Indo-Pacific Perspectives, March 2021

Our Staff

Editor In Chief Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell

Series Editor Dr. Peter Harris

Editors Major Matthew House. USA Mrilyunjaya Dubey Captain Christopher Little, USAF

Art & Design Dr. Achala Gunasekara-Rockwell 00 0 00 I n clo 2�P8c ifi C Perspectives March 2021 Introduction Taiwan's Security 1 Dr. Peter Harris, editor 5 Dr. Wu S�ang-su

"Rock-solid" An Interpretation of Michael Mazza Xi's Taiwan Policy ... 2 6 Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao

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Taiwan's Security in Status Quo? What the Emerging Indo Status Quo? 3 Pacific Order 7 Jessica Drun Dr. Sana Hashmi

Ir?esistible Trend OCEAN 4 Dr. Zuo Xiying sides of the Taiwan Strait will have to Introduction recognize that they belong to a single jurisdiction. The Past, Present, and Future of Cross–Taiwan However, in Taiwan there is little ap- 1 petite for unification if this means ab- Strait Relations sorption into the PRC. Even Taiwan- Dr. Peter Harris, editor ese politicians who have long believed in the principle of “One China” cannot accept their island becoming just another province of an authoritarian hegemon. For Taiwanese who oppose unification altogether, the prospect of a union with China is nothing less than an existential threat to their national identity and democratic system. Given the intractability of the Taiwan Question, it makes sense that US foreign policy is not ordered toward the end of encouraging a permanent political settlement between Beijing and Taipei—at least not in any meaningful sense. Instead, Washington’s priority is simply to deter the PRC from using military force to impose a settlement rom the vantage point of the on its terms. To be sure, the im- United States, it is difficult to portance of this goal should not be di- envisage a long-term solution minished. America’s political and mili- F tary power has helped foster stability to the problem of cross–Taiwan Strait relations. Beijing is adamant that Tai- across the Taiwan Strait for decades— wan must one day be incorporated into arguably averting a military confron- the People’s Republic of China tation of catastrophic proportions. (PRC)—ideally through a peaceful pro- Nevertheless, there are some serious cess of reconciliation, but via force if questions about the durability of US necessary. According to Chinese lead- policy toward Taiwan that demand ers, this is a fundamental question of consideration. Can the PRC be de- national sovereignty and territorial in- terred forever, or will leaders in Bei- tegrity and so there can be no compro- jing one day calculate that taking Tai- mise on the idea that, ultimately, both wan by force is preferable to a never- Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 1 Harris

ending standoff across the Strait? If when describing their geopolitical en- push comes to shove, is the United vironment. The Indo-Pacific regional States truly committed to the military construct seems to be rooted in the defense of Taiwan against a Chinese idea that states from India to Japan invasion? What about military actions share a common set of interests in the short of a full-scale invasion? Is there shadow of China’s rise. Most im- any prospect for a peaceful resolution? portantly, Hashmi argues, Indo-Pacific In this second Indo-Pacific Perspec- states share an interest in preserving tives roundtable, a distinguished a rules-based order. Given that Tai- group of experts suggest some answers wan is a democracy and a reliable fol- to these and related questions. lower of international rules, why is The roundtable begins with two as- Taiwan so often excluded from imagi- sessments of what Taiwan’s current nations of the Indo-Pacific? Giving political status means for the United Taiwan a formal role in the emerging States and the wider region. First, Mi- Indo-Pacific order would not be well chael Mazza provides a forceful justifi- received in Beijing, but Hashmi ar- cation for America’s continued com- gues that the benefits of including Tai- mitments to Taiwan. Mazza makes a wan as a responsible Indo-Pacific two-pronged argument: (1) Taiwan’s stakeholder should not be overlooked. political independence generates sub- Zuo Xiying provides a methodical stantial material benefits for the analysis of how the issue of cross- United States in terms of both secu- Strait relations is viewed from Beijing. rity and economics; and (2) the sur- While Mazza argues that Taiwan vival of democracy on at least one side should be considered a core issue by of the Taiwan Strait ought to be con- the United States, Zuo points out that sidered a moral imperative. Mazza’s Taiwan already is treated as a core arguments are clear and compelling, concern by PRC leaders. This will not an uncompromising rejection of the change. While Hashmi argues that idea that America’s self-interest can Taiwan can contribute to a free and be secured via retrenchment and re- open Indo-Pacific, Zuo cautions war in straint in East Asia. the Taiwan Strait could easily bring Sana Hashmi goes beyond the US- the regional security architecture China-Taiwan trilateral relationship crashing down. These are sober obser- to highlight the importance of Tai- vations about PRC strategic thinking wan’s political status in a regional that demand contemplation in the context. She notes that a growing United States and elsewhere. Zuo number of states now invoke the con- maintains that the United States can cept of a unified “Indo-Pacific” region have a positive role to play in Indo-Pacific Perspective │2 Introduction resolving the dispute between Beijing time. Xi would be an unlikely peace- and Taipei, but he provides a frame maker, to say the least. But in Liao’s for viewing cross-Strait relations that analysis, Xi’s focus remains on achiev- will be uncomfortable for many US- ing the so-called “China Dream”—that based analysts. is, a strong and confident PRC. Xi’s in- Turning to the question of the military terest in unification is not so urgent balance across the Taiwan Strait, Wu that he would sacrifice his domestic Shang-su gives a masterful overview agenda for a costly war over Taiwan. of Taiwan’s ability to withstand mili- Finally, Jessica Drun returns the fo- tary pressure from the PRC. Could cus to the Taiwanese side of the Strait. Taiwan retain control of its airspace in She points out that political actors in- the event of a Chinese assault? For side Taiwan have divergent views over how long could the island resist a full- the existing cross-Strait relationship, scale invasion? Wu gives a clear-eyed let alone the future political status of technical assessment of the military Taiwan. The concept of a “status quo” situation as it currently exists. He is important, given that parties to the makes several conclusions, including dispute often cry foul—and, on occa- the argument that Taipei’s defenses sion, have even threatened war— are currently deficient in some key ar- whenever the prevailing political set- eas, and that the prospect of US in- tlement between Beijing and Taipei is volvement in a cross-Strait confronta- placed in jeopardy. But what if there tion—which, he points out, would is no agreement over how to describe transform such a conflict into a much the status quo? According to Drun, the wider conflagration—is likely critical absence of an intersubjective agree- to deterring China from attempting a ment over how to interpret the cross- direct assault. Strait status quo has wide-ranging po- How likely is a military invasion of litical and diplomatic consequences. Taiwan? Based on her analysis of pub- Drun’s contribution is a fitting conclu- lic pronouncements by Xi Jinping, sion to the roundtable, encapsulating Hsiao-chuan Liao offers some reasons just how complex cross-Strait relations to be skeptical Beijing would resort to are—and just how difficult it will be a military “solution” in the imminent for Beijing and Taipei to resolve their future. Liao is pessimistic about the differences through negotiations. current and future state of cross-Strait What advice do the contributors have relations. She notes that Xi is commit- for Taiwan, China, the United States, ted to the idea of unification between and other regional powers? None the PRC and Taiwan and that his would disagree with Winston Church- rhetoric has become more forceful over ill that “meeting jaw-to-jaw is better Indo-Pacific Perspective │3 Harris than war,” but they each have different views on how diplomacy can be re- turned to center stage. All are somewhat pessimistic about the future, even if they support the basic idea that war can be avoided through adroit political leadership and strategic thinking on all sides. That, at least, is something for far-sighted and peaceable leaders to build upon. Not much, but not nothing. ■

Dr. Peter Harris Dr. Harris is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University, where his teaching and research focus on international security, international relations theory, and US foreign policy. He serves as the editor for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Af- fairs’ new “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” series.

Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- ment of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │4 That rock-solid commitment has en- “Rock-solid” dured for decades, even as the particu- lars of Taiwan policy have evolved. In America’s Past and the Formosa Resolution of 1955, Con- 2 Present Commitment gress pre-authorized Pres. Dwight D. to Taiwan Eisenhower to use force in defense of Michael Mazza Taiwan, noting that armed attack “would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific area” and that “the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean.”1 The American switch in diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 did not fundamentally

change that outlook. The Taiwan Rela- n 23 January 2021, 15 Peo- tions Act, passed with veto-proof ma- ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) jorities and signed into law by Pres. Oaircraft flew into the south- Jimmy Carter, described US policy west corner of Taiwan’s air defense thusly: identification zone (ADIZ). Thirteen 2. to declare that peace and stability in the aircraft repeated the exercise the fol- area are in the political, security, and eco- lowing day. The US Department of nomic interests of the United States, and are State called on Beijing “to cease its matters of international concern; [. . .] military, diplomatic, and economic 4. to consider any effort to determine the fu- pressure against Taiwan” and, in what ture of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat must have been reassuring words to to the peace and security of the Western Pa- leaders in Taipei, described American cific area and of grave concern to the United “commitment” to Taiwan as “rock- States . . .2 solid.” Those are strong words from Why is the US commitment to Taiwan the new Biden administration, espe- “rock-solid” and why must it remain cially given the lack of a legal obliga- so? The commitment has its origin in tion to defend Taiwan and the lack of the aftermath of World War II, as formal bilateral diplomatic ties. American strategists were establish- Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 5 Mazza

ing a forward defense perimeter to en- independence will remain a key US in- sure the events of 7 December 1941, terest and driver of American policy in would never be repeated. Gen Douglas Asia. MacArthur, fretting that Taiwan The PRC’s annexation of Taiwan might fall into communist hands, in a would, moreover, usher in a new re- memorandum transmitted to Wash- gional order in Asia—one that would ington just 11 days before the out- be conducive to the interests of no one break of the Korean War, compared but Beijing and its hangers-on. The the island to an “unsinkable aircraft presiding, if currently contested, order carrier and submarine tender ideally is marked by widespread (though not located to accomplish Soviet offensive unanimous) embrace of an under- strategy and at the same time check- standing of law of the sea grounded in mate counteroffensive operations by both customary law and the United United States Forces based on Oki- Nations Convention on the Law of the 3 nawa and the Philippines.” Seven Sea, liberal approaches to interna- decades later, that logic still holds rel- tional trade, and a preference for the evance. peaceful settlement of disputes. Some Were China to one day occupy Taiwan, in Asia may bristle that the current the defense of Japan and the Philip- order has long been dominated by the pines, both US allies, would become United States, but it is hard to argue far more complicated. China would with results: the emergence of several bolster its ability to control the South high-income countries in the decades China Sea waterways should it choose since World War II, healthy growth in to do so. Most troubling of all, the PLA several developing economies, and would for the first time have unim- more than four decades without great- peded access to the Pacific Ocean, al- power war. lowing it more easily to threaten But a successful PRC occupation of Guam, Hawaii, and the continental Taiwan would overturn the norms gov- United States. PLA ballistic missile erning the current regional order. The submarines might ply the waters of Asia-Pacific would fast become a the Western Pacific, allowing China to realm in which might makes right; in pose a more potent nuclear weapons which traditional conceptions of free- threat to the United States. dom of navigation are likely jetti- As long as Washington assesses that soned; in which security competitions American security is best served by grow in intensity, to the detriment of defending forward—an approach that economic prosperity; and in which has served the United States well over China increasingly sets the terms of the past 70 years—Taiwan’s de facto trade for those inside and outside the Indo-Pacific Perspective │6 “Rock-solid”

region. Such an outcome would not be because it is a thriving liberal democ- conducive to the national security of racy—one whose freedom is threat- the United States as it is traditionally ened by a much larger authoritarian understood. neighbor. American leaders have long Economic wellbeing is another key assessed that a world in which democ- driver of the American commitment to racies are prevalent is a world that is Taiwan. US economic interests in Tai- conducive to US interests and national wan are significant. Taiwan is consist- security. And although a crusading ently a top-10 trading partner. Accord- impulse has waxed and waned as a ing to the Office of the United States driver of American foreign policy, it Trade Representative, Taiwan was has arguably never been absent. En- America’s 13th-largest goods export suring Taiwan’s survival as a de facto market in 2019 and the 6th-largest ag- independent democratic state, then, is ricultural export market.4 critical if Washington wants to shape a world in which the United States What is more, Taiwan occupies a key can thrive. position in global tech supply chains. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing The existence of Taiwan’s democracy Company, LTD, the world’s largest serves as proof-positive that there is dedicated semiconductor foundry, is a nothing incompatible between a Chi- chip supplier for major American com- nese-speaking polity and self-govern- panies from Advanced Micro Devices ment. Quite the contrary. If democracy to Qualcomm and from Apple to is one day to come to China—a hope, Nvidia. Bloomberg News described even if not, at this point, an explicit “Taiwan’s grip on the semiconductor aim of American policy—it may be in business” as “a choke point in the no small part due to dissidents and re- global supply chain.” Its dominance of formers looking admiringly at, learn- the industry, moreover, has “helped ing from, and drawing inspiration Taiwan form a comprehensive ecosys- from Taiwan’s own experiences with tem around it: ASE Technology Hold- one-party rule, liberalization, and ing is the world’s top chip assembler, democratic consolidation. while MediaTek has become the larg- Taiwan is a country of only 24 million est smartphone chipset vendor.”5 Put people. It lies less than 100 miles from simply, if the United States were to the PRC coastline and is separated lose access to Taiwan’s innovators and from the United States by the entire manufacturers, the American tech in- width of the Pacific Ocean. Its quarrel dustry could be paralyzed. with China has its roots in a civil war Last, but certainly not least, Taiwan is that ended in 1949 and Cold War con- important to the United States ditions that have persisted despite the Indo-Pacific Perspective │7 Mazza

Cold War’s end. With US–China tensions on the rise across multiple facets Michael Mazza of the bilateral relationship, some may Mr. Mazza is a visiting fellow at the Ameri- question whether Taiwan is worth the can Enterprise Institute and an expert on US trouble for Washington. It is. Indeed, defense policy, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, Taiwan is where various points of fric- and Chinese military policy. tion converge. It is arguably where American and Chinese national secu- Disclaimer rity concerns, visions of regional order, The views and opinions expressed or implied economic and technological interests, in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc- and core values most directly collide. tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- Of course, the country is also home to ment of the Air Force, Air Education and freedom-loving people who want noth- Training Command, Air University, or other ing more than to live in peace with agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents. their neighbors. The United States has every reason to ensure Taiwan’s citizens can continue doing so. ■

Notes 4 Figures are taken from the Office of the United States Trade Representative, “U.S.-Taiwan Trade 1 See: “Joint Resolution by the Congress,” 29 January Facts,” https://ustr.gov/. 1955, https://history.state.gov/. 5 Alan Crawford, Jarrell Dillard, Helene Fouquet, 2 For the full text of the Act, see: Taiwan Relations and Isabel Reynolds, “The world is dangerously de- Act, 1 January 1979, https://www.ait.org.tw/. pendent on Taiwan for semiconductors,” Japan 3 See: “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambas- Times, 26 January 2021, https://www.japan- sador at Large (Jessup),” 25 June 1950, https://his- times.co.jp/. tory.state.gov/.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │8 Pacific region are reliant on—and Taiwan’s have tilted toward—either of the two Security in superpowers. 3 Amid growing competition between the Emerging the United States and China, the Indo-Pacific region has gained signifi- Indo-Pacific cant prominence. Interestingly, the countries that are trying to avoid en- Order tanglement in the US–China confron- Dr. Sana Hashmi tation—which are not interested in choosing one major power over the other—are also supporting the idea of the Indo-Pacific. The recently released Association of Southeast Asian Coun- tries (ASEAN) outlook on the Indo-Pa- cific region, shows a growing ac- ceptance of the Indo-Pacific construct. Several other countries—including those of the Quadrilateral Security Di- alogue (Quad)—have embraced the Indo-Pacific as a means to preserve a rules-based order in the twenty-first century. These developments are

shaped, in part, by the growing US– China competition that reached a high he past few years have seen level during the Trump administration dramatic changes taking place and is likely to be continued under T in Indo-Pacific geopolitics, Pres. Joe Biden. such as China’s rise, Beijing’s increas- Taiwan’s security is directly linked ingly assertive foreign policy, and the with the United States and its rela- erosion of American supremacy. As tions with China. Any major change in the region’s two major powers, the the regional or bilateral dynamics will changing relationship between China have a direct impact on Taiwan. Tai- and the United States impacts re- wan has been quick in sensing the gional and international security dy- growing importance of the Indo-Pacific namics and the affairs of small and region on strategic, diplomatic, and middle powers. After all, most of the economic fronts. As a result, Taiwan small and middle powers of the Indo- has expressed its willingness to play Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 9

