CANADA Institute INSTITUTE

JANUARY 2006

Occasional Paper Series

The Foreign and THE PROVINCE OF held a referendum on separation from Canada on October 30, 1995. It was not the first time this issue had been Defense Policies of brought before the provincial electorate, but this time the proposal was only narrowly defeated. For the first time, a majority of francophones voted for an Independent separation. The separatists lost because anglophones and speakers of other lan- guages voted overwhelmingly against separation, and their votes were just Quebec barely sufficient to tip the balance. The result strengthened the separatists and endowed them with a sense of momentum—while English-speaking DWIGHT N. MASON Canadians were left with pessimism about the future of the country. The two sides’ conflicting visions of Canada seemed impossible to reconcile. The referendum results raised the real possibility that Quebec might soon become independent, either through agreement with Canada or unilaterally. This outcome now seems unlikely, but the issue is not going to disappear. Ten years later, there remains a hard core of separatists. Their position has been strengthened, for the moment at least, by the growing number of scandals, prin- cipally the “sponsorship” scandal, engulfing the . The essence of the sponsorship scandal is the allegation that persons close to the Liberal government of former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (and perhaps to the current government) used federal funds for partisan purposes in Quebec, among them to weaken support for separatism in the province. These activities allegedly included bribery and kickbacks. One Liberal partisan recently observed, “it is way, way worse that I expected…. a referendum with a ‘Yes’[i.e., in favor of separation] is a growing possibility…”1 Indeed Quebec secession is one of the issues animating the current Canadian federal election campaign. Thus, while Quebec independence seems a distant possibility in 2005, it cannot be ruled out. For that reason, it is instructive to look back to a time preceding the 1995 sovereignty referendum, during the 1994 Quebec provin- cial election campaign, when the Parti Québécois and others held discussions about what kind of foreign and defense policies an independent Quebec might 2 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series reasons forthis: than inpr I Q THE SITUATION AT THETIMEOF1995 REFERENDUM on thesesubjectsthenandno the thinkingof ed b pur a demonstrated b defense pr the 2003w Canadian go tion thr topushsepara- was theparty determined victory, Despiteitsnarrow provincial Quebec elections. narrowly won officeintheSeptember1994 form, onaseparatistplat- running The Parti Québécois, ling theassetsof of Bouchar 1995 r P it w dur Québécois r 1995, succeeding inthefutur f actor inshapingU u.Theforeign anddefensepolicyideaspresent- sue. ar y ti Québécoisalmostattainedthatgoalinthe ing ther ultimate success. as ab the separatistsare interesting inthatthey reveal manifested itself but in1995thisissue Canadianpolitics, of uebec’s placeinCanadahaslongbeenafocus at theCenter for Strategic andInternational Studies inWashington. Canada-United States, where heserved until July2002. Heisnow asenior associate the chairmanof theUnited States Section of thePermanent Joint Board onDefense, that efer where heworked from until 2002. 1991 In1994, President Clinton appointed himto be voseutos There were anumber of evious eruptions. ough. o become anon-attorney memberof theWashington law firm of Storch andBrenner, d, le totrainonthegoalof g ister attheU.S. Embassy inOttawa, Mason retired from theForeign Service to ar inIraqandpar endum andfeltitself v University of California atBerkeley. After serving asdeputy chief of mission andmin- ram in2005. “the fundamentalobjecti DWIGHT N.MASON isagraduate of Holderness School, Brown University, andthe er efer had tur emains so nment’s in decisionsnottoparticipate It no many Quebeckers besides separatists y endum campaign. the pr Quebec’ w ned inastr held theadv differently andmore seriously v er o .S e Its ne vincial go , eignty .–Canadian r stating onNo s w . w influence o .” Those vie t to bewithinrange 2 of ong perfor antage of pr v He w so er emier h ..missile the U.S. v v mn,which nment, e er ltos as elations, of as intenton v iny The eignty. ws are also ember 21, , the Parti contr v Lucien er the mance ol- I I concentrates ther Canada andtheUnitedStates. defense policyideasfocuspr political situationinCanadawhichhasr ratism tothefr ar defense policyvie e basic outliner abr ministr institutions w Canada asacountr After 1995, ly from Canada. world’s top25economies whencountedseparate- million andtheprovince ranked amongthe ly one withhighstak but also now notonlyapracticalconsideration, Independence forQuebecwould have beenandis ner. eighthorninthlargest tradingpart- United States’ makingtheprovince the US$34 billionin1994, siderab independence lie inthebr a Impor Not sur fhihee motnei ih fthe current inlightof heightenedimportance of n19,Quebec’s populationwas almostseven In1995, . futur oad, 4 Quebec would have beenable tomanage e ati hi w ih,theforeign and tant intheirown right, y le economiccost. without Quebec with se for inter pr the r isingly ont pages. eakdo , emains accuratetoda er e b . ws heldby theQuebecseparatists est of 3 v ut thisw e national aff eral intheUnitedStates. ..tradewithQuebecreached U.S. , wn of es—economically andpolitical- alr y these Quebecforeign and eady inplace Canada begantocontemplate of . The or ould ha the traditionalmodelof imar tw Man air o Ther ily onr s ig y founding peoples, v that had24posts n fthisattitude ins of e of efor y come atacon- . , the r etur elations with including a ,thispaper e, ned sepa equir This ed - French and English. Gradually that profile had There are two founding nations here.We got here before changed so that by 1995, 15% of Canada’s popula- you; you conquered us in 1760; you conquered us tion was foreign born, and 40% was of neither again in 1980 in the first referendum; you conquered English nor French descent.5 As a result, many us again in 1995 in the second referendum—but we’ll Canadians (but not most francophone Quebeckers) win in the third referendum.11 no longer saw their country through the prism of Canada’s origins. Weary of the sovereignty issue, Furthermore, it seemed that many Quebeckers much of the population outside Quebec resented believed that they would be better off with their own what it saw as federal government pandering to government, rather than the federal government, Quebec when it came to various economic and pro- managing economic policy.12 This notion was proba- curement programs. The province’s native peoples bly based on Quebeckers’ reaction to the budget also rejected the “two founding peoples” view of deficit reduction policies and targeted reductions in Canada, pointing out that they had been there first. social programs by both the federal government and Thus, the issue of Quebec’s place in Canada, and its the provinces of Alberta and Ontario.13 Whereas in claims to special status, seemed less and less important the past Quebeckers had resisted separation for fear of and legitimate to a growing number of Canadians.6 its economic consequences, now they saw a possible economic advantage. These attitudes hardened after the referendum, and there was movement in English-speaking Canada to plan for appropriate terms for Quebec’s separation and for a Canada without that province.7 Among the ideas expressed at the time was that of partitioning Quebec Quebec’s place in Canada has to allow populations living within Quebec and opposed to independence to remain in their homes long been a focus of Canadian and in Canada. Prime Minister Chrétien lent his sup- port to this idea, noting that such an action had the politics, but in 1995 this issue same logic as Quebec’s separation from Canada.8 In a poll published in the December 25, manifested itself differently 1995/January 1, 1996, issue of Maclean’s magazine, “ 51% of Canadians (not including Quebeckers) agreed and more seriously than in with the proposition that “if a majority of Quebeckers wish to separate, ‘just let them go’”; 77% previous eruptions.

were opposed to giving Quebec a veto on constitu- 6 0

tional changes; 61% were opposed to recognizing 0 Quebec as a distinct society; and, perhaps most telling, 2 y r

75% did not accept the notion that Canada is com- Canadians overall were pessimistic about the future a posed of two founding peoples.9 But a majority of of their country. Jeffrey Simpson, an astute Canadian u n a Quebeckers, when polled, said they would vote for political observer and columnist, commented in the j

separation in a future referendum (59%) and an even December 20, 1995, issue of the Toronto Globe and N O

greater number believed that a majority of their fellow Mail that, “Thirty years of struggle between ethnic S

Quebeckers would vote for separation (64%).10 identification in francophone Quebec and the con- A M

An example of the intensity of feeling at the time is trasting identification demands of the rest of Canada . the statement made December 7, 1995 at a meeting of have reached a point at which a very large number of N T the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage of the Canadians, inside and beyond Quebec, do not believe H G House of Commons by Suzanne Tremblay, a Bloc a synthesis is possible.”14 I W

