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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zoob Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 75 - 19,497 VIETH, Jane Karoline, 1943- JOSEPH P, KENNEDY: AMBASSADOR TO THE COURT OF ST. JAMES'S, 1938-1940. (VOLUMES I AND II) The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1975 History, general

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor. Michigan 48io5

(^Copyright by

Jane Karoline Vieth

1975

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY:

AMBASSADOR TO THE COURT OF

ST. JAMES’S, 1938-1940

Volume I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Jane Karoline Vieth, B.S., M.A.

*********

The Ohio State University 1975

Reading Committee: Approved By Philip P. Poirier Clayton R. Roberts Marvin ZaJiniser P Adviser Department of History ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Philip P. Poirier of

the Department of History, Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Poirier's patience and his comments and criticisms were invaluable to me and greatly improved my dissertation.

Conversations with Charles Roach, a long-time Kennedy friend and

associate, gave me additional insights into the complex character and personality of Joseph Kennedy. I also appreciate the interest and

advice of: David Dilks, University of Leeds; Donald Watt, London

School of Economics; and Martin Gilbert, Merton College, Oxford.

I am also grateful to A. J. P. Taylor and his excellent and friendly staff at the Beaverbrook Library who made valuable correspondence between

Kennedy and Beaverbrook available to me; to the staff of the Public

Records Office, London, for their guidance through the Foreign Office correspondence; to the Director and archivists at the Franklin D. Roose­ velt Library, Hyde Park, New York for their efficient and gracious help in making Roosevelt papers available and for promptly responding to my numerous phone calls and letters; and to the officials at the Library of

Congress, At Churchill College, Cambridge, and the Cambridge University

Library for further assistance in my research.

Am also indebted to my typist. Coral Johnson, for her cheerfulness under enormous pressure and her numerous kindnesses.

11 TO THE MORE CREATIVE—

CAROLINE SHAW VIETH VITA

5 February 1943 ...... Born, Coshocton, Ohio

1964...... B.S. in Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1967...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1967-1972 ...... Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969...... The Lazarus Summer Fellowship, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1970-1971 ...... Research in London, England

1973-1975 ...... Instructor, Department of Humanities, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

History of England since 1714. Professor Philip P. Poirier

History of Tudor and Stuart England. Professor Clayton R. Roberts

History of the Middle Ages including England to 1485. Professor Franklin Pegues

History of Twentieth Century Europe. Professor Peter Lamour TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume I

Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ii

DEDICATION...... iii

VITA...... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... V

Chapter

I. "THE LION'S MOUTH" ...... 1

II. "NINE CHILDREN AND NINE MILLION DOLLARS" 56

III. KENNEDY'S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY ...... 106

IV. MUNICH ...... 152

V. "NO RISKS; NO COMMITMENTS" ...... 218 CHAPTER I

"THE LION'S MOUTH"

As the throng of well-wishers finally left the crowded stateroom five minutes before sailing time on February 24, 1938, the crew of the

Manhattan prepared to set sail for England. On board was a most distin­ guished and colorful personality--a red-haired, forty-nine year old Irish

Catholic, the father of nine children, a millionaire New Dealer, a Wall

Street manipulator, a dabbler in the motion picture industry, a sharp, shrewd, ambitious man— Joseph P. Kennedy. A bemused Franklin Roosevelt had decided to confront His Majesty's Government with this Bostonian as his new Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. Kennedy told newsmen that he had not received "any instructions" from Roosevelt and that he was

"just a babe, being thrown into--." Someone suggested, "The lion's mouth?"^ Kennedy gave a noncommital grin.

A diplomatic dilemma greeted the new Ambassador when he arrived in

London that Spring. War clouds hovered over Europe. Kennedy's dilemma was how to use effectively American influence with the British Government to reduce international tension and to maintain peace. And how to use his friendship with Roosevelt to untangle the mass of makeshift and con­ tradictory schemes of international cooperation which passed for American

^New York Times, February 24, 1938, 8. foreign policy. American foreign policy alternated between isolationism and internationalism. Roosevelt leaned one way, then the other, as political conditions dictated.

Because of Roosevelt's flexibility, an ambassador in a major European capital like London could exert tremendous influence on the President's opinions. All his ambassadors were allowed to report to him directly.

He distrusted professional diplomats and probably paid closest attention to reports submitted by his own hand-picked men; Kennedy was bound to inspire greater trust and confidence than the supposedly apolitical professional. Kennedy was a loyal Democrat, a generous contributor and campaigner and a devoted participant in the creation of the New Deal.

He had repeatedly loaned Roosevelt his respectable businessman's backing to make the New Deal more palatable to the conservative business community in Wall Street. He thus had outstanding credentials. As an ambassador,

Kennedy was nominally under the authority of the State Department. Yet, his status in the Democratic Party and his friendly relationship with

Roosevelt gave him a large degree of freedom and an unusual opportunity to influence foreign policy.

It is the purpose of this study to determine what Kennedy's atti­ tudes towards American foreign policy were before the outbreak of war

Gordon Craig, The Diplomats: 1919-1959 (New Jersey, 1953) 654-655. Moffat writes that Hull will always refer Kennedy "to the White House as he considers [him] the President's personal selection." J. P. Moffat, The Moffat Papers (Cambridge, 1956) 153. and after the wa,r began; to discuss why he held these views; and to

examine and evaluate their impact. To appraise Kennedy's success, one

must understand the background and the political philosophies and

personalities of the statesmen with whom he dealt, particularly Neville

Chamberlain and Franklin Roosevelt.

From behind their broad ocean— moats defensive to the republic,

Americans in the 1920's and 1930's often regarded international events

with a marked indifference. They demanded that American foreign policy

guarantee their isolation from international squabbles--the collapse of

the League of Nations, the Spanish Civil War, or Chamberlain's desperate

attempt at appeasement. A generation earlier, in 1917, the United States

had abandoned its tradition of isolation in a fervor of patriotism and

idealism. But American participation in the Great War had not brought

the just and lasting peace prophesied by Wilson, but only a Carthaginian

treaty and a sullen truce. Americans claimed that they had been tricked

into war by Allied propaganda or by the plots of munition manufacturers.

In the 1920's Americans consequently began turning inward. Parti­

cipation in the League of Nations was rejected; so was Roosevelt's

scheme to join the World Court in 1935. Americans were further disgruntled because the Allies had "hired" more than ten billion dollars in American war loans and only little Finland had lived up to the bargain to repay

the borrowed money. In 1934 the Johnson Act was passed. Drafted by

Hiram Johnson, a militant isolationist, it forbade loans to any foreign government in default on its war debts. Throughout the 1930's the continuous failures of collective security and the economic chaos of the Great Depression confirmed citizens in their indifference to

international affairs.

In Congress key isolationist senators like William Borah, a

Republican from Idaho, Gerald Nye from North Dakota, Key Pittman, Chair­

man of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee, and crusty Hiram

Johnson staunchly defended a policy of isolationism. Although they

vehemently opposed American involvement in either Europe or Asia, they

were most afraid of European entanglements. American involvement in

another European war would mean a de facto alliance with her former allies,

Britain and France. This would again raise the possibility of consider­

able and perhaps permanent American commitment to Europe. But war in

Asia would certainly be a naval war, never a land war, and therefore, mobilization would not be great enough to undermine American democracy.

Further, the only Asiatic power strong enough to cause war was Japan.

And surely an independent United States could successfully defeat Japan 3 without the help— or hindrance--of allies.

The dogged public and Congressional adherence to isolationism forced

even a staunch internationalist and big Navy man like Franklin Delano

Roosevelt to trim sail. His Wilsonian credentials were very much in

order. As Wilson's devoted Under Secretary of the Navy, he had traveled

^Richard Whalen, The Founding Father (New York, xS64) 202-203. Manfred Johas, Isolationism in America, 1955-1941 (New York, 1966) 23. Also see Leroy N. Rieselback, The Roots of Isolationism (New York, 1966) and Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Toronto, 1962). extensively, dealt with foreign problems, and loyally served the interests

of the Navy for eight years. Raised in the big Navy tradition of Admiral

Alfred T. Mahan and Tlieodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt campaigned vigorously for the expansion of the Navy which he kept in an aggressive

state of preparedness. He developed considerable skill as an administra­

tor and cultivated personal contacts in labor circles, especially in the volatile shipbuilding industry. He managed to appease its diverse

elements— the military and civilian interests, and labor and management.

While World War I raged in Europe and the prospects of American

entry ran high, a harassed Roosevelt in his mid-thirties first met, fought with and beat a brash equally harassed Bethlehem Steel shipbuilding

executive still in his twenties, Joseph P. Kennedy. Recalling their

feud years later Kennedy remarked, "Roosevelt was the hardest trader I'd

ever run up against." As he reminisced about a particularly severe arm-

twisting session Kennedy remembered that "when I left his office I was

so disappointed and angry that I broke down and cried.

After the war Roosevelt continued in the Wilsonian tradition. He became an avid campaigner for American entry into the League of Nations.

And as his party's Vice Presidential candidate in 1920, at the age of

thirty-eight, he defended the "internationalist" party platform. He was

thus well prepared to deal with foreign policy, and yet in the early

years of his first Administration, he looked elsewhere while Congress

took control.

^Liberty Magazine, Fall, 1971, 27; originally published in Liberty Magazine, May 21, 1938. His internationalism made him suspect. The suspicions aroused by

Roosevelt's Wilsonianism kept William Randolph Hearst, the militant isolationist publisher, who held the balance of power at the 1932

Democratic National Convention, undecided as to whom to support for the presidential nomination. The two Democratic front runners were Roosevelt and A1 Smith, the 1928 Democratic Presidential candidate. Hearst, himself a frustrated office seeker, relished playing king-maker and cracking the whip over Roosevelt and Smith. In 1931, two days after Hearst announced his support for John Nance Garner, Roosevelt bowed to Hearst's demand and disavowed his Wilsonian past. He announced that he too opposed

American entry into the League of Nations.

Still unplacated, Hearst, in a signed editorial appearing in the

American in the Spring of 1932, called down "A Plague o'Both Your Houses" and labeled Roosevelt and Smith as equally obnoxious internationalists.

Hearst additionally warned Roosevelt, then Governor of New York that:

The Hearst papers accepted his repudiation [of American participation in the League of Nations] as sincere, or at least opportune; but most of the press found it difficult to conceive how a gentleman who had been a fanatical friend of foreign nations all his political career could suddenly adopt the principles of George Washington... on the eve of a Presidential election...Mr. Roosevelt is concerned about the unknown American man....The unknown man is not going to be benefited by Mr. Roosevelt's plan to put this country into foreign complications by the trap door of the League Court___

In an editorial flourish Hearst added, "the Democratic Party needs a genuine leader and also some genuine Democracy.

^New York American, April 24, 1932 as quoted in Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940 (New Haven, 1946) 97-99 and Whalen, 123-126. 7

Still receiving no nod from Hearst and needing another act of atonement, Roosevelt in the Spring of 1932 sent Joseph Kennedy on a

"business trip" to win Hearst's support. Kennedy, every bit as staunch an isolationist as Hearst, repeatedly assured him of Roosevelt's patriotism.^ Upon his return, Kennedy visited Roosevelt in Warm Springs.

The New York Times of May 8, 1932, stated that Kennedy's visit

excited some attention here [Warm Springs] as he had just come from California on a business trip, in which he paid a call on William Randolph Hearst. Mr. Hearst was one of the original figures behind the boom to swing the California delegates for speaker Garner. After the speaker won, the question of what his managers planned to do with his votes became vital....Whether this subject was brought up in the conversation between Governor Roosevelt and Mr. Kennedy was not learned, although considerable curiosity on the point was mainfested.?

Long before the Spring of 1932 Joseph Kennedy had joined Roosevelt's bandwagon but not because of his views on foreign policy. Although

Kennedy had made a killing during the stock market crash of 1929, he dreaded the future. He was afraid of a violent social revolution which could eliminate his entire fortune. Years later he wrote, "In those days

I felt and said I would be willing to part with half of what I had if 1 could be sure of keeping, under law and order, the other half. Then it seemed that I should be able to hold nothing for the protection of my family."B

^WJhalen, 123. For a further discussion of Kennedy's influence on Hearst, see Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York, 1966) 379.

?New York Times, May 9, 1932, 8.

^Joseph P. Kennedy, I'm For Roosevelt (New York, 1936) 3. Kennedy thought the Hoover Administration too sterile in its approach to economic problems. He wanted a man of action. He found one, in 1930, at the Governor's Mansion in Albany. Kennedy accepted Henry J. Morgen- thau Jr.'s invitation to lunch with Roosevelt and renew his association with his old adversary. Roosevelt could not have been more gracious, charming, and attentive. Kennedy left after a long afternoon at the

Governor's Mansion pledged not only to contribute financially to Roosevelt's election, but also to campaign strenuously on his behalf.^ "I'm the only man with more than $12 who's for Roosevelt," he boasted.

Kennedy's motives in supporting Roosevelt were a mixture of admira­ tion, fear, and opportunism. "Roosevelt was a man of action. He had the capacity to get things done," said Kennedy. "I had seen him in action. I knew what he could do and how he did it...."^^ Recalling his licking in 1917, Kennedy later explained, "I remember what a fighter he was in the Navy Department. He cut more red tape and accomplished more than anybody else could have. He is the only man in sight with the imagination and guts to get us out of this." 12

In a more personal vein, he described his own fears years later to his friend, Joe McCarthy, a reporter and free lance writer and the author of The Remarkable Kennedys, a flattering campaign book about John Kennedy,

^IVhalen, 116.

^^Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 28.

l^New York Times, August 12, 1934, 3-4.

l^Liberty Magazine, Fall, 1971, 27. Originally published in Liberty Magazine, May 21, 1938. After the stock market crash, Kennedy recalled, "I was really worried.

I knew that big, drastic changes had to be made in our economic system and I felt that Roosevelt was the one who could make those changes. I wanted him in the White House for my own security, and for the security of our kids, and I was ready to do anything to help elect him." 13

Finally, being Kennedy, he wanted to be on the winning side. He was certain Roosevelt could win.^^ Kennedy's opportunism made the sickly, hollow-eyed Louis Howe suspect him.^^ Strong support of Roosevelt did work to Kennedy s personal advantage. Congress began a public investi­ gation into Wall Street's activities in April, 1932, but Kennedy was never asked to testify. He was undoubtedly as responsible as many other businessmen for the economic chaos. But as a vigorous Roosevelt supporter, he did not seem representative of Wall Street's image.

Kennedy also contributed handsomely to Roosevelt's campaign. He gave Roosevelt twenty-five thousand dollars and he lent the Democratic 17 Party fifty thousand more. Having the Wall Street millionaire in their

l^Joseph McCarthy, The Remarkable Kennedys (New York, 1960) 58.

^^Victor Lasky's extremely critical account emphasizes Kennedy's opportunism. He also suggests a further motive--money. He argues that one reason Kennedy supported FUR in 1932 was because of Roosevelt's opposition to Prohibition. Anticipating the repeal of the Volstead Act, Kennedy set up a liquor importing company, Somerset Importers, Ltd. J.F.K.: The Man and the Myth (New York, 1966) 25, 43.

l^Alfred B. Rollins, Roosevelt and Howe (New York, 1962) 312.

l^whalen, 122.

Importune Magazine, September, 1937, 57; Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 29. 10

corner often helped Roosevelt's workers tap new sources of support and

convert formidable critics, like Hearst, Kennedy’s old Hollywood friend.

Hearst greatly respected Kennedy's financial acumen but was wary of

accepting his pro-Roosevelt political views.

At the Democratic Convention in Chicago, Hearst held out despite

Kennedy's efforts. Pledged to the politically helpless John Nance Garner

from Texas and allied with California's William G. McAdoo, Hearst

controlled forty-two Texas delegates and forty-four Californians. But

there was another political hopeful in Chicago. A name frequently heard

in the hotel lobbies and corridors was that of Newton D. Baker, Wilson's

former Secretary of War, who was high on Hearst's black-list. In the

New York American in February, 1932, Hearst had written that "Newton D.

Baker's new pair of 'spring heel' League of Nations gum shoes, that he

now wears for 1932 campaign purposes, do not conceal the cloven hoofs of 1R his internationalism." By convention time, Hearst had not altered his

opinion. The right-wing publisher was still appalled at the possibility

that Baker, an ardent internationalist and defender of the League, might

receive the nomination.

On the fourth day at Chicago, Roosevelt's workers were desperate.

They had sat miserably through three drawn-out ballots and feared that

the prediction of a deadlocked Convention and a dark horse winner would

come true. Roosevelt was stalled, only eighty votes short of victory.

1 O New York American, February 25, 1932 as quoted in Beard, 97. 11

His men turned the pressure on California, and sat for hours waiting to get a connection to the California delegates through the jammed switch board. Finally, a desperate Kennedy did get a call through to Hearst.

Arthur Krock of The New York Times, overheard Kennedy bluntly demanding: "W.R., do you want Baker?" Hearst said no. Then Kennedy- informed him: "If you don't want Baker, you'd better take Roosevelt, because if you don't take Roosevelt, you're going to have Baker." Still unenthusiastic about the choice, Hearst asked if there was a chance for another dark horse like Maryland's Governor Albert Ritchie. "No, I don't think so," replied Kennedy. "I think if Roosevelt cracks on the next ballot, it'll be Baker.Kennedy's persuasiveness apparently helped to convince Hearst to throw both delegations behind Roosevelt.

That evening in the sweltering convention hall, there was silence for the first time when the Californian delegate, McAdoo, stood up. He was perfectly aware he was about to name the next President of the United

States. "California came here to nominate a ^resident of the United

States. She did not come to deadlock the Convention...," he shouted into the microphone. "California casts forty-four votes for Franklin D. 20 Roosevelt." As he announced his support of Roosevelt, delegation after delegation swung over. There was pandemonium, and the organ pounded out "Happy Days Are Here Again." Tlie candidate broke with

l^Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York, 1968) 330. Also see Mialen, 125-126.

20james Farley, Jim Farley's Story (New York, 1948) 25. 12 tradition and flew from Albany to Chicago personally to deliver what

Kennedy describes as "a very bullish" acceptance speech. 21 Roosevelt promised the hushed audience "I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people...." 22

Roosevelt's campaign advisers were a grab bag of people. They spoke from every point of view, left, right, center, and nowhere. They included university professors, party chieftains, old Harvard friends, old Wilsonites,

ZlRaymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939) 32.

ZZparley, 26. Also see Samuel Rosenman for a discussion of the Chicago convention. Working with Roosevelt (New York, 1952) 68-79. Kennedy claimed full credit for Roosevelt's victory. See IVhalen, 126. However, there is considerable differce of opinion as to who influenced whom at Convention Hall that night. Raymond Moley's account states that two people "who deserve more credit for the negotiations than anyone else were Sam Rayburn of Texas and Tom Stocke of Santa Barbara, California. Arthur F. Mullen also materially helped win over Garner through Congress­ man Howard in Washington." After Seven Years, 31. Charles A. Beard states that "although Governor Roosevelt's supporters were far from sure of victory when the Democratic Convention assembled in 1932, they managed with the aid of 'Garner and McAdoo and Hearst and Joe Kennedy and Jim Farley,' to nominate the Governor after a brief season of 'ag­ onizing' uncertainty." The Making of American Foreign Policy, 101. Cordell Hull writes that he and Daniel C. Roper went to McAdoo to see if he would "cast California's vote for Roosevelt in exchange for an arrangement to nominate Garner for Vice President. I do not know what other persons, save Farley and Howe, undertook to figure in this arrange­ ment....We were vain enough to feel satisfied that this conference with him...played its full part in the favorable understanding reached." The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948) 153-154. Although Hull's account fails to mention that Kennedy played any significant role in Roosevelt's nomination, James Farley's references do give Kennedy credit for influencing Hearst's decision. Farley writes "Joseph P. Kennedy, who was closely associated with Hearst, called the publisher to warn him of the blossoming Baker movement and to urge him to use his influence to get the California delegate to switch to Roosevelt." Jim Farley's Story, 24. This story is also supported by Arthur Krock who witnessed Kennedy's phone conversation to Hearst. Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line, 330. The Unofficial Observer, the pen name for James Carter, also states that Kennedy "was on the inside track with Roosevelt...and he helped swing Hearst to Roosevelt's side...." The New Deal (New York, 1934) 355. Thus, despite Moley's and Hull's omission Kennedy did try to influence Hearst, but lie was only one among many who deserves some credit. 13 old Bryanites, high-tariff men, low-tariff men, and Joe Kennedy.

Kennedy usually operated as a loner, staying quietly in the background and acting as Roosevelt's eyes and ears. Newsmen dubbed him one of 23 Roosevelt's "silent six" Brain Trusters. He continued to buttonhole wealthy Democrats for campaign contributions and quietly solicited thirty thousand dollars on Roosevelt's behalf from the old protagonist himself, Hearst.An appreciative Roosevelt asked Kennedy to serve on his campaign executive committee but Kennedy declined the honor because 25 of the friction between himself and Howe.

Even so, Kennedy remained influential. He contributed suggestions on economic reform to Raymond Moley, Roosevelt's speech writer. One such speech, given in Columbus, Ohio, became a blueprint for a New Deal measure providing for the Securities and Exchange Commission. After engaging in partisan attacks on Hoover's "new economics," Roosevelt then called for banking and financial reform, including governmental regulation of holding companies, and commodity and securities exchange. Roosevelt promised "to prevent the issue of manufactured and unnecessary securities

...[to use] Federal authority in the regulation of [securities and commodities] exchanges...vastly more rigid supervision of national banks

the separation of [Investment banking and Commercial banking]...and

^^Rosenman refers to Kennedy as a member of Roosevelt's "Brain Trusters." Working with Roosevelt, 88.

24whalcn, 127.

25Rollins, 350. 14 the restriction of Federal Reserve Banks in accordance with the original plans and earlier practices of the Federal Reserve System.As

Kennedy casually contributed his ideas, he could hardly have guessed that one day the Chairmanship of this commission would go to him as a reward for his efforts.

In the fall of 1932, Roosevelt invited Kennedy to accompany him on his campaign train.^7 During the trip Kennedy would frequently separate from the official party and visit the local businessmen to "sell"

Roosevelt, to run down rumors, and to spread a few of his own. Even in his hometown of Boston, he stayed in the background, lived up to his reputation as "a man of mystery," and kept "tabs on things independently of the official party.

Kennedy was also given the extremely delicate task of keeping the immensely popular, ranting, radio priest from Detroit, Michigan, Father 29 Charles E. Coughlin, on friendly terms with Roosevelt. Coughlin, then a Roosevelt admirer, blended progressive Catholic doctrine with argumenta ad hominem and captivated a weekly audience of thirty to forty-five million listeners with his persuasive charm and melodic voice. Once

Kennedy had worn the garb of an isolationist to bring Hearst around.

Now he posed as a leading Catholic layman and a defender of social justice

26samuel Rosenman (editor), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. I. The Genesis of the New Deal (New York, 1938) 672-682.

77^0ley. After Seven Years, 53 and The First New Deal, 380. Also cited in Fortune Magazine, 142

^^Boston Globe, November 3, 1932.

29Fortune Magazine, 142 and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston, 1960) 24. 15 to keep Coughlin in line. The many facets of Kennedy’s character and his easy access to a variety of worlds proved to be one of his most valuable contributions to Roosevelt.

Kennedy celebrated Roosevelt’s triumph as though it was his own personal victory. He accepted Roosevelt’s invitation to continue the festivities in Florida and to join him on Vincent Aster’s yacht for a post-election cruise. On shore the merrymaking continued. Kennedy’s in-laws, ’’Honey Fitz” and the regal Mrs. Fitzgerald looked up and exclaimed to her dancing partner: "Isn't it wonderful.' My son-in-law Joe Kennedy 30 has made Franklin D. Roosevelt President."'

Almost everyone who had played a role in Roosevelt's victory received a reward— except Joe Kennedy. Kennedy wanted to be the Secre­ tary of the Treasury and was bitterly disappointed when Roosevelt selected his old, reliable friend, William H. Woodin for the post. How had 31 objected; so Kennedy was snubbed.

Unwelcomed by the New Dealers, Kennedy returned to Wall Street and cultivated his friendship with Jimmy Roosevelt, the President’s eldest 32 son by vacationing with him in F.urope and entertaining him at Palm Beach.

^^Drew Pearson’s column. The Washington Post, October 1, 1960, D. 15.

^^Moley, The First New Deal, 381, 383, 519. He also gives a good description of Kennedy’s bitterness. 442.

^^Victor Lasky claims that Kennedy’s friendship with Jimmy Roosevelt helped him corner the United States franchise for Scotch whiskies in Britain. Roosevelt supposedly helped him make "contacts" with British distillers. 43. This same argument also appeared in an article by Newsweek entitled "The Mystery of Joe Kennedy," September 12, 1960, 29. 16

Kennedy's prize was worth the agonizing two year wait. The Chairmanship of the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission was bestowed upon

Kennedy in 1934.^^ Apparently, Raymond Moley, a leading Brain Truster was

influential in Kennedy's appointment. He told Roosevelt that it would help restore Wall Street's confidence. Besides, no one could pull any­ thing on Kennedy. "He knew every trick." "Ok," said Roosevelt, "get

Joe here."^^ Ironically, the celebrated Wall Street speculator was now to become its watchdog; the chief poacher was made gamekeeper.

During his first Administration, Roosevelt's first priority was to

implement the New Deal. Its twin objectives were "the application of

intelligence and good will to the solution of our domestic problems, and 35 the avoidance of foreign entanglements." However, he was much too engrossed in domestic issues to provide effective leadership in foreign affairs. Even though he held emphatic views on the necessity for strong vigorous executive leadership in foreign policy, he seemed content to allow Congress to take the reins.

Roosevelt's makeshift foreign policy lacked a general coherent plan or a commitment to any particular philosophy. It was improvised from one situation to another and was a pragmatic, practical way to solve

immediate problems. The political climate engulfing the President made

it extremely difficult to devise a coherent scheme for foreign policy.

33gee Moley's account for a discussion of Kennedy's appointment and the controversy arising from it. After Seven Years, 286-289.

^^Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 29.

35lbid., 319

^^The two most informative secondary accounts of Roosevelt's leader­ ship are Burns, 247-263 and William Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New London, 1963) 197-230. 17

Congress could deny funds, and the Senate could reject treaties. Even within the executive branch itself, Roosevelt had to contend with the

cliquishness of the Foreign Service set, with bureaucratic rivalries and with the strange connection between careerists in the State Department

and powerful congressmen on Capitol Hill, where a host of politicans had their fingers in foreign policy. Beyond the Potomac were the mass of

Americans who controlled in the voting booths the future of those who made foreign policy. American attitudes swung like a pendulum from

internationalism to isolationism to neutralism to internationalism. No wonder Roosevelt tread warily in foreign policy.

Roosevelt rambled back and forth between his Wilsonianism and the

economic nationalism of the New Deal, between anti-imperialism and

traditional power politics. Always he skirted controversial solutions which might undermine his political popularity and wreck his New Deal.

Privately he was a loyal internationalist and believed in collective action to maintain peace and that "our real shield [from the Old World] was not the Atlantic Ocean but the English navy;" publicly, he frequently 37 sounded and sometimes acted very much like an isolationist. He wrote

in 1935 to Colonel House, Wilson's trusted adviser, "I am, of course,

greatly disturbed by events on the other side....I have thought over two or three different methods by which the weight of America could be thrown

into the scale of peace and of stopping the armament race." But his reason for rejecting these schemes was always the same. "I fear any

^^Leroy Rieselbach, 12. 18

suggestions...would meet with [a]...chilly, half-contemptuous reception

...." 38 Publicly, however, he frequently spoke of keeping America uncommitted. In 1936 he again mouthed the slogans of isolationism.

"Despite what happens in continents overseas, the United States of

America shall and must remain, as long ago the Father of our Country 39 - • prayed that it might remain-unentangled and free." His major campaign address on foreign policy in 1936 given at Chautauqua, New York, contained more isolationist rhetoric. "We are not isolationists except insofar as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war....I have seen war...I hate war."^^

Roosevelt torpedoed the 1933 London Economic Conference with his

famous "Bombshell" message. He supported the national economic policies of the New Deal, and he continued Hoover's League of Nations and war

38Elliott Roosevelt wrote that Roosevelt's private letters especially after 1936 illustrated his fear that the European situation would lead to war. "These events (Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and Germany's repudiation of Locarno, and the Spanish Civil War) produced a fatalistic tone in F.D.R.'s letters to his ambassadors." Elliott Roosevelt, (ed.) F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, vol. I (New York, 1950) 471. Also Raymond Moley whom Jim Farley describes as "one of the ablest men around Roosevelt" writes that Roosevelt's foreign policy had been characterized from the beginning, by a slowly deepening and strengthening internationalism. See Moley, After Seven Years, 377-378.

39gamuel Rosenman, (ed.). The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1935, 410.

40lbid., 1936, 288-289. Charles A. Beard lists quote after quote from Roosevelt's speeches to document the President's public adherence to isolationism in American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940. 19 debt programs. These actions seemed to indicate his retreat from the

Wilsonian tendencies of the Democratic Party.At the same time he held out some hope to devout followers of collective security. He meekly proposed to the Geneva World Disarmament Conference in May, 1933, that the United States would promise not to interfere with League sanctions against an aggressor if the European powers would reduce their a r m a m e n t s . ^2

Roosevelt gingerly took this initiative because he wanted to resist fascism and yet avoid a head-on fight with Congress. Nothing came of his proposal, however, because Hiram Johnson mobilized the Senate isolationists against it and because Roosevelt was still undecided on a vigorous plan.

Even a symoblic gesture toward internationalism like Roosevelt's plan for American entry into the World Court failed because of Congressional opposition. Roosevelt resented his defeat: "As to the thirty-six

^^Raymond Moley has a very good discussion of the London Economic Conference. After Seven Years, 259. James Farley offers an interesting insight into Roosevelt's motives. "It is my conviction that the Presi­ dent wrecked the conference because he thought bankers...were engaged in a great international plot against him." Jim Farley's Story, 40. Herbert Feis states that Kennedy was to be one of the advisers to the London Conference delegation; but there is no reference as to whether or not he was. 1933: Characters in Crisis (Boston, 1966) 173.

^^Hull wrote "The President and I had the same views. We knew there could be no peace without suitable reduction and limitation of armament....We knew this was not possible except under a world policy strongly supported by universal public opinion." "Here...was a radical change in the traditional attitude of this country toward two old principles-neutrality, and freedom of the seas. It meant that, if the other nations instituted sanctions against a nation they deemed an aggressor, we would do nothing to interfere with such sanctions if we determined on our own that the other nations had made the right choice of the aggressor. Concretely, we would not insist on upholding the freedom of the seas or our rights as a neutral so as to continue our trade with that country." The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 222, 228. 20

Senators who placed themselves on record against the principle of a

World Court, I am inclined to think that if they ever get to Heaven they will be doing a great deal of apologizing for a very long time-that is if God is against war-and I think He is."^^

A further catalyst to Congressional opposition to Roosevelt's flirtation with internationalism was proved by the sensational revela- ' tions, in 1934, of the Nye Committee. The hero of the drama was a stern young Senator from North Dakota, Gerald Nye. Under his instigation his committee investigated the armaments industry and the banking inter­ ests and their influence on American entry into World War I. It condemned there "merchants of death" for their lies and trickery. The timing was perfect. The committee's findings contributed to a general revulsion from intervening in Europe's squabbles. 44 Roosevelt reacted passively to the Nye investigation. At this crucial moment, he could have chosen to introduce a program of educa­ tion and responsible leadership to prevent the mobilization of public hysteria which might shackle him in the conduct of foreign policy.

Instead he allowed the committee to use their evidence to pound out a program of rigid isolationism. This policy was not inevitable.

Americans could have chosen to join with other nations and

^^Elliott Roosevelt, 450.

44originally both Roosevelt and Hull agreed to cooperate with the committee especially in its purpose to investigate the traffic in arms. But then Hull's attitude changed and he tried, not very successfully, to urge Roosevelt to bring tie committee within reasonable limits. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 400, 402-406. 21 work together to prevent another war. But this would have required strong, vigorous leadership. Instead, Roosevelt only drifted.

The alarming conclusions of the Nye Committee, the passiveness of the Administration, the tensions raised by German rearmament and the growing crisis between Italy ...nd Ethiopia caused an isolationist stampede.

By the summer of 1935, the peak was reached when Congress demanded neutrality legislation defining American conduct toward a European war.

Isolationist spokesmen wanted to embargo all trade in armaments during wartime. Both Roosevelt and Hull approved the embargo scheme but they wanted discretionary power to distinguish between victim and aggressor by embargoing arms only to the latter. Such executive authority, they argued, would provide a strong deterrent to aggression.

Congress resolutely protested against their request since it meant taking sides in a war and therefore implied American involvement. With

Borah’s help. Senator Pittman drew up a compromise requesting the Presi­ dent, after he proclaimed the existence of a state of war, to declare a mandatory arms embargo against all belligerents. He was further authorized to warn Americans traveling on belligerent ships that they did so at their own risk. Although Roosevelt protested that its "inflexible pro­ visions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out," he neverthe-

^^The State Department itself had been working on the question of neutrality and by July 20 had completed a bill which gave the President discretionary authority to impose an arms embargo. But the isolationist element in Congress refused to accept the State Department's provision for discretionary power and the Senate sub-committee refused the draft on August 7. Elliott Roosevelt, 530-531. Also see Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, 378 and Cordell Hull, 406, 410-412. 22 less signed the First Neutrality Act of August 31, 1 9 3 5 . IVhen the dictators planned for war in Europe and Asia, Roosevelt's hands were tied; he had lost the power to deter aggression.

Italian troops invaded Ethiopia in October, 1935. While the League of Nations met to condemn this act of aggression and to vote to apply sanctions on armaments to Italy, Roosevelt, acting independently, swiftly invoked the Neutrality Act. The cautious officials at the State

Department wanted the League to act first but Roosevelt refused."They are dropping bombs on Ethiopia," he grumbled to his dinner guests, "and 48 that is war; why wait for Mussolini to say so." He was thereby placed in the pleasant position of cutting off exports in the name of neutrality and working separately, but effectively, with the League to impose economic sanctions against the aggressor.

The major weakness of the act, which Roosevelt and Hull previously recognized, was that it embargoed only arms and munitions; but not raw materials, like steel, coal, or oil, Italy's most vital import.49 In attempting to undermine this unintentional aid to Italy, Roosevelt announced a "moral embargo" and condemned profiteering in commodities

4^Samuel Rosenman, The Public Speeches and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1935, 346.

4^"Since both Ethiopia and Italy were members of the League and the Emperor had asked the League to take cognizance of the dispute, I felt that it was the League's function to act, if it wished, and that any indicative move on our part would only confuse the issue." Hull, 418. Also see Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948) 79. 48ibid.

49h u 11, 430-433. 23

sent to.Italy. This aroused the hopes of League members that perhaps

the United States would cooperate with their efforts to embargo oil.

When Hull was asked if the United States would agree to their proposal,

he, unhappily, said no.^^ Predictably, Haile Selassie’s natives,

paralyzed by the Neutrality Act and forsaken by the League, were defeated by the Italian war machine. In December, 1935, England and France agreed

in the infamous Hoare-Laval plan to the dismemberment of Ethiopia and

"the hand of Realpolitik showed through the glove of international

cooperation."^^

By 1936, Roosevelt had almost given up the hope of conducting his

own foreign policy. His attempts to gain Congressional approval for

his "moral” embargo on war materials and authority for executive discre­

tion in applying the embargo were repeatedly dashed by the Congressional

isolationists led by Nye, Johnson, and Co. And time was running out.

The Neutrality Act was about to expire in February, 1936. When Hull

appealed again to Congress to accept the Administration’s plan, he

encountered a stone wall of isolationist sentiment. After six weeks of

debate, Roosevelt and Hull begrudgingly faced defeat and accepted the

50Ibid., 441-442.

S^Moley, After Seven Years, 330. Hull wrote that "I was definitely opposed to it...it seemed almost to place a premium on aggression...." The protest aroused by the Hoare-Laval plan killed it. Hoare was swept out of office and replaced by Anthony Eden. Baldwin assured the House of Commons on December 19 that the proposals were "dead." Hull, 443. 24

Second Neutrality Act on February 29, 1936; essentially, it was an extension of the previous act but it also limited the extension of loans 52 to belligerents and it did strengthen the embargo provision. Formerly, the President was allowed to embargo any belligerent; now, however, he was required to do so. The President did have authority to determine whether or not a state of war existed. The ^"^6 Neutrality Act embodied the isolationist's major argument, the Nye thesis. They reasoned that embargoes on arms and on trade would prevent American involvement in war by hanstringing the activities of American businessmen.

Public and Congressional opinion aside, Roosevelt's inability to get Congressional approval again was explained in part by his lack of leadership. He failed to educate the public and Congress by explaining that his policy of applying embargoes discrirainately, distinguishing between victim and aggressor, could keep the United States out of war by deterring aggressors. But again, he sat back and hoped that Americans would be educated by events.

Hitler's march into the demilitarized Rhineland in March, 1936, had already revealed the impotence of France and England in enforcing the provisions of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pacts, When in July,

1936, the civil war began in Spain, Britain and France sought an embargo

is to the credit of the President that, when the measure came to him for approval, he expressed in writing the deep disquiet it caused him and the regret with which he signed it." Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, 1944) 60. Also see Hull, 460, 463-466. 25

on arms to the Spanish Government, an embargo which Germany and Italy

consistently ignored in assisting Franco. Roosevelt took an extreme

isolationist stance. He requested and received permission to extend the

Neutrality legislation to cover the war in Spain and to legalize the moral

embargo.

The President’s application of the Neutrality Act and the moral

embargo to Spain was sanctioned overwhelmingly by Congress. Ironically,

the President’s policy aided the spread of fascism by cutting off

supplies to the democratically elected Spanish Republican Government.

Aware of this contradiction, Roosevelt in the spring of 1938, momentarily

considered lifting the embargo, but abandoned the idea supposedly upon

the advice of Joseph Kennedy, by then Ambassador in London. Kennedy

reputedly warned that such a move might expand the war. Hull too, fearing

that it would hinder the Nonintervention Committee’s attempt to revise

the Neutrality Act, argued against Roosevelt’s idea.^^ But the future,

not the past revealed the reason for Roosevelt’s caution--the 1936

Presidential election. Re-election was his immediate goal; afterwards, he, rather than Congress, would conduct foreign policy, or so he

planned.

When Anne O ’Hare McCormick, a New York Times correspondent, returned

from interviewing the European leaders. Hitler, Mussolini, and Baldwin,

S^Hull, 478.

^^Leuchtenberg, 223; Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1961) 536; Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Morgenthau Diaries: III, ’’Colliers," CXX (October 11, 1947) 79. 26 she was stunned at the difference between them and Franklin Roosevelt.

She found them prematurely aged in marked contrast to the serenity of

Franklin D. Roosevelt. "On none of his predecessors has the office left

so few marks as on Mr. Roosevelt. He is a little heavier, a shade grayer; otherwise he looks hai dy and in better health than on the day of his

inauguration. His face is so tanned that his eyes appear lighter, a cool Wedgwood blue; after the four grilling years since the last campaign, they are as keen, curious, friendly, and impenetrable as ever."^^

Roosevelt loved being President and gaily prepared for the election.

Once again he beckoned to Kennedy to join his ranks.

After resigning from the Chairmanship of the Security and Exchange

Commission in 1935, Kennedy resumed his old role as Roosevelt's informal adviser and secret emissary. In September of 1935, he toured the

European gold bloc nations as an unofficial New Deal observer and discussed the economic situation with the head of the Bank of England,

Montagu Norman, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and with Baldwin's

likely successor, Neville Chamberlain. Upon his return, Kennedy was an overnight guest at the White House and gave Roosevelt a pessimistic report on Europe's economic recovery. Recovery lagged because of the increasing arms spending. His only cheery news was the Europeans' admiration of

S^Anne O'Hare McCormick, New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1936, 1, 2, 24. 27

Roosevelt; they liked his "guts" and considered the New Deal a success.

During the 1936 campaign, Roosevelt again used Kennedy to woo business interests. To line up business support, Kennedy, aided by Arthur Krock, wrote a campaign book. I'm for Roosevelt. "I have no political ambitions for myself or for my children," Kennedy wrote, "and I put down these few thoughts about our President, conscious only of my concern as a father for the future of his family and my anxiety as a citizen that the facts about the President's philosophy be not lost in a fog of unworthy emotion."

Few who knew him well could have taken that statement seriously. His major argument was that Roosevelt had saved capitalism, not through socialism but by his middle-of-the-road-liberalism. "An organized functioning society," argued Kennedy, "requires a planned economy. The more complex the society the greater the demand for planning. Otherwise there results a haphazard and inefficient method of social control, and 57 in the absence of planning the law of the jungle prevails."

"Dear Joe," Roosevelt's thank you note began, "I'm for Kennedy.

CO The book is grand. I am delighted with it...." In two years the collaborator, Krock, would repudiate the book's main thesis because of

Roosevelt's attack on business and within five years the title of

Kennedy's book and Roosevelt's thank you note would mock their authors.

As the tempo of the election picked up during the summer, so did business criticism of "'That Man' in the White House." The businessman's

S^New York Times, November IS, 1935, 18.

S^Kennedy, 3.

SGwhalen, 183. 28 hatred of the New Deal obviously annoyed Kennedy as he defended his book to an interviewer at Hyannis Port. "Some of my friends in the business and financial world have told me that I might as well make up my mind I have had my last job from anyone in the business world once the book is published." In a contemptuous slap at the business community

Kennedy retorted, "I'm afraid some people are laying up bad trouble for themselves the way they are acting. The time when they could sit tight and write their own ticket is gone. You can't tell the public to go to

Hell any more. Fifty men have run America," he continued, "the rest of

America is demanding a share in the game and they'll get it. These fellows talk against the New Deal," snapped Kennedy, "But all their stock prices and the indices of their own business operations show that they don't act on their talk. They don't mean what they say or they don't know what they mean."^^ He proceeded to lecture the business community and to laud Roosevelt and stated that "the total indebtedness in this country of all kinds is now less than when the New Deal began....

I regard Mr. Roosevelt definitely as the type of person who possesses the background as well as the ability to perpetuate the things which have made this country great.

In the last weeks of the campaign, charges of "dictatorship" were leveled against Roosevelt. The most virulent attacks came from Father

S^New York Times, July 26, 1936, 1.

^^Boston Sunday Post, August 16, 1936, 1, 14. 29

Coughlin. He interrupted his scathing attacks on Roosevelt, whom he labeled a "liar," "betrayer," and "scab," to make a bad pun and praise

Kennedy as "a shining star among the dim 'knights' of the present administration's activities.Kennedy had repeatedly tried to placate

Coughlin, but this was too much. He answered Coughlin's charges in a speech before the Democratic Businessmen's League. He praised Roosevelt as "a god-fearing ruler, who has given his people an increasing measure of social justice." In answering the charges of dictatorship, Kennedy replied that "if there had been a dictatorship, the words 'liar' and

'betrayer' would have been uttered only once." Kennedy wound up campaigning for Roosevelt on October 31 with a radio speech from Boston repeating the theme that the criticism of the President grew from his attempt to straighten out the Republicans' financial legacy.

Kennedy hoped that his efforts would win him a cabinet post in

Roosevelt's second Administration. He still dreamed of occupying the

Treasury. Instead, he received an SOS from Roosevelt in 1937 asking him to accept the "dirty" job of chairing the new Maritime Commission and of trying to revive the reputation and prestige of the Merchant

Marine. "Such is the penalty," wrote Arthur Krock, "of having once performed a miracle.

^^New York Times, October 25, 1936, 33.

GZwhalen, 185.

G^New York Times, March 10, 1937, 22. 30

After Roosevelt's tremendous landslide. Congress became even more

distrustful. The isolationists decided to enact "permanent" neutrality

legislation by revising and extending the provisions of the Second

Neutrality Act. Two new provisions appeared in the 1937 Neutrality Act,

the 'cash and carry' plan which was limited to two years and never

applied under this act, and the presidential authority to name the

commodities. This plan was devised by Senator Pittman and was an attempt

to unify the isolationists who were divided between those wishing to

avoid war and those fearing the economic consequences of a total embargo.

Pittman's compromise stated that belligerents could buy supplies in the

United States, but they had to pay cash upon delivery and carry them

away in foreign ships.

From the isolationist point of view, a majority position in 1937,

the Third Neutrality Act protected the United States against going to war as a protest over the violation of her neutrality rights and wartime

trade and loans. The internationalists, however, interpreted the act

differently. They claimed that it surrendered America's traditional right to freedom of the seas to the totalitarian dictators. Further,

they argued, it endangered American security by condoning aggression.

The internationalist New York Herald-Tribune jeered at the law and

paraphrased it to read "An act To Preserve the United States From Inter­

vention In The War Of 1917-1 9 1 8 ."^4

^^New York Herald-Tribune, May 1, 1937. Also cited in Leuchtenberg, 225. 31

The most serious Congressional assault on the President's independent control of foreign policy was the Ludlow Amendment. Its debate in Con­ gress was immediately prompted by the Japanese bombing of the "U.S.S.

Panay" on December 12, 1937. The ship was anchored in the Yangtze and prominently flying American flags. Roosevelt was indignant and discussed the possibility of economic or military retaliation with his Cabinet and with the army and naval high command.He drew back when he realized that there was no public outcry for retaliation and the "threat of war passed like a lacy cloud over the moon."^^ Tokyo quickly apologized and claimed the incident was "accidental." Although Roosevelt and Hull believed the attack to be deliberate, they accepted the apology.

The "Panay" incident showed the precariousness of peace and stimu­ lated Congressional action on the Ludlow Amendment. It provided, except in the case of a national invasion, that the Government could only declare war when a majority voted to do so in a national referendum. Only the most severe White House pressure prevented the passage of this amendment which would have deprived the President of one of his chief constitutional

^^Farley, 116. Harold Ickes wrote that the President considered an embargo based on powers granted to him by Congress in a forgotten act in 1933. He had the authority to impose economic sanctions "in order to prevent war." Economically blockaded, Roosevelt thought that Japan "could be brought to her knees within a year." He wanted sanctions to be applied in consultation and cooperation with other democratic powers. The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes (New York, 1954), Vol. II, 273-275.

GGparley, 116.

67Ickes, December 18, 1937, Vol. II, 275. 32 prerogatives. It was finally defeated in the House of Representatives in January, 1938, by a vote of 209 to 188. The 188 votes illustrated

Roosevelt’s tenuous control, the strength of Congressional distrust and 68 isolationist sentiment, and the national aversion to war.

The prestigeous British magazine. The Economist, showed some appreciation of American foreign policy attitudes. It humorously suggested that if the "United Kingdom" was substituted for "United

States" and "France" for "British Empire" and "Eastern Europe" for "the

Old World," then we would "find ourselves standing in America's shoes."

The trade name for the shoes is "isolationism" but as we know, this

"particular line in footwear is most awkwardly bewitched. The first and last thing about isolationism is that the left shoe and the right shoe can only step in diametrically opposite directions-with the conse­ quence that the distracted wearer, after straddling as wide as he can, has ultimately to kick off one of the shoes and hobble along in the other, wherever it chooses to lead him."^^

In the fall of 1937, still seething over his Supreme Court defeat,

Roosevelt decided to do some political fence mending, to "make-up" with some of his opponents, to drop a few barbs and get a few licks in at

Democratic rebels. Late in September, the presidential special rolled out of the capital and headed for the cornfields and valleys of the

68Congressional Record, 75th Congress Third Session, 277.

69, Economist, February 19, 1938, 384. 33

Northwest; inside the Presidential compartments, Roosevelt prepared his speeches calling for an expanded farm program and wages and hours

legislation. Arriving in Chicago, he dramatically changed the subject and created an international sensation. On October 5, 1937, he explained to the crowd that he had deliberately chosen Chicago, the capital of

isolationist sentiment, to speak on a subject of "definite national impor­ tance." And so he did, launching into a discussion on international affairs— and doing it as no other President had dared for sixteen years.

Speaking sternly, though indirectly, about the increasing tensions in

Spain and Japan's invasion of China, he condemned the "present reign of terror and international lawlessness." Unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other countries "has now reached a stage where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened." If chaos continues "let no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization." No nation can completely "isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining." Then, in a departure from the suggested State Department outline, came the dramatic climax. "When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease...

War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared." He quickly added that he intended to use every practicable measure to avoid war. 34

He continued, in a mixed tone: "We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down."

He ended on a positive note. "America hates war. America hopes for 70 peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace."

The crowd cheered its approval and much of the country responded 71 favorably to his address. But Hull, surprised and shocked, kept quiet.

Other party leaders were also silent. But not the opposition. Its violent reaction completely surprised Roosevelt. The Chicago Tribune, isolationist to the core, charged that he had turned the city into "the center of a world-hurricane of war fright." 77 Some isolationist Congress­ men even threatened Roosevelt with impeachment. Indignant at the lack

^^Samuel Rosenman, Public Addresses and Speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937, 406-411. Ickes claims some credit for the use of the word "quarantine." While he and Roosevelt were discussing the interna­ tional situation, Ickes said "that it was just like a case of a contagious disease in a community.... I remarked that the neighbors had a right to quarantine themselves against a contagious disease. The President said 'That is a good line; I will write it down which he proceeded to do.'" Ickes, 222. Rosenman wrote that the original draft of the speech did not "contain anything about the specific implementation of this coopera­ tion, let alone a 'quarantine' threat to foreign countries. These passages originated with the President himself and, aS/T^ learned, were not incorporated in the text of the speech until immediately before his arrival in Chicago." Rosenman also credited Normal Davis with writing the draft which was the kernel of the Chicago speech. Davis had used the phrase "war is a contagion," but did not use the word "quarantine." Working with Roosevelt, 165-166.

P. Moffat suggests that*perhaps Hull's strongly critical attitude toward the quarantine speech developed only after he saw it criticized in the isolationist press. He also noted that initially "The Secretary was delighted at the speech" and most of the Department's officials "thought it would be strongly approved by the public." Tlie Moffat Papers, 153.

^^Chicago-Tribune, October 6, 1937, 1. 35

of support from his own party leaders, Roosevelt complained that "its

a terrible thing, to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead 73 and to find no one there."

The next day during an off-the-record press conference, reporters

bombarded the President with questions, trying to interpret his speech.

Repeatedly, they asked him to explain the Chicago address and to define

the meaning of "quarantine." Immediately a reporter asked if a "quarantine"

implied a repudiation of American neutrality. "Not for a minute," replied

Roosevelt, "it may be an expansion." When asked if at the very least it

involved economic sanctions, Roosevelt answered, "No, not necessarily."

He stated that there were a host of untried methods of ensuring peace.

He hinted that "the lead is in the last line, 'America actively engages

in the search for peace.' I can't tell you what the methods will be. We

are looking for some way to peace...." A reporter asked if the speech

could be interpreted as "an attitude without a program...." Roosevelt

agreed with this statement and added "but it says we are looking for a

program." But wasn't a quarantine of aggression a position of non­ neutrality, asked a correspondent. "On the contrary," the President

declared, "it might be a stronger neutrality." The conference ended with

this confusing exchange:

Q: Do you [think] that sanctions mean war? P: No. Don't talk about sanctions Never suggested it....Don't get off on the sanction route.

73gamuel Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 167. 36

Q: I meant that in general terms; going further than moral denunciation. P: That is not a definition of "sanctions." (^; Is a "quarantine" a sanction? P: No. Q: Are you excluding any coercive action? Sanctions are coercive. P: That is exactly the difference. Q: Better, then, to keep it in a moral sphere? P: No, it can be a very practical sphere.

Ever after Roosevelt shunned any further explanations of the "quarantine" speech. But in his Fireside Chat on October 12, in reference to his

Chicago address, he did explain that it was a Presidential duty to build a solid foundation to maintain peace for many generations. Peace must 75 be "sound and permanent," built on a "cooperative search" by all nations.

The nature of Roosevelt's leadership is a topic of complex and heated historical debate. Many historians argue that he realized that German and Japanese territorial ambitions posed a colossal threat to the national security of the United States and that by 1937, two months after the

Japanese invasion of China, he began to campaign nationally to wake-up a complacent, isolationist country. His quarantine address, generally interpreted as a landmark in American foreign policy, is cited as evidence of Roosevelt's first major effort to arouse Americans to the Axis peril.

74gamuel Rosenman, Public Speeches and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937, 423-425.

^%any distinguished historians accept this interpretation of Roosevelt's quarantine speech. See Burns, 318-319; Leuchtenberg, 226-227; and Langer and Gleason, Ttie Challenge to Isolation (New York, 1952) 11- 19, Members of Roosevelt's official family give much evidence to support this interpretation. See Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 164-169; Moffat, 153-155; Hull 544-545; and Moley 379. For other interpretations see Travis Beal Jacobs, "Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech," Historian, XXIV (August, 1962) 483-502, and John McV. Haight, "Roosevelt and the After- math of the Quarantine Speech," Review of Politics, XXIV (April, 1962) 233-259. 37

The speech marked his first attempt to lead the United States along the road to internationalism and collective security, only to find that most

Americans were unprepared and unwilling to follow him. It is further assumed that the President, anxious to avoid being questioned, was deliberately confusing in his press conference the following day. Over­ whelming American hostility and isolationist feeling forced him co shelve his plan to deal firmly with the Axis powers and he thus quickly retreated from the implications of collective security.

However, an examination of the events surrounding his speech indicates that Roosevelt was more likely searching, as he had been for some months, to find a plan to prevent war between the democracies and dictatorships.

Thus, the quarantine speech revealed that he was still following a variety of schemes for preserving peace. It was simply one in a series of steps in his pursuit of peace.

Further, an examination of editorial opinion and letters sent to the

President shows that the immediate reaction to his address was favorable.

It did, however, provoke a barrage of criticism from influential isola­ tionist newspapers to which the Administration was overly sensitive.

Ickes wrote "the Hearst papers are after the President in full cry on account of his Chicago speech." The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, October 9, 1937, Vol. II, 227. Grace Tully lists eleven newspapers which Roosevelt habitually examined for editorial opinion. Of these The Chicago Tribune, a Hearst paper, the New York Herald Tribune, and the New York Sun opposed the Quarantine Speech. See F.D.R.: My Boss (New York, 1949), 16. Also cited in Political Science Quarterly, LXXII, (September, 1957) 430. 38

This criticism had a temporizing effect on the President. 77 Perhaps his press conference remarks rather than deliberately confusing, were 78 meant to be taken literally, at their face value.

Roosevelt's first major attempt to dramatize his quest for peace was not the delivery of the quarantine speech but rather his attendance 79 at the Buenos Aires Conference in December, 1936. He thus wished to draw the world's attention to the universal appeal of the Buenos Aires agreements. He believed that if he was successful in achieving an understanding on peace and disarmament at the Buenos Aires Conference, perhaps a similar agreement could be reached in the Pacific and else- 80 where. The Buenos Aires Agreements emphasized a constructive approach to peace by creating machinery to peacefully settle disputes and to eliminate the causes of war.

The delegates also discussed ways of organizing non-belligerents during wartime. Two schemes were suggested; collective security and collective non-belligerency. The former plan called for laws similar to the United States neutrality acts; the latter suggested the use of non-coercive but non-neutral measures. Both schemes were preventive measures designed to deter aggressors and to unify and protect non­ belligerents. In his desire to relieve international tensions by holding a world conference modeled on that of the Buenos Aires Conference, Roose-

^^Dorothy Borg challenges the traditional interpretation in the Political Science Quarterly, 405-433.

78jbid., 406.

79lbid., 406-411.

®9ickes, November 20, 1936, Vol. II, 7. 39 velt took several further initiatives during the Spring and Summer of

1937. 81 He sent Norman Davis to Europe to discuss his plans informally with European leaders and he invited Neville Chamberlain to the United

States.

Davis reported that most of the British and French politicians en­ dorsed Roosevelt's ideas, but Chamberlain was less sympathetic. Although he wanted the democracies and the dictatorships to work out a solution to their problems, he did not like Roosevelt's suggestion for a compre­ hensive plan undertaken by many nations. Chamberlain thought that poli­ tical appeasement should precede economic appeasement and limitations on armaments. Twice Roosevelt invited Chamberlain to visit him and discuss the international scene. Dorthy Borg argues that Chamberlain refused both invitations because he believed that the international scene was 82 so fluid that any plans made would quickly become obsolete. IVhen

Chamberlain rejected the President's invitation, then Roosevelt de­ livered his "quarantine" speech. Apparently he thought that if some move toward peace was to be made, he would have to rely less on

Chamberlain and pursue a more independent policy. Or perhaps, as Sumner

Welles suggests, he wanted to encourage others to take the initiative.

The day after his quarantine speech, Roosevelt began another peace initiative when he asked Welles to outline a new peace program providing for American participation in collective action, the October plan. Roose-

Blporeign Relations of the United States, 1937, I, 113, 131; also see Hull, 548-549; and Elliott Roosevelt for Roosevelt's personal letter to Chamberlain, 702-703.

^^Political Science Quarterly, 411-412. 40 velt intended to hold a dramatic meeting, inviting all the diplomatic repreæntatives in Washington on Armistice Day, and set in motion procedures which would ultimately result in an international agreement on political, economic, and armament problems. But he dropped the matter because of

Hull's almost hysterical opposition to a plan he considered "illogical and impossible."®^

Halifax's visit to Hitler in November, 1937, and his statement that his Government were embarking on an appeasement policy to settle the differences between Germany and England, inspired Roosevelt to again renew his peace initiative in January, 1938. Roosevelt decided to issue a world wide appeal for a solution to international problems and to initiate "a policy of active though unacknowledged, 'cooperation' with

England."®^ His plan for "parallel action" with the British did not involve approval of their appeasement policy, but it did imply acceptance

or of it. The President asked Welles to draw up suggestions for imple­ menting the October plan of 1937 and specifying the methods for choosing the representatives to draft the agreement. Although Norman Davis and

Welles argued that France, Italy, Germany, and Britain should all be

^®Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1950) Chapter I; Langer and Gleason, 22; Hull, 546-549.

®^Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, 379.

®®Langer and Gleason, 25. 41 consulted simultaneously, Roosevelt followed Hull's cautious advice to prevent embarrassment by approaching London first

On January 11, 1938, Roosevelt sent a confidential outline of his proposal to Chamberlain, and Welles gently but firmly warned London that

American confidence in Britain could be destroyed if they responded negatively.®^ But Chamberlain, "imbued with a sense of a special and personal mission to come to friendly terms with the dictators..." ignored the Under Secretary's warning and rejected Roosevelt's proposal which he 88 viewed "with the gravest concern." He feared the strength of isola­ tionist sentiment in the United States and he believed that the Adminis­ tration could only be counted on for verbal protests.Without consul­ ting Foreign Secretary Eden who was abroad, he wrote to Roosevelt asking him to consider "whether there is not a risk of his proposal cutting across our efforts here." Chamberlain argued that the price of Italian

^%ull, 548; Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, 24.

S^Welles, 26

^^Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York, 1948) 218.

®^Keith Felling, Neville Chamberlain, (London, 1970) 336. Also see Viscount Templewood's account. He writes that "Rightly or wrongly, we were deeply suspicious...of American readiness to follow up inspiring words with any practical action....Whatever the President might wish. Congress would never approve of any resolute intervention in European affairs...." Nine Troubled Years, 263. 42 and German appeasement would be increased under Roosevelt's proposal since the two dictators "may feel constrained to take advantage of them

It would indeed be regrettable, Chamberlain wrote, if parallel

American action "were found to be capable of being used to block progress...." He suggested that it would be wiser for Roosevelt "to consider holding his hand for a short time to see what progress we can make in the beginning to tackle some of the problems piecemeal." Further,

Chamberlain informed a surprised Roosevelt that his Government was "making a fresh approach towards reconciliation with Italy" and planned to grant de jure recognition to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia.

Chamberlain's snub was like a "douche of cold water" drowning the

Administration's hopes for peace.It shocked the White House and indicated a new direction in British policy. Previously, Washington had assumed that the British would first try to appease the Germans, not the

Italians. The Administration was further infuriated by Chamberlain's

Italian policy since it completely disregarded American policy.

Roosevelt sent Chamberlain an obliging note on January 17, 1938, saying "I readily agree to defer making the proposal I had intended to make for a short while" and to await the outcome of Britain's efforts.

90p.o. 371/21526; Despatch No. 35; also P.M. Chamberlain to Presi­ dent Roosevelt, January 14, 1938, President's Secretary's File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. (hereafter cited as PSF and FDRL.)

^^Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision, 66-67. 43

However, he reminded Chamberlain, "this Government of course has no connection" with the Italian appeasement policy. He warned that American reaction to Italian recognition would be adverse.

Hull lectured the British Ambassador more emphatically complaining that recognition would "rouse a feeling of disgust, would revive and multiply all fears of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire; it would be represented as a corrupt bargain completed in Europe at the expense of 93 interests in the Far East in which America was intimately concerned."

So far, Roosevelt's good intentions had only succeeded in creating tension between Downing Street and the IVhite House and causing a mis­ understanding, possibly intentional, over the United States Goverment's attitude toward appeasement.^^ The furor grew more intense when Eden who "represented the Canning tradition in the Conservative Party," returned to London on January 15, 1938, and was informed of Chamberlain's behaviour.