Hashmi an active role in shaping the region. four years of Tsai’s government have While Taiwan is yet to devise its own witnessed a stronger relationship be- blueprint for the Indo-Pacific region, tween Taiwan and its Indo-Pacific such a step will likely materialize partners. sooner rather than later. Taiwan’s ex- A key aspect of Taiwan’s strategic ties pression of interest in joining the in the region is its relationship with Indo-Pacific region has been suffi- the United States. Over the past four ciently showcased by Taiwan’s presi- years, the Taiwan–US relationship dent Tsai Ing-wen, who on several oc- has gained in considerable strategic casions has stated that Taiwan can weight. During the Trump administra- play an instrumental role in the re- tion, Taiwan became more prominent gion. Speaking at the 2020 Taiwan– in US foreign policy pronounce- US–Japan Trilateral Indo-Pacific Se- ments—even though at times Trump curity Dialogue on 8 December, Tsai appeared to use Taiwan as a card in urged the Indo-Pacific countries to his China agenda. The pro-Taiwan ini- work together toward a resilient and tiatives brought forth by the Trump peaceful future. She stated, “Leverag- administration are, in all likelihood, ing expertise and capabilities, Taiwan going to be carried forward by the and its like-minded partners in the re- Biden administration. At least, recent gion can effectively address the chal- statements by Biden’s advisers are in- 1 lenges ahead.” dicative of continuity. There has also Taiwan—like other major rule-abiding been speculation that the Biden ad- stakeholders—advocates a rules-based ministration would pay more attention order, inclusiveness, and transpar- to Taiwan, as to give it a greater place ency; its COVID-19 response is an im- in the Indo-Pacific deliberations. portant example in that context. Tai- America’s response has been amplified wan’s emerging response seems by Taiwan’s proactive engagement aligned with the officially declared pol- with the Indo-Pacific countries during icies of the US (Free and Open Indo- the COVID-19 pandemic. Pacific), India (Act East Policy), and A region as diverse as the Indo-Pacific Japan (Partnership for Quality Infra- should not forget the variety of mutual structure). So far, only the United concerns and common interests that States has formally included Taiwan include traditional and nontraditional in its Indo-Pacific strategy; while be- security issues. One such common con- ing open to the idea, other leading cern has continued to be the rise of Indo-Pacific countries have shied away China. If the COVID-19 pandemic from officially mentioning Taiwan as a made countries of the region realize partner country. Nevertheless, the last how interconnected they were on the Indo-Pacific Perspective │10

Taiwan’s Security in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order health front, then the perception of avoids war, yet clearly conveys our resolve to 2 unprovoked Chinese aggression has protect our democracies. led to an increasing realization of vul- Such statements by world leaders nerabilities on the security front. Over were common throughout 2020, as the past year—amid a global pan- they struggled with how to deal with demic, no less—China’s trade war the pandemic. Simultaneously, coun- with the United States, border conflict tries such as India, Australia, and with India, trade boycotts of Austral- Canada during this time began to feel ian goods, and the encroachment into the brunt of China’s aggression. The Taiwanese and Vietnamese territories Indo-Pacific construct has resulted in has portrayed China in an increas- giving countries a platform to deal ingly aggressive light on the world with common challenges in a seem- stage. ingly intractable situation. The Indo- Pacific is not premised on an overtly The idea of an Indo-Pacific region— anti-China component and is even spurred by former Prime Minister of open to including China as a responsi- Japan Shinzo Abe’s idea of bringing ble stakeholder in the future. Never- together the Indian and Pacific theless, it is true that growing Chinese oceans—has created anxieties for aggression has been a common con- China. China feels threatened by the cern for those countries advocating for emerging Indo-Pacific order—fearing a rules-based order. It is somewhat marginalization. While support for the puzzling, despite convergent interests notion of an Indo-Pacific region de- and shared concern in the face of the rives from much more than just “China threat,” that Taiwan—a demo- shared concerns over China’s rise, it is cratic country that is aligned with the true that China has played an instru- United States and its other allies—is mental role in shaping countries’ re- still not often a part of the Indo-Pacific spective visions of what the Indo-Pa- official discourse. Protecting Taiwan’s cific region needs to look like. In Au- integrity is vital to preserving a rules- gust 2020, Tsai used her keynote ad- based and inclusive order where peace dress at the 2020 Ketagalan Forum to and stability are of the utmost im- state: portant values. It is time for like-minded countries, and democratic friends in the Indo-Pacific region As the Indo-Pacific region evolves, it and beyond, to discuss a framework to gener- will open new opportunities for Tai- ate sustained and concerted efforts to main- wan to diversify its partnerships and tain a strategic order that deters unilateral aggressive actions. We need a strategic order expand cooperation with countries of that encourages cooperation, transparency the extended region. It is equally im- and problem-solving through dialogue, not portant for Taiwan to gather support threats of war. We need a strategy that Indo-Pacific Perspective │11

Hashmi from fellow democracies in the Indo- countries. This will allow more re- Pacific region. While Taiwan has been gional powers to learn from Taiwan’s able to secure bipartisan support in best practices and for Taiwan to the United States in recent years, the demonstrate its acclaimed “Taiwan Biden administration’s focus, for at model.” Like other major stakeholders, least the first few months, is likely to Taiwan’s policy has been open, trans- be on containing the pandemic and parent, and inclusive. Its participation other domestic issues. This does not in regional frameworks will only mean the Biden administration will strengthen the rules-based Indo-Pa- lose interest in the Indo-Pacific. The cific order. appointment of an “Indo-Pacific czar” Most importantly, Indo-Pacific nations and other renowned foreign policy and must recognize that, if China escalates security experts in the new admin- a military conflict with Taiwan, then istration demonstrates that the such a move would disrupt the peace United States is attempting a renewed and stability of the entire region. This “pivot” to Asia. The Indo-Pacific region scenario is not in the best interests of will continue to remain the top prior- the countries of the region. Integrating ity in US foreign policy. It will be criti- Taiwan more formally into regional cal for Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific deliberations and processes would countries to reorient its joint focus. It make countries more aware about the is in the interests of regional powers to shared risks of a cross-Strait conflict. facilitate Taiwan’s greater participa- In turn, this might pressure the region tion in collective diplomacy—leading to find ways to avoid such a situation. to a robust security network against As far as Taiwan is concerned, a common threats. clearly articulated Indo-Pacific policy In the twenty-first century, countries would serve its interests better, plac- are seeking beyond traditional ways of ing it amid all critical debates of the cooperation to elevate relationships. region. ■ New technologies and new challenges have led to this novel, yet challenging Dr. Sana Hashmi phase in international relations. Some countries are opting for “minilateral” Dr. Hashmi is Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She is the author mechanisms within the Indo-Pacific of China’s Approach towards Territorial Dis- region. The Global Cooperation and putes: Lessons and Prospects. Training Framework should be expanded beyond its current member- ship of the United States, Japan, and

Taiwan, to include more Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │12

Taiwan’s Security in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order

Notes 2 “President Tsai attends the Ketagalan Forum－ 2020 Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue”, Office of the 1 “President Tsai Attends Opening of 2020 Taiwan- President of Republic of China (Taiwan), 8 August US-Japan Trilateral Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue”, 2020, https://english.president.gov.tw/. Office of the President of Republic of China (Taiwan), 8 December 2020, https://english.president.gov.tw/.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │13

Taiwan,1 can the United States reach Irresistible a grand bargain with China,2 and does US policy toward Taiwan need to be Trend unambiguous?3 Behind these discus- 4 sions lies a core question: Is Taiwan’s The US–China security a core concern of the United Interest Asymmetry States? Like in the United States, and Taiwan’s Future there are also different views in Dr. Zuo Xiying China. This article will try to provide an interpretation. The Taiwan Issue in American Foreign Policy In the context of China’s rapid rise, a growing number of US-based analysts have endorsed Taiwan as a core concern in the past decade. This trend is related to two factors. First, US policy toward China has undergone fundamental changes. Since the Obama administration, the United States has gradually adjusted its China policy, trying to strengthen US–Taiwan rela- aiwan is one of the core issues tions, while dealing with the unstable in US–China relations. Amer- situation in the Taiwan Strait. Second, ica’s position on the Taiwan is- mainland China’s desire for reunifica- T tion will be promoted accordingly. sue has been the weathervane in the Western Pacific. This was true during With Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen’s rejec- the early stages of the Cold War, in tion of the 1992 Consensus, Beijing US–China strategic cooperation after has switched its guideline for promot- the Sino-Soviet split, and in the con- ing reunification from “placing hope on temporary context of China’s rise. the Taiwanese” to “placing more hope China’s rise after the Cold War.. In on the mainland itself.”4 the past decade, with the deterioration In the United States, analysts debate of US–China relations, some US ana- whether Taiwan’s security is a core lysts have discussed crucial issues con- concern or not. Supporters of this idea cerning Taiwan. Three profound ques- point to the island’s strategic value for tions needing further thought are containing mainland China and to the should the United States abandon issue of American credibility. Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 14 Irresistible Trend