Québécois Member of Parliament. Ms. Tremblay said, Writing in Maclean’s magazine shortly thereafter, dis- D in commenting on a remark by the Committee tinguished Canadian public opinion analyst Allan Chairman John Harvard, that Gregg, in commenting on his annual poll for that mag- azine and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, said: 3 4 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series oenet hr eeanme fsubsequentno There were anumber of government. and theSpeaker then broke thetieby voting forthe Thevote was 152to152, 2005. fidence onMay 17, nocon- Liberal government barely survived avote of The current scandal. created by “sponsorship” the confidence vote from thepolitical situation arising 2005 no federal electionforced by aNovember 28, Ithasbecomeanissueinthecurrent more forcefully. call anelectionuntilatleast2007. doesnothave QuebecLiberalparty But theruling to rbbywni aprovincial electionwere heldnow.probably win if inQuebecthatwould theparty the Parti Québécois, seeable future. forthefore- to influenceU.S.–Canadian relations, and enough toshapeQuebecandCanadianpolitics, scandals mentionedearlier ly beenstim because abaseof Quebec immediate pr The situationhaschangedsincethen. SE nteitreigtm,separatismcouldreturn In theinterveningtime, Sovereignty objective alsoremains aprincipal of they hav they appeartohav vinced thatsov in thenearfuture would notwithstandthestr strong enoughtoholdCanadatogether optimism thatthepub … the pathextolledby theforcesofnationalsovereignty. to propelledeven closer emboldened by thereferendum, seemtohave been far fromgrowingweary, Quebeckers, But embrace andtheiraspirations…. Quebeckers speaking Canadaappearstobelosingitsresolve to English- constitutionalaccord, attempts toachieve andfruitless, Having tiredoftheseemingly endless, willceasetoexist… asweknowit, ournation, decade, abeliefthatby theendofthis Quebecker—reports almost oneinthreeCanadians—andeverysecond findings istheblackestIhave ever examined… Today, thisyear’sIn 20years ofanalyzing setof pollresults, CE As I look at these figures, I see very little cause for Iseeverylittlecause As Ilookatthesefigures, e,secessioncannotbedismissedentirely Yet, . SSION REMAINSANISSUE e little toloseandthatadeter ltdb h sosrhp andother ulated by the“sponsorship” ospect of ereignty isinevitab separatists remains andhasrecent- . Quebeckers areincreasingly Quebeckers con- . e bought intothepropositionthat lic opinion fabric ofthenationis lic opinionfabric another referendum in ains ofanotherreferendum Thatbaseislarge . le . More tothepoint, ior Certainly it . ating Canada Ther e is no 18 to independence. The Parti Québécois simplywishestopushfurther ties inQuebectomaximize Quebec’s autonomy. There amongallpolitical par- isgeneralagreement action. provincial independenceof the causeof be tootemptingfortheoppositionpar the situationr confidence v the Conservatives.” will exposetheunholyalliancebetween theBlocand choice between theseparatistsandfederalists… We “Canadianswillvote forunitygiven a caucus, tary hetoldtheLiberalparliamen- Atthattime, Quebec. for separation)forareferendum in amajority (i.e., scandalcouldcreate winningconditions “sponsorship” 2005thatfixationonthe 13, suggested onApril MinisterPaul Martin LiberalPrime an electionissue, the separatistsinQuebec the Conser w haps withinthr increasingly likely intherelatively nearfuture—per- anindependentQuebeclooked The prospect of Canada. divided Quebeceven from further therest of ration. election in1996seekingamandatetonegotiatesepa Another scenar separation pr might declar r edi 97 as seemed probable then. ere heldin1997, Quebec has been quite successful in pursuing this Quebec hasbeenquitesuccessful inpursuing Quebecwillcontinue topursue Election ornot, Anticipating thepossibilitythatseparatismwould be So f we have seen—but forfracture. notonlyattitudes areaprescription forparalysis—as that wouldnotbeavailable toall.Taken those together, provinces thatentitlesQuebectoabsolutely nothing of10equal their nationisbasedonapartnership ing Canadiansholdaseemingly unshakable viewthat English-speak- inevitability ofabreakupthecountry, offers fewreasonstostay.While lessconvincedofthe nsot theQuebecreferendum seemedtohave In short, 17 ri h lcincmag,theLiberalsand ar intheelectioncampaign, Speculation atthetimew aie aeacsdec te fhelping vatives have accusedeachotherof e otes, emained frag o independence an v et ieyasi thenextreferendum ee tofive years if o letls iey was aprovincial albeitlesslikely, io, ed impossib n h oenetsrie.But and thegovernment survived. 19 . ile andultimatelyproved to le tonegotiate 15 yw a y as thatif . ties. Quebec , ter ms of 16 - policy. The most recent example of this is the out- in an analytical and reporting sense and as a tool for come of the First Ministers’ meeting held in the fall of informing and influencing provincial governments 2004. Here the Quebec Liberal government managed and publics. to strengthen and extend the principle of opting out This vision of a “deconstructed” Canadian foreign of specific federal programs yet receiving funding for policy was articulated by Quebec Premier those programs established not only for Quebec but after the First Ministers’ meeting: “When Quebec is the for all provinces. In effect, Quebec succeeded, at least sole government responsible for implementing a partic- temporarily, in creating a coalition of provinces seek- ular international agreement, it should clearly be the ing more provincial powers at the expense of the fed- one making the international commitment…. A eral government. Allan Gregg commented on the Quebec jurisdiction at home remains a Quebec juris- outcome of that meeting, asserting that Quebec had diction in international relations.”21 Presumably and in effect “won sovereignty–association through federal ideally, from a Quebec point of view, the same accommodation” possibly at the expense of the ulti- approach would hold true for other provinces as well. mate viability of Canada itself.20 Whether or not this This Quebec view of its international role, some- view is accurate, the meeting’s outcome showed not times known as the Gérin–Lajoie doctrine, is based only that Quebec was no longer isolated, but also that on the fact that the Canadian constitution assigns it had increased its influence. certain powers to the provinces and others to the Increased provincial authority will introduce federal government. It is Quebec’s view that the greater complexity into U.S.-Canadian relations and provinces (and thus Quebec) have the right to act push the United States to deal more directly with the internationally in those areas the constitution provinces. Operationally, this will increase the reserves to them.22 This view is not universally importance of the U.S. consulates general in Canada shared in Canada or abroad.

FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES

Under the circumstances, it makes sense to consider Quebec.25 (Interestingly, these latter reports were what kind of foreign and defense policies an inde- updated in late 2001, with the authors concluding pendent Quebec might have pursued if the 1995 that their basic findings remain pertinent.26) referendum had succeeded and if Quebec had sub- Examination of these materials suggests that

sequently become independent. These views persist Quebec would have established its foreign and 6 in Quebec, and they affect Canadian foreign policy 0

defense polices well in advance of and in preparation 0 today. for sovereignty. 2 y There are a number of sources that offer insight In the case of defense, the American Consulate r a

into what the foreign and defense policies of an inde- General in Quebec reported that the sovereigntist u n a pendent Quebec might have looked like at the time of Parti Québécois had definite j

the 1995 referendum. They include the Parti ideas. It intended that Quebec have its own army, join N

Québécois platform published in 1993, prior to the NATO and NORAD, engage in peacekeeping opera- O S 23 1994 provincial election, statements and speeches by tions, and remain a reliable partner for the United A M

Quebec government and Bloc Québécois leaders, States. Quebec’s governing party expected that . (the Bloc is a federal party based in Quebec that sup- francophone troops based in Quebec would become N T