He was appalled and insisted that the entire Cabinet reconsider the issue.

Eden warned Chamberlain that Roosevelt had "been disappointed at what he

[considered] to be the negative nature of the reply...." Since the

American government was emphatically opposed to ^ jure recognition,

Eden argued that a continuation of Chamberlain's policy "might produce

02 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Chamberlain, Washington, January 17, 1938. 740.00/2460, Confidential File, MS Department of State.

^^Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 227.

^^F.O. 371/21526, Despatch No. 35-113 passim; Langer and Gleason, 28.

^^Templewood, 256.

^^Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (London, 1962) 548-567. 44 constant friction” and could be "injurious to Anglo-American relations

His greatest fear was that a "disappointed” and "critical"

Roosevelt "would withdraw more and more into isolation," a disastrous situation "which would destroy the recent attempts to cultivate Anglo-

American cooperation." Eden considered this possibility "the greatest disaster to the peace of the world.

Eden was also supported by the new Under Secretary in the Foreign

Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan. Cadogan initially thought that Roosevelt's scheme was too "wild," but then he argued that "we must not turn him

[Roosevelt] down...." "We must let Roosevelt go ahead..." because "we

g o can't throw [American cooperation] away...." Because of Eden's strenuous opposition and his support in the Foreign Office, Chamberlain sent a more cordial note to the President explaining that Italian recognition would only be extended as part of a general settlement and, in a complete about face, welcomed Roosevelt's initiative and promised that the British Government would do its utmost "to contribute to the success of the President's plan whenever the President decided to launch it."^^ But Roosevelt was indecisive and adopted a policy of watchful waiting. He decided to put off his plan "'for days not weeks,' until the German situation was c l e a r . "1^0 After Eden had decided not to

^^F.O. 371/21526; Anthony Eden to Neville Chamberlain, January 18, 1938.

^^David Dilks, (editor) Sir Alexander Cadogan's Diary (New York, 1972) January 18-20, 1938, passim. Hereafter cited as Cadogan * s Diaries.

99p.O. 371/21526; Sir Ronald Lindsay to the British Foreign Office, February 12, 1938.

lO^Cadogan's Diaries, February 10, 1938, 39. 45

"crawl to Rome"101 and had submitted his resignation and after Hitler's

occupation of Austria, the President's peace proposal faded away and 102 became one of history’s might-have-beens.

Perhaps Roosevelt hesitated to renew his plan because he feared too

great an American involvement in Britain's appeasement policy. Or perhaps he agreed with Welles that the opportunity for his remedies had 103 faded and "was not likely to recur." The Under Secretary further wrote that "in November, 1937, the European situation was still fluid."

Although Germany's plans were well formulated, "the full participation by the United States in such a world-wide effort to keep the peace...

lO^Ibid., February 19, 1938.

l^^Offner wrote that Eden would have resigned after Chamberlain rejected Roosevelt's initiative, even after the conciliatory telegrams of January 21 were sent if the whole affair had not been secret. He also gives an excellent account of the different views American diplomats took over Eden's resignation. See Arnold A. Offner, American Appeasement (Cambridge, 1961) 232-233. Ian Colvin gives a detailed and well-documented account of Chamberlain's "rift with Eden," see The Chamberlain Cabinet, (London, 1971) 84-87. Needless to say, the resignation of Eden delighted the Nazis. Nevile Henderson, Britain's Ambassador to Germany, told Halifax that "everybody here is at heart profoundly relieved at Eden's departure. Coming from the Germans that is naturally a compliment to Eden. At the same time it must be admitted that it was unlikely that any understanding with Germany was possible so long as Eden was Secretary of State....Eden and Hitler could never have agreed." P.O. 800/269/38/15 Nevile Henderson to Halifax, Sir Nevile Henderson's Private Papers, February 27, 1938, 35.

^^^F.O. 371/21526; Despatch No. 153, from Sir Ronald Lindsay to the British Foreign Office, March 12, 1938. 46 might have given Italy pause. It might have resulted in a radical modification of Japanese policy...." But "with the annexation of

Austria and with the threatened attack upon Czechoslovakia in the Spring of 1938, the President had no longer any real opportunity to arrest

impending calamity.

Churchill, of course, attached the greatest significance to it and regarded Chamberlain's reaction as a major blunder. "We must regard its rejection," he wrote, "for such it was-as the loss of the last frail chance to save the world from tyranny otherwise than by war...." He ' logically placed the blame for scuttling Roosevelt's proposal upon

Chamberlain. "That Mr. Chamberlain, with his limited outlook and in­ experience of the European scene, should have possessed the self sufficiency to wave away the proffered hand stretched out across the

Atlantic leaves one, even at this date, breathless with amazement.

Welles, however, felt that guilt should be shared. "The responsi­ bility for the loss of this last 'frail chance' to spare humanity the greatest of recorded catastrophes can be laid at the doors only of two men-Neville Chamberlain and Cordell Hull. It was their decision that was determining...." He continued "even if there was but one chance in a million for success, was that chance not worth taking?"^^^ But even if

104gumner Welles, The Time For Decision, 68-69.

^^^Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 229, 225.

lO^Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, 30. 47 the President's proposal had been implemented, the ambitions of the

Axis powers were so great, that Roosevelt's plan, like Chamberlain's appeasement policy, would probably have been doomed to f a i l u r e .

To summarize, Roosevelt's foreign policy throughout his first

Administration was a makeshift policy. He accepted, not always willingly.

Congressional leadership and publicly posed as an isolationist. He was indecisive, he refused to follow a bold course, and he waited for events to educate the American public.

But during his second Administration, after the 1936 elections, the

President began to grope for a policy to check the expansion of the fascist powers and pursued a variety of schemes; he attended the Buenos

Aires Conference, delivered his quarantine speech, and sent his peace plan to Chamberlain. Domestic problems were no longer so pressing and

lO^Arnold Offner wrote that "to judge from the fact that in January and February 1938 he [Hitler] was formally reversing German policy in the Far East in direct opposition to American and British interests, and from his impatience in the Austrian crisis and willingness to use force without assurances that he would not meet concerted opposition, one must conclude that he would not have been interested in a conference sponsored by a politically, and militarily, uninvolved United States." 231-232. Colvin argues that "it remains an open question whether the Roosevelt initiative could, without full British backing, have done more than irritate the dictatorships." He sees the importance of Roosevelt's note as deepening the "rift between Chamberlain and Eden, the former believing...that it would have gravely disburbed the chances of a settlement with Germany upon which they were building their hopes." 86. Northedge argues that Chamberlain "regarded Roosevelt's hands as tied by isolationist opinion, which he thought would prevent any practical American cooperation in arrangements to hold the European situation in check." Northedge also believed that the most Roosevelt's plan could have done was to edge "the American public one step closer to co-operation with the European democracies." See F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant (London, 1966) 485-486. 48

the situation in the Far East and in Europe had become dangerously

acute. He wanted to commit the United States to a plan of collective

security, prohibitions of armaments and implements of war to nations

involved in aggression, and draw up a general international agreement

for peace. Still extremely sensitive to isolationist opinion, he

exaggerated the strength and unity of his opposition and tended to

underestimate popular support for his foreign policy. Nevertheless, he began a cautious attempt to arouse the country to the threats to

American security. His indecision grew from his determination to build

a consensus for his policy and to maintain his political leadership. 108 The Roosevelt administration was personal, centralized and haphazard.

The President had an exalted sense of his own position and unlimited

confidence in his personal influence and his own abilities. He fully regarded himself as the equal of foreign royalty and preferred personal

conferences with foreign statesmen. He supplemented his personal conduct

in foreign affairs by keeping close contact with foreign representatives

in Washington, by transacting business, slipshod fashion, over the

telephone to his own representatives in capitals, and by sending personal emissaries on diplomatic missions. Despite all that has been written about him, he remains an extremely enigmatic man, a reserved and

lOS^offat writes that even in 1933 he was complaining that "to such a degree our foreign affairs centralize with the President that no one here really knows what is going on." He wrote "Bill Phillips and I are as much upset over the lack of clear guidance that is being given...." 93-94. 49

self-sufficient figure, one not easily influenced, who quite independently made up his own mind.

He failed to take Congressional leaders into his confidence on

foreign policy issues and he often went over their heads by appealing

directly to the good sense of the country in his 'homey' public addresses

and fireside chats. His major speeches were all based on his own outlines.

His assistants were essentially executors, not formulators, and played a minor role in foreign policy design. Roosevelt's chief collaborators in

foreign policy were Secretary of State Hull and Secretary of the Treasury

Morgenthau, a Dutchess County neighbor, close personal friend and avid

New Dealer. Roosevelt's dependence on Morgenthau created friction between him and Hull and increased Roosevelt's already chaotic, uncoordinated

Administration.

Hull, the conservative influence, was discreet and inflexible, and a man of high integrity. He was "experienced in practical politics, doggedly obstinate beneath his gently philosophic manner.He was particularly interested in issues of international trade and tariff policy. Roosevelt respected him, valued his opinions and kept him as well informed as his personal habits permitted. One adventuresome and pliable, the other cautious and restrained; they complemented each other well.

^^^Langer and Gleason give an excellent account of Rooseveltian Washington, 6-7.

^l^Alsop and Kinter, American White Paper (New York, 1940) 4. 50

Except for his oim political appointees like the "tall, glacial, able" Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, Roosevelt particularly disliked the State Department and distrusted career officers as a class.He sarcastically referred to them as professional perfectionists. In a letter to Hull, the President once wrote: "I am reminded of a remark made to me by an old career service man-'You can get to be a Minister if

(a) You are loyal to the service (b) You do nothing to offend people

(c) If you are not intoxicated at public functions.'" He also believed there was "a lot of dead wood in the top three grades that should never have got there." 112

In the State Department, Hull ruled supreme. Although he too kept a chaotic, uncoordinated department, both he and his staff were well 113 informed by the high caliber of diplomatic dispatches from abroad.

Yet the foreign policy attitudes of the major officials in Washington were in a state of flux, they lacked a comprehensive program and failed to exert leadership to implement one. "Policy was the product of cables received from abroad rather than of a dynamic conception of American interests" wrote Alsop and Kintner, two widely read columnists.

ll^Ibid., 2.

H^Eiiiott Roosevelt, 913-914.

ll^Langer and Gleason, 9.

^^^Gordon Craig, The Diplomats, 1919-1939, 654; Alsop and Kintner concur with this view. "The cables make American foreign policy.", 4. 51

This was partially due to the tradition of isolation and inadequate political analysis. Hull and his subordinates viewed other countries as a reflection of the United States, Since economic problems were foremost on their minds, they failed to see any other cause for discon­ tent in other capitals. "Their world was static, rigidly divided by oceans, yet peopled largely by foreign speaking Americans. Before

Munich they were worried about trade agreements, international morality, and holding conferences with heads of states to discuss problems.

Despite this, Roosevelt was open to influence. He realized that the

European situation was rapidly deteriorating, but what effect this would have on America and what actions he should take were still matters of keen debate. Because of Roosevelt's indecision, the American Ambassador in London would have a unique opportunity to directly influence Anglo-

American relations.

Unfortunately, the announcements of Kennedy's appointment on

December 9, 1937, embarrassed the Government since it had been leaked to the press before Robert Worth Bingham, the previous ambassador, had resigned officially. Tlie appointment was greeted with sniffs of disdain by some Boston Brahmins and shrugs of disbelief from State Department officials. Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, a Liberal MP, completely disapproved of Roosevelt's decision and expressed his opinion to Harold Ickes. "At a time when we should be sending the best that we have to Great Britain,

ll^craig, 654. 52 we have not done so," Ickes grumbled, repeating Wedgwood’s remark. "We have sent a rich man, untrained in diplomacy, unlearned in history and politics, who is a great publicity seeker and who is apparently ambitious to be the first Catholic President of the United States.The more judicious Times greeted Kennedy's appointment as ushering in "a new era in the history of the American Embassy in London." It emphasized that the new Ambassador was one of the President's "closest" business advisers and dismissed his lack of experience as no barrier to success. "The new

Ambassador will thus come to London as a man qualified by experience and ability to speak on behalf of American business," and as one familiar with the "inmost thoughts of the President, particularly about trade."

The Times predicted that Kennedy would be a "peculiarly authoritative 117 envoy" during the forthcoming Anglo-American trade negotiations. Yet

Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the United States, informed his Government that even those in the United States who disapproved of his appointment "regret his departure...because they regard him as the sole surviving counsellor of moderation to President Roosevelt...." and pre­ dicted dire consequences "now that Mr. Roosevelt is left without any

1 1 O such controlling influence...." Eleanor Roosevelt was apparently

ll^ickes, April 17, 1938, Vol. Ill, 370.

ll^The Times, February 28, 1938, 15-16. The Times also emphasized Kennedy's "humble" parentage and birth in its biographical essay, but actually Patrick J ., Joe's father was fairly prosperous and something of a power in Boston politics. Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 27.

1 1 O P.O. 371/21526, Despatch No. 222, Sir Ronald Lindsay to British Foreign Office, March 8, 1938. The Times too described Kennedy as "one of the few restraining influences on the President." February 28, 1938, 15-16. 53 pleased. She congratulated Kennedy on the appointment and warned "I know that it will not be an easy job and I feel sure that that is why the President is sending you, but I do think it will be interesting and there will be many things which you will enjoy.

Roosevelt appointed Kennedy because he felt he could trust him and considered him "an able fellow.Kennedy had frequently proven his devotion to the Democratic Party and his loyalty to Roosevelt. Besides,

Roosevelt reasoned, he deserved a handsome reward for his excellent past service. He was a man of considerable wealth, a necessary condition for any ambassador; he was well known among the leading British economic and political personalities he had cultivated on his 1935 tour, he had made a reputation for being an effective negotiator; and he had been an out­ standing administrator as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com­ mission and the Maritime Commission. He could be regarded as "a shrewd, ingrainedly bearish stocktrader in the skin of a genial stage Irishman

...." 121 He held a commonplace opinion of the English whom he viewed as a nation of shopkeepers and not as cultivated gentlemen. Roosevelt could use Kennedy as a trustworthy eavesdropper, a candid reporter, a spokesman, as Roosevelt's eyes and ears. Another explanation frequently given for

^^^Eleanor Roosevelt to Joseph P. Kennedy, January 17, 1938, PDRL. 120 Farley wrote that apparently Roosevelt considered Kennedy not as a possible Secretary of the Treasury, but as a possible Secretary of Commerce, 126. Also see C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles (New York, 1969) 22.

IZlAlsop and Kintner, 13. 54

Kennedy's appointment was that Roosevelt was considering running for an unprecedented third term and that he viewed Kennedy as a threat to his own political ambitions. The Washington gossip mill claimed that Kennedy wanted to be the first Catholic President of the United States. Even

Liberty Magazine ran a lead article in 1938 entitled "Will Kennedy Run

For President?"^^^ To what extent Roosevelt took Kennedy seriously and did in fact try to "exile" a potential political rival seems impossible to determine.

Kennedy considered the new post a challenge and hoped that if he 123 performed admirably in London, he might still get the Treasury. He relished the distinction of being the first Irish-Catholic to be appointed to a post normally reserved for distinguished Anglo-Saxon

Protestants. The son of a saloon keeper from East Boston had come a long way. For the rest of his life he would be referred to as "the

Ambassador." "I want to say now," Kennedy wrote to FDR "that I

^^^Liberty Magazine reprint. Fall, 1971, originally published in Liberty Magazine, May 21, 1938; so did Look Magazine, August, 1938, see Look Magazine "The Look Years," 1972, 5. This rumor was repeated in Duncliffe's biography. The Life and Times of Joseph P. Kennedy (New York, 1965) 94. Also see Sulzberger, 23,

l^^An article appeared, in the St. Louis Star Times which stated that "an authoritative source" said that Kennedy and Morgenthau will swap jobs sometime in March, 1939. "This plan, evolved by President Roosevelt himself, not only has the entire approval of both men but was agreed upon long before the announcement of Kennedy's appointment to the London post...." Diary of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., January 22, 1938, (hereafter cited as Morgenthau Diary) Vol. 108, F.D.R.L. David E. Koskoff in Joseph P. Kennedy: His Life and Times emphasizes how much he wanted the position. Koskoff argues that Kennedy was motivated pri­ marily by social reasons, a "show them" attitude (New Jersey, 1974) 114-119, 55 don't know, what kind of a diplomat I shall be, probably rotten, but I promise to get done for you those things that you want done. Rose and

I are deeply gratefulHe further revealed his feelings to a friend, "I've got nine children and the only thing I can leave them that will mean anything is my good name and reputation.That legacy seemed safe enough as the "Manhattan" hoisted anchor and set sail for England.

^^^Telegram to President Roosevelt from Joseph P. Kennedy, January 13, 1938, PSP: Kennedy, F.D.R.L.

^^^Literary Digest, December 25, 1937, 6. CHAPTER II

"NINE CHILDREN AND NINE MILLION DOLLARS"

Within a week after the "Manhattan" docked, Kennedy and his staff at the American Embassy proudly stepped into three British state car­ riages decked with top hatted coachmen, footmen, and outriders in flow­ ing scarlet cloaks and rode majestically through the streets of London to Buckingham Palace where Kennedy officially presented his credentials to King George VI. The King looked distinguished dressed in the uniform of an Admiral of the Fleet and Kennedy, this time following traditional protocol, wore a white tie, tailcoat, and long trousers.^ Knee breeches were not required.

The question of whether he would bow to British custom and don satin knee breeches for Court functions had haunted Kennedy. A diplomat who accepted the British custom could be charged with "kow-towing" to his hosts. Kennedy had been unmercifully teased, especially by Roosevelt who told him not to worry and playfully added he'd be a knock out in silk 2 stockings and knee breeches. As soon as he arrived in Plymouth, Kennedy was immediately surrounded by reporters demanding to know if he intended 3 to wear knee breeches. "Not Mrs. Kennedy's little boy," he retorted.

^New York Times, March 9, 1938, I.

2„"Whalen, 207, also TuIIy, 157.

^The^The Associated Press, TiTriumph and Tragedy: The Story of the Kennedys, (New York, 1968) 64.

56 57

His invitation to attend the season's first Court prescribed the customary men's attire: "Knee breeches, white waistcoats, decorations, riband and

star and miniature medals."^ Kennedy apologetically exclaimed to Lord

Halifax, the new Foreign Secretary, that he simply could not wear knee breeches. It would "ruin" him in America. On the evening of the season's first Court, Kennedy wearing tails and long trousers, approached the three-tiered throne dais adorned with a canopy and a portrait of King

George III, to greet the King and Queen.^ The London Evening Standard commented that "Mr. Kennedy's desire to shield himself from the charge of flunkeyism achieved the somewhat paradoxical result that the only trousers at last night's court were those worn by himself and some of the less important waiters."^

This illustrated Kennedy's determination to remain American. Some

Americans had whispered that this self-made millionaire who so desperately wanted social acceptance and respectability would quickly be taken in by the sly, clever Englishmen. But Kennedy refused to be dazzled by English pomp, titles, and traditions. He greeted Fleet Street reporters at the

Embassy with his feet cocked up on his highly polished desk. After all,

Kennedy explained to the astonished reporters, "You can't expect me to develop into a statesman overnight." The newsmen were impressed. "Right now the average American isn't as interested in foreign affairs as he is

^Saturday Evening Post, February 4, 1939, 66.

^Ibid. Also see JPK to Jimmy Roosevelt, March 3, 1938, F 104, Hull's Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Hull Papers).

^IVhalen, 207-208. 58

in how he's going to eat and whether his insurance is good." The out­

spoken Ambassador continued, "Some, maybe, even are more interested in 7 how Casey Stengel's Boston Bees are going to do next season." The

reporters scurried off to write flattering descriptions of this authentic

and frank American Ambassador. One author wrote that "The Londoners

must have had reservations when he arrived. For he was not only the

first Irish-Catholic to defile the London Embassy but he was rambunctious

and ill-tempered, worse than careless with his language, vulgar in the

eyes of the nicer people, anything but bashful, and filthy with American

dollars. He chewed gum. He put his feet on his desk and called the O Queen "a cute trick." He was "so representative of modern America,"

said Lord Halifax.^

Ever since Kennedy's arrival he had been surrounded by a storm of publicity. His "gift for charming newspaper men into writing such reams as are usually reserved for occupants of the White House or the electric chair" was successful on both sides of the Atlantic.His popularity with the sports-minded British soared when he shot a hole-in-one at the

Stoke Poges golf course. A dazed Kennedy remarked to British reporters:

"Just fancy! I had to come all the way over here...."^^ He tossed off a now famous quip which he continued to use in after dinner speeches:

^Tirae, March 14, 1938, 19.

^Koskoff, 122.

^The Times (London), March 19, 1938, 17.

lOSulzberger, 22,

llTime, March 14, 1938, 28. 59

"I am much happier being the father of nine children and making a hole in one than I would be as the father of one and making a hole in nine." 12

By evening, Kennedy's lucky stroke was front-page news. And when Rose

Kennedy and the children arrived, the British press went wild. The size of his brood and its impending arrival made headlines in London. "Nine

Children and Nine Million Dollars" wrote the Daily Express awed by both feats.Newsmen dubbed them "the U.S.A. Nine-Child Envoy," and called

Kennedy "The Father of his Country," and "Jolly Joe."^^ IVhen Kennedy went down on the train to greet them, he was mobbed by the children and scarcely got near his wife. He had to borrow $120 from newsmen to take his family back to London since he discovered that he had only one ticket and no money. Reporters chipped in to loan him the money for six first- class rides.

The height of Kennedy's reception and acceptance by the British came in the spring of 1938 when he and his wife were invited to spend the week-end at Windsor Castle with the King and Queen, As they were dressing for dinner in the suite which had once been the private chamber of Queen

Victoria, Kennedy straightened his tie, cocked his head to one side and mused: "Well, Rose, this is a helluva long way from East Boston, isn't

l^McCarthy, 70-71. 1 % Lester David, Ted Kennedy; Triumphs and Tragedies (New York, 1971) 39.

^^McCarthy, 70-71; Duncliffe, 97; Gail Cameron, Rose (New York, 1971) 126. 15 Lester David, 40. 60

j^t?iil6 a despatch to the President, Kennedy summed up his brief stay

in England: "I think I have made a fairly good start here with the people and seem to be getting along reasonably well with the Government so far."^^

Kennedy had very definite views about his duties as ambassador. He intended to be a working diplomat and to represent the attitudes of the average American. Ray Atherton, a former adviser at the London Embassy, told Kennedy how efficiently the Embassy was run and intimated that

Kennedy could let the professional staff run tiie business of diplomacy while he devoted himself to social and ceremonial functions and to pursuing "contacts." Kennedy, however, had other ideas. The staff would continue to handle routine matters but Kennedy insisted on keeping well informed. If anything important went on, Kennedy himself would handle it.18

His fierce Irish pride would not allow him to merely accept the title and not perform the duties. However, the art of diplomacy was a novel experience, an art in which he had little training and no background.

With great fanfare he had entered a world in which men move with circum-

^^The Associated Press, Triumph and Tragedy, 63; also see Rose F. Kennedy, Times to Remember (New York, 1974) for a detailed discussion of the "fabulous, fascinating" weekend. 221-225. 17 JPK to FDR, March 11, 1938; PSF, box 10, FDRL.

l^Liberty Magazine, Fall, 1971, 27. 61

spection and discretion, a world in which men spoke more to conceal

more often than to convey, a world in which words were chosen for subtlety

and connotation, not clarity or precision. As an Ambassador, Kennedy had

"surrendered the right to express personal opinions except in absolute

privacy; no matter how strong or well-grounded his views, he was only

the spokesman of those in his homeland who held the power of decision

and commitment.

One way in which he helped to swell the flow of accurate information

to the State Department was to insist that all reports be approved by him before they were forwarded to Washington. If he came across anything dubious, he simply called "Neville" and asked for the facts. Kennedy

introduced this procedure when he realized that the junior attaches were passing on to Washington the cocktail circuit rumors and luncheon table gossip--weak sources of information for American foreign policy. The smooth running of the Embassy staff and Kennedy's procedural reforms testify to his tremendous skill as an administrator.

His sense of propriety about Ambassadorial duties was revealed by his desire to abolish the tiresome annual tradition of selecting American debutantes for presentation at Court. His decisions could only be arbitrary since the Ambassador rarely knew any of the women personally.

His selections were determined by endorsements from socialites and public officials. Kennedy considered the practice "distasteful," "invidious," 71 and "undemocratic." After consulting with the White House, the State

l^Whalen, 209.

ZOlbid., 226.

^^New York Times, April 10, 1938, 1, 26. 62

Department, and the British authorities, who were all like-minded,

Kennedy decided to abandon the custom. Roosevelt, who heartily agreed

with Kennedy's position, suggested instead that presentation "should be

limited to immediate families of American officials in London or to

the immediate families of residents in England for a long period of time

...."22

Kennedy had supposedly arranged with the Republican Senator from

Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge, to use his recommendation forwarding

a debutante's application as the pretext for announcing the new policy.

In a "Dear Cabot" letter, Kennedy refused the application stating that

the presentations served no necessary function and explained that in

the future only the families of American officials and permanent American

residents would be presented to the King and Queen.23 Lodge had understood

that he would publish Kennedy's letter and warmly endorse% the new policy.

However, the letter was first published in London, without the Senator's note of approval. Newsmen understandably assumed that "his aristocratic attempt to present a Boston damsel of blue Back Bay blood" had been swiftly rejected "by a sturdy red-haired Irish Bostonian of true democratic instincts."24 To save face. Lodge quickly released a "Dear Joe" note stating "I think this is a good decision and that you have adopted a

22pDR to Hull, March 21, 1938, Official File 3060; JPK, 1938-1942, FDRL, hereafter Official File will be cited as OF.

2% e Times (London), April 11, 1938, 12, FO 371/22832/2099. Annual Report for 1938, 8-38.

^^Arthur Krock, New York Times, April 12, 1938, 22; also JPK to Hull March 28, 1938, 841.4612/245 Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 63 truly democratic policy..,.The Court, then cracking down on their

Qvm presentations, quietly added its approval. Even The Spectator praised the new Ambassador for having done "an eminently sensible thing

...." It noted how America's democracy and isolationism "breaks down when presentation is in question. But perhaps it is all to the good," it concluded. "Ostrich feathers across the sea may be a bond of union.

The more sedate Times wrote that "Mr. Kennedy has not only relieved him­ self of the burden, but has done the same service for many others, and

Lhese are openly and unaffectedly grateful."^7 American newspapers printed a poem honoring the occasion:

Here's to deah old London, The home of the debutante dodge— Till a Kennedy spoke to a Cabot And got a response from a Lodge.

At the season's first Court, Mrs. Kennedy and the two eldest Kennedy daughters were presented to King George VI and Queen Elizabeth. Only seven American women were chosen for the honor; all were wives or 29 daughters of American officials in London or residents in England.

^% e w York Times, April 10, 1938, 36.

^^The Spectator, April 15, 1938, 662.

^^The Times (London), April 11, 1938, 12. 28 New World Telegram and Sun, April 11, 1939, 16 and Washington Daily News, same day as cited in Koskoff 125.

^^Duncliffe wrote that Kennedy's decision to restrict the list brought to light a racket among some of the impoverished members of Britain's nobility. They included on their presentation rosters American women who paid a fee ranging from $500 to $5,000. Mien word was leaked to the Palace, the traffic was halted and some of Britain's nobility were informed that their presence at court was not desired. 98; also see Rose Kennedy, 226-227. 64

The men with whom Kennedy associated most frequently were like-

minded British businessmen, bankers and financers and members of

Britain's political officialdom. His closest friends in London were

the "arch-capitulators," Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England;

Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's eminence grise and chief industrial adviser; Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer; and Chamberlain

•ZQ himself. Kennedy also developed a good professional relationship with

Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of

State for Home Affairs until 1939, then Lord Privy Seal through 1940.

And Sir Alexander Cadogan, the powerful Under Secretary in the Foreign

Office considered Kennedy "very nice-frank and I should think friendly

...." Kennedy and the Canadian-born Lord Beaverbrook, one of Britain's greatest press barons, developed a friendship which continued long after 32 Kennedy resigned as ambassador. Other than these men, Kennedy's relationship with British officials seems to have been conducted on a professional basis.

Before the first month of his ambassadorship was out, Kennedy hosted a dinner at the Embassy which included the leading bankers in the City. yVfter dinner the guests and their host relaxed over brandy and cigars and

^^The Nation, December 24, 1940, 593.

31çadogan's Diaries, March 14, 1938, 62.

^^Lord Maxwell Beaverbrook, General File, 1938-1946; Hon. Joseph Kennedy: Beaverbrook Library, hereafter cited as Beaverbrook Papers. 65 discussed Anglo-American economic and financial problems--their fears of a world-wide depression, their hopes for a restoration of confidence in the business community, especially in the United States, and the British

T nr default on their war debts payment. The evening was a pleasant reunion for his guests, many of whom had been Kennedy's hosts during his trip in

1935.

One of Britain's leading industrialists. Lord Arthur Riverdale, wrote to Roosevelt approving of the new American Ambassador. He praised

Kennedy as "a very intensive young man" and admired him for being "quite a new type" of diplomat. He noted Kennedy's self reliance and indepen­ dence and wrote "I do not think he needs such a lot of assistance." He

"is quite capable of taking care of himself.Another English fan of

Kennedy's wrote that "Joe Kennedy is such a human sort of person, it is almost difficult to call him Ambassador and we really think of him as just Joe Kennedy.

During the spring of 1938, the newcomer joined the weekend guests at Cliveden, the country estate of the Astors in Buckinghamshire and charmed the dinner guests at the Aster's London mansion in St. James'

Square. The "Set," reputedly the purveyors of appeasement was considered a "second Foreign Office" and composed not of a formal clique, but a

^^From JPK to Hull, March 30, 1938, 341.5151/848., Department of State Files, hereafter cites as DSF.

^^Lord Riverdale to Thomas J. IVatson, March 24, 1938, OF 3060, FDRL.

SSgeorge Harding to M.H. McIntyre, June 21, 1938, OF 3060, FDRL. 66

hodge-podge collection of politicans, editors, Oxford dons, and writers

united under the roof of Lord and Lady Astor. By April, 1938, Ickes, a

tiresome Kennedy critic, dutifully noted that "he [Kennedy] appears to

have been taken in hand by Lady Astor and the Cliveden set" whom Ickes

described as "profascist in sentiment.

Tlie Tory Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, regarded by his critics

as austere, overly-sensitive, overly self righteous was one of the most

important Englishmen with whom Kennedy cultivated and maintained a strong

friendship. Although some politicans, like Churchill, thought of

Chamberlain as a "town clerk looking at the situation in Europe through

the wrong end of a municipal drain pipe," 37 or as having been "weaned

*20 on a pickle," Kennedy found in him an intimate friend and a pleasant

and sympathetic personality. Kennedy wrote Hull giving his initial

appraisal of Chamberlain. "I consider him a very strong character

one that could easily dominate a situation. He definitely has a 39 realistic, practical mind...." Kennedy, in fact, was one of the few people given the privilege of first name informality by the gracious but ungregarious Prime Minister. "I can talk Chamberlain's language and

Halifax's language...." he told Hull.^^ Kennedy informed an acquaint-

Ickes, April 23, 1938, Vol. II, 377; This same charge was noted in a summary, "General Observations on 1938," prepared by the Foreign Office. It noted the charge that Kennedy was "in the pocket of the Prime Minister " FO 371/22832/2099, Annual Report for 1938, 8-38.

3?Craig, 678.

^^C.L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (London, 1955) 414.

39jPK to Hull, March 4, 1938, 711.41/389, DSF.

40jPK to Hull, March 22, 1938, File 104, 4, MS. in Hull Papers. 67 ance with disarming candor soon after his arrival in London, "I'm just

like that with Chamberlain. Why Franklin himself isn't as confidential with me as the Prime Minister.

How much of Chamberlain's comradeship was politically motivated is difficult to determine. Early in 1938 Chamberlain had rebuffed Roosevelt's invitation for a world conference and had discounted American influence in the international a r e n a . ^2 But throughout the spring and summer of

1938, after the Anschluss and with the approach of Munich, Chamberlain sought to entice Roosevelt into approving and supporting his appeasement policy. Friendship with Kennedy would serve this end.^^

Still, the similarities in their backgrounds and their complementary political philosophies also explain their friendship. Kennedy, the Wall

Street manipulator who saw "the world through the bars of the dollar 44 mark" must have been impressed, even awed, by this Birmingham banker, a relic of the Victorian age who was "masterful but magnanimous, dogged, but a first-class loser, a leader who fought better, and only for causes.

4lThe Nation, December 24, 1940, 593.

^^Offner in American Appeasement wrote that Roosevelt still could have summoned a peace conference between January 21 when Chamberlain pledged British support and February 4 when Hitler reorganized his government or even up until the Anschluss on March 12. The President's decision not to call a conference "suggests not only hypersensitivity to Chamberlain's first rebuff but, as with the quarantine address after- math and the Brussels Conference, lack of substantial peace programs." 232.

^^Langer and Gleason, 26-27; also Roger Bjerk, Kennedy at the Court of St. James; The Diplomatic Career of Joseph P. Kennedy, 1938-194U. (Washington State University, 1971) 36, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.

^^Louis Fischer, Men and Politics, (New York, 1941) 625. 68

not for himself.Both men were self-proclaimed "realists." Kennedy

admired Chamberlain's "realistic" style, his attempt to consider all the

salient facts in formulating policy and his well intentioned plan of removing the causes of war by approaching the dictators and discussing

their grievances. Both men were dedicated to avoiding war and to pre­

serving capitalism. The highly principled Victorian was thoroughly repelled by war because it "wins nothing, cures nothing, ends nothing

...." "In war," he wrote, "there are no winners, but all are losers.

Kennedy applauded and supported Chamberlain's view. His abhorrence of war was partly personal. "I have four boys," said an emotional

Kennedy, "and I don't want them to be killed in à foreign war." Yet he also hated war because it was "irrational and debasing." "War [destroys] capitalism. IVhat could be worse than that?"^? Kennedy, in later crises.

45peiling, 124.

4Glbid., 320.

4?New York Post, January 11, 1961, as cited in Itfhalen, 228. The three best published sources on Kennedy are Richard IVhalen, The Founding Father, and Wm. Kauffman's chapter in The Diplomats by Gordon Craig. Whalen's work is excellent journalism, rich in detail, and basically sound. However, he is a journalist, not an historian, and he does not give enough analysis or interpretation of Kennedy's influence on Roose­ velt or his effect on Anglo-American relations. Wm. Kauffman's chapter entitled "Two American Ambassadors," is an excellent summary of Kennedy's tenure from 1938-1940, when many major documents were unavailable. I have also been quite impressed by David E. Koskoff's Joseph P. Kennedy; A Life and Times. His detailed biography is well documented and focuses not just on Kennedy's Ambassadorship but on his earlier and later life. I have also read Roger Bjerk's unpuuiished dissertation, Kennedy at the Court of St. James; the Diplomatic Career of Joseph P. Kennedy, 1938-1940. His analysis is good history and basically sound, although he and I differ on interpretation. Bjerk's work, however, is limited by a total reliance on American sources. His interpretation would be greatly strengthened by placing Kennedy in a British perspective and by an examination of the British sources. 69

went much further than Chamberlain in refusing to recognize war as the

ultimate weapon in statecraft. Both men assumed a necessary relation­

ship between peace, prosperity, and democracy. They dreaded the conse­

quences of war and the radical changes in institutions which it unleashed.

To conduct a successful war, capitalism would have to give way to some

form of collectivism. And why fight to transform capitalism into

socialism?

War would mean the destruction of European civilization, or at

least Chamberlain's and Kennedy's conception of it. Civilization

required the preservation of capitalism and the maintenance of the

commercial ties between London and New York and the world centers of trade

and business. Forced to make an unhappy choice between two evils, Cham­

berlain preferred Nazism to Communism. Out of blind distrust of Soviet

Russia, he closed his eyes to much that he detested in the Third Reich

and chose to befriend Germany, even at the expense of her weaker neighbors.

He wanted Germany to expand Eastward and he hoped to negotiate an anti­

communist entente with Germany. He hoped that a satiated and thankful

Germany would ultimately befriend B r i t a i n . ^ 8

Chamberlain's policy had the sympathy and endorsement of the American

Ambassador; so long as it was pursued without the collaboration of the

United States. As befitted a self-made millionaire, Kennedy shared his host's distrust of Communist Russia and hoped that peace could be pre­

served by appeasing Germany.^9

^^IVlialen, 228-229; Feiling 118-125; 320-323, passim; also see Chapter V, 28, 31-32, for additional evidence for Chamberlain's views

^^Rose Kennedy, 241. 70

Yet the views of these two businessmen, however complementary, were

not identical. They held divergent opinions over economic issues and

over the proper American diplomatic role.^^ Economics was the major

factor in Kennedy's philosophy; economics, he argued, "far overshadow[ed]

any political maneuveringsIn a chatty letter to his old crony,

Jimmy Roosevelt, Kennedy gave his assessment of the British situation:

Being reasonably an expert in economic matters, I can tell you, after forty-eight hours in this place, that England is faced with an economic problem that makes ours look like a tea party. The armament program is keeping the wolf from the door, but underneath is a condition that seems to be as dangevous as ours was during the year 1929. England has used up practically all of its aces.

"And boy, when [armament spending] stops they're in for it," predicted

Kennedy. "I believed that this factor...will be the determining factor 52 in writing the fate of the world rather than the political side."

His outlook for Europe was no less gloomy. The major problem facing the continent, according to Kennedy, was unemployment. To the jobless

European worker it mattered little, notes Wlialen, "which flag flew

err over his hungry family." In an address to the American Club Kennedy warned that "unless the United States and Great Britain are able to better their economic positions, nothing else will matter much, believe me. We must get some permanent economic solutions for unemployment, security

SOpoger Bjerk gives a sound analysis of the differences in perspec­ tive between Kennedy and Chamberlain, 36.

^^JPK to FDR, March 11, 1938, PSF, box 10, FDRL. CO JPK to Jimmy Roosevelt, March 3, 1938, F 104, Hull's Papers.

^\halen, 215. 71

for the workers and other fundamentals which have gone wrong.To

alleviate these conditions, he suggested that America must assume the 55 leadership since she had the manpower and resources.

If economics was the central issue in diplomacy to Kennedy, to

Chamberlain it belonged to the periphery. Instead he embraced political

solutions, as the primary means of ensuring peace. Chamberlain succinctly

expressed his attitude to Sir John Simon. "I disagree with those who

think you can solve political difficulties by removing economic thorns

from the flesh. Politics in international affairs governs actions at

the expense of economics, and often of reason.The differences between

Kennedy and Chamberlain were ones of means, not of ends. Yet, their

differences wore great enough to lead both men to advocate two separate

approaches to German politics in the summer of 1938.

Like Hull, Kennedy believed that economic solutions could redeem

political problems. He accepted the Secretary of State's vision of

economic internationalism and believed that it could be used as an

instrument for promoting cooperation and maintaining peace. He told

Hull that "wherever I go and with whomever I speak I am stressing the

fact that the economics of the situation need attention even more than

the political aspects." He returned to his theme: "I cannot reiterate

too strongly that the economics of the whole situation are going to cause

54jPK to Hull, March 25, 1938, 123/59; DSF.

S^Whalen, 215.

S^Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement (New York, 1966) 157. 72

the real trouble in Europe. After all, as you look around, outside of

Finland and Portugal and possibly some country in South America, there

is today no such thing as balanced budgets. Control of exchange and

quota systems are gradually injuring trade and we are going to have a

chance to come out with an economic scheme much broader than trade agree­

ments to save the world, and that's the spot where I think the United 57 States can earn the real respect of the world." Kennedy urged Roose­

velt "...to make a worldwide gesture [toward peace] and base it completely

CO on an economic stand...." Yet his advocacy of internationalism

applied only to economic cooperation, like that embodied in the Anglo-

American trade agreement; it did not imply an acceptance of political

commitments or interventionism. Politically, Kennedy was a staunch

nationalist, an isolationist in the tradition of Senator Borah.Like

Borah, Kennedy believed that the U.S. should remain aloof from alliances or entanglements in Europe's political affairs. Intervention in foreign

affairs could threaten America's economic security and her own democratic

institutions.

Although Chamberlain throughout the spring and summer of 1938 con­ sistently tried to get American approval for his British appeasement policy, he reluctantly accepted Kennedy's conception of America's role.^^

57jPK to Hull, March 22, 1938, File 104, MS in Hull Papers. CO JPK to FDR, March 11, 1938, PSF, box 10, FDRL.

59See Bjerk for a similar description, 24-25.

^^Langer and Gleason, 27-31. 73

He professed a desire to "go it alone" since he believed it was "always

best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but w o r d s . " ^ 1

In the meantime, at least, he pretended neither to want nor expect

"America to pull our chestnuts out of the fire for us."^^ But at the same time, he intended to promote Anglo-American understanding and cooperation.

Thus, personal and professional relationships did help to influence

Kennedy's attitudes and had a considerable impact on his conception of

Anglo-American relations. His excellent rapport with British officialdom enabled him to closely observe British attitudes and intentions and thus to remain well informed. And his close relationship with Chamberlain, who kept him better informed than official routine required, enabled him to establish a very effective diplomatic coordination between London and Washington. Further, as he associated with Britain's political and social elite— the opinion-makers, the industrialists, the aristocracy, the financiers--he began to accept and espouse their economic and political views. Although it is unclear precisely who influenced whom, or to what extent the arch-appeasers gave Kennedy his political educa­ tion there was enough similarity in their attitudes to lead Roosevelt to wonder out-loud during the Munich crisis "who would have thought that the English could take into camp a red-headed Irishman.

61peiling, 325.

G^Ibid., 323.

G^Morgenthau Diary, September 1, 1938, Vol. 138, 34, FDRL. 74

Kennedy's first diplomatic assignment was to settle the conflicting

Anglo-American claims concerning the Phoenix Islands in the Pacific.

Both Britain and the United States coveted several islands, including

Canton and Enderbury within the Phoenix group. The dispute arose in the spring of 1937 when both Britain and the United States sent meterological expeditions to Canton Island. The crew of His Majesty's Ship "Welling­ ton" was quite surprised to discover the American ship "Avocet" already anchored in the harbor. The British Government politely notified the

American Government that its ship was violating the Order-in-Council which was issued on March 13, 1937, and incorporated Canton and some of the other Phoenix group into the Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony.

Roosevelt refused to accept the Order-in-Council and suggested negotia­ tions concerning the ownership of the islands. After several months delay, the British accepted the proposal.

The Roosevelt Administration was particularly interested in these islands because it wished to forestall Japanese colonization and the establishment of Japanese military installations. It also recognized their strategic importance for trans-Pacific air service. Pan-American

Airways, the leading commercial American aviation company, which wanted to build an airport, may have exerted influence on the Democratic

Administration to press the American claims.

G4po 371/21544/A1874/864/45. Public Records Office, Foreign Office Papers, London, England; also see FO 371/21518/IAC 494 (Committee on International Air Communications). It gives Kennedy credit for being Roosevelt's mouthpiece for proposing the President's scheme.

G^United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, (Washington, 1955) Vol. II, 1938, 77, 80, 82, 83, 96 passim. Hereafter cited as FRUS. 75

The negotiations were transferred from Washington to London upon the arrival of the new American ambassador. Kennedy's instructions were to argue that since both English speaking countries had conflicting claims over the islands, Chamberlain should accept Roosevelt's "simple proposal for joint trust on a reciprocal basis and to postpone the issue of their ultimate sovereignty.Otherwise, the two countries would race each other for colonization. After several months of diplo­ matic haggling, an agreement was reached on the basis of Roosevelt's proposal of joint occupancy.

It is unclear whether Kennedy's, Roosevelt's, or other considera­ tions impressed Chamberlain most, but the episode did illustrate

Kennedy's naive attitudes toward the complexities of international relations.An excited Kennedy superficially interpreted the agreement as a lesson for the world and simplistically deduced that the solutions to international tensions and crises required little more than good will.

He praised the settlement as "a good natured settlement of a profound difference of opinion, a cameo of what world settlement might be if the same intelligent good neighborliness were exhibited by different nations

...." "In the last analysis," Kennedy confidently stated, "the issues over which governments make such a fuss are generally small ones, or at least they start as small issues." "Tlie difficulty seems to be," he added, "that contending governments do not get together in a friendly and sensible spirit in the early months of controversy, before it has

GGPO 414/273, May 23, 1938, No. 434, 156-157.

414/273, April 6, 1938, No. 28. Halifax reported to Lindsay that Kennedy did promise "to support our representations in Washington." 76

grown psychologically into a matter of real import.Actually, the

Anglo-American dispute over the Pacific Islands was not "a profound

difference of opinion" but a rather trivial issue in which neither

country had vital interests at stake. And Kennedy's analysis of forth­

coming crises was no less naive.

Eleven days after Kennedy's arrival in Britain and almost a week

after Eden's resignation, Adolph Hitler finally carried out his hotly

debated and long planned dream, "Operation Otto." At daybreak on March

12, 1938, Nazi troops rolled across the frontier into Austria. The

Austrian Republic was incorporated into the Reich. The Chamberlain

government protested and then resignedly accepted the fait accompli.

Beyond Vienna lay Prague, now isolated both economically and militarily.

The annexation of Austria had been foreshadowed in July, 1934, in

the murder of Austrian Chancellor, Dollfus. To protest the Nazis'

assassination of Dollfus, Mussolini had ordered two divisions of Italian

troops to the Brenner frontier. But Hitler was not to be thwarted. He had long coveted this vast estate of Maria Theresa because he wanted to unite all the Teutonic races within the German Reich and because it was

the gateway to Czechoslovakia and to Southeastern Europe. But by the

early spring of 1938, he was still uncertain of Italian, French, and

British opinion. Italy however was no longer concerned about Austria.

Mussolini was too deeply absorbed in Spain and too busy digesting his

Ethiopian conquests to view Hitler's designs on Austria as anything other than completely "immaterial to him." lŸhen Hitler asked Mussolini's

^^New York Times, September 3, 1938, 3. 77 opinion about his scheme for Austrian annexation, he learned to his hysterical relief that "the Duce accepts the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards.... Italian intervention would be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff...." Hitler told Philip of Hesse, his personal representative to the Duce, "please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this....Never, never, never, whatever happens....As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin...."^^ When Hitler saved Mussolini in 1943 from the Italian Provisional Government, he kept his word.

Nor did Hitler have anything to fear from France or England.

Although both countries had long believed that a new settlement would have to be negotiated between Germany and Austria, they were utterly shocked at the Nazis' aggressive display of military force. Neither could do anything except protest. France, occupied with yet another

Cabinet crisis "was actually without a government, while debates in the 70 Chambers showed she was also without a policy." She simply "[threw] up her hands" in dismay at Germany's latest violation of Versailles.

According to Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the Chief of the European Affairs

Division at the State Department, France was simply too busy "still trying to pay for the last war....still trying to prepare for the next war, and at the same time through extreme social legislation lowering national income...." 7Î

^^Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 234.

7°Feiling, 340.

^^Moffat, 191. 78

Chamberlain, meanwhile, received the news of Austria's peaceful

invasion while he was actually entertaining Ribbentrop, the German 70 Foreign Minister, and his wife at Number 10 Downing Street. The

Government had "always known that Germany could swallow Austria" and fully realized that Hitler's ultimatum of February 20 to Kurt Von

Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, jeopardized the country's inde­ pendence.^3 Hitler had demanded that all imprisoned Nazis be granted amnesty, that Austrian Nazis receive full political freedom, and that two cabinet positions, the Ministries of Justice and Security be given to Nazi sympathizers. Yet the British did nothing.Their apathy was described by Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty. He wryly commented in his diary that "the past week has been a busy one, full of events. The full significance of Hitler's summons to Schuschnigg appeared gradually. It was nothing less than the end of Austria's inde­ pendence; a portentous event in European history about which nobody here 75 seems to think or care."

^^Keith Middlemas, The Strategy of Appeasement, (Chicago, 1972) 186.

73çadogan's Diary, February 17, 1938, 48; A.C. Johnson, Viscount Halifax (London, 1941) 456; and Northedge 495; Halifax paced his office muttering "Horrible! Horrible! I never thought they would do it." Northedge 494.

^^Colvin writes that the Cabinet which met two days later discussed the proper British response and Chamberlain suggested that the methods used by Hitler should be condemned, Halifax agreed "that what it was necessary to condemn was the method." Chamberlain further urged "that no statement ought to indicate that events were leading to war." As the meeting adjourned for lunch, Chamberlain's opinion was confirmed; the Cabinet would not make a specific statement that day. 106-107.

^^Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, (London, 1957), February 20, 1938, 216. 79

Despite the previous warnings, Chamberlain was deeply shocked by

the Anschluss, the more so when the curt German reply to the British

note of protest stated that Austria was none of Britain's business.

The British were ill prepared to deal with Hitler's latest violation

of Versailles because the Government was still preoccupied with the

storm of controversy within the Cabinet caused by Chamberlain's rift

with Foreign Secretary Eden.^? He had opposed Chamberlain's policy of

making amends to Germany and Italy and instead, counseled firmness with

the dictators and cooperation with friendly countries, especially France

and the United States. Lord Halifax, a more consistent supporter of

Chamberlain's diplomacy, replaced the handsome, dashing Eden as Foreign

Secretary. Further confusion resulted from the Prime Minister's decision

to boot Sir Robert Vansittart upstairs by giving him the honorific but

powerless position of Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government. Van­

sittart, previously the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was

ardently pro-French and anti-German and considered "an idiot with an y 78 idee fixe," by his more flexible successor. Sir Alexander Cadogan.

Northedge quotes Hitler as saying "England has sent me a protest. I would have understood a declaration of war ...." The German reply denied that they had given the Austrian Chancellor an ultimatum and asserted that "the form of relations between the Reich and Austria can only be regarded as an internal affair of the German people which is of no concern of third Powers." 494. 77 Colvin points out that the Foreign Affairs meeting of the Cabinet on March 15, its first since Austria's invasion, discussed Spain and the Anglo-Italian conversations. On March 18 it discussed Czechoslovakia, not Austria since that country had already been eliminated. 108.

^^Cadogan's Diary, February 16, 1938, 47. 80

These changes in the Cabinet and in the Foreign Office did not go un­

appreciated by Hitler.Furthermore, Chamberlain's diplomacy, focusing

on the Anglo-Italian agreements and settling Britain's Mediterranean

problems gave the Prime Minister little opportunity to devise a practical policy for Central Europe, Hitler simply acted too quickly for the

sluggish British to change their focus.

The new American Ambassador barely had time to become familiar with

the Embassy routine. Perhaps he had been coached by the State Department to anticipate Hitler's action since Hull had received several despatches

forecasting it, and Kennedy must have realized the British fears over the forthcoming crisis. Yet Austria's invasion was more of a surprise to him than it was to the British. Several hours before Nazi troops rolled into Austria Kennedy wrote to Roosevelt assessing the situation.

He had discussed the German-Austrian affair with British officials who considered it "acute." However, Kennedy predicted that "nothing is likely to happen except to have Schuschnigg eventually give in unless there is some indication that France and England are prepared to back him up." And that, he assured the Administration, was out of the question. "Nobody is going to fight a war over here," Kennedy reported,

"unless Germany starts shooting somebody. Nobody wants it." "My own impressions," he wrote, undisturbed by Hitler's bluttering, "is that

Hitler and Mussolini having done so very well for themselves by bluffing, are not going to stop bluffing until somebody calls their bluff." As

79F0 800/269/Vol. 6. Nevile Henderson to Halifax, February 27, 1938; Sir Nevile Henderson's Private Papers. 81

far as the American position was concerned, Kennedy believed that "the

top side people" in Britain "all feel that the U.S. would be very fool­

ish to try to mix in. All they are interested in is to have the United 80 States stay prosperous and build a strong navy...." In a letter to a

friend Kennedy wrote that "the march of events in Austria made my first

few days here more exciting than they might otherwise have been, but I

am still unable to see that the Central European developments affect our

country or my job." He did not expect war and optimistically wrote, "I am sure I am right that none of these various moves has any significance 81 for the United States, outside of general interest."

In response to the crisis, the American government, which had not as yet defined its attitude toward political-territorial issues, merely sent Hitler a meek note of protest. "The extent to which the Austrian incident...is calculated to endanger the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the principles in which this Government believes," wrote the Secretary of State, "is, of course, a matter of serious concern to 82 the Government of the United States." Hull also closed the American

Legation in Vienna and asked Germany to assume responsibility for

Austria's debts. Hitler simply ignored the request. Moffat succinctly stated the American position: "IVe certainly can't be thought, whatever

on JPK to FDR, March 11, 1938, PSF, box 10, FDRL; also quoted in Offner, 238.

BljPK to Bernard Baruch, March 21, 1938, MS in Baruch Papers and the same letter in the Kent files, both say "foreseen" and "unforeseen." Koskoff, 130.

G^Hull, 575, 82 our sympathies may be, to assume any responsibility legal or moral, in 83 Europe at the moment...."

While the British Government was still examining the crisis, Cham­ berlain received a note from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany. He advised Chamberlain "that we shall not find the Germans unwilling to cooperate in other matters, providing we do not make Austrian independence a condition of Anglo-German understanding.... It is my duty," wrote Henderson, "to express my conviction that Germany will not yield 84 over this point...." Chamberlain apparently accepted Henderson's advice. In the House of Commons, two days after the invasion of Austria, the Prime Minister strongly criticized Hitler's methods. "It seems to us," Chamberlain told the MPs, "that the methods adopted throughout these events call for the severest condemnation, and have administered a profound shock to all who are interested in the preservation of European peace. It follows," Chamberlain warned, "that what has passed cannot fail to have prejudiced the hope of His Majesty's Government of removing

83 Moffat, 189. Offner argues that Ambassador Dieckhoff, the German Ambassador in Washington believed that ultimately the United States would go to war over Britain. Even as early as Roosevelt's quarantine speech, Dieckhoff had warned that American isolation would last only as long as Great Britain was not menaced. And after his interview with Hull and Welles following the Anschluss he wrote that "we can no longer count on America's isolation, and...we must be prepared, in case of a world con­ flict, to see Americans throw their weight into the British scale." His later despatches were circulated throughout Germany's diplomatic and military departments, and the Reich Chancellery where they may have been read by Hitler. He continued to insist that American intervention on behalf of Great Britain was inevitable. 236. 84 FO 800/269, Vol. 6. Nevile Henderson to Halifax, Nevile Hender­ son's Papers, February 27, 1939. 83

misunderstandings between nations and promoting international cooperation."

Chamberlain repeated the Government's policy toward Austria. "We were

under no commitment to take action vis-à-vis Austria..." except to

o r consult with the French and Italian Governments.

The aftermath of the Anschluss provided a time for reflection and

reassessment, Churchill, labeled an office-seeking Cassandra, and

politically isolated vigorously criticized Chamberlain's policy. He viewed the Anschluss as part of "a programme of aggression, nicely

calculated and timed, unfolding stage by stage and there is only one

choice open, ...either to submit like Austria, or else to take effective measures while time remains to ward off the danger and, if it cannot be warded off, to cope with it."^^ In a thought-provoking speech before the

Commons on March 14, he proposed a "Grand Alliance," a number of states united for mutual defense. 87 Chamberlain, however, had already considered and rejected such a scheme. He viewed it as attractive but impractical.

Slightly shaken by the Anschluss, Chamberlain began to reconsider his policy. "It is perfectly evident, surely now" wrote Chamberlain, "that force is the only argument Germany understands....Heaven knows, I don't

85 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, March 14, 1938, Vol. 333, 52. Hereafter cited as HC, Debates. Also mentioned in Offner, 237.

^%C, Debates, March 14, 1938, Vol. 333. p. 95. 87 Ibid., 99-100; Middlemas, 186.

GGpeiling, 347. 84 want to get back to alliances but if Germany continues to behave as she

o n has done lately, she may drive us to it."

Kennedy, however, was not alarmed over the crisis. Since he assumed that economic motives determined political actions, he interpreted

Hitler's eastward expansion as a move to secure markets and resources to alleviate Germany's economic situation. In a conversation with

President Hoover, Kennedy said "he was thoroughly convinced that Hitler had no idea of going to war, and he further believed that Hitler's expansion in Central Europe was motivated by a desire "to get some natural resources that will enable him to become a terrific factor in economic trade.He was neither frightened nor optimistic about

Europe's problems. Peace was still possible; war was not inevitable.

He told Hull that the English "are not going to get themselves into any kind of a mess-and by a mess I mean a war-unless they have tried out every possible method to avert it."^^ Kennedy's economic assumptions blinded him to political realities. He ignored the transformation in the balance of power and the increased vulnerability of Czechoslovakia.

Nor did he realize the aggressive, expansionist nature of Nazism or the demonic threat which Hitler posed.

Clearly, the Ambassador's major concern was to maintain the American tradition of non-intervention and to expand American trade to Europe. In

G^lbid., 341-342.

SOjPK to HULL, March 22, 1938, File 104, MS in Hull Papers. S^Ibid. 85

a phone conversation with Hull, he repeated the British contention that

nothing could be belatedly accomplished. ^2 He warned both Roosevelt and

Hull to publicly remain silent on the issue.

But Kennedy's fears were groundless. America had no intention of

intervening. The only overt response to the Anschluss was Hull's speech

on March 17 which restated American foreign policy slogans— "the main­

tenance of the peace of our country and the promotion of the economic, 93 the social and the moral welfare of our people...." He stated that

"the startling events of the past weeks, offer a tragic demonstration of how quickly the contagious scourge of treaty breaking and armed violence spreads from one region to another." He advocated that the U.S. follow 94 "a sound middle course" between internationalism and isolationism.

"This might be Mr. Eden, before his fall, addressingtlie Tory backbenchers," wrote The Spectator clearly unimpressed with the Secretary's statements.

It praised American statesmen like Hull who "are making heroic efforts to draw their countrymen after them along the path of salvation;" but bemoaned "how slow it all is compared with Hitler's lightning thrusts.

In the weeks following the Anschluss, Kennedy advocated two seeming­ ly contradictory policies. He opposed Chamberlain's Anglo-American

^^Transatlantic Telephone Conversation between JPK and Hull, March 15, 1938, Hull Papers, Box 66.

93pO 371/21492/23, March 17, 1938, Radio Bulletin #62, 304-308; Hull, 576-577.

94po 414/375, March 1, 1938, No. 22; also cited in FO 371/21526/ A2109/64/65.

95The Spectator, March 26, 1938, 675-676. 86

policy by encouraging the American doctrine of economic cooperation and

political isolationism and he supported Chamberlain's attempt at poli­

tical appeasement by arguing for his Anglo-Italian Agreement.

In a phone conversation with the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry

Morgenthau, Kennedy discussed Hitler's invasion of Austria and emphati­

cally stated that German aggression was motivated economically, not politically. "They can talk to me all they want to about the political aspects of everything that's happening, Henry, but that isn't what the trouble is," insisted the Ambassador. "The trend is definitely down unless they get together on some economic basis-to hell with the politi- 97 cal." Again, his solution was increased international trade.

Kennedy looked for an opportunity to explain his views on foreign policy to an English audience. Although he sympathized with Chamberlain's unhappy submission to Hitler's aggression, he wished to emphasize to his hosts that they could not rely on American support. In addition to his professional purpose, Kennedy wanted to prove, contrary to Washington rumors, that he had not been beguiled by British society. Roosevelt still teased him: "When you feel that British accent creeping up on you and your trousers riding up to the knee, take the first steamer home 98 for a couple of weeks holiday."

^^Roger Bjerk also offers this insight. 60. 97 Transcript of Telephone Conversation between JPK and Morgenthau, Jr., March 16, 1938, Morgenthau Diary, Book 115, 183-189, FDRL.

^®FDR to JPK, March 11, 1938, President's Private File 207, FDRL hereafter cited as PPF; also cited in Elliott Roosevelt, Vol II, 769. 87

The forum Kennedy chose was the traditional Pilgrims Club dinner

given for every new American Ambassador and held several days after the

Anschluss. Kennedy knew he would have a receptive audience. Invitations

were sent out to nearly four hundred British politicans, diplomats, and

businessmen. Kennedy spent several days working on his speech. He

submitted a copy to Hull who edited Kennedy's draft. The cautious

Secretary thought that the tone of Kennedy's original version was a little

too rigid and "hence subject to possible mininterpretation than would 99 appear advisable at this precise moment."

As Kennedy jokingly likened himself to a Pilgrim father and com­

plained about the woes of transporting a wife and nine children across

the Atlantic, the audience nestled back in their seats anticipating the

usual rhetoric on Anglo-American friendship and common heritage. But

within a few moments the astounded audience strained forward determined

not to miss a word of this astonishingly blunt lecture on American

diplomatic self-interest.