Opponents are concerned about the China embodies the fundamental in- worst-case scenario: a showdown be- terests of the Chinese nation.”5 On tween China and the United States. this point, there is a fundamental con- This situation will ascertain the high flict between China and the United costs that the United States will have States. to pay if it is determined to intervene Historically, the United States has to prevent a nonconsensual reunifica- abandoned and revalued Taiwan sev- tion. However, Taiwan’s status as an eral times since World War II. In Chi- issue in American foreign policy is dy- nese interpretations, Taiwan is a vital namic. Whether Taiwan’s security is a card that the United States can use to core concern of the United States de- contain China. However, China and pends not only on the historical frame- the United States have asymmetric in- work but also on the United States, terests on this issue.6 For China, Tai- Taiwan, and mainland China. In dif- wan is related to the nation’s reunifi- ferent periods, the answer will not be cation, which is a core issue of sover- the same. eignty upon which there can be no To be sure, Taiwan is related to some compromise. Regarded as one of vital interests of the United States, China’s constant core interests, Tai- and the cost of abandoning Taiwan wan is at the forefront. For the United would be high. The United States States, of course, Taiwan is also criti- would lose an essential tool with cal. Still, its significance is much lower which to contain China in the Asia-Pa- than for China, which means it is a cific region. Meanwhile, it would make wavering core interest. Under some a significant dent in the US commit- extreme circumstances in China and ment to its alliances, arguably weak- the United States, interests might be ening America’s reputation in this re- compromised. The constant core inter- spect. However, China is politically op- est is one of the fundamental differ- posed to the United States regarding ences between Beijing’s One-China Taiwan as its core interest and even Principle and Washington’s One- more opposed to the United States re- China Policy: policies can change, garding Taiwan as part of its sphere of whereas principles do not. influence. Almost all Chinese people Will the US Intervene in a Future agree that the Taiwan issue concerns Taiwan Strait Conflict? China’s sovereignty. As stated in China’s white paper, The One-China Another critical issue is whether the Principle and the Taiwan Issue, “[s]et- United States would intervene by tlement of the Taiwan issue and reali- force if there were a crisis across the zation of the complete reunification of Taiwan Strait in the future. This question seems easy to answer. In the Indo-Pacific Perspective │15 Zuo

Three Communiqués, the United abandon Taiwan. After all, the United States has repeatedly reiterated its in- States has always been ambiguous terest in the Taiwan issue’s peaceful about the form and extent of any in- settlement. In the Taiwan Relations terventions it would take in Taiwan’s Act, the United States has also clearly defense; grave concern is a phrase expressed its “grave concern” about with a wide range of policy space. the use of nonpeaceful means.7 How- Therefore, it is uncertain how the ever, the United States’ stated inten- United States might intervene in fu- tion is one thing, and its realistic ture conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, choice when facing the conflict is an- particularly if Washington judged the other. The tangible answer to this costs of intervention to be high. An in- question is that it depends on the pre- tervention could be military in nature, vailing US calculation of its benefits but it could also take the form of polit- and costs. ical isolation or economic sanctions The United States has abandoned its against Beijing. allies twice in the Asia-Pacific: Pres. America’s conflicted position on Richard Nixon’s withdrawal from whether it would intervene militarily South Vietnam in 1973 and Pres. in the Taiwan Strait has implications Jimmy Carter’s establishment of dip- for China. According to common sense, lomatic relations with the People’s Re- it is unrealistic for China to formulate public of China and disconnection with its strategy and policy to assume that the Republic of China in Taiwan in the United States would not intervene 1979. These two abandonment in- in Taiwan. Instead, China must pre- stances have in common that they pare for the worst-case scenario: a US were both high-cost and highly benefi- military intervention in China’s reuni- cial from the US perspective. fication. The expectation of US inter- It is unlikely that the United States vention will be a constant in Chinese will choose to abandon Taiwan to be- strategic planning. This is not to say cause it eyes strategic gains. The stra- that China regards the United States tegic opportunity that China and the as an adversary. Rather, the expecta- United States had to balance against tion of US intervention is merely una- the Soviet Union during the Cold War voidable in the context of US equivoca- jointly will not repeat. Additionally, tion and ambiguity. the possibility of a grand bargain be- China welcomes the United States to tween China and the United States in play a constructive role in China’s the Western Pacific is also very low. peaceful reunification. As Huang However, China may impose high Jiashu, a professor at the Renmin costs to compel the United States to University of China, pointed out, “the Indo-Pacific Perspective │16 Irresistible Trend

most ideal choice is to let the United economic sanctions, and military in- States help us in the final peaceful tervention. For the United States, the settlement of the Taiwan issue. If such price is bound to be very high. The fi- a goal can’t be achieved, at least we nal result will most likely be that the should not let the United States be- United States cannot stop China’s reu- come an obstacle. If such a goal still nification process militarily. Washing- can’t be achieved, at least we can let ton can only impose costs on China the United States play a positive role through political isolation and eco- in opposing Taiwanese independ- nomic sanctions to make up for its loss ence.”8 In the past, China and the in reputation. United States accepted the ambiguity Conclusion of each other’s positions. However, with the growing intensity of strategic There is a vast asymmetry of interests competition, all parties’ policy space is between China and the United States getting smaller, and the Taiwan Strait on the Taiwan issue, which leads to crisis is emerging.9 the asymmetry of resolve. That will be the crucial factor affecting the situa- The future conflict between China and tion in the Taiwan Strait in the future. the United States on Taiwan is a ri- If one day, China and the United valry of strength and a clash of re- States must make independent deci- solve—a contest between China’s de- sions on the future of Taiwan, whether termination to uphold its state sover- Taiwan’s security is a core concern of eignty and the United States’ resolve the United States will become a sim- to defend its commitment. As the ple choice. In this regard, some US- power gap between China and the based analysts, such as Barry R. Po- United States shrinks, the willpower sen, John J. Mearsheimer, and contest will become a decisive factor. Charles Glaser, have pointed out the This historical trend is apparent. The historical trend. Unfortunately, their strategy of using Taiwan to contain view is not mainstream in the United mainland China may entangle the States, and it is difficult to convert United States in a disastrous direct into foreign policy. ■ conflict between China and the United States, turning Taiwan into a “strategic high-risk asset” of the United Dr. Zuo Xiying States.10 Dr. Zuo is Associate Professor of Interna- tional Relations at the School of Interna- If China becomes determined to start tional Studies, Renmin University of China. the agenda of reunification, its leaders will do so prudently but ready to bear any costs, including political isolation, Indo-Pacific Perspective │17 Zuo

Disclaimer Training Command, Air University, or other The views and opinions expressed or implied agencies or departments of the US govern- in JIPA are those of the authors and should ment or their international equivalents. not be construed as carrying the official sanc- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- ment of the Air Force, Air Education and

Notes 4 Xin Qiang, “Having Much in Common? Changes and Continuity in Beijing’s Taiwan Policy,” Pacific 1 Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for Review, 5 June 2020, https://doi.org/. U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 5 Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of Press, 2014), 102–04; John J. Mearsheimer, “Tai- the State Council, The One-China Principle and the wan’s Dire Straits,” National Interest, no.130 (2014), Taiwan Issue, February 2000, http://www.taiwan.cn/. 29–39; and John J. Mearsheimer, “RIP Taiwan?” Na- 6 Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: De- tional Interest, 24 July 2018, https://nationalinter- terrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Re- est.org/. lations,” International Security 27, no. 2 (2002):48– 2 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?: 85. Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign 7 Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 10 April Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 80–91; Nancy Bernkopf 1979, https://uscode.house.gov/. Tucker and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Should the United 8 Huang Jiashu, “Lun heping tongyi zhi lujing zhuan- States Abandon Taiwan?,” Washington Quarterly 34, huan [On the Path Transformation of ‘Peaceful Reu- no. 4 (2011): 23–37; Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China nification’],” Taiwan Yanjiu [Taiwan Studies], no. 6 Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military (2017), 5. Competition and Accommodation,” International Se- 9 Zuo Xiying, “Unbalanced Deterrence: Coercive curity 39, no. 4 (2015): 49–90; and Ely Ratner, “There Threat, Reassurance and the US-China Rivalry in Is No Grand Bargain with China: Why Trump and Xi Taiwan Strait,” Pacific Review, 3 December 2019, Can’t Meet Each Other Halfway,” Foreign Affairs, 27 https://doi.org/. November 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/. 10 Xin Qiang, “ Zhanlue gaowei zichan: quanli geju, 3 Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Sup- zhongmei guanxi yu Taiwan zhanlue juese de shan- port for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” Foreign Af- bian [Strategic High-Risk Assets: Power Structure, fairs, 2 September 2020, https://www.foreignaf- Sino-US Relations and the Evolution of Taiwan’s fairs.com/; and Bonnie S. Glaser et al., “Dire Straits: Strategic Role],” Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan [Taiwan Re- Should American Support for Taiwan Be Ambigu- search Journal], no. 4 (2020): 72–83. ous?,” Foreign Affairs, 24 September 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │18 military advantages. Asymmetrically, Taiwan’s the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded the arsenal of standoff Security firepower with ballistic missiles, rock- 5 ets, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface An Intertwined Knot missiles in the last three decades. Dr. Wu Shang-su Therefore, the whole island of Taiwan is vulnerable to missile strikes from China.1 Combined with other capabilities—such as surveillance satellites and submarines—these standoff weapons underpin the PLA’s antiaccess/aerial-denial (A2/AD) strategy to counter US military deployments in the region. Symmetrically, Beijing has substantially modernized its conventional military assets; the PLA Navy (PLAN) boats new surface and underwater fleets could be used to block maritime access to Taiwan and establish sea control, an indispensable condition for amphibious invasion.2 The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLAN Air Force have each strengthened their ince 1949, the Taiwan Strait fighter wings with new indigenous and has been a potential flashpoint Russian models, backed by aerial for conflict —something espe- S warning and command system and cially true in the last decade due to aerial refueling platforms to achieve the shifting balance of the forces be- the air superiority necessary for air- tween the militaries on either side. strikes and air cover for a possible in- Traditionally, Taiwan relies on the ge- vasion of Taiwan.3 Finally, both the ographic barrier of the Strait and sup- PLAAF and PLAN have enlarged their port from the United States—through airborne and amphibious capacities arms sales and via the latent threat of for projecting forces across the Strait.4 potential military intervention—to balance against strategic pressure In contrast, Taiwan’s defenses have from China. However, Beijing enjoys fallen into inferiority. Air defense, sea both asymmetrical and symmetrical denial, and antilanding measures Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 19 Wu