ports the separation of Quebec from Canada), the the Quebec army. As an example of the Quebec gov- H G minority reports of the Bloc Québécois attached to ernment’s public thinking, the Consulate General I the 1994 Parliamentary Reports on foreign and W included in its report a quotation from the legislation D defense policy,24 and three reports prepared by con- on sovereignty that the government of Quebec sultants to the Government of Quebec on defense planned to enact after a successful referendum: policy options and considerations for a sovereign “Quebec will maintain forces proportional to its size 5 6 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series economic spaceasitexistsno the CommonMark fr association orthr Québécois platfor Quebec withr a todeclare Quebec theQuebeclegislation the draftsof these policyobjectives were reiteratedand includedin tion. ity of been difficultandperhapsimpossib monetar lar francophones li extend Quebec’ transpor trade including commoninterest, of Canadaonmatters of itsneedtocooperatewiththerest Quebec becauseof Good relations withCanadawere essentialfor Refor Quebec been unacceptab mately includedpar for Quebecindependencewhich, then de debt andof negotiate anappor little practicalmeaninginP w endor Commons inOtta and Leaderof national organizations.” tive anddefensethrough existinginter- security and needs…andwillassumeresponsibilities incollec- diate goals: 1) an agreement withCanadaonfuture 1)anagreement diate goals: IMMEDIATE GOALS: AGREEMENT WITHCANADA ee mo as impor so , The centralpolicyobjecti When theP Reaching theseobjecti sfrfrinplc,theseparatistshadtwo imme- As forforeign policy, vereign nationanddefinethereferendum ques- an independentQuebecw 32 , the environment, North American defense, American North theenvironment, , sed themearlierwhenhew m v v Quebec Pr y . eloping ideainther ain n omnctos They also andcommunications. tation, ement of man 36 P union withCanada, tant symbolicallyandpolitically ar federal assetsinQuebec Fur ty, y espect toCanadaasdescr ar 34 igi te at fCanada. of ving inotherparts ther English-speaking Canadians, ough specificag s ti Québécoiscametopo the OppositioninHouseof the pr capital andpeoplealongthelinesof m le toandstr ability toprotectinterests the of tionment of emier LucienBouchar w oe economicaccordsmight more, et. a. tition of w 30 as 27 In Quebecthatendor o It w vincial pr “to maintaintheCanadian v arliament. es, s fCanadatosetterms est of w” ould alsoha a v customs union, ubc would have Quebec, oee,would have however, the Canadiannational r e whether b eements. ould ha of ongly resistedongly by as headof . le g 31 emiers, if an independent ibed b i they hadulti- ven the hostil- 29 wer in1994, v v but ithad , y e e d 35 In par y a sought to sought a the Bloc 28 also had the P tr and the sement and the 33 eaty of ticu the ar ti - off Defense Pr leged r both of major expor could sustain. ment pr Canada’s NAFTA partners. sought bilateraleconomicpreferences notavailable to Quebechad have beenimpossible tonegotiateif unbalanced defenseindustr tr Quebec w par impor negotiated concer their lo decisions of ship under 53% of ments, uf industr defense industr is impor The DefensePr Washington andOttawa. of theagreement requiring bothmatters Agreement, Production Sharing w NORAD andNA natur ment w m Amer (NAFTA). Free American Tradeship intheNorth Agreement forQuebec’s support member- U.S. focus onsecuring and2) good relations withtheUnitedStatesaninitial anddefenserelations, political, economic, ue as includedintheUnitedStates–CanadaDefense unitions usedb actur Quebec w Be ties andtheirabilitytomaintainorincurcommit or significantlyr Key here would factors have beentheindividual . . e y ican Separation wouldhave with leftbothparties standing with Canada about a military relation- standing withCanadaaboutamilitary tant effectonthemilitar ond that, elationship withtheUnited Statesunderthe y ed inthepr y of ould ha oper Canada’ for exampletoNA tant becausek which dependinlargepar alties andpr w Aer ould ha oduction Shar as locatedinQuebecandmostof the r francophone military personnel basedon personnel francophone military t ty ould alsohave atan neededtoarrive ospace DefenseCommand(NORAD). mark The defenseindustr . The latterag oduction Sharing Agreement matter Agreement oduction Sharing v y s a e elationship Quebecsoughtwith y ning thedi v defense electr ar Canadian–Quebec defenseag T et andaccesstohightechnolo the Canadianmilitar been str e educed. e ovince. O enpriual obfli its doubtfulif been particularly ospects, andwhetherornotQuebec , located inQuebec e y n gemn,were cut ing Agreement, elements of ongly influencedby the 37 vision of reement would have an ies, This isstillgenerally T and thear y onics andaer O capabilities of 38 y’ s t and theNor which neither sustainability in upon itsprivi- federal go the Canadian y were man- rangement . In 1995, ospace v both er ree- the gy, n- th - IMMEDIATE GOALS: THE UNITED STATES AND NAFTA

The Parti Québécois platform placed the highest pri- rather than power. It should therefore be a primary ority on good relations with the United States and objective of Canadian foreign policy to help develop Canada. In the words of in March rules-based regimes in areas of concern to Canada. 1994, when he was still Leader of the Opposition in For this purpose we suggest several strategies. One is the House of Commons in : to ‘multilateralize’ relations with the United States, dealing with our neighbor in multilateral forums Canada has been a faithful ally of the U.S.The same wherever possible, and using the latter to blunt U.S. will be true of a sovereign Quebec.Whatever happens unilateral policies.”42 overseas, we will continue to share a common geo- It is likely that Quebec would have adopted a political space, and to contribute to its defence within the similar policy for managing its other key relation- new NORAD that will emerge from upcoming nego- ship—that with Canada. This, too, was presaged in tiations.I understand that certain countries did not have the Parti Québécois platform preceding the 1994 the choice of being or not being neutral. But neutralism provincial elections. The Parti Québécois stated that is not my cup of tea. Neutralism did not win the Cold its very first step after achieving sovereignty would War.And this kind of neutralism which is made of be to apply to join the and its spe- indifference and passivity will not win the peace in the cialized agencies (the United Nations Educational, hot spots of the world.39 Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture However, Quebec’s most immediate policy goal for Organization, for example), as well as the World its anticipated relationship with the United States Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation would have been to secure U.S. support for member- and Development, the Organization of American ship in NAFTA.40 Provincial leaders, as well as their States, the Commonwealth, and NAFTA.43 While federal party ally, the Bloc Québécois, tried to foster the immediate motivation was to secure international that support by claiming (with some justification) that recognition, another long-term aim would have it was Quebec’s support for the U.S.–Canada Free been to influence and benefit from the international Trade Agreement (FTA) and then the larger NAFTA, “rules of the road.” which made the agreements possible in Canada.41 Managing such an asymmetrical relationship as would have existed between the United States and a hypothetically independent Quebec would present a 6

challenge, but a familiar one to Canadians and 0

Quebeckers. The classic Canadian response to this 0 Separation would have left 2 situation is to seek company in dealing with the y r

United States through multilateral, rules-based a both parties with unbalanced u arrangements. Quebec would probably have fol- n a lowed the same policy. defense industries, which j For example, in the Parliamentary committee N O reviewing Canada’s foreign policy in 1994, the Bloc S neither could sustain. A

Québécois members strongly and prominently agreed M .

with the majority report on the appropriate strategy“ N for managing relations with the United States. That T H

portion of the majority report said that Canada ought G I

to continue to follow its traditional policy of trying to W deal with the United States in a multilateral, rules- D based system, noting that “Canada’s goals can be achieved only in concert with others and within the 7 framework of an international system based on rules 8 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series THE VIEW OFTHEWORLD FROM QUEBEC IN1995 ino ouain,andpreventive diplomacy. populations, tion of protec- democracy, restoration of relief, humanitarian intheareas of particularly national peacekeeping, anditsown tointer- specializedcontributions peace, mediation, str thr Quebec mightha abroad” gent available totheUNforitspeacekeeping missions contin- apermanent encouraged “thesettingup of TheBloc theUnitedNations.” of ed “undertheaegis conduct- forces, theCanadianarmed role of primary foreign policyfunctionandrecommended thatitbea The Blocidentifiedpeacekeeping asafundamental Peacekeeping I I I Quebec mighthave pursued: theforeign anddefensepoliciesasovereign tion of Theseperceptions provide ausefulapproxima- 1995. conclusionsabouttheworld situationin number of Quebecseparatistshadreached a the UnitedStates, Peering beyond theirrelationships withCanadaand views can be summarized asfollows:views canbesummarized These reviewed Canadianforeign policyin1994. theParliamentarycommitteethat the of report dissentto foreign anddefensepolicyideasinitsformal next toasuper tr ue of engthening the international systemandfocusedon engthening theinternational UN peacek organizations suchasNORAD upon member alliance withtheUnitedStatesandsecondarily dependentuponits Canada’s isprimarily security the notionthatitcould. anditwould befoolishtopositpolicyon militarily, Canadacouldnotdefenditself At thesametime, Canada ortoQuebec. There threatwas to nosignificantmilitary tion. theCold War hadcreated anew situa- The endof inter functions w These obser nadto,theBlocQuébécoisexpressed specific In addition, uhaplc factive diplomacycentered on ough apolicyof . 46 national organizationsthatar 50 a eeping. Ther sovereign Quebec—aminorpower living swl sartikn ftheNATO and as well asarethinking of new and original initiatives topromoteneworiginal and ould bebetterspentonstr efor v po ations would have beeneven more 47 ve beenexpectedtoseekinfluence ship ininter wer. e , resources expendedonmilitary 48 44 Ther 45 efor national alliancesand ,anindependent e, , NA e T focused on engthening ,andthe O, 49 reflect theUN’s needs.” missions strategic their that NORAD alliances“so policies andne financialinstitutionsshouldreviewInternational their inAfrica. particularly sis onthepoorest countries, withempha- assistancepolicy, international of stone” “Sustainable humandevelopment must bethecorner- Foreign aid sanctionswhennecessary. unilateral if lations shouldbepunishedby multilateral sanctionsor tionships shouldbelinked tothoseobjectives andvio- aidandtraderela- Therefore, foreign policy. of stones” anddemocracyshouldbe“corner- Human rights Human rights rected to “international organizations thatwillbe rected to“international andthesaved resources redi- “should bescaledback” in NATO participation economic and Military NATO Council. Council shouldbeestablished toassisttheSecurity andanEconomicSecurity should beexpanded, Council TheSecurity the missionsare multilateral. objectivesto thosewithhumanitarian andonlywhen ticipation inpeacekeeping missionsshouldbelimited Quebec’s par- However, able totheUnitedNations. nent peacekeeping contingentshouldbemade avail- andaperma- processThe reform shouldbepressed, United Nations en ourpoliticaltieswiththecountr ne NAFT T imposing harsher tradesanctions.”imposing harsher “range from suspendingtradebenefitsalltheway to with badhumanr be str in NAFT Amer r countr defence b de esponsib r w ade v elopment andencourager mark ntee.Pressure shouldbeputoncountries engthened. c. Tradeica.” disputesettlementmechanismswith- A ies 55 le forg A should beextended udgets. t o u nepie,but alsotostrength- ets forourenterprises, “identified asha and the World Trade Organizationshould w ross… human rights violations.”ross… humanrights No bilateralaidshouldbeg pr ights records andpenalties could o g rams shouldfocusonhuman 51 ving committedorbeen “not onlytoopenup 54 ecipients totr 52 ies of i ven to 53 Latin im called upon to play a greater rôle in conflict resolu- ments…. We consider that NORAD would be a spe- tion.” The two F-18 squadrons dedicated to NATO cial means of linking our economic and trade interests duty should be dismantled, contributions to the fund- to military alliances that can give permanence to the ing of joint AWACS systems ended, and contributions political stability taking form in Central and South to infrastructure programs reduced—but a full politi- American countries.” Specifically NORAD should cal presence in NATO continued. NATO should be establish a “common air, land and sea detection and transformed into a “regional alliance which would surveillance network,” and in support of the United focus more on peacekeeping missions in the European Nations should be “responsible for organizing peace theater.” NATO’s mission should be altered so that its missions in the Americas” with a strong focus on efforts are “devoted primarily to carrying out peace- counter-narcotics action.57 keeping missions under the aegis of the UN.” A greater emphasis should be placed on the Partnership The Arctic for Peace initiative and the rapid integration of former The Arctic should be demilitarized and enjoy a status East Bloc countries.56 similar to the Antarctic. NORAD systems can ensure the effectiveness of such an agreement.58 NORAD The Bloc called NORAD’s mission fundamental to Ballistic missile defense North American security, and said its mandate and The Bloc expressed opposition to “launching of resources “must be enhanced” and broadened to armed space systems and the placing of any anti-ballis- include “our economic partners in the rest of the tic missile system on Canadian territory or in aero- Americas and thus extend our economic agree- space above Canada.”59