"The two countries knew each other so well," Kennedy explained,

"that they could afford to speak plainly to each other...." Kennedy

stated that it was his duty to explain to the British "what is in the minds and hearts of my countrymen...." "The average American today has two worries. He fears he may lose his job and he fears his country may get into a war...." The Roosevelt administration, explained the

Ambassador, intended to remain faithful to the traditions of no entangling alliances. It continued to be "careful and wary" of foreign countries and refused to make binding future commitments. The attitude of the

S^Hull to JPK, March 14, 1938, OF 3060, FDRL. 88

U.S. was frequently misunderstood. "In some quarters," Kennedy stated,

"it has been interpreted to mean that our country would not fight under any circumstances short of actual invasion." That attitude "is not accurate...and...is a dangerous sort of misunderstanding to be current just now." The audience applauded approvingly and then fell back into a thoughtful silence, when Kennedy continued. "Others seem to imagine that the United States could never remain neutral in the event a general war should unhappily break out." That was also a "dangerously conceived misapprehension." The American Government intended to "pursue whatever course we considered best for the United States." "My country has decided," explained Kennedy, "that it must stand on its own feet...."

His unsmiling audience understood the implication. The American govern­ ment would gladly "join and encourage other nations in a peace program based on economic recovery, limitation of armaments and the revival of the sanctity of international commitments....The great advantage of economic peace, it appears to us, is that it is not based on coercion."

Echoing Hull, Kennedy elaborated on this point. "You cannot run down a customer with a bayonet. You cannot force people to buy things....

If the nations of the world would trade liberally and naturally among themselves a new kind of security would be born, a security based on intelligent self-interest and not on f o r c e . The Spectator obviously disappointed with his remarks described his speech as "cautious"

lOOpO 371/21692/300, March 17, 1938, JPK to Hull; also see JPK to Hull, March 19, 1938, 123/58 DSF; entire text also reprinted in the New York Times, March 19, 1938, 1, 6; also see The Times (London), March 19, 1938, 17. 89 and illustrative of the way in which a Government's policy in a democratic country "is confined within the bounds of a public opinion which may be based on traditions that have little to do with urgent realities of the contemporary world.

However disappointed Kennedy's speech may have been to the British, at least it delighted Senator William F. Borah, a powerful isolationist, a Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, an ally worth having. He considered Kennedy a very "sensible" foreign policy spokesman.

Kennedy wrote to him in April, 1938: "The more I see of things here, the more convinced I am that we must exert all of our intelligence and effort toward keeping clear of any involvement. As long as I hold my present job," Kennedy promised him, "I shall never lose sight of this guiding principle." British politicans had reassured him that they completely understood American public opinion and were "going ahead with their plans without counting on the United States to be either for or against them." The neither "want or expect anything special from us." Now that this is understood, I can deal with them "in a frank and business-like manner...

A few weeks later Kennedy lectured before the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom and repeated his thesis of economic cooperation.

"We want to see the channels of trade unclogged, so that goods may move freely between nations," he told his audience. "Therein lies our hope of prosperity, not only for shipping but for other industries as well."^®^

lO^The Spectator, March 26, 1938, 675-676.

lOZLetter from JPK to Senator Borah, reprinted in Marian C. McKenna, Borah, (Ann Arbor, 1961), 354.

105 JPK to Hull, April 1, 1938, 123/62, DSF. 90

And therein lay Kennedy's credo for world peace. Tlie Prime Minister, on

the other hand, viewed economic appeasement in terms of restoring Germany's

pre-World War I colonial possessions, but not as being the basis for world

peace.He continued to assume that political appeasement must precede

economic appeasement.

Despite their differences in diplomatic philosophy the Ambassador

strongly supported Chamberlain's Anglo-Italian policy and urged Roosevelt

to publicly approve of the Prime Minister's rapprochement with Mussolini.

The Italian policy had been a troublesome issue between the two heads of state ever since Chamberlain had informed Roosevelt of his plan to grant de jure recognition to Mussolini's Ethiopian conquests. Despite Wash­ ington's objections the Anglo-Italian Treaty was signed on April 16, 1938.

Essentially it was a weak 'gentlemen's agreement' reaffirming the military status quo in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, renewing the censorship on propaganda, and cautiously promising British recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia when Italy evacuated her troops from Spain. The agreement would not be binding until the touchy 'Spanish question' had been settled to Chamberlain's satisfaction. By the end of the year, ten thousand of Mussolini's Black Shirts had been withdrawn from Spain and the treaty became effective on November 16, 1938. By ratifying the treaty, Britain abandoned its doctrine of non-recognition of military conquests.

^^^Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, (London, 1963), 189-197. 91

During the spring of 1938, Chamberlain tried desperately to win Roose­

velt's endorsement for his appeasement p o l i c y . Previously, Roose­

velt had discreetly refused support. But Kennedy, on Chamberlain's

behalf, urged his Government to approve the policy. He forwarded a

personal message from Lord Halifax asking for Roosevelt's endorsement

and he included a suggested draft approving the policy for the Presi­

dent's use at his press conference on April 19. The Foreign Secretary

wrote that: "The Prime Minister and I hope very much that the Presi­

dent will share our view that this agreement embodies a real contribu­

tion towards world appeasement....Should the President share these views

I need hardly say how grateful both the Prime Minister and myself would

be should he feel able to give some public indication of his approval of

105^ serious misunderstanding arose, caused by Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the U.S. He informed his Government that Welles had said that "the President regarded recognition (of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia) as an unpleasant pill which we should both have to swallow and he wished that we should both swallow it together." This was certainly a compromising statement and probably it was inaccurately reported, perhaps intentionally. Despite this misunderstanding, the British were not deterred from their efforts. ' Langer and Gleason, 28, 29; Offner however, argues that "Welles said very nearly, if not exactly, the words Lindsay attributed to him. Americans generally might have looked unfavorably upon abandoning nonrecognition, but Welles did write Roosevelt's message to Chamberlain (which Hull approved) that recognition of Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia "at some appropriate time may have to be regarded as an accomplished fact." Apparently, wrote Offner, the prospect of the British independently giving immediate recognition, without making it an "integral part of measures for world appeasement," upset American diplomats. Unfortunately, they did not make their distress as clear as they should have to the British, for Roosevelt expressed "deep gratification" at Chamberlain's second message, and Lindsay reported that the proposed British course, including support of Roosevelt's conference, "entirely met the President's views." The English thus could assume that the Americans had reached similar con­ clusions about measures to preserve peace and now had only to await their next move." 223. 92

the agreement itself and of the principles which have inspired it."^®^

Roosevelt apparently remained cool to the idea and remarked to Welles

"I suppose the last paragraph needs some a n s w e r . "1^7 decided to give

the British some moral support and issued the cautious statement:

As this Government has on frequent occasions made it clear, the United States, in advocating the maintenance of inter­ national law and order, believes in the promotion of world peace through the friendly solution by peaceful negotiation between nations of controversies which may arise between them. It has also urged the promotion of peace through the finding of means for economic appeasement. It does not attempt to pass upon the political features of accords such as that recently reached between Great Britain and Italy, but this Government has seen the conclusion of an agreement with sympathetic interest because it is proof of the value of peaceful negotiations.1^8

lOGjPK to Hull, April 15, 1938, PSF, box 10, FDRL; Offner, 233; also FO 371/22832/2099, Annual Report for 1938, 8-38.

lO^FRUS. April 18, 1938, Vol. I, 147; Hull, 581; Memo from FDR to Secretary of State, April 18, 1938, OF 48, Great Britain.

lO^In a memo to FDR from JPK, the ambassador wrote: "With reference to our telephone conversation of this morning, I am enclosing herewith for your consideration a suggestion of what you might wish to say at your press conference tomorrow with regard to the British-Italian Agreement. "I have spoken on the telephone to the Secretary and he is in accord with the general lines of this suggestion." Kennedy's statement read: "As this Government has on frequent occasions made it clear, the United States, is advocating the maintenance of international law and order, believes in the promotion of world peace through the friendly solution by peaceful negotiation between nations of controversies which may arise between them, as well as in the promotion of peace through the finding of means for economic appeasement. Without attempting to pass upon the political features of the accord recently reached between Great Britain and Italy, this Government has seen the conclusion of the agreement with sympathetic interest." JPK to FDR, April 18, 1938, OF 3060, FDRL. Bjerk gives the same argument, but he offers no evidence for Kennedy's influence. He also cites from FRUS, March 29, 1938, Vol. I, 276, which does not deal with the Anglo-Italian Agreement, but rather with the Spanish Civil War. I assume he meant to cite Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. I, 276, which contains Roosevelt's statement to the press, but does not contain any references to Kennedy or to his role as Ambassador. See Bjerk, 71. 93

Apparently Kennedy's recommendation did help to convince Roosevelt to endorse Chamberlain's policy. Hull, vacationing in North Carolina,

"reluctantly concurred" when he was informed of Roosevelt's decision.

And the resentful Ickes was hardly pleased. He blamed Kennedy for his

"malevolent" influence on Roosevelt and regretted "that the President made any such statement. It wasn't called for," he argued, "because the negotiations in question were between Great Britain and Italy." He regarded Roosevelt's endorsement as "an unusual procedure" since it implied his approval of Italy's militaristic policy toward Ethiopia and

Spain.

Kennedy's support of Chamberlain represented a slight shift in the

Ambassador's attitude. Previously, he had argued for economic solutions; now, however, he accepted Chamberlain's political policies as temporary expedients which complemented his long-range schemes for economic co­ operation. Kennedy's new conception of foreign affairs was to attempt to combine both political and economic approaches and necessitated a closer relationship between the two heads of government.

In addition to illustrating Kennedy's shift in foreign policy, the

Anglo-Italian Agreement also revealed the confusion in American foreign policy and the precarious position of the Ambassador. Kennedy, contrary to diplomatic convention, decided on his own authority, to support

Chamberlain's policy. Thus, he, not the Administration, suggested policy.

^0%ull, 581; Offner, 233.

ll°Ickes, April 23, 1938, Vol. II, 377; May 1, 1938, 380. 94

while Washington quietly concurred. Kennedy, like other diplomats

throughout the 1930's, was placed in the awkward position of representing

a policyless nation since Washington had not yet defined its attitude

toward European political-territorial issues. In such a situation, a

diplomat would be likely to rely upon his oivn wits and convictions or be extremely susceptible to the fears and attitudes of his government.

Kennedy was both self-assertive and susceptible.

The Anglo-Italian Treaty was only one facet of Chamberlain's two­ pronged Mediterranean policy; the other feature was non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War. Like Britain, the United States was also committed to the principle of nonintervention in Spain. America's jjolicy, defined by the Neutrality Act of 1937, weakened the embattled leftist Loyalist

Spanish government. Yet there was scarcely national unanimity over Wash­ ington's policy. The Spanish Civil War aroused deeper passions and caused more dissension in the United States than any other foreign issue. To many a dogmatic liberal, this struggle was the supreme test of doctrinal ortho­ doxy. The Loyalists were pictured as heroically defending democracy and freedom and staving off fascism. The Liberals were thus emphatic on lift­ ing the arms embargo to aid the Loyalists. Liberal spokesmen like Ickes were boisterously indignant over America's "shameful" Spanish policy.

The staid Under Secretary of State was also worried; We'les believed that Franco's victory would be a tremendous strategic advance for

Mussolini.

ll^Ibid.

112Burns, 356. 95

Yet the opposition was no less vocal. To many a loyal American

Catholic, the anticlerical and socialist programs of the Loyalists were an affront. They insisted on steadfastly maintaining the current policy of nonintervention. Furthermore, Britain, France, and a score of other countries had also adopted this policy. And Hull and a group of Anglo- 113 phile career officers stubbornly supported Britain's lead.

Thus, Roosevelt was caught in the middle of a great national debate on foreign policy. Privately, he sided with the revisionists and in the spring of 1938 he timidly suggested lifting the embargo on arms ship­ ments to Spain. Although he was extremely indecisive and wobbled back and forth, he ultimately decided to continue the policy of noninterven­ tion.

Kennedy's opposition to revision and his influence on Roosevelt is a matter of considerable historical debate. A host of historians argue that he played a major, diabolical role in Roosevelt's decision to con­ tinue the embargo and blame him for Roosevelt's decision to drop the idea of revision.It is true that Kennedy advocated continuing the policy of nonintervention and it is true that Roosevelt decided against revision. But that only proves that the President and his Ambassador

11 % ■^^•^Hull, 516-517; Burns, 356.

ll^Hull, 517.

llSgee Bjerk for a very good discussion of the histiography of the Spanish Civil War, 63-67. 96 ultimately agreed on the Spanish question; it does not prove that Roose­ velt accepted his Ambassador's arguments, or that he followed Kennedy's advice.

Chamberlain, Kennedy, and Hull essentially agreed on the Spanish issue; they all argued that nonintervention was the most effective way of containing a localized war. In a despatch to the Secretary of State,

Kennedy outlined Britain's Spanish policy. He reported that it was designed "(a) To limit or prevent foreign intervention and (b) at all costs to prevent the internecine struggle in Spain from enveloping

Europe in a general war." He also included Chamberlain's statement to the House of Commons in which the Prime Minister reaffirmed his faith in nonintervention. Chamberlain stated "that the policy of noninter­ vention, even though infractions of this policy may take place, affords the best means of avoiding a major conflagration." Kennedy agreed with

Chamberlain's attitude and stated that "with all its faults noninterven­ tion has contributed towards the preservation of peace in Europe.

Settlement of the Spanish problem," he wrote, "would seem to be an essential prerequisite to any scheme for general European appeasement.

The I injection of any new factor into this already overcharged and

I ^^^Koskoff writes that Kennedy's arguments which coincided with William Bullitt's, the American Ambassador in France, were certainly influential with the President. 134. 97 delicate situation," the Ambassador warned, "might have far reaching 117 consequences."

And Hull, too, advised against revision by arguing that it would subject the United States to "unnecessary risks." In May, 1938, he argued:

In view of the continued danger of international conflict arising from the circumstances of the struggle, any proposal which at this juncture contemplates a reversal of our policy of strict noninterference which we have thus far so scrupulously followed, and under the operation of which we have kept out of involvements, would offer a real possibility of complications.^^®

Like Chamberlain and Hull, Kennedy viewed the Spanish issue from the perspective of foreign policy; Roosevelt, however, examined it from the standpoint of domestic politics. Kennedy's arguments may have slightly influenced Roosevelt's decision, but he was only one of the spokesmen arguing for a continuation of the existing policy. If Roosevelt was persuaded by anyone not to abandon revision, it was probably the

Secretary of State who had the greatest influence. Henry Morgenthau wrote "I think his [Roosevelt's] main motive [for continuing noninter­ vention] was...a desire not to force the hand of his Secretary of State.

He felt that he could not afford, for the sake of a single issue, to

117 FRUS, May 9, 1938, Vol. I, 191. But Koskoff argues that privately Kennedy was "horrified at any suggestion that America or Britain should help in any way the 'bunch of atheists and Communists' which he believed the Spanish government to be," and left-wingers considered Kennedy to definitely be pro-Franco. But he was careful not to argue in personal terms, nor to appear "too Catholic" in case his Presidential opportuni­ ties materialized. 134.

^^^Hull, 516. 98 weakened Hull before Congress, where his popularity often won the Admin­ istration a narrow victory on major fights.Another factor which influenced the sly politican in the White House was the fear of adverse domestic repercussions. Lifting the embargo would have brought down the wrath of the isolationists and cost the Democratic Party many Catholic votes in the coming fall election. Astute Democratic Party chieftains naturally joined with Hull and Kennedy in opposing revision.

"So the cat was out of the bag-the 'mangiest, scabbiest cat ever,"' wrote Ickes when he heard of Roosevelt's decision to continue noninter­ vention. He bitterly complained, "This proves up to the hilt what so many people have been saying, namely, that the Catholic minorities in

Great Britain and America have been dictating the international policy 120 with respect to Spain." Although Ickes certainly overstated his case, nevertheless, the prudent Roosevelt could hardly afford to alienate such a large bloc of traditionally Democratic supporters. Unplacated, Ickes continued to regard Roosevelt's decision as "one of the black pages in 121 American history."

^^^"Colliers", The Morgenthau Diaries, October 11, 1947, 79; Bjerk argues that Kennedy was only a reporter for Chamberlain's views, but not an advocate. He cites a despatch from Kennedy to Hull and states that Kennedy did not offer his own opinions. However, the last paragraph of the despatch indicates that Kennedy did give his views. FRUS, May 9, 1938, Vol. I, 192, Bjerk also states that domestic considerations made Roosevelt decide against revision. He gives no description of Hull's influence. 66-67.

IZOpckes, May 12, 1938, Vol. II, 390; Burns, 356.

IZllbid., 378. 99

Despite Kennedy’s popularity and warm reception by the British, at

home Liberal New Dealers, like Ickes, continued to berate the new Ambas­

sador. Kennedy's general unorthodox behaviour and his disregard for

conventions, so pleasing to the British, also caused tremendous criticism

of him from the State Department. With his usual frankness, Kennedy

"inveighed eloquently against 'the career boys' in the State Department"

to his arch Liberal critic, Ickes, who took it all in and mischievously

repeated it to the Department officials. Joe Kennedy, wrote Ickes,

"insisted that the State Department did not know what was going on in

Europe and that there was no use trying to keep the State Department

informed. He complained that everything leaked through the State Depart­ ment and that nothing got to the President straight unless he sent it to 1 nn the President direct...." Tlie State Department officials, originally neutral, became increasingly critical of the brash, new Ambassador.

Kennedy became even more controversial as rumors of his political aspirations were again revived in the spring of 1938. Roosevelt was apparently indecisive and reluctant to break tradition by announcing his candidacy for a third term. James Farley was considered as a presidential possibility in 1940 with Joe Kennedy as his Vice Presidential running mate.^^S Although this would match two Roman Catholics, Kennedy would still strengthen the ticket since he could "command the great con­ servative business support" and ensure a well-financed campaign. The

IZ^ibid., 405.

^^^Ibid., 420; Victor Lasky, RFK; The Myth and the Man (New York, 1971) 53. 100

Chicago-Tribune predicted that his conservatism "as compared with other

Roosevelt followers will offset religious prejudice in the South,

That Kennedy occupied a unique position, esteemed by both F.D.R. and

Wall Street, made some political fans urge him to consider the Presi­

dency. But they received no encouragement. Kennedy explained to a

New York Times foreign correspondent that he discouraged the advances

because "he [loved] his family too much. His present job [was] bad

enough for the children without absolutely ruining them." Kennedy also

stated "I'm not a good candidate. I'm no good at going out and asking

the public to vote for me. So far. I've managed to keep hold of my personal independence and I've never given the presidency a serious

thought...."125 One political observer claimed that the White House was upset at the frequency with which Kennedy was mentioned as Roose­ velt's successor.126

However, it was difficult to find conclusive evidence of Kennedy's political ambitions. Some of the Kennedy-for-President rumors grew from the press repeating itself and some grew from maliciousness and a desire to create friction between Roosevelt and Kennedy. But his long­ distance wooing of the American press appeared to confirm his supposed presidential ambitions. He sent several select correspondents "confi­ dential" information which was published, much to the astonishment of

12^Chicago-Tribune, June 23, 1938, 2.

Sulzberger, 22.

126chicago-Tribune, June 23, 1938, 1; also cited in Lasky, JFK, 52, 101 127 the yet uninformed IVhite House and the State Department. One dumb­

founded reporter, shocked at the intimate nature of Kennedy's reports,

collected his letters and immediately handed them over to Roosevelt.

Some Kennedy watchers, not realizing that he had wanted the Ambassador­ ship, believed that he had been exiled to London and argued that his actions were calculated to keep his name in the headlines. Another

interpretation claimed that Kennedy was trying to prepare the public for his lack of success in settling the war debts and negotiating the 128 trade talks and to absolve himself of responsibility for their failure.

To bolster his sagging popularity in the United States, Kennedy decided to return home and announced that he would attend Joe Jr's graduation at Harvard. He told Hull that the Ambassador in London should be ordered home at least twice a year and that he wanted to discuss his

"very definite impressions with him about the situation here" and to 129 meet with Roosevelt. Kennedy spent the day before he left making a round of official calls on Chamberlain, Halifax, and a host of Ambas- sadors and diplomats. 130

"I'm just the same-you won't find me changed a bit," joked Kennedy as he welcomed a reporter over the telephone while the "Queen Mary"

1 97 Ibid.; also reported in IVhalen, 217, Duncliffe, 99, and Lasky, 53.

IZGwhalen, 217-218. 129 JPK to Hull, May 5, 1938, 125/68, DSF. 130 The Times, June 14, 1938, 16. 102

glided into the New York harbor.Kennedy met Jimmy Roosevelt and

the entourage of reporters accompanying him down the bay on the Coast

Guard cutter with a flat denial that he was interested in the Presidency.

Kennedy stated that he had worked for Roosevelt since 1932 and that "If

I had my eye on another job it would be a complete breach of faith with

President Roosevelt." 1 *^2 In the good natured banter between Kennedy and the reporters, the infamous knee breeches affair was thrown up to him.

Was he trying to hide something by wearing long trousers? Both the King and Queen understood his reasons for refusing to wear knee breeches, explained Kennedy. He claimed that "[it] wasn't because he was bow- 133 legged" as some people say, but simply because he did not want to.

To prove his point, Kennedy spotted a pretty young lady reporter and grinning broadly, offered to show her privately that he was neither knock-kneed nor bowlegged. His offer was refused.

Despite the criticism which he received from some quarters, there were still lots of old friends, cronies, and Kennedy-fans who were de­ lighted with the Ambassador. Arthur Krock, his life-long friend raved in his column, "Well, here is Mr. Kennedy back again, the rage of London, the best copy in the British (and Irish) press, his counsel steadily sought by the statesmen of the country to which he is accredited, his influence manifest and powerful in all matters in which the United States

^^^New York Daily News, June 20, 1938, as cited in IVhalen, 219.

132New York Times, June 21, 1938, 6.

133New York Times, June 23, 1938, 20; McCarthy, 103 has an interest in Great Britain." He is still the same 'old Joe,' bubbled Krock, "undazzled by such a taking up socially and officially as no American perhaps has known abroad since Franklin's day, with his vocabulary unimpaired, his method unchanged and the British openly glad of his Irish connectionsClearly, it was the same high-spirited, wise-cracking Joe Kennedy who had left the U.S. four months earlier.

After attending his son's commencement at Harvard, Kennedy was invited to Hyde Park personally to confer with Roosevelt. The machia­ vellian White House press secretary, Steve Early, had informed the

Chicago Tribune, the leading anti-Roosevelt newspaper about Kennedy's confidential correspondence with select members of the American press.

The Tribune, engaged in wishful thinking, reported that Roosevelt's conference with Kennedy had been carried on "in a frigid atmosphere because Mr. Roosevelt had received positive evidence that Kennedy hopes to use the Court of St. James [sic] as a stepping stone to the White

House in 1 9 4 0 .

Roosevelt was far too shrewd a politician to give the Tribune and other administration ill-wishers any ammunition. His meeting with

Kennedy did not lead to a split between the two. Ihe President's concern was not that Kennedy should become a political rival, but that

^^^New York Times, June 23, 1938, 20.

135chicago-Tribune, June 23, 1938, 1. 104

he should become a political c r i t i c . Kennedy was considered a long

shot since he had never held an elective office and he had no power base.

Besides, burly Jim Farley, a fellow Catholic, did have Presidential

aspirations and he controlled the political machinery of the Democratic

Party. If Roosevelt did subtly encourage any political aspirations which Kennedy may have had, it was only to ensure his loyalty.

As a critic, Kennedy could seriously damage Roosevelt's political

future, especially by mobilizing the conservative anti-Roosevelt Wall

Street sentiment. Any coldness that may have existed during the inter­ view was intended to convey Roosevelt's annoyance at Kennedy's indis­ cretions. But the adroit politician made sure that they parted as friends.

Roosevelt discussed Kennedy's visit with Ickes who "was interested both in the substance and the point of view of the President's remarks.

..." "I do not think Joe is fooling him very much," Ickes confided in his diary. "He said...that he did not expect Joe to last more than a couple of years in London because he was the kind of man who liked to go from one job to another and drop it just when the going became heavy.

... He knows that Joe is enjoying his job in London, where he is having the time of his life although he cries 'wolf.'"

l^^Whalen gives a similar analysis, 224. There is some interesting evidence on this point. FDR said that he "considered Kennedy a very dangerous man and that he was going to send him to England as Ambassador with the distinct understanding that the appointment was only good for six months and that furthermore by giving him this appointment any obligation that he had to Kennedy was paid for," FDR also told Morgenthau that he was having Kennedy watched hourly and the first time he was critical of Roosevelt, "I will fire him." He said several times "Kennedy is too dangerous to have around here." Morgenthau Diaries, December 8, 1937, Vol. 101, 69-70, FDRL. 137 Ickes, July 3, 1938, Vol. II, 415. 105

This illustrated a fundamental difference in the emotional make-up

of the two men. Kennedy's mercurial personality fluctuated between bearish pessimism and bullish optimism. He was a hot-tempered, cold- 1 ^8 blooded "hard hitting, tempestuous and clever Celt...." Roosevelt, however, was seldom anything other than undaunted, serene, relentlessly cheerful, "like the fairy story prince who didn't know how to shudder"^^^ wrote one close aid. This innate temperamental difference would be further revealed during the succeeding crises and become a source of considerable friction between the two men.

l^^Unofficial Observer, 255. 139 *Moley, 192. CHAPTER III

KENNEDY'S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

A few days after his return to London, Kennedy, accompanied by his

eldest son, Joe Jr., made a sentimental pilgrimage to Ireland to receive

an honorary degree from the National University in Dublin. The Govern­ ment of Eire must have looked upon the first Irish-Catholic Ambassador

to the Court of St. James with particular pride. The British Foreign

Office officials insisted that Kennedy's trip was "unofficial" and reluctantly went along. Cadogan considered it "somewhat abnormal," but after all, he said, Kennedy was "of Irish extraction" and he had "publically proclaimed his pleasure at the conclusion of the recent Anglo-Irish

Agreement." "It seems to me," he wrote, "that it would be a happy idea if he were now to accept the honorary degree from Dublin University, which would no doubt be conferred upon him at a ceremony where speeches would be delivered of a friendly character to this country." Another

Foreign Office official chimed in with the reminder that "even if we dis­ liked the idea 1 don't see how we could possibly object...that being so, let us say that we shall be very glad if Mr. Kennedy agrees."^

In the United States, Kennedy had quietly snubbed the Irish-

American organizations and was incensed when he was described as a

^FO 371/21548/5134, Foreign Office Minutes, June 28, 1938; Koskoff, 142.

106 107 hyphenated American. Once labeled an Irish-American by a Boston paper,

Kennedy complained, "I was born here. My children were born here. IVhat the hell do I have to do to be an American?"^ But as he plodded across the "ould sod" of the ancestral homes of the Kennedys', in Wexford, and the Hickeys', in Cork his reactions betrayed the intense Irish prejudice which affected his actions and attitudes. A friend once asked him why he disliked certain Englishmen. Kennedy's revealing answer was that he could not forgive those who had ordered the infamous Black and Tans into Ireland.3 As he addressed the dinner guests at Dublin Castle,

Kennedy said that "he had such a tremendous sentimental regard for

Ireland, that he was afraid to speak; he might weep at his joyful home­ coming." Instead, he spoke eloquently on Anglo-Irish affairs and praised the recent treaty between the two countries as "a step in the right direction...."^

The treaty to which he referred was the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed on April 25, 1938. It provided for a comprehensive trade treaty, a financial settlement of the long standing Irish war debts, and a British promise to transfer its harbor defences, the Irish ports of Cobh, Bere- haven, and Lough Swilly, to the Government of Eire. Chamberlain defended

^Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 28.

^IVhalen, 255.

^New York Times, July 8, 1938, 10; see John Cudahy to Hull, July 11, 1938, 123/97, DSF. 108

the agreement. "I considered the port concessions as a symbolic gesture

of good will and friendship," he wrote, "I am satisfied that we have

only given up the small things...for the big things,-the end of a long

quarrel, the beginning of better relations between North and South

Ireland, and the co-operation of the South with us in trade and defence."

Spurred by Germany's annexation of Austria, Chamberlain insisted "that

this is no time for keeping open old sores.

Churchill, however, argued against the treaty and vehemently

attacked the port provisions. "You are casting away real and important means of security and survival for vain shadows and for ease," he warned

the Government. "A more feckless act can hardly be imagined."^ Churchill regarded the ports as "the sentinel towers of the western approaches by which the 45,000,00f people in this island so enormously depend on

foreign food for their daily bread...." In addition to being Britain's lifeline, the ports were necessary as refueling bases for ships protecting convoys. "The first step which...an enemy might take would be to offer

y complete immunity...to Southern Ireland if she would remain neutral...."

Although de Valera had pledged that Ireland would not become a base for any foreign power during wartime, Churchill's prediction proved accurate.

During World War II a neutral Ireland denied Britain access to her ports unless she would surrender Ulster.

^Felling, 310-311,

^Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 248-249.

?HC, Debates, May 5, 1938, Vol. 335, 1099-1101. 409

The American press heaped praise on both governments and hailed the Anglo-Irish treaty "as a constructive achievement of mutual benefit to both parties." Lindsay, the British Ambassador in Washington, optimistically reported that the treaty was "to be welcomed cordially from the point of view of Anglo-American relations, and that it cannot 8 fail to contribute to their further improvement."

The negotiations over the Anglo-Irish Agreements produced friction between the proud flamboyant Ambassador and his chief. Both Kennedy and

Roosevelt vied with each other as each claimed credit for helping to bring about the Anglo-Irish Agreements. Administration advisers spread the rumor that "Kennedy got himself into a little trouble" since he "had set himself up as the mediator on Anglo-Irish relations." Actually,

Roosevelt aides reported that "Kennedy had had absolutely nothing to do with [them]."^ The real catalyst was not Kennedy but Roosevelt himself; he had sent sympathetic recommendations and letters of encouragement to

Chamberlain and de Valera. After the agreements were concluded, Roose­ velt received a most appreciative letter from de Valera which he proudly

®F0 414/275, May 9, 1938, 149.

^Morgenthau Diary, September 14, 1938, Vol. 122, 0042, FDRL. Also Ickes states that Roosevelt sent the letters to Chamberlain to Kennedy who handed them over to the Prime Minister. He supports Morgenthau's conclusion that Roosevelt considered himself "a determining factor" in the Anglo-Irish Agreements. Ickes, July 3, 1938, Vol. II, 416. 110

showed his advisers. Apparently, the Ambassador's imagined role was

one more instance of Kennedy blarney,^®

Although his role in the Anglo-Irish Agreements may have been over­ blown, Kennedy's successful arbitration during the thorny Anglo-American trade negotiations enhanced his already glowing reputation as a mediator.

The Economist praised Kennedy as having a "high and deserved reputation" as "a successful businessman and a gifted negotiator." It greeted the announcement of Kennedy's appointment as holding out "the greatest hope that the recent substantial improvement in the relations between the two

Governments may be not merely maintained but further extended."^~

The trade discussions between the United States and Great Britain were one facet of the negotiations under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement

Acts. Under the terms of the treaty, the President was authorized to reduce tariffs embodying the form of the most-favored nation principle.

l^Koskoff explains how Roosevelt, before Kennedy went to London, wrote to Eamon de Valera, "I have taken the course of asking my good friend Mr. Joseph P. Kennedy, who sails today for England to take up his post as Ambassador to convey a personal message from me to the Prime Minister, and to tell the Prime Minister how happy I should be if reconciliation could be brought about." Kennedy relayed the message to the Prime Minister. Koskoff cites an interview with a "key English­ man" in the Irish negotiations and he claims that Kennedy had "only marginal influence if any." In explaining his efforts to Irish diplomats, no doubt he did exaggerate the effect he had had on the British position and made leading Irish-Americans like Jim Farley jealous. 131-133.

llfhe Economist, January 15, 1938, 106. Ill

Any concession given to one country would automatically be extended to

all other countries producing the same product, provided they did not

discriminate against American goods. Ultimately the American Government

signed agreements with twenty-one countries.

Hull considered the trade agreements as "the spear point of the

approach of peace;" they would open the channels of international trade 1 O and encourage a greater economic cooperation.^ Since political tensions

were ultimately caused by economic rivalry, a revival in international

trade, according to Hull, would "be the most powerful single force for 13 easing political tensions and averting the danger of war." An agree­

ment between the two great Anglo-Saxon democracies was particularly

important as a symbol of democratic unity and a major contribution to

world peace. By late fall, 1937, discussions between Britain and the

United States had begun.

As a disciple of Hull's doctrine of economic cooperation Kennedy

staunchly supported the Secretary of State. Yet throughout the discus­

sions, Kennedy's pragmatic, practical manner frequently conflicted with

Hull's rigid, doctrinaire approach. Kennedy's methods, however, revealed

that he had a greater grasp of British political realities and that he was a far shrewder negotiator.

l^Hull, 525.

l^ibid., 519. 112

Kennedy's first assignment was to try to gain concessions from

Parliament on an import agreement dealing with American motion pictures.

Hull stubbornly viewed the film negotiations as a necessary preliminary to a general trade agreement. He gave the Tory Government a terse warning: "I am confident that the British Government will understand that an alteration to the disadvantage of the United States on the very eve of [the] trade agreement negotiations in the status of so important a product as motion pictures could hardly fail to affect the attitude of my Government toward concessions to be offered certain important British exports to the United States.The Secretary could hardly have made his position more explicit nor could he have taken a more inflexible attitude.

Kennedy, however, fully understood the impolitic nature of the

American position and advised Hull to compromise. If the United States made some concessions, he advised, a mutually acceptable agreement could still be reached on the present bill in Parliament. Furthermore, he pointed out, the American government could then expect British acquies­ cence "to be acknowledged by some concession to the U.S.A. during the course of the negotiations." Kennedy thought that it was "unwise as well as useless to attempt to persuade the British to alter existing legislation."^^ He added that the film negotiations should be treated

14pRUS, February 15, 1938, Vol. II, 19; FO 371/21530, February 16, 1938, No. 3173.

ISpRUS, April 26, 1938, Vol. II, 27. 113 separately from the general trade agreement. Hull, however, was unwilling to accept his Ambassador’s advice and Kennedy returned the negotiations to Washington. The significance of the dispute was not the negotiations themselves but rather the disagreement between the Ambassador and his chief. Kennedy, unlike Hull, showed a willingness to compromise and an ability to accept political realities.

Throughout the long sluggish negotiations over the general trade agree­ ment, Kennedy worked tirelessly, sometimes chiding Washington, always hunt­ ing for areas of compromise, and patiently chipping away at British obsti- nance. At one point during the early months of the negotiations, Kennedy severely criticized one of the President’s speeches which the touchy British considered to be an attack on class and privilege and a demand for class warfare. Kennedy reprimanded the President’s speech writer and accused him of nearly causing the collapse of the already tenuous trade negotiations.

Roosevelt’s speech, delivered on March 23 at Gainesville, Georgia, criticized

"the economic royalists" and stated: "Today, national progress and national prosperity are being held back chiefly because of selfishness on the part of a few....It is that attitude," Roosevelt continued, "which leads such people to give little thought to the one-third of our population which 1 have described as being ill-fed, ill-clad, and ill-housed....When you come down to it," Roosevelt explained, "there is little difference between the feudal system and the Fascist system. If you believe in the one you lead to the other.To Tories who had been dubbed "pro-fascist" by their opponents, Roosevelt’s remarks touched a sensitive nerve.

l^Samuel Rosenman, (ed.). The Public Papers and Addresses of F.D.R., Vol. VII, 164-168. 114

Kennedy reprimanded the Administration and accused it of creating a pessimistic attitude among Britain's financial elite. The author of the speech deserved to be horsewhipped, he protested, "This thing over here is going to go into a tailspin," warned the nervous Ambassador.

"You will not only have the possibility of war, you will have plenty of troubles. I want to tell you," Kennedy stressed, "that I had the biggest bankers in this country to dinner, and everyone of them is concerned. 17 We all can't be wrong, I am going to try to get him at Warm [Springs]."

After months of negotiations and rumors that they had almost reached a stalemate,Hull, frustrated by British haggling, asked Kennedy to remind Chamberlain that the United States wanted a trade agreement "not primarily for the dollars and cents immediately involved," but "as a powerful initiative to help rectify the present unstable political and economic situation everywhere." Since the Axis powers were suspiciously eyeing the negotiations, Hull thought "that it would greatly harm not only our two countries but also the whole outlook for peace and economic improvement if we, after months of haggling, should turn out a little, narrow, picayunish trade agreement." It would be tragic, if the American and British government failed to take advantage of "this unprecedented opportunity" to create "a real and lasting contribution to world peace and economic stability.

^^Transatlantic Telephone Conversation between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Kennedy, March 30, 1938, Hull Papers, Box 66, Folder 206, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

^%ee The Economist, July 30, 1938, 218; August 13, 1938, 314.

ISpRUS, July 25, 1938, Vol. II, 41. 115

Kennedy took up his assignment with relish and sent word to Hull

that British resistance stemmed from an unfavorable balance of trade.

Chamberlain's government refused to grant further concessions to the

United States on the terms of the trade agreement since Parliament

would regard it "as a complete sell out." Meanwhile, Kennedy reported,

the economist, John Maynard Keynes, published a letter in the Times

pointing out the unfavorable trade balance. It was obvious, wrote

Kennedy, that the British "should only buy where they can sell and that

barter doubtless must be considered strongly by the Government."

Kennedy advised Hull that Britain had made as many concessions as were

politically advisable and he could not press them further. Cabinet

members were already worried about Parliamentary criticism. Only

Chamberlain, Kennedy said, seemed really interested in reaching a worth-

while agreement. 20 Kennedy openly criticized Hull's approach and told him that "the tone of the last document you handed the British was definitely in the nature of an ultimatum and the British so regard it."

"We need to move reasonably quickly," he warned "to ensure the success of the negotiations. If you can give me some inside advice as to what you will take to settle I will go to work on it."21

But instead of sending him "inside advice," Hull repeated the

Administration's arguments to Kennedy. Kennedy, feeling completely hamstrung, snapped "there was little I could do since I had nothing new

20 The Landis Papers, Chapter 18, p. 5.

^IpRUS, October 7, 1938, Vol. II, 59-60; The Landis Papers, Chapter IS, p. 5l 116

to contribute.... Far be it for me to make any suggestions as to how

those handling the trade agreement should avail themselves of the

Ambassador's services, but it does seem to me that if they really want

a trade agreement it might be well to have the man on the spot find out

just how much further we could go without kicking the thing over. As

I have said to you over the telephone," he lectured the Secretary, "I

am not in a position to judge the value of the agreement or the terms

of it. I merely know what some people are likely to do in a game of

cards when they are called. I am assuming naturally that you want to

99 get this deal through if it is at all possible...." Hull abruptly

replied: "I cannot, of course, agree that the granting of our requests

would make the agreement a farce from the British stand point." However,

he caustically added, "I appreciate your interest in and efforts on 23 behalf of the trade agreement...."

Kennedy's brash manner and his constant profanity greatly annoyed

the Secretary of State. Yet Kennedy ultimately proved the "career boys"

in the State Department wrong. The American Government finally settled on the British terms. Hull informed him: "I have reached the conclu­

sion that the present offers represent the ultimate limit to which the

British are prepared to go...." The successful completion of the

Anglo-American Trade Agreement which was finally signed in mid-November,

1938, owed much to Kennedy's persistence and to his pragmatic and pro-

^^FRUS, October 18, 1938, Vol. II, 65-66; also Tlie Landis Papers, Chapter 18, p. 7. 23ibid. 117 fessional approach. Hull's gracious tribute acknowledged this. "In reaching this decision," he wrote, "I have been influenced by your excellent telegraphic reports....Your reports and assistance have been of great value and I am deeply grateful to you."24

The British regarded the trade agreement as "the major event" that year in Anglo-American relations and "the most outstanding achievement" to date of Hull's economic policies.Hie enthusiastic Ambassador described it as "easily the most important commercial pact of all time."^^

Kennedy had worked so diligently during the discussions because he shared Hull's dream of economic international cooperation. As he told the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, "these agreements have to satisfy people and as business men we know that, no matter what solutions are made of the political problem, unless some solution is made of the economic problem our countries will not be good for any of 27 us to live in very much longer." Yet Kennedy's economic orientation prevented him from understanding the political dimensions to problems.

Once political issues, like the Czech crisis, arose, Kennedy's isolation­ ism quickly surfaced.

Tlie Anglo-Italian Agreement and Chamberlain's policy of non-inter­ vention in Spain illustrated his appeasement policy in the Mediterranean.

Hie crisis over Czechoslovakia which unfolded during the spring and

24pRUS, November 3, 1938, Vol. II, 69-70.

25fO 371/22832/2099, Annual Report for 1938, 8-38.

^^The Times, May 23, 1939, 11; see November 25, 1938, 16, November 29, 1938, 9, November 30, 1938, 9, for Kennedy's views on the Agreement.

27jPK to Hull, May 2, 1938, 123/69, DSF. 118

summer of 1938 and culminated in the infamous Munich Agreement in

September, tested the Prime Minister's appeasement policy toward Germany.

And once again, the prim Birmingham entrepreneur at 10 Downing Street

could rely on the sympathy and endorsement of the self-made millionaire

living at Grosvenor Square.

In early July, Winston Churchill reminded the House of Commons of

his speech two months earlier in which he had said:

that after a boa-constrictor had devoured a goat or a deer it usually slept the sleep of repletion for several months. It may, however, happen that this agreeable process is disturbed by indigestion. If the prey has not been sufficiently crushed or covered with slime beforehand, especially if it has been swallowed horns and all, very violent spasms, accompanied by writhings and contortions, retchings and gaspings, are suffered by the great snake. These purely general zoological observations, of which further details can be found in Buffon's Natural History, suggest a parallel-no doubt very remote-to what has happened since Austria was incorporated in the German Reich.

Germany's annexation of Austria had foreshadowed the fate of

Czechoslovakia. In February, 1938, Hitler addressed the Reichstag and publicly announced his intentions. "Over ten million Germans live in

two of the states adjoining our frontier," he stated. Germany was obliged to protect fellow Germans and to ensure their "general freedom, personal, political, and ideological." Hitler's twin objectives were to absorb all Germans living outside the Reich and to extend Germany's

^^Churchill, Step By Step, (New York, 1939) 225. 119 boundaries eastward. The success of the Anschluss had achieved part of his design. As Nazi troops rolled into Austria, Hitler remarked "This 29 will be very inconvenient to the Czechs."

Tlie three million Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia were closely tied to their Austrian cousins racially and historically. The Anschluss stirred their sense of nationalism and increased their demand for annex­ ation to the powerful German Reich lying just across their frontier.

The Sudeten Germans provided a convenient pretext for Hitler's ambitions.

Descendants of the defunct Astro-Hungarian Empire, they had lived since the thirteenth century outside of Germany. Their grievances were neither novel nor irreconcilable. Hitler's purpose was not merely to incorporate the Sudenten Germans into the Reich, but to crush the state of Czechoslo­ vakia.

Fortunately, for Hitler's intention, Czechoslovakia was not a truly national state, but rather a state of diverse and seldom harmonious nationalities; in addition to the 3.5 million Germans living there, there were also 7.5 million Czechs, 2.3 million Slovaks, and smaller numbers of Magyars, Ruthenians and Poles.Nevile Henderson, the British

Ambassador in Berlin, referred to this hodge-podge of differing nation­ alities as "those blasted Czechs," and insisted that he knew Englishmen

^^Churchill, Tlie Gathering Storm, 251-252.

SOpeiling, 343. 120 who pompously regarded their state as some new kind of interesting flower.31 "May God keep us out of war for the Sudeten!" he advised the

Foreign Office. "If the Germans are going to behave as the Winston

Churchills of this world believe," the nervous Ambassador wrote, "we shall have lots of opportunities later for going to war with them. Let us reserve our effort for a cause which will be 100% just and not one based on emotions of fear and hatred or even of false reason and false prudence."32. One perplexed British diplomat in Prague began his despatch:

"There is no such thing as Czechoslovakia" and Henderson heartily agreed with him.33 And Jan Masaryk, the Czech minister to England accused

Chamberlain of having "yet to find out that Czechoslovakia was a country and not a d i s e a s e . "34 But there it was, strategically located in Central

Europe, the only democratic outpost east of the Rhine, and an ally of both France and Russia.

As a westerner and the heir of Masaryk, Benes^, the Czech President, ignored his alliance with Russia and looked to the West for assistance.

He was "the Metternich of democracy, with the same self-confidence, the same ingenuity of method and argument, with the same exaggerated reliance 7 r also on treaties and international rights." Bene^ told a British journalist

7 1 Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D., Vol. II, (Washington, 1949], September 10, 1938, 7751 Also cited in Gilbert and Gott, 106.

3^Sir Nevile Henderson to Sir Alexander Cadogan, FO 800/269, March 30, 1938, 38/28, Sir Nevile Henderson's Private Papers.

33Gilbert and Gott, 106.

34offner, 247.

33a .J,P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York, 1961), 149. 121

"unlike Austria, we will fight. We shall be massacred, but we will

fight."3G Under his capable leadership, Czechoslovakia was the strongest

and best governed of the new post World War I nations. Yet she faced

certain handicaps; she was cut off from her allies and surrounded by a

sea of hostile neighbors; Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary. To

send military aid to Czechoslovakia would entail a full-scale European war. Her geography and her politics made her a perpetual affront to the

German dictator. Her liquidation would not only give Germany her rich natural resources and undisputed hegemony throughout Central Europe; it would also eliminate the threat which a well-armed Czechoslovakia and a potential Russian or Anglo-French military base posed to German hegemony.

Despite the fact that in 1925 the Czech government had concluded an arbitration convention with the Germans, which Hitler had explicitly promised to uphold, the German General Staff under orders from Hitler had been busy drafting plans for the elimination of Czechoslovakia since

June, 1937.

Both France and Britain, keenly aware of Hitler's ambitions, wanted to avert a crisis and to avoid a decision between war and national humiliation. The French were the more defensive; they had an explicit obligation to aid the Czechs under the terms of their 1925 mutual defense treaty; the British, at most, had only a vague, casual commitment to the

Czechs as fellow members of the expiring League of Nations. Since the end of World War I, every British government had resolutely refused to

^^Northedge, 496. 122

give specific, binding commitments to the Eastern European countries or

to promise to help the French fulfill their treaty obligations. And

the Chamberlain Government was no exception. The Prime Minister's deepest

desire was to ensure "a stable future for Czechoslovakia. "^7 As early

as November, 1937, Chamberlain wanted to say to the Germans: "give us

satisfactory assurances that you won't use force to deal with the

Austrians and Czechoslovakians, and we will give you similar assurances

that we won't use force to prevent the changes you want, if you can get

them by peaceful means." He believed that the British electorate and

the Dominions would oppose a war to maintain the status quo in Czechoslo­

vakia. On the other hand, Britain could hardly pretend to be unconcerned

over the fate of the Czechs. Chamberlain's policy was to "work for a

peaceful settlement, perhaps on some basis of local autonomy, and urge

the Czechs to yield more liberties to their German subjects than they

*7 0 had up to date."

Chamberlain argued that Czechoslovakia's geographical position made

it impossible to stop a German assault. "We could not help Czechoslovakia," he asserted, "she would simply be a pretext for going to war with Germany

....I have therefore abandoned any idea of giving guarantees to Czecho­ slovakia, or the French in connection with her obligation to that country, a sentiment which Kennedy would certainly have applauded.

3?Feiling, 353.

^^Ibid., 333, 334; Gilbert and Gott, 107. Offner writes that "Cham­ ber la in~cTearly intended to take the initiative in finding a solution to the argument between the government of Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans; he also determined to see that no situation would develop in which England would have to fight to defend Czechoslovakia." 249.

^Spoiling, 348. 123

In the House of Commons on March 24, 1938, Chamberlain spelled out his policy. His Government would not give commitments because no vital

British interests were directly threatened as with France or Belgium,

He reminded the MPs of the German pledge not to use force against the

Czechs and of the Czech promise to grant concessions. However, he warned

Hitler, in an equivocal statement, constantly quoted throughout the tense summer months, "legal obligations are not alone involved and, if war broke out, it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations,,,,The inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements,,,,This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associa­ tions of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty, and determined to uphold them,"^^ He thus kept his course open.

Hitler, however, disregarded Chamberlain's warning. He instructed the pro-Nazi leader of the Sudeten Germans, Konrad Henlein, a former gymnastics director, to present a list of unacceptable demands to the

Czech government at the annual Sudeten German Party Congress in April,

The Karlsbad demands called for the reconstruction of the Czech state into a "state of nationalities" with complete freedom for National

4PHC, Debates, March 24, 1938, Vol, 333, 1405-1406, Cabinet 16/209, Committee of Imperial Defence and Foreign Policy Committee, Czech Crisis Cabinet File, Hankey's File, March 24, 1938, 4, Chamberlain also took pains to keep the United States Government informed of misgivings of the British Government and the possibility of a move by Germany against Czechoslovakia. For examples of repeated statements to the United States see FO 371/22832/2099, Annual Report for 1938, 8-38, 124

Socialist propaganda, and a thorough-going revision of Czech foreign

polic)". They were intended to make Czechoslovakia into nothing less

than a mere German satellite. As the two plotters hoped, the Prague

government rejected the Karlsbad proposals.

Because of Czech intransigence, Daladier, the new French Prime

Minister, a taciturn peasant, and Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, arrived

in London to discuss the Czech question with Chamberlain and Halifax on

April 28. The Anglo-French talks nearly broke down when the French pressured the British to promise joint action if France went to war.

Chamberlain obstinately refused. The best that the French could get was

a weak, non-commital statement that Britain might not remain neutral if

France intervened in a Czech-German war. They further agreed to warn

Bones' that his government must negotiate with Hitler. Kennedy summed up

Chamberlain's double-fisted policy toward Germany as a "veiled threat."

He told Hull that: "Now we are urging Banes' to make a reasonable and sensible deal" but at the same time telling Hitler: "Be as reasonable as you should because if you touch the spring it may go off and then you may not do as well as you think.

^^The Karlsbad proposals called for: "1. Full equality of status. 2. Guarantee by recognition of the Sudetens as a legal body. 3. Deter­ mination and legal recognition of German areas. 4. Full self-government in German areas. 5. Legal protection of civilians outside areas. 6. Reparation of injustices and damages since 1918. 7. German officials in German areas. 8. Liberty to profess German nationality and political philosophy," Cabinet 16/209, April 24, 1938, 6.

^ZpRUS, May 16, 1938, Vol. I, 505. 125

To please the British and French and to placate the Sudeten Germans,

the Prague Government, on May 17, offered an amnesty for political

offenders, the appointment of German officials proportional to the

German population, and new municipal elections. To influence the outcome, the German government began a "war of nerves." IVhen London received reports of German troop movements and news of the shooting of two Sudeten

Germans, rumors of war quickly spread. The Czechs responded by ordering a partial mobilization of the army, and both France and Russia promised to support their ally.^^ On May 20, Halifax informed the German

Ambassador in London that if the Czechs were attacked and France upheld her treaty obligations, then Britain might enter the conflict. This last vestige of Anglo-French cooperation helped to foil Hitler and to prevent another weekend coup. Incensed and revengeful. Hitler met with his advisers and ordered that preparations for military action against

Czechoslovakia were to be set by October 1.^^

In addition to the official diplomatic channels, Chamberlain participated in "a new departure in British diplomacy" by attending a luncheon in which he spoke "off the record" to a group of American and

Canadian journalists about the Czech issue. Talkative, relaxed and frank, the Prime Minister explicitedly stated that his Government intended no definite action to prevent the economic or territorial expansion of

43pRUS, May 21, 1938, Vol. I, 506; Offner, 249.

^^A. J. P. Taylor, Tiie Origins of the Second World War, (New York, 1961), 160-162. 126

Germany eastward into Danubia. Only a war could prevent Germany's

expansion in Central Europe. He doubted that either France or Russia

would use military force to save Czechoslovakia. One stunned correspon­

dent confessed that the Prime Minister did not even seem to believe that

Czechoslovakia, in its present form, had much raison d'etre. Still,

Chamberlain did believe, the much assured correspondent wrote, that the

Czech issue could still be peacefully solved, perhaps, as Chamberlain so

casually suggested to his astounded audience, by moving the frontier

inward since the Sudetens occupied the area along the border. Hopefully,

after Germany's ambitions had been satisfied, she might then be willing

to negotiate a general appeasement and a disarmament settlement.

The instigator of this meeting was Cliveden's vivacious hostess,

the American-born Nancy Astor. She had asked the permission of her close

friend, the American Ambassador, and had received Kennedy's warm endorse­ ment. Apparently, both she and Kennedy, two of Chamberlain's staunchest political fans, wanted to create a closer rapport between the British

and the Americans and to increase communications between the two English-

speaking democracies. Whatever the motives of these two, the meeting was a success. The correspondents left the luncheon with a greater under­

standing of British foreign policy and a more sympathetic attitude toward

Chamberlain. One favourably impressed correspondent decided that Chamber-

lain looked younger than his 69 years and that he was not quite so much

of "a cold fish."46

4%r. Hugh Bailie from Webb Miller, May 11, 1938, Hull's Papers, 105.

4Gjbid., Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, 119. 127

Throughout the early months of the Czech crisis, Kennedy faithfully

stood by Chamberlain, serving as his loyal confidant and dutiful reporter to the American Government. He was privy to Britain's secrets and had

Halifax's promise that he would receive confidential information and be kept fully informed of "all British movements of importance."4? Halifax kept his word. Kennedy was briefed beforehand concerning Chamberlain's important parliamentary statement on March 24 and he was also informed 48 by the Foreign Office of the substance of the Anglo-French talks.

Despite the fact that he was very well informed, Kennedy's initial analysis of the Czech situation proved to be short-sighted. He repeatedly ignored the warnings of "war-mongers" like Churchill. Nor did he accept the advice of other diplomats, like the Soviet Ambassador to Britain,

Ivan Maisky, whose interpretations ultimately proved to be correct. As with the Anschluss, Kennedy completely misunderstood the aggressive nature of Nazism. He reported that "The danger in Czechoslovakia is obvious," and predicted that "the British will probably try to put it up to Hitler that as a member of the great European community they hope that Germany will contribute her part and show her willingness, through meeting the efforts of the Czech Government in a fair spirit, to assist the cause of continental peace."^9 To assume, especially after the

4?FRUS, March 23, 1938, Vol. I, 40.

48FRUS, May 5, 1938, Vol. I, 51.

4^Ibid., Charles Lindbergh wrote in his journal in February of 1938 that Kennedy "does not expect war this year and feels that Chamberlain has handled the situation well." Tlie Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindberg, (New York, 1970) 159. 128

Anschluss and after hearing Hitler's speeches that Hitler had a "fair

spirit" or a "willingness" to contribute to continental peace showed a

certain gullibility.

Kennedy saw the Czech crisis, like the Anschluss, largely through

the eyes of his host. Like Chamberlain, Kennedy believed that Britain's

military weakness spelled certain defeat. Years later, Kennedy told a

friend that Chamberlain's position throughout 1938 was that Britain "had

nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with

Hitler.The Ambassador was severely critical of Britain's jingoes

and war-mongers whom he accused of urging war on an unprepared Britain.

He was determined from the outset, notes Arthur Krock, that if war came, the United States would keep out of the conflict.

Kennedy complacently watched the Czech crisis unfold. His detailed despatches had nothing of the passionate, hysterical tone which they

later acquired. And even during the "May Crisis," Kennedy still remained complacent. At least since March 23, he could rest assured that Chamber-

lain intended to settle the dispute peacefully. "My job," the Prime

Minister apologetically told him, "is to try to keep England out of war if I possibly can; therefore I am doing a lot of things that are difficult for me to do."^^ Or perhaps, as one historian suggests, he accepted the

SOwalter Millis, (ed.j. The Forrestal Diaries, (New York, 1951), 121-122.

S^Krock, Memoirs, 334.

^^FRUS, July 6, 1938, Vol. I, 57; See Colvin for a discussion of the Cabinet meetings during the "May Crisis." Tlie Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet which had met in March 1938 and discussed British policy toward Czechoslovakia seems not to have met at all in May 1938. Also it did not meet between June and November 14, 1938, "an extraordinary gap," writes Colvin, "by which time the Czechoslovakia Republic...ceased to exist." 134. 129

interpretation of the Czech Ambassador, Jan Masaryk. Masaryk told

Kennedy "that Hitler has enough on his hands just now to keep him o c c u p i e d . "53 Stall Hitler, Masaryk suggested to Kennedy. The longer a confrontation could be avoided, the greater the chance of finding a solution.

And yet, Kennedy became increasingly troubled by the Sudeten issue and decided to try his own foim of personal diplomacy. Acting on his own authority, he initiated conversations with the German Ambassador in

London, Herbert von Dirksen, in late May and mid-June. Von Dirksen did not believe that Kennedy was motivated by political or personal considera­ tions but rather by an "idealistic conviction of the necessity of bringing about general pacification in the world...." He believed that the American

Ambassador was "sincere in his efforts to create a better atmosphere in

German-American relations" and wrote to his Berlin superiors that Kennedy was "favorably regarded in every way in diplomatic and Government circles h e r e . "54 Kennedy told von Dirksen that he intended upon his return to the United States to discuss the European situation with Roosevelt. His report would include the optimistic appraisal that the tension could be lessened by establishing friendly relations between the American and

German Governments.55

^^FRUS, May 14, 1938, Vol. I, 499-500.

5^Documents on German Foreign Policy. Series 0, Vol. I, June 13, 1938, 718; also Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 29. Offner also describes Kennedy's negotiations with Dirksen, 251-253.

5^Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. I, June 13, 1938, 715. 130

On June 13, two days before Kennedy's departure, the two Ambassadors

again met. Kennedy told von Dirksen that neither he nor Roosevelt was

anti-German. "The present Government had done great things for Germany.

. he remarked. Charles A. Lindbergh's favorable report on Germany's

living conditions and the "satisfied" morale of the German people had

greatly impressed Kennedy. He revealed his basic diplomatic assumption,

the correlation between economic dislocation and political turmoil and

repeatedly stated "that in economic matters Germany had to have a free

hand in the East as well as in the Southeast.He still believed that

economic appeasement was the most effective way to preserve world peace.

Unfortunately, according to Kennedy, few in the United States spoke 57 favorably about Germany because they were afraid of offending the Jews.

Kennedy insisted that public opinion in the United States was "by no

means so unfavorable toward Germany...." Von Dirksen stated that he had

learned that if war broke out, ninety per cent of the American people

would support a war against Germany. Kennedy agreed but argued that

this sentiment did not apply to peacetime. The great majority of

Americans wanted "peace and friendly relations with Germany." Although

anti-German sentiment was particularly strong on the East coast, where

three and one-half million Jews lived, elsewhere, it was much weaker.

Nor did the average American have much affection for England, Kennedy

56Ibid., 718.

^^See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion of Kennedy's views on Jews. 131 stated. "He only knew that she had not paid her war debts, and that she had deposed her King because he wanted to marry an American; he had no prejudice against Germany."

Von Dirksen appealed to Kennedy to use his influence with the

American press and with Roosevelt to speak [henceforth] more favorably of Germany. Again, Kennedy blamed Germany's bad press on Jewish influ­ ence. The two Ambassadors arranged to meet again after Kennedy returned to London in mid-July.

Actually, it was not Kennedy, but von Dirksen who accurately inter­ preted America's mood. A survey of public opinion on July 27, 1938, revealed that sixty-five percent of the people questioned reported that if war broke out, they would support France and England against Germany and Italy. Three percent stated they would favor the Italian and German cause, and thirty two percent were undecided.Hull, too, provided evidence for von Dirksen's impressions. He commented to Dieckhoff, the

German Ambassador in the United States, that "The tide of opposition in this country to the course of the German Government has been steadily rising and continues to rise...." This anti-German feeling, Hull stressed, was caused by "Germany's seeming intention to find new methods each week or month to injure this country and correspondingly benefit

Germany.

^^Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D., Vol. I, June 13, 1938, 718; Koskoff, 136-138.

^% e w York Times, July 27, 1938, 7; Moffat, 196.

^%ull, 584-585. 132

Dieckhoff*s reports to Berlin frequently commented on the "stiffening of the attitude of the Adminsitration" and of the "acute" and "bitter" anti-German sentiment in the United States. "The lies and misrepresenta­ tions spread here in speech and in writing, particularly by the daily newspapers, in connection with the recent crisis on the Sudeten-German question have aroused a feeling of resentment against us." Most of the

State Department officials and even Roosevelt himself have "turned against us more and more..,," he complained.

Dirksen's assessment of Kennedy's motive was probably accurate.

Kennedy was alarmed at the real possibility of war and obviously thought that an American-German rapprochement would greatly increase the chance of peace. Perhaps he believed that his adventure into personal diplomacy was called for because he mistakenly assumed that Washington did not fully understand the seriousness of the European situation. He incor­ rectly held the "career boys" in the State Department responsible for misinforming Roosevelt.

However, throughout this episode, Kennedy did display professional diplomatic skill. If his pro-German remarks were meant to flatter Dirksen and Berlin officialdom, then Kennedy was acting like one more diplomat who masquerades to his country's political advantage. Nevertheless, what was done was without his superior's consent. As an American Ambassador, his role was only to accurately describe and report the facts--not to initiate policy.63

6^Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. I, June 25, 1938, 719.

62Ickes, June 26, 1938, Vol. II, 405.

6%jerk gives the same interpretation, 80, 133

By late June, Kennedy's mercurial spirits had sunk to despair.

Harold Ickes, honeymooning in London, visited him and sympathetically

listened to him rail. "Joe Kennedy was full of the European situation.

