimism about the future of the country. The two sides’ conflicting visions of Canada seemed impossible to reconcile. The referendum results raised the real possibility that Quebec might soon become independent, either through agreement with Canada or unilaterally. This outcome now seems unlikely, but the issue is not going to disappear. Ten years later, there remains a hard core of separatists. Their position has been strengthened, for the moment at least, by the growing number of scandals, prin- cipally the “sponsorship” scandal, engulfing the Liberal Party of Canada. The essence of the sponsorship scandal is the allegation that persons close to the Liberal government of former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (and perhaps to the current Paul Martin government) used federal funds for partisan purposes in Quebec, among them to weaken support for separatism in the province. These activities allegedly included bribery and kickbacks. One Liberal partisan recently observed, “it is way, way worse that I expected…. a referendum with a ‘Yes’[i.e., in favor of separation] is a growing possibility…”1 Indeed Quebec secession is one of the issues animating the current Canadian federal election campaign. Thus, while Quebec independence seems a distant possibility in 2005, it cannot be ruled out. For that reason, it is instructive to look back to a time preceding the 1995 sovereignty referendum, during the 1994 Quebec provin- cial election campaign, when the Parti Québécois and others held discussions about what kind of foreign and defense policies an independent Quebec might DWIGHT N. MASON is a graduate of Holderness School, Brown University, and the University of California at Berkeley. After serving as deputy chief of mission and min- ister at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, Mason retired from the Foreign Service to become a non-attorney member of the Washington law firm of Storch and Brenner, where he worked from 1991 until 2002. In 1994, President Clinton appointed him to be the chairman of the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, where he served until July 2002. He is now a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. pursue. The foreign and defense policy ideas present- Important in their own right, the foreign and ed by the separatists are interesting in that they reveal defense policy views held by the Quebec separatists the thinking of many Quebeckers besides separatists are of heightened importance in light of the current on these subjects then and now. Those views are also political situation in Canada which has returned sepa- a factor in shaping U.S.–Canadian relations, as ratism to the front pages. demonstrated by Quebec’s influence over the Not surprisingly, these Quebec foreign and Canadian government’s decisions not to participate in defense policy ideas focus primarily on relations with the 2003 war in Iraq and in part of the U.S. missile Canada and the United States. Therefore, this paper defense program in 2005. concentrates there. THE SITUATION AT THE TIME OF THE 1995 REFERENDUM s uebec’s place in Canada has long been a focus I Independence for Quebec would have been and is e i r of Canadian politics, but in 1995 this issue now not only a practical consideration, but also e s Q manifested itself differently and more seriously one with high stakes—economically and political- r e than in previous eruptions. There were a number of ly. In 1995, Quebec’s population was almost seven p a reasons for this: million and the province ranked among the p l world’s top 25 economies when counted separate- a n I The Parti Québécois, running on a separatist plat- ly from Canada.3 U.S. trade with Quebec reached o i s form, narrowly won office in the September 1994 US$34 billion in 1994, making the province the a c Quebec provincial elections. Despite its narrow United States’ eighth or ninth largest trading part- c o victory, the party was determined to push separa- ner.4 Quebec would have been able to manage E T tion through. It now held the advantage of control- independence, but this would have come at a con- U ling the assets of the provincial government, which siderable economic cost. Many of the required T I T it was able to train on the goal of sovereignty. The institutions were already in place, including a S N Parti Québécois almost attained that goal in the ministry for international affairs that had 24 posts I A 1995 referendum and felt itself to be within range abroad, with several in the United States. This D of ultimate success. Its new premier, Lucien basic outline remains accurate today. A N Bouchard, had turned in a strong performance A I C during the referendum campaign. He was intent on After 1995, the rest of Canada began to contemplate succeeding in the future, stating on November 21, a future without Quebec. The origins of this attitude 1995, that “the fundamental objective of the Parti lie in the breakdown of the traditional model of 2 Québécois remains sovereignty.” 2 Canada as a country of two founding peoples, French and English. Gradually that profile had There are two founding nations here.We got here before changed so that by 1995, 15% of Canada’s popula- you; you conquered us in 1760; you conquered us tion was foreign born, and 40% was of neither again in 1980 in the first referendum; you conquered English nor French descent.5 As a result, many us again in 1995 in the second referendum—but we’ll Canadians (but not most francophone Quebeckers) win in the third referendum.11 no longer saw their country through the prism of Canada’s origins. Weary of the sovereignty issue, Furthermore, it seemed that many Quebeckers much of the population outside Quebec resented believed that they would be better off with their own what it saw as federal government pandering to government, rather than the federal government, Quebec when it came to various economic and pro- managing economic policy.12 This notion was proba- curement programs. The province’s native peoples bly based on Quebeckers’ reaction to the budget also rejected the “two founding peoples” view of deficit reduction policies and targeted reductions in Canada, pointing out that they had been there first. social programs by both the federal government and Thus, the issue of Quebec’s place in Canada, and its the provinces of Alberta and Ontario.13 Whereas in claims to special status, seemed less and less important the past Quebeckers had resisted separation for fear of and legitimate to a growing number of Canadians.6 its economic consequences, now they saw a possible economic advantage. These attitudes hardened after the referendum, and there was movement in English-speaking Canada to plan for appropriate terms for Quebec’s separation and for a Canada without that province.7 Among the ideas expressed at the time was that of partitioning Quebec Quebec’s place in Canada has to allow populations living within Quebec and opposed to independence to remain in their homes long been a focus of Canadian and in Canada. Prime Minister Chrétien lent his sup- port to this idea, noting that such an action had the politics, but in 1995 this issue same logic as Quebec’s separation from Canada.8 In a poll published in the December 25, manifested itself differently 1995/January 1, 1996, issue of Maclean’s magazine, “ 51% of Canadians (not including Quebeckers) agreed and more seriously than in with the proposition that “if a majority of Quebeckers wish to separate, ‘just let them go’”; 77% previous eruptions. were opposed to giving Quebec a veto on constitu- 6 0 tional changes; 61% were opposed to recognizing 0 Quebec as a distinct society; and, perhaps most telling, 2 y r 75% did not accept the notion that Canada is com- Canadians overall were pessimistic about the future a posed of two founding peoples.9 But a majority of of their country. Jeffrey Simpson, an astute Canadian u n a Quebeckers, when polled, said they would vote for political observer and columnist, commented in the j separation in a future referendum (59%) and an even December 20, 1995, issue of the Toronto Globe and N O greater number believed that a majority of their fellow Mail that, “Thirty years of struggle between ethnic S Quebeckers would vote for separation (64%).10 identification in francophone Quebec and the con- A M An example of the intensity of feeling at the time is trasting identification demands of the rest of Canada . the statement made December 7, 1995 at a meeting of have reached a point at which a very large number of N T the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage of the Canadians, inside and beyond Quebec, do not believe H G House of Commons by Suzanne Tremblay, a Bloc a synthesis is possible.”14 I W Québécois Member of Parliament.