Within the United States, the problem of gaining sovereignty. notion of Quebec sovereignty had But there was a degree of wishful

not been taken seriously because thinking in Quebec about NAFTA 6 0 0 it was thought to be unlikely. It was and the U.S. position on Quebec’s 2 y r a

also thought unwise to plan for admission to that system.… u “ n a such an improbable contingency A statement from President j N O lest the news of such an effort leak Clinton shortly before the referen- S A M .

out and encourage the separatists. dum made it clear that the United N T

Within Quebec, these “relationship States now took the matter of H G I W

issues” were understandably Quebec independence seriously D eclipsed by the more immediate and did not favor it. 9 10 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series UNITED STATES AN INDEPENDENTQUEBEC’S RELATIONSHIP WITHTHE pendence forse I I I I anddidnotfavorseriously it. Quebecindependence States now tookthematterof before thereferendum madeitclearthattheUnited took astatementfrom President Clintonshortly It positiononQuebec’s admissiontothatsystem. U.S. wishful thinkinginQuebecaboutNAFTA andthe Butthere was of adegree gainingsovereignty. lem of eclipsedbyunderstandably themore immediateprob- aratists. leakoutandencouragethesep- suchaneffort news of to planforsuchanimprobable contingencylestthe Itwas alsothoughtunwise was thoughttobeunlikely. sovereignty becauseit hadnotbeentaken seriously for suchrelationship. visualizedorplanned hadseriously Neither partner tobothcountries. themsurprising someof problems, United Statesprobably would have encountered early An independentQuebec’s relationship withthe Quebec aff dra toprotect Efforts itsown interests would have ests. inter- thedecisiononU.S. duetotheimpactof rily prima- United StatesandaQuebecpoisedtosecede, nQee betdt eaain thosegroups in Quebecobjectedtoseparation, groupsand aboriginals minority asseemedlikely, If, arrangements. these would want a strengthening tosee of Today theUnitedStates NORAD capabilities. principally defensearrangements, American existingNorth there wasof nodegradation The UnitedStateswould have wanted toensure All thisandmor Quebec–Canada economicandtradeag and thosear been r United StatesandMexicanconsentw Canada would have affectedtheUnitedStates. betweenAn economicarrangement Quebecand or otherk to benointer w ihnQee,tee“eainhpise”were these“relationship issues” Within Quebec, Quebec thenotionof Within theUnitedStates, Many problems would have between the arisen wn theUnitedStatesintointer re u navneo eaaini there were separationif orked outinadvance of equired forQuebec’s admissiontoNAFTA, air ey relationships. s rangements would alsofigure intoany e v v eral r ruption in North American trading American inNorth ruption en befor easons: e would have tohave been e the da 60 wn of nal Canadianand actual inde ould have reements. - length. shouldimmediately beatQuebec’s sideand positive… francophone nations…andinparticular “Intheevent thatthereferendum response is 1995, Frenchlater President Jacques Chirac said in January Asthencandidateand nized Quebecinany event. mission. located inQuebecthathadaNORADorNA equipment military the UnitedStates—forexample, ment’s federalassetsinQuebecwould have affected that theUnitedStatesprotect theirinterests. They would have certainly demanded federal debt. the of anapportionment of inquired abouttheterms Quebec’sThey would have andCanada’s debt. tion of citizens thenheldandstilldoholdaconsiderable por- U.S. For example, response. have dictatedtheU.S. andtheassessedimpactnodoubtwould been affected, interests would Numerous have U.S. by theseparation. caused America would inNorth minimizedisruption interest becauseit ment would beintheUnitedStates’ aquickandamicable agree- vulnerable third parties, affecting asinany “divorce” however, United States; economic andpoliticalrelationships would affectthe betweenAn agreement CanadaandQuebeconfuture The prospect of aCanada–Quebec agreement affected man ments w Quebec’ tin Canadatocon- totheabilityof national spacestation, theinter- of toconstruction Lawrence Seaway, the St. ments andar nations of Franceandtheother Furthermore, on separation. probablyfailing would have hadan acceleratingeffect f not inandof f ab ailure tonegotiatefavorable would probably terms act, acrimonious negotiationsthatwere acrimonious obviously act, eareetwt aaaddntlo od but withCanadadidnotlookgood, le agreement ue tomeetitsNATO andNORADcommitments. lic opinionandwould have attemptedtodoso. policyby mobilizingpub- knew how toaffectU.S. eo,ec ftheseissuesisdiscussedatgreater eachof Below, iial,aprineto theCanadiangovern- of apportionment Similarly, In 1995, s ould fall underconsiderable scrutiny.ould fall A blt omiti t hr fsuchcommit- ability tomaintainitsshare of La Francophonie Quebec–Canada ag Quebec’s prospects forreaching afavor- rangements ranging fromrangements ranging managementof y existing UnitedStates–Canadaag tefhv tpe needne In have stoppedindependence. itself likely would have recog- r eement w ould ha r T ee v O e - NORAD The NORAD agreement is the basis for U.S. and Canadian cooperation for air defense and space warn- Some relationship with a ing for North America. The United States would therefore have taken special interest in the disposition sovereign Quebec would have of Canadian federal assets located in Quebec that per- formed NORAD functions. Those assets included the been necessary to permit CF-18 fighter interceptors stationed in Quebec as well as various radar systems, including those dedicated to NORAD to meet its mission controlling internal air traffic. “ The relationship Quebec sought with NORAD requirements. would also have been of great interest. Some relation- ship with a sovereign Quebec would have been neces- sary to permit NORAD to meet its mission require- ments. Besides air defense, examples include anti- narcotics surveillance and cruise missile defense. support and recognize this new situation.”61 Indeed Quebec appeared to value the NORAD agreement, France had overtly and seemingly covertly supported and indeed would have been unable to maintain its Quebec’s independence for many years.62 own air sovereignty without it. Today, Quebec’s coop- eration would also be necessary to maintain internal NAFTA air defense. In addition, cooperation in surveillance Ultimately it would have been in the United States’ and control—whether or not through NORAD— interest for an independent Quebec to become a would be needed for management of disasters, as well member of NAFTA, but this could not have been as to protect the St. Lawrence, the Gulf of St. accomplished immediately since it would have Lawrence, the Hudson Strait, and Hudson’s Bay. required the agreement of the U.S. Congress and Adding Quebec to NORAD would have been pos- Mexico.63 Such negotiations would have proven to be sible. Already, NORAD integrates U.S. and Canadian complex and difficult, and held the potential to military personnel into a single operational structure, reopen many previously settled issues. Furthermore and such a system could accommodate Quebec per- any Canada–Quebec economic agreement would sonnel. A central issue, then and now, is whether have to have been consistent with the terms of the Quebec would be willing and able to find the resources NAFTA, thus serving to threaten or to preclude any necessary to support an active role for an independent

special Canada–Quebec arrangements. For there to be Quebec in the defense of North America. 6 0

no disruption of Quebec’s existing trading relations 0 under NAFTA, negotiations with the United States Minorities and native peoples 2 y r

and Mexico on accession would have to be completed Distrust of the intentions of the Parti Québécois a u

in advance of sovereignty. Thus, the Canada–Quebec among minorities and native peoples was widespread n a and the Quebec–NAFTA negotiations would have in Quebec before the 1995 referendum. Their misgiv- j

been interrelated and overlapping. ings were sharpened after the referendum results when N O