He was greatly afraid that hell might break loose at any time over

Czechoslovakia;" and he intended to tell Roosevelt about it as soon as he got home. The frightened, theatrical Ambassador left no doubt in his visitor's mind "that he was very nervous over the entire European situation."^4 But he was not alone in his fears. The British Foreign

Office shared his apprehension. Even William Bullitt, the American

Ambassador in France told Ickes that the tension may have subsided some­ what but "the situation was still grave." He was "even more jittery over the European situation" than Kennedy and predicted that a war which would completely destroy European civilization was inevitableit would probably last twenty years and then be fought to a stalemate.

Kennedy's "pleasant" and "informative" conversation with Roosevelt at Hyde Park confirmed the President's suspicions. Although he was guarded in his replies to newsmen later that afternoon, Roosevelt did tell reporters "that the international picture was not a particularly happy one but that all he could do was to hope for the best;" an apt description of America's response to the European crisis."Before

64Ickes, June 26, 1938, Vol. II, 405-406.

G^lbid., 409.

G^New York Times, June 22, 1938, 4. 134

Munich," one shrewd analyst wrote, "this country's role in world

politics was chiefly that of a chorus, somewhat over-given to gloomy

gesture and hortatory speech.Ever since the beginning of the

Czech crisis, the American Government had continued its "attitude of

contemplation."G8

The only important act by the American Government during the early

stages of the crisis was Hull's press statement issued on May 28, 1938.

Apparently, he was prompted by the "May Crisis" and not by one of

Kennedy's increasingly frequent requests for a statement in support of

Chamberlain. In his message, Hull stated that the American Government

considered the Central European crisis "critical" and had followed the recent events with "close and anxious attention." He reminded the public of the Kellogg Anti-War Pact, signed nearly ten years earlier, in which sixty three countries had agreed upon the "renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy" and that "the settlement or solution of all disputes" should "never be sought except by pacific means."

The American Government, Hull said, cannot ignore the fact that any outbreak of hostilities anywhere causes a general disturbance "the ultimate consequences of which no man can foresee" and is likely to cause unpredictable and permanent damage.

^^Alsop and Kintner, 6.

^^Langer and Gleason, 32.

69FRUS, May 28, 1938, Vol. I, 520-521; Offner, 251. 135

Although the crisis had quickly subsided, the State Department officials "knew that the peril was greater than before. It was already a question as to whether 1938, only twenty years after the armistice, would be the war year," Hull wrote.Thus, despite Kennedy's poor opinion of the State Department, its officials were well informed and deeply concerned about the crisis in Europe. Nevertheless, without the forceful executive leadership which Roosevelt was unwilling to give, 71 American policy continued to be one of "pinpricks and righteous protests."

After returning to London in mid-July, Kennedy went on a brief speaking tour, celebrating the Fourth of July, dedicating a window in the Cathedral to the memory of King George V and a room in Fydell House of the English-

Speaking Union in Boston, Lincolnshire. Over and over again his theme was the same. Democratic institutions were inherently superior to those elsewhere in the world where people, "embittered by injustice and impove- 72 rished by lack of opportunity, have turned despairingly to new roads."

In Winchester he spoke of the "intolerance such as is abroad in so much of the world" which may "threaten us and the bases of our national lives."

"We must be always on the alert," he told the audience, "to defend the thesis that no permanent national happiness can ever be achieved, in the kind of society to which we are accustomed and which we wish to pre- 7 ^ serve, by one segment of our populations at the expense of others."

70null, 583.

^Igurns, 385.

^^JPK to Hull, July 3, 1938, 123/90, DSF.

73jPK to Hull, July 13, 1938, 123/95, DSF; The Times, July 13, 1938, 13. 136

He reminded the English-Speaking Union that there are those who declare

that democracy cannot work and that it is doomed shortly to disappear

from the face of the earth. We do not agree with them and we must make

a determined demonstration of our faith as an inspiration to our own

people, and perhaps, in time, to other peoples.... It is up to us, to

make sure that democracy does work.”^^

He continued to keep Roosevelt informed and told him "that he [did]

not regard the European situation as so critical. There had been some

fear," he reported, that "Germany might go berserk after the harvests

are in, but the feeling now is that if this does not happen, war is not 75 likely to come until next spring at the earliest." One reason for

Kennedy's favorable report was Chamberlain's remark "that nothing is

going to happen unless some unfriendly incident occurs...."^^ The Prime

Minister also informed Kennedy of his decision to sponsor the Runciman mission and to ask the American Government to issue a public statement of approval. Kennedy argued that this "would have a favorable effect 77 on world opinion and Lord Halifax would naturally be much gratified."

Washington, however, ignored the request.

74jPK to Hull, July 16, 1938, 123/99, DSF,

7Slckes, July 16, 1938, Vol. II, 420.

7GpRUS, July 6, 1938, Vol. 1, 57.

7?FRUS, July 29, 1938, Vol. I, 539. 137

Despite Washington’s refusal, Chamberlain announced to the House

of Commons on July 26, that he intended to send Lord Runciman to Prague,

He would act on his own responsibility, "not in any sense as an arbitra­

tor, but as an investigator and mediator, and not under instructions

from His Majesty's or any other Government,..." Actually, his mission was not to mediate, but rather to urge Bene^ to accept Henlein’s demands.

Despite Runciman’s efforts--he arrived in Prague on August 4--the stalemate between Henlein and Bene^ continued. As a banker and a trans­ portation expert, Runciman had no particular qualifications for the mission. He likened it to being set "adrift in a small boat in mid-

Atlantic,"^^ His objectivity was a sham; on weekends he visited German princes in the Sudetenland and often listened to Czechs with pro-Nazi 80 sympathies. It was "self-evident" to Runciman that the Sudeten German districts should be given a "full right of self-determination at once,"

To continue the present state of uncertainty, he warned, would be to risk civil war. Since the overwhelming majority of Sudeten Germans wanted unification with the German Reich, a plebiscite or referendum

^Bpeiling, 357; HC, Debates, July 26, 1938, Vol, 338, 2957-2958; also, Colvin describes the Cabinet discussions of Runciman and Halifax's optimistic opinion that "some of his advisers, who had been inclined to take rather a grave view of the outlook over Czechoslovakia, now thought that the war party in Germany had received a check at the end of May, and perhaps were receiving a further check by what was happening now, and for that reason there might be a better prospect of a peaceful issue to the affair, 137,

^^Moffat, 196,

GOwheeler-Bennett, 82, 138 would be "a sheer formality," an "inevitable delay" serving only "to

excite popular feelings." Runciman advised that these areas "should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany...." The integrity

and security of the Czechoslovak Republic would be strengthened, despite her loss of territory, because a problem "of intense political friction

[would be removed] from the middle of Europe." Like Switzerland,

Czechoslovakia should follow an entirely neutral foreign policy "not only 81 for her own future existence but [for] the peace of Europe."

President BeneS' finally agreed to accept Henlein's program and to grant the Sudeten Germans virtually complete autonomy. Hitler, however, had little interest in the Sudeten Germans; he wanted the destruction of the Czechoslovak state. Consequently, he ignored Prague's offer.

Kennedy also offered his services as a mediator. He renewed his conversations with von Dirksen in late July. The German Ambassador confided to him that Hitler was willing to negotiate an Anglo-German 82 rapprochement. Acting on the German Ambassador's suggestions, Kennedy mentioned to Washington that Roosevelt might prod Chamberlain into taking 83 the initiative. Again, his request was ignored. He also told Chamber- lain about his conversation with von Dirksen. However much the Prime

81pO 800 Lord Runciman's Mission, Extracts from White Paper, September 21, 1938, Vol. 304-308.

G^Tel. 741.62/280, July 20, 1938, DSF, as cited in Bjerk, 83; Koskoff, 143-144. 83 JPK to Hull, 741.62/282, July 21, 1938, DSF, as cited in Bjerk, 83-84. Offner writes that in the aftermath of Munich the Germans agreed to permit Kennedy to meet with Hitler if Roosevelt approved. But before formal plans were made, the November pogrom against the Jews and the mutual "recall" of Ambassadors caused the proposal to be tabled. Offner argues that Kennedy's visit would have served no useful purpose. American intentions were of no concern to Hitler. He intended to precipitate a crisis in Czechoslovakia to bring about the solution he wanted. 253. 139

Minister wanted a general agreement with Germany, Chamberlain informed

Kennedy that he had no intention of acting until the Czech issue was settled.

During an hour long conversation, an anxious Chamberlain worried

"out loud" to Kennedy and surprised him with the news that there was a

50-50 chance of war since Hitler intended to have Czechoslovakia, one way or another. Given Britain's state of military unpreparedness,

Chamberlain felt he dare not bluff. If France went to war, Chamberlain explained, then Britain "might be forced into it." Still, he promised, 84 "he definitely would not go until he was absolutely forced to," "It will be hell," said Kennedy, Upset by the war of nerves and worried about a general European war breaking out, the Ambassador realized that the isolationist position of the United States would be extremely difficult to maintain. He asked the Prime Minister if there was anything that the President might do. Chamberlain said no.. Despite the Prime

Minister's refusal, the excited Ambassador, without consulting Washington, offered Chamberlain a "blank check." Giving Chamberlain a sweeping assurance of Roosevelt's support, he said that the President had decided

"to go in with Chamberlain" and that he would approve of "whatever

O C course Chamberlain desires to adopt...." Kennedy conveyed a totally

84pRUS, August 29, 1938, Vol. I, 560-561; Offner, 257.

OC E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, (ed.), Documents on British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. II, (London, 1949), 213. Hereafter cited as Documents on British Foreign Policy; FO 371/22832/2099, Annual Report for 1938, 8-38, also cited in Koskoff, 145 and Offner, 257. 140

erroneous sense of approval and enthusiasm on FDR's part, and apparently

meant that the President would accept either a "sell out" of the Czechs

or war with Germany.

The Prime Minister also informed his confidant of an Anglo-French 87 agreement binding France to consult with Britain before declaring war.

Always hopeful, Chamberlain still wished to avoid war and, despite Cabinet

opponents, to staunchly cling to his appeasement policy and explore other

alternatives for peace. Present British public opinion opposed war, he

explained, but if France declared war, it would be a different story.

Kennedy, more optimistic about preserving peace than Chamberlain, reported

to Hull that the Prime Minister would use his influence to keep France

and Britain from going to war. Giving him a strong vote of confidence,

Kennedy wrote that the sick-looking Prime Minister was "worried but not O O jittery" and still "the best bet in Europe today against war." Kennedy

^^Chamberlain wrote on July 19 that he had noticed a change in American attitudes. "Kennedy has come back with the most roseate accounts of the change in American opinion in our favour and of the President's desire to do something to help." Middlemas writes that "Kennedy was not always representative of the thinking of Roosevelt or the State Department." Chamberlain understood that American officials were trying to create a state of doubt about American policy, only to the extent of trying to deter Germany from extreme provocation from Czechoslovakia. But "Kennedy's enthusiasm was nothing on which to base a policy of bluff." And after his "blank check" statement, Kennedy substantially modified it the next day when he told Halifax that the United States would be "shocked" by German aggression. They would not think it necessary to go to war. 284-285.

G^FRUS, August 30, 1938, Vol. I, 560-561.

BGibid.; Koskoff, 145; Offner, 258. 141 still refused to believe that a German invasion of Czechoslovakia was imminent, Germany was trying to "bluff" and "intimidate"; and had no

o n wish to be "vindicative (sic)," he explained to Halifax the next day.

Furthermore, the American Ambassador in Paris and Berlin shared Kennedy's opinion and agreed that His Majesty's Government was taking the situation far too seriously. It would not make sense for Germany to expand. "In the present state of world economics," Kennedy lectured Halifax, "it was by no means certain or even probable that any expansion of territorial

control w o u l d benefit those making it." The Nazis had been successful over a restricted area; but the more they expanded the greater the difficulties would be. Ultimately, he predicted, Germany would face economic paralysis. He added, that however shocked U.S. opinion might be over another act of Nazi aggression, it would not support a general

European war.^O

Kennedy's consistent economic orientation was the key to his diplo­ matic philosophy and to his assessment of Germany's problems. Obviously, his basic assumption was that the financial structure of a country was the basis of its strength or weakness and that Germany's financial resources were simply too limited to allow her successfully to run a vast empire. However, the Ambassador had confessed to Halifax that

"his arguments were not necessarily conclusive and that there was much to be said on the other side."^! Thus, in the last days of August,

GBoffner, 257.

^Opocuments on British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. II, 213.

Ollbid. 142

Kennedy was still optimistic about peace, still accepted an economic

orientation, but was still willing to cooperate with Chamberlain.

The same day Kennedy's name reached the headlines in the Hearst-

owned Boston American. The gabby Ambassador told a reporter in an

"exclusivd' transatlantic interview that he had just conferred with

Halifax. "Keep cool-things aren't as bad as they seem," he advised.

"The thing to do here and in the United States is not to lose our heads." The increasing tension in Europe had united the British "very

strongly" behind the Prime Minister, Kennedy stated. Maybe having an

inkling of Chamberlain's dramatic initiative to maintain peace, Kennedy ventured a prediction: "No war is going to break out during the rest of 1938."92

Roosevelt firmly scolded his Ambassador a few days later:

As you know, we were all greatly disturbed by the appearance of an "exclusive" message of advice from you which was published as having been given to the Boston American and then passed on to the other Hearst papers. I know that the Secretary [of State] wired you about it and the other day I saw what you sent to the Secretary. It is not a question of "getting along reasonably well with the agencies"-for, of course, you do that but it does involve the use by an American newspaper of a single news agency of a

9^Time, September 12, 1938, 28-30; also mentioned in IVhalen, 231 and Koskoff, 146. 143

"special interview" or "special message of advice" to people back here. I know you will understand.

Tliroughout the late summer months and into early fall, Roosevelt

became increasingly irritated at his outspoken Ambassador. He regarded

Kennedy as an Irish-Catholic Walter Hines Page, America's classic

diplomatic anglophile who looked upon the London Embassy as an extension

of Whitehall during World War I.^^ FDR accused Kennedy of having been

"taken in" by the "slippery" Chamberlain. "No matter what you say about

Bingham" (Kennedy's predecessor), Roosevelt hotly insisted to Hull and

Morgenthau, "he never became pro-British."^^

In a dispute over his proposed draft of a speech, Kennedy once

again collided with his boss. He first hassled with the State Department

and refused to consent to its censorship. But the headstrong Ambassador

^^Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1938-1945, Vol. II, 809; referred to in Koskoff, 146; Hull sent Kennedy a rather cold reprimand in which he remarked that "I feel that the recent public speeches and public statements of the President and myself, which were prepared with great care, accurately reflect the attitude of this Govern­ ment toward the European and world situation, and that it would not be practicable to be more specific as to our reaction in hypothetical circumstances." He referred to a special telephonic interview with the Boston Evening American and wrote "this will undoubtedly be regarded as unfair to other agencies and would...result in great confusion." Hull to JPK, September 1, 1938, 123/109, DSF. Kennedy responded that "the only conversation they had with me was to the effect that people were very excited over there and I told them to keep cool....I manage to get along reasonably well with the agencies and have not heard any complaints and it is my custom to answer any telephone call that comes from Boston because that is where my family is." JPK to Hull, September 3, 1939, 123/110, DSF.

S^whalen, 204.

O^The Morgenthau Diaries, "Colliers," October 18, 1947, 16; also Morgenthau Diary, September 1, 1938, Vol. 138, 34, FDRL. 144

was quickly overruled when the department officials appealed directly to

the President. Upon Roosevelt's order, Kennedy deleted the offensive

sentence: "I can'c for the life of me understand why anybody would want

to go to war to save the Czechs." Appalled by his Ambassador's intended

remarks, FDR quipped "The young man needs his wrists slapped rather hard.

The occasion for his controversial speech was a memorial commemora­

ting Samuel Seabury, the first Episcopal Bishop of the United States. In his honor a cornerstone was being laid in Aberdeen Cathedral, Scotland.

Appropriately, Kennedy's remarks concerned religious freedom and by impli­ cation attacked the Jewish pogroms in Italy and Germany, "In certain parts of the world," cried Kennedy, "the profession and practice of religion is being called a political offense." Because of their religious conviction, "men and women are being deprived of their natural born citi­ zenship" and being thrown out of their native land. By contrast, Kennedy explained, the two great English-speaking democracies, Britain and America were "imbued with certain old-fashioned but still useful qualities-respect for the rights of others and for the sanctity of engagements as well as Q7 genuine love of freedom for the individual!" Such talk pleased the highly appreciative anti-appeasers.

S^Morgenthau Diary, September 1, 1938, Vol. 138, 34, FDRL; Offner, 246.

^^John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, (Cambridge, 1959) 518; JPK to Hull, August 31, 1938, 123/106, DSF; Herschel V. Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1938, 123/113, DSF; 123/112, DSF; The Times, September 13, 1938, 10, and September 3, 1938, 6. 145

Later that afternoon Kennedy’s luncheon address comforted the Prime

Minister's supporters. Holding up as a model the recently concluded

Anglo-American agreement which settled the Phoenix Islands dispute,

Kennedy drew a parallel and implied that the Sudeten crisis was an

insignificant matter which could easily be resolved. All it took was

no political goodwill, the Ambassador confidentially stated. His address was a warning to Chamberlain not to risk war. And in the tense days that followed Chamberlain too would publicly lament the imminence of war "because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.

In the last days before Munich, Roosevelt remained extremely sus­ picious and critical of Chamberlain. Tlie Prime Minister, Roosevelt bitterly remarked, was untrustworthy: "Chamberlain was playing the usual game of the British...peace at any price if he could get away with it and save his face." And far from being optimistic about

Chamberlain's policy, as Kennedy thought, the President became in­ creasingly discouraged. "I'll bet three-to-one that the Germans will be able to accomplish their objectives" without a war, he told Morgen­ thau.As the tension increased, Kennedy reported to Washington that for the first time in his conversations with English leaders "there was a slightly hysterical tone."^®^

GByime, September 12, 1938, 29; also New York Times, September 3, 1938; JPK to Hull, August 31, 1938, 123/106, DSF.

99whalen, 232.

lOÜMorgenthau Diary, September 1, 1938, Vol. 138, 34, FDRL.

Moffat, 200. 146

Through the American Ambassador in London, Chamberlain and Halifax repeatedly asked Roosevelt what his Administration's attitude would be in any kind of contingency. During a conversation with Kennedy in early

September, for instance, Halifax again discussed the American position.

"I had ventured to say," the Foreign Minister wrote, "that although, of course, I recognized it was impossible either for his country or mine,

I had little doubt that if the United States and Great Britain together were able to say to a potential aggressor that we should both find our­ selves at war if the aggression took place, there would be no aggression.”

"We might not be as far from such a development as we might think,"

Kennedy optimistically remarked. If only people would realize, said the Ambassador, that "it was the fear of war that was causing them to lose everything they had, making it impossible for them to improve their prospects, and compelling them to live in the shadow of perpetual un­ certainty, the point might well be reached where the American people would think a good deal more of the possibility of direct action than they thought to-day." 102 But such a commitment was far from Roosevelt's mind. Their trying to wring a commitment from him led the suspicious

President to believe that the British "would try to place the blame on the United States for fighting or not fighting, and his [Chamberlain's] inquiry to Kennedy was designed to place the blame on us, so that if they went in it was on account of the support they would have gotten

102 FO 414/273, September 5, 1938, 23. 147 from us and if they did not, it was because we held back."1^3 nj£ start 'continuous consultation' now," wrote Alsop and Kintner, "we'll find ourselves being treated as an 'associate power' before we know it "104 Administration had not forgotten how Chamberlain used Roose­ velt's guarded endorsement of the Anglo-Italian Treaty or the President's speech at Kingston, Ontario, to his own political advantage. "This is an old game," complained one State Department official, "but Joe Kennedy seems to have fallen for it."^®^

In response to Kennedy's inquiries, Hull sent a curt reply: "It would not be practicable to be more specific as to our reaction in hypo­ thetical circumstances....The recent public speeches and public state­ ments of the President and myself... accurately reflect the attitude of this Government toward the European world situation.

lO^Morgenthau Diary, September 1, 1938, Vol. 138, 34, FDRL.

^^^Alsop and Kintner, 7.

lO^Moffat, 203.

^^^Telegram from Hull to JPK, September 1, 1938, PSF, Box 10, FDRL; Koskoff, 147. Koskoff writes how the British press played up Kennedy's frequent visits to British officials and gave the appearance of continu­ ous consultations between the United States and Great Britain. Hull was concerned lest there be an apparent London-Paris-Washington axis that could embarrass the United States if Britain and France went to war. The State Department did want to be kept informed, but did not want to be involved, or have its position as an unconcerned neutral compromised, Koskoff said perhaps Kennedy did not understand this, but neither did the State Department explain this to him. Either the Ambassador did not realize this, did not wish to realize it, or did not care. 148. See The Times, August 31, 1938, 10, for evidence. The headline reads "Britain and the Czechs" and below it "U.S. Ambassador at No. 10." It later explains in a brief paragraph that Kennedy had called on Chamberlain "to be informed of the British Government's view of the developments in Central Europe." No further mention is made of Kennedy. 148

Hull's radio address of August 16, 1938, and Roosevelt's speech

two days later at Kingston, Ontario, were explicit statements of American

foreign policy. Hull's intention was to explain to the American public

that a policy of isolation would not protect them from a general war,

and at the same time to warn the Axis powers that they could not ignore

the United States. "Our own situation is profoundly affected by what

hàppens elsewhere to the world," he warned. The American people must

contribute "along with other peoples— always within the range of our

traditional policies of nonentanglement," to support a program of peace 107 with justice, economic well-being with stability, and order under law.

The British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, was not par­

ticularly impressed. "His address is couched, as usual in lofty and

general terms, which made his mind wander." Lindsay thought that his

self-righteous tone and the constant repetition of the themes would 108 detract from the effectiveness of Hull's arguments.

Two days later, Roosevelt speaking at Kingston, Ontario, inserted

the words, "that the people of the United States will not stand idly by

if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire.

However, it too, restated the American aversion to foreign entanglements.

His speech was intended to "embroider on the theme of the eternal question

mark of American foreign policy," to make the dictators doubt that

lO^Hull, 587.

lOGpO 414/275, August 16, 1938, 17.

lO^Hull, 587; The Economist, August 27, 1938, 404, 149

America would always stay out of war and, at the same time, to warn the democracies that they could not always count on American assistance.

The Economist approved of the speeches and wrote that "President Roose­ velt and his Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, do not weary of well­ doing in their attempt to give leadership to American opinion on the great problems in international affairs." Happily, wrote The Economist,

"The Press of the Third Reich is already gnashing its teeth.

Kennedy told Hull that Halifax was delighted with the speeches and forwarded the Foreign Secretary's request that Hull make a further state­ ment on the Czech issue. Halifax reasoned that a statement made by the

American Government before the Nazi Party meeting in September, might have a restraining effect on Hitler. Hull obliged and issued a state­ ment on the anniversary of the Kellogg-Briand Pact on August 27. He called it a tragedy that "in certain parts of the world strife and con­ flict are bringing untold misery to millions, and in other parts the idea of warfare is being actually glorified....On the observance or non- observance of the solemn pledge made ten years ago depends the preserva­ tion of all that is valuable and worth while in the life of each and n 7 every nation."

Roosevelt was becoming increasingly incensed at Kennedy. Not only was the Ambassador hinting at American support to the British newspapers;

^Moffat, 194.

^^^'fhe Economist, August 27, 1938, 404.

^^^New York Times, August 28, 1938, 1. 150 the President also accused him of trying to force his hand in "the

Chamberlain game."^^^ Hull, too, was dismayed. He accused Kennedy of pursuing his own private foreign policies and of starting the rumor of a London-Paris-Washington peace axis.^^^ The Administration feared that because of Kennedy's "personal diplomacy," they had become a party to the British game either way. The British "have us for the moment stymied," wrote Morgenthau. "Kennedy is playing with the British Foreign Office and the Prime Minister. He has spilled the beans, and the President knows that."115

Certainly, Kennedy was pursuing his own private foreign policy. In his attempt to win the Roosevelt Administration's support for Chamberlain's appeasement he was defining American foreign policy from Grosvenor Square, rather than implementing the policy decisions made in Washington. His adventures into personal diplomacy may be partially explained by his friendship with Chamberlain and his belief in the Prime Minister's appeasement program. Perhaps, too, he mistakenly thought Washington was not sufficiently aware of the seriousness of the situation and that his advice was being ignored.

Unlike the Anschluss, the Czech crisis thoroughly alarmed Kennedy,

For the first time he faced the possibility of a general European war

11^Morgenthau Diary, September 1, 1938, Vol. 138, 34-35, FDRL.

ll^Hull, 588.

ll^Morgenthau Diary, September 1, 1938, Vol. 138, 35, FDRL. 151 and was forced to consider America's role. He mistakenly believed that

U.S. support of Chamberlain's appeasement policy, without implying an

American diplomatic or military commitment, would restrain Hitler. He naively assumed that Hitler cared about the American attitude or that he could be deterred by American sloganizing. CHAPTER IV

MUNICH

On the night of September 12 many Europeans impatiently sat by the

radio listening for Hitler's broadcast from Nuremberg in which he was

expected to reveal his plans for Czechoslovakia. At the American Embassy

in Grosvenor Square, Kennedy despondently wrote to a friend in the United

States as he waited for the Fuehrer's speech. Despite his optimistic

prophecy of peace throughout 1938 and his unshakable faith in Chamberlain's

policy, he was filled with foreboding and sunk in depression. He reported

to his friend that he was thinking of sending his wife and children home-

-and possibly of never seeing them again.^

As it was. Hitler made his familiar demand for "justice" for the

Sudetens. The next day riots erupted in Czechoslovakia and Benei^ responded by establishing martial law in some of the Czech districts. On September

14, he called off the negotiations with Henlein who fled to Germany. War seemed so close that Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, ordered that American gold in London be returned to the United States on American naval ships.^ British officials, too, were alarmed. They fully realized

^Whalen's description is particularly colorful, but he fails to mention who Kennedy's friend was. 232. Rose Kennedy reports in her memoirs that the family was actually packed and ready to go because war was imminent. Chamberlain's trip to Munich, however, saved them from the trip. 235-239.

^Blum, 518.

152 153 that German troops were ready to pounce at any moment. "The Big Four,"

Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, and Hoare, who referred to Hitler as "the madman," met in almost constant session. Kennedy remarked that there was "a new glint in Neville Chamberlain's eyes, in those of Sir S. Hoare and of the others which I have never noticed before. This time they mean business."^

Kennedy initially urged the British to take a strong stand. Roose­ velt fully agreed with his Ambassador's position. Sir Ronald Lindsay from Washington, warned Halifax that any compromise with the Germans would "bring about a certain let-down of .American friendliness...."

However, he explained that the importance of the American attitude should not be overemphasized. It was "more an argument in favour of firmness than one against wise accomodation." He also reported that Roosevelt had told a Frenchman, "you may count on us for everything except troops and loans." Nevertheless, Lindsay wisely added, he should have mentioned a reservation— "subject to dictates of our public opinion and our own domestic politics."^ Yet Lindsay was still optimistic that the U.S. would join Britain if war broke out.

On the morning of September 14, Chamberlain interrupted a Cabinet meeting to inform Kennedy of a daring and unconventional plan taken on

SpRUS, September 13, 1939, Vol. I, 592.

^Northedge, 524.

5fO 414/275/C9711/1941/18, September 12, 1938, 26. 154 his own authority. Chamberlain explained to his friend that he wanted an opportunity to "demonstrate to the world that all efforts of his were bent upon preventing war."^ Therefore, he had written to Hitler asking 7 him if he could meet with him to try "to find a peaceful solution."

He told the Ambassador that he intended to suggest to Hitler that the

Sudeten area be given local autonomy for five years. At the end of that time, a final settlement should be determined by an international body.

If Hitler objected, Chamberlain was prepared to move the time table up to six months. "The great trouble with this," Kennedy declared, "is that Hitler will be winning a victory without bloodshed and make the next crisis whenever and about whatever it comes much easier for him to O win out." Chamberlain agreed with Kennedy's observation but planned to

"bribe" Hitler with the promise of a general peace settlement. If Hitler rejected his plan, then Chamberlain intended to tell him that Britain would fight alongside France.

The Prime Minister discussed his scheme with the Cabinet and informed it that Hitler had invited him to come to Berchtesgaden on September 15.

6jPK to Hull, September 14, 1938, PSF, King and Queen, FDRL.

^British Documents, Series 3, Vol. II, September 13, 1938, 314. Actually, Colvin argues that this was not the Prime Minister's plan originally but an idea which Hitler had originally suggested to Baldwin and which Baldwin "had been prudent enough and comparatively strong enough to disregard." 146.

GJPK to Hull, September 14, 1938, PSF, King and Queen, FDRL. 155

g "It came as a bombshell," wrote one Cabinet official. The Government's

response was "unanimous and enthusiastic."^^ Chamberlain's plan was

not a momentary inspiration but rather an initiative which he had been

pondering for some time. He had discussed "Plan Z" with two or three

of his colleagues and with Nevile Henderson^^ but the final decision to

introduce the scheme had only been made on September 13. As before,

Halifax pressed Kennedy to obtain Washington's endorsement. At a press

conference the next day, Hull made an equivocal statement; "The historic

conference today between the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the

Chancellor of Germany is naturally being observed with the greatest

interest by all nations which are deeply concerned in the preservation

of peace." 12

As the sixty-nine year old Prime Minister arrived at Munich Airport

after his first airplane ride, a seven hour flight during a howling rain

storm, he was greeted by Nevile Henderson who asked him how he enjoyed 1 ^ his first flight. "I'm tough and wiry," he smartly replied. During

the enthusiastic welcome which he received from the rain-soaked Germans,

®R.J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore Belisha, (London, 1960), September 14, 1938, 139.

lOpeiiing,363.

llviscount Simon, Retrospect, (London, 1952), 244.

l^Hull, 589; FRUS, September 15, 1938, Vol. I, 605.

^%artin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, 144. 156

Chamberlain was informed of Henlein's broadcast demanding the annexation

of the Sudetenland to the German Reich. He boarded the train for the

three hour ride to Berchtesgaden and later remarked that he felt like

"a man called on to play poker with a gangster, with no cards in his

hand...."14

Chamberlain's first impression of Hitler was completely negative.

He considered him "rather disagreeable" and "entirely undistinguished."

"You would never notice him in a crowd, and would take him for the house

painter he once was," he later wrote.After tea, the two men held a

three hour tète k tete in the Fuehrer's private room. During their con­ versation Hitler insisted that the British accept the principle of self- determination for the Czechs. In practice, of course, it assured German domination of the Sudetenland and the destruction of the Czech Republic.

Although Chamberlain accepted his demands "in principle," the two leaders agreed to postpone their negotiations until the Prime Minister had con­ sulted with his Cabinet. In the meantime. Hitler promised not to go to war unless he was provoked by the Czechs. "1 do not know just what com­ fort Chamberlain expects to get from this promise..." Kennedy later told

Hull, since the British had evidence that the Germans had laid the ground­ work to provide themselves with an excuse to invade Czechoslovakia.^^

14peiling, 364.

ISlbid., 366.

^^FRUS, September 17, 1938, Vol. I, 607; see FRUS, September 17, 1938, Vol. I, 609-612 for Kennedy's report of his conversation with Chamberlain. 157

Chamberlain left Berchtesgaden feeling that he had established

"a certain confidence" with the Fuehrer. Despite the "hardness and

ruthlessness" in his character, Chamberlain remarked, "I got the impres­

sion that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his 17 word...." Yet the Prime Minister never believed that Hitler was bluffing. On the contrary, he reported to the Commons, "my visit alone 18 prevented an invasion."

At the Cabinet meeting on September 17, Chamberlain described his interview with "the commonest little dog" he had ever met. Yet he was 19 obviously pleased when he heard that Hitler described him as "a man."

Chamberlain vigorously argued that war could only be prevented by accepting the principle of self-determination and ceding the Sudeten areas to

Germany. Runciman too attended the session and discussed his attempts at negotiations with the Czechs. He sided with Chamberlain's policy and 20 called for "immediate and drastic action." This plan, Churchill wryly 21 commented, "at least had the merit of simplicity."

l^Feiling, 367.

ISibid., 368.

l^Duff Cooper, 229; Colvin, 155; also see Middemas, 339-369 for a discussion of the Cabinet meetings. 20 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 269. There is some disagreement over Runciman's views. Churchill, who did not attend the session says he supported "the transfer of predominately German districts to Germany." Duff Cooper, who did attend the meeting said his views were "interesting, of course, but quite unhelpful, as he was unable to suggest any plan or policy." 229. Hore-Belisha who was also present said Runciman favored a plebiscite as the only solution. Minney, 140.

Zlchurchill, Tiie Gathering Storm, 269. 158

A heated row broke out when some of the Cabinet, led by Halifax and

Duff Cooper, objected to Chamberlain's policy and the acceptance of self-

determination. A further source of friction, Kennedy reported, was the

resentfulness of some Cabinet members because Chamberlain constantly con­

ferred with the "inner Cabinet" and excluded the rest. If the anti-

Chamberlain group rejected self-determination, war would break out, the

Ambassador predicted. The responsibility would lie with the recalci- trants. 22 A definite decision on self-determination was postponed until the next day when Daladier and Bonnet would arrive in London.

The two French ministers and the inner Cabinet drew up a set of stark proposals which accepted Hitler's demand for self-determination and recommended that Czech districts which had a German population of over

50% should be transferred to the Reich. The Anglo-French proposals also stipulated that an international commission which included Czechs should supervise the population exchange and the frontier adjustments. It pro­ vided for an international guarantee of Czechoslovakia to replace the inept French and Russian alliances. "Nly oivn impression," Kennedy cabled

Hull, "is that unless there is a terrific rise of public opinion all over the world, England does not propose to fight on the Czech issue."

Chamberlain reasoned to his friend that he could "see no rhyme nor reason

^^Telegram JPK to Hull, September 17, 1938, PSF, Box 10, FDRL; Rock pointed out that only Cooper's and Churchill's accounts mention the Cabinet debate. Templewood and Hore-Belisha make little mention of it. But Kennedy's account corroborates Cooper and Churchill. See William R. Rock, Appeasement on Trial, (Archon Books, 1966), 120; see Colvin for an account of the meetings, 157-160; 161. 159

in fighting for a cause which, if I went to war for it, I would have to

settle after it was over in about the same way I suggest settling it

now."^^

Initially Benës rejected the Anglo-French proposals. But after

being subjected to great pressure he reluctantly gave way on September

20. With consent wrung from the Czechs, Chamberlain flew to Godesberg

on September 22 to continue his discussion with Hitler. As Chamberlain

left for this second conference, Kennedy summed up the British attitude.

"Public opinion here, I think, is probably a shade against Chamberlain's

plan and there is definitely opposition in the Cabinet...." In most of

the meetings which he had attended, the Ambassador noted, "the English

are spending most of their time apologizing to us for the way England

is acting...." The English would go to war if it was declared, he said, but they "would still be hollering murder because they had to fight [for]

Czechoslovakia." "You are damned if you do and damned if you don't," wrote the perplexed Ambassador.

But in addition to reporting Chamberlain's actions and reflecting upon Britain's moods, Kennedy lent more than moral support to the cause of appeasement. Halifax hinted to the Ambassador at the Government's displeasure over several anti-government scenes in a Paramount newsreel which had just been released. And Kennedy graciously offered to look into the matter. Acting unofficially and on his own authority, he relayed the Foreign Secretary's views to the managers of Paramount.

23pRUS, September 19, 1938, Vol. I, 621-622.

24pRus, September 21, 1938, Vol. I, 631. 160

Acting from a spirit of public duty, the managers willingly and voluntarily withdrew the offensive film. The film included an interview with Wickham

Steed, a former editor of The Times and A.J. Cummings, the political editor of The News Chronicle. Both newsmen vehemently criticized the

Chamberlain Government for partitioning Czechoslovakia.

The "Kennedy incident" became public during a debate in Parliament in which the Opposition charged the Government with censorship over news- 2c papers and films. "It is interesting to find such an accommodating

Ambassador" jeered Geoffrey Mander, a Liberal. He questioned the pro­ priety of an American Ambassador willingly aiding the Government's censor­ ship efforts. But there had been "no censorship and no undue pressure," reported a Government spokesman. The strongest defense of Kennedy came from Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He said "the govern­ ment is grateful to the Ambassador of the United States and I am glad that the Ambassador and ourselves were in complete accord." After all. he Ieminded the Commons, the incident had occurred on September 22, the day when the Prime Minister flew to Godesberg. "If ever there was a day wher it was necessary to exercise caution and say or do nothing likely to stir dangerous reaction it was September 22."^^ Certainly the Ambas-

Z^Apparently there was much truth in the charge that the Government was exercising censorship. Kennedy reported that Hoare visited the edi1:or of the Daily Herald and the editor of the News Chronicle to per-;uade them to support Chamberlain. FRUS, September 17, 1938, Vol. I, 611

^^New York Times, December 8, 1938, 23; Also see New York Times, November 24, 1938, 1. Whalen also mentions the inident, 238. 161 sador had acted without Washington's sanction. Despite the criticism in Parliament, this issue was not a serious matter of government policy but merely a small opportunity for Kennedy to use his influence as a friendly favor to his hosts.

Roosevelt, meanwhile, secretly invited Sir Ronald Lindsay to the

White House to discuss the Anglo-French note. The sympathetic President called it "the most terrible remorseless sacrifice that had ever been demanded of a State.He fully sympathized with the difficulties of the British and French governments and did not blame them for their present course of action. He would be the first one to cheer he said, if Chamberlain was successful. However, Roosevelt told Lindsay that he was at a loss to know what to do and intended to remain silent on the

Czech issue at his press conference the next day. He did, though, reintroduce the Welles plan by suggesting that the Western Powers might wish to hold a world conference to reorganize all controversial frontiers on rational lines and invite all heads of state. He, too, would attend provided it was not held in Europe. FDR then indicated to the British Ambassador that if war did break out, Britain and France could count on some support from the U.S. He suggested that if the Allies did not formally declare war, the American government could get around its neutrality legislation. Lindsay commented that Roosevelt was "quite 28 alive" to the possibility that America might again be involved in war.

27pO 371/21527/A7504, September 20, 1938, No. 349. ZGibid. 162

At this juncture, Roosevelt refused to offer any guarantees or to make

any effort to guide the British toward any particular policy. Confused

himself, perhaps, as to what to do, FDR coasted along in a do-nothing

policy.

At Godesberg, Hitler, who regarded Chamberlain as an "impertinent

busybody who spoke the ridiculous jargon of an outmoded democracy,"

discarded the Anglo-French proposals and presented Chamberlain with an

ultimatum. The Czech issue, the Fuehrer emphatically insisted, "must be

settled definitely and completely by the 1st October at the latest." It

was not a question of being unfair to Czechoslovakia, Hitler explained,

but rather of redressing past injustices. Three and a half million

Germans, against their will, had been incorporated into Czechoslovakia

for solely political considerations. There were two possible solutions.

Hitler informed Chamberlain; "a peaceful one, and the drawing of a

frontier on a national basis; a military solution, which means a military

or strategic-frontier." A disgruntled Chamberlain returned to London

convinced that he faced no alternative but to accept--or rather to persuade the Czechs to accept. To reassure the British of his intentions, he made a radio address: "I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul." But if war is declared, we must be sure "that it is really the

Z^Northedge, 331.

^^British Documents, Series 3, Vol. II, September 22, 1938, 465-471. 163

great issues that are at stake." To prevent another holocaust, Cham­ berlain promised that he "would not hesitate to pay even a third visit

to Germany...." To crush Cabinet criticism against appeasement, the

Prime Minister painted a terrifying picture of war. If the British declared war on Germany now, summed up the Secretary of War Hore-Belisha, 32 it would be like "a man attacking a tiger before he has loaded his gun."

Kennedy supported Chamberlain's dire predictions of war by summoning 33 Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh to London. The "Lone Eagle" had used his tremendous prestige with the Germans in 1936 to inspect the infant

Luftwaffe. He returned to Germany in 1937 and again in 1938. After his last trip to Germany he had also examined the Russian and Czech air forces.

The boyish American hero arrived in London on September 21 and explained his views in a letter to Kennedy. His message stated that "Germany's strength in military aviation was greater than that of all other European countries combined, and that the U.S. was the only country in the world capable of competing with Germany in aviation.While the European democracies had slept, Hitler had created his Luftwaffe. Britain was in no shape for war; nor did she realize the military change that aviation had created. "I am afraid," wrote Lindbergh, that "this is the beginning

31peiling, 372.

32Minney, 146; see Colvin for a review of the arguments raised by the Cabinet, 162-165. 33 Lindberg was very impressed with Kennedy whom he described as an unusual type of diplomat. He respected his deep commitment to family values. "I cannot help liking Kennedy. He is an unusual combination of politican and businessman." "He has great vanity but he also has ability." Lindberg, Wartime Journals, 26, 159.

S^Lindberg, 72. 164 of the end of England as a great power. She may be a 'hornet's nest' but she is no longer 'a lion's den.'"35

Kennedy relayed Lindbergh's message to Neville Chamberlain, to the

British Air Ministry and to the Secretary of State in Washington. He did, however, delete Lindbergh's opinion that Europe should stay out of war, but his recommendation was obvious in his assessment. Oddly enough, although Kennedy asked that Lindbergh's cable be sent to Roosevelt and the

Navy and War Departments, it circulated solely in the State Department.

The reports of the financier, Bernard M. Baruch, corroborated Kennedy's and Lindbergh's frightening observations. Allegedly taking his summer vacation in Europe, Baruch was on a confidential assignment for Roosevelt to investigate the rumors of increasing Nazi military strength. His account was particularly depressing; he notified FDR that neither France nor England were prepared for war. Their airplane production was slightly over 500 planes a month, as opposed to Germany's output of almost 40,000 planes a year.3^ "War was coming;" he later said, "you could see it and you could feel it."^®

Although Baruch shared Kennedy's horror of the military weakness of

Britain and France, he differed radically with the American Ambassador over the feasibility of Chamberlain's appeasement policy. Baruch was a

3^Ibid.

SGwhalen, 235.

37a 1s o p and Kintner, 12; also mentioned in Whalen 225-235.

3^Coit, Mr. Baruch, (Boston, 1957), 466. 165 close personal friend of Churchill and a tenacious exponent of his views.

As a personal emissary for Roosevelt and a private citizen, he had con­ siderably more freedom of movement than Kennedy. Unlike an ambassador sending confidential reports, Baruch could use his accounts to awaken the American public. That was Roosevelt's aim. "Put a burr under their tail, Bernie, and if I hear 'em holler. I'll know you're doing all right,' 39 the President instructed.

After straining on Chamberlain's leash, BeneS' finally ordered a general mobilization on September 23. As the Government debated the

Prime Minister's Czech policy the next evening, there was no doubt, wrote one astute observer, that "the tide was running against Chamber­ lain's peace policy in and out of the Cabinet.At the same time that Halifax was trying to stiffen Chamberlain's backbone, Cadogan was lecturing Halifax for capitualting to Hitler's demand for immediate occupation of Czechoslovakia. On the way home from the Cabinet meeting that night, Cadogan gave the Foreign Secretary a piece of his mind. He accused Halifax of being "a d^faitiste-pacifist." "I know we and they are in no condition to fight; but I'd rather be beat than dishonoured," the indignant Under Secretary stated. "Above all, if we have to capitu­ late, let's be honest. Let's say we're caught napping; that we can't fight now, but that we remain true to all our principles, put ourselves

39Ibid., 469.

^^Moffat, September 26, 1938, 214. 166

straight into war conditions and rearm. "Don't--above all— " he continued,

"let us pretend we think Hitler's plan is a good one!" After a sleepless

night, Halifax made a complete reversal at the Cabinet meeting the next

day--to Chamberlain's complete surprise--and "plumped for refusal of

Hitler's terms.

Kennedy informed Hull of another division in the apready splintered

Cabinet between Chamberlain who wanted "peace at any price" and those

like Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who argued for per­

mission to mobilize the fleet. Chamberlain's critics refused "to take

any more back talk from Hitler" since they assumed they "would have to

fight him anyhow.

Both Roosevelt and Hull had been deeply worried about the crisis

and frequently received fatalistic reports from Kennedy and Bullitt.

Finally, Roosevelt decided he could keep still no longer; it was time

for action. Over Hull's objections, the President insisted on making

a personal appeal to the European heads of state. "It can't do any harm,"

he comforted Hull. "It's safe to urge peace until the last moment.

As Roosevelt smoked incessantly and Hull quietly swore under his breath,

the two men worked until the early hours in the morning on September

26, and finally hammered out the President's message: "I most

^^Cadogan Diaries, September 24, 1938, 103-105; Middlemas too describes the incident, 377.

^^Moffat, September 24-25, 1938, 212.

"^^Hull, 590.

44lbid., 591. 167 earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations....As long as negotiations continue differences may be reconciled. Once they are broken off, reason is banished and force asserts itself. And force produces no solution for the future good of humanity." But once again his message contained the traditional statement of American foreign policy: "The United States has no political entanglements."^^ Roose­ velt also sought the aid of Mussolini and asked him to use his influence with Hitler to avoid war.

Almost immediately, Chamberlain, Benes^, and Daladier reported that they agreed with the President and were willing to negotiate. The

British and French, Kennedy cabled "are very happy about the President's message...."^^ Hitler's diatribe arrived later that night and blamed the present crisis on the obstinate Czechs. Roosevelt sent a second futile appeal addressed only to Hitler. FDR suggested an immediate conference which would be attended by all nations concerned about the

Czech problem but again refused to commit the United States to political entanglements. Yet the President would go no further than make verbal gestures. FDR vetoed President Benes' suggestion that he appeal to the British and French to stand by the Czechs. He also turned down

Kennedy's request made on Chamberlain's behalf, that the Prime Minister

Hull, 592, Alsop and Kintner, 10-11; FO 371/22832/2099, Annual Report for 1938, 8-33.

4&FRUS, September 26, 1938, Vol. I, 659; also Hull to FDR, September 28, 1938, PSF, Great Britain, FDRL. 168

be allowed to broadcast a message directly to the American people 47

The determined Ambassador did, however, arrange to have Chamberlain's 48 broadcast carried by American companies.

As the situation deteriorated, a desperate Chamberlain drafted a

personal plea to Hitler asking him to agree to an international tribunal

composed of British, Germans, and Czechs to supervise the transfer of

Czech territory. Chamberlain's appeal was delivered by the self-effacing,

quiet mannered Sir Horace Wilson, a relentless appeaser. Hitler threw

one of his violent tantrums and ranted and railed against Chamberlain and

his stunned messenger. He refused the Prime Minister's request and

shrieked that he wanted Chamberlain's consent to the Godesberg ultimatum

by the afternoon of September 28. If the Czechs refused, he swore he

would "smash" them.^^ An upset Kennedy exclaimed: "Hitler figuratively

slammed the door in Wilson's face."^^

Finally the Cabinet wore down the Prime Minister's resistance and

declared a state of emergency. The fleet was mobilized, gas masks were

clumsily tried on, the coastal defenses were manned, workmen feverishly dug trenches. "The nations of Europe seemed to be ranging themselves in battle array," wrote The Economist.Church attendance rose as the

British earnestly prayed that the Czechs would not be stubborn. And

^^FRUS, September 24, 1938, Vol. I, 643; Offner, 263.

48FRUS, September 26, 1938, Vol. I, 661.

^Spelling, 372.

SOpRUS, September 27, 1938, Vol. I, 673.

Slfhe Economist, October 1, 1938, 2. 169

Kennedy ordered American citizens in London to return to the United 52 States because "of the complicated situation in Europe...." During

these horrifying days, one Englishman wrote that he felt "a strange

sense of oneness with England, as though the strings of one's being are 53 turned up to their finest pitch." The long brilliant weekend between

the Great War and the next one appeared to be drawing to a close. "You

had the feeling," Senator Jack Kennedy reminisced, "of an era ending and

everyone had a very good time at the end."^^ In her memoirs. Rose

Kennedy wrote poignantly of the "brooding silence" the "unsmiling,

unemotional faces. Everyone unutterably shocked and depressed" and 55 feeling that the "hopes for peace are shattered;...war is inevitable."

Throughout the crisis, the American Ambassador frequently dashed back and forth between the Embassy, the Foreign Office, and 10 Downing

Street and almost daily worried over the phone to his bosses in Washington about "the death watch over Europe.One day he went to see Chamberlain on business and then returned a second time for no reason at all except to have it known that he visited the Prime Minister twice on the same

52po 371/21539/A7449; Memo to FO September 27, 1938.

S^Nigel Nicolson, (ed.). Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939, (Great Britain, 1966), September 27, 1938, 362.

S^Coit, 467.

^^Rose Kennedy, 238.

^^Alsop and Kintner, 8; see The Times, September 15, 1938, 10, for reference to Kennedy's visit and September 20, 1938, 12. On September 19, 1938, The Times wrote that Mr. Kennedy called on Chamberlain twice. 12. And once on September 1, 1938, The Times, 12b. 170 day during the crisis.And Chamberlain in return kept his faithful friend completely informed of his every move. In addition to keeping up with the frantic pace of events and faithfully reporting them to the

White House, Kennedy engaged in some "scare tactics" of his own midway in the crisis. He ordered two American cruisers to England simply for effect on Germany. Halifax thanked the Ambassador for his gesture and told him that the fleet movements had considerably impressed the Nazis.

On September 26, Kennedy cabled Hull that the British had made a definite commitment to the French. Chamberlain promised Daladier "that if the French go to war the English will definitely go with them."^^

Hull asked the Ambassador if he really thought the French were equipped to fight. Kennedy did not know but said that the British "as they always do, feel that they can rise to the occasion.The next day Chamberlain sent a reassuring message to Hitler. "You can get all essentials without war, and without delay." He again offered his services, "I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once," he plaintively wrote.

S^Lindberg, 79; The Times, September 12, 1938, 12, wrote that Kennedy had met with Chamberlain and Halifax during that day. It also wrote that Kennedy has been kept informed throughout the discussions since "the sym­ pathy of the United States, always valued, is valued highly at this diffi­ cult moment, and that relations between the two countries are at their most cordial." And after Munich Kennedy also met with King George, the first visit he made to Buckingham Palace after the crisis began. The Times, September 28, 1938, 10.

S^Lindberg, 79; also British Documents, September 11, 1938, 295.

SSpRUS, September 26, 1938, Vol. I, 662.

GOnull, 592.

Glpeiling, 374; see The Times, September 15, 1938, 10 for the complete text. 171

On the afternoon of September 28, the day Hitler set for Chamberlain's

answer to the Godesberg ultimatum, the House of Commons was filled to

capacity as its members assembled to hear Chamberlain's answer. Kennedy

was packed into the gallery near the French, Italian and Czech ambassa­

dors.^^ The Queen Mother, Mary, and the Duke and Duchess of Kent were

also in attendance. The air in the stuffy chambers was tense. The

audience broke into restrained applause as the worn and haggard Prime

Minister entered the Chamber.Slowly and carefully, and barely glancing

at his notes, he explained his negotiations with Hitler. As Chamberlain

was nearing the end of his foreboding account, Cadogan, at the Foreign

Office, received a call from Nevile Henderson in Berlin. He took the

message, ran to Parliament, and handed it to Halifax who quickly sent

it to Chamberlain. As the tired Prime Minister read the message, his

whole body changed— the tension and anxiety evaporated from his face.

He seemed ten years younger, wrote N i c o l s o n . ^5 Forgetting the micro­

phone in front of his chair which carried his speech to a crowd spilling

over into a nearby room, Chamberlain bent over and quietly asked Sir

John Simon "Shall I tell now?" Simon nodded "yes." The Prime Minister

announced to the hushed Chamber that Hitler had invited Mussolini,

Daladier, and himself to a conference at Munich the next day. "I need

The James Landis Papers, Box 51, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Kennedy gives a good description of the scene in the House of Commons.

^^Gilbert and Gott describe a trivial historical debate over how much applause greeted Chamberlain, 173.

^^This account refutes the rumor that Chamberlain had pre-staged the Munich invitation. The Cadogan Diaries, September 28, 1938, 109.

G^Harold Nicolson, 364. 172

not say what my answer will be," Chamberlain replied.Only for a

moment was there absolute silence as the stunned audience just sat there.

Then, utter pandemonium erupted. Practically the entire House rose to

give Chamberlain a standing ovation. Cheers came from the jubilant

Tories, papers were thrown into the air, Clement Attlee gave Labour's

blessing to the plan, weeping MP's shook Chamberlain's hand, Kennedy

beamed joyfully. There had been no scene like it since Sir Edward Grey's

declaration of war on Germany in August, 1914. "Everyone immediately felt

a vast relief and unspeakable emotion. From the depths of despair we were moved to a new hope," Mrs. Kennedy later recalled.^® A deeply ashamed

Harold Nicolson glumly watched the scene and dubbed it a "Welsh Revivalist meeting.Throughout the hysterical celebration, Churchill remained seated. Eden stalked out of the room. Afterwards, Churchill told Cham- 70 berlain, "I congratulate you on your good fortune. You were very lucky."

Kennedy wrote that Chamberlain asked to meet him after his speech in the

House of Commons. He told the Ambassador that "he did not want to go away without thanking me for the help I had given him during the last week." The Prime Minister also insisted "that I must stay on the job for

GGpeiling, 374.

G^The Landis Papers explain Kennedy's reaction to Chamberlain's announcement of Hitler's invitation. Chapter 17. Also see Whalen, 237.

G^Rose Kennedy, 239.

G^Harold Nicolson, September 29, 1938, 366.

^^Ibid., September 28, 1938, 366. 173

I would do much good for world peace.As Chamberlain prepared to

leave for Germany Roosevelt sent an ambiguous message, a terse "Good

man!"^^

Roosevelt was given the credit for Hitler's last minute decision to

call the Munich Conference. "The President can feel that God was on his

side and he was on God's side," Kennedy jubilantly wrote. Roosevelt's message was "the finest the President had written for a long time."

Cadogan told him that unquestionably Roosevelt's appeal to Hitler "had done the trick..." and a number of Ministers and Ambassadors also ex- pressed their appreciation of Roosevelt's appeals. Halifax talked with Kennedy and thanked him on behalf of the Government for FDR's timely intervention. He stated "that [he] had no doubt whatever that this had exercised a very powerful influence upon the course of events.Roose­ velt's last minute decision to issue his appeal indicated that he, like

Kennedy, was convinced that Hitler was not bluffing. He too feared that the Western democracies would be defeated if war broke out.

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 17.

^^FRUS, September 28, 1938, Vol. I, 688.

73FRUS, September 28, 1938, Vol. I, 693; FRUS, September 29, 1938, Vol. I, 700.

^^British Documents, Series 3, Vol. II, September 29, 1938, 625. Northedge writes that Halifax had been instrumental in making certain that Roosevelt was informed of every detail of British policy at the beginning of September. The President accordingly let it be known through Kennedy that Britain could depend on American support if war broke out. Yet Roosevelt also said that press talk that the United States would join Britain and France in a "stop Hitler bloc" had been "one hundred percent wrong." 524-525. 174

As Chamberlain left for Munich, Kennedy tried to prop up Halifax’s

faith in appeasement. He declared to the doubting Foreign Secretary that "he himself was entirely in sympathy with, and a warm admirer of everything the Prime Minister had done." Although he fully recognized all the present difficulties, Kennedy stated that he was very hopeful about the outcome of the Munich Conference. The European situation required "a spirit of realism" he remarked, which meant doing anything 75 necessary to preserve peace. The Ambassador’s steadfast support of appeasement was motivated not just by loyalty and sympathy to Chamber- lain but also by his own conception of America’s self interest. It prevented a war which might involve the United States.

Early next morning, Chamberlain began his third trip to Munich.

The entire Cabinet, acting on Simon’s suggestion had come to the airport, 77 as a "pleasant surprise" to see him off. When Chamberlain arrived in

Munich, Hitler, in a great demonstration of friendship gave the Prime

Minister the double handshake which he used only on very special occa- 78 sions. Mussolini arrived as a self-styled mediator; so did Daladier, as an uncomfortable witness. The Russians were not invited. Nor were the Czechs allowed to attend, although Chamberlain made a weak attempt

^^Ibid.

^^The over-enthusiastic Lindbergh credited Kennedy for helping to arrange the Munich Conference. He certainly overstated the case. See Lindbergh, September 29, 1938, 79.

^^Duff Cooper, 241.

^Spelling, 376. 175

to persuade Hitler to permit it. The Fuehrer was adamantly opposed.

Instead, the Czech representatives waited quietly at the British hotel

throughout the thirteen hour meeting in which four foreigners carved

up their Republic.

About two o'clock in the morning, the Munich Agreement was finally

signed after the top of the inkwell fell off and no ink was found inside.

Hitler had extorted a ruthless tribute and gained virtually all his demands. Through temper tantrums and conferences he had won more than he might ever have gotten through war. At 2:15 a.m. Chamberlain and

Daladier presented the agreement to the unconsulted Czechs. During

their conference Chamberlain, exhausted by his labors, yawned constantly making no attempt to hide his weariness.In addition to the Sudeten-

land which was ceded to Germany, the Republic lost its border fortresses and was thus left defenseless.

While the statesmen were waiting for the final draft of the document,

Chamberlain asked Hitler if he would join him in a private talk. The

Corporal "jumped at the idea." It would be the last time the two men ever saw each other. As the two men talked quietly in Hitler's apart­ ment in a tenement house, their conversation rambled over a variety of issues: Spain, disarmament, and economic relations with Southeastern

Europe. Finally Chamberlain asked Hitler if he would sign an agreement which he had written beforehand. As the interpreter read the document

^^Gilbert and Gott, 178. 176 in German, Hitler excitedly interjected "ja, ja" and agreeably signed it.

"We regard the agreement signed last night, and the Anglo-German Naval agreement, as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to fiO war with one another again." Before his meeting with Hitler that morning, Chamberlain had casually remarked to his Parliamentary Private

Secretary, now Sir Alec Douglas-Home: "If he signs it and sticks to it, that will be fine; but if he breaks it, that will convince the Americans of the kind of man he is." In view of the evidence now available, wrote

Laurence Thompson of the Times thirty years later, this motive seems to have been very much on Chamberlain's mind. However, the cost was 81 extremely high; the sacrifice of Britain's prestige.

An enormously enthusiastic cheering mob of delirious Britons welcomed 82 back their "flying messenger of peace." The trim figure draped in black with his self-satisfied smile left the plane at Heston Airport carrying 83 that ever present symbol of British prudence, the black umbrella. That evening from the window of 10 Downing Street, Chamberlain addressed the 84 multitude chanting "Good old Neville." Holding up "that miserable 85 scrap of paper," as Duff Cooper later called it which Hitler and he had

BOpeiling, 377.

^^The Times, November 23, 1968, 9.

SZpeiling, 376, 377, 380, 381.

83whalen, 237.

G^Mowat, 619.

BSpuff Cooper, 247. 177

signed, he yelled to the throng below him: "This is the second time in

our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace

with honour. I believe it is peace for our time."^^ "We are to-day

reprieved, and in every country men and women will utter a prayer of

thanksgiving," wrote The Economist as it praised Chamberlain for "the

magnificent perserverance and tenacity" with which he pursued the search ^ 87 for peace.

On September 30 President BeneV bowed to the Munich decision. He

resigned his office, left the nation he had helped found, and sought

refuge in England. On the evening of October 5, he addressed the Czech

nation. "I feel it is for the best not to disturb the new European

constellation which is arising.... But this I will say, that the sacri­

fices demanded from us were immeasurably great and immeasurably unjust.

This the nation will never forget, even though they have borne these 88 sacrifices quietly."

Europe's immediate reaction was one of joyful relief. Kings

and peasants alike praised Chamberlain. The odds at Lloyds against war

jumped to 32 to 1. In Brussels a medal was struck to the "apostle of peace." Dutchmen sent tulips to the Prime Minister, thousands of Germans

cheered him, streets were named after him. One devoted admirer even

^^Feiling, 381; Colvin writes that Chamberlain sincerely believed it was "peace in our time." 168.

^^The Economist, October 1, 1938, 1-3.

BBcilbert and Gott, 181. 178

89 asked for a piece of his umbrella to use as a relic in a Greek icon.

At the British Embassy in Berlin, Nevile Henderson sympathetically pre­

dicted to Chamberlain that "Millions of mothers will be blessing your name tonight for having saved their sons from the horrors of war. Oceans of ink will flow hereafter in criticism of your action.One cynical

Foreign Office official said "For all the fun and cheers you might think that they were celebrating a major victory over an enemy instead of 91 merely a betrayal of a minor ally."

Lord Baldwin, the former Tory Prime Minister, advised his heir "you have everything in your own hands now,— for a time— and you can do any- 92 thing you like. Use that time well for it won't last." And indeed, it did not. Parliament debated the Munich Agreement from October 3 to

October 6. Chamberlain repeated his belief that his action alone had prevented war. Although the Commons approved the policy of His Majesty's

Government by a vote of 366 to 144, profound disillusionment had set in both in and out of Parliament.

The long pent-up private quarrel in the Cabinet broiled over into 93 public debate. Duff Cooper resigned from the Admiralty. He explained

®^The description of Europe's reaction is taken from Whalen, 238, and Felling, 380.

GOsimon, 249.