have been the core of Taipei’s island firepower and may not have much ca- defense strategy for decades. Still, re- pacity left for sea denial.9 Antilanding lated capabilities undermine the de- may be more realistic to achieve be- velopments on the other side of the cause of Taiwan’s possible quantita- Strait.5 Taiwan’s fighters and surface- tive superiority in terms of conven- to-air missiles (SAM), and related sur- tional forces (although the PLAN’s veillance facilitates are the backbones amphibious capacity is increasing, for to prevent airstrikes from China. But the foreseeable future, it will be lim- Taipei’s airbases, radars, SAM batter- ited). However, Taiwan’s antilanding ies, and other air defense facilities capability significantly relies on con- have become the main targets of scription, which is how the island can standoff firepower from the Mainland. assemble a large reserve of soldiers. Consequently, the loss of Taiwan’s air Yet conscription has been cut to four defense capacity could be demolished months of basic training without being in the first wave of Chinese attacks.6 deployed to regular units, raising If Chinese Special Forces penetrated questions about whether such inexpe- Taiwan in advance of an attack, then rienced reserves could form the ade- this would represent another serious quate mobilized units to accomplish threat to Taiwan’s air defense. Tai- antilanding missions. Regular units wan’s air defense capabilities—espe- also face a shortage of soldiers due to cially the fighters—have come to oc- the lack of conscripts.10 Sabotage by cupy a significant portion of the coun- Chinese Special Forces could further try’s defense budget. There are severe disrupt antilanding forces’ prepara- doubts about the wisdom of military tion, or even paralyze the chain of spending priorities.7 command. Regarding sea denial, Taiwan’s fast Since 2016, the Tsai Ing-wen admin- attack craft and onshore launchers of istration has pursued a military build- antiship cruise missiles are the main- up, with a focus on defensive capabili- stays to deter the PLAN’s surface ves- ties. For air defense, Taipei has pro- sels, which would be essential for an cured 66 F-16C/B Block 70 fighters, amphibious invasion to capture the is- Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and land.8 However, these defenses may FIM-92 SAMs, and other equipment also become the targets of China’s from Washington, along with indige- standoff firepower, and airstrikes after nous funding projects such as the the neutralization of Taiwan’s air de- Tien-Kung series SAMs and AT-5 ad- fenses. Taipei possesses four destroy- vanced trainers/light fighters.11 Such ers and 22 frigates, but these assets investment certainly strengthens the could be vulnerable to Beijing’s A2/AD capacity and capabilities of air

Indo-Pacific Perspective │20 Taiwan’s Security

defense. Additionally, the introduction result in a missed opportunity to use of the indigenous Wan-Chien, Ameri- offensive capabilities to relieve pres- can air-to-ground (AGM) missiles such sure on Taiwan’s air defenses. as the AGM-154 and AGM-88, AGM- Taiwan’s naval modernization pro- 84 land-attack missiles, land-based gram is ambitious. It covers a broad Hsiung-Fung 2E cruise missiles, the spectrum of vessels, including Tuo Army Tactical Missiles, and other Chiang-class stealth corvettes, subma- standoff munitions allow Taiwan to at- rines, frigates, landing platform docks, tack targets (whether standoff fire- high-speed minelayers, submarine res- power airbases or other military facili- cue ships, and mine countermeasure ties) in Fujian province and even far- vessels. These various projects reflect 12 ther inland. Such offensive opera- the Tsai administration’s intention of tions lower the pressure on Taiwan’s developing the indigenous defense in- air defense. dustry with a balanced naval strategy However, the airbases’ vulnerability of aimed at both sea control and sea de- Taiwan is unchanged, meaning that nial.13 Although sea control-oriented Taiwanese fighters may not have a assets, such as frigates and amphibi- chance to take off or return to bases ous transport docks, are valuable in after flying their first sorties. Putting peacetime, their prospects for survival fighters in the shelters in Eastern Tai- in the face of the Chinese A2/AD fire- wan has been a solution for three dec- power are doubtable. As for the sea de- ades, but it comes at the cost of reduc- nial-oriented vessels, their survival ing air defenses and limiting other during wartime would be better but aerial operations. There is also a risk far from guaranteed. The limited that China may develop bunker-buster length of the Taiwanese coastlines munitions. Taipei’s offensive capabili- could be studied by the PLAN in ad- ties thus present a dilemma: a vance to know the “hideouts” of Tai- preemptive strike is militarily ideal wanese vessels, which would be vul- for the most significant impact, but it nerable to Chinese antiship cruise may cause a “troublemaker” label by missiles (ASCM) and other weapons.14 the international community with a The submarines with the highest risk of losing the support of third par- stealth level constitute Taiwan’s stra- ties, especially the United States. Sup- tegic reserve, but China’s active de- pose Beijing launches the first salvo of ployment of underwater sensors may attacks. In that case, most of Taiwan’s create constraints on their opera- fighters will be occupied with mere tions.15 Besides, transforming an in- survival and air defense— if not en- digenous project of defense manufac- tirely neutralized— which would turing into a credible fighting force is

Indo-Pacific Perspective │21 Wu

expensive, time-consuming, and an voluntary soldiers will adversely im- uncertain endeavor. Considering the pact Taiwan’s ability to repel amphibi- fast pace of PLAN naval construction, ous landings if not adequately ad- time is not on Taipei’s side when it dressed. comes to maritime projects. Although Taiwan’s military moderni- On land, various new procurements zation in recent years has not entirely have added multiple layers of defense. removed the weaknesses in its na- These include M1A2T main battle tional defenses, it is essential to re- tanks (MBT), onshore Harpoon and member that security dynamics in the Hsiung-Fung series ASCMs, indige- Strait are not just a question of bilat- nous infantry fighting vehicles, multi- eral relations. Given Taipei’s geo- launch rocket systems, AH-64E and graphic location on Taiwan’s island, AH-1W attack helicopters, FGM-148 operations at the north end of the is- and BGM-71 antitank missiles, and land are unavoidable. Yet US military UH-60M utility and CH-47D transport bases in Okinawa would face the north helicopters.16 The ASCMs, rockets, flank of any Chinese military opera- and other munitions can directly sink tions against Taiwan in this area. If the PLAN amphibious transport Beijing decides to control the conflict docks. The attack helicopters would scale, this exposed northern flank engage remaining landing vehicles would be a potential vulnerability. On and vessels approaching coastlines the other hand, if China attempted to and any Chinese airborne troops. The neutralize the threat from Okinawa M1A2T MBTs have better armor and with the A2/AD firepower, warfare firepower than the old M-48Hs and M- will naturally go beyond the Strait. In 60A3s. Along with the infantry and ar- such a scenario, Taiwan’s enhanced tillery firepower, these units would defenses would pose a problem for Bei- thwart attempts to form beachheads jing by prolonging the island’s military by Chinese amphibious forces.17 Util- resistance and allowing a longer time ity and transport helicopters could for Beijing to succumb to its exposed rapidly deploy troops for reinforce- northern flank. Economic, political, ment. Tactically, warfare in this stage and other nonmilitary policy tools of fighting would take place under con- from mainland China would be more ditions of one side enjoying air superi- effective in dealing with Taiwan and ority, which means that the outcome less likely to provoke an intervention of antilanding operations depend on from the United States. Threats of the how many Taiwanese SAMs and other use of force are likely to remain useful air defenses remained intact. The is- only insofar as they can help set a “red sues of conscription and recruitment of line” to deter Taiwan from declaring