A complicating factor in the period of time leading former Premier attributed the sover- S up to the referendum was the continuing tendency of eigntists’ narrow loss to “the ethnic vote.” 64 While the A M

the Government of Quebec to dismiss the difficulty of Parti Québécois repudiated these remarks,65 they . such negotiations, indeed to assume (at least in public) nonetheless served to revive the question of who is a N T

that an independent Quebec could simply sign on to “real Quebecker,” and reinforced the idea, as a Globe H G the NAFTA agreement or would automatically and Mail editorial put it, that Quebec separatism is “a I W

become a part of it simply because Canada is a mem- kind of ethnic nationalism… exclusively of franco- D ber. These presumptions ignored the nature of phone Quebec.”66 ’s editorial NAFTA; nonetheless, they are illusions that persist in analysis and the ethnic groups’ fears were substantiated some quarters today. when Pierre Bourgault, a former advisor to Premier 11 12 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series “ aieu a utdi h eebr1 1995, was quotedintheDecember 1, Parizeau, so belie r Canada ortheUnitedStates. ubces u sJw,ItaliansandGreeks.” but asJews, Quebeckers, themselves as notus….[They]…don’t thinkof racists, They’re the Greeks whovote inanethnicblock. and Mail kne States’ eignty mightr non-francophones fr par in esignation, v v itself have beenin doubt. who Quebec andaw been faced withanisolated the United States could have declar cially inthecase of anunilateral the event of sovereignty (espe- impr would have maintained or and political agreement that have negotiated aneconomic that QuebecandCanada could problematic anditwas doubtful membership inNAFTA were The prospects for Quebec If remarksThose harsh willnotsoonbeforgottenin er estor concer tition Quebecsothatthosewhoopposed w v eignty minor e this in1995, policy b that theirr s oved onthestatus quo.…In ssyn,“tsteJw,theItaliansand “it’s theJews, as saying, e , ation o the the ity g ultimat emain intheirhomesandCanada. y y y n, mobilizing U contr certainly knowcertainly how toaffectUnited r oups andabor and addedw and the ights ar f om thepr ib e independence), uted tothedepar fut eakened Canada y e kno Besides causingP jeopar .S ure might . eight topr w pub ig o it no dized b vince inals inQuebec i pno.They lic opinion. w Theimpact . tur , y oposals to e incr Quebec ar fmore of 67 izeau’ Globe eased v 68 er - s Washington audiencein1994, F points: Matthew CoonComemadethefollowing Chief Grand Ina1995speechtoCree commission, ent. Quebectobecomeindepend- bound by adecisionof adjusted toexcludethoseopposed, anindependentQuebecbe of that theboundaries Party demand NotonlydidtheReform to acceptit. opposed toQuebecindependenceshouldnotbeforced The CanadaandintheUnitedStates. allies intherest of 96.3% voted tostay inCanada. without Canada; Quebec’s onwhethertheirfuture shouldbewithor They held theirown referendum before shortly I I I The Inuit articulated thesamepositionin 1997. The Inuit articulated lorie h su,syn nJnay2,19,that, 1996, saying onJanuary 26, also raisedtheissue, Intergovernmental Affairs government’s Minister of odeapeo whatthosegroups canaccomplish. good exampleof Quebechydroelectricity provides a thesaleof issue of Vermont andNew York from 1989 to1993onthe theCrees in onthedebateanddecision-making of reape rn he CoonCometolda GrandChief or example, consent inanewindependentstatewithorwithoutour incorporated Quebec… a It canbeseenthatourlandswere never historically willbe peoplesandourterritories Aboriginal Itisintendedthat resources willbemadeby others. peoplesandtheirlands Aboriginal concerning Once againitisintendedthatfundamentaldecisions our own peopleandtraditionallands… over we Cree jurisdiction willalsoassert pendence, inde- aunilateraldeclarationof In theevent of The Crees tookthepositionthatthey couldnotbe The argumentbegantogainground thatthose anddenialofourfundamental humanrights.breach canonlyachievement beaccomplishedthroughthe membershipshouldnotbegranted ifits nations.This of if andwhenitrequestsmembershipintheclub vigilantquestionsofQuebecand also you toasktough, ofthe need thesupport people… American We want We peoplesinQuebec Creesandtheotheraboriginal The non-francophonesandthenative peopleshave The Crees were strongly unitedonthisposition. y ato theentitycalledNew France or of part have nothesitatedtoexploit suchconnections. [emphasis intheoriginal]. 74 but thefederal 70 forcibly 72 73 71 69 “You can’t consider Canada divisible but the territory policy truth: Quebec independence would greatly of Quebec sacred. If there are native groups or regional complicate and perhaps unravel existing North municipalities who on an equally democratic basis American economic, defense, and other relationships decided they wanted to stay in Canada, you would have which are in the United States best interest to preserve to talk to those people.”75 Prime Minister Chrétien and strengthen. agreed that this analysis was “logical.”76 Carl Ek and Stephen F.Clarke of the Congressional A policy calling for the partitioning of Quebec in Research Service summed the matter up in a the event of independence would likely have driven December 19, 1994 report: francophone Quebeckers to more radical positions, possibly leading to civil unrest. As one columnist Quebec independence would unquestionably compli- noted at the time, such a policy is “almost impossible cate matters for U.S. policymakers. For example, in to achieve without severe social disruption… it will the short term, a split likely would disrupt the drive more francophone Quebeckers away from fed- economies of both Canada and Quebec. Because eralism…. Partition would be contested, perhaps vio- Canada is by far the United States’ largest trading lently, and it would succeed only with the application partner, any economic disturbance to the north could of force.”77 This analysis was echoed by Quebec’s set off commercial ripples in the United States; near- Minister for International Affairs : “If term economic adjustments that followed a break you take a decision that goes against the will of the might be slow, painful, and costly for the trade sectors majority of Quebec’s population, it will have to be of all three states.81 militarily imposed by force.”78 The Globe and Mail editorialized, “if Quebec votes to separate, its minori- The prospects for Quebec membership in ties will not go along placidly.”79 NAFTA were problematic and it was doubtful that Some places where sentiment for partition might Quebec and Canada could have negotiated an eco- have existed or emerged are on the United nomic and political agreement that would have States–Quebec border. Of particular interest is the St. maintained or improved on the status quo. In fact, Regis–Akwasasne Mohawk region straddling the given the prevailing atmosphere at the time, achiev- New York, Ontario, and Quebec borders. Prior to ing any agreement was unlikely. Thus, in the event 1995, American Indian reservations in this region had of sovereignty (especially in the case of an unilateral been trouble spots. The Mohawks at Akwasasne had a declaration of independence), the United States reputation for smuggling goods into Canada, includ- could have been faced with an isolated Quebec and ing weapons probably destined for other Mohawk a weakened Canada whose ultimate future might reservations near .80 itself have been in doubt.82 This probably remains

In short, minority and aboriginal discomfort with true today. 6 0

Quebec’s quest for sovereignty potentially posed a At a minimum, the United States would have been 0 threat to public order, and such groups potentially faced with a transitional period lasting several years 2 y r

could have drawn the United States into the contro- during which North American economic and other a u

versy. That potential persists. relationships might be in disarray while new relation- n a ships were worked out. U.S. good offices would prob- j

Quebec’s independence not in the United ably have been needed to complete this transition, N

States’ interest O

and this situation would have been greatly complicated S

In 1995, the possibility of an independent Quebec if there had been unrest in Quebec and disputes over A M caused the United States to wake up to a fundamental its borders. . N T H G I W D