^^Gilbert and Gott, 180.

GZpeiling, 382.

^^In Tlie Landis Papers Kennedy remarked that Chamberlain was very bitter about Cooper's resignation. Chapter 17; Colvin describes the debate in the Cabinet, 168-170; and Northedge makes the obvious point that having assented to the principle of the secession of the Sudeten districts. Duff Cooper had weakened his case for resigning over Munich, 529. 179

to the hostile Commons that "the Prime Minister had believed in addressing

Herr Hitler through the language of sweet reasonableness. I have believed

that he was more open to the language of the mailed fist...."^^ Josiah

Wedgwood, the old leftwing radical congratulated him. "This old colleague

from better days is proud of you....I do dislike belonging to a race of

clucking old hens and damned cowards.

Cooper, Wedgwood, Eden, Nicolson, Macmillan, Attlee, Lloyd George

and a host of other angered dissenters spoke up in the Commons and echoed

Churchill's indictment: "We have sustained a total and unmitigated

defeat." His denunciation of Munich in Parliament raised a storm of

protest. He paused to let the fervor die down and then continued:

"Munich was the fruit of five years of uninterrupted retreat of British

power.. ..And do not suppose that this is the end," he warned. "This is

only the beginning of the reckoning...unless...we rise again and take 96 our stand for freedom as in the olden time."

Most important, however, were the changing attitudes of citizens outside Parliament. The Economist, which only a week earlier had cau­

tiously praised Chamberlian for postponing the crisis, now regarded the

^^Duff Cooper, 249; Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 290-291.

^^Duff Cooper, 249.

^4lC, Debates, 335, 359-73; also cited in Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 292-295; also see Herschel V. Johnson, Counselor of Embassy to Secretary of State, October 11, 1938, 760F. 62/1683, GDG, DSF for a summation of the arguments in Parliament and October 12, 1938, 76; OF 62/1684, GDG, DSF, for a continuation of the debate and the final vote. 180

Munich agreement as a betrayal of the "international principles to which

Britain and France have hitherto consistently pinned their faith." The

lesson of Munich is "that potential aggressors will get what they want, whether it is just or unjust, if they bully, bluff, agitate, prevaricate and threaten, and that small states will be far safer if they make terms with the dictators than if they rely on the justice of their cause and the sympathy of world opinion.During the chaotic mobilization prior to Munich, sleepy Britons were rudely awakened by the pitifully poor con­ ditions of their defenses. Not only did Germany's air force surpass

Britain's but barely a hundred anti-aircraft guns could be found for the defense of London, the largest and most populous city in the world; and these were manned largely by untrained personnel. All the service depart­ ments sent in long lists for supplies, complaining about their alarming shortages. Ironically, one effect of Chamberlain's "peace for our time" proclamation was to create a vocal demand for a speedy rearmament.

Throughout that winter, air-raid shelters were improved, plans were drawn 98 up for fire protection, for evacuation, and for civilian training.

This stepped up rearmament program lent credibility to the Myth of

Munich, created by Kennedy, among others, that Chamberlain's "sell out" of the Czechs bought Britain precious time to rearm. Viscount Simon, one

07 The Economist, October 8, 1938, 53-54. qo Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 292, 294-295; Simon, 249. 181 of the "inner circle" and an apologist for Chamberlain, offers a classic defense for the Prime Minister's appeasement policy. At Munich, Chamber- lain "secured an invaluable twelve months in which to strengthen our preparations to wage [war]." "It was his action at Munich," Chamberlain's

Chancellor of the Exchequer loyally testified, "that helped to secure, more than anything else could have done, that Britain went into war against

Germany as an absolutely united nation, with a united Commonwealth at her side. . . .The fact that his action did not ultimately preserve peace does not, in my judgment affect the essential rightness of his policy at the time."^9 Munich--a word inevocably fixed in our vocabulary is synonymous with a dishonorable "sell-out" to the bullying tactics of aggression.

Even as the ink dried on the treaty, a debate arose which continues to the present day over whether or nor Munich was necessary and what if anything was gained by it.^^O

BBsimon, 238-239.

lOOfhe debate over Munich continues to the present day as original documents and sources become increasingly available and as passions cool. An article in The Times written in 1971 argues that in 1938 it had still been possible to contend that the principle of self-determination for which World War I had been fought could not justly be denied to the Sudetens simply because they were Germans and supporters of the Nazi regime. But by 1939 morality was clearly on the Allied side as Nazi ambitions grew outside Germany's ethnic frontiers. It was obvious to any perceptive observer that Hitler, as Chamberlain claimed, had "made up [his] mind to dominate the world by fear...." The Times, May 18, 1971, 9. Dwight E. Lee, the editor of Munich: Blunder, Plot or Tragic Necessity? [Lexington, Massachusetts, 1970) has collected a series of articles of various political figures and historians concerning Munich. They answer his question as to why, after five years of Hitler's threats, acts of defiance, and broken treaties, the British and French Governments continued to hope for conciliation and peace. Three general answers may be given: (1) the British and French blundered; (2) they deliberately planned Munich in order to turn Hitler eastward; (3) they had no other choice because they were too weak to go to war. See Lee, vii-xi. 182

Hie Fuehrer's gigantic bluff to wage war from the Sudetenland had

been overwhelmingly successful. He had cowed both France and Britain

and bragged to his generals that he had only confronted a group of

"little worms." After Munich the Prime Minister looked forward to a

further thawing in Anglo-German relations. Chamberlain prayed that this

last concession would satisfy Hitler; after all the Fuehrer had promised

that the annexation of the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand;

lOOcont rgbukes certain misconceptions regarding the Munich Agreement. He argues convincingly against the charge that Cham­ berlain connived in the rape of Czechoslovakia out of a "sneaking regard for Fascism or hatred of Communism." He writes that "Chamberlain's failure to come energetically to terms with Russia over the handling of the Czech question was a blunder big enough almost to rank as premeditated malice. But not quite." He also refutes the charge that Chamberlain was personally proud of the Munich Agreement and regarded Czech dismay as contemptible and stupid. Nor can he be considered callous towards the Czechs because he yawned continuously during the early morning hours of the Munich Treaty. Northedge argued that the most impartial first-hand reports of the Munich Conference describe Chamberlain as fully sensitive to Czech feelings. Chamberlain believed that Hitler was not bluffing when he threatened to order his war machine into motion if the Sudeten­ land was not immediately handed over. Evidence indicates that this assumption was correct. Northedge also argues that Chamberlain did not believe that the Sudetenland was Hitler's final territorial demand in Europe or that the Munich Agreement had guaranteed peace. And when he said to the crowd "all this will be over in three months," he was referring to the enthu­ siasm of the moment, rather than the likelihood of a stable peace. Northedge believes that Chamberlain had two main purposes in asking Hitler to sign the Anglo-German declaration: to help sweeten a bitter pill for Britain and to get a final pledge from Hitler to use with Britain and American opinion if Hitler broke his word. The central issues which concerned Chamberlain was whether the democracies could fight to keep 3 1/2 million Germans in Czechoslovakia and whether the democracies could fight to any advantage; the answer to each was "No." There was not only the risk of defeat but defeat in defiance of a principle in which most British and French people no longer believed. And the United States could do nothing more than act as observers. Chamberlain's mistake, wrote Northedge, was to think too much in terms of Czech, too little in terms of the wider strategic effects of Nazi control of the 183 he wanted no other part of that hacked up state. This, however, was one more of Hitler’s soothing lies. Munich was nothing more than a way station in Germany’s expansion. Plans were already under wayto swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia.

During the remainder of 1938, the disillusioned quickly retreated from the camp of the appeasers. But among those whose loyalty and judg­ ment had never swerved was Chamberlain's close friend and steadfast ally, the American Ambassador. Throughout the Czech crisis, Kennedy consistent­ ly supported Chamberlain’s attempts to peacefully accommodate to Hitler’s demands. IVhen asked his opinion of the Munich Agreement the Ambassador later explained that Europe faced two alternatives, one chaos and the other war. "And if there is any way of doing better than either of those, then it is worth trying. With me," the Ambassador continued,

"it is not a question of the strategy of the Munich Agreement. I am pro-peace. I pray, hope and work for peace.

lOOcont.g^^g^gj^ or Bohemian areas. Always Chamberlain believed that Hitler would pause on the rim of chaos and draw back. But these assumptions were false. Munich, argues Northedge, "helped to complete the process of education of the British in the ways of depraved men." 541-548. Also see "Munich Reconsidered," International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2, April 1961, 153; see Bjerk for a very good discussion of the historical debate surrounding Munich, 103-106.

lO^New York Times, December 16, 1938, 13. 184

Kennedy's work for peace consisted of keeping Washington posted on

the events in Europe. Ilis job was so excellent that Sumner Welles com­

plimented him: "I can't tell you how admirably you have been keeping us 102 informed. It couldn't be better." Kennedy's efforts also included

encouraging Roosevelt and Hull to make vague, nebulous statements about

America's foreign policy, making ostentatious calls on Halifax and

Chamberlain, trying to frighten the Nazis by despatching several American

cruisers to British waters and by unofficially aiding the Government's

censorship efforts. Yet he also undermined his efforts by telling the

counselor at the German Embassy in London that "his main objective was

to keep America out of conflict in Europe.

Originally, the indecisive Roosevelt followed the policy of "no

risks, no commitments."^®^ But his last minute appeals indicated that he,

like Kennedy, believed that even a "sell-out" of the Czechs was worth the

price of peace. Yet there is no evidence to prove that the President and

his Ambassador influenced each other; but rather they independently arrived

at the same conclusions.^®^ Kennedy's detailed reports were merely one

l®2pRUS, September 26, 1938, Vol. I, 661. 103 German Documents, Series D, Vol. I, 713.

^®^Alsop and Kintner, 8.

lOSBjerk arrives at the same conclusion, that Kennedy had no influence on Roosevelt's last minute appeals, 101. iVhalen, however, gives Kennedy credit for influencing Roosevelt but offers no evidence, 236. 185 more source of information which crossed the President's cluttered desk.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, gave his Ambassador no indication of his assessment of the Czech c r i s i s . Left to his own wits, it was no wonder that Kennedy easily adopted the views of His Majesty's Government.

Reminiscing about the Munich period, years later, Kennedy remarked to a friend that Roosevelt had sent him a congratulatory cable for

Chamberlain. "I went over to 10 Downing the day I received the cable," said Kennedy. "But instead of handing the cable to Chamberlain, as is customary, I read it to him. I had a feeling that cable would haunt 107 Roosevelt some day, so 1 kept it."

In the United States, September had been the month of a great hur­ ricane in the Northeast. But at the end of that month, the calm, sunny, blue skies seemed to symbolize the profound sense of relief which many

Americans felt after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement. "I have had a pretty strenuous two weeks," Roosevelt happily wrote to a friend, but a midsummer cruise "made it possible for me to come through except for a stupid and continuing runny nose. A few days ago I wanted to kill

Hitler and amputate the nose. Today, I have really friendly feelings 108 for the latter and no longer wish to assassinate the Fuehrer."

^*^^Kennedy's uninformed condition was no different than that of other American Ambassadors in the 1930's. Bjerk gives an interesting discussion of the difficulties faced by Joseph Grew, the United States Ambassador in Tokyo and Wilber Carr, the United States Ambassador in Prague, 96-97.

^^^New York World-Telegram, April 11, 1960; also cited in IVhalen, 238; Lasky, 54; Rose Kennedy, 242.

lOSgiiiQtt Roosevelt, Vol. II, 818; also mentioned in Burns, 388-389. 186

The Munich crisis marked a watershed in American foreign policy;

it was as one observer wrote when "the end of our world began.The

unsettling experience of Munich ended the do-nothing mood among the

American policy makers. And yet the agreement was warmly welcomed by

Roosevelt. The President said that he "had all his fingers crossed"^^^

at Munich and in a little known letter to Mackenzie King he expressed

his profound relief. He wrote that "We in the United States rejoice

with you, and the world at large, that the outbreak of war was averted.

To me the most heartening aspect of the situation is the fact that this

feeling of relief has been so spontaneous and has been expressed with

such obvious sincerity throughout the world." He added that "those who work for the peaceful solution of international problems have the over­ whelming support of their fellow-men."^^^ Despite Washington's relief

that war had been averted, American officials began to completely re­

evaluate foreign policy in the light of Chamberlain's surrender to

Hitler.

One astute Foreign Office official hoped that Munich had made

Americans realize their great dependence on the British Fleet for the safety of the Atlantic seaboard. If they now believed that they could no longer depend on the British Fleet, he wrote, and if the American

^^^Alsop and Kintner, 6.

^^^Ibid., 13; Offner also agrees that Roosevelt had convinced him­ self that "Munich opened the way to a new and better world." Roosevelt and his aides wanted "peace at any price, peace with honor; but above all, peace." Chamberlain also wanted peace and when he agreed to go to Munich Roosevelt sincerely believed him to be a "good man." 268-269.

^^^Elliott Roosevelt, Vol. II, 816; Viscount Simon, 248-9. 187

Government provided security through a fleet stationed in the Atlantic and fortifications extending to the Gulf of Mexico, then "the Munich

Agreement may well be celebrated by the future historian as the event which transformed the Unspoken Alliance from an abstraction to a poli­ tical fact."^^^

Years later Kennedy, too, admitted that Munich had had a profound effect on him. In his memoirs, which were not revealed until 1968, the

Ambassador staunchly defended the Munich Agreement because it revived the hopes for peace which had all but vanished. Yet he was reluctant to offer a definite historical judgment. Writing in the 1950's, Kennedy explained that "Munich today is far away and yet not far enough for any accurate appraisal." Furthermore, he did not believe that he himself could judge impartially because his closeness to the event made it 113 "impossible for me to do so."

Despite Kennedy's reluctance to evaluate Munich, he did offer a series of arguments in defense of Chamberlain's diplomacy. Munich was

"anti-climactic," he wrote, since it only confirmed the unjust and inaccurate diplomatic assumptions of the interwar period. Beginning with the Versailles Treaty, Europe's diplomatic retrogression continued with the invasion of Manchuria, the swallowing of Ethiopia, the collapse of the League of Nations, and the presentation of the Anglo-French proposals to Hitler. Chamberlain, according to Kennedy, was thus left with no alternative but to accept the Fuehrer's demands at Munich.

llZpo 371/22827/A1143, February 1, 1939, 170.

ll^The Landis Papers, Chapter 18. 188

He could hardly do otherwise, Kennedy argued, because neither

England nor France were in a position to fight. England's military

production was grossly inadequate and many Britons arrogantly smirked

at the prospect of going to war with Germany to save little Czechoslo­

vakia, French industry was riddled with internal dissension, and the

country was on the verge of bankruptcy. France simply lacked the will

to fight.

Kennedy also regarded Russia as an unreliable ally. Her army had been severely weakened by Stalin's recent purges. The Ambassador accused

the Soviets of deliberately using their diplomacy to goad the democracies

and dictatorships into a war. While the two camps fought each other to

the death, Russia would remain smugly aloof. Ultimately, she would triumphantly emerge to spread Communism across Europe's ruins.

Nor could Chamberlain count on the United States to be even a minor arsenal of democracy. Americans were overwhelmingly pacifistic and doggedly maintained their isolationist tradition.

Kennedy applauded Chamberlain for his realistic perception of Britain's total isolation and his recognition of her military weakness. He further approved of the Prime Minister's wary attitude toward Hitler. Although publicly Chamberlain seemed pleased by his "friendly talks" with the German

Chancellor, privately he expressed profound distrust of him. Chamberlain pessimistically confided to his friend that war had been averted only momentarily.

Kennedy warmly praised Chamberlain's diplomacy and shared the

Prime Minister's belief that Munich was not the place for Britain to 189

force a showdown with Germany. Since Kennedy regarded war as simply too

horrible an alternative to consider seriously, he viewed Chamberlain's

personal quest for peace as both heroic and noble. To the impressionable,

pacifistic Ambassador, Chamberlain was a man of great stature. He quite

naturally looked upon Chamberlain's opponents with much distain.

The Ambassador considered Churchill to be the embodiment of the

traditional British balance of power diplomacy which he abhorred. To

Kennedy, Churchill and his followers lacked insight into the causes of war. He further deplored their willingness to use war as the ultimate

diplomatic weapon. The American Ambassador also criticized those oppo­ nents to the left of Chamberlain, the Socialists. Although he admired

their pacifism, he quickly dismissed them for their inability to accu­

rately perceive the causes of war.

In his memoirs Kennedy bemoaned the fact that he too, like Chamber-

lain, had been severely attacked because he tenaciously clung to the belief that "war was a calamity" which ultimately "proves nothing but defeat [for] the victors and vanquished alike." The only hope for peace which Kennedy saw was a process "of practical adjustments followed by the willingness of nations to refrain from threats of force.

Throughout the remaining months of 1938 Kennedy continued to prop up Chamberlain's appeasement policy. He was invited to address the 190

Trafalgar Day dinner of the Navy League. Kennedy was extremely honored

by the request; it was a high tribute for a foreigner.Anticipating

criticism of his remarks. Kenned) spent three weeks carefully polishing

his draft and received Washington's official approval for his speech.

As an American eyewitness to Chamberlain's efforts to preserve peace, he intended to praise his friend for his courage and political wisdom

for having successfully averted a holocaust.Rose, however, gave him a wifely warning: "Have you thought how this would sound back home?

You know, dear, our ambassadors are supposed to lose all their power of

resistance when they get to London. You don't want folks to get the 117 idea you are seeing things through English eyes?" After Kennedy

admitted much forethought and mentioned Rose's warning, he then launched

into a lecture on the wisdom of coexistence with the dictators. Clearly

labeling his plea as a 'pet theory of mine' Kennedy explained that

"Democracies and dictatorships should cooperate for the common good rather than emphasize self-apparent differences.... It is true that the democratic and dictator countries have important and fundamental diver­ gencies of outlook, which in certain matters go deeper than politics,"

Kennedy stated. "But there is simply no sense, common or otherwise, in letting these differences grow into unrelenting antagonisms... After all," he continued, "we have to live together in the same world, whether

llSibid.

llGwhalen, 241.

ll?The Landis Papers, Chapter 18; Lasky, 53; Gail Cameron, Rose (New York, 1971), 137. 191

we like it or not." An excellent summary of Neville Chamberlain's recent 118 Munich policy, wrote a New York Times correspondent. Ironically, in

an editorial the next day. The Times completely ignored Kennedy's 'pet

theory' and praised the Ambassador for hir references to the American

and British fleets "which have achieved a relationship unique in his­

tory.Although he did speak of the ultimate misery which an arms

race brings, he also spoke of British rearmament as a portent of hope.

But on the other side of the Atlantic, Kennedy's speech and his

admission of considerable forethought created a major uproar. His

critics accused him of endorsing Nazi aggression. His supporters praised

his realistic grasp of foreign affairs and his "common sense." At

Harvard Jack Kennedy wrote to his father that the speech, "while it

seemed to be unpopular with the Jews, etc. was considered to be very 120 good by everyone who wasn't bitterly antifascist."

Political observers speculated as to whether or not Kennedy's speech

forecasted a change in foreign policy. Was it a "trial balloon" which hinted at Roosevelt's retreat from his moral "quarantine" Chicago speech?

Or could it be that the Department's consent was "a negative act of

approval?" State Department officials gave a resounding "No" to both questions. In his press conferences the next day, Hull said "he knew

New York Times, October 30, 1938, 10; also see New York Times, October 20, 1938, 10 and Newsweek, October 31, 1938, 10-11; JFK to Hull in The Times (London) October 20, 1938, 16.

^^^The Times, October 21, 1938, 15.

l^Ojames M. Burns, John P. Kennedy (New York, 1960) 37; also see IVhalen, 243; Lasky, 53. 192 nothing new concerning American foreign policy.” Arthur Krock dropped into the State Department to discuss the speech with department officials.

Moffat assured him that it signaled no official change in policy. Any change would be announced by the President or the Secretary. "We would 122 [not] sound off through a mere Ambassador.”

Despite Hull’s original endorsement of the speech and his remark to Kennedy that "I think you have been successful in avoiding many pitfalls,” the surprised Secretary of State, stunned by the public’s 123 criticism, quickly beat a hasty retreat. ’’Every time our foreign policy has run off the rocks it has been because of a speech made by one of our Ambassadors abroad,” Hull fumed to Moffat. Despite Kennedy's claim to be advancing his oim 'pet theory,’ Hull continued, "we should have definitely called Kennedy off in advance....”

The outcry in the United States started a fury of department buck- passing and a hunt for a scape goat. Hull asked Welles why he failed to see the dangers of the speech. Welles replied that he was thinking about Mexico and had absentmindedly initialed the speech since he assumed that Hull had already approved it. Intent on preserving the reputation of the State Department, Hull cornered Moffat and demanded

121 New York Times, October 21, 1938, 8; Even the Canadian Minister was concerned and dropped by to see Hull about Kennedy’s address. Hull to Sir Herbert Marier, October 28, 1938, 123/136, DSF. 1 22 Moffat, 220-221.

l^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 18; Hull to JPK, October 18, 1938, 123/ 131, DSF; the despatch contains Hull’s criticisms of Kennedy’s speech and his suggested revisions. Not a word was mentioned concerning Kennedy’s "pet theory;” also see Memorandum of the Press Conference, October 20, 1938, 123/134, DSF, for the kinds of questions which Hull faced. 193

to know why he had not foreseen the problems which the speech might

cause. He replied that he thought there might be repercussions but

Kennedy's phrase "a pet theory of my own" would protect Hull and the

State Department. However, Moffat confided to his diary "a 'goat' is

needed and I shall have to be the goat. In the long run, however, no

one is going to be hurt unless it be Mr. Kennedy himself

Moffat's prediction was entirely accurate. About a week after his

infamous 'pet theory' speech, Kennedy publicly mused about its reaction.

In a short address to the Worchestershire Association which presented

Stanley Baldwin with a pair of wrought iron gates for his entrance at

Astley Hall, Kennedy spoke of the dangers which a man in public life

faced. He remarked that he had been reading for about a week now about

the remarks which he supposedly made before the Navy League. "There

was very little that one could discuss these days without offending

someone in one country or another. Sometimes one could get along by

skirting the edge of some issue of the day." But that, as he had just 125 "discovered to his sorrow, was also dangerous." In his memoirs,

Kennedy devoted half a chapter to explaining the Trafalgar Day speech

and discussing its repercussions. He was particularly displeased with

Hull for his janus-like behavior and was obviously perturbed by the vehement reaction which his speech aroused in the liberal American

124Moffat, 220-221.

^^^The Times, OctoberOctob 27, 1938, 16; Rudolf Schoenfeld, First Secre- tary of the Embassy to Hull, October 28, 1938, 123/138, DSF. 194 press. Kennedy was quite critical of its anti-German viewpoint and its

Jewish correspondents. Although he sympathized with their deep concern for Germany's Jews, he was obviously very upset by their attacks on him.

"I was naturally not the sole butt of their attack," wrote Kennedy,

"but I received my share of it.. . .1 was hardly prepared, despite years

1 in public office, for the full viciousness of this onslaught."

Kennedy's Trafalgar Day speech gave the impression that American foreign policy had changed drastically from an ambiguous, and contra­ dictory, to a clearly defined course. This was not Roosevelt's inten­ tion. To undo Kennedy's misconception, Roosevelt decided "a flourish of militant rhetoric" was necessary. 127 One week after Kennedy's speech

Roosevelt delivered a vehement attack on the dictatorships. "It is becoming increasingly clear," he insisted over the radio, "that peace by fear has no higher or more enduring quality than peace by the sword.

There can be no peace if the reign of law is to be replaced by a recur­ rent sanctification of sheer force. There can be no peace if national policy adopts as a deliberate instrument the threat of war....There can be no peace if humble men and women are not free to think their thoughts, to express their own feelings, to worship God." 128

^^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 18.

l^^Whalen, 244.

^^%osenman. The Public Papers and Addresses of FDR, 563; Hull, 597. 195

FDR received a number of letters from outraged Americans protesting

Kennedy's indiscretion and praising Roosevelt for his public denunciation 12Q of his Ambassador's speech. Roosevelt's public "stab in the back" incensed Kennedy and did nothing to alleviate the strain between the two men. The stubborn Ambassador refused to be disciplined or to refrain from making caustic personal criticisms of FDR. His memos continued to flow to special newsmen in the United States. In the New York Mirror, a Hearst-owned newspaper, one reporter wrote that "the White House has on its hands a fighting Irishman, with blazing eyes and a determination to strip the bandages of deceit, innuendo and misrepresentation bound 110 around the eyes of American citizens." A fight between the Ambassador and his foes in the White House and the State Department was in the offing, he warned.

A Wall Street Journal correspondent, however, differed with the

Hearst paper's prediction. Frank Kent explained in his column that the groundswell of criticism, especially in the liberal press, the charges

Kennedy "'talked too much,' that he was trying to promote his own political ambitions, that he had been taken into camp by Mr. Chamberlain, that he had been socially seduced by the British, that as an ambassador he lacked both taste and discretion" all of this was particularly

letter from Marcelle Schubert and Janet Dinkelspiel is an example of the kind of letters Roosevelt received. They wrote that "Mr. Kennedy should not be allowed to make such suggestions even as a private individual. We protest strongly against the speech and its policies." October 28, 1938, OF 3060, FDRL.

New York Mirror, November 12, 1938, as cited in IVhalen, 244. 196 sweet to his mischievous boss in the White House. Kent thought that the resentful Roosevelt had been rather peeved at his Ambassador's tremendously favorable publicity and a trifle jealous, especially because Kennedy's press fans were precisely those newsmen who habitually raised "the presidential blood pressure." It was not a secret, Kent wrote, that when Kennedy returned to the U.S.A. in June, "the White

House crowd" "planted" critical stories in newspapers around the country and accused him of "overplaying his hand" and "getting too big for his boots." Roosevelt had also belittled Kennedy privately and accused him of hiring "high powered" press agents to promote his own presidential ambitions.

Precisely because the Ambassador's Trafalgar Day speech did cause so much unfavorable criticism, "Kennedy chastened and subdued by an embittering experience, a Kennedy nursing his bruises and licking his wounds, will be personally more popular around the White House when he next returns...." Despite the fact that "Mr. Kennedy knows all this,

Mr. Roosevelt knows that Mr. Kennedy knows it, and Mr. Kennedy knows that Mr. Roosevelt knows he knows it," each continued to publicly profess their loyalty and preserve a cordial veneer of friendship because "each 131 needs or wants what the other can give...."

Kennedy's free-wheeling behavior earned him few friends among the dignified officials at the State Department. In his Memoirs, the veteran diplomat, George F. Kennan described an event which created even more ill- will at the Department. As the Nazi troops advanced into Bohemia, as the

] 31 Wall Street Journal, October 28, 1938, 4. 197

trains and planes were at a standstill, as the State Department was at

the height of confusion, it received a request from Kennedy to arrange

a way by which his son John could cross the border through the German

lines to visit Prague. "We were furious," Kennan recalled. "Joe

Kennedy was not exactly known as a friend of the career service, and

many of us, from what we had heard about him, cordially reciprocated

this lack of enthusiasm. His son had no official status and was, in

our eyes, obviously an upstart and an ignoramus. The idea that there

was anything he could report about conditions in Europe which we did

not already know and had not already reported seemed (and not without

reason,) wholly absurd." That Kennedy should be so presumptous, espe­

cially at such a time, struck his colleagues as totally "outrageous."

"With that polite but weary punctiliousness that characterized diplo­ matic officials required to busy themselves with pesky compatriots who

insist on visiting places where they have no business to be, I arranged

to get him through the German lines, had him escorted to Prague, saw to

it that he was shown what he wanted to see, expedited his departure, then 112 with a feeling of 'that's that,' washed my hands of him...."

Kennedy's eldest son, Joseph, also caused consternation at the

State Department. He went off to Spain as a journalist against his father's wishes. Kennedy had refused his son's request because Joe Jr. held a diplomatic passport and his father considered it "highly improper."

l^^Victor Lasky, RFK; the Myth and the Man, 54. 198

Joe Jr. said nothing further, but when his father returned to the United

States, he went to Paris, and after exchanging his diplomatic passport for a regular one and acquiring a visa, he crossed the border into Spain 133 and went to Madrid. He remained there until its occupation by the

Nationalists. He was detained by Spanish authorities at Irum en route to London and had his personal baggage and a "diplomatic pouch" confis­ cated. The authorities found several "compromising articles" in his baggage; among these "red money" and reports which Kennedy had written against "the movement.Young Kennedy was informed that the Spaniards had taken such action because the United States had not recognized the

Nationalist Government. American authorities intervened and requested the assistance of the Spanish Consul. Eventually, Joe Jr. was released and returned to London. His proud father was so impressed with his son's letters that he used them in discussing the Spanish situation with

Chamberlain and read them at a dinner party to Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times.135

The strain between the outspoken Ambassador and the President was hardly abated when Kennedy, in early November, came up with a plan to resettle 700,000 German Jews. The universal condemnation following the brutal Nazi pogrom against the German Jews touched off a clamor for

^^^The Boston Globe, April 20, 1939, 2.

IS^Hull from Thurston, April 11, 1939, 123/187, DSF. 13S The Boston Globe, April 20, 1939, 2. 199 devising some scheme to aid them. The assassination of a German diplomat at the Paris Embassy by a seventeen year old German Jewish refugee pro­ vided the Nazis with a pretext for "spontaneous" reprisals. Nazi gangs were ordered into the Jewish ghettos on the night of November 9-10 to loot businesses, deface synagogues, and arrest thousands of Jews. The

American Goverment recalled the American Ambassador, Mr. Hugh Wilson, from Berlin and virtually suspended diplomatic relations with the German

Government. Here both the President and his Ambassador were in complete agreement. Roosevelt told the press, "The news of the past few days from

Germany has deeply shocked public opinion in the United States....! myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth century civilization.Kennedy was "particularly outspoken" and described 137 the pogrom as "the most terrible thing I have ever heard of." Nothing further was heard from him about the virtues of coexistence with the dictators.

Both Britain and the United States were slow to respond to the plight of the German Jewish refugees. As early as March, soon after Kennedy arrived in London, Hull asked him to see if the British would be willing to cooperate in an international effort at relocation. Washington went ahead with its plans for a relief agency and Roosevelt announced that

Mr. Myron C. Taylor would be the American representative on the committee.

IS^Hull, 599.

^^^New York Times, December 17, 1938, 8. 200

Kennedy acted as a liaison man between Washington and Downing Street and 138 helped to organize the first international refugee conference.

By August, the Intergovernmental Committee had opened its head­

quarters in London, and George Rublee, a former diplomat and energetic

Washington lawyer had been elected its Director. Although Kennedy was

unable to attend its first meeting, he promised the refugee committee

"every assistance.Rublee's aim was to go to Germany to negotiate

for large-scale Jewish emigration. He told Hull that he had already

talked with the British and French officials and hoped to persuade them before he left for Germany to specify the number of refugees they would

accept. Some Nazi officials had given serious consideration to the problem and had drawn up a list of proposals for discussion. "I have no indication that the Germans are reluctant to talk," Rub lee reported

to Hull. "It is apparent to me, however, that the British are reluctant

to have me talk with the Germans." He also accused the Foreign Office of opposing the Committee's efforts and trying "to smother it." To help him win British support, Rublee turned to Kennedy. The Ambassador, how­ ever, refused to lend more than moral support to Rublee's efforts.

During the tense weeks of early September and the optimistic ones

following Munich, Kennedy nicely but firmly staved off Rublee's pleas.

l^GpRus, March 23, 1938, Vol. I, 740; May 7, 1938, Vol. I, 473; October 10, 1938, Vol. I, 795.

139pRus, August 12, 1938, Vol. I, 764. 201

He complained to Welles that Kennedy was "personally sympathetic but

he feels he cannot do anything." He was unwilling "to take a strong

line" because he feels "that our undertaking is hopeless. Perhaps

Kennedy's cool response was triggered by his unwillingness to be upstaged.

Ever since the summer of 1938, Kennedy himself had planned to go to

Germany and frequently discussed it with the German Ambassador. Or perhaps Kennedy refused to commit himself because he feared it might hinder Chamberlain's personal access to Hitler.

Finally in October, due to Rublee's prodding, Roosevelt personally

intervened and directed Kennedy to convey to Chamberlain a personal message asking the Prime Minister to discuss the refugee problem with

Hitler.FDR suggested that the German Government permit orderly emigration by allowing the refugees to take some of their property with them. But Rublee felt that Roosevelt too was merely making empty gestures. 144

Despite Kennedy's apparent coolness to the Intergovernmental

Committee's relief efforts, he did discuss the problem with the German

Ambassador in London, Herbert von Dirksen. He explained that the Jewish problem was very important to German-American relations. "It was not so

140f RUS, October 12, 1938, Vol. I, Memo of the Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation, 795-796.

l^loocuments on German Foreign Policy, Series D, October 13, 1938, Vol. IV, 634.

^^^New York Times, November 15, 1938, 6.

143FRUS, October 5, 1938, Vol. I, 792.

^^4po 414/2751, October 7, 1938, 31-32; also cited iii Whalen, 248. 202 much the fact that we wanted to get rid of the Je:.s that was so harmful to us, but rather the loud clamor with which we accompanied this purpose," the American Ambassador remarked. Kennedy claimed that he "understood our Jewish policy completely." He himself was from Boston and in several golf courses there, no Jews had been admitted for the past 50 years.

Nor had his father been elected Mayor of Boston because of strong anti-

Catholic feeling. "In the United States," Kennedy said, "such pronounced attitudes were quite common, but people avoided making so much outward fuss about it."145 in a later conversation between the two Ambassadors over Kennedy's proposed visit to Germany, the American Ambassador again mentioned the strong anti-Semitic attitudes in the United States and stated again that a large portion of the population had an understanding of the German attitude toward the Jews. "From his whole personality,"

von Dirksen wrote, "I believe that he would get on well with the F ü h r e r .

The German diplomatic papers were captured during World War II and published by the State Department in 1949. IVhen von Dirksen's conver­ sations with Kennedy were published, they lent credence to the ill-founded rumor that Kennedy was anti-Semitic. Kennedy described the views attrib­ uted to him as "complete poppycock" and said he remembered no such con-

Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, June 13, 1938, Vol. I, 715; Whalen writes that some of the facts in the despatch were garbled, like the reference to Pat Kennedy, but the German Ambassador had obviously talked to someone who was well acquainted with the religious bias of Boston clubs, 246; Duncliffe, 102; Lasky, 55.

l^^Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D., October 13, 1938, Vol. IV, 634. 203 versations. He accused von Dirksen of "trying very hard to set himself right in Germany by telling the German Foreign Office the things he thought they'd like to hear." Further, one of Kennedy's Jewish friends remembered that he wanted to go to Germany to see Hitler "in order to tell him off."^^?

Actually, Kennedy was a frequent critic of the Nazi regime. "They are hostile to law, family life, even to religion itself," he remarked and was genuinely shocked at the persecution of the Jews. Kennedy numbered many Jewish business associates among his friends and in Palm

Beach belonged to a Jewish golf club. "Pretty good for a guy who's supposed to be anti-Semitic, no?" he asked.And another long time friend of Kennedy's said that Kennedy regarded Jews as "pretty good p e o p l e . "^49 Any "prejudice" which Kennedy had was probably the usual big city cultural bias which was quite common at that time.

Despite Kennedy's public unresponsiveness to Rublee, his private response to the refugee problem was humane. Working unofficially,

Kennedy arranged for the escape of twenty-eight Spanish nuns from the

^^^Whalen, 246; Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 29.

^Newsweek, September 12, 1960, 29.

^^^Author's interview with Charles Roach, a long time Kennedy friend and early business associate at the Old Colony Realty Associates, Spring, 1970, Columbus, Ohio. Whalen in his later chapters on Kennedy discusses at length the charge of anti-Semitism and describes an interview between Kennedy and Joe Dinneen of the Boston-Globe. Kennedy denied the charge and stated that although there were individuals like Felix Frankfurter or Henry Morgenthau, Jr. for whom he did not have a high regard that did not mean that he condemned all Jews. Many of his friends, some of them Jews, argued that he was not anti-Semitic nor hypocritical. Still, he offended many because of his habitual ethnic epithets-"kike," "wop" and "mick." "He was a man of emphatic, rather than enlightened, opinions." 379-380. 204

Sacred Heart Convent in war-torn Barcelona. Behind their rescue lay the story of almost five months of persistent red-tape cutting by the

American Ambassador,

Upon his arrival in England, Kennedy enrolled three of his daughters in the Sacred Heart convent at Roehampton and during his visit there first heard of the plight of the Spanish nuns who were living on charity in private homes in Barcelona. Kennedy discussed the situation with

Chamberlain and Foreign Office officials and received a magnanimous promise from Halifax that the Government would "lend every help we could.

As a personal favor to Kennedy, Chamberlain despatched the British des­ troyer "Hero" to Spain to transport the sisters. After receiving the promise that the sisters would not return to Spain during the wars or aid the Rebels, the Spanish Government finally granted permission for 151 their departure.

Unfortunately, however, no amount of red tape cutting or personal intervention by Kennedy could save the German Jews. It was not until the universal uproar following the Nazi pogrom of November 9-10 that

Chamberlain and Kennedy were finally spurred to action. Chamberlain, at first reluctant to discuss publicly the touchy refugee issue because he feared "snapping the thread of personal access" between himself and the German Chancellor, finally announced to the House of Commons that

ISOpo 414/275; April 6, 1938, 135.

ISlNew York Times, July 22, 1938, 1. 205

an Intergovernmental Committee was discussing the possibility of re­

settling the refugees in Britain's colonial empire. He told the MPs

that "No one in this country would for a moment seek to defend the

senseless crime committed in Paris. At the same time there will be deep and widespread sympathy here for those who are being made to suffer so severely for it."^^^ And Kennedy, as if thunder struck, dashed back and forth from Downing Street, to the Foreign Office, to Essex, to

Downing Street inquiring about the plight of the refugees and the plans for their resettlement. One caustic reporter in London stated that "it required sharp prodding, along with Hitler's latest tornado of anti- 153 Semitic terror, to persuade Mr. Kennedy to bestir himself."

Kennedy arranged to meet with Malcolm MacDonald, the young Dominion and Colonial Secretary to give him a good "fight talk." Over lunch at

MacDonald's estate in Essex, the Ambassador, his wife, and two other guests discussed the refugee problem. Kennedy asked point blank "Why in heaven's name England did not show more interest in intergovernmental relief..." especially since she had all that land. It looks to me, he lectured, "as if everybody was feeling sorry for the Jews but that nobody

^^^New York Times, November 15, 1938, 6.

l53The Nation, as cited in IVhalen, 248. 206

was offering any solution."The need now was for deeds, not words,

to rescue hundreds of thousands quickly from a fate that was growing 155 worse everyday."

He also called on Halifax at the Foreign Office the next day to

impress upon him the shock and indignation in the United States. He

told a surprised Halifax that "by no very logical process" the Americans

were blaming the British because the Germans were persecuting the Jews.

There was a growing anti-British feeling and a disillusionment with

Chamberlain's appeasement policy, the Ambassador reported. Halifax

reassured the nervous Ambassador that the British Government was dili­

gently working on a resettlement scheme. Kennedy approved of their

efforts and said "he would personally very much like to see us in a

position of going to the United States and saying that we were prepared

to make some land available and would provide for some financial assis­

tance. . . Kennedy told Halifax that Bernard Baruch had predicted

154jpK to Hull, November 18, 1938, PSF, Great Britain, FDRL. In her memoirs. Rose Kennedy writes that her husband never received proper credit for his concern over the plight of German Jews. Especially after the November pogrom, Kennedy "was active behind the scenes, in helping many individual Jews escape." She also credits him with devising the "Kennedy plan" and proposing that Jews be granted asylum in South America, Lower California, and Africa. He worked on this plan for months but the war broke out before it could be implemented. "The rest is one of the most tragic chapters in world history." 243.

^^^New York Times, November 15, 1938, 6.

156fo 414/275, November 15, 1938, 46-47. 207

that the American Jews could raise $100,000,000 if they found an area

to resettle the refugees.Both men parted on a united note agreeing

that "in face of this exhibition of German method, it was more important

than ever that sane lovers of liberty and fair dealing everywhere should

stand together.Later in the week a persistent Kennedy met with

MacDonald three times in one morning and also discussed the refugee problem with Clement Attlee, leader of the Opposition.

Germany's pogrom brought havoc to Chamberlain's appeasement policy.

The atmosphere was so strained between the two countries that there was no likelihood of immediate resumption of the Anglo-German conversations on armaments, colonies, or other items in the appeasement p r o g r a m . ^^0

Moreover, Hitler had done more to hurt Chamberlain politically than any of his parliamentary opponents. The Nazi persecutions not only caused a heavy decline in the stock market and seriously undermined the chances of a Conservative victory in several parliamentary by-elections, but it also stiffened Parliament's opposition against a colonial reshuffle which would benefit Germany. The pogrom gave Britain a moral excuse for keeping her colonies. "No one at this moment feels disposed to risk the uncon­ ditional transfer of any backward race to the sort of subjection which finds favor in Germany today," wrote the London Times editor.

lS7jpK to Hull, November 18, 1938, PSF, Great Britain, FDRL.

158fo 414/275, November 18, 1938, 3.

IS^New York Times, November 18, 1938, 3.

lôÜNew York Times, November 15, 1938, 1.

IGl^ew York Times, November 16, 1938, 9. 208

British officialdom believed that the refugee problem was so critical

that the future of Anglo-German relations and European appeasement could be endangered unless an immediate solution could be found. The fact that

Chamberlain had told the House of Commons that Tanganyika, formerly a

German territory, was one of the places under consideration for settlement

indicated how badly Anglo-German relations had deteriorated since his prophecy of "peace in our time."1^2

Even if the Nazis agreed to permit mass emigration the situation had become complicated by the one-billion mark fine which the German

Government had imposed on the Jews, leaving them penniless and in debt.

Countries such as the United States, which were already reluctant to admit an influx of Jews would certainly not welcome the addition of paupers. The strongest opposition to immigration came from American

Jews themselves, claimed an official in the British Foreign Office; they feared an increase in anti-Semitic feeling in the United States.

Yet despite all the obstacles, one reliable British official reported, "Things are moving." Word leaked out of a daring, simplistic plan of action devised by Kennedy, Chamberlain, Halifax, and MacDonald.

Dubbed the "Kennedy Plan," its object was to save 700,000 German Jews from Hitler's grasp and resettle them in sparsely populated areas in

^^^New York Times, November 22, 1938, 9.

IGSpO 414/275, November 17, 1938, 48. 209

the British Empire. It was breathtaking in scope and called for generous

financial contributions from private sources in the United States and

Britain. Kennedy caustically remarked "It's a case of getting money now.

Now we will see how sorry the world is for them."^^^

Kennedy was given the credit for convincing the British to support

the relief effort. Despite the recent Nazi persecutions, a newspaper

correspondent wrote the British might have done nothing if Joe Kennedy had not brought "all his energy and persuasiveness to bear. ... IVhat Mr.

Kennedy has managed to do in the past fortnight is the talk of diplomatic

circles in London at the moment." When one amazed diplomat heard that the Goverment was going to act on behalf of the refugees, he exclaimed

"That man had Chamberlain eating out of his hand. It was Mr. Kennedy who started the ball rolling."Kennedy is rated the most influential

U.S. Ambassador to England in many years." claimed Life Magazine. "If his plan for settling the German Jews, already widely known as the

'Kennedy plan,' succeeds, it will add new luster to a reputation that may well carry Joseph Patrick Kennedy into the White House.The New York

Times attributed Chamberlain's change of heart to his desire to gain

^^% e w York Times, November 22, 1938, 9; also see New York Times, November 16, 1938, 9.

^^^New York Times, November 27, 1938, E3.

l^^Duncliffe, 103. 210

American good will. He realized that nothing improves Anglo-American

relations like "a burning moral issue on which both nations think alike.

Yet both Roosevelt and Hull claimed no knowledge of Kennedy's scheme and

Welles told Lindsay that Kennedy had received no specific instructions

for the relief of Jews nor had the Ambassador reported any conversations he had had with Halifax.The President subtly told Kennedy to mind his o'.vn business when he announced that henceforth Myron Taylor would be the Government spokesman for the refugee situation.

Despite the optimistic predictions, the "Kennedy Plan" was never implemented, Kennedy blamed British bureaucratic sluggishness and red tape. Yet the "Kennedy Plan" was little more than an immediate response to popular d e m a n d . 170 Tlie real coordinator was not the flamboyant

Ambassador, but the behind-the-scenes-worker, Rublee. In early 1939, he went to Germany and painstakingly worked out an agreement for the emigra­ tion of thousands of Jews. The German Government confiscated their

l^^New York Times, November 27, 1938, E3.

lOBpo 414/275, November 17, 1938, 48. According to a cable from Kennedy to Hull dated February 27, 1939, Halifax had given him the barest outline of a proposal, which the British were considering, for calling a conference in the fall of the Palestinian Jews and Palestinian Arabs and trying to work out the formulas for the new state. They planned to review the question of immigration again five years later. Kennedy judged the British were "giving the Arabs the better of it." He also reported that he planned to have a conference with Dr. Stephen Wise and asked Washington for their suggestions. JPK to Hull, February 27, 1939, 867N.01/1449, DSF, 169 Duncliffe, 103; FRUS, November 18, 1938, Vol. I, 832; Lasky, 54.

170whalen, 249. 211 property but agreed to pay their expenses as far as the border. After

Rublee returned to London, Kennedy called to congratulate him. The

Ambassador was utterly amazed? "How could it have happened? IVhy hadn’t they done something like this before if they were willing to do such things?"^^^ But before Rublee's arrangement could be carried out. World

War II broke out and Germany's Jews were stranded.

Throughout the remaining months of 1938, critics stepped up their attacks on Kennedy and found a receptive audience in Ickes and Morgenthau,

After his Trafalgar Day speech Kennedy stood indicted by some Administra­ tion liberals as a pro-Fascist. Not only was he accused because he echoed Chamberlain's appeasement line, but it was also his misfortune to be judged by his social connections with the Cliveden Set. Ickes, a liberal ideologue, did not doubt that Chamberlain and the Cliveden Set catered to Fascists and Nazis and since Kennedy was frequently on their 172 guest list and shared many of their views, he too, was their pawn.

When Kennedy met Lord Lothian aboard the "Queen Mary" an American liberal journalist, Louis Fischer, disapprovingly recorded in his notebook that the outspoken Ambassador and the disillusioned appeaser— an intimate of the Cliveden Set soon to be named the British Ambassador to the United 173 States--"spent much time together." In the White House too, Roosevelt intimates gloated over how "terribly peeved with Joe" the President was.

^^^Columbia Oral History Institute as cited in IVhalen, 250.

^^^Ickes, see Vol. II, May 12, 1938, 390; December 18, 1938, 528; January 29, 1939, 571; June 29, 1939, 676; for examples of his attitudes toward fascists.

l^^Louis Fischer, Men and Politics, 586. 212

Farley confidentially predicted to Morgenthau that Kennedy's next visit

"will probably be the beginning of the end."^^^ To reporters who ques­

tioned him about his connection with the Cliveden Set and its supposedly

pro-German views, Kennedy defiantly responded "I don't know what it is. 175 . . .It has not been my experience to meet anyone who is pro-German."

Although Kennedy ignored much of the criticism, he did decide to

return to the U.S. to confer with Roosevelt and see for himself if there

had been a revulsion against appeasement. He announced to reporters in

December that he would sail for America for a vacation. As he boarded

the "Queen Mary," he assured the newsmen "This is not a one way trip.

I never stay anywhere too long, but I am definitely coming back around

February 1....I am just going home to rest and do some thinking about

America.

The always loyal Arthur Krock wrote that the Ambassador was coming home to an "atmosphere of open attack and unfriendly gossip from the

New Deal inner circle...." He has been accused of being Chamberlain's pawn, a prisoner of the "Cliveden Set", sympathizer with the dictators and a public critic of the President. Krock noted that these attacks have continuously come from sources cultivated by the New Dealers and

it is "probably that these persons are responsible for what amounts to

l^^Morgenthau Diary, December 5, 1938, Vol. 154, 365.

l^^New York Times, December 16, 1938, 13.

l^^New York Times, December 11, 1938, L49 213 a campaign." But this correspondent, wrote Krock, has closely observed

Kennedy's work in London and believes "that these attacks and the stories do a great injustice to Mr. Kennedy." He has achieved the goals he set out to do "to render frequent and accurate reports, to achieve popularity and confidence at his post; to serve primarily his country's interest; to be watchful of blunders and indiscretions; and to conduct certain 177 negotiations. All these Mr. Kennedy has done."

Krock's criticism of the New Dealers was justified. Certainly

White House devotees, like Tom Corcoran, one of Roosevelt's later "Brain

Trusters" got "really violent" in his conversation with Morgenthau concerning Joe Kennedy and Arthur Krock. "Krock was running a campaign to put Joe Kennedy over for President; ... if any prominent Catholic gets in the way, he's to be rubbed out. ... Krock is the Number one Poison at 178 the White House," he angrily told Morgenthau.

On December 15 a gloomy Kennedy arrived in the United States and was interviewed by reporters in his suite on board the "Queen Mary."

It was no longer the same gay, wisecracking Joe Kennedy. A reporter's reference to him as "Your Excellency" produced one of the few smiles of the interview. He answered questions for nearly an hour and seriously discussed Europe's situation and the pessimistic prospects for peace.

When asked if he thought that the Munich agreement had been the best solution for Europe, Kennedy replied that "with me it is not a question

1 77 Arthur Krock's column, December 13, 1938, 24.

178Morgenthau Diary, May 22, 1959, Vol. I, 104, FDRL. 214 of the straegy of the Munich agreement. I am pro-peace, I pray, hope and work for peace." Nevertheless, he asserted that Chamberlain’s appeasement policy had not produced the expected results. Despite its failure, however, he obviously had no thought of abandoning his support of appeasement. "The situation appears to change everyday and not for the better. . . .Hie efforts must continue, or give way to chaos or war, he pessimistically predicted. Repeatedly he emphasized that as a matter of strategy and policy, the position of the United States would "be so much better if there is peace in Europe." But regardless of the outcome of the present European crisis, Kennedy frankly insisted that he was

"'stronger than ever' in his belief that the United States should steer its course clear of European trouble." He gave the President a strong vote of confidence by stating that he thought Roosevelt was "doing every­ thing he [could] and he [was] admired for it abroad."

A reporter kidded him about two of his previous predictions, that there would be no war, and that the stock market would rise. Kennedy replied that "I had a couple of bad days with those predictions on my mind and I am going out of the prophecy business. ... Of course the market is still good, and I am safe on that score. I'll still stand by both until the end of the year." However, he observed, "On December

31, I am retiring from the prophet field." 1 7Q

^^^New York Times, December 16, 1938, 13; The Times (London), December 19, 1938, 21. 215

Throughout the week Roosevelt had been consulting with a variety of

persons about foreign affairs. He had had discussions with most of his

key European Ambassadors and with Britain's former Foreign Minister,

Anthony Eden.l^O Kennedy, too, was scheduled to confer with the Presi­

dent. Newspaper reporters indicated that a widening rift was developing

between the President and his Ambassador. Repeatedly, wrote Boake Carter

of the Boston Globe, Kennedy "had bucked both the State Department and

Mr. Roosevelt who is, of course, the State Department." He consistently

had given advice diametrically opposed to the policies the President

decided to adopt. Upon finding that the President either ignored or

contradicted his advice, Kennedy had expressed his dissatisfaction "in

language that Mr. Roosevelt does not care to hear." And upon "more occasions than a man has fingers on his two hands, Kennedy has told

Chamberlain one thing, only to have Mr. Roosevelt make a complete fool of the American Ambassador in London by himself announcing a different policy." The Boston Globe reported that Kennedy had returned to the

United States to find out precisely what Roosevelt's foreign policy actually was. The irate Ambassador was determined to step off the boat, go to the White House, and tell the President to "put up or shut up, but either way quit making a sucker out of me." However, some of his friends had convinced Kennedy to calm down, warning him that "Mr. Roosevelt is slicker than you. He'll twist whatever you say and make himself appear

1 Q 1 with the credit and you with the discredit."

ISONew York Times, December 17, 1938, 8.

IGlgoston Globe, April 20, 1939, 2. 216

Apparently Kennedy took their advice, swallowed his pride, and

dutifully reported to the President. There seemed to be no hint of dis­

cord in their lengthy conversations on December 17. The Ambassador repeated his pessimistic view of Europe's affairs. "The Munich accord has not slowed things down any," he informed Roosevelt. He underscored his bearishness by predicting the probability of a war in Europe within the next few m o n t h s .

As he left the White House, Kennedy denied the rumors that he would resign and that he had been summoned to return by the President. He informed reporters that he had come home only for a six weeks vacation in Palm Beach with his son Jack. He had every intention of returning to

London in February, unless— and he added a tantalizingly vague qualifi- 183 cation--"something happened before then."

Kennedy left Washington and flew to his sumptuous home in Palm Beach on North Ocean Boulevard. He spent the days basking in the sun, talking over his poolside telephone to friends throughout the country, visiting with columnists like Walter Winchell and entertaining neighbors, including

Colonel McCormick of the Chicago Tribune. 184 Kennedy saw no reason to discontinue his support of Chamberlain. The people with whom Kennedy spoke also assured him that the country was 100% behind the present U.S.

^^^New York Times, December 17, 1938, 8. IGSlbid.

January 16, 1939, 18. 217 policy of isolation. Thus Kennedy was reassured and saw no reason to change, or apologize for, his views.His assumptions, however, were no longer widely shared by Washington’s policy makers.

IG^whalen, 251. CHAPTER V

"NO RISKS; NO COMMITMENTS"

Munich had left a legacy of suspicion and distrust and had an

unsettling impact on American foreign policy. Both Roosevelt and Hull viewed the post-Munich European situation with even greater alarm since once again Hitler had proved that Germany could expand without encounter­

ing anything other than verbal protests from the democracies.

The President and his policy makers had become increasingly skep­ tical of America's policy of isolation and were no longer so willing to accommodate Chamberlain's appeasement. Soon after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, Roosevelt and his advisers began to grope for some means to prevent war by aiding the European democracies. Though the mood of the country dictated caution concerning Europe's affairs, the

President could, at least, count on public and congressional support for a policy of national and hemispheric defense.^ He therefore decided to send Hull, the highest ranking statesman to the Pan-American Conference at Lima, Peru. Hull was the hero of the Lima Conference which opened in December, 1938.^ He ultimately won the unanimous consent of the

^Langer and Gleason, 35-39; Hull, 612.

See Hull for a discussion of the Conference itself, 612.

218 219

American Governments to the Lima Declaration which stated that "the eighth international conference of American states declare...that they reaffirm their decision to maintain and defend (their continental solidarity) against all foreign intervention and activity...by the pro­ cedure of consultation...when deemed advisable and at the initiative ? of any one of them." The declaration was the first time that the nations of the New World had agreed to regard themselves as a unit in their dealings with non-American states; the American Republics were mutual partners in upholding the formerly one-sided Monroe Doctrine.

In addition to ratifying the Lima Declaration, the conference adopted a number of other resolutions to stimulate cultural cooperation and free trade.^

As Hull returned to the United States aboard the "Santa Maria," the ship's radio broadcasted the President's "methods short of war" address to both houses of Congress on January 4, 1939. His carefully prepared statement was a model of discretion and circumspection.

Designed to say what was essential without provoking the wrath of the isolationists, it began by referring to the Munich crisis and reminding

Congress that while war had narrowly been averted, peace had hardly been assured. The President then offered his solution couched in terms of national and hemispheric defense, for which he could be certain of support. He spoke with unusual emphasis:

3 Alsop and Kintner, 23; Langer and Gleason, 41.

^Hull, 610, 618, 220

Words may be futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, there are many methods short to war but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people. At the very least, we can and should avoid any action, or any lack of action, which will encourage, assist or build up an aggressor.

He then lectured his audience on the inconsistencies in the existing neutrality laws and pleaded for their revision. "We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality," he declared, "our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly— may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self- preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen any more."„5

One such "method short of war" had been the withdrawal of Ambassador

Hugh Wilson from Berlin as the harshest possible rebuke againstthe anti-

Semitic Nazi pogroms in November, 1938.^ Before his recall, Wilson had been ordered to take every opportunity to convince the Wilhelmstrasse that further German aggression would trigger tremendous repercussions in the United States. American diplomats throughout Europe repeated the warning. Hull also suggested applying the doctrine of nonrecognition to hostile countries, imposing countervailing duties on German imports and y stepping-up plans to arm the democracies.

^Rosenman, Ihe Public Papers and Addresses of F.D.R., 1939, 3-4; Langer and Gleason, 46-47; Alsop and Kintner, 27; Hull, 612.

^See Chapter IV, 35 for full discussion.

^Alsop and Kintner, 26; Hull, 614. 221

A few days after Roosevelt's speech, hull met with Key Pittman, the

Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss a revision of

the Neutrality Act. Hull favored outright repeal of the arms embargo or,

at the very least, an amendment giving the President discretionary autho­

rity to proclaim an arms embargo. Pittman argued that these suggestions

were impolitic, and both men finally agreed on a compromise measure. The

scheme allowed the implements of war like arms and ammunition to be made

part of a cash and carry plan. Their rationale was that the raw materials

used for armaments were just as necessary to a belligerent as arms them­

selves; consequently any distinction between them was unnatural. Pittman O introduced the bill on March 20 and was confident it would pass.

In addition to, these initiatives Roosevelt requested nearly one and

one third billion dollars for defense in his annual budget message to

Congress. He planned to ask for an additional appropriation of over half

a billion dollars, primarily for the purchase of more than 4,500 planes

for the Army and Navy. Washington officials believed that Roosevelt's

message would call for the greatest peacetime array of armed might in the

country's history. Congressional supporters argued that the peace and

security of the United States depended upon a policy of neutrality and

adequate defense.® To support him in his drive to build up America's military power, Roosevelt summoned Kennedy and Bullitt to Washington in

%lull, 613-614.

®New York Times, January 10, 1939, 1 and 8; Langer and Gleason, 47. 222 early January to testify before the hesitant House and Senate Military

Affairs Committees.

Both Kennedy and Bullitt told a secret meeting of the Congressional

Military Affairs Committee that a major European war could erupt in the coming Spring. Bullitt considered the chances of war to be "fifty-fifty."

Kennedy was far more pessimistic. The greatest threat to Europe's peace was not Hitler, whose territorial designs involved the smaller and less powerful central European States, they said, but rather Mussolini.

Mussolini's ambition was to imitate Hitler and acquire a choice morsel of France's empire, like Tunisia and Corsica.

The two ambassadors discussed the German military machine and the tremendous threat posed by Hitler's air force. The Nazis were reported to have an armada of 9,500-10,000 planes.Kennedy and Bullitt claimed that Hitler's threat to use his air power was the major factor in Britain and France's decision to back down at Munich. However, neither power would have bowed to Japanese or Italian aggression provided they acted without the aid of Germany. The only "hopeful" note in their testimony was the Ambassadors' suggestion that perhaps Germany might advance east­ ward, into the Ukraine, and thereby give Britain and France time to build up their armaments. Possibly, they suggested, an eastward advance might even prevent France and Britain from having to enter the war. Both

^^New York Times, January 11, 1939, 1; The Times, January 12, 1939, 10.

^^New York Times, January 15, 1939, section IV, 1. Also see The Times, January 12, 1939, 10. 223 diplomats asserted that the security of the U.S. was not directly threatened. However, they did suggest that Germany might demand naval bases in the West Indies in the near future.The Times carried the story and wrote that the descriptions of their testimony which had leaked were "remarkable for their prevailing gloom." They allegedly , described Europe as "chaotic" and "crises" ridden and supposedly argued that Munich had accelerated not retarded the armament race. The Times optimistically reminded its readers that although rumors of imminent war were circulating, "it is important to remember that there is no present discoverable warrant for them." 13 Kennedy's testimony was apparently misinterpreted by the press. He flatly denied the charge that he had told the committee that Britain would allow Germany to build an air base in Canada. "I never said anything that could possibly be interpreted in such a way." "I never said it and I never thought it."^^

The President's embryonic foreign policy seemed to be going well until the newspaper headlines reported the crash of an American bomber which claimed several victims on January 23, 1939. One of the passengers was an official of the French Air Ministry. For the first time Americans learned that Wm. Bullitt had negotiated a deal approved by Roosevelt which

l^New York Times, January 11, 1939, 1 and 13.

l^The Times, January 11, 1939, 9.

l^New York Times, January 14, 1939, 3. 224 permitted the French to buy U.S. army aircraft and to become familiar with its top secret equipment. Isolationists were indignant; the

Senate Military Affairs Committee demanded an investigation and the

President, practicing a bit of appeasement on his own, invited the

Senators to attend a confidentail "chit." The irate committee members trooped over to the White House and angrily accused Roosevelt of un­ neutral conduct. FDR tried to mollify his audience by describing a bleak picture of the prospects of peace in Europe. Oblivious to the

Senator's growing uneasiness, he began to explain the various combina­ tions by which Hitler could swallow the smaller nations in Europe and the colonies of England, France, and Holland. Such strategic changes in the map of Europe, Roosevelt predicted, would have a devastating impact on the peace and security of the U.S. The ensuing conflict would be a struggle between different economic systems; as a have-nation, the United States, would be seriously challenged by the have-not nations.