Indo-Pacific Perspective │22 Taiwan’s Security de jure independence. In this sense, threats of military force can be used to Dr. Wu Shang-su coerce but not compel. As long as Bei- Dr. Wu is a research fellow in the S. Raja- jing does not feel desperate, at least, a ratnam School of International Studies high-cost military option - even with (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. some chance of victory – must be judged unfavorable in contrast to al- Disclaimer ternatives such as economic pressure. The views and opinions expressed or implied If viewed in this wider context, one in JIPA are those of the authors and should can see that Taiwan’s enhanced mili- not be construed as carrying the official sanc- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- tary defenses have increased its capac- ment of the Air Force, Air Education and ity and capabilities to resist Chinese Training Command, Air University, or other military threats, despite some draw- agencies or departments of the US govern- backs, and has thus contributed to the ment or their international equivalents. cross-Strait security’s stability. ■

Notes 9 “Military Balance 2020,” 312. 10 Paul Huang, “Taiwan’s Military Is a Hollow Shell,” 1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Se- Foreign Policy, 15 February 2020, https://foreignpol- curity Developments Involving the People’s Republic icy.com/. of China 2020 (Washington, DC: US Department of 11 “Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019,” Defense, 2020), 51, 55–59, https://media.defense.gov/. 55; “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 2 Robert S. Ross, “The Rise of the Chinese Navy: Office in the United States (TECRO) – Repair and From Regional Naval Power to Global Naval Power?” Recertification of PATRIOT Advanced Capablity-3 Mis- in China’s Global Engagement, ed. Jacques Delisle silse,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 9 July and Avery Goldstein (Washington, DC: Brookings In- 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/; “Taipei Economic and stitution Press, 2017), 215–18, 222. Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United 3 Andreas Rupprecht, Flashpoint China: Chinese Air States - Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger Missiles and Power and Regional Security (Houston: Harpia, Related Equipment and Support,” Defense Security 2016), 33–40; and “The Military Balance 2020,” IISS, Cooperation Agency, 16 December 2015, 232–33, 266, https://www.iiss.org/. https://www.dsca.mil/; and “TK Ⅲ Air Defense 4 “Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019,” Weapon System,” National Chung-Shan Institute of IISS, 193–94, https://www.iiss.org/; and Military Bal- Science and Technology, 10 July 2020, ance 2020, 263–65. https://www.ncsist.org.tw/. 5 “National Defense Report 2017” (Taipei: Ministry of 12 “Missiles of Taiwan,” CSIS Missile Threat, 14 June National Defense, 2017), 67. 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/; Masao Dahlgren 6 Michael J. Lostumbo, David R. Frelinger, James and Shaan Shaikh, “US Approves Taiwan ATACMS, Williams, and Barry Wilson, Air Defense Options for SLAM-ER, Harpoon Missile Sales,” CSIS Missile Taiwan: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Opera- Threat, 27 October 2020, https://mis- tional Benefits (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 1– silethreat.csis.org/; “Taipei Economic and Cultural 20. Representative Office (TECRO) in the United States - 7 Lostumbo et al., Air Defense Options for Taiwan, AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Missiles,” 23–25. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 29 June 2017, 8 “Military Balance 2020,” 312. https://www.dsca.mil/; and “Taipei Economic and Indo-Pacific Perspective │23 Wu

http://thediplomat.com/. Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United 15 H.I. Sutton, “China Builds Surveillance Network States - AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Mis- In South China Sea,” Forbes, 5 August 2020, siles (HARM),” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, https://www.forbes.com/. 29 June 2017, https://www.dsca.mil/. 16 “Military Balance 2020,” 312; and SIPRI Arms 13 Xavier Vavasseur, “Taiwan Starts Construction of Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace New IDS Submarine for ROC Navy,” Naval News, 24 Research Institute, 1 February 2021, https://arm- November 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/; and strade.sipri.org/. “National Defense Report 2019,” 106–07. 17 “Military Balance 2020,” 311–12. 14 Shang-Su Wu, “No, Stealth Missile Corvettes Won’t Help Taiwan,” The Diplomat, 9 January 2015,

Indo-Pacific Perspective │24 in Taiwan,”2 which proposed the ter- An mination of cross-Strait military con- frontation and called for peaceful reu- Interpretation nification. Since then, direct transpor- 6 of Xi’s Taiwan tation, postal services, and business ties have allowed for substantial en- Policy—and gagement between both sides of the Strait. Other Chinese leaders since Taiwan’s Deng have proposed their own Taiwan Response policies, but the specific content has never shifted substantially. However, Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao on the 40th anniversary of the Mes- sage, Xi Jinping announced his “Five Points” policy, which positions China away from the opposition of an independent Taiwan to active promotion of reunification.3 In the wider context of the PRC’s more assertive diplomacy under Xi, this shift in emphasis gives cause for pessimism when considering the future of cross-Strait relations and East Asia’s broader stability. Continuation and Adjustment of China’s Taiwan Policy When Xi assumed office in 2012, his hina’s policy toward Taiwan policy toward Taiwan matched that of has remained fairly consistent his predecessor, Hu Jintao. However, since Deng Xiaoping turned it at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi C revealed his “China Dream,”4 which from the position of “fight” to that of “negotiation” in 1978.1 Specifically, showed his ambitions to revive peaceful reunification remains the ul- China’s historical glory. Specifically, timate goal of the People’s Republic of Xi predicted that China would become China (PRC). Still, reunification by a well-off society and realize the mod- force is regarded as a possible outcome ernization of socialism before 2035. He if a peaceful resolution is unattaina- further set up a goal to establish ble. In 1979, the Standing Committee China as a country with leading na- of the fifth National People’s Congress tional capabilities and international adopted its “Message to Compatriots influence by the mid-21st century. As Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 25 Liao

for cross-Strait relations, Xi insisted constituted a consensus between the on “One Country, Two Systems” and PRC and Taiwan. In return, Beijing “the 1992 Consensus.”5 Yet, Xi’s sought to shrink Taiwan’s diplomatic speech to the 19th Party Congress representation overseas by pressuring paid more attention to the consolida- countries to cut ties with Taiwan and tion of the party and the economic sit- working to restrict Taiwan’s participa- uation in mainland China than it did tion in World Health Assembly meet- cross-Strait relations.6 When he did ings. The PRC also suspended the offi- address the Taiwanese government cial communications across the Strait. and people, Xi sought to appeal to It is in this context that Xi chose to them rather than use the language of update his policy toward Taiwan in compulsion. Given that then-President 2019, the 40th anniversary of the Na- of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, recognized tional People’s Congress’ Message to reunification as the ultimate goal, Compatriots in Taiwan. It is likely cross-Strait relations did undergo a that Xi was trying to influence Tai- relatively positive and intimate phase. wan’s presidential election, which An historic meeting between Xi and were held in January 2020. The main Ma was held in November 2015, the shift detailed Xi’s renewed emphasis first such meeting between mainland on unification instead of bilateral co- China and Taiwan since the end of the operation. This updated policy has be- Chinese Civil War. come an essential part of the PRC’s However, in the 2016 presidential approach to Taiwan. But three subse- election, Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen. quent updates are also worth noting. Tsai, a Democratic Progress Party The First Adjustment: The Con- member, supports an independent Tai- tent of the 1992 Consensus wan, divorced from Xi’s One Country, Two Systems. At least at first, Tsai In his speech to the 19th Party Con- tried not to irritate China – for exam- gress, Xi portrayed the 1992 Consen- ple, by not publicly announcing Tai- sus as referring to the One China prin- wan’s independence – and used the ciple, which describes mutual recogni- diplomatic language of “the two sides tion of both sides belonging to one of the Strait” to define Taiwan and China. This mutual recognition is the China. Indeed, Tsai agreed with Xi traditional understanding in mainland that, in 1992, both sides across the China. However, in the updated ver- Strait had jointly acknowledged that sion, Xi redefined the 1992 Consensus they could set aside differences to seek as an understanding that “both sides common ground.7 But Tsai refused to of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together toward promise that the One China principle national reunification.”8 This Indo-Pacific Perspective │26 Taiwan’s Security