13 14 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series selves.” tothisemotion-ladenissueour- becoming aparty for themomentnothingistobegainedby our our standard positionclearlybut by indirection since to the UnitedStates“willbebestserved by referring was that whichwas accepted, State, of Department [the U.S.].” it willinevitably affectfuture Quebecattitudestoward forces win ‘yes’ If will bebroadly resented inQuebec. eign inter the F point outthat him thatPremier RenéLévesque hadasked himto ultimately told failed.) thatMorin The consulgeneralreported sovereignty, alsoontheissueof dum, (The1980referen- preceding the1980referendum. StateCyrus Vance’s toCanadaintheweeks trip of Secretary toU.S. prior 1980, inApril Claude Morin Quebec’sand Minister Intergovernmental Affairs consulgeneralinQuebecCity diplomat andtheU.S. a distinguished versation between GeorgeJaeger, togaduie.We donotintendtoinvolvestrong our- andunited. They hopethatCanadawillremain pens inCanada. care aboutwhathap- “Americans cles) statedinpart, insomecir- (which becameknown asthe“mantra” Thatposition tion onQuebecandCanada in1983. years. for anumber of remained report classifiedandprivate resulting U.S. démarche cooperative neighbors.” interest clearlyliesinhavinglegitimate strong and best achieved byour remaining asilentfriend… Quebec]andthatlittleis [of do toeasetheproblem, “There islittletheUnitedStatescan Department, State commented inadespatchtotheU.S. Walton Butterworth envisioned thiswhenhe W. Ambassador U.S. In1965, strong andunitedCanada. Quebec sovereignty andhasconsistentlypreferred a The UnitedStateshasnever looked favorably upon Québécois governments inQuebec. worse—amatters traditionencouragedby Parti its views favoringCanadianunitypublicly lestitmake Butterworth’s policyandhadbeenrestrained instating THE POSITION OFTHEUNITEDSTATES The consulgeneral’s recommendation tothe The UnitedStatessubsequentlypublished itsposi- A theUnitedStateshadfollowed Until 1995, ederalist sidenow majorfor- willbeseenas ‘first lsi xml fthisdynamicisseeninacon- classic exampleof 84 eto’i eeedmcmag.Assuchit inreferendum campaign. vention’ rfsinly The conversation andthe professionally. h oeneto Quebec handled this The Government of “a significant[U 83 .S.] statementfavoring up began thinkingthatthepr separatism. Quebec asindifference oreven for assubtlesupport was by policy in beingmisinterpreted some U.S. Furthermore, the Quebecsituationlooked serious. by 1995, andthird, to intimidatetheUnitedStates; the lettertobecomepublic andappeared tobetrying Quebecallowed second, had beennoconversation; there First, episodeforseveralMorin–Jaeger reasons. selves Canadianissues.” ininternal tf,Sceayo State Warren went Christopher of Secretary staff, AmbassadorJames Blanchard andhisembassy U.S. remarkable. stating itbefore theCanadianParliament was president aU.S. remarks andtraditionaltheposition, b Blanchar stra in public. United StatespositiononCanadianunityclearlyand responsibility totheUnitedStates…” phone Quebeckers—will betemptedtoassign franco- those whodidvote Yes—a of clearmajority [of our collecti they would enterinto that Quebeckers are tomake, tions bepublicly perceived inthedecision asafactor remarks onQuebec. State Warren toprotest thelatter’s Christopher October18 of to Secretary 1995, wrote onOctober19, Landry Bernard Affairs International Minister of whenQuebecDeputyPremier and in1995, clumsily, years. rested foranumber of entirely for you todecide.” course, of recognize… thatyour politicalfuture is, but we relationship withastrong andunitedCanada, hasenjoyed itsexcellent my predecessorshave said, asmany of “TheUnitedStates, saying, Parliament, positioninaspeechto laid outthetraditionalU.S. hear aclearstatementof y .” This timetheoutcomewas very different from the nOtbr1,19,in response toadvicefrom 1995, On October18, Indeed the Landry affair may affair haveIndeed theLandry beenthefinal Landry wrote, in part, “Should American declara- “ShouldAmerican inpart, wrote, Landry publicly andvery The 1980gamewas played again, ale,i eray19,President Clintonhad 1995, inFebruary Earlier, his v w h eeedm yasi agn as is plausible, the referendum] by aslimmargin, 88 nsiuaigaUS eiin Ambassador decision. in stimulating U.S. a It w eiled thr d later wr ve memory.…If victory eludesthe victory Yes side ve memory.…If 87 as important thattheQuebecelectorate as important It now seemedadvisable tostatethe eat. ote htvr feno,i at I infact, That very afternoon, , “I certainly wasn’t“I certainly intimidated h ..ve fsecession. view of the U.S. esident mighthave tospeak 89 However mildthese 85 There thematter 86 further. In reply to a question from the press, weigh and resolve. The United States subsequently Christopher stated: went out if its way to stress this latter point. Then, on October 25, 1995, President Clinton I don’t want to intrude on what is rightfully an internal took a planted question on the Quebec matter at a issue in Canada. But, at the same time, I want to press briefing and said: emphasize how much we’ve benefited here in the United States from the opportunity to have the kind of When I was in Canada last year, I said that I thought relationship that we do have at the present with a that Canada had served as a model to the United strong and united Canada. I think it is probably useful States and to the entire world about how people of dif- for me to say that we have very carefully cultivated our ferent cultures could live together in harmony,respecting ties with Canada…. I think we shouldn’t take for their differences, but working together.This vote is a granted that a different kind of organization would not Canadian internal issue for the Canadian people to obviously have exactly the same kind of ties…. I do decide…. I can tell you that a strong and united want to emphasize the very, very important value that Canada has been a wonderful partner for the United we place—the high value we place on the relationship States. I have seen how our partnership works, how the that we have with a strong and united Canada.90 leadership of Canada in so many ways throughout the world works, and what it means to the rest of the world What is notable here, beside the emphasis, is the to that that there’s a country like Canada where things reference to a possible different relationship with a basically work. Everybody’s got problems, but it looks new kind of Canada. The intended message was that like a country that’s doing the right things, moving in Quebec ought not to assume that things would the right direction, has the kinds of values that we’d all remain unchanged in the event of secession—among be proud of.And they have been a strong and powerful other things, an indirect reference to Quebec mem- ally of ours.And I have to tell you that I hope that will bership in NAFTA. This statement of the U.S. posi- continue…. Now the people of Quebec will have to cast tion also pointed out that the Quebec question was an their votes as their lights guide them. But Canada has “internal issue in Canada,”meaning not one that only been a great model for the rest of the world… and I confronted Quebeckers, but one for all of Canada to hope that can continue.”91

CONCLUSION

In 1995, the foreign and defense policies of a sover- To the extent possible, an independent Quebec 6 0 eign Quebec would have focused primarily on the would probably have continued the traditional Canadian 0 2

United States and Canada. Initially, an independent policy of conducting relations with the United States in y r

Quebec’s highest priority in terms of policy goals a multilateral, rules-based context. Undoubtedly its pos- a u would have been to negotiate an economic and ture toward Canada would have been similar. n a political agreement with Canada, along with mem- A sovereign Quebec, for example, would probably j bership in the NAFTA. To avoid disruption in have followed in Canada’s footsteps in seeking to N O

North American relationships, these negotiations strengthen the international system, and similarly S would likely have involved the United States and might have benefited from multilateral links as coun- A M been initiated before independence. U.S. interests terweights to its larger neighbors. On the one hand, . N