"That is why," Roosevelt added, "the safety of the Rhine frontier does necessarily interest us." "Do you mean that our frontier is on the

Rhine?," one of the Senators asked breaking the tense silence. "No, not that. But practically speaking if the Rhine frontiers are threatened the rest of the world is too. Once they have fallen before Hitler, the

I ^^Blum, The Morgenthau Diaries, Vol. II, 72-78 states that all the equipment had been removed from the plane; also see The Economist, February 4, 1939, 239-240. 225

German sphere of action will be unlimited.The Senators, suffering

under the illusion that there would be no war, regarded such talk as

thoroughly alarming. Ultimately, the discussion was leaked to the press

and Roosevelt was accused of saying what he had not said, that the Rhine

was our frontier. Outraged, Roosevelt branded the statement as a delib- 17 erate lie: "Some boob," must have said it. However, resentment and

suspicion of the President continued to mount and the repeal of the arms

embargo was deferred. But by mid-March, Roosevelt's predictions were

beginning to prove correct. "There can be no question," The Economist

wrote, "that the President has a very large body of opinion, perhaps a

majority, on his side." Roosevelt, at least, has directly stated "a

case in which increasing numbers of Americans are coming to believe. And 18 at best he has changed the course of history."

By beginning to grope for a definite, positive foreign policy, the

differences between the foreign policy assumptions of Roosevelt and his

pessimistic ambassador became all too glaring. Roosevelt had begun to

doubt that peace could be maintained. Kennedy had absolutely no reser­

vations. He firmly insisted that war in Europe was inevitable. Having become convinced by the Munich crisis that the United States must rearm,

he supported the President's drive for rearmament and argued before the

Committee that the United States should become a bastion of peace and

l^Alsop and Kintner, 31; Langer and Gleason, 48-49 describes the Committee's reaction as does The Economist, February 4, 1939, 239-240.

^^Burns, 389.

^^The Economist, February 4, 1939, 239-240. 226

security in the Western Hemisphere. But while Roosevelt began to urge

"methods short of war," Kennedy tenaciously clung to Chamberlain's

appeasement policy, recommending extreme isolation, and, at times, acquiescence to the totalitarian demands. He continued to hope that

somehow the U.S. could escape the consequences of a war in Europe.

Kennedy sent Roosevelt a memorandum in December, 1938, discussing the various ways by which the United States could maintain its strict isolationism. He posed the question, "What would be the effect on the

United States of the decline or collapse of the British Empire?" He described three ways by which Britain could lose her empire and three corresponding alternatives for the United States. If Britain were defeated outright, the totalitarian power would confiscate the British navy and demand her overseas strategic naval and air bases which would then be economically integrated into their Zollverein. By dominating the southern Atlantic, they would subject Africa and South America to their influence therefore making enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine extremely difficult. Likewise, Japan's occupation of Singapore would give her control of the Indian Ocean and enable her to impose terms on Australia and New Zealand. Kennedy believed that in self-defense the United States would need to increase her armaments and acquire strategic aerial and naval bases in the French and British Guianas and the British West

Indian Islands.

A second hypothetical situation concerned the totalitarian powers once again resorting to their well known "gangster" or "squeeze" techniques and forcing Britain and France to hand over vital possessions. 227

Kennedy saw this as a real possibility and offered as evidence the

testimony of a leading Nazi:

It is the destiny of the Fuehrer to do more than lead the German Volk out of the wilderness of defeat. We shall become supreme and strong. France for certain, England probably, are decadent peoples and must make way for a powerful people who are ready, as all the world has seen, to make unlimited sacrifices for national great­ ness ... .Neither England nor France will fight for the Czechs. We must gain access to the Mediterranean so that a German bloc extends from Danzig to Trieste....We shall demand colonies in order to lay the foundations of a world empire. Will England concede our demands? I think she will give way. You ask why? Because you will not be strong enough to refuse....The Americans won't help you-not until it's too late anyhow....

The "gangster" technique, recently applied so successfully to Austria and Czechoslovakia, would render Britain and France impotent by total­ itarian control of the aerial and naval bases. Only North America and

South America, insofar as the United States could enforce the Monroe

Doctrine, would remain outside their orbit. In self defense, Kennedy argued, the United States would have to compete in the race for empires and assume control of French and British territories and parts of West

Africa in the interests of the Monroe Doctrine.

Kennedy discussed the connection between peace and prosperity and the establishment of democratic institutions. Tlie thriving democratic institutions, long familiar to the English speaking community, were an example of the stability and prosperity brought by Britain's control of the seas and the Pax Britania. During the nineteenth century the North and South American reliance on the British navy protected them from being dragged into war and constituted their "first line of defence." Great strides were made then in establishing democratic institutions because of Britain's protection and policing power. The nineteenth century 228

European balance of power, Britain's superior fleet, and her monopoly

of the exits to the Atlantic Ocean was the basis for her supremacy.

This system of defense, Kennedy argued, was vindicated during World War

I "but only because the United States threw in her weight behind it."

But today, he wrote, Germany's unparalleled ambition in Central Europe

and the effectiveness of her air power make Britain vulnerable to direct

attack. She is no longer an island fortress safely protected by her

fleet. Further, the rise and expansion of Japan poses a serious threat

to British power in the Far East and challenges her naval supremacy.

He pointed out three American responses to the totalitarian challenge.

One alternative, he grudgingly conceded, was that the United States

return to the old Wilsonian thesis of "making the world safe for

democracy" by supporting democratic control of the seas and helping to

overthrow the totalitarian nations. Another required the United States

to construct a fortress around North America and occupy all vital posi­

tions 1000 miles from her shore. Otherwise, the United States should

stand idly by with its arms folded like a spectator watching the totali­

tarian regimes gobble up Europe, Asia, and master the seas.

There was however, a third alternative, one long overdue; he

suggested the integration of Europe through a "voluntary federation"

or the "dominating influence" of one or more great powers. He predicted

that "peace and prosperity" could be found by establishing four or five

economic and politically self-supporting spheres of influence; the Monroe

system, the Franco-British system, the Germanic system, the Russian and

Japanese-China system. Anything needed outside each sphere could be 229 attained through barter or free trade. Such a scheme, he believed could enable the world to "settle down to a long peace and security in which the forces for freedom everywhere would once more have an opportunity to develop."

"Whichever way we look the future of the world rests with the

United States," he concluded. America will become either the director and organizer of the democratic states, or she will become a vestige of the past, the last democratic state surrounded by a hostile, totalitarian world. All three theories allowed the United States to adhere rigidly to a policy of isolationism and virtual pacifism. Each argument illus­ trated that American interests could be successfully maintained by staying out of war.

"His attitude," wrote one astute historian, "was akin to that of the weather prophet. He saw clouds on the horizon and he correctly predicted rain; but he hoped that the storm would either dissipate itself, or blow off in another direction....He was content to watch, pray, keep his distance, and urge the purchase of umbrellas." However, he failed to realize that politics, unlike the weather, is subject to some degree of self-control. Withdrawing merely allows someone else to shape the course of the future. Nevertheless, he refused to advance a more active policy for the United States even though it might have reduced the chances of the war which he so greatly feared. 20

^^JPK to FDR, December 19, 1938, PSF: Great Britain, FDRL.

ZOcraig, 665-667; Bjerk, 115. 230

On February 11 the gloomy ambassador sailed once again for Britain cutting his vacation short by two weeks. The Boston Globe mischievously charged that Roosevelt, fully aware of Hitler’s intention to swallow

Czechoslovakia, sent Kennedy back to "force [him] out under a cloud of discredit, and substitute for him a White House marionette," a sort of

"Walter Hines Page." Kennedy, realizing that he had been "sold out" decided to return to London to prevent Roosevelt from appointing another

"robot.

Immediately upon his return to London, Kennedy conferred with

Lord Halifax. He "was in good form and made even more generous use than usual of the American vernacular to emphasize his points." Halifax told

Lindsay that Kennedy seemed more optimistic and said "American opinion was moving steadily in the right direction and was more and more coming to realize that, if there were a show-down in Europe, they could not be disinterested." However, he also warned that there was always the fear that American opinion "might be stampeded;" in particular he was worried about the Ludlow Amendment by which a declaration of war could only be issued after the American people had been consulted and Congressional action prohibiting Americans from trading with any nation at war. His advice regarding Anglo-American relations was to say little. "The less said the better," Kennedy remarked since "it was very difficult to say anything that did not lend itself to misrepresentation." The Ambassador

Z^Boston Globe, April 20, 1939, 1 and 2. 231

also noticed a growing anti-Semitic feeling in the United States which he attributed to the widespread belief that the Jews were trying to get

America into war.

A pause occurred turning attention to the Vatican when on February 10,

1939, Pius XI died. On March 2, 1939, Pius XII was elected by the College of Cardinals. Roosevelt conferred on Kennedy the distinction of being 23 the first American representative ever to attend a papal coronation.

For Kennedy this was a ceremony more personal and moving than anything he had yet officially witnessed. Roosevelt's choice was a natural one, but it presented a problem of logistics and organization, since the

Kennedy's were scattered over three continents. Mrs. Kennedy was aboard a ship returning from Egypt when she received a cable telling her to proceed immediately to Rome. The children and their nurse and governess went on ahead and occupied an entire compartment on the train to Rome.

The Ambassador and Jack were the last to arrive and traveled on the train with the Duke of Norfolk, the leading English Catholic aristocrat and the representative of the King and the Government. Eventually, all of the

Kennedy's with the exception of Joe Jr. who was in Madrid, were united under one roof in the Eternal City.^^

22pO 414/276/4335, Halifax to Lindsay, February 17, 1939, 43; also referred to in Koskoff, 187.

“^Hull to JPK, March 6, 1939, 886A.001/41B, DSF; The Times, March 14, 1939, 14, Koskoff writes that Kennedy lobbied for the honor of being the nation's number one Catholic layman. 189,

^^New York Times, March 12, 1939, 40; March 8, 1939, 9; also see Duncliffe, 105, 232

OC Pius XII was delighted at the presence of his former host.

He recalled his trip in 1936 to the U.S. when he, as Cardinal Pacelli, had visited the Kennedy home in Bronxville, New York, and Kennedy had accompanied him to Hyde Park to meet the President. While six of

Kennedy's nine children toured the Roman ruins, aides were sent scamper­ ing to correct a colossal oversight. The irate Ambassador had discovered that there were no American flags to decorate his limousine. Rome was thoroughly searched as the aides visited shops and called on American residents desperately trying to find two small flags. All was in vain; the American representative was forced to ride through the Roman streets in shiny black anonymity.

Even the coronation of Peter's successor was not without its political overtones. The German Government sent no official representa­ tive. Moreover, Pius Xll selected Cardinal Maglione, a man noted for his pro-French and pro-democratic sympathies as his Secretary of State.

Before his selection, both the German and Italian Governments actively 27 campaigned against his candidacy. Pius Xll promised to dedicate "his pontificate to the achievement of peace...." and sent a pastoral letter to the German people. Writing in German he said "my whole affection

^^New York Times, March 11, 1939, 4.

Z^lbid., March 12, 1939, 1.

2?Time, March 27, 1939, 45 and March 20, 1939, 50. 233 and concern belong to the German nation.” He gave a blessing to the clergy', and to all Catholics, and a "special blessing for all the dear

German children.”^®

The service deeply moved Kennedy. He told a New York Herald-

Tribune correspondent that he had experienced "a day overwhelming in its 29 memory, in its magnificence, in its universal appeal.” The next day

Pius XII received the Kennedy family in a private audience. He summoned the Ambassador first. Breaking protocol, the Pope rose to greet Kennedy and took his hands as they conversed for twenty minutes in English. Then

Mrs. Kennedy was presented to the Pope who would one day name her Papal 30 Countess, an honor he bestowed only once during his reign. Finally the nine Kennedy children were admitted with their governess and nurse and members of Kennedy's staff. The Pope reminisced about his visit to their home and remembered that Teddy Kennedy had played with his cross and asked about his ring as he held him on his lap. He also presented rosaries to the children and blessed the family.

Seven year old Teddy afterwards explained that "I told ray sister Patricia I wasn't frightened at all.” "He [the Pope] patted my hand and told me I was a smart little fellow. He gave me the first 7 ] rosary beads from the table before he gave my sister any.” The next

^% e w York Times, March 14, 1939, 7.

^^New York Herald-Tribune, March 14, 1939 as mentioned in IVhalen, 255.

^^Gail Cameron, Rose, 137.

SlTime, March 27, 1939, 45. 234 morning, Teddy received his first Holy Communion from the Pope, probably the first non-Italian to receive such distinction. Throughout his reign

Pius XII showed a special regard for the Kennedy family and awarded the

Ambassador the Order of Pius the Ninth, an honor usually bestowed on heads of state and very high officialdom.

While still in Rome, Kennedy met Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian

Foreign Minister and his wife, a daughter of Mussolini, at a dinner held at the American Embassy. Kennedy was appalled at Ciano's behavior and told Hull "I have no idea how able he is in his office, but I have never met a more pompous ass in my life. He spent most of his time rushing girls into a corner for conversation, and at the dinner he would not talk seriously for five minutes for fear that two or three of the girls who were invited in order to get him to come, might get out of sight....

I came away with the belief that we could accomplish much by sending a dozen beautiful chorus girls to Rome than a flock of diplomats and a fleet of airplanes." Kennedy cabled Hull that the Italians [put great stock in their friendship with the United States and that they] were completely unprepared for war and desperately wanted to avoid it.

"Everytime the President says anything, nobody in the Cabinet or Govern- 77 ment in Rome is fit to talk with for the rest of the day." The Ambas­ sador and his family left Rome delighted by the coronation but most unimpressed by Italian politicans.

S^Tansil, 517.

^^Ibid.; Langer and Gleason, 77. 235

Europe was to have only six more months of peace. Throughout this period, Kennedy's cables ran the gamut from extreme fatalism and pacifism to exuberant optimism. His reports "had something of the frantic inconsistency that one associates with accounts of mysterious natural phenomena. The omens were uniformly ominous, yet he hoped that events would take a turn for the better, and he grasped at every straw in the wind."^^

In mid December, 1938, Kennedy had warned Roosevelt to expect war by spring. And in late January, Washington received a further pessimistic prognosis. British officials, said Kennedy, were clearly worried about Hitler's "disquieting" mood. Europe's gossip mill whispered that he was "bitterly resentful" of the Munich Agreement since it

"baulked him of a localized war against Czechoslovakia." Munich's popularity with the base majority of his countrymen and their affection for Chamberlain had "personally humiliated" Hitler and illustrated the strong German desire for peace. Thus, he held Britain responsible for thwarting his ambitions. The Ambassador also told Hull that the British

Foreign Office had learned that Hitler planned another foreign adventure slated for the spring of 1939. Some of his advisers were urging him to expand in the east. While other rumors indicated that Ribbentrop and

Himmler advised him to consider a western advance. There was also evidence to indicate that the Fuehrer wanted to convert the Anti-Comitern

^^Craig, 667; also cited in IVhalen, 256.

SSpRUS, January 24, 1939, Vol. I, 2-5. 236

Pact into an alliance for joint military assistance against an aggressive third party. The Ambassador reported that Chamberlain's government regarded the end of February as the most dangerous period. There were rumors of Nazi troop mobilizing and the formation of a reserve regiment.

Worse still, both Britain and France were acutely aware that their combined military forces were no match compared to the forces which Germany and

Italy could muster. And in a later cable, Kennedy described Britain's mood as complacent. He believed that the "top-side men" in the Government asked themselves nightly how much longer Hitler could afford to keep

Germany at peace. "The long term for England, whichever way you look at it," he fatalistically predicted, "seems to be exceedingly dark."^^

But by mid February, the mercurial ambassador was cabling a different message. He had talked with Chatfield, Simon, Hoare, Halifax and Chamber- lain in addition to many others. Kennedy wrote "...they thoroughly believe that England is on its way; that Germany will not attack; that the problem of last fall, when they were obliged to do things that perhaps they would rather have done otherwise, is gone, and that while Britain would not go to war if Germany should attack Rumania or the Ukraine, they would declare 37 war at once if Germany moved towards Switzerland or Holland." Kennedy reported that Chamberlain too, shared this optimistic assessment. He

36FRUS, February 23, 1939, Vol. I, 21.

37jPK to Hull, February 20, 1939, 7400.00/589, MS Dept, of State as cited in Tansil, 449, 237 cabled Hull a description of a conversation hith Chamberlain and Halifax and reported that Chamberlain "feels definitely that [the general outlook] is much better." The Prime Minister attributed Europe's quiet interlude to Roosevelt's rearmament program and to Britain's stiffer attitude. He told Kennedy that this "has done much to make Hitler believe that the

English would not take a fight lying down." Chamberlain discussed Kennedy's recent visit to Italy and disagreed with his friend's assessment of

Mussolini. He did not believe that Mussolini posed much of a threat to peace. He regarded him as a "practical operator," a man much like him­ self, "who likes to see the whole picture." Nor did he take seriously the talk about a Russian-German alliance. "They are both so distrustful of each other that it would never work out." If Hitler continued his policy of expansion, he could aim for control of the Ukraine, Chamberlain pre­ dicted. The Prime Minister characterized Hitler as one "who looks out of the window at Berchtesgaden, dreamingly considering the future prospect of Germany without being very practical." Nevertheless, he saw no reason to believe that Hitler intended to move toward the west. The Prime

Minister's prescription for doing business with Hitler was "to take him at his word," even though he fully realized "that it is by no means certain that the word will be kept." However, Kennedy added, Chamberlain had had

"no reason personally to disbelieve it." The Ambassador's conclusion was that the Prime Minister intended "to go along, preparing and arming all the time, but assuming that he can do business with Hitler." However,

Kennedy pointed out, it was difficult to reconcile Chamberlain's two points of views: "his hope that appeasement will still be worked out and his fear that Hitler has in his hands, and is quite likely to use 238

them, the means of causing a world war." Kennedy optimistically declared

that "I feel and the general impression here is that Chamberlain is

stronger now than he has ever been...."^°

But by early March, Kennedy was once again depressed and despondent.

He sent Roosevelt another lengthy, alarmist sermon on the problems of the

collapse of the British Empire, the destruction of the Pax Britannica,

and the "serious" consequences this would produce in the United States.

Again, his orientation was economic and isolationist as he reviewed the various alternatives open to the United States. He asked if the United

States could risk seeing Britain and France defeated by the totalitarian regimes? Their defeat would turn the Mediterranean into a German-Italian

lake, Russia would be at the mercy of Germany and Japan; and the empires of Britain, France, and the Netherlands would be divided between the totalitarian powers. Strategically, the destruction of Britain's naval supremacy would have a devastating impact on America. The U.S. might find it impossible to maintain the strategic triangle of the Dutch Harbor-

Hawaii-Panama bases without which the American navy could not protect trade routes or sources of vital supplies. If there were to be a totali­ tarian victory in Europe, the United States should build an enormous armament system, including a two-front navy. They would require sacri­ fices by the public extremely difficult for a popularity elected govern­ ment to defend. But even-this would not permanently guarantee America's

SSpRUS, February 17, 1939, Vol. I, 14-17. 239

safety. If she faced a two-front attack and if Latin America fell under

Axis control, there would only be a 50-50 chance, Kennedy predicted, that

the American system would not be permanently and utterly wrecked. If the

American fleet was destroyed, then certainly, the independence of sections

of the country would be seriously threatened.

He viewed the political effects as no less damaging. The United

States alone faced a hostile totalitarian world. The "sullen," "resentful"

and "half starving" defeated populations, might well join with their

oppressors to destroy the last stronghold of democracy. Kennedy also

feared internal threats. The vast and unprofitable taxation for armament

expenditure and the accompanying national regimentation for defense would,

he feared, "inevitably mean the destruction of the American form of Govern­ ment as at present conceived, in the very effort to defend the country

from alien authoritarian forms of control." The defeat of Britain and

France would mean the end of liberalism, economically and socially. The

resources of the conquered would be turned against the United States; she would lose about 50% of her export trade and 75% of her foreign investments would fall under the control of potential enemies. "The effects of this would soon penetrate into every American home." In self defense, the

United States would have to develop an economy dictated by the government,

like Nazi Germany's, to take up the slack resulting from shrunken exports.

Such centralization would duplicate the features of the Fascist state;

"to fight totalitarianism we would have to adopt totalitarian methods."

Nor would the United States be immune from the ideological infections spreading from Europe through Latin America. "The menace which such a 240

development would constitute to the continuance of democracy in the United

States does not require to be underlined." The economic depression and

resulting unrest and dissatisfaction, "would provide just the proper

soil in which foreign ideologies could take root. ... In short," he con­

cluded, "America, alone in a jealous and hostile world, would find that

the effort and cost of maintaining ’splendid isolation' would be such as

to bring about the destruction of all those values which the isolation 39 policy had been designed to preserve."

Despite his fatalistic conclusion, Kennedy still refused to counsel any policy other than extreme isolation and appeasement, despite the fact that his observations illustrated the folly of isolation.

Almost a month before Hitler's next act of aggression The Economist, always a close observer of American opinion, examined the question of whether or not the United States would enter a European war. There was already much American goodwill for Britain and France and the more coura­ geously they defended themselves against the totalitarian powers, Germany,

Italy, and Japan, the more sympathy and support they would derive from the

United States. If the totalitarian powers engaged in unprovoked air attacks on British and French cities, "it would seem to be a safe con­ clusion that American opinion, at the outset of such a war, would be considerably more favorable to the Anglo-French cause than it is now."

The Economist predicted that the Neutrality Act and the Johnson Act would be repealed and the American Fleet would become the guardian of the Pacific. These measures would ensure the security of the United

39jPK to FDR, March 3, 1939, PSF: Great Britain, FDRL. 241

States without involving her in war. However, the magazine also noted

that there was a growing belief in the United States that ultimately

armed intervention would be unavoidable. The next war would be a sharp

and violent initial attack, followed by a long-drawn out struggle.

Initially, the United States would not be of substantial assistance, but

in the second and longer phase the help that could be relied upon from

the United States would be large and decisive— an accurate prediction of

American foreign policy during the next two years.

On March 15 Hitler swallowed up the remnants of the tottering state of Czechoslovakia. In early March, egged on by the Nazis, the diverse nationalities lumped together in the ill-defined Czech state turned upon each other. Emil Hacha, the aging, weary, lawyer-President of Czechoslovakia dismissed the Ruthenians and the Slovakian Governments, arrested Monsignor

Tiso, the Slovak Premier along with several members of his Cabinet, and proclaimed martial law. In retribution, the Ruthenians and the Slovaks loudly proclaimed their independence. Chamberlain reported in the House of Commons on March 13, that there had apparently been a "Cabinet crisis" in Slovakia but that "the situation there appears to be outwardly calm."^^

The Nazi press stepped up its violent attacks and harped on the theme of a Communist plot. On the afternoon of March 14, Hacha was ordered to Berlin, presented with a bouquet of flowers at the rail-way station, and cordially received by the Fuehrer. The tone of the meeting

^Ofhe Economist, February 3, 1939, 331-332,

41nC, Debates, March 13, 1939, Vol. 345, 23. 242 quickly changed,as Hitler tried first to persuade him to sign away his

country's independence, then he threatened him that some 200,000 German

troops were already poised along the Czech frontier ready to bomb Prague.

After several hours of shouting, haranguing, mental torture, and shots with a hypodermic needle to revive him from two fainting spells. Hacha at 4:30 in the morning signed the document subjecting Bohemia and Moravia to Nazi domination.

At 6:00 on the morning of March 15, the silent, weeping, and occasionally defiant street crowd watched the Nazi troops pour into

Bohemia. Hitler himself triumphantly entered Prague and spent that night there-his only recorded visit. In the Hradschin Castle, the

Palace of the Bohemian Kings, and the symbol of Czech nationalism.

Hitler seated himself at the table where Benes had often sat and wrote:

"Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.

By annexing a non-German population. Hitler had violated his own often proclaimed principle of nationality. He ignored international law, and he utterly flouted the Munich Agreement. "It is no longer

^^See Wheeler-Bennett, Prologue to Tragedy (New York, 1948) 341-345.

43ibid., 346. In an announcement from Prague Hitler recognized the independence of Slovakia, but Ruthenia, proclaimed on March 14, only survived twenty-four hours. Hitler gave it to Hungary as a reward for its co-operation. Its incorporation was announced in the Hungarian Parliament by the Prime Minister on March 16, 1939. Also see Alsop and Kintner, 32; Moffat, 230; and Foiling, 399 for additional discussions. 243 possible," Bullitt grossly understated, "to have confidence in any promises he may m a k e . "44 On the other side of the Atlantic, Roosevelt's sleep was interrupted by Bullitt's trans-Atlantic telephone call informing him of the invasion. He urged the President to denounce Hitler's aggres­ sion and push for a revision of the neutrality l a w s . 45 By breakfast time,

FDR had received a cable confirming the news from the American diplomat stationed in Prague, Wilbur Carr. "One more state is on the way to extinction." Moffat gloomily wrote in his diary. "It looks as though

Hitler were more successful even than N a p o l e o n . "4^ Both Roosevelt and

Welles were outraged. Welles spent the day wandering back and forth between the Department of State and the White House. He regarded the invasion of Prague as "the first unshaded instance'of open thievery" and told the President that he was almost sick to his stomach because he could not publicly vent his opinions.Hull, vacationing in Florida, 48 received a call from Roosevelt who informed him of the news. As the

President and his policy makers searched for an appropriate response, one State Department official remarked "No one here has any illusions that the German Napoleonic machine will not extend itself almost indefi­ nitely."4®

44pRUS, March 17, 1939, Vol. I, 48.

45Langer and Gleason, 66-67.

4&Moffat, March 14, 1939, 231-232.

4^Alsop and Kintner, 32.

48jbid.,

4^Langer and Gleason, 66. 244

Britain's immediate reaction was much more subdued. On the after­ noon of March 15, Chamberlain calmly informed the House of Commons that

Czechoslovakia had "become disentegrated."^^ Despite the fact that he opposed the method and the manner of Czechoslovakia's destruction, the

Prime Minister refused to honor Britain's guarantee to a state that had ceased to exist. "The situation had radically altered since the Slovak

Diet declared the independence of Slovakia... .His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation.

Chamberlain's statement aroused a barage of criticism within his own party and in the press. Kennedy, of course, supported Chamberlain and told

Halifax: "American public opinion, like all other, was profoundly shocked, and it was very important that it should be protected, as far as might be, from jumping to entirely wrong conclusions....The truth, however, as he saw it, was that nothing whatever could have prevented these recent 52 events in Czecho-Slovakia except the decision to make war."

While Halifax tried to prod the surprised Prime Minister to unequivo­ cally condemn the Nazis, to broaden his Cabinet by including national leaders representing all parties and to introduce a modified scheme of 53 conscription. Roosevelt was busy searching for weapons to implement

^^HC, Debates, March 15, 1939, Vol. 345, 439; also see Felling, 399- 400; IVheeler-Bennett, 353; and Northedge, 563-567.

S^HC, Debates, March 15, 1939, Vol. 345, 437.

^^Halifax to Lindsay, March 17, 1939, British Documents, IV, 364 as cited in Koskoff, 192.

S^Aian C. Johnson, Viscount Halifax: A Biography, (New York, 1941), 510-513. 245 his peace offensive. He made several decisions. There was no longer any debate on the question of whether or not Hugh Wilson, the American

Ambassador, would return to Berlin. Making use of the economic powers so casually granted by Congress, the President ordered countervailing duties against Germany and the freezing of Czech funds in American banks.

He abrogated the trade agreement with Czechoslovakia and by continuing to deal with the Czech's representative in Washington^^ refused to recognize officially Germany's absorption of Czechoslovakia. In addition to these measures, Roosevelt approved a sharply worded statement drafted by Hull and Welles and delivered by Welles on March 17, 1939. The Government

[it read]:

cannot refrain from making known this country's condemnation of the acts which have resulted in the temporary extinguish­ ment of the liberties of a free and independent people.... It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbi­ trary force are threatening world peace and the very structure of modern civilization....^5

Still, it was little more than the old policy of "protest and pinpricks" since the revision of the Neutrality Bill was bogged down in bureaucratic machinery.The Economist warned that "Febbleness and irresolution in

London now might alienate America once and for all. We trust that our 57 Government realise this and have taken it to heart."

Alsop and Kintner, 33; Hull, 615; Langer and Gleason, 68; also see the Moffat Papers which give a good description of Washington's attitude and the fury of official activity, 232-233.

^^Langer and Gleason, 67-68; Hie Economist, March 25, 1939, 608.

S^Burns, 390.

57The Economist, March 25, 1938, 608. 246

While Chamberlain boarded the train to speak in Birmingham on

March 17, Halifax gave Kennedy the gist of the Prime Minister's speech and warned him that it signaled a transition in British foreign policy. 58 As always, Kennedy loyally applauded the Prime Minister's decision.

Halifax's arguments were probably more influential than Roosevelt's actions in swaying Chamberlain's mind. In addition, Henderson's report from Berlin March 16 must also have undermined any hopes in further appeasement. He wrote that "the utter cynicism and immorality of the whole performance defies description....His Majesty's Government will doubtless consider what attitude to adopt towards a Government which has shown itself incapable of observing an agreement not six months old and which is apparently set on domination by force of the whole of the

Danube basin.In protest against Hitler's action Henderson was recalled from Berlin on March 17.

At Birmingham that evening Chamberlain proclaimed a "Right-about- turn" in Britain's foreign policy and vigorously condemned Hitler's aggression. As he reproached Hitler for his breach of faith and for shattering the Munich Agreement, there was a note of petulance, personal betrayal, and wounded pride. He defended his Munich policy and enumerated

Hitler's public and private pledges. He had promised Chamberlain at

Munich, "This is the last territorial claim which I have to make in

Europe." "I shall not be interested in the Czech state any more, and I can guarantee it. We do not want any more Czechs," Chamberlain mockingly quoted him. Toward the end of his address Chamberlain posed rhetorical

SSwheeler-Bennett, Munich, 361. eg **Feiling, 212. 247

questions about the future: "is this the end of an old adventure, or

the beginning of a new? Is this the last attack upon a small state, or

is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction

of an attempt to dominate the world by force,...? There was nothing,"

Chamberlain emphasized, which he would not give for peace, "but there

is one thing that I must expect, and that is the liberty that we have

enjoyed for hundreds of years, and which we would never surrender."

"No greater mistake could be made than to suppose that, because it be­

lieves war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fibre that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it were ever made."^® The Birmingham speech marked the abandonment of Chamberlain's appeasement policy.

The speech also ensured the continuous leadership of Chamberlain.

Halifax regarded the speech as an "inspiring declaration of policy and one more calculated to promote confidence in other potential victims.

But he also warned Kennedy that if Hitler grabbed Rumania, England could not "wait any longer." The Ambassador told Washington that the British had to determine whether Hitler was bluffing; if so "his bluff should be called;" if not, the sooner they took him on the better. "If Chamber- lain opposes that idea very strongly there may be a break between the

Prime Minister and Halifax," Kennedy predicted. In his conversation

GOchurchill, The Gathering Storm, 308; Foiling, 399-400; Northedge, 568; Colvin, 187.

Glwheeler-Bennett, 358.

62jPK to Hull, March 18, 1939, 740.00/630, Confidential File, MS Dept of State as cited in Tansill, 454-455. 248 with the Foreign Secretary, Kennedy said that the President had been

impressed by recent events in Europe and was considering the revision of America's neutrality laws. He explained that if Britain helped

Rumania when attacked, America would be "more readily moved" to aid

Britain than if she stood by and did nothing.

Simon too, was lavish in his praise of the speech. "I think that history will ultimately record that what he then said did much to bring an absolutely united country into the war." And even Churchill was delighted. "Here was decision at last:

taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground, which must surely lead to the slaughter of tens of millions of people....Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without blood­ shed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves."^4

Chamberlain was devising a "bold and startling" new strategy; one which he hoped would gain time for Britain.He announced it to the

Cabinet on March 20. He proposed that France, Russia, and Poland join with Britain as signatories to a declaration personally written by

^^Northedge, 569; Gilbert and Gott, 238.

G^churchill, The Gathering Storm, 310-311.

GSpeiling, 402. 249

him. It read:

We the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, hereby declare that, inasmuch as peace and security in Europe are matters of common interest and concern; and since European peace and security may be affected by the action which constitutes a threat to the poli­ tical independence of any European state, our respective Governments hereby undertake immediately to consult together as to what steps whould be taken to offer joint resistance to any such actions.

Kennedy characterized the non-doctrinaire British approach as

"practical and expedient" and praised Chamberlain for examining all

possible alternatives for resisting German aggression.The French

too, supported the Prime Minister's efforts and announced tlieir assent

to the declaration, Russia also agreed to sign after France and Poland

had done so.

Halifax and Bonnet held a series of conversations in London to

discuss their strategy. If war did break out, Halifax argued that their

major concern should not be could we assist Poland or Rumania? but could

Britain and France conduct a successful war against Germany? As long as

the Nazis remained in power, there was little chance of a European peace.

And if Hitler did go to war, Nazism might well be overthrown by the

Germans themselves. Speaking unofficially, Halifax concluded that "even

GGfO 800/311/C3986/19/18, March 23, 1939, 5; Documents on British Foreign Policy, Third Series, IV, 400; Moffat, 234; Colvin, 187-198.

G^FRUS, March 22, 1939, Vol. II, 93. Koskoff writes that Kennedy was one of the few'statesmen who still thought peace was more important than stopping Hitler. Halifax reported Kennedy's reaction to Chamber­ lain's speech of March 17: "He thought the Prime Minister's speech last night was first-rate, but that to him it did definitely carry a corro­ boration that we should resist further German aggression." 193. 250

if no assurance of Poland's collaboration could be obtained in advance--

and this would, of course, affect Russia's capacity to help--it would

still be very difficult for France and Great Britain to take no action

if there was a further act of aggression by Germany.But Bonnet

argued that now was the time "to call a halt to Germany" and to find out precisely where each country stood. He told Halifax that his Govern­ ment was deeply concerned about Poland's attitude which they considered

"of vital importance." It was so important, in fact, that if Poland seemed reluctant, Daladier suggested that she be "threatened" into signing. The Poles, however, strenuously objected to publicly associating themselves with Russia. Kennedy reported their Foreign Minister, Colonel

Joseph Beck, argued that if "Poland gave her adherence to the declaration proposed by the British it would take her definitely off the fence and put her in the Soviet camp against Germany,The Poles do not like the Russians as bedfellows, Kennedy cabled. Beck also feared that "a tie up of any sort between Russia and Poland will cause an open break with Hitler and war will be on."^^ Beck offered a counterproposal; he

G8pO 800/311/C3986/19/18, March 23, 1939, 5.

GSpRUS, March 22, 1939, Vol. II, 92-93.

^^FRUS, March 24, 1939, Vol. I, 98; also see Northedge for a further discussion on Poland's attitude, 570-577. After Kennedy's conversation with Beck, the Ambassador said that the Polish minister was "more than happy to have England's support given in the way that it was, i.e. that Poland is the one to determine when England is [to] come to her rescue." Northedge, 574; Gilbert and Gott, 239-246, 248-260. 251

suggested eliminating Russia from the agreement and limiting it to an

alliance with Britain and France. Although the Poles were incapable of

defending themselves, they refused to sanction an alliance with the Soviet 71 Union, the one power which certainly could aid them.

"I confess," declared Chamberlain that "1 very much agree with him,

for I regard Russia as a very unreliable friend...with an enormous

irritative power on others.Halifax told Kennedy that he regarded

Poland as a much more valuable ally than Russia. Russia's air force was weak, old, and short ranged and their army was poor and lacked indus­ trial backing. The only thing Russia was capable of doing, he told

Kennedy, was sending ammunition to Poland. 73

For the previous several months, Nazi propaganda had preached the necessity of recovering the port of Danzig. Jack Kennedy, visiting

Poland, wrote to his father that "The Polish people will not give up

Danzig to Hitler, not without fighting for it."^^ Kennedy discussed the Polish issue with Halifax and warned him that if Hitler acted against

Poland, Romania, or Russia, then England and France might find their assurances unsatisfactory; they might even "find it necessary to wash

71 Foiling, 406; also see Langer and Gleason for a good discussion of how Beck "maneuvered the British and French into their fateful offer." 74.

^Zpeiling, 408.

^^See FRUS, April 6, 1939, Vol. I, 113, for an example of Halifax's attitude toward Russia; Northedge, 570.

^^Whalen, 257; James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy, 38. 252

their hands of the whole of Southeastern Europe." But Halifax argued

that "the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now."

Even the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, Halifax said, strongly believed

that a line should be drawn and a warning given to Hitler. If he dared

to cross the line then "the war is on."^^

Chamberlain was completely aware of the problems the Polish issue

posed and feared an imminent attack on Poland. Nevertheless, the Prime

Minister informed Kennedy that he would address the House of Commons on

March 31, 1939, and explain his decision to guarantee Poland's indepen­

d e n c e . He completely reversed Britain's foreign policy when he told

the MPs that "in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish

independence; and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it

vital to resist with their national forces. His Majesty's Government

would feel bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in

their power."77

Britain's guarantee was "one of the most remarkable public déclara-

tions in the history of British foreign policy" 78 since it completely

^SpRUS, March 24, 1939, Vol. I, 99.

7&Moffat, March 31, 1939, 237; also see Felling, 404 for Chamber­ lain's views.

7?HC, Debates, March 31, 1939, Vol. 345, 2415; FRUS, March 31, 1939, Vol. I, 105; Langer and Gleason, 74.

^^Langer and Gleason, 75. 253 repudiated Chamberlain's earlier warning of March 17 against "new unspecified commitments operating under conditions which cannot be

foreseen.And it did, despite its limitations, commit Britain to positive action in Eastern Europe, which she had previously been un­ willing to accept. However, the guarantee gave another country the responsibility for determing when Britain should go to war. In a conversation with Kennedy, Cadogan reassured the Ambassador that there would be no hedging on Britain's part. "If Poland thought that any gesture of Germany's threatened their independence, and they themselves

on are the judges of that. Great Britain commits itself to fight."

Kennedy replied that it would be regarded in America as "subterfuge."

Moffat, an astute American observer, closely studied the speech and wrote that "Many students have always claimed that had Sir Edward Grey [former

British Foreign Minister] before the War [in 1914] sent forth clearly that Great Britain would fight in certain circumstances, the War would never have occurred. "Apparently," he mused, "Chamberlain has made up O 1 his mind that this will not occur a second time."

Kennedy reported that Chamberlain had been reluctant to make the commitment and was completely aware of its implications. Nevertheless, he repudiated his appeasement policy because he was left with no other

79peiling, 400.

SOpRUS, April 3, 1939, 106.

81Moffat, March 31, 1939, 237. 254

choice; "his bridges had been set ablaze by the arsonist in Berlin."82

And besides, the Britons would no longer stand for any more cringing before the dictators. Roosevelt was delighted. He told Lindsay the statement was "excellent" and that in his opinion "it would have a very great e f f e c t . The British public calmly accepted the radical change in official policy. So calmly, that Kennedy warned his friends over the telephone not to be misled. Compared to the Munich crisis of the 84 previous fall, "the danger may be as great or greater." And even

Churchill warned him of a "fifty-fifty chance of war."®^ Speaking before the London Press Club, Kennedy praised the press for educating the British

"not to lose their heads or grow panicky. You have served them...well," he remarked. "The 13th of March stands as an important day in all our lives. In the moment the future is being born— our future. IVhat it holds for any of us no one of us can know..,."®^

There was criticism of Chamberlain's new policy, of course. One critic bitterly scoffed that "Chamberlain having abandoned Czechoslovakia 87 then proceeded to guarantee one of her despoilers." Chamberlain's biographer suggests that although he had no intention of perpetrating

B^whalen, 258; also see Langer and Gleason, 75.

GSpO 414/276/4335, Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay, March 31, 1939, 67.

^^The Times, March 25, 1939, 14; The New York Herald-Tribune, March 25, 1939, 6.

SSwhalen, 257.

G^The Times, March 25, 1939, 14.

87 Langer and Gleason, 75, The critic was Wheeler-Bennett. 255

"a Polish Munich" over Danzig, nevertheless, Chamberlain may have given way too quickly to Beck.®^ And both Churchill and Lloyd George were worried about the exclusion of Russia. "To halt with the guarantee to

Poland would be to halt in No Man's Land under fire of both trench lines and without the shelter of either," said Churchill. And the wily Lloyd

George shrewdly predicted that "If we go in without the help of Russia, we shall be walking into a trap" since Russia was the only country who would quickly come to Poland's defense and whose air power could match 89 Germany's.

But Chamberlain was unable to overcome his aversion to the Kremlin in failing to cement an alliance with Russia and so he committed a strategic blunder which ultimately doomed his policy. "I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia," he confided in his diary. "I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to. And I distrust her motives which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears. Moreover she is both hated and suspected by many of the smaller states, notably by Poland, Roumania, and Finland.

GBpeiling, 406.

G^Langer and Gleason, 75.

GOpeiiing, 403; Keith Feiling, Chamberlain's biographer, insists that his dislike of Russia was not based on ideological prejudice, but on facts presented to him by military and intelligence reports. 402. He writes that "Not a trace can be found in his letters of an ideolog­ ical motive; he was not made up like that, and any notion that he resis­ ted war, for fear of its potential social consequences, is entirely legend. What they do contain is political argument and political suspicion; the belief implicitly held, it would seem, in our military circles that Russian strength, exhausted by blood-letting, would collapse, and a feeling that Russia was playing power politics rather than seeking peace." 406. 256

Kennedy fully sympathized with Chamberlain's attitude and told Roose­ velt that he viewed Soviet Russia as "an impoderable in the situation."

He saw absolutely no reason to assume that the two English speaking democracies could count on the Russians. Either Russia would come under

Nazi domination, even without an invasion, or the Soviet "doctrinaires" would retire into "splendid isolation" behind the walls of the Kremlin until "the pickings in Europe or West China were ripe." And anticipating the worse, it would be "the height of optimism," he concluded, "to expect

Russia to come to the aid of the United States" after a totalitarian victory in Western Europe.

Russia's friendship would have been costly--a free hand with the small states of Central Europe; but it was no more expensive than the price of

Munich. Thus, the opportunity for an Anglo-Russian alliance was allowed to lapse, until Russia made the agreement with Germany on August 23, 1939

--much to the shock and horror of Chamberlain and Kennedy.

Long after Chamberlain's public admission of error, Kennedy never wavered in his steadfast loyalty to his friend. He frequently stated that the British should erect a bust in his honor out of gratitude for his accomplishments at Munich and for the breathing space he bought

England. One friend of Kennedy's predicted that Chamberlain would go down in history as Britain's worst Prime Minister, Kennedy hotly defended

91jPK to FDR, March 3, 1939, PSP; Great Britain, FDRL. 257

Q2 him and retorted that he might well be remembered as the best. And when Neville Chamberlain died Kennedy admitted that "he was closer to

Neville Chamberlain than to anybody in England." "The world will miss 93 his sane counsel. He really gave his life that England might live."

Years later, Kennedy recalled that the real stumbling block to an

Anglo-Russian alliance in 1939 had been the Soviet demand to annex the states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Speaking in 1945, Kennedy remembered that Britain's major problem in 1939 was "that if they backed

Germany...they were then faced with a greater Germany, a weakened France, and a relatively defenseless England, whereas an alliance with Russia and the ultimate destruction of Germany would present England with precisely the problem that they now have, namely a vacuum of power in Central

Europe into which Russian influence would flow."^^

Throughout the trying spring and summer of 1939, Kennedy remained close to Chamberlain, sharing his views and his penchant for wishful thinking. Since he assumed that war would break out anyway, he desperate­ ly wanted the United States to remain aloof. Kennedy issued Chamberlain a similar admonition. So long as his good friend lived at #10 Downing

Street, Kennedy seemed to believe that Britain was worth saving; provided, of course, that the cost to the United States was minimal and did not

^^Conversation between Kennedy and Whalen on December 26, 1962 in New York. Cited in IVhalen, 259.

^%ew York Times, November 11, 1940, 4.

^^Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 122-123. 258

involve American military action. He therefore advised Chamberlain that

Poland should be left alone and thereby forced to make an expedient deal with Germany which would not disrupt Hitler’s eastern ambitions. Pre­ viously, Kennedy had advised the creation of spheres of influence and avoidance of all entanglements for the United States, Now, however, he was advocating that Britain and the United States "stand with arms folded,

He concluded that Hitler would march obligingly eastward and collide with

Russia. Such a scheme would give Britain and the United States time to rearm and place them in the pleasant position of curious spectators watching the two great totalitarian giants destroy each other.

Such a view, in 1939, was entirely plausible and widely shared,

Chamberlain accepted it. However, it overlooked the possibility of

Russia's defeat and Hitler's subsequent action, iVhat then? James

Forrestal, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy during World War II, wrote that nothing indicated that Hitler would have been content with his con­ quests; rather he probably would have turned westward and attacked 97 France in order to construct a completely Nazi dominated Europe.

Washington had little direct impact on Chamberlain's decision to guarantee Poland. Roosevelt, getting "madder and madder" at Hitler and

95Craig, 666,

^^Ibid.; also mentioned in Langer and Gleason based on conversations the authors had with Kennedy, June 30, 1949, 76,

^^Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 122. 259

totally disillusioned with Chamberlain's appeasement drew only pessimis­

tic conclusions from the latest example of Nazi aggression. Nothing

indicates that he opposed British and French efforts to try to build up a peace front. In fact, he seemed to regard Britain's guarantee to

Poland as a step forward since it committed Britain to positive action 99 in Eastern Europe.

Although Roosevelt took no active role in Chamberlain's guarantee to Poland, he warmly supported the Prime Minister's approaches to

Mussolini. He also decided to try some personal diplomacy of his own.

Kennedy had previously reported that Mussolini desperately wanted

America's good will and deplored the possibility of war.^^® Ambassador

Joseph Davies in Belgium who argued that Hitler would not risk war unless he was certain that he could count on the support of the Italians and urged the President to talk peace to the Duce. Roosevelt liked the idea and decided to try it.

The new Italian Ambassador, Prince Colonna, must have been quite surprised when Roosevelt delivered a "curtain lecture" on foreign policy as he presented his credentials to the President on March 22, 1939.

Roosevelt warned him not to take the American isolationist press too seriously. If war broke out, FDR assured his guest, Americans would

98ickes, March 18, 1939, Vol. II, 597.

S^Moffat, March 23, 24, 31, 1939, 233-235, 237-238; Langer and Gleason, 76.

IGDjgiegram from Kennedy, March 17, 1939 as cited in Langer and Gleason, 77.

lOlfelegram from Davies, March 21, 1939 as cited in Langer and Gleason, 77. 260 side overwhelmingly with the democracies. The President's intention was to sound out the Italian dictator through his Ambassador on the possibility of Mussolini taking the initiative for peace. He tried to undermine the comradeship between the two dictators by playing on the fear that Europe was not big enough for two overlords; ultimately Mussolini would be swept under the carpet by Hitler. He baited his proposal by hinting that if

Mussolini pressed for peace, then he could gain territorial concessions 107 at the conference table.

Mussolini's answer came on Good Friday, April 7, 1939, as Italian troops marched into Albania. Roosevelt, as usual, was on the phone asking the American Ambassadors throughout Europe if he could do anything.

The answers were always the same. Not without making some commitment.

Hull publicly protested that "the inevitable effect of this incident, taken with other similar incidents, is further to destroy the confidence and to undermine economic stability in every country in the world, thus affecting our own welfare. 103 Mussolini had ruined the chance for an

Italian sponsored peace initiative. Where would the junior partner in the Axis brigade strike next--Greece, Yugoslavia, or Rumania?^^^ chamber- lain too was badly shaken. He had counted upon his personal relationship

102 Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, Vol. II, 875-876 contain Roosevelt's notes on the meeting; Langer and Gleason give a good discussion of the conversation, 78.

^^%ull, 619.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 79. 261 with the Duce to keep him in line. He sadly wrote "I am afraid that such

faith as I ever had in the assurances of dictators is rapidly whittled away."!^^

On top of all this, Roosevelt received frantic warnings from his

European ambassadors that war was imminent. Bullitt had previously predicted March 26 as the target date.^®^ He revised his estimate upward and wrote to Roosevelt on April 11 "It's just five minutes before midnight; the darkest hour is at hand."^^^ From London, Kennedy cabled that Halifax had informed him that the Germans were mobilizing twenty divisions on the

1 no western front and preparing to deliver an attack on the British Fleet.

Davies predicted that Hitler must be deciding between war and peace right now since he was at the height of his power. "Peace for Hitler would be the hard way out," he pessimistically concluded.

Roosevelt spent the lull debating foreign policy by the hour and groping for an appropriate response. He had already repeatedly voiced sympathy with the democracies and condemned the dictators--but again, those were merely words. Were there any other weapons? The Neutrality

Feiling, 404; see Northedge, 581-583. Northedge writes that Greece was the principal gainer from Italy's invasion since Britain pledged to come to her aid if attacked. She also promised to guarantee Turkey, 582-583.

lOGpRus, March 17, 1939, Vol. I, 49.

^^^Alsop and Kintner, 35.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 79.

lO^FRUS, March 30, 1939, Vol. I, 104. 262

Bill, the only effective means of giving the democracies material support,

was still bogged down in Congress. He once again turned to the only weapon

he had— the spoken word.

The President sent a "Saturday surprise" message to both Hitler and

Mussolini. The gist of the message was a direct plea that both leaders

prove their oft-repeated protestations about peace by guaranteeing the

independence of some thirty states. Roosevelt asked them directly "Are

you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or

invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations?"^^^

Then he got down "to brass tacks" and dramatically named them, one by one.

In addition, he went a step farther and offered to act as an intermediary

in transmitting their replies to the countries involved and in calling a

conference to discuss outstanding problems.

Roosevelt had been toying with this idea ever since he returned from

Warm Springs and began discussing it with Hull and Welles on the evening of April 10. The two State Department officials immediately recognized

the merits of the plan. By asking the dictators point blank whether they would "fish or cut bait," it could give Britain and France more breathing space for rearmament. Hull, a habitual worrier, was dubious about

its actual effect and Roosevelt reluctantly agreed with him. Undaunted

^^^Samuel Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of F.D.R., Vol. Ill, 214.

ll^Alsop and Kintner, 36-37. 263

anyway, the President wanted to try it. After all, he argued, it would

serve at least one good purpose: it would put the two villians on the

spot publicly by calling them the would-be conquerors of Europe. 112

Roosevelt himself wrote out a rather "homey" draft of the message and then sent it along to the State Department for further revision.

Lisping slightly and dropping his 'R's' as always, Hull read it aloud to his State Department cohorts. It called for guarantees to Finland,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and so on down the map of Europe and the

Near East. As Hull's voice droned on his listeners could well imagine

Roosevelt peering over a map of Europe and calling off the names of the countries to Grace Tully who obediently scribbled them down. 113 The dictators were asked to give assurances to these countries for a ten year period which would provide ample opportunity to negotiate a settle­ ment of problems. As he came to a particularly picturesque passage,

Roosevelt's pet, which suggested that the dictators take their problems to a conference table and in effect-"park their guns outside," Hull wondered if Hitler and Mussolini would understand the President's refer­ ence to America's pioneer court room procedure.It closed by offering peace, a reduction in armaments, and increased world trade. It clearly pinned the moral responsibility for the fate of humanity on the heads of great governments.

and Kintner, 36.

^^%ull, 620; Moffat, April 10, 1939, 239-240; Langer and Gleason, 85; and FRUS, April 14, 1939, Vol. I, 131-133 has the full text. 264

For the next several days, Roosevelt haggled with Hull over the wording, alternative drafts, and the timeliness of the message. But by April 13 the message was polished and approved by Roosevelt, by now entirely pleased with himself. Still grumbling, Hull again wondered if the timing was right. But Roosevelt, relying on one of his hunches, insisted it was. "We only just caught the boat before Munich," he argued. "Perhaps they're too worried in Europe, but I don't want to miss the boat now."^^^ Accordingly, it was sent to Rome and Berlin.

Roosevelt had taken pains to head off an isolationist protest by explaining his message paragraph by paragraph to newsmen the next day and watering it down. He stressed for the benefit of the correspondents and "some of our friends on the Hill" that the address was nothing new, no entanglements, no commitments. "I am the post office, the telegraph office-in other words, the method of communication." he insisted-just an intermediary, not a mediator, nothing more.^^^ The American public was absolutely delighted by the dramatic move. Some isolationists grumbled, of course, but most were pleased since no commitments were offered. The interventionists chanted that FDR had "put the dictators on the spot."^^^

Overseas, outside of the Axis countries, the reception was enthusiastic.

Kennedy cabled that Chamberlain expressed to him "his great appreciation Î18 of the President's message in the cause of world peace...."

ll^Alsop and Kintner, 37.

^^%amuel Rosenman, ed.. The Public Papers and Speeches of F.D.R., Vol. VIII, 213-214. 117 Langer and Gleason, 86.

llSpRus, April 17, 1939, Vol. I, 139. 265

Several days passed before the Axis replied. It so happened that

Marshal Goering was visiting Rome when Mussolini received Roosevelt's message. As he and the Italian dictator discussed it, Goering suggested that it might indicate an incipient brain malady. Mussolini mused that it could indicate a case of creeping paralysis. Mussolini's official response was an outranged single sentence in a speech on April 20, 1939.

TTie Duce refused to be influenced by "press campaigns, convival vocifer­ ations, or Messiah-like messages." The ten year truce was "absurd" and the participation of the United States in any conference would reveal the American Government in "its customary role of distant spectator." 120

Finally, On April 28, 1939, came Hitler's bitterly scathing and vitrolic reply. Instead of directly responding to the President's message, he dramatically appeared before the Reichstag to deliver another stinging harangue on European affairs. He abrogated the ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland, tore up the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1938, and denounced the consultative Munich declaration. At the end of his harangue, he delivered a cunning and sarcastic reply by reading aloud Roosevelt's question and throwing back in his face the pet arguments of American isolationists. He rebuked Roosevelt's appeal to guarantee the indepen­ dence of thirty-one nations by jeering, amid cheers and applause, that he had polled each of the states listed and asked it if it feared German

11Q •^^^Burns, 391.

1 70 Langer and Gleason, 87. 266

aggression. Each answered, no. He played on Germany's role as underdog

and chided Roosevelt. "Mr. Roosevelt! I fully understand that the vast­

ness of your nation and the immense wealth of your country allow you to

feel responsible for the history of the whole world...!, sir, am placed

in a much smaller and more modest sphere. " 121 Hitler had so played

on the international dereliction of the United States as to turn the

tables on Roosevelt by appealing to American isolationist sentiment.

Rabid isolationists delighted in Hitler's sarcasm. "He asked for it," said Nye. Roosevelt took Hitler's harangue as a personal affront and lapsed into silence.^^2 He realized that he had no effective instrument for exerting pressure on the dictators. At best, Roosevelt's message had provided an opportunity for réévaluation.

Roosevelt had been prompted into sending this famous message partially by the alarming cables coming from abroad. Again and again he had been complimented on his 1939 annual Congressional message and told that it exercised a restraining influence on the dictators. Further, Roosevelt put great stock in his personal popularity and prestige with the peoples of the world. Initially, it appeared that Hitler had gotten the better of the President. But in the long run, his unconventional appeal, a

l^lgurns, 391.

122%bid., 392; Moffat, April 15 and 16, 1939, contains a good description of Roosevelt's speech, 240-241; Hull, 622-623, and Alsop and Kintner, 38, describe the reaction of the State Department. 267 mixture of pleas and rebukes stigmatizing the dictators as war mongers may have helped to awaken Americans to the imminence of danger. Langer and Gleason argue that FDR's message and his emergence as the moral crusader in the service of peace had "struck to the heart of the public throughout the world." By helping to reduce the "universal feeling of hopelessness and despair," it thus served as an "effective antidote to 1 9 ^ the disillusionment and demoralization of the Munich period."

In addition to sending his "Saturday surprise" message to Hitler and

Mussolini, Roosevelt decided upon a gesture intended as a warning to

Tokyo. He transferred the American Fleet from the Atlantic to its home port in San Diego. Ordinarily, the Fleet remained in the Atlantic for three years for maneuvers. But because of the tense international scene and Washington's willingness to relieve pressure on Britain's navy, FDR agreed to withdraw the Fleet several months ahead of schedule.The idea had originally been Halifax's. The Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defense, Lord Chatfield, cornered Kennedy at a party soon after Roose­ velt's speech was made public and told him that in 1936 during the Italian crisis Britain had promised the Australians that if international tensions increased, they would send a fleet to Singapore. However, at the present time, Halifax said, the Government felt that they could not spare a fleet for Singapore since it would weaken Britain's position in the Mediterranean.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 115.

371/23560/F12963/G, Lindsay to Halifax, March 24, 1939, 89. 268

"If the United States would consider, at the psychological moment, trans­

ferring the American fleet back to the Pacific to Honolulu-or some place

else," then Australia's uneasiness would be reassured and the British

navy could begin operations in the Mediterranean. Chatfield urged Kennedy

to press hard with Washington and stressed "that this was psychologically

i m p o r t a n t . "125 Britain's problem was either to send an adequate fleet to

the Far East and thereby weaken their strength in the Mediterranean and

perhaps cause the Egyptians and the Iraquis to renege on their treaty

obligations to Britain or to send no fleet, anger the Australians, but

still maintain their Mediterranean supremacy and their claim to Egyptian

and Iraquian loyalty. Their only hope was that the United States would

come to their aid.^^G

Roosevelt must also have been prompted by French fears that a weakened

Mediterranean force might prompt further Italian action against Greece.

Since Roosevelt believed that it was more important to hold the Mediter­

ranean than to increase the defenses of the Far East, he agreed to

Halifax's suggestion. The President's bluff worked. Tokyo was extremely

impressed with the reappearance of the Fleet in the Pacific, claim

Langer and Gleason, and regarded this maneuver and FDR's message to the

dictators as indicative of America's determination to support the

European democracies.127 The Economist praised Roosevelt for taking

125pRUS, March 22, 1939, Vol. I, 88.

126pO 371/23981/W4831/G. March 22, 1939; Cabinet Papers 27/625, 170-177.

l^^Langer and Gleason, 104-105. 269

"a firm hand in the international poker game" and professed to see the main outlines of American policy in the event of war: severing contacts with the aggressor, supplying aid and materials to the democracies and maintaining peace in the Pacific. "Behind these lies the probability that the engagement of America's sympathies and the moral condemnation of aggression would lead before long to more drastic American action," it predicted.128

By mid April, 1939, Chamberlain found himself in the midst of an elaborate system of commitments. The guarantee to Poland had been expanded to include commitments to countries ranging from the North Sea down to the Black Sea and the Aegean. Within this expanse were a half dozen countries, any one of which if attacked by the Axis powers, could drag

Britain and France into war. Under the prodding of Halifax, Chamberlain finally decided to undertake serious war-time preparations. Under the guise of "a state of emergency," Chamberlain was to introduce military measures of "the first importance including conscription," Kennedy re- ported to Washington. 1 2Q The Prime Minister justified his conscription proposal on the grounds that the present state of the world "could not 1 in justly be called a period of peace." Kennedy also cabled that Chamber-

l-^The Economist, April 22, 1939, 188-189.

IZSpRUS, April 21, 1939, Vol. I, 171.

130peiling, 403. 270

lain had told the House of Commons that he had authorized the establish­

ment of a Ministry of Supply to support the army which has increased to

340,000.131

British officials still had their fingers crossed on the prospects

of peace. Kennedy remarked that Halifax stubbornly clung to the belief

that "neither Hitler nor Mussolini wanted to go to war." The Foreign

Secretary predicted that the dictators would do everything possible to 1 72 keep England "in a state of jitters at least for a few months." And even by mid April, Halifax remained "strangely optimistic" but cynically 1 added that "this may all change before night fall." Chamberlain too shared this guarded optimism and was "a shade more hopeful of peace."

But the strain was beginning to tell on the old man, Kennedy told Hull that the Prime Minister "has failed more in the past weeks than he has in the past year. He walks like an old man and yesterday he acted like one."134

In a speech in Edinburgh, Kennedy was presented with the freedom of the city. Reiterating the official guarded optimism, he reminded his audience; "Let us not forget that we still had peace." Perhaps never

131j p k to Hull, April 20, 1939, PSF; Great Britain, FDRL.

132f r u s , April 6, 1939, Vol. I, 113.

133pRus, April 11, 1939, Vol. I, 128.

134pRus, April 17, 1939, Vol. I, 139-140. 271 before in history had countries been so bitter, for so long a time, with­

out having warfare erupt. "That was the most hopeful aspect of the whole situation... .War was not inevitable....The fact that we had been able to escape war thus far should encourage us to hope that somehow, we 135 should be able to win through to a just and durable peace...,"

Once again, Kennedy tried his hand at personal diplomacy. He requested permission from the Department of State to go secretly to Paris and dine privately with two Germans, a Mr. Mooney, in charge of the General Motors plant in Germany and an unnamed personal friend of Hitler, one of the

"topside influences in the Krupps" and part of Hitler’s "inner circle.