statement marked a departure from percent of Taiwan’s population— past understandings of the 1992 Con- stayed in China for business, family sensus by conflating the One China reasons, or schooling in 2018 alone. principle with the goal of reunifica- China further pushed Taiwan to con- tion. sider political negotiations and to set This conceptual reformulation led the up concrete steps for reunification. Tsai government to clarify—for the While most Taiwanese prefer the sta- first time—that Taiwan cannot accept tus quo, Xi has argued that “One the 1992 Consensus.9 Taiwan’s version Country, Two Systems” can be custom- of the 1992 Consensus is that both ized to accommodate Taiwan. He fur- sides recognize there is only one China ther explained that Taiwan’s socio-eco- but agree to differ on its definition. nomic system will be fully respected, This concept is different from Xi’s in- along with private property, freedom terpretation, which does not admit of religion, and other lawful rights. that the definition of “One China” may From this viewpoint, different ap- differ. Since Xi has further added the proaches should not be an excuse to phrase “to achieve national reunifica- suspend progress toward reunification” to the 1992 Consensus, there are tion. However, the reliability of “One fears the PRC may continue to add or Country, Two Systems” has come un- delete content from the concept as der scrutiny given the conspicuous re- they wish. Hence, a 1992 Consensus cent events in Hong Kong. For Tsai, based on mutual agreement does not the model used to incorporate Hong exist now—if it ever did. Kong into the PRC cannot be accepted—calling instead for a “Taiwan The Second Adjustment: Custom- consensus.”10 ized “One Country, Two Systems” for Taiwan Subsequent events in Hong Kong—especially the mass protests against ex- In his 2017 speech, Xi’s Taiwan policy tradition and national security laws— was consistent with tradition. He used have reinforced the perception in Tai- the formulation of “One Country, Two wan that incorporation into the PRC is Systems” when mentioning Hong unacceptable. Beijing insists the ulti- Kong and Macau. According to PRC mate right of interpreting laws in propaganda, this framework for gov- Hong Kong belongs to the central gov- ernance is conducted perfectly in Hong ernment. Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s Kong and Macau. As such, there is no own government appears to be too reason that Taiwan cannot be next. weak to defend its legislation and has After 2012, China and Taiwan have dealt with the prodemocracy protes- had more and more substantial en- tors strictly and violently. These gagements. Two million Taiwanese—9 Indo-Pacific Perspective │27 Liao events have revealed the problems security, and a standardized democ- with trying to preserve a democratic racy monitoring mechanism to prevent system under Chinese autocratic rule. extreme penetration from the PRC.11 In this situation, “One Country, Two Conclusion: Hot Spot of East Asia Systems” is a dead-end for Taiwan. Tsai’s decision to rebuff Xi has made The three adjustments detailed above her the only politician with the confi- demonstrate that Xi appears to have dence to say “no” to the PRC, a status become more urgent in his appeal for that likely contributed to Tsai winning reunification. He has shifted away a second term as the President of Tai- from cooperation by both sides of the Strait to an emphasis of reunification wan. as a premise. Some scholars even ar- The Third Adjustment: Gradually gue that Xi will try to accomplish reu- Unlinking “Reunification” from nification while leader of the PRC. “Peaceful” While reunification is undoubtedly im- In his 2017 speech, Xi mentioned “reu- portant to Xi, his clear priority is to nification” only three times and linked achieve the “China Dream”—some- two of them with the term “peaceful.” thing that Xi has explicitly invited The implication at hand is while reu- Taiwanese to share in but regarded as nification remained a core concern, a separate and higher-order goal than “peaceful reunification” was the pre- political reunification. Since Xi has so ferred means for achieving that goal. far declined to present reunification as However, in his 2019 speech, Xi used part of his “China Dream” concept, he “reunification” 46 times but only in- is unlikely to consider the use of force cluded the word “peaceful” as a quali- to absorb Taiwan into the PRC. fier 18 times. It appears the overall Finally, it is worth remembering that significance of reunification has in- three structural factors influence creased for Xi—but the importance China’s Taiwan policy: trilateral rela- that reunification shall be peaceful tions among the United States, Tai- has declined. wan, and China; the bilateral interac- In response to Xi’s perceived shift in tions between China and Taiwan; and emphasis on this point, Tsai has re-as- domestic politics in China and Tai- serted the Taiwanese view that inter- wan. Each of these factors is dynamic actions between both sides of the but is moving in the direction of a Strait must be peaceful and equal, not hardened, more hostile policy. For ex- characterized by force or threats. Tsai ample, China now faces serious com- has also proposed a security network petition from the United States. Sup- for cross-Strait exchanges: security for port for an independent Taiwan has people’s livelihoods, information increased—alongside more negative Indo-Pacific Perspective │28 Taiwan’s Security feelings toward mainland China. Addi- be viewed with optimism, as there are tionally, Xi’s suspension of cross-Strait grave implications for the wider East cooperation has led Taiwan to lean Asian region. ■ more heavily on the United States. In Washington, leaders such as Pres. Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao Donald Trump have viewed closeness with Taiwan as a tool for containing— Dr. Liao is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the National Taiwan University. or at least irritating—China. This hostile climate is perhaps why Xi’s “Mes- sage” to Taiwan is full of anxiety, ea- Disclaimer gerness, and appeals to the Taiwanese The views and opinions expressed or implied people but not the Taiwanese govern- in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc- ment. On the contrary, China has in- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- tensified military maneuvers against ment of the Air Force, Air Education and Taiwan by violating Taiwan’s air Training Command, Air University, or other space with its fighter jets. Together, agencies or departments of the US govern- these trends mean that developments ment or their international equivalents. in cross-Strait relations cannot easily

Notes 6 Nathaniel Taplin, “China’s Xi to World: Party First, Reform Second,” Wall Street Journal, 18 October 1 Jiann-fa Yan, “The Likely Framework and Contents 2017, https://www.wsj.com/. of Xi Jin Ping’s Taiwan Policy, Taiwan International 7 “Inaugural address,” Central News Agency, 20 May Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2020): 39–61. 2016, https://www.cna.com.tw/. 2 “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the 8 “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reuni- Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reuni- fication,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council fication.” (People’s Republic of China), 2 January 2019, 9 Chris Horton, “Taiwan’s President, Defying Xi http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/. Jinping, Calls Unification Offer ‘Impossible’,” New 3 See: “Xinhua Headlines: Xi says ‘China must be, York Times, 5 January 2019, https://www.ny- will be reunified’ as key anniversary marked,” times.com/. Xinhua News Agency, 2 January 2019, 10 Horton, “Taiwan’s President.” http://www.xinhuanet.com/. 11 “President Tsai issues statement on China's Presi- 4 “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC Na- dent Xi's ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’,” Office tional Congress,” China Daily Website, 4 November of the President of the Republic of China, 2 January 2017, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/. 2019, https://english.president.gov.tw/. 5 “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC Na- tional Congress.”