would have been affected, and U.S. consent would Quebec would likely have concentrated on peace- T have been necessary for Quebec’s inclusion in keeping in various specialized forms; and on the other H G NAFTA. Such negotiations would have been diffi- might have tried to refocus NORAD and NATO in I W cult with no assurance of success. Failing to achieve that direction. Whether or not Quebec would have D economic and trade agreements with Canada and had the resources and the influence to significantly the United States, Quebec might have moved to redirect the policies maintained by those defense 15 independence anyway. alliances seems doubtful. 16 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series NOTES lent,” Unthinkable,” tions,” setsoutsecessioncondi- “Reform andSusanDelacourt, 1996; 1995). October5, Studies, International of Canada, secession 20proposalsforanewconfederation:A Vision fortheFuture Mail, has incr Canadians foreign-born Now thepercentage of 129. p. 1994), Canadian Pr woman show.” grandstand comment ontheaff Harvard’s thatChairman reports Thearticle subsequent 1995. and Mail 37; Canada ing CanadawithoutQuebec 1996,” forCanadain “Adoomsday scenario Newman, and Peter C. “Why Chrétien’s proposal won’t wash inthe West,” 94 e.Thedifference invotes was49.4% 50,498outof Yes. Theresults were 50.6%Noand exceedingly closevote. thereferendum inQuebecgiven the the outcomeof andby doingsoprobably influenced cy more explicitly, officialsstatedthispoli- U.S. 1995, During partnership. Canadian unityandstrength are centraltothebilateral a “Trouble intheNorth,” Dwight Mason, 1991; onCanada’s Forum Future, Citizens’ Wilkins, Liberal foeforunityr Society,” Keith Spicer, otel oebr2,1995. November 21, Montreal, o of anIndependentQuebec wn togaduie aaa andhasmaintainedthat strong andunitedCanada, .Rs oad Qee iiil,Chrétiensays,” “Quebecdivisible, RossHoward, 8. 6. 9. 4. .LansingLamont, 5. 1. John Ward, “Former PMkeeps “Former mum asscandalwidens,” John Ward, 1. The UnitedStateshasconsistentlysaidthatitprefers 2 uinBuhr,“Towards Quebec’s LucienBouchard, Sovereignty,”12. .JfrySmsn “Ottawa norole inimagin- hasearned Jeffrey Simpson, 7. 10. 1 uTahH uhWno,“BlocMP jumps on Tu Thanh Ha&Hugh Winsor, 11. 3. .Lce ocad ttmn,Press Conference, Statement, LucienBouchard, 2. J ohn Gra idea of Globe andMail No F Anthon Jr., Roh, Charles E. Québec Inter Globe andMail Maclean’s Ibid reape e ar opr “Thinkingthe Cooper, seeBarry or example, , eased to19%. aur 0 1996. January 30, , ahntn .. ue2,20,slide4. 2005, June 24, D.C., Washington, J Maclean’s v nay19,p 2. p. 1996, anuary ember 11, ,p 19. p. ., Refor ess at distinct,” y y , A etmagazine, West “P W New Country or No Country:A Strategy for orNoCountry:A New Country T rno,Jnay1,19,p 46. p. 1996, January 15, (Toronto), m national eople outsideQuebecfeelingabittr eebr2,19,p 17. p. 1995, December25, , ilson-Smith, Canada.com News P air tothepress was that“She’s aone- T rno,Arl1,19;FI Morton, F.I. 1995; 18, April (Toronto), ar 95 ioCrei,“West favors its Miro Cernetig, 1995; eebr1 1995; December1, , emarks, Earl H. Globe andMail, yo aaa aur 96 .1 and 1; p. January 1996, Canada, ty of Breakup (Washington: Center for Strategic and CenterforStrategic (Washington: Foreign Service Journal Foreign Service , al19,p 30. p. Fall 1995, The ImplicationsforU , ” ” a 90 the May 1990; Fr Globe andMail, Globe andMail, Vsoso an Ex-tinct( “Visions of NwYr:W.W.(New York: Norton, y , Br , Apr iefing for No l1,2005. il 10, v me 4 1995; ember 14, 20 Report Ambassador uy19,p. July 1993, , Realities about J December 8, .S.Trade Policy an uar fthe of Globe and y ucu- 18, Globe sic ) same asitwas then. secession would alsolikely bemuch the States view of TheUnited similar tothosethatexistedin1995. the UnitedStatesandwithCanadawould bevery on foreign anddefensepolicyonrelations with views itislikely thattheseparatists’ issue inthefuture, year,” outelectionthis “Bouchard rules byreported RhéalSéguin, pr anearly Bouchard seemstohave outthepossibilityof ruled 6. oeg oiy oebr19.Hereafter citedas“ November 1994. Foreign Policy, CommonsReviewing Canadian Senate andtheHouseof Québécois Mail pr voters eligible voting. 4,669,554 castwith93%of tis20 oges ue35 2005. June 3-5, at its2005Congress, W Studies, andInternational Speech attheCenterforStrategic 1994. theSpecialJoint Committee onCanada’s Defence Policy, of 1995. Canada’s DefencePolicy,” etme ,19.Hereafter citedas“FinalReport.” 1995. September 5, Final, Rapport surlesQuestionsde Défense, Note deRecherche F and Pr yteMmeso the by of theMembers 1993). and Oppor just losttouchwithCanada?” Rousel inassociationwiththeconsulting fir 1995. November 21, Montreal, 14-15. pp. 1995, December 25, 05 .60. p. 2005, 2 o sme 02:p 7. p. 2(summer2002): no. 32, or incipes o sigo,DC,Mrh2 94 p 8-9. pp. 1994, March 2, D.C., ashington, ica lcini ttmn nJnay2,19,as 1996, vincial electioninastatementonJanuary 25, 20. settoplay “Martin unitycard,” Jane Taber, 19. 3 Anthony Wilson-Smith, 13. 5 la .Geg “CanCanadaSurvive?” Gregg, AllanR. 15. fQuebecindependencewere asamajor toreturn If 24. 2 e nsMlnr,“ubci uoe Constraints “QuebecinEurope: SeeInesMolinaro, 22. 8 e,forexample, See, 18. 4 efe ipo,“Hasthe government lostitsnerve or Jeffrey Simpson, 14. 5 vsBlne,CalsPiip ai,andStéphane Charles-PhilippeDavid, Yves Bélanger, 25. 17. Press Conference, Statement, LucienBouchard, 16. 21. 23. eign P , Apr Globe Her ior Allan Gr Le QuébecdansunMondeNouveau Ibid “T P , eter C ities fortheFuture Progr o olicy Dissent”; ebr ftheSpecialJoint Committeeon of Members il 14, eafter citedas“ . adaDfeetFrinPlc,DissentingReport ward aDifferent Foreign Policy, tunities, and Mail amme depa . g,“QuebecisGone,” egg, 2005. Ne ” wman, Amer aur 6 1996. January 26, , Bloc Québécois ys “The DissentingRepor , Un Project de Pays: Déclaration de Déclaration Un ProjectdePays: Bloc ican ReviewofCanadianStudies , Security inaChanging Security World, Special J op a . statement of cit Defense P Globe andMail ., p cit op. p . itCmiteo the oint Committeeof 46; ,p 18. p. ., ,” oeg oiy Principles Foreign Policy, K olicy Dissent. The Mnra:VLB, (Montreal: eith Spicer, the P W m , December 20, alrus ar MARCON, Maclean’s t ti Québécois by the , Globe and F Bloc ebr ” op cit Report Quatre uary v 92 , Bloc ol. ., p . Scénarios de Restructuration de la Défense D’un Québec Souverain, 59. Ibid., p. 78. September 27, 1995; and Étude sur la Ministère de la Défense 60. James J. Blanchard, Behind the Embassy Door: Canada, National, August 1995. Hereafter cited as “DND Study.” Clinton and Quebec (Chelsea, MI: Sleeping Bear Press, 1998), 26. Commission d’études des questions afférentes à l’accession du pp. 248-9. Québec à la souveraineté (Québec: Bureau de coordination des 61. Chirac quoted by Rhéal Séguin, “French leaders give études, 19 Decembre 2001.) lift to Parizeau,” Globe and Mail, January 27, 1995. 27. American Consulate General, Telegram 328, October 62. J.F.Bosher, The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997 10, 1995 (Confidential. Declassified). (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 28. Le Québec dans un Monde Nouveau, p. 77. 1999), pp. xii–xv, 22-31. 29. Ibid., pp. 79-80. 63. Roh, op. cit., p. 1. 30. Ibid., pp. 80-1; and Jacques Parizeau, “Perspectives on 64. Jacques Parizeau, Speech to supporters, October 31, Currency in a Sovereign Quebec,”speech before a Congress 1995, quoted in the Globe and Mail, November 1, 1995. of FOREX, Toronto, March 19, 1993. 65. Richard Mackie, “Parizeau’s ethnic view hurt cause, 31. Le Quebec dans un Monde Nouveau, pp. 74-75. PQ admits,” Globe and Mail, November 14, 1995. 32. Texts of the draft legislation in Globe and Mail, 66. Editorial, Globe and Mail, January 30, 1996. December 7, 1994 and September 8, 1995. 67. Richard Mackie, “Bourgault targets ethnic voters,” 33. About half of English-speaking Canada is opposed to Globe and Mail, December 1, 1995. economic association with Quebec according to a 68. For example, some sentiment for separation from CROP/CBC poll published in the Globe and Mail, September Quebec had been expressed in Montreal. See Colin Vaughn, 5, 1995. “Two cities in something of the same fix,” Globe and Mail, 34. Globe and Mail, December 1, 1995. December 18, 1995. This probably should not be taken too 35. The premiers had generally taken the position that it seriously, but people in other areas such as the Pontiac region would be impossible for a sovereign Quebec to maintain an on the Quebec-Ontario border near Ottawa might have economic partnership with Canada. Globe and Mail, developed similar feelings. See also Steven K. Holloway, September 8, 1995. “Canada without Quebec,” Orbis, Fall 1992, p. 542. See also 36. Jeffrey Simpson, “The country is full of loose talk Susan Delacourt, “Reform sets out secession conditions,” about an unimaginable idea,” Globe and Mail, January 31, Globe and Mail, December 1, 1995. 1996. 69. William Averyt, “Canada-US Electricity Trade and 37. Final Report, pp. 230, 232. Environmental Politics,” Canadian-American Public Policy 38. American Consulate General Quebec, Telegram 328, (University of Maine, December 1992), pp. 23, 25, 27. October 10, 1995. 70. Matthew Coon Come, Speech to the Cree Eeyou 39. Lucien Bouchard, “Towards Quebec’s Sovereignty,” Astchee Commission, quoted in the Globe and Mail, September pp. 13-14. 26, 1995. See also Holloway, op. cit., p. 542. 40. Le Québec dans un Monde Nouveau, pp. 77-78; Lucien 71. John Gray, “Crees vote 96.3% to stay with Canada,” Bouchard, “Towards Quebec’s Sovereignty,”pp. 11-12. Globe and Mail, October 26, 1995. 41. Jacques Parizeau, speech to the Council of the 72. American Consulate General Quebec, Telegram 36, Americas, New York, December 12, 1994 and Lucien February 17, 1997 (Unclassified, released November 21, 1997), Bouchard, “Towards Quebec’s Sovereignty,”are examples. . 42. Bloc Foreign Policy, p. 4 citing pp. 2 & 76-77 of the 73. Matthew Coon Come, speech at the Center for 6 0