The request was refused. Sumner Welles explained that he had discussed

Kennedy's request with Hull and "we both feel strongly that at this particular time it would be almost impossible to prevent your trip to

Paris and the names of the persons you will see in Paris from being given a great deal of publicity." It would create "an erroneous impression" 137 in the press and create speculation and unfortunate comment."

ISSfhe Times, April 22, 1939, 9; JPK to Hull, April 17, 1939, 123/ 190, DSF.

ISGjPK to Hull, May 4, 1939, 123/199, DSF.

137jPK to Hull, May 4, 1939, 123/201, DSF. There was however, a rumor circulating in the Daily Telegraph on May 8, 1939, that Kennedy had recently visited Dublin and conferred with De Valera concerning British conscription, a rumor vigorously denied by Kennedy. A retraction was printed in the Daily Telegraph, May 8, 1939. JPK to Hull, May 10, 1939, 123/203, DSF. 272

Undaunted, in the late spring, Kennedy took time out from his

onerous burdens to have a little fun, spread the Kennedy charm, and "kid"

the student body and faculty of Manchester and Bristol Universities.

Both universities had chosen to honor the Ambassador and to express their

appreciation of his diplomatic labors.

Kennedy stiffly walked toward the podium in the Manchester auditorium,

and in the best English tradition, doffed his cap and saluted the seated

Chancellor. He was introduced to the throng as an ambassador "whose

excellency had already been tested and proved in other spheres....On

the golf course, he has learned the diplomatic virtues of unswerving

patience and perserverance in untoward and depressing circumstances and

of calm and moderate speech even under intolerable provocating." His

embassy, the speaker continued, is noted "for an adequate supply of

olive branches," a tribute to Kennedy's role as perpetual peacekeeper.

At the mention of his "excursions into motion pictures," he relaxed and became the familiar smiling Ambassador of his photographs flashing his 1 *58 famous grin. Loud applause greeted him as he rose to deliver a

lecture on preserving the freedom of universities. He quoted an Irishman

"Ah, yes, indeed, university education's a great thing. It teaches a young man how to starve in a lot of different languages. . . .Our world today is in a sorry muddle," he remarked as he warned against allowing universities to be misused by erratic and unscrupulous men. "Discussions of education are too often litered with high sounding phrases, which

l^^Manchester Guardian, May 18, 1939, 123/204, DSF; The Times, May 18, 1939, 18. 273

1 "sg glibly hide a multitude of half-baked theories and uncertainties.”

He interrupted his lecture with a personal digression hinting at his

possible resignation. "I still insist that whenever I leave England,

whatever my record is, I shall still be known as the father of nine

children.”140

Kennedy was the first American ever to receive an honorary degree

from Bristol University and probably the first American ever to receive

it from the hands of Chamberlain's old adversary, Winston Churchill, the

universities' Chancellor. Churchill took the opportunity to lecture his

audience on the propriety of Anglo-American relations. Reminescent of

Eden's chestnut-out-of-the-fire theme, Churchill insisted that "nothing would be more dangerous than for the British people to suppose that they

could lay aside their exertions because the United States was going to

come and fight their battles. . ..It is not our business at the present time to ask favors of any one.” Kennedy considered it a privilege to follow "your greatest orator” and responded to his remarks by urging the study of American life and history in English schools. "It was vital that English people should understand the changes going on in the United

States.”141

l^%lanchester Evening News, May 18, 1939, 123/204, DSF; The Times, May 18, 1939, 18.

140Manchester Guardian, May 18, 1939, 123/204, DSF.

14lBristol Western Daily Press, May 26, 1939, 123/204, DSF; The Times, May 19, 1939, 17; The Times, May 26, 1939, 16. 274

The Ambassador's luncheon preceding the ceremonies had been inter­ rupted by a mock student "rag" in which a junior edition of Winston

Churchill presented Kennedy with the honorary degree of Fahrenheit on the steps of the Union. Kennedy rose majestically to the occasion and said "I want to tell you 1 am having a lot of fun getting degrees, so don't kid yourselves." To the nervous students worried about their examinations, Kennedy said that he had passed every course at Harvard, except banking and economics in which he made his career. After he received a gigantic plywood key of doubtful value, he was hustled off to the ceremonies in the Major's coach led by a student motorcycle escort imitating American "speed cops." "A man would be an awful sucker to come here if you didn't like him," he called over his shoulder. And indeed, the British certainly did.^^Z g^t in a few short months, the universally popular Kennedy was to become to most Englishmen the symbol of American duplicity and treachery. In the last few months before the war, most Englishmen regarded him as a "man with a vigorous and business­ like personality, gifted with charm and a keen sense of humor." Certainly, he looked at the British from an American angle, said a Foreign Office spokesman, but he had acquired "an altogether remarkable understanding of

[the British] outlook and a ready appreciation of their national qualities.

142gristol Western Daily Press, May 26, 1939, 10, 123/204, DSF.

143po 371/22827/A2667/1090/45, April 14, 1939. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY:

AMBASSADOR TO THE COURT OF

ST. JAMES'S, 1938-1940

Volume II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Tlie Ohio State University

By

Jane Karoline Vieth, B.S., M.A.

*********

The Ohio State University 1975

Reading Committee: Approved By Philip P. Poirier Clayton R. Roberts . /) Marvin Zahniser / / û VUC a j Adviser Department of History TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume II

Page TABLE OF CONTENTS...... vi

Chapter

VI. "THE LION'S TAIL TltflSTED"...... 275

VII. ENGLAND AT BAY...... 347

VIII. "THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT"...... 441

IX. CONCLUSION...... 541

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 546

VI CHAPTER VI

"THE LION'S TAIL TWISTED"

As the British closely watched and quietly applauded, the President once again took up the fight for revision of the embargo provision deeply imbedded in the Neutrality Laws.l Before Hitler gobbled up Czechoslovakia and Mussolini seized Albania, Roosevelt had been content with a hands off policy and conducted foreign policy through intimation rather than through any forthright action. In 1939 the fate of revision depended on the

Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Key Pittman, formerly an

Alaskan gold rusher and now the Senator from Nevada, A real talker, an oligarch of the Senate, a clever man, Pittman nevertheless proved unequal to the task of scrapping with the formidable isolationists on his committee,

Borah, LaPollette, Johnson, and Vandenberg. Opportunities slipped by, delays were endless. Every fortnight or so, Hull or FDR would ask for a progress report. "Two weeks more and we'll be getting somewhere," came 2 the standard reply.

^See FO 371/22815, June 29, 1939, 29 for an example of British attitudes.

^Alsop and Kintner, 40.

275 276

But by mid-April appeasement was dead, killed by Axis aggression.

The moment was now ripe for an assertion of America's influence. Repeal of the arms embargo might tip the international scales in favor of the democracies. Sir Ronald Lindsay, Britain's ambassador to the United

States believed that "success in this major objective would be the greatest contribution America could now make to the cause of peace."

However, he warned Halifax, "failure might be an even more serious set­ back."^

In early May, Hull and Pittman met once again. The Chairman finally confessed that the prospects were unfavorable and tossed the bill back into the Administration's lap. Prodded constantly by Hull who feared war even more than his boss and who deeply believed that repeal would enhance the prospects of peace, the President himself entered the lists. Lindsay promptly notified Halifax of Roosevelt's decision and strongly recommended that the Foreign Office take no active diplomatic steps lest they

"embarrass" the Administration.^

Hull and Roosevelt decided to begin a concerted effort by holding a series of conferences with wavering Senators and Representatives. They groomed and rehearsed each other for these sessions. Roosevelt would invite his guests to his White House office late in the afternoons.

Speaking calmly, sometimes half humorously, he echoed some of the argu-

3pO 371/22814/A4279; June 19, 1939, Lindsay to Halifax.

4lbid. 277

ments in Kennedy's March memorandum.^ He pointed out that if Britain

were defeated she would not remain the mistress of the seas. Sea power

would be the dominant objective of the victors. He painted a gloomy

picture of the dictator's supremacy in the Atlantic, their interest in

raw materials and their meddling in South America. He explained how we

would be put "on the defensive in our own backyard." "Of course this

seems very remote," he would conclude. "But these are remote possibili­

ties which no far-sighted man can overlook. It's our job to take care of that kind of possibility. And I regard repeal of the embargo as the

greatest step we can take to guard the country's interest, both to keep

the peace and in the event of war."^

Hull used a different approach. In a series of quiet chats, sprinkled with salty language and held in his unpretentious apartment at the Carlton

Hotel, he tried to nudge his guests into agreement. He bitterly remarked to one person that the embargo "substituted a wretched little bob-tailed, sawed-off domestic statute for the established rules of international law."

In so doing it had "conferred a gratuitous benefit on the probable aggres­ sors, depriving those who resist them of the right to buy the wherewithal of resistance in this country." "IVhy dammit," he blurted out to one guest,

"these nations have told us again and again what they mean to do. Hitler intends to make himself the colossus of Europe, while Japan places her heel on Asia. If they succeed we will have to transact our business with

^See Chapter V, p. 238-240.

^Alsop and Kintner, 10. 278

the rest of the world through Tokyo and Berlin. We know all this, and

yet we retain this embargo, which directly encourages Hitler, makes war

more likely, and threatens our own peace and safety. "Back home we call 7 people who do that kind of thing just plain chuckleheaded."

On June 30 the House approved a new version of the bill; but late

at night an amendment was passed by a majority of two votes, 159 to 157,

in the absence of many Democrats, which kept the embargo provision

intact. Lindsay, who closely followed the proceedings, cabled Halifax

that the "general level of debate was low." Many speakers were extremely unrealistic and interested in resurrecting the past, he wrote. There was constant reference to Washington's Farewell Address and to America's

entry into World War I, and little attempt to consider the connection between the Neutrality Legislation and the present international situa­ tion. "The result of the debate," he wrote, "was largely influenced by the relations between the President on the one hand and the Republicans g and the more disgruntled members of his own party on the other." The

Economist, too, interpreted the bill's defeat not in international terms, but as "another round in the domestic political struggle between pro- and anti-Roosevelt political factions"^ and likened the debate to the conflict between President Wilson and Congress in 1919 over American membership in the League of Nations. That too was debated in domestic and often personal terms.

'^Ibid., 42.

^FO 414/270, July 13, 1939, 21.

^The Economist, July 8, 1939, 61, 279

Undaunted, Roosevelt and Hull turned to the Senate and pressed

Pittman to bring the legislation to a vote before his committee. On

July 11 the committee voted, 11 to 12, to reserve all considerations

on neutrality legislation until January, 1940. "January, 1940! What might not happen before then! In those six months the fate of the civi­

lized world might be at stake," Hull protested. With the approval of his boss, the Secretary issued a public statement on July 14: "The present embargo encourages a general state of war both in Europe and

Asia since the present embargo has this effect, its results are directly prejudicial to the highest interests and to the peace and to the security of the United States.Lindsay blamed the bill's failure on a

Congressional revolt against the President, the weakness of leadership in both houses, and the traditional Congressional posture of inaction and acceptance of isolationism.^^

Dismayed at the Committee's delaying tactics, Roosevelt and Hull invited the Senate leaders to the White House on July 18. The purpose of the meeting was to make one last "desperate effort" for support of the bill, or, failing in that, to make the opponents accept responsibility 12 for the bill's defeat. The Senators met in the President's upstairs study of the White House. Hull recalled that the surface atmosphere appeared congenial, but underneath, it was tension-ridden. The President

l^Hull, 649.

llpO 371/22815/A5008, July 20, 1939, Lindsay to Halifax.

l^Hull, 647. 280

began the conversation by referring to Senator Nye's extreme isolationist

views which were holding up the bill's passage in the Senate. "Tliere

are others, Mr. President," Senator Borah interjected. Taken back,

Roosevelt turned to him and asked "IVhat did you say. Senator Borah?"

"There are others, Mr. President," he repeated. A debate followed between

the two in which Boarh stressed his opposition to the bill and emphatically

stated that no war would break out in the near future. "Cordell, what 13 do you think about the possibility of danger ahead," Roosevelt asked.

"If Senator Borah could only see some of the cables coming to the State

Department about the extremely dangerous outlook in the international

situation, I feel satisfied he would modify his views," the Secretary

replied, restraining himself as much as possible. Borah explained that

he had sources of information in Europe which, he implied, were more

reliable than those of the State Department. They assured him that

"there would be no war in Europe in the near future," he stated, with

emphasis and total finality. Such was the conversation which symbolized

the results of divided authority in the direction of American foreign

policy. Hull recalled that:

Never in my experience had 1 found it nearly so difficult to restrain myself and refrain from a spontaneous explosion. I knew from masses of official facts piled high on one another at the State Department that Borah was everlastingly

l^ibid., 650; for an extensive discussion of this meeting see Hull, 649-650; also Burns, 392-393; Langer and Gleason, 81; and FO 414/276/ A5382/98/45, Sir Ronald Lindsay to Viscount Halifax, July 27, 1939, 30. In his memoirs which were published in 1948 Hull wrote that he had just read Borah's published description of their conversation in the White House on July 18. Hull subtly disputes Borah's version and implies that his facts and implications are erroneous. Roosevelt, according to Hull, supported his description. 649-653. 281

wrong, and that we were looking squarely at a state of imminent danger of a general outbreak of war before the end of sumraer-and I said so. Borah's statement, giving more credit to his private sources of information than to the official State Department dispatches, was a disparagement of our whole diplomatic service.

After the party leaders said that it was impossible to muster enough votes to bring repeal to the Senate floor, Roosevelt asked:

"Cordell, what do you think about the situation?" "I scarcely know what to think about anything in the light of the complacent way Senator

Borah has brushed aside the whole mass of facts we have at the State

Department, which completely disprove his theory that there will be no war."^^ The meeting broke up around midnight; Congress adjourned in

August and the embargo remained intact.

The British adopted an attitude of resignation. Lindsay advised

Halifax to "keep a stiff upper lip."^^ The Economist described it as

"disappointing that a mainly partisan opposition should have succeeded in an anti-Administration manoeuvre, the success of which may give heart to the aggressor in Europe.However it was no reason for despair. Hitler would be greatly mistaken if he believed that this action guarantees

American aloofness to Europe's affairs. And one optimistic Foreign

Office official wrote that the present bill "was not too bad for us."

If war did break out and the United States were involved, he believed

^%ull, 650-651.

l^FO 371/22815/A5008, July 20, 1939.

l^The Economist, July 22, 1939, 159. 282

that Roosevelt would nevertheless limit the export of war materials which America needed for her own defence. "There is not much to gain

and something to lose by Mr. Roosevelt making further attempts to get

the kind of legislation he wants," a Foreign Office secretary wrote.

"I cannot help thinking that unless he is quite certain to succeed he would do better from our point of view to refrain from further action.

Another failure to get the embargo repealed would be seen by the Axis 17 as a sign that American sympathies are not really against them."

Kennedy, who had previously remained silent on the issue, echoed this line of reasoning. He feared the Senate's action "would lead Hitler to hold that he could go ahead with adventure without the risk of Ameri- 18 can intervention on the side of Great Britain and France."

Years later, writing in 1948, Hull argued that no one could ever say whether or not the Administration's failure to repeal the embargo provision was an important factor in Hitler's decision to go to war.

"I am certain, however," he wrote sadly, "that if the arms embargo had been lifted in May, June, or even July, 1939, he would inevitably have had to take this factor into his calculations. I am equally certain that 19 the failure to lift the embargo encouraged him to go ahead, ..."

l^FO 371/22815/A4828, July 14, 1939, 51. 1 O FO 371/22815/A4991, July 14, 1939, 19 Hull, 653; Hull described his attempts to win over the isolationist as "nerve-racking and a back breaking experience." The isolationist reminded him "of the somnambulist who walks within an inch of a thousand- foot precipice without batting an eye." 666-667. 283

Midway between the bitter controversy over the Neutrality Legislation came the June visit of George VI and Queen Elizabeth to the United States.

Kennedy had persuaded the shy, hesitant King to accept Roosevelt's invi­ tation and personally handled many details for the visit. Their Majesties were particularly eager to visit the Roosevelts. "I only know three

Americans— ," the Queen told Kennedy, "you, Fred Astaire, and J. P. Morgan 20 and I would like to know more."

Roosevelt had first invited the royal pair almost a year earlier, in September, 1938, and asked Kennedy to present his invitation to His

Majesty. Roosevelt explained that he had seen the Canadian Prime Minis­ ter, MacKinzie King, who told him that the royal couple would visit

Canada in the summer of 1939. "If this visit should become a reality,"

Roosevelt wrote, "I hope very much that you will extend your visit to include the United States." "I think it would be an excellent thing for Anglo-American relations...." He suggested several events that might interest the couple: "If you bring either or both of the children with you, they will also be welcome, and I shall try to have one or two

Roosevelts of approximately the same age to play with them." 21

Roosevelt himself paid meticulous attention to the details, worrying about seating arrangements, selecting the appropriate picture frames for their pictures, monogramming the personalized copies of several books with the appropriate seals, and advising the royal pair on what to

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 18.

21po 371/21548, September 17, 1939, FDR to King George VI; also see JPK to Hull, November 5, 1938, #1288, Safe, FDRL. 284 wear.^^ The royal couple met half a million Washingtonians at a White

House reception, heard Marian Anderson and Kate Smith sing at the State

Dinner, sailed down the Potomac to Mt. Vernon, and attended the inevitable 23 wreath laying at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington cemetry.

All in all it was a brief moment of friendship, good-will, and glittering pomp and pagentry during a tense, crisis-ridden summer. The visit was an unqualified success and helped to store up good will for

Britain in the tough months ahead. Roosevelt told a friend: "I wish you could have met the young couple from England. They had a real understanding not only of foreign affairs in general but also about social legislations. And Kennedy reported to the audience at the annual Fourth of July dinner of the American Society that Their Majesties 25 "made more friends for their nation than any other two people in history."

He described the greeting between the King and the President as "perhaps the most important handclasp of modern times.

Throughout official Washington there was much back patting and many rounds of national and international thank yous. "To say that the King

22 Elliott Roosevelt, Vol. II, 851-854, 878-879, 881-884, 891 illus­ trate Roosevelt's personal involvement; also see 894-895. For additional sources about the royal visit see Ickes, June 11, 1939, Vol. II, 650; Bums, 393; Moffat, 242; FO 414/276/A443/27/45, June 20, 1939, 120, Sir Ronald Lindsay to Viscount Halifax.

23%ckes, June 11, 1939, Vol. II, 648.

^^FDR to Wm. Allen White, June 15, 1939, PSF; Great Britain, FDRL, Elliott Roosevelt, Vol II, 893.

Z^New York Times, July 5, 1939, 8.

^^The Times, June 10, 1939, 17. 285 and Queen were received here with open arms would be an understatement.

It was into the hearts of the population that they were taken, and taken without reservation," glowed the Washington Post. The Hearst owned

Washington Times-Herald reminded its readers that "Americans are cousins of the British— though not brothers....They are like wise friends of the

British and want to remain so— though they don't want to be British allies." The eastern papers, however, showed no such reservations.

"Family bickering is [sic.] sometimes unlovely," wrote the Christian

Science Monitor, "and so it has occasionally been with Britain and

America. But now a fine thing has happened. The King and Queen of

England have been this way, and the old bond between the democracies has taken on higher, warmer, yes friendlier qualities than it ever had before."

Many newspapers echoed the exuberant note of the Baltimore Sun: "As long as [His Majesty] stands for freedom, we stand together, right heartily adding our "Amen!" when his subjects shout 'God Save The King.'" Even in the traditional heartland of the mid-west the accounts were extremely favorable, with the exception, of course, of the Chicago-Tribune. It ridiculed the American guests at the Washington ceremonies: "the crown colony representatives of the Atlantic seaboard" it jeered. "If the clumsy homage of the New Dealers opens the way for the betrayal of their own country, the Empire may think the results well worth the shock.

What has been accomplished by the efforts of The King?...If [Congress] scraps the Neutrality Act and gives Mr. Roosevelt the authority he wants to pick sides and give aid, Mr. Chamberlain will think very well of his coup d'Etat." Sir Ronald Lindsay summed up the press comment and wrote 286

that the royal couple have made a deep and lasting impression. But it

remained to be seen whether it would influence the minority of Senators 27 who opposed the revision of the Neutrality Law. And even the peevish

Ickes wrote, that from the British view point, they had undoubtedly accomplished some good, although he did not believe that it would lead to a relaxation of America's aversion to entangling alliances. The

King and President had established a firm relationship of mutual affec­ tion and genuine respect. They and Mrs. Roosevelt and the Queen con- 28 tinued to correspond with each other in the following months.

During the royal visit Kennedy made up his mind to resign. While the King and Queen were still touring the United States, he told American friends to expect him home soon and reserved a seat on the first homeward voyage of the new Pan-American clipper. He had a long list of reasons for quitting: the younger children were becoming too British, his business interests were suffering, and the personal expenses of his Ambassadorship were enormous. Friends sensed a new note of impatience in his attitude toward the British. "A lot of people tell me that Britain is relying on two things today,... One is God and the other is the United States, 29 and recently you don't seem to have been counting too much on the Deity."

1 I 414/276/A4441/27/45, Sir Ronald Lindsay to Viscount Halifax, June; 20, 1939, 118.

^^Langer and Gleason, 129; Ickes had a number of petty and peevish criticisms about Americans with bad taste and bad manners. He was particularly critical of the fawning Vice President who butted in and frequently mauled the King. He also made a list of imagined snubs and blunders. See Vol. II, April 15, 1939, 618; June 11, 1939, 644-650.

Z^Whalen, 261. 287

Kennedy was homesick. More important perhaps was the stinging barrage 30 of criticism which he had received.

Professional Kennedy critics, like Harold Ickes, tried to exacerbate

the differences between the Ambassador and his boss. He passed on to

Roosevelt at a cocktail party a quip made by his wife which he mischie­

vously attributed to Senator Borah. "Mr. President, I had a talk with

Senator Borah on the telephone today who, as you know, has better sources of information in Europe than the Department of State." Instantly in­

trigued, the President fell for the hoax and asked, "Did you? Is he in

Washington?" Ickes replied no, but that he had had a long distance phone

conversation with him. "He tells me, from his confidential sources,"

Ickes said with a straight face, "that Chamberlain has decided to increase 31 his Cabinet so that he can give Joe Kennedy a place in it."

The tale-telling liberal ideologue delighted in gathering every malicious scrap of anti-Kennedy gossip to show Roosevelt. He remained after a Cabinet meeting to catch the President's attention and showed him a left wing British newspaper. The Week, which featured a vicious smear job on Kennedy. The author claimed to be puzzled by the "mystery of

Mr. Kennedy" and even more by the mystery of why Roosevelt kept him in office. He accused him of being a notorious appeaser, Chamberlain's principal apologist, deliberately misrepresenting American opinion toward

Munich. Swept away by his ardent Catholicism, Kennedy "wrongly believes,"

^^Arthur Krock's column. New York Times, July 18, 1939, 18.

^^Ickes, September 9, 1939, Vol. II, 712. 288 the author claimed, that in his pro-Franco sentiments "he is serving the interests of his church." Kennedy privately told his Cliveden Set friends that they "need not worry" about Roosevelt. "It will be my friends that are in the White House in 1940. ... Roosevelt is run by the Jews," the article continued and "all the anti-fascist sentiment in the United 32 States is really created by the Jews, who control the press." Kennedy's influence on the British Government was so great that his opinions have even been quoted in the British Cabinet. It was Kennedy's misfortune to be harslily judged because of his association with Britain's appeasers who were themselves charged with anti-Semitism because they held the

Jews responsible for pushing Europe into an unnecessary war. Because of the company he kept, Kennedy also became the target of a whispering campaign accusing him of anti-Semitism, a charge which continued to haunt 33 him for the rest of his life. The same charges were repeated in an article written by an exiled Italian diplomat. Count Sforza [sic], which appeared in a Swiss Democratic party paper, the "National Zeitung [sic],

Basel.

79 The Week, Memo from Sumner Welles, June 22, 1939, 3060, FDRL; also see Hull Memo, May 17, 1939, 123/212, DSF; and Edwin Trent to Hull, May 29, 1939, 123/205, DSF; May 27, 1939, 123/223, DSF; June 7, 1939, 123/205, DSF.

^^Whalen, 254.

^^The American Ambassador in London, Kennedy, is speaking with the Germanophile circle which is behind the London Times not only in a [sic] defeatist manner, but more in a way extremely hostile against President Roosevelt. He is sympathizing in such a way with General Franco— and means that he is doing a very good work for his church— that he often explains that the Democratic policy of the United States is only a Jewish matter and that Roosevelt will disappear [in] 1940." "National Zeitung [sic], Basel" by Count Sforza [sic]; W. H. Colze to O'Connor, June 14, 1939, PSF, box 10, FDRL; also in Kennedy, Jos. P. 123/217, DSF, Depeche de Toulouse, June 26, 1939. 289

Roosevelt thoughtfully read the article and quietly replied, "It is true." 35 J. Edgar Hoover also sent Roosevelt a copy of the article. Ickes be­ lieved that if the allegations were true, Kennedy ought to be recalled immediately. But Roosevelt did nothing.

Roosevelt was always willing to give people the benefit of the doubt.

And besides, he considered Kennedy useful, though mercurial and tempera­ mental. His blunt and realistic reports served FDR's interests, even though he had to spend a good bit of time in administering large dosages of Presidential charm and persuasiveness to appease Kennedy and soothe his ego. "The trouble with Kennedy," Roosevelt told Morgenthau "is you always have to hold his hand." "Kennedy gets upset at irregular inter- 37 vais and calls up and says he is hurt because I have not seen him."

The criticism of Kennedy became so intense that Hull who had pre- 38 viously wondered if Kennedy accurately represented the American position came to his defense and told a press conference that he had "full faith" in Kennedy. Hull scoffed at allegations made by such politically diverse men as Philip P. LaPollette, the former Governor of Wisconsin who accused

Kennedy of being "sympathetic toward undemocratic elements in Great

Britain^^ and the Nazi leader. Dr. Joseph Goebbels, who described him as

Edgar Hoover to Sumner Welles, June 22, 1939, Pile 3060, PDRL.

36%ckes, June 29, 1939, Vol. II, 676.

^^Morgenthau Diary, April 15, 1939, Vol. 4, 207, PDRL.

^^The Morgenthau Diaries, "Colliers," October 18, 1947, 16.

^^Press Statement, April 12, 1939, 123/196, DSP; The Times, April 21, 1939, 15. 290 a "master conspirator" who plotted "to add the United States to an iron ring around Germany." Hull refused to believe that "there was anything serious about being attacked from a so called Progressive Liberal" on one day and "the next day being attacked by the opposite angle of reactionaryism.

Kennedy's critics also included fellow isolationists, like General

Hugh S. Johnson, the former head of the National Recovery Administration.

In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was holding hearings on revision of the Neutrality Act, Johnson took time to lambaste the Ambassador. "Walter Hines Page was a British Ambassador to

Washington. It would be a good idea to inquire whether we have not got another of those things at the Court of St. James now," Johnson warned.

"The dowagers and the duchesses— not to mention the debs--are a potent pill."^^ Kennedy "has been taken in tow by the Social Lobby," chortled a columnist for the New York Times. "One more diplomatic American scalp dangles at the belt of the duchesses." Is there anyone "who may be trusted to go to London and not be led astray?"^“

Ickes gossipped about Kennedy during a luncheon with the American

Minister to Eire, John Cudahy. Cudahy admitted that "Joe Kennedy does some pretty loud and inappropriate talking about the President. He does

40New York Times, April 21, 1939, 8; Press Statement, April 20, 1939, 123/196, DSF; The Times, April 21, 1939, 15.

^^New York Times, April 25, 1939, 12; also mentioned in British sources FO 371/22814/A3264/A8/45, April 28, 1939.

^^New York Times, April 27, 1939, 24. 291

this before English servants, who are likely to spread the news." He

described him as "vulgar and coarse and highly critical in what he says

about the President." The Minister stated that if Joe couldn't be loyal he ought to resign. He told his eager listener that he had once warned him not to talk so before the servants, Joe said 'that he didn't give a damn."43

As happened before and would happen again when Kennedy told Roose­ velt he wanted to resign, the President applied a generous dosage of

Rooseveltian charm and Kennedy changed his mind. He told Kennedy that he was just "telling several people the other day that I have complete confidence in you, that you have never mentioned leaving London, that you are doing a good job there, and that in these critical days I count on your carrying on."44 Kennedy promised to remain at his job through the summer, at least, and dutifully canceled his reservations on the

Pan-American clipper.

Later, in a speech before the Pilgrim Club, Kennedy publicly indulged in self pity and described London "as the most difficult place for an

American diplomat to make a success." "Here you make good by what you prevent from happening rather than cause to happen." He reassured his audience "I am not planning to leave England, in spite of the fact that every morning when I get up I see either that my successor has been named or that I'm due to l e a v e . "43 So instead of going home, Kennedy

43ickes, July 15, 1939, Vol. II, 685. 44 FDR to JPK, July 22, 1939, PSF; Subject File, "K."FDRL.

43n o w York Times, July 18, 1939, 8. 292 wired Hull for permission to vacation in Cannes throughout August. "It seems to be the spirit of those high up in authority in the government to take vacations now, on the ground that possibly in the middle of

August it may be necessary for everybody to be back in London," he explained.Permission granted.

Tidying up his thinking, Kennedy dashed off his latest views on the international scene before going on vacation. He told the President that the Chamberlain Government was "coming down the last stages of a hectic career" and having some problems with their supporters but not enough to unseat them. If they held another election, assuming there were no inter­ national complications, "the Conservative Party under Chamberlain would win quite easily." There had been a newspaper campaign to broaden the

Government and include Churchill but Chamberlain remained opposed. The

Prime Minister told Kennedy that he did not want Churchill because he does not believe that "he could deliver nearly one-tenth as much as people think he could; he has developed into a fine two-handed drinker and his judgment has never proven to be good." Chamberlain also believed that had Churchill been in the Government, Britain "would have been at war, before this."^^

Kennedy also told Roosevelt that the economic condition was the worst

"the world has ever seen. As you know, I have been constantly bearish for

4GjPK to Hull, July 12, 1939, 123/226, DSP.

47jPK to FDR, July 20, 1939, PSP; Great Britain, PDRL; also see The Landis Papers, Chapter 37, 485. 293 the last two or three years and I see nothing tonight that makes me

change my opinion, but, on the contrary, I feel more pessimistic than

ever." After sizing up the bleak financial situation of Germany, France,

Britain, Japan, China, Spain and Italy, Kennedy's advice was that the

United States, despite all the demands on its finances, should keep 48 itself "financially strong" for at least another year. That was the best way it could help the international financial situation. After his words of advice to the President, Kennedy packed up his wife and seven of their children and headed for the French Riviera. Joe Jr. and

Kathleen went on to Spain for a separate two-week vacation. Kennedy leased the famous Domain de Ranguin, a villa known for its beautiful rose gardens, five miles from Cannes. There he dove off a rented yacht, played golf in the afternoons, nursed his stomach ulcer, and corresponded 4Q frequently with FDR.

Kennedy had difficulty shaking off his mood of despondency and self pity even in Cannes. He wrote a rather touching letter to Roosevelt loudly proclaiming his loyalty. He had been worrying, he remarked, that his experience and knowledge were being wasted in London. In this day and age, an ambassador may be little "more than a glorified errand boy."

He felt discouraged because of the many things which have to be done

"which seem to have no close connection with the real job at hand."

48 JPK to FDR, July 20, 1939, PSF; box 10, FDRL.

^ % e w York Times, July 21, 1939, 8; New York Times, July 22, 1939, 2; IVhalen, 262, 294

But of one thing Roosevelt could be sure: "Regardless of any personal inconvenience, as long as I am of any assistance to you, I shall remain for whatever time you like." Citing his boyhood lessons of gratitude and loyalty, he wrote, "I have tried to live up to those two principles, and to you personally, I owe a debt on both counts." "Remember," he promised, "that whatever you want to do, I always 'stay put.*"^^ In a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, Kennedy mused about how quickly everything had changed. "This morning we are praying that, miraculously, war may be avoided, when only a month ago everyone thought things were definitely on the upgrade." What worried him most was the effect it would ultimately have "on the social, political and economic life of the United States, regardless of what we do."^^

Soon after Kennedy returned to London, the news broke that the un- believeable had occurred; the mortal enemies, Germany and Soviet Russia had signed a non-aggression pact. The seeds were laid in early May, 1939, when Litvinov was replaced by Molotov as Russia's Foreign Commissar.

Molotov's first overtures to the Germans were tentative and noncommital as he sounded them out on the psosibility of renewing commerical nego­ tiations. Sometime in the first week in August, Count Von der Schulen- berg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, informed Molotov that his master was not just interested in economic matters but in negotiating a Nazi-

Soviet Nonaggression Pact, a move designed to isolate Russia from the

Anglo-Franco-Polish front. Schulenberg insisted that the British were

^°JPK to FDR, August 9, 1939, PSF: Kennedy, FDRL.

^^JPK to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 31, 1939, FDRL. 295

the true enemies of their countries and reassured Molotov that Germany's 52 Anti-Comitern Pacts were meaningless. He must have been terribly

surprised when Molotov told him that Stalin was interested, not just

in economic matters, but even more particularly in political relations.

While Hitler delayed his answer, Stalin prodded him by inviting a special

French and British military mission to Moscow to discuss ways of coordina­

ting an anti-Nazi front. The Russian dictator was in the enviable posi­

tion of being courted by both sides and consequently played one off

against the other to achieve his own goal. Stalin wanted to remain aloof

from Europe's conflict so he could advance his won territorial ambitions 53 in Eastern Europe.

^^Alsop and Kintner, 52-53. 53 Langer and Gleason, 114; The Economist, December 23, 1939, 452. Actually, A. J. P. Taylor in The Origins of the Second World War makes a good case for Russia's action. He writes that the Nazi-Soviet Pact provided for mutual non-aggression and eliminated Germany from the Baltic states and the eastern part of Poland. "This was, after all, what the Russians had sought to obtain from the Western Powers. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was only another way of doing it; not so good a way, but better than none." The Western powers who thought it "disgraceful" that Russia should come to terms with Germany had, after all, concluded the Munich Agreement with the Nazis. "The Russians, in fact, did only what the Western statesmen had hoped to do; and Western bitterness was the bitter­ ness of disappointment, mixed with anger that professions of Communism were no more sincere than their own professions of democracy." And unlike Chamberlain, Stalin had rejected any glowing expressions of friendship. "The Soviet Government could not suddenly present to the public German-Soviet assurances of friendship after they had been covered with buckets of filth by the Nazi Government for six years," Stalin remarked. Further, unlike Munich, the pact was not an alliance or a partition of Poland; it was merely a pledge of neutrality, which is precisely what Poland wanted. The pact was also anti-German since it limited Germany's eastward advance. Both parties believed that it would prevent war and that Hitler would score another Munich over Poland. Taylor agues that no alternative existed for Russia. The Russian fears of an alliance of European states against them "were exaggerated, though not groundless." Considering Poland's refusal of Soviet aid and Britain's 296

As the date for the attack on Poland drew near. Hitler began to

quicken the pace of negotiations by agreeing to Russia's demands for

concessions in the entire area from the Baltic to the Black Sea. He

also sent a personal note to Stalin on August 20 urging that Ribbentrop

be received on August 22 or 23 at the latest to sign the non-aggression

pact. On August 20, the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet trade agreement

was made public and on August 22 the Soviet press reported that Ribben­

trop would arrive for the negotiation of a non-aggression pact. Stalin

got everything he wanted in the treaty and a secret protocol. The

Germans declared their lack of interest in Latvia, Estonia, and Finland

and the states of Southeastern Europe. The two powers agreed on a

partition of Poland. The Kremlin put no obstacles in the way of Nazi

aggression against a third power and failed to insist upon the "escape

clause" characteristic of most Soviet non-aggression agreements. The

Soviets also promised to end their negotiations with Britain and France.

The treaty and the secret protocol were signed at 1:00 A.M. on August 24

Sscont.policy of drawn out negotiations with Russia, the most that Soviet diplomacy could acquire was neutrality. Despite all this, the Soviets had committed a blunder; by concluding a written agreement with Hitler, they too assumed that he would keep his word. 252-253. In Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, Wheeler-Bennett wrote that with the con­ clusion of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, "both had gained their immediate objectives. Germany had obtained Russian neutrality in her attack upon Poland and had secured her rear in the event of war with Britain and France." In addition, Russia had gained a "breathing-space" of a year and a half and could prepare for Germany's "inevitable" attack upon her. 413. Gilbert and Gott write that Polish "obduracy" and refusal to allow Soviet troops to enter Poland prevented an Anglo-French agreement with Russia. "Denied a democratic ally, Stalin accepted a totalitarian one." England lost a potential ally for a two front war and Poland lost an ally on her eastern front. 264. 297

amid a round of toasts and handshakes in Moscow."I know how much

the German Nation loves its Fuehrer," said Stalin. "1 should therefore

like to drink his health.

Few in Europe's capitals or in Washington doubted that the treaty made war inevitable. Moffat believed that the odds were not 75-25 in

favor of war. "It seems unbelieveable, really unbelieveable," repeated Roosevelt as he prepared three more last minute messages to

Hitler, to Italy's King Victor Emmanuel, and to President Mo^cicki of

Poland urging them to use every resource to settle their differences

r 7 peacefully. And Halifax too was fatalistic. "My reason shows me no 58 way out but war, but my instincts still give me hope."

At the American Embassy Kennedy had closely watched the develop­ ments and was quite shocked by the announcement. He paced the floor of his office in his shirtsleeves and told a caller, "You have come to me in one of the most important moments in world history." "We are engaged in a fight for time." He realized that the opportunities for working out an accommodation with the Fuehrer were slight, but he emphasized

"Anything that keeps Britain at peace is in the interests of the United

^^The Treaty was actually signed on August 24, 1939, but dated August 23, 1939.

^^Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 352.

S^Moffat, 251.

S^ibid., 253; Hull, 662.

SBpRUS, August 23, 1939, Vol. 1, 342; also see FO 800/217/1316, A Record of Events Before the War, 1939, 82-84. 298

States....Chamberlain feels he cannot make too many concessions. Yet

gaining time is the most important thing we can do at this point.

Certainly time was what Chamberlain's government wanted. The

Government revived a strategy to ask the United States to use its influence in the interests of peace. Sir Horace Wilson, acting on

Cliamberlain's behalf, met with Kennedy on August 23 and asked him to make a suggestion to Washington. "The British wanted one thing of us and one thing only," Kennedy told Welles, "Namely that we put pressure on the Poles. They felt that they could not, given their obligations, do anything of this sort but that we could," Kennedy argued. His pro­ posal was unanimously scotched by FDR and his advisers. "As we saw it here," Moffat explained, "it merely meant that they wanted us to assume the responsibility of a new Munich and to do their dirty work for them."^®

Chamberlain told Kennedy that the situation looked "very bad but I have done everything that I can think of and it seems as if all my work has come to naught." "The futility of it all is the thing that is frightful." "After all they cannot save the Poles, they can merely carry on a war of revenge that will mean the destruction of the whole of Europe." Kennedy reported to Washington that "the situation was dark and much worse than it was a year ago." The only hopeful note

59 Lasky, 55; iVhalen, 262; Koskoff gives a good summary of Kennedy's attitude toward Russia. 203-205. He also writes that Count Edward Raczynski, the Polish Ambassador, summarized Kennedy's views; "Kennedy was generally sympathetic to Poland's plight, but Poland was of course a secondary concern to Kennedy, and to him the vista of terrific world upheaval outweighed the fate of a distant country of which he knew little. He was generally sympathetic as far as it went." But that wasn't very far. He told a friend, "I'd sell a hundred Polands down the river any day rather than risk the life of a British soldier or the loss of a British pound." Koskoff, 206.

^^Moffat, 253; Hull, 662; Whalen, 262. 299 left, as far as Kennedy could see, was for the Poles to use delaying tactics in their negotiations with the Germans. Kennedy again pressed

Roosevelt to use his influence for peace and suggested that "the place to work is on Beck.,..I see no other possibility."^^ And Jack, who had just returned from Berlin where he had had a shouting match with "storm trooper types" who pelted his car with bricks delivered a message to his father from Alex Kirk, the American Charge d'Affaires. "War would break out within one week," Kirk predicted.

Roosevelt continued to urge peace on Germany and upon receiving word that Poland had accepted his offer to conciliate, remarked "At any rate this puts the issue squarely up to Germany which no one bothered to do in 1914."^^ He wired the Fuehrer about Poland's response and added that

"All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept.Hitler continued to insist upon the immediate return of Danzig and the Corridor. Britain still refused, publicly at least, to p ■. pressure on the Poles. Hitler did make one concession; he made a formal offer to Nevile Henderson that he would directly negotiate with a Polish plenipotentiary if he arrived within the next 24 hours.He agreed to this proposal not

FRUS, August 23, 1939, Vol. I, 355-356; Koskoff writes that Kennedy's only argument for avoiding war was to gain time. Hisreal interest was not really in gaining time, but in preserving peace, "peace at any price." 207.

^^Triumph and Tragedy, 67; Whalen, 262.

^^Alsop and Kintner, 57.

^^FRUS, August 25, 1939, Vol. I, 369.

^^FRUS, August 29, 1939, Vol. I, 382. 300 because he wanted to reach an accommodation with Poland, but because he wanted to give Chamberlain's government every opportunity to get out of their guarantee to Poland, Once again the British press began to speak of appeasement.^^ Henderson liked Hitler's proposal, although he complained that it was more of an ultimatum, and urged Chamberlain's government to accept. He advised the French to urge Beck to visit Hitler immediately; and he was extremely emphatic with Lipski, the Polish Ambas­ sador, who ignored his advice. Halifax telegramed Henderson: "We cannot advise Polish Government to comply with this procedure, which is wholly unreasonable." The French, however, fully supported Henderson's view.

It was the proposal which they had been hinting at repeatedly. They advised Beck to go immediately to Berlin.

During the crisis Kennedy was frequently conferring at 10 Downing

Street with British officials and keeping Washington fully informed.

He cabled a description of Henderson's interview and his "ridiculous proposition." Kennedy explained that Hitler intended to "have his rights in Poland even if it meant a great war,...from which England would suffer much more than Germany." However once the Polish issue was settled, he promised to "make a deal with England that would guarantee the British Empire forever." Then he intended to "go back to peaceful pursuits, and become an artist, which is what he wanted to be."

GGchurchill, 353; Moffat, 258.

G?Moffat, 258. 301

Kennedy remarked that "he is now, but I would not care to say what kind."

IVhen Henderson protested and said that Chamberlain could not make deals

offensive to the Poles, Hitler remarked "that Poland had no future any­

way because Russia and Germany would settle Poland.

The British worried about the problem through August 30 trying to

find a solution. Kennedy explained Chamberlain's attitude to Hull:

"Frankly he is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable

than the Germans" and urged Henderson to remind Hitler that "after all

the Danzig situation is a small item...." Although he refused to urge

the Poles to make concessions, he intended to point out the value of a

peaceful settlement to Poland. Chamberlain was "not all enthusiastic

about the prospects, but he is hopeful," Kennedy wrote.

Finally Henderson met with Ribbentrop on August 30 and told him

that a Polish representative was not coming. Ribbentrop read Hitler's

terms to him, the immediate return of Danzig and a plebiscite in the

Corridor— the same terms which Paris and London had long favored. When

Henderson returned to the British Embassy to summon Lipski at 2:00 A.M., he urged him to request an immediate interview with Ribbentrop. The

Polish Ambassador ignored the advice and went back to bed. The Polish

Government's only reply was that they were "favorably considering"

^^FRUS, August 25, 1939, Vol. I, 369-370; JPK to FDR, August 25, 1939, Safe: Kennedy, FDRL.

G^FRUS, August 30, 1939, Vol. I, 392. 302

Britain's suggestion for direct Polish-German negotiations. 70 Hitler, however, had decided to abandon negotiations. On August 31 he ordered 71 the invasion of Poland to begin the next day.

In Washington, the death watch over Europe had begun. One commen­ tator described it as "sitting in a house where somebody is dying up­ stairs. There is relatively little to do and yet the suspense continues 72 unabated." Reports and rumors of mobilization were everywhere. The

Nazis cut off all communications to Poland and then silenced their own phone and telegraphic wires. At Hull's request a 24 hour radio watch began as State Department aides took turns listening to Europe's broad­ casts. They sent bulletins to Roosevelt on the hour and tracked down with minute care the rumors and reports of each development, the messages passing back and forth between the British, German, and Polish Govern­ ments, the Fuehrer's ultimata, and the rumors of another appeasement as

Britain and France tried desperately to find some peaceful solution.

In the Department of State itself, a 24 hour duty was set up and three department officers rotated shifts around-the-clock. A special unit was also established to arrange for the reparation and protection of Americans 73 in critical areas of Europe.

^^Taylor, 265.

^^Gilbert and Gott, 296-297; also see Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, Conn., 1960), 782-784; Wheeler-Bennett, 425; Taylor, 265.

^^Moffat, 255.

73null, 663; Moffat, 254-255. 303

A stream of people ran in and out of the State Department and the

White House. Sir Ronald Lindsay frequently conferred with the President and kept London up to date on his attitudes especially concerning the

Neutrality Legislation. FDR told him that even if war broke out, it would still be difficult to persuade Congress to alter the Neutrality

Law. If war came, he would have to proclaim an embargo; however, he promised to delay signing it for as long as possible. During this period, probably five days, the British could still get the arms and ammunition which they needed here. The President, according to Lindsay, obviously was "anxious to cheat in favor of His Majesty's Government.

And Lord Lothian, Lindsay's replacement as Britain's Ambassador to the

U.S. fully concurred with Lindsay's view. "There is certainly nothing neutral about the President's personal attitude towards the conflict between the dictatorship and the democracies," he wrote after he had 75 presented his credentials to the President.

Kennedy was frequently on the transatlantic telephone calling the

White House or the State Department and making dramatic pronouncements.

"The jig is up," he told Hull and added that he had just sent him a cable--"the most serious one he had ever sent in his life." After

Kennedy's call, Hull sent for several aides who sat waiting for Kennedy's cable for two or three hours on a hot, muggy Washington Sunday. Kennedy's

371/22815, August 25, 1939, Ronald Lindsay to Halifax.

^^FO 371/23904, August 30, 1939, Lord Lothian to Halifax. 304 telegram did not bear out his sensational description. It reiterated the

British Cabinet's attempts to continue negotiations. Britains' actions

"struck all of us as a mere play for time and completely unrealistic in relation to German psychology," wrote Moffat. "The most charitable explanation was that Britain and Germany were planning to throw the blame for an actual breach on the other. The less charitable explanation was that the British were not above a dicker leaving Poland to pay the price.

A little before three o'clock on the morning of September 1, 1939,

Roosevelt was awakened by a phone call. "Who is it?" "This is Bill

Bullitt, Mr. President." "Yes, Bill." "Tony Biddle has just got through from Warsaw, Mr. President. Several German divisions are deep in Polish territory, and fighting is heavy. Tony said there were reports of bombers over the city. Then he was cut off...." "Well, Bill, it's come at last. God help us all." After talking for a few more minutes,

Bullitt hung up. 77 Roosevelt called Hull, "The Germans have invaded

Poland," the President said. 78

Hull remembers that he dressed hurriedly as thoughts flashed through his mind--the end of civilization untold suffering, death, and destruction.

^^Moffat, 256. 77 Alsop and Kintner, 58; Burns, 394.

^%ull, 671. 305

He quickly drove to the State Department through Washington's hushed

streets and paced the floor of his office until 3:30 A.M. waiting for

his principal advisers to arrive. Moffat, Berle, Welles, and several

others arrived, "their faces alert and anxious," Hull later recalled.

They listened to Hitler's announcement to the Reichstag that the invasion

of Poland had begun and that "bombs will be met with bombs." They talked

about the war in a hushed, polite way like people gathering for a funeral.

"We are ending our death watch over Europe," Berle reportedly said, 80 rising to the occasion.

Hull then called Kennedy and Bullitt to ask for their appraisal of

the news. Kennedy replied that Britain's Government had not yet been

informed of the invasion. In fact, we were the first to give them the news. Kennedy explained that Britain's information was extremely sketchy

and that Chamberlain had to delay action until he had been officially

notified from British Embassies and Consulates. Still, he predicted, 81 "Britain would declare war before the end of the day." Bullitt suggested that the President send an appeal to all nations immediately requesting them to refrain from bombing civilian populations. While

Department officials were sending out the appeal, Hull spoke again to

Kennedy. It was "all over," Kennedy said. The "party is on." Asked if there was any doubt as to whether or not Britain would act, "Oh, unques- OO tionably none," he replied.

G^Alsop and Kintner, 58-59; Hull, 671; Burns, 394.

SlMoffat, 260; Hull, 671,

G^Hull, 672. 306

The group at the State Department continued to discuss the enormous problems confronting the United States. They wondered how many millions of men, how many bombed cities, how much destruction would be necessary to stop Hitler. At six o'clock they adjourned for breakfast. Kennedy called the President to confirm his earlier report that Britain would

0*2 fight. Soon Hull and his advisers were at his bedside.

Later that afternoon, Kennedy sent Hull several triple priority cables keeping him abreast of the latest developments. The British, in consultation with the French, were preparing a warning to Hitler advis­ ing him that unless His Majesty's Government "receives assurances from the German Government that hostile action against Poland has ceased, the 84 obligations of Great Britain will come immediately into play." An hour later Kennedy sent word that the warning had been approved by both governments and was being despatched to Berlin. He also wrote that the

Foreign Office was preparing a second note containing an ultimatum and a time limit. Its terms depended on Hitler's reply, of course, but

Kennedy predicted that it would be delivered later that day. Almost as an afterthought, Kennedy again cabled Washington that the Government 85 did not consider it "improbable" that Hitler may make no reply at all.

B^Burns, 394; Alsop and Kintner, 59.

G^FRUS, September 1, 1939, Vol. I, 405.

GSpRUS, September 1, 1939, Vol. I, 406, 307

On the morning of September 1, all Britain's armed forces had been mobilized and as public clamor for him to broaden his Cabinet grew,

Chamberlain announced that his constant critic, Winston Churchill, had become a member of the War Cabinet. The next day Britain's bulldog was also appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, a position he had held during World War I. The Admiralty Board promptly notified the Fleet of his appointment. "Winston is Back," it signaled affectionately.®^ And

Anthony Eden who had resigned in disgust in February, 1938, because of his opposition to Cliamberlain's Italian policy, was invited to become

Secretary of State for the Dominions. Despite the extreme gravity of the situation, there were as yet few public signs of activity except for 87 an occasional khaki figure and some schoolboys filling sand-bags. But regardless of Chamberlain's military preparations, there were widespread suspicions and doubts as to whether he intended to honor Britain's commitment to Poland. Poland fought on alone, while the French debated, and Britain temporized. Many Britons had no desire to fight for Poland, a state which had helped herself to a part of Czechoslovakia under the cloak of Nazi aggression.

That evening in the House of Commons, the MPs gathered to hear

Chamberlain's address. The building had been darkened and the lights dimmed giving a very dramatic aura to the Chamber. Lloyd George and

®^Robert R. James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, (New York, 1970), 380.

B^Nicholson, 409-410. 308

Winston Churchill were in their places sitting opposite each other, the

Gallery was filling with distinguished visitors whispering back and

forth, and the Polish and Russian Ambassadors were surprised to find

themselves sitting beside each other. The Speaker arrived punctually at

six o'clock and opened the session with prayers. The Chaplain added a

special prayer, "Let us this day pray for wisdom and courage to defend 88 the right." The Prime Minister entered with Arthur Greenwood, the

acting Leader of the Labour Opposition, and was greeted by wild cheering.

Chamberlain rose immediately and began his address by saying that

the time had come for action rather than words. Speaking with consider­

able emotion, he reminded the audience how "eighteen months ago in this

House I prayed that the responsibility might not fall on me to ask this

country to accept the awful arbitrament of war. I fear that I might not be able to avoid that responsibility." He continued, raising the pitch

of his voice and pounding the podium with his fist: "The responsibility

for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man, the

German Chancellor, who has not hesitated to plunge the world into misery 89 in order to serve his own senseless ambitions." The House roared its

approval. Calmly and deliberately Chamberlain explained the recent

course of events, all the while fiddling with his pince-nez and rubbing his hands together. He stated that Britain's Ambassador had been ordered

88lbid., 410.

89peiling, 45; Nicholson, 410-411. 309

"to hand to the German Government the following documents," an embarrassed pause followed as he fumbled through his papers searching for the instruc­ tions.^® The Prime Minister read the document. Unless the German

Government suspend "all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory. His Majesty's

Government...will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland."

His explanation for "this last warning" to Hitler left confusion in the minds of his listeners. Many failed to understand why no time-limit was given and were critical of this loophole.®^ Tlie fact remained that under her treaty obligations, Britain should already have come to Poland's aid.

On September 2 FDR worked on the speech he was planning to deliver to the American public. He worried aloud to his aides over the probable

British and French response to Hitler's invasion. He spent much of the day on the phone trying to get the latest reports from his Ambassadors in Europe and only succeeded in speaking once or twice to Kennedy and

Bullitt. The reports were always the same; Britain and France were waiting for Hitler's answer to their warning while Nazi agents desperately 92 tried to reestablish contacts to bolster waning appeasers.

Kennedy explained that the delay was unavoidable since the French

Chamber would not be convened until the afternoon of September 2. Further, he reported, the British wanted to coordinate the activities of the

®®HC, Debates, September 1, 1939, Vol, 351, 130; Nicholson, 410-411.

®lçadogan Diaries, September 2, 1939, 212. 92 Alsop and Kintner, 66-67. 310

two countries in timing and form to avoid the impression of "dragging

France into war." The Government were anxious "to impress on the French public and on public opinion generally that Great Britain is backing her ally France and that the issue is not solely a question of British obliga- 9 3 tions to Poland." He reassured Hull that Britain was "set to go," since Chamberlain did not expect Hitler to comply with his demand to evacuate Poland. The final decision would be made in London and Paris 94 in the next 24 hours Kennedy predicted.

Rumors and gossip ran wild throughout Whitehall that day. The news arrived that Ciano, at Mussolini's request, had offered to mediate and had suggested that a five-power conference between Germany, France, Russia,

Italy and Britain be summoned. That evening, the House of Commons reassembled, anxious to hear Chamberlain's decision. One observer said 95 that we felt "exactly like a court awaiting the verdict of the jury."

There was a strange, unpleasant silence in the packed hall as the crowd waited for two hours for Chamberlain's arrival. At 7:42 the Prime Minister and Greenwood entered and Chamberlain rose to explain that he had received no reply from Hitler. Perhaps, he suggested. Hitler was considering

Mussolini's peace proposal. But so long as Poland's invasion continued.

03 FRUS, September 1, 1939, Vol. I, 405. Another explanation for France's delay was General Gamelin's desire to gain more time to complete mobilization and evacuate children since French officials believed Paris would be bombed immediately. Cadogan Diaries, September 2, 1939, 212; Simon, 252; Birkenhead, 445; Halifax, Fullness of Days, 209., 94 Hull, 675; also see FO 800/317/1316, A Record of Events Before the War, 1939, 83.

^^Nicholson, 412. 311

Britain would not participate in a conference. However, Chamberlain added,

’’If the German Government should agree to withdraw their forces then His

Majesty's Government would be willing to regard the position as being

the same as it was before the German forces crossed the Polish frontier.

That is to say, the way would be open to discussion between the German and Polish Governments on the matters at issue.As he rambled through the chronology of events repeating Britain's warning and adding that

Britain and France were still in consultation, MPs were astonished to discover that no time-limit had been set, no decision had been taken.

Was this another Munich? A gasp ran through the House as Chamberlain sat down. A moment of silence followed as Arthur Greenwood rose to 97 speak. "You speak for England!" shouted a Conservative across the isle.

Cheers erupted throughout the Chamber. Speaking directly and simply

Greenwood said "An act of aggression took place 38 hours ago. The moment that act of aggression took place one of the most important treaties of modern times automatically came into operation. There may be reasons why instant action was not taken," he said calmly. "But...I wonder how long we are prepared to vacillate at a time when Britain and all that

Britain stands for, and human civilization are in peril. We must march

go with France." Cheers thundered throughout the hall and Chamberlain's

^% C, Debates, September 2, 1939, Vol. 351, 281.

G^There has been considerable debate over who uttered the remark. Taylor and most other historians claim it was L. S. Amery. See Taylor, 267. But Nicholson attributed it to Robert Boothby who confirmed it in 1965. Nicholson, 412.

GGnC, Debates, September 2, 1939, Vol. 351, 282-283. 312 most ardent supporters loyally proclaimed their agreement with the

Opposition. Chamberlain rose again and made a conciliatory speech explaining that he was trying to work in concert with the French. He refused to believe for one moment that the French were weakening. But the MPs refused to believe him. As the Chamber adjourned, there was much grumbling. Opinion in the country was also adamant. Few observers could recall when the Commons had been so deeply stirred and profoundly moved as it had been that day. There was no doubt, Churchill wrote.

England wanted war. "I even deemed it more resolute and united than in 99 the similar scene on August 3, 1914 in which I had also taken part."

Chamberlain was extremely despondent after the scene in the House of Commons and terribly shaken by the erroneous impression that he was ratting on Poland. Halifax remarked that he had never seen him quite

"so disturbed." The two men assessed the situation over dinner at 10

Downing Street and Chamberlain said that he feared the Government would fall unless the situation was clarified. Cadogan and M. Corbin, the

French Ambassador, joined them after dinner and spent a frantic hour calling Daladier and Bonnet and Sir Eric Phipps, Britain’s Ambassador in

France, in an attempt to persuade the French to give Hitler a time-limit as short as possible.

G^churchill, The Gathering Storm, 362; see Nicholson for a descrip­ tion of the atmosphere in the Commons, 412-413.

^®%lalifax. Fullness of Days, 210. Halifax writes that Chamberlain was very disturbed by the reaction in the House and asked Halifax and Sir Alec Cadogan to join him at 10 Downing Street. Halifax thought that the reaction of the House "showed democratic assemblies at their worst; and I could not acquit some members of the cabinet of having fed the flames of suspicion." FO 800/317/1316, A Record of Events Before the War, 1939, 84. 313

An unscheduled two hour Cabinet meeting was held at 11:30 that night as the Cabinet debated the time-limit on the ultimatum. Sir

Reginald Dorman-Smith, the Minister for Agriculture, vividly recalled that Chamberlain was terribly calm, even icy, throughout the discussions and obviously worried about an attack on Paris. In the early hours in the morning, Chamberlain quietly said "Right gentlemen, this means war."

At that moment the entire room was lit up by an omnious flash of light­ ning and thunder.101 They were agreed. Acting on Cadogan's suggestion,

Henderson was instructed to deliver an ultimatum to Hitler at nine 102 o ’clock that morning which would expire at eleven o'clock. He told

Halifax "...A dog they say, returns to his vomit. I wish I could encourage Hitler to return to his first love which was architecture. 103 But I fear that Germany is too jealous a mistress." The French had promised to act a little later.

l^lsirkenhead, 447.

l^^Cadogan Diaries, September 2, 1939, 212. Later that same night, Fritz Hesse, under orders from Ribbentrop, met Sir Horace Wilson at 11 Downing Street with a proposal from Hitler. He offered to withdraw from Poland and to provide reparation for damages provided that Germany would receive Danzig and the road through the Corridor and the Britain agreed to act as mediator over the dispute. Hesse was empowered to offer this proposal to the British and begin negotiations immediately. When Hesse saw Wilson, he begged him to submit Hitler’s proposals to the Cabinet. Wilson, echoing Chamberlain whom he had just seen after receiving Hesse’s proposal, said that he saw no way for Chamberlain to turn back and asked if Hitler would be willing to make a public apology. As the two men talked, someone knocked on the door and handed Wilson a note. He read it several times and then burned it. Turning to Hesse, he informed him that the invasion of Poland had made it impossible for any Englishman to con­ sider Hitler's proposal. News had come that France was prepared to join Britain in declaring war. Wilson argued that Britain could not allow a foreign power to rule the Continent without destroying the foundations on which the British Empire and its prestige in the world rested. In that situation Hitler's proposals could not be offered to the Cabinet. See Rock, 318-319. 103 FO 800/316/H/XV/239, General; Viscount Halifax, July 18, 1939. 314

On the morning of September 3, Chamberlain summoned Kennedy and showed his friend the speech he would deliver to the British Empire in a few hours. Profoundly stirred, unembarrassed tears stung his eyes as he read Chamberlain's words which so poignantly expressed his own feelings: "Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have believed in during my public life has crashed in ruins I trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated Europe has been re-established.

Kennedy hurriedly returned to the embassy and dashed off a cable to Hull informing him that Britain would declare war at 11:00

At a few minutes after 4:00 in the morning, Washington time, Roosevelt was awakened by a phone call from Kennedy. Kennedy told him the gist of

Chamberlain's remarks. In a state of utter despair, he predicted that another Dark Age would descend over Europe. Regardless of who was victorious, chaos would be the ultimate victor. The half-choked voice kept repeating: "It's the end of the world, the end of everything.

Roosevelt tried unsuccessfully to steady his emotional Ambassador by giving him a trans-Atlantic pat on the back. As the Ambassador's wife and her two eldest sons donned gas masks and huddled in the cellar of

Edward Molyneux, the dressmaker's shop during Britain's first air-raid, the President once again roused his Cabinet to give them the news of war.