Indo-Pacific Perspective │29 policy toward the former and a more Status Quo? robust and collaborative relationship with the latter. But even without this What Status flurry of activity, broader geostrategic 7 considerations—namely, China’s grow- Quo? ing influence and the shift in the cross- Jessica Drun Strait military balance—would have required debate on the long-term suita- bility of key elements of US policy toward Taiwan. These discussions are important and necessary. Yet, they often suffer from the vagueness surrounding the key- words and phrases used in cross-Strait discourse. In some cases, such as that of the contentious “1992 Consensus” and in US strategic ambiguity on whether to come to Taiwan’s defense, imprecision is deliberate—to shelve contradictions and advance dialogue in the former and to preserve policy options in the latter. Arguably, however, the most inexact concept of cross-Strait relations is what constitutes the so- called “status quo.” he past year has seen renewed attention and emphasis on Tai- General alignment between Beijing, wan and its place and role in Taipei, and Washington on what the T status quo encapsulated allowed for an the world—from the reelection of Pres. Tsai Ing-wen and her administration’s era of cross-Strait calm from 2008 to almost unparalleled success in han- 2016, spurred in part by Pres. Ma dling the COVID-19 pandemic to an Ying-jeou’s policy of rapprochement to- upsurge in not only contacts with ward the People’s Republic of China Washington but also in Chinese coer- (PRC) and the adoption of the “1992 cive measures against the island. In Consensus” formulation that served as the final months of the Trump admin- the baseline for official cross-Strait istration alone, a stream of policy an- contacts. Since the inauguration of nouncements regarding China and Tai- President Tsai in May 2016, however, wan sought to embed a more hardline this tacit, mutual understanding began Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 30 Status Quo? What Status Quo? to unravel. It continues to disintegrate especially during the four years of the to this day—and Taiwan’s domestic Trump administration. politics offers no reason to believe that The issue stems, at least in part, from this trend will go into reverse. This has a genuine lack of agreement over what clear implications for trilateral rela- specific circumstance or set of circum- tions among the PRC, Taiwan, and the stances make up the status quo. This is United States. a fundamental disagreement over de- Discussions on cross-Strait relations notation and not just connotation. In have centered on the idea of a status practical terms, the concept of a status quo and the maintenance thereof. How- quo in cross-Strait relations is perhaps ever, there has been insufficient atten- best understood as a point on a spec- tion to exactly what the status quo en- trum—a range that, at certain points tails. Rarely do mentions of the status in time, has helped to disguise disa- quo seek to explicitly define it, but in- greements among the three sides on stead, appear to defer to an obscure no- shared goals and objectives. At one end tion of a supposed ideal point in time or of the spectrum lies “unification,” or a universally tolerated state of rela- the merger of the PRC and the Repub- tions—or as a “catchphrase to describe lic of China (ROC) into a single polity; the stalemate in the Taiwan Strait” at the other, “independence,” or formal that was “convenient for all parties in- moves to officially separate the two. volved.”1 The status quo is an imagined point be- It matters how the status quo is de- tween these two theoretical extremes— fined, however—not least of all because a way to describe and encapsulate “Tai- any movement away from this assum- wan’s ambiguous position as a de facto edly fixed moment draws consternation independent state that lacks de jure 2 from the other vested players. Official statehood.” statements out of Beijing and Taipei The views of the major actors in cross- regularly condemn the other for actions Strait relations—Beijing, Washington, that challenge the status quo and call and two major political parties in Tai- for a return to sometimes unspecified, wan, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the but often disputed, baselines. Washing- Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)— ton has likewise stressed the need for all exist at various points on this spec- balance and dialogue, and for both trum. The myth of a common status sides to adhere to the status quo, quo can be sustained whenever their though Washington has often itself respective views fall within proximity been accused by the PRC of being an with one another. Politics, however, is instigator in ratcheting up cross-Strait never static, and, as the past four years tensions by disturbing a status quo, have demonstrated, developments in Indo-Pacific Perspective │31 Drun cross-Strait, US–China, and US–Tai- spectrum even further apart. The past wan relations have prompted shifts in five years are ripe with examples and each country’s perception of the status include China cutting off official chan- quo—leading to divergence along the nels of communication with Taiwan, spectrum and heightened tensions. ramping up its campaign to poach dip- For example, for Beijing, the status quo lomatic allies, restricting Taiwan rep- is “One China”—accepted at this point resentatives’ access to international under the “1992 Consensus” formula- forums, and increased military intimi- tion. In China’s view, Tsai’s unwilling- dation with the People’s Liberation ness to acknowledge the “1992 Consen- Army (PLA) aircraft regularly enter- sus” constitutes a break from the sta- ing Taiwan’s Air Defense Identifica- tus quo. This is despite of Tsai’s contin- tion Zone (ADIZ). In response, Taiwan ued reassurance that she remains com- and the United States have both deep- mitted to the status quo—which, in her ened and enhanced their already ro- administration’s view, means building bust bilateral relationship, to include on the achievements of her predeces- more high-level meetings, more regu- sors. This was clear from Tsai’s first in- lar arms sales, and inclusion of Tai- augural address, which included a nod wan in US-led regional frameworks, to 1992: among other actions. Since 1992, over twenty years of interactions Further, one of the most critical ele- and negotiations across the Strait have ena- ments in Taiwan debates is also one of bled and accumulated outcomes which both the more underexplored—at least in sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and English-language discourse. Much like political foundations that the stable and the discussions on cross-Strait rela- peaceful development of the cross-Strait re- tions referenced above, assessments 3 lationship must be continuously promoted. on Taiwan domestic politics also tend The Tsai administration’s approach to to fall back on black-and-white charac- the status quo aligns with the broader, terizations of key players, especially longstanding DPP position that Tai- by categorizing the DPP as “pro-inde- wan is already an independent coun- pendence” and the KMT as “pro-unifi- try, as the ROC and thus does not need cation.” This type of framing not only to formally declare itself as such, but aligns with how the Chinese Com- which also makes any of Beijing’s One- munist Party (CCP) labels Taiwan’s China demands a nonstarter.4 two main political parties but also This incongruence in views on the sta- plays into Chinese discourse control tus quo has prompted policy responses efforts—of shaping global narratives that have further exacerbated existing to better align with Beijing’s narra- differences—driving points on the tives and, in the process, help advance

Indo-Pacific Perspective │32 Status Quo? What Status Quo?

its interests.5 happens, however, both major parties The truth is far more complicated and in Taiwan will continue to place vary- may compel a further downward spiral ing emphasis on the sovereignty of the in cross-Strait relations by bringing ROC—a trend that will likely gain about a domestic convergence of views greater traction in the future, as iden- among Taiwanese actors while simul- tity politics in Taiwan are skewed taneously driving collective Taiwanese heavily toward a uniquely Taiwanese interpretations of the status quo even identity, separate from China. It is further from that of the Chinese gov- hard to discern any signs of movement ernment. The KMT—China’s pre- toward mainland China’s interpreta- ferred interlocutor—has been reas- tion of the status quo. sessing party priorities and policies In short, any future confluence of while in opposition—including the views on the status quo is becoming party’s approach to cross-Strait rela- increasingly unlikely—and with it, tions, which has long centered on the any common baseline for cross-Strait “1992 Consensus.” However, there are discourse between the two sides. This signs that the Chinese leadership may is an overlooked, yet fundamentally no longer accept the vague One-China important, aspect of cross-Strait rela- agreement moving forward, and may tions. ■ instead demand explicit recognition that “China” refers to the PRC.6 At the Jessica Drun same time, Beijing has seemingly tied the “1992 Consensus” with “One Coun- Ms. Drun is a Non-Resident Fellow at the 2049 Project. try, Two Systems”—which is vastly unpopular in Taiwan and rejected by both major political parties. Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed or implied Accordingly, the KMT is at a cross- in JIPA are those of the authors and should roads on whether it will continue pur- not be construed as carrying the official sanc- suing the “1992 Consensus” in its cur- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- rent construct, in a moderated form, or ment of the Air Force, Air Education and to scrap it altogether—a debate that Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US govern- will play out in the elections for party ment or their international equivalents. chair later this year. Whatever

Notes Strait: Impacts on U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” China Re- view 18, no. 3 (2018): 121–48, at 122. 1 Chih-Chieh Chou, “Contending Notions of the 2 Lev Nachman and Brian Hioe, “No, Taiwan’s Presi- Cross-Strait Status Quo in Taiwan and Across the dent Isn’t ‘Pro-Independence’,” The Diplomat, 23

Indo-Pacific Perspective │33 Drun

Chinese Power,” Center for Advanced China Re- April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/. search, 28 November 2018, https://www.ccp- 3 “Inaugural address of ROC 14th-term President watch.org/. Tsai Ing-wen,” Office of the President of the Republic 6 Jessica Drun, “Taiwan’s Opposition Struggles to of China (Taiwan), last modified 20 May 2016, Shake Pro-China Image,” Foreign Policy, 11 March https://english.president.gov.tw/. 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/. 4 Nachman and Hioe, “No, Taiwan’s President Isn’t ‘Pro-Independence’.” 5 Elsa Kania, “The Right to Speak: Discourse and

Indo-Pacific Perspective │34

Members of the Consortium of Inda-Pacific Researchers

Dr. Ernest Gunosekoro-Rockwell.Director & Editor in Ct,ief Palricio Clough,Deputy Editor in Ct1ief Jon Howard, Assi,lanl Editor in Chief Dr. Hyun-ii Rim,Senior Editor Dr. lndu Saxena, Senior Write, Dr. NHiko Srivastava. Senior Writer & Researcher Major J.R. Sessiom, USA Senior Writer MojorKaoru Elliott, USSf.Senior Re,caarcher MojorMotthewHouse. USA.Senior Editor T eny Vance.Senior MultimediaSpecialist & Asst. Senior Researcher Thilini Kohondowoorachchi.Senior Reseorche, & Writer Anvesh Jain, Asst. Senior Writer Donna Budjenska. Assl. Senior Editor Dr. Acha la Gunasekara-Rockwell. Asst.Senior Multimedia Specialist Leo Mother5.Asot. Senior Writer Tom Connolly, Asst. Senior Researcher & Editor Captain Christopher Litlle, USAF, Edilar. Multimedia Specialill, & W1ile, CaptainMichael Brodka, USA Researcher Captain Neil Low, USA. Writer Captain PelerLoltus, USAf-,Editor CommanderMichael lomsik, USN, Ed;tar AakritiKumar, Writer Ankush Wagle, Researcher Atandro Ray. Researcher & Mullimedia Specialist Benofsho Allor, Researcher EleanorLewis, Wriler Emilio Angeles. Researcher, MultimediaSpecialist. & Wriler Fabio von Loon, Researcher & Writer John 1.01h. Editor & Writer Leo Lin, Writer MahikaSri Krishna, Write, Mrillika Guha Sarkar, Researcher & Writer Mrilunjoyo Dubey. Editor.MultimedioSpeciolist. & Writer Prakash Jongid, Reseorct,e, Rushali Soho, Re1eorcher & Writer Professor Ruboiyal Rahman, Edilor, Multimedia Specialisl, & Wrilcr San1kruti Yagnik.Researcher. Writer.& Communications Assistant SoumyodeepDeb, Researcher & Writer SieveDrinnon, Edi I or & �esearcher Sunaina Karki, Researcher & Editorial Assisl□r1t Sumnima Karki, Researcher & EdilorialAssistanl