majority report. Strategic and International Studies, quoted in the Globe and 0 43. Le Québec dans un Monde Nouveau, pp. 76-78. Mail, November 5, 1995. 2 y

44. Final Report, pp. iv, 107; DND Study, p. 38. 74. Reform Party, “A Vision for the Future,”p. 14. r a

45. Bloc Defense Policy Dissent, p. 73. 75. Susan Delacourt, “Liberals ponder the unthinkable,” u n

46. Final Report, pp. iv, xviii, 104-108, 297, 299; Bloc Globe and Mail, January 29, 1996. Mr. Bouchard’s reply to this a j Foreign Policy Dissent, pp. 73, 76-77. sally was, “Canada is divisible because it is not a real country.”

47. Bloc Foreign Policy Dissent, p. 4; Bloc Defense Policy Rhéal Séguin, Globe and Mail, January 29, 1996. N O

Dissent, pp. 72-3, 75, 78. 76. Ross Howard, “Slim vote can’t split Canada, PM says,” S

48. Final Report, p. 104, 107, 299. Globe and Mail, January 31, 1996. A M

49. Ibid., pp. 73, 108, 297. 77. Jeffrey Simpson, “The country is full of loose talk .

50. Bloc Foreign Policy Dissent., p. 4. about an unimaginable idea,” Globe and Mail, January 31, N

51. Ibid. 1996. T H

52. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 78. Barry Came, “Raising the Unity Stakes,” Maclean’s, G 53. Ibid., pp. 19-20. February 12, 1996, p. 23. I W

54. Ibid., p. 23. 79. Editorial, Globe and Mail, January 30, 1996. D 55. Bloc Defense Policy Dissent, pp. 72-73. 80. Charles Truehart, “Separatists in Quebec Facing 56. Ibid., pp. 75-76. Independence-Minded Indians,” Globe and Mail, February 6, 57. Ibid., pp. 76-79. 1995. 17 58. Ibid., pp. 77-78. 81. Carl Ek and Stephen F. Clarke, “The Quebec 18 CANADA INSTITUTE occasional paper series sages (meaningthatthe mes- person andasfirst tothemostseniorofficials), tribute marking (“Exdis, ahighlevel marking(“Immediate”), with ahighpriority They were sent StateforhisvisittoCanada. of the Secretary this point, pr given the that, however, …We would think, side ortheother. (September/October 1996). 95(ofdnil Declassified). 1965 (Confidential. fQuebecSecedes,” if American ConsulateGeneralQuebec, American Thesamepointwas alsomadein Declassified). dence. SentwithImmediateprece- 1980(Secret/Exdis. 22, April Sovereignty Question,” ha They seemnotto he apparently didnothave thesetelegrams. w General). sa anything might Secretary and tensionsheightenedinQuebec, comment andadvicewas that“withreferendum infullswing close referendum racetothe‘No.’” TheConsulGeneral’s itwas feltthatUShadtippeda tion would bemostintenseif infrancophoneQuebec….Thisreac- new anti-Americanism would bea said, Morin interference.’….Only result, certain Quebecker willperceive itas‘Ottawa-engineered outside will have disproportionately heavy impacthere….Average Canada inpresent super-charged pre-referendum atmosphere USpreference foraunited “...reiteration of had toldhim, Declassified). 2 94–886F, 4,note 236) citedinfootnote85below thatConsul 343, Thushisconclusioninbook(p. response tohisrequest. the g 0 Sce/xi.SentwithImmediateprecedence. 005 (Secret/Exdis. y ere important. esent v v e These telegrams were sent as a part of the effort toprepare theeffort wereThese telegrams of sentasapart 83. American EmbassyOttawa, American 83. 84. American ConsulateGeneralQuebec, American 84. 8 In telegram 185 the Consul General reported thatMorin 185theConsulGeneralreported In telegram to pr When Liséewr .CalsDrn “Will CanadaUnravel? PlottingaMap CharlesDoran, 2. r been r oup of ess onthisissuewilline olatility of These markingsw oebr1,19,p.5-6. pp. 1995, November 16, the better.” eleased tohim; teleg ” rams consider or Ex ote thebookcitedinfootnote85below, ubcoiin thelesssaidexplicitlyat Quebec opinion, Foreign Affairs y Congressional Research Service Report No. Report Service Congressional Research ecuti w er lhuh they shouldhave beenin although, ould signalthatthesetelegrams v e e per Distr ed forr vitab sonally from theConsul o.7,n.5 no. 75, vol. Despatch A-493, Despatch ib ly beexploitedb ution—meaning dis- elease tohimin Telegram 185, Telegram 189, January 6, April 21, April y one o a h oetmo the Yes side.) son was themomentumof F Har u shr osy Butonewonders. dum ishard tosay. these thoughts. United States, Canadian P evc eotN.96–3F, No. Report Service Referendum andFuture Prospects,” per to theireffort of the UnitedStatesadisingenuous lineaspart should notbecauseforalarm.” may beable togetratherthannoneandthatQuebec’s future he loaf thathewillhavethat heacceptsfact totake thehalf Lévesque wants confidence ustoknow instrict other words, andtheQuebecproblem‘resolved.’ shouldthusbe In him, ical PQelementsthenwillhave littlechoicebut tosupport Themore rad- Lévesque willcallsecondreferendum. claimed, couldbe Once‘specialstatus’ expectations. independentists’ from may cry befar said, Morin which, ‘joint representation,’ Lévesque willinendsettleforsomekindof in foreign affairs. s where Lévesque canclaimthat Quebechasachieved a‘special but atleasttopoint aspossible, talksasfar will betocarry Idea InsteadLévesque willengagetechnicaltalksgently. tions. hewinsreferendum elec- andfall frontation withOttawa if isnottoprovoke any avoidable con- discussed withothers, whichhehasnotsofar tion that“Lévesque’s real intention, alsotoldhimearlierinthesameconversa- thatMorin reports TheConsulGeneral Premier Lévesque’s views onseparatism. he drew from thatconclusiondeserve reconsideration. General Jaeger hadnotsentsuchmessagesandtheinferences au. hswl emc esta ht ae rjcs Even Thiswillbemuch lessthan tatus.’ White Paper projects. ebr suade theUnitedStatesnottocommentonr 89. 87. 6 Blanchard, 86. 91. 85. 88. 0 Blanchard, 90. 92. eClis 90,p 261. p. 1990), perCollins, Whether or not Morin andLévesque wereWhether ornotMorin tofeed trying T ay2,19,in 1995, 23, uary elegram 189isalsointeresting of forwhatitreported elegram Ibid., W J Ibid., Ibid., Cark EkandStephenF ean-François Lisée illiam J arliament 1943–1995 .199. p. .22 (Landry’s letterwas nottheonlyreason for 242. p. p . uy4 95,p 96. p. 1995), July 4, 248. Blanchar . lno,Sec oPrimn fCanada, SpeechtoParliament of Clinton, p cit., op. cit op. United StatesPresidential ,p.240-1. pp. ., d eebr1,19,p.,4. pp.1, 1995, December 19, .238. p. , made itclearthatthepr In theEy . Clark, (Otta Congressional Research e aEbsyo the wa Embassyof of theEagle “Quebec’ Ad s (T dresses tothe 1995 incipal r or efer onto: en ea - - THE CANADA INSTITUTE’S OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

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