^^^Alsop and Kintner, 68; Foiling, 416; Triumph and Tragedy, 67.

^^^France's ultimatum was delivered at noon, September 3 and by five o'clock she too was at war.

^O^Alsop and Kintner, 68; ('dialen, 263.

lO^Cameron, Rose, 139; Kennedy, Times to Remember, 252. 315

That evening Roosevelt spoke to "the whole of America." "Until four-thirty this morning," he began, "I had hoped against hope that some miracle would prevent a devastating war in Europe and bring to an end the invasion of Poland by Germany." He reminded his audience of his efforts to "throw the full weight of the United States into the cause of peace." However, he said.

You must master at the outset a simple but unalterable fact in modern foreign relations between nations. When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all nations everywhere is in danger. It is easy for you and for me to shrug our shoulders and to say that conflicts taking place thousands of miles from the continental United States, and indeed, thousands of miles from the whole American Hemisphere, do not seriously affect the Americas--and that all the United States has to do is ignore them and go about its own business....We are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought, does affect the American future. Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields. At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American neutrality. This nation will remain a neutral nation," he insisted. "But I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience. I have said not once, but many times, that I have seen war and that I hate war. I say that again and again. I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurances and reassurances that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end." He reemphasized his point. "As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no black-out of peace in the United States."

lOBRosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of F. D. R., 1939, 461-464. 316

For the next several days FDR grappled with the problems of neutral­ ity. While Hitler’s war machine devoured Poland, the President delayed issuing the proclamation required by the Neutrality Act to give Britain and France time to purchase munitions. He also had the satisfaction of delaying the departure of the German liner "Bremen" from New York by two days. He personally instructed thirty-seven U.S. Customs and Marine

Bureau inspectors to search the ship for contraband and even made the crew go through a lifeboat drill. One furious "Bremen" official yelled,

"Now they are searching an empty swimming pool." Roosevelt's antics cost Germany some $6,000.^^^ But these were all trivial. His major task was to repeak the embargo itself; this became Roosevelt's major job in the fall of 1939. The Economist noted that the American public's attitude was "unanimously in favour of the stand being made by Britain and France," but still seriously divided as to America's role. The most recent public opinion surveys showed that less than half of those polled wanted to send troops. All that could be said with certainty "is that

American opinion is changing, that it is changing rapidly, and that it is moving in a sense favourable to the democracies.

Following his urgent call to Roosevelt telling of Britain's declara­ tion of war, Kennedy regained his composure by carrying on with his

^O^Time, September 11, 1939, 13; Burns, 395-396.

ll^The Economist, September 2, 1939, 444. 317 official duties. He conferred briefly with Chamberlain, Simon, and

Halifax at 10 Downing Street and then returned to the Embassy.

Always the realist, Kennedy had already completed his personal prepara­ tions for war. Soon after he and his family returned from France, he had his family moved to a country house outside of London, Its exact location was a carefully guarded secret until Rose and the children had safely left the country. 119

Early each morning Kennedy arrived at the Embassy in a Chrysler sedan, waved quickly through traffic by London bobbies who recognized the "CD" plate (Corps Diplomatique) on the radiator-grille. As always, he entered his office, threw his coat over a rack, draped a chair with his vest, loosened his tie, rolled up his shirt sleeves over his freckled arms and quickly went to work, all the while tugging his black suspenders, cussing and grumbling to himself, and yelling orders. The windows of his office were always open and the August page was still on his desk calendar. The three telephones, two radios, and two vases of freshly cut flowers were the only adornment in the otherwise plain blue room.

The Embassy had been moved from the palatial building at Prince's Gate to an old red-brick apartment house seven stories high at No. I 113 Grosvenor Square. After several futile attempts, the State Department

^^^New York Times, September 3, 1939, 13.

^^^Time, September 18, 1939, 13-14; Triumph and Tragedy, 67.

^^^Time, September 18, 1939, 13-14. 318

finally authorized an air raid shelter in the house. Until it was built,

however, the Ambassador and his staff had to run several hundred yards

to the shelter at Claridge's Hotel.The Embassy staff, too, had been

reorganized and put on a twenty-four hour work day. One of Kennedy's

optimistic aides even brought in a cot hoping to catnap after nightfall

During the first week of war, Kennedy's days were full. His greatest

problem was the safety and welfare of the nine thousand Americans in

Britain. Even Joe Jr. pitched in and tried to speed the exodus by

arranging for berths aboard several tramp steamers returning to the

United States. The Embassy had to keep an eye on American business

interests in Britain and answer over 150 daily cables which poureJ into

the Embassy inquiring about relatives and friends. Kennedy had to visit

British bigwigs, comfort Chamberlain, and keep FDR informed. Several

times he had to make hard choices: on Tuesday whether to get a hair-cut

or have lunch (he chose the former); on Wednesday whether to blow up at

the State Department or the Maritime Commission over delays in rechartering

the course of South American bound cruise ships desperately needed for the refugee packed ports of Europe; he chose the later.

At three o'clock in the morning of September 4, Kennedy was awakened by an aide's call telling him that the 13,500 ton British liner "Athenia," sailing for Glasgow to Liverpool to Montreal, had been struck on the port

^^^Whalen, 264.

September 18, 1939, 13-15.

^^^Ibid., Tlie Landis Papers, Chapter 17, 476-480. 319

side by a German torpedo. At that moment the unarmed ship was sinking

in the Atlantic. Three hundred Americans were listed among her 14,000

passengers. Of the 112 who had been killed by the explosion, 12 were

Americans. Kennedy called the American consulates in Belfast, Dublin,

and Liverpool to get a list of names of passengers who had embarked in

each port. He cabled Roosevelt "All on 'Athenia* rescued except those

killed by explosion. The Admiralty advises me survivors picked up by 117 other ships. List of casualties later. Thank God." Kennedy hurried

down the hall to Jack's room, woke him up and sent him and his old friend 118 and aide Eddie Moore to Glasgow where rescue operations were under way.

Jack's assignment was twofold; get the facts and help the survivors.

The survivors painted a grim scene to the young interviewer; oil pouring

from the exploded tanks, firemen thrown from a hatch, seasick, half-naked passengers crawling over dead bodies and slipping on oil and filth as they hurried for the lifeboats. Many of them had anxiously waited 10 or

12 hours in the lifeboats hoping for rescue. They had seen one boat sunk and another smashed to bits by the propeller of a rescue ship. The conclusion was unanimous, the "Athenia" had been struck twice without warning by a German submarine's torpedo, although a Nazi radio broadcast from Berlin was already accusing the British of having sunk the liner themselves to arouse American sympathy.

117 Time, September 18, 1939, 13-15; The Times, September 5, 1939, 8. 118 Time, September 18, 1939, 13-15; New York Times, September 4, 1939, 1 and 5. 320

Jack tried to soothe the feelings of the outraged passengers who demanded a convoy. The answer was no. Roosevelt had just announced his decision not to send American convoys for returning refugees. Jack tactfully but firmly explained the decision to the survivors. He told them that they would be picked up by the American liners "Orizaba” and

"Stella Polaris" and taken to New York, without a convoy. After seeing to the comfort of the passengers Jack sent a full report to his father.

It was a trying experience, but his father was pleased. "I sent him up to Glasgow to handle the whole job of taking care of the survivors and finding out from them what had happened. And he handled it well, too," 119 Kennedy bragged, with fatherly pride. An avalanche of cables from nervous relatives of Americans in England flowed into the Embassy.

Government funds could not be used to answer such requests; but Kennedy saw that the replies were sent promptly and paid for as many as one hundred and fifty personal telegrams daily. 120 Kennedy spent his fifty- first birthday on the third day of war at the Embassy. That evening the family gathered around his birthday cake. Only Jack was absent.

Rose and Joe had agreed that the children should return to the United

States; over the next few weeks, they were sent back in groups of three.

Rose, too, returned to the States at the end of the month and set up housekeeping in Bronxville, New York. 121

119 Triumph and Tragedy, 68.

IZOwhaien, 226.

12lTriumph and Tragedy, 69; Duncliffe, 107. 321

On September 17 Russian troops entered Poland and finished what the Germans had begun. By September 28, 1939, the guns were silent as the two powers announced the fourth partition of Poland. Britain and

France's delcarations of war were followed by a long oppressive pause in which Hitler played a psychological game of cat and mouse. As the unreal quiet swept over the Continent, arm-chair strategists joked about the "phony war," the "twilight war." Chamberlain predicted peace by the spring of 1940.^^^

Kennedy, too, felt a let down after the frantic activity of the first weeks of war. "I was amused and delighted to hear you say over the telephone that it was actually boring in London now that you have 123 got rid of most of the returning Americans," Roosevelt wrote to him.

Thinking about Britain's chances and about the effects of war upon the

United States, Kennedy became a prophet of unrelieved gloom--defeatist and fatalistic. Even in September, 1939, he was announcing that Britain would lose the war. "England has a Chinaman's chance," he declared.

"England and France can't quit whether they would like to or not and 1 am convinced, because I live here, that England will go down fighting.

Unfortunately," he told FDR, "I am one who does not believe that it is going to do the slightest bit of good in this case."^^^

^^^itfhalen, 274.

IZ^Elliott Roosevelt, Vol. II, 950.

124jpK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, 7 pages, FDRL. 322

For the life of him Kennedy could see no sense to Britain's war.

"Just what are you fighting for now?" he bluntly demanded of Halifax and Simon. "You can't restore Poland to the Poles can you?" "No, not all of it," Simon replied, "Well then," Kennedy declared "that will be a failure; you can't talk about aggression and permit Russia to retain half of Poland and have its claw over the Balkan states as well as the

Baltic States." "Possibly not," Simon sadly agreed. Furthermore, he warned them, if Hitler were overthrown, chaos would result and Germany might well go communist and become an even greater menace to Europe.

Besides, a long drawn out war would drain both Britain and France and reduce them to a mere shell of their present selves. Chamberlain,

Halifax, and Simon all sadly agreed with Kennedy's depressing prognosis.

But there was nothing they could do. If the Government advocated peace, they would be quickly and resoundingly defeated. "Now there is no ques­ tion in my mind," Kennedy reported to Roosevelt, "the British will not give up the struggle, even though they are confused about what they want

IOC and what they'll get if they win."

But Kennedy, of course, had his own ideasabout Britain's aims.

Despite the patriotic moralistic slogans which his friends habitually mouthed, this was not, he admantly insisted, aholy war. The Ambassador, as blunt as they made them, bristled when he heard such talk. "For

Christ's sake," he'd tell them, "stop trying to make this a holy war,

IZSlbid. 323 because no one will believe you; you're fighting for your life as an

Empire, and that's good enough.A Foreign Office official heard that Kennedy had expressed the opinion "that we should be badly thrashed in the present war....My informant [apparently Billy Harrington, who later married Kennedy's daughter, Kathleen] said that Mr. Kennedy appeared rather to relish expressing this opinion, which he attributed not to serious antagonism to us, but rather to a delight inherent in most Americans in seeing the lion's tail twisted [and perhaps in twisting the lion's

1 oy tail.]" Britain's popular resolve heartened Roosevelt, but threw

Kennedy into a state of despair. "I have yet to talk to any military or naval expert of any nationality this week," he cabled Roosevelt, who believes that Britain and France have much of a chance against Germany 128 and Russia and their potential allies. However, Kennedy added, another segment of "informed opinion" made Russia the pivotal country.

If she stayed out of the war, then England and France could defeat

Germany. One strategy would be to indirectly attack her through one of the neutral states. "Of course, when you mention this to anybody in official quarters, they hold up their hands in horror...." However, if Russia indicated her support for Germany, Italy might be persuaded to enter. In this case, England should simply "dig in for protection" instead of trying to defeat Germany. Kennedy summed up his fears for

IZGwhalen, 270.

12?Gage Minute, September 20, 1939, FO 371/22827/A6S61/1090/45, as cited in Koskoff, 541.

128jPK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, 7 pgs., FDRL. 324

Britain's survival: "To my mind it is a very open question as to what will be the effect on this country of air bombardment, coupled with 129 submarine warfare."

Kennedy's greatest fear was that if it were a long war the United

States would be dragged in. He could imagine a chivalrous but fool­ hardy America gallantly dashing to Britain's rescue. And inevitably, 130 American boys would be sent to spill their blood on Europe's soil.

Unquestionably, he explained, "the war will be conducted with British eyes constantly on the United States." He warned Roosevelt against rashly authorizing any legislation without ensuring its economic advan­ tage to the United States. As long as we remain at peace, England will be as considerate as possible about offending us. "Nly own impression is that if by any chance she should succeed, the burden will be placed more completely on our shoulders by 100% than it was in 1917." His advice to Roosevelt was "that we should be on our guard to protect our 1 own interests." He was even more terrified at the thought of the war's impact on America. However, it was still not too late. America could be spared and Britain's best interests served if Roosevelt could be persuaded to act as peacemaker and to end the violence through nego­ tiations.

129jpK to FDR, September 10, 1939, PSF, box 10, FDRL.

l^Owhalen, 268.

ISljPK to FDR, September 10, 1939, PSF, box 10, FDRL. 325

With war just a week old, Kennedy held a confidential conversation 132 with several high British officials. King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, and Britain’s Lord Privy Seal, Sir Samuel Hoare. There was no doubt,

Poland’s defeat was certain. Vfhat would Hitler do now? Both the King and Hoare believed that Hitler would propose a peace agreement with

Britain and France, probably within a month. Hoare believed that neither the French nor the Germans could make any appreciable headway against each other and described the French advance as three steps forward and three steps back. He dreaded the time when the French would ask Britain to come to their aid by sending bombers to attack Germany. If Britain agreed, their bomber force would quickly be eliminated and Germany’s retaliatory attacks would destroy her factories and seriously hurt pro­ duction. If, however, they postponed an attack on Germany until they arrived at greater capacity, the French might become restless and ask

"Why fight any longer to save Great Britain?" Kennedy thought that this was a gamble, but he told Hull, "I am of the opinion that the War Cabinet at the moment do not feel justified in taking that risk." Both men

1 32 John Wheeler-Bennett’s biography of King George VI, (London, 1958) contains a good account of Kennedy’s meeting with the King. George VI regarded Kennedy’s opinions as distressing and disturbing. After their discussion the King wrote to Kennedy and diplomatically stated the British case. "As I see it, the U.S.A., France and the British Empire are the really three free peoples in the world, and two of these great democracies are now fighting against all that we three countries hate and detest. Hitler and his Nazi regime and all that it stands for....[England] has been expected to act, and has had to act as the policeman, and has always been the upholder of the rights of smaller nations....We stand on the threshold of we know not what. Misery and suffering of war we know. But what of the future? The British Empire’s mind is made up. I leave it at that." 419. 326

agreed with Kennedy's view that to continue the war "means complete

economic, financial, and social collapse and nothing will be saved after

the war is over....It seems to me," Kennedy concluded, "that this situa­

tion may crystallize to a point where the President can be the savior

of the world." The British Government would probably not accept a proposal from Hitler, "but there may be a point when the President himself may work out the plans for world peace....As a fairly practical

fellow all my life," he continued, "I believe that it is entirely con­ ceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world and I have not thought so up to this minute....! am passing this on," he wrote, "because I think that beyond all other questions of importance in the world, this is one that the President should be thinking about...."

Washington's reaction was swift. Just two hours later Hull's wire arrived :

The President desires me to inform you, for your strictly confidential information and so that you may be guided thereby without divulging this mes­ sage to any one, that this Government so long as present European conditions continue, sees no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this Government that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and of aggression.1^4

1 33 FRUS, September 11, 1939, Vol. I, 421-424; also see The Landis Papers, Chapter 37, 483-485; Koskoff, 212.

l^'^FRUS, September 11, 1939, Vol. I, 421-424; IVhalen, 269. 327

Kennedy had received a rather severe transatlantic slap across his

knuckles. Roosevelt’s rebuke illustrated not just his distrust of the

talkative Ambassador, but also a growing difference in attitudes,

Kennedy regarded Nazism as regrettable, but still tolerable and even preferable to the total chaos which he believed would result from a holocaust. The destruction of Nazism could not possibly justify the impact of war. Roosevelt, on the other hand, almost dismissed the consequences of war, so intent was he on eliminating an intolerable

"regime of force and aggression."

Roosevelt discussed Kennedy’s attitudes with his old political henchman, Jim Farley. Kennedy had been "taken in" by the British said FDR. "He is more British than Walter Hines Page was....I want to tell you something and don’t pass it on to a living soul," he confided. "Some weeks ago Joe had tea with the King and Queen, who were terribly disturbed about the situation. Afterwards he saw Sir Samuel

Hoare and several others connected with the British government, and they, too, were quite worried. After his talks Joe sat down and wrote the silliest message to me I have ever received. It urged me to do this, that, and the other thing in a frantic sort of way." The Duchess

County patrician declared that "the trouble with the British is that they have for several hundred years been controlled by the upper classes."

Warming to his subject, he told Farley that the upper classes had used governmental policies to protect themselves, further their own self- interest and ensure their control over Britain’s economy. In the pre­ war days, Farley recalled, Roosevelt had never been particularly fond 328

of the British and doubted that Britain would ever go to anyone else's

aid. He believed that "they were for England and England alone all the

time." When Farley left the President's office, there was little doubt 135 in his mind that Roosevelt would welcome a sweeping change.

Kennedy argued that the continuation of the war would devastate

Britain and Europe economically, financially, socially, and politically; nothing could be saved from the holocaust. "I personally am convinced,"

he wrote to Roosevelt, "that, win, lose, or draw, England never will be

the England that she was and no one can help her to be." The war would undermine the evolutionary process and regardless of its outcome, hasten Britain's decline as a world power. But, if by chance, Britain did "win" her war, Kennedy still regarded it as a losing proposition, as an empty victory. Britain would be bankrupt, democracy would be crushed, civilization would be destroyed. One of the reasons why

Kennedy was so fatalistic about Britain's chances was that the "topside people" in Government--Chamberlain, Simon, and Montagu Norman, the head of the Bank of England--had opened their balance sheets to him. He and his worried friends at Downing Street and Whitehall realized that Britain was already in shaky financial straits and faced the possibility of bankruptcy in the very near future. After a particularly depressing conference with Simon and Norman, Kennedy sent Hull and Morgenthau a bleak description of Britain's financial condition. Putting it mildly.

1 TS Farley, 198-199; Mialen, 270. 136 JPK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, 6 pgs., FDRL. 329

he wrote, they are pessimistic. "The financial and economic situation as

far as Europe is concerned is worse than tragic," Norman had told Kennedy,

"England is busted now." She could only continue to spend money for two,

at best three years before complete chaos hit the nation. Bartering would

once again become as widespread throughout Europe as it had been in

Medieval society, Norman warned, and Britain would follow in the footsteps

of the once powerful Spanish and Portugese Empires and become a decadent,

"has been" nation. The trio unanimously concluded: "If this conflit

lasts any great length of time, there will be no hope for the world; at 137 any rate, at least none for Europe."

In addition to Britain's economic and financial instability, Kennedy

also saw symptoms of political disintegration. "There are signs of decay,

if not of decadence, here, both in men and institutions," wrote Kennedy

in his usual blunt style. Aside from the economic problems, "the Par­

liamentary machinery is not operating to throw up real, able leaders."

Morgenthau Diary, September 30, 1939, Vol. 214, 212-216, FDRL. In early October Kennedy sent Roosevelt a memorandum analyzing Britain's economic "swing-over from a peace to a war time economy." The usual pattern of retail trade had been completely upset, the amusement industry had virtually ceased and the service trades had been heavily curtailed. The neighborhood shops and department stores had fallen considerably in volume of sales. Firms have transferred their businesses to the country and the drop in luxury industries had thrown thousands into unemployment. Gasoline rationing had seriously undermined the garage and filling station trades. Needless to say, the transitional period had been one of great hardship for most of the people involved. Kennedy reported that several schemes were being considered to help the unemployed during this period. The action might include instructing the Unemployment Assistance Board to look generously upon the requirements of unemployed families and perhaps to provide them with a temporary government subsidy. However, Kennedy bearishly predicted "the very heavy demands on the Treasury lead me to doubt that any such action will be taken unless the expected absorption of these individuals into the war time economy lasts much longer than anyone here now anticipates." JPK to FDR, Memorandum, October 2, 1939, PSF, Box 10, FDRL; also see The Landis Papers, Chapter 37, 481-483. 330

He wondered if Chamberlain would survive a serious political reverse.

If not, who could replace him? No one, he concluded. Europe's demo­ cratic nations were to blame for the present chaos and for encouraging the growth of autocracy. They had forced democracy upon the defeated nations at Versailles and thereby tied democracy to the status quo. By resisting change, Kennedy argued, they ensured that all progressive forces within the conquered states would of necessity, take on an anti-democratic character. Kennedy's conclusion was always the same: "Democracy as we conceive it in the United States will not exist in France and England 138 after the war, regardless of which side wins or loses."

Roosevelt's reply strikingly revealed their basic differences.

"IVhile the World War did not bring forth strong leadership in Great

Britain, this war may do so, because I am inclined to think the British public has more humility than before and is slowly but surely getting 139 rid of the muddle through attitude of the past."

Kennedy and his friends among Britain's ruling elite worried that even if Hitler were destroyed, Nazism would give way to Communism. The

Ambassador believed that Hitler was at least a stabilizing force in

Germany. But if he was overthrown, the political crisis coupled with

Germany's bleak economic outlook and the shortage of food would produce utter chaos. After all, Kennedy insisted, "beating them isn't going to

ISBjPK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, 6 pgs., FDRL.

IS^Eiiiott Roosevelt, Vol. II, 949-950. 331 solve the problem of eighty million people who have no economic resources and nothing very much to look forward to...."^^^ But when Kennedy mentioned his fear to Roosevelt, the President politely dismissed it. "I do not think people in England should worry about Germany going Communist in the Russian manner," FDR advised. "They might blow up and have chaos for a while but the German upbringing for centuries, their insistence on independence of family life, and the right to hold property in a small way, would not, in my judgment, permit the Russian form of brutality for any length of time."^^!

To Kennedy, only by setting the Western Hemisphere apart, as an isolated fortress far from the madness in Europe and Asia, was there any hope of maintaining the values which he held dear. This theme ran throughout his despatches. Repeatedly, he urged Roosevelt to "drive home the point," to the American public "that we don't want any part of this mess."^^^ He concluded that Americans "should curb our sentiments and sentimentality and look to our own vital interests"^^^ as preparation for the leadership of the English speaking people which would undoubtedly fall to the United States after the war.

Despite his ardent isolationism, he was not indifferent to Britain's plight. He had lived too long in Britain and liked the English too well not to be worried about their fortunes. He asked Roosevelt to consider

l^OjPK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, 7 pgs., FDRL.

^^^Elliott Roosevelt, Vol. II, 949.

142jPK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, pg. 7, FDRL.

to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, pg. 6, FDRL. 332

two issues: "How you can point out to the American people just what

the position of England and France is and what their possibilities are

to achieve the aims we all hoped they would attain and by pointing out

that, since we do not intend to get in the war, we must be considerate

of our friends who are in it. Secondly, I would start thinking how you

can help save face for the Allies and yet at the same time be the factor

in getting the position of the United States a topside one as a result

of your intervention.144 "Being considerate" to Kennedy meant limited

intervention. After Dunkirk, arms and ammunition and fifty destroyers were not too costly to aid the British; he also thought that principle

could be shoved aside in favor of lend-lease.

Despite his advocacy of "consideration," Kennedy’s heart was not in the fight. His terror of the consequences of war all but led him to reject war as an instrument of national policy. And later, he con­ temptuously repudiated the concept of "total war" and the self righteous demand of "unconditional surrender" for which the Allies were clamoring.

Kennedy’s overriding goal was peace, even if it meant Nazi hegemony throughout Europe. American and British interests could both be served if Britain and Germany would agree to a compromise peace. One month after the outbreak of war he revived his "saviour of the world" pro­ posal despite Roosevelt’s chilly initial reply and hinted that the

144 JPK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, pg. 7, FDRL.

145craig, 669-670. 333

President should reconsider his refusal to mediate. "Some of my English friends," Kennedy told Roosevelt, "believe that only one man can save the world, not only in attaining peace, but in planning for the future, and that man is yourself....You are a combination of the Holy Ghost and Jack Dempsey.Roosevelt was obviously irked and sounded off to his longtime friend and neighbor, Morgenthau. "Joe always has been an appeaser and always will be an appeaser....If Germany or Italy made a good peace offer tomorrow, Joe would start working on the King and his friend, the Queen, and from there on down, to get everybody to accept it....He's just a pain in the neck to me," snapped FDR.^^^ Roosevelt refused to budge. Kennedy reported that he had detected "a very defi­ nite undercurrent in this country for peace." It will grow, he predicted, and force the "topside people" in the Government to define Britain's war aims. Those who want peace would soon argue that once the war aims were spelled out, "it will be apparent to the world, and particularly to the English and French, that they are fighting for something they 148 probably never can attain."

Roosevelt renewed the fight to repeal the Embargo. Ever since the first week of war, he had received polite but agonized appeals from

Britain and France concerning America's Neutrality Law. Kennedy passed

^^^JPK to FDR, November 3, 1939, PSF, box 44, FDRL.

^^^Morgenthau Diaries, October 3, 1939, Vol. II, 317. 1 4ft JPK to FDR, November 3, 1939, PSF, box 44, FDRL. 334 on to Hull Churchill's remark that the British were "discouraged" by

American neutrality. ^49 made their burden much heavier. A few days

later, on September 10, he told Roosevelt that British officialdom was

"depressed beyond words" that the law still stood. In their opinion,

".America has talked a lot about her sympathy, but, when called on for action, have only given assistance to Britain's enemy." All they want,

Kennedy argued, was to purchase equipment which was already ordered on a cash and carry basis.Kennedy told the State Department that Hore-

Belisha feared that the Soviet Union, Italy, and Turkey would side with

Germany if the Neutrality Act was not modified. As a result, Britain's position would be hopeless.

The sympathetic President sent Chamberlain a note of encouragement.

"I hope and believe that we shall repeal the embargo within the next 152 month and this is definitely a part of the Administration policy."

Chamberlain was delighted: not only would the French and British be able to draw on the immense reservoir of American resources, but the repeal of the embargo would also have a devastating impact on Germany and on world o p i n i o n .

149HU11, 693.

ISOjPK to FDR, September 10, 1939, PSF, Box 10, FDRL.

ISlpiull, 693; W. Bullitt was equally emphatic about repeal.

152f r u s , September 1, 1939, Vol. I, 671; Neville Chamberlain from FDR, September 1, 1939, PSF, Great Britain, King ^ Queen, FDRL.

^^^FRUS, November 8, 1939, Vol. I, 680-681; also see Neville Cha lain to FDR, October 4, 1939, PSF, Great Britain, King 8 Queen, FDRL. 335

Roosevelt responded by calling a special session of Congress and on September 22 he went before it to personally ask for the repeal of the embargo provision. Before a hushed, cramped crowd of Representatives,

Senators, ambassadors, foreign dignitaries, and other spectators, Roose­ velt began by proudly reviewing the peace keeping history of the United

States. The Neutrality Act of 1935 was a "deviation" and a "reversal" of this tradition. "I regret that the Congress passed that Act. I regret equally that I signed that Act." He once again asked Congress

"to take action to change that Act." Let no group assume that they alone represented the peace bloc. "We all bejong to it." He rehearsed all the old familiar secondary arguments on the futility and the uneven­ ness with which the Act operated, suggested that it was neither neutral nor impartial, and never once mentioned his real motive, to provide material and assistance to the democracies. Tlie present embargo pro­ visions were "vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security, and above all American peace.The Chamber was silent as he came to the end of his speech. Roosevelt was tired and stumbled over two or three sentences. But his sobering conclusion was forcefully put:

I should like to be able to offer the hope that the shadow over the world might swiftly pass. I cannot. The facts compel my stating, with candor, that darker periods may be ahead. The disaster is not of our making; no act of ours engendered the forces which

^^^Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of F.D.R., Vol. 8, 512-516; Alsop and Kintner, 77; see Hull, 683-684 for his analysis of the Administration’s real motives. 336

assault the foundations of civilization. Yet we find ourselves affected to the core; our currents of commerce are changing, our minds are filled with new problems, our position in world affairs had already been altered. In such circumstances our policy must be to appre­ ciate in the deepest sense the true American interest.155

During the volatile Congressional debate, Roosevelt accepted

Senator Pittman's rather arrogant remark that the Executive "end of the

Avenue" should make no indiscreet statements. Consequently, he

remained quietly in the background exerting little direct influence.

Congressional supporters of repeal were asked to line up votes; patronage

gripes were soothed over; silverities received a promise for a higher

price on domestic silver and governors, mayors, and businessmen were quietly asked to muster up public opinion. "I am almost literally walking on eggs," Roosevelt complained to Lord Tweedsmuir, the Canadian

Governor General who agreed to postpone a trip to the United States. 157 "I am at the moment saying nothing, seeing nothing and hearing nothing."

He canceled one speech to the Democrats and received daily and sometimes hourly reports on the Congressional line-up. All the while Congress debated the merits and detriments of repeal. Finally, at the end of

October, the Senate voted to repeal the embargo provisions by a vote of 63 to 30. The House followed suit a few days later. Chamberlain

1 CC U.S. Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 2nd session, 1939, Vol. 85, Part I, 10-12; Alsop and Kintner, 77.

^^^Hull, 693.

Burns, 396. 337 wrote Roosevelt: "The repeal of the arms embargo, which has been so anxiously awaited in this country...is also a profound moral encourage­ ment to us in the struggle upon which we are engaged,"To France and Britain the permission to buy in America will be very welcome and 159 immediate advantage will be taken of it...," said The Economist.

Thus the process which began after Munich in September, 1938, of re­ defining American foreign policy to aid the democracies by methods short of war reached a turning point in October, 1939. Although Roosevelt never directly asked the question, nevertheless. Congress's answer was strongly affirmative. Aiding the democracies by methods short of war became the foundation of American foreign policy.

War had touched everything in Britain including Kennedy's position.

He resented the reduction of his status and confided to a friend during the first week of war: "My days as a diplomat ended Sunday morning at eleven o'clock. Now I'm just running a business--an officer of a company. I'm back where I was ten years ago," he complained. "Instead of going up I've gone down."^^^

So long as Roosevelt remained indecisive about America's role in international affairs, Kennedy's advice must have made some impact on the President's thinking. But after the outbreak of war, when Roosevelt

1 ^8 FRUS, November 8, 1939, Vol. I, 680-681; Neville Chamberlain to FDR, November 8, 1939, PSF, Great Britain, King 8 Queen, FDRL. 159 The Economist, November 11, 1939, 205.

l*°Whalen, 267. 338 began to search for a more active foreign policy, decision making became

increasingly centralized in Washington. Kennedy found himself increasingly

isolated and ignored. Several fact-finding missions were sent abroad to provide the Administration with a fresh eye-witness account of Europe's

conditions. The observers were to report directly to the President, over the heads of the American Ambassadors scattered throughout Europe.

Negotiations between the two great English speaking democracies were

located more often than not in Washington, rather than in London. And once Churchill kissed hands as Prime Minister, negotiations were con­ ducted personally between the two heads of state. Kennedy was relegated to the role of errand boy.

Churchill's rise to power hastened Kennedy's decline since it represented the antithesis of appeasement, the return to Britain's age old theory of the balance of power and her refusal to allow any single power to hold sway over Europe's continent. Just as Churchill had looked coldly on Chamberlain's appeasement-minded American friend and his support of Munich, so he adamantly opposed Kennedy's repeated peace efforts. He resented Kennedy's bleak accounts to Washington describing

Britain's slim chances which filtered back to him through his friends in the United States. Upon hearing one such fatalistic report Churchill rose to the occasion. For a moment he just sat back there, hunched over, reports Nicholson,and then launched into a magnificent Churchillian oration waving his whiskey-and-soda to emphasize his remarks and using his cigar like an exclamation point. "It may be true that steel and fire will rain down upon us day and night scattering death and destruc- 339 tion far and wide. It may be true that our sea-communications will be imperilled and our food-supplies placed in jeopardy. Yet these trials and disasters...will serve to steel the resolution of the British people and to enhance our will for victory. No, the Ambassador should not have spoken so," he emphatically declared to an American visitor. "He should not have said that dreadful word. Yet supposing [as 1 do not for one moment suppose] that Mr. Kennedy were correct in his tragic utterance, then 1 for one would willingly lay down my life in combat, rather than, in fear of defeat, surrender to the menaces of these most sinister men."^^^ Their suspicion was mutual. Kennedy told Roosevelt he dis­ trusted Churchill's influence in the United States."For all Church­ ill's prophecies in respect to Germany, 1 can't imagine [him] adequately leading the people out of the valley of the shadow of death."

No longer could Kennedy enjoy the intimate relationship, the con­ fidences and the casual access to the Prime Minister he had known with

Chamberlain. With the new Prime Minister he simply had no common ground.

They could not meet in the familiar world of high finance. Churchill was something of an anachronism in modern Tory politics. He was neither a businessman nor a capitalist, but an aristocrat. And while out of

IGlwicholson, .396.

to FDR, November 3, 1939, PSF, Box 44, FDRL; see Fischer, 625 and Lasky, 56 for further examples.

lG3jpK to FDR, September 30, 1939, PSF, Box 10, 6 pgs., FDRL. 340 power, Churchill, by no means a wealthy man, supported himself and his family by taking up his pen. Through his American mother, Jenny Jerome,

Churchill had inherited a sincere affection and an affinity for Americans

IVhen he heard rumors that there was an uneasy feeling in some parts of the

United States that he did not like America, Americans, or Roosevelt, he vigorously denied the accusation and launched a bitter, though fairly constrained tirade on Ambassador Kennedy whom he held responsible.

Resourceful, ruthless even, Churchill intended to get what England needed and looked upon Kennedy as an obstacle to be surmounted. He abhorred Kennedy's policies of keeping the interests of the two countries in neat tightly sealed little compartments; a necessary condition, the

Ambassador insisted, for keeping America out of war. Churchill worked ceaselessly to merge the vital interests of the two democracies and to create the foundation for his dream of a Grand Alliance. He once told

Walter Lippman that if Kennedy's prognosis about England's chances was correct and if Britain should be defeated "It will then be for you, for the Americans, to preserve and lo maintain the great heritage of the

English speaking peoples." He admonished his American friend to "think imperially," to think of something, higher and vaster than one's own national interests. "Nor should I die happy...," he declared, "were I not convinced that if we in this dear dear island succumb to the ferocity

lG4james, 4.

l^^Sherwood, 238. 341

and might of our enemies, over there in your distant and immune conti­

nent the torch of liberty will burn untarnished and [I trust and hope]

undismayed.

In this diplomatic tug-of-war over America's role, Kennedy, the

political rookie, was at a considerable disadvantage in his duel with

one of Britain's master politicians. The Prime Minister had always

complained about the shackles of America's neutrality legislation but

he did not just rely on pity. He made the most of the bleak picture

and coupled it with an appeal to American self-interest. He told

Kennedy "After all, if they bombed us into a state of subjection, one

of their terms would certainly be to hand over the Fleet and if we

attempted to scuttle the Fleet their terms would be that much worse.

And if they got the British Fleet, they would have immediate superiority over the United States and raiders troubles would then begin.

Kennedy was also placed at a considerable disadvantage because

Churchill enjoyed the unique privilege of confidential access to Roosevelt.

This gave him the opportunity, exploited with relish by Churchill, of wield­ ing as much influence on Anglo-American relations as the Ambassador in

London. On September 11, the very day he rejected Kennedy's proposal for a U.S. sponsored peace initiative, FDR sent a note of congratulations

IG^Nicholson, 396-397.

^^^FRUS, October 2, 1939, Vol. I, 499-500; also mentioned in IVhalen, 491. 342 to the new First Lord of the Admiralty. "What I want you and the Prime

Minister to know is that I shall at all times welcome it, if you will keep me in touch personally with anything you want me to know about.

You can always send sealed letters through your pouch or my pouch."

Churchill responded immediately using the signature "Naval Person."

And after he became Prime Minister, he signed his letters "Former

Naval Person."1^8

Thus began a long and unique correspondence in American diplomatic history which lasted throughout the war and covered about a thousand letters apiece. The President of the United States, the spokesman for a neutral power, arranged for a confidential line of communication between the head of state and a subordinate official of a foreign power engulfed in war. And the United States Ambassador in London served as the messenger boy for the two most powerful representatives in the English- speaking world.

As Kennedy's power declined, he turned movie critic to escape the boredom and frustration of life in wartime England. A new comedy

"Mr. Smith Goes to Washington," directed by Frank Capra and produced by Columbia Studios had just been released. IVhen Kennedy saw the film, he fired off an angry cable to Columbia Studios and sent a duplicate copy to the White House. "I am convinced," he stormed, "that the picture will definitely discredit American civilization in the eyes of

IGBchurchill, The Gathering Storm, 392; a similar letter to Chamber- lain from FDR is in Elliott Roosevelt, Vol. II, 919. 343

the English public," It was part of his duty as Ambassador, he claimed,

to correct the distorted view which most Europeans had of American life.

The movie gives the impression that the United States has a corrupt

political system filled with crooked politicans. He scolded the producers

for releasing a film with such a jaundiced view of American life and told

them they should assume their "responsibilities much more earnestly than

they have to date,,,,"^^^

One Columbia executive, Harry Cohen, and the Director jumped to the

film's defense. They dashed off a reply to Kennedy explaining to him

that the picture developed the theme of Americanism by showing how the

least experienced peoples could rise to the highest political heights

and "make justice triumph over one crooked Senator." Enclosed in the

cable was a long string of newspaper quotes praising the film. The uproar died down when someone remembered that the irate Ambassador was 170 just one more moviegoer who didn't like a film.

As Kennedy rambled through the empty rooms of the big old country house, which he rented near London at Windsor Park, he felt lonely and depressed. The blackout irritated him and he kept the lights blazing behind the dark heavy curtains. He missed his family and wrote fre­ quently to his children. Their letters painstakingly copied and recopied showed the wisdom of treating all alike. Rose too, wrote

l^^JPK to FDR, November 17, 1939, PSF, FDRL, Great Britain, Jos, Kennedy, FDRL,

l^^Harry Cohen to JPK, November 17, 1939, PSF, box 10, FDRL; IVhalen, 274, 344 frequently. "My darling— I am wondering when I shall see you and what is happening! It is all so heartbreaking," she wrote soon after her return to Bronxville. "As I say— all I can do is to pray very hard that 171 I shall see you soon." Nor did she hesitate to admonish him: "Do pray too and go to church, as it is very important in my life that you do just that."^^^

Kennedy's loss of influence, his boredom and lonesomeness, and his frustration with wartime England affected him more intensely than ever before. Previous self sacrifices had been accompanied by a sense of achievement. But now, Kennedy was getting restless and wanted to match his wits with something more challenging and less futile. Kennedy's old friend, Montagu Norman, stopped by the Embassy one day for a chat.

"I see that you folks in the United States are contemplating industrial 173 mobilization. Who's going to run it? ... God almighty," he snapped.

There was one position for which Kennedy felt eminently qualified.

Ever since he first came to London, Kennedy had compiled meticulous detailed notes on England's mobilization. He looked forward to the opportunity to apply England's lessons to peace-time America. Besides, he was itching to get involved in American politics again. In 1940

^^^Cameron, Rose, 141.

IT^Whalen, 274.

l^^New York Times, May 18, 1947, III, 1; also mentioned in IVhalen, 275. 345 the Presidential election would be coming up and certainly a major issue in the campaign would be America's role in wartime Europe. Because of his close observation of Britain's and Europe's problems, Kennedy was anxious to join the fray and debate American foreign policy with the warhawks.

In November the newspapers carried the story that Kennedy would return to the United States for "consultations" with the President and to spend Christmas holidays with his family. Kennedy himself wrote that

"the strain of the work at the Embassy was beginning to have its effect on me. In slightly over two months I had lost some fifteen pounds.

Sleep was at a premium; the telephone rang at all hours with its insis­ tent demands."^^4 What the weary diplomat wanted most of all was to have a two week vacation in Palm Beach, reading detective stories, sleeping, swimming, and sleeping again. There was considerable press speculation about the Ambassador's recall and resignation, and his next appointment. The usual sources close to the President said that there was nothing unusual about Kennedy's return; he had not been recalled, he merely asked to go home for the holidays. He was expected to return 175 to his post in London sometime during the new year. Kennedy waited impatiently to leave. "I haven't been back in almost a year," he told

174 The Landis Papers, Chapter 37, 487-495.

175{yjew York Times, November 24, 1939, 3; New York Times, November 25, 1939, 2; New York Times, December 1, 1939, 12; New York Times, December 7, 1939, 3; The Times, November 24, 1939, 8; The Times, Novem­ ber 30, 1939, 8. 346

a good-bye caller, "I'll bet anything that within an hour after I land

I'll be in all sorts of arguments.

As Russian troops marched into Poland on December 1, Kennedy crossed the channel into Belgium enroute for Lisbon where he boarded a Dixie

Clipper for the flight to the United States.

Newsmen formed the usual gauntlet and tossed questions at the

Ambassador as he alighted from the plane. England doesn't understand our policy, Kennedy told reporters. The British are still trying to figure out "just what we mean," he said. On the one hand "we express great sympathy with their cause," but on the other we reaffirm our

"intentions to remain neutral.... It's like a fellow sticking out his tongue at a man and not being ready to punch him in the jaw." But then he quickly added that they had no expectation that the United States would join their war effort. IVhen asked about his future plans Kennedy bearishly replied: "I'm all through....This is ray last public job. I'll be dead and burried five years from now," he solemnly declared. But no one was convinced. IVhat about running for President in 1940, one 177 reporter asked? Kennedy ambiguously replied: "I haven't any idea."

176whalen, 275.

^^^New York Times, December 7, 1939, 3. CHAPTER VII

ENGLAND AT BAY

Most astute political observers believed that 1940 would be an unusual year for America--would Roosevelt break precedent and seek a third term? He had appeared to give support to a variety of potential candidates. He urged Hopkins to try for the Presidency in 1938; he supported handsome Paul V. McNutt of Indiana to such an extent that

McNutt believed that there had been a "laying on of hands;" and in several instances he appeared to tell Hull that he should be his succes­ sor. At other times he encouraged Jackson, Wallace, and Governor Lehman of New York. All the while Roosevelt never completely eliminated the possibility of his own candidacy.

FDR's major problem, if he decided to seek reelection, was how to get a unanimous convention draft so as to neutralize anti-third term sentiment.^ The British, too, were keenly interested in Roosevelt's plans. Churchill asked Kennedy if he thought Roosevelt would seek a third term. "Probably he would," Kennedy replied, "if he thought it 2 were necessary to keep things right in the United States." During

^Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 498, 411-412. 2 The Landis Papers, Chapter 41, no pagination.

347 348

Kennedy's first press conference after his return from London,one old

Bostonian friend pulled him aside. "How do you stand on the third term,

Joe?" he asked. "I can't go against the guy," Kennedy replied. "He's

done more for me than my own kind. If he wants it. I'll be with him."

Two days later Kennedy officially endorsed Roosevelt. As hemade

his way up the steps of the White House to discuss a plan for revising

restrictions on American shipping, he chatted with reporters. "The

problems that are going to affect the people of the United States—

political, social and economic— are already so great and becoming greater

by the war that they should be handled by a man it won't take two years

to educate," Kennedy remarked. But it was Roosevelt's dedication to

peace that most influenced Kennedy. "First and foremost, we know from

what we have seen and heard that President Roosevelt's policy is to keep

us out of war, and war at this time would bring to this country chaos

beyond anybody's dream. This, in my opinion, overshadows any possible

objection to a third term."^

Kennedy's strong endorsement "burst like a bombshell." Arthur Krock wrote that it was a major contribution to the doctrine of indispensability

which the President's supporters had been spreading ever since Nazi storm-

troopers marched into Poland. "Shellshock" was the explanation given to

Kennedy's endorsement by bitterly disappointed Democratic moderates and

3 Interview in New York on October 24, 1962 as cited in IVhalen, 276.

^New York Times, December 9, 1939, 1, 3. 349 businessmen who had counted on him to stand firm on the two term tra­ dition and who knew well his opposition to certain New Deal policies.

"Joe is usually a bear, but this time he is a whole den," an opponent quipped.^

Kennedy was gripped by blinding fatalism and profoundly impressed by the weakness of the democracies. He thought that British and French morale was dangerously low. Both economically and militarily Germany was their superior. The Ambassador wondered to a group of Washington army and naval officers whether or not the democracies could stand the strain. "By the end of this year, if not before, people in England and

France, and all over Europe would be ready for communism..,."^ Only

American isolation from Europe's problems and an early peace at practi­ cally any price could save the world from destruction.

During his brief stay in Boston, Kennedy spoke at a reunion of parishioners at Our Lady of Assumption Church where he had served as a choir boy. This was his first speech since the war began and he strongly urged America to "keep out." "As you love America, don't let anything that comes out of any country in the world make you believe you can make a situation one whit better by getting into the war," he stated.

One of his greatest fears was that the "sporting spirit of the American people and their desire not "to see an unfair or immoral thing done," could bring America into the war. "There is no reason--economic, finan-

^Ibid., December 12, 1939, 26.

^Langer and Gleason, Vol. I, 345; Koskoff, 231. 350 cial or social— to justify the U.S. entering the war....This," he said plainly, "is not our fight.IVhen his speech was circulated in Britain

Englishmen reacted with anger and dismay over the Ambassador's blunt words. Cadogan, at the Foreign Office, remarked: "I should not have been surprised by worse. Other diplomats reacted less mildly. Tlie

Belgian Ambassador said that KEnnedy's speech would "not endear [him] to his European colleagues in London."^

Kennedy and his family spent Christmas in Palm Beach where his

December vacation lengthened into late February, 1940. Not feeling quite himself, and having had "a very rotten time" of it, Kennedy had a physical examination, slept fourteen hours a day, and relaxed in the sun. He promised Roosevelt that if a crisis arose in Europe, "regard­ less of what the results might be to me in disregarding doctors' orders

I would take a plane and get over there." In the meantime, he planned to perfect his suntan.His extended stay aroused speculation that he migh t resign and accept a position campaigning for Roosevelt. FDR urge< 1 him to stay on in London. Following a conference with Roosevelt in m Ld-February in which the two men discussed "the world situation,

: ^New York Times, December 11, 1939, 2; IVhalen, 277.

i ®F0 371/22827/A8763/1091/45, December 14, 1939; as cited in Koskoff, 232.1

; ^Ibid., December 13, 1939; as cited in Koskoff, 232.

!*-Oj PK to FDR, January 18, 1940, PSF, box 10, FDRL.

llfimes (London), February 14, 1940, 7. 351

1 ? Kennedy told reporters he planned to sail for London on February 24.

During Kennedy's extended vacation, rumors had sprung up in Massachusetts

of a Kennedy-for-President movement. A campaign to elect Kennedy-

pledged delegates was underway without the Ambassador's consent. Although

the party faithful were prepared to support Roosevelt if he chose to

run again, Jim Farley, an Irish-Catholic, was also a Bay State favorite

for the Presidency. And among his supporters was young Joe Kennedy Jr.,

one of the most active Farley men in Massachusetts. Joe Jr. was taking

the first steps of a political career by running as a delegate to the

Democratic National Convention. Regardless, the senior Kennedy reaffirmed 13 his support for Roosevelt.

While he was in Washington conferring with the President, Kennedy

told officials at the State Department that he had "taken the pulse" of

the people who attended his chain of movie houses throughout the country.

He was struck at the outpouring of anti-British feeling. About 80% in his unofficial survey were anti-British, he reported to Breckinridge

Long, a State Department official. Long suggested that Kennedy report his findings to British authorities and then read off a long list of

l^New York Times, February 14, 1940, 13.

l^Times (London), February 14, 1940, 7; New York Times, February 14, 1940, 13; Arthur Krock, who probably knew, wrote that "Kennedy not only dreamed of being President; he once actively promoted efforts to the end that he would be installed in the White House as the first Roman Catholic. The Consent of the Governed (Boston, 1971), 148-149. See Koskoff for a very detailed discussion of Kennedy's presidential aspirations in 1940, 234-238. 352

American gripes: tampering with American mail, searching American ships enroute to neutral ports, and preventing supplies from reaching the stricken people of Poland.The sooner the British realized how much antagonism they were causing, "the sooner they could expect better rela­ tions with the American Government and better support from the American people," Long remarked.And when Kennedy did return to Britain, he did his best to straighten out misunderstandings between the two govern­ ments. He boasted to a friend that since his return to Britain, "the exchange of rude notes had stopped." Problems are discussed orally now, which left "much less sting.

In addition to conferring with Kennedy, FDR also spoke with William

Bullitt who arrived in Washington in February to report on his December visit to the French front. He agreed with Kennedy's depressing prognosis; the French would be defeated in the event of a Nazi aerial attack. Itfhere- as Kennedy advised isolationism and urged that the United States look out for its own national interests, Bullitt argued that it was in America's interest to do everything possible to bolster the Allies. He henceforth 17 used his influence to speed up the supply of American planes to France.

4gee FDR to Churchill, February 1, 1940, PSF; Great Britain, FDRL. In this document Roosevelt protested to Churchill that "there has been much public criticism here" regarding the search and detention of American ships. "The general feeling is that the net benefit to your people and to France is hardly worth the definite annoyance caused to us."

l^Fred L. Israel, The War Diary of Breckinridge Long (Lincoln, 1966), February 7, 1940, 59.

l^George Bilainkin, Dairy of a Diplomatic Correspondent (London, 1942), April 8, 1940, 61. 1 7 Langer and Gleason, 345. 353

The differences between the two Ambassadors were of long standing boiled over into a loud, angry feud one afternoon in Bullitt’s State

Department office. The Ambassador to France was in the midst of an

interview with J. M. Patterson, the publisher of the New York Daily

News and his Washington correspondent, Doris Fleeson. Kennedy invited himself in and cheerfully butted in on the conversation. Before long, he was emphatically saying "that Germany would win, that everything in

France and England would go to hell, and that his one interest was in saving his money for his children." He then launched into an attack on

the President, whereupon Bullitt interrupted and disagreed with him.

Their discussion became so violent that Patterson said he feared he was intruding and he and Doris Fleeson discreetly left. Undaunted,

Kennedy continued to thunder against Roosevelt. Bullitt accused him of disloyalty and told him that he had no right to say what he had before the two reporters. Kennedy replied "that he would say what he Goddamned pleased before whom he Goddamned pleased." Bullitt then accused him of being "abysmally ignorant on foreign affairs" and said that Kennedy had no "basis for expressing any opinion." As long as Kennedy was a member of the Administration "he ought to be loyal--or at least keep his mouth shut."IB The two Ambassadors angrily parted. Whatever else Kennedy’s latest flare up with Bullitt indicated, it clearly showed that despite his endorsement of Roosevelt, Kennedy still remained sharply critical of his boss.

IBickes, March 10, 1940, Vol. Ill, 146. 354

In addition to Bullitt and Roosevelt, Kennedy also collided with

Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau over his self-appointed role as

Britain's economic adviser and once again, the outcome was a subtle

Presidential hint to Kennedy to mind his own business.

During the early months of 1940, the Administration, having decided to aid the Allies by "methods short of war," moved carefully so as not to rekindle the wrath of isolationists. Only after France fell did the Administration dare to move dramatically and publicly to aid Britain.

Till then, Roosevelt's only ace was the full implementation of the "cash and carry" program. Only by selling her assets could Britain obtain

American goods. Because she had defaulted on her World War I debts and because she was a belligerent, the Johnson Act and the Neutrality Act forbade the extension of American credit. Since Britain's cash reserves were low, they had to sell American securities and even dip into their declining gold supply to meet their payments. The United States Treasury and the Securities Stock Exchange were vitally interested in Britain's economic policy. They wanted them to make gradual controlled sales of securities to prevent economic dislocation in America's market and to keep as much of their gold as possible in order to preserve its value as the foundation of international exchange.

As the Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Kennedy believed it was his responsibility not just to keep the United States informed of

Britain's economic situation, but also to advise the British about their securities program. His early financial reports were quite depressing. "England is busted now," Kennedy told the Administration, 355 and Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, fully concurred with his view. Tlie situation was "worse than tragic." Even if by chance

Britain won the war, she would have to return to a medieval economic system. Everything— Europe's assets, the world's gold and currency-- all of it would belong to the United States. There would be "no hope for the world...at least none for Europe." Kennedy's role as Britain's self-appointed financial adviser was frowned upon by the Administration.

"This is what the President definitely doesn't want," said the Secretary of the Treasury.Morgenthau told the British Embassy that the Presi­ dent wanted the discussions transferred to Washington, but Kennedy con­ tinued to intervene in London.

In mid November, 1939, the British had arranged to sell their securities for a handsome profit and had then surprised Washington by announcing that their sale had been postponed and the money raised by selling gold. "I don't believe the English can be as dumb as they seem," the Secretary remarked. 90 Already irritated by Britain's change of plans,

Morgenthau was doubly angered when he learned "that Ambassador Kennedy

[had] had some influence in the decision to postpone the vesting."21

Initially, Kennedy had argued that Britain should sell her securities gradually and preserve her gold supply. And when he saw Roosevelt in

l^Blum, 104.

^^Morgenthau Diary, April 29, 1940, Vol. 258, 123, FDRL.

^^Blum, 106. 356

December, 1939, he complained that the British would give up nothing if they could help it.^Z But a few months later he changed his mind. He urged the Roosevelt Administration to issue a loan to Britain through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, despite the fact that it was forbidden by the Neutrality Act, and he urged the British to durap their securities all at once.23 "I can't understand it," Morgenthau said of

Kennedy. "He has turned about face...."^^ "Either the New York Stock

Exchange is open to do business," the Ambassador wrote, "or its function is finished. If a man has a lot of securities and he has to sell them, he has got to go right out and get the best price he can. If they had to liquidate these securities, unless the market becomes very active, you can take my word for it that there would be plenty of trouble." 25

Morgenthau was quite upset with Kennedy and thought he was urging a policy which would undermine the stability of the American market.

He grumbled to a staffer about receiving "one of these typical asinine

Joe Kennedy letters. ... What is behind this letter?" Morgenthau's aide a s k e d . "This is a very peculiar position for Joe Kennedy to take. In the first place, he knows from previous discussions from you and what­ not, that this is out. He must know enough about it to know that it is

ZZibid.

23jPK to FDR, Morgenthau Diary, April 11, 1940, Vol. 259, 405-409, FDRL; FDR to Morgenthau, April 26, 1940, PPF, 207, FDRL.

^^Morgenthau Diary, April 29, 1940, Vol. 258, 123, FDRL.

Z^Blum, 105.

26Morgenthau Diary, April 23, 1940, Vol. 258, 123, FDRL. 357

an absurd thing to recommend. He also knows it is an absurd position

to expect them to sell enough securities so that they won't be selling

any gold, because that would mean the sale of so many securities on our market that the SEC and everybody else would object strenuously. Tliere- 27 fore, there must be a third alternative which he hasn't implied there."

"The whole proceeding has left a very bad taste in my mouth,"

Morgenthau complained. He told the British financial attache that

"whatever Mr. Kennedy told them was his own personal opinion, not the opinion of the Administration." Actually, Morgenthau later learned that Kennedy's influence had been exaggerated. The British postponed the sale of securities not so much because of his advice, but because 28 Britain's first war loan had been delayed.

Morgenthau believed that Kennedy's "third alternative" was personal financial gain. "The only explanation I can get," the Secretary said, was "that he has been consistently short in the market." If this is correct, "that would explain this thing. Every move he makes is to bear down on our market...to depress our securities and our commodi­ ties."^^

Morgenthau's fears were without basis. Actually, the Ambassador believed he was acting in behalf of America's economic self-interest.

Z^Ibid., 129.

^^Blum, 107.

29Morgenthau Diary, April 23, 1940, Vol. 258, 129, FDRL. 358

Since he assumed that Britain's destruction was only a matter of time, he urged her to get rid of her securities all at once, while she still

could and while they were still valuable. This would give the United

States a unique opportunity to gain additional assets.

Kennedy also told Roosevelt that it was "indefensible for us to continue to take large quantities of gold from England and France before arranging to take over British-owned investments in the United States.

The value of gold was slipping; it would soon become a worthless commodity. The international market would soon be off the gold standard, he predicted. "It is a one way street and we might as well face it."^^

The Ambassador's advice was ignored.

In addition to arguing on the basis of economic nationalism,

Kennedy sincerely believed that his views carried considerable weight, if not with the Administration, then at least with influential isolation­ ists on Capitol Hill. He remarked boastfully to a friend that "the Senate

Foreign Affairs Committee has faith in me because of my previous work, 31 hence the value of what I say when I do say it...." "Sick and tired" of his interference, Morgenthau asked Canada's Prime Minister, Mackenzie

King, to persuade London to send a responsible Treasury official to 32 Washington. Until the emissary arrived, Roosevelt, under prodding

30jPK to FDR, Morgenthau Diary, May 3, 1940, Vol. 259, 408-409, FDRL; Hull Papers, April 11, 1940, 104, DSF; also see Bjerk, 180-181.

^^Bilainkin, April 8, 1940, 60.

^^Blum, 109. 359

from Morgenthau, wrote the Ambassador and told him that the United States

Treasury was pursuing "the only policy with respect to its gold purchases

that is compatible with the public interest."^3

In early February, acting on one of his hunches, the President

suddenly announced his decision to send a personal emissary on a fact­

finding mission to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London. Roosevelt believed

that the lull in the fighting offered a splendid opportunity to explore

the views of the four governments on the possibility of establishing a

permanent and just peace. His spokesman would offer no dramatic peace

proposals, make no suggestions and accept no commitments; he would only

wave the old bait— disarmament and trade expansion— under the Axis nose.

Perhaps Roosevelt was bored with Kennedy's fatalistic prophecies and

pessimistic reports of the democracies' c h a n c e s . ^4 Whatever his motive,

FDR's mind was made up. He wanted his own eyewitness and someone he

trusted. His choice for the mission was the urbane, sophisticated Under

Secretary of State, Sumner Welles.

In the early days in January, 1940, Roosevelt had summoned Welles

to the White House to discuss his proposal. Ever since war broke out,

the President explained, he had been mulling over whether or not there was still some course of action which he as the President of the United

States could take to avert the holocaust. Frankly, he told Welles, the

^^Morgenthau Diary, May 3, 1940, Vol. 259, 395, FDRL.

3‘^Koskoff states that "Roosevelt was unquestionably harsh on Kennedy for the Ambassador's efforts at peacemaking. Nonetheless, the President himself was attuned to just such possibilities...." 242-243. 360

chances seemed "about one in a thousand that anything at all could be done." Still, every conceiveable alternative had to be explored. "For various reasons," Roosevelt said, he [Welles] "was the most available person within the government to undertake this mission for him" iTie

President impressed upon the Under Secretary that he had no peace pro­ posals and certainly no authority from Congress or the American people to offer any new proposals. "My mission," wrote Welles, "therefore was a forlorn hope."^^ Rather like "peddling Bibles in a brothel" observed one columnist.

Early in February, Roosevelt discussed the proposed mission with the Secretary of State. Hull opposed the mission and warned the

President that hundreds of rumors would spring up regarding its purpose.

Nevertheless, as FDR had predicted, Hull graciously accepted the fait accompli. But his two volatile ambassadors in London and Paris, Kennedy and Bullitt, were outraged. They had not been consulted and bitterly protested that they were being superseded. Kennedy learned that Welles had authority to deal directly with the British and bypass him entirely.

^%elles. The Time for Decision, 77.

^^Alsop and Kintner, 86.

37 In his Memoirs, Hull wrote that Roosevelt told him that Welles had secretly requested the mission on several occasions. It was on his initiative, not the President's, Welles had argued that as as long as the "phoney war" lasted, some basis might yet be found for peace. 737-738; also see Hull's Memoirs for his criticism of the trip, 737-738. 361

A plea to the President got no results and in late February the angry

•7 0 Ambassador scurried back to London just in time to greet Welles.

Kennedy stopped off in Rome on his return and grumbled about Welles'

mission to Myron Taylor, recently appointed the United States representa­

tive to the Vatican. Taylor told him that he had warned the President

against sending anyone unless he consulted first with the American

Ambassadors stationed in the countries on Welles' itinerary. Otherwise,

he said, it "would tend to offend" them and "belittle their importance

as spokesmen for their countries." But, Taylor said, the President "cut

right through the normal diplomatic procedures." Kennedy nodded in

agreement. "I think the President wanted to make a stage play," Taylor

surmised. "It's like Roosevelt though," Kennedy said with resignation.

"He does those things...."^^

Actually, the President later confided to Breckinridge Long that

he had acted on impulse and in hopes that a "fact-finding" mission might

delay a Spring offensive; even better, Roosevelt said, it might prevent

it all together. Even if it only forced Hitler to revise his calendar by a week, it would be worthwhile. During that week the Allied position

38whalen, 280; Koskoff states that Kennedy "might fairly well have regarded the Welles mission as the fruit of his own efforts. While Bullitt saw Welles' trip as a blow to good order, Kennedy welcomed it as an overdue step in the right direction." 243. But Tlie Landis Papers themselves seem to contradict that assertion; see the following footnote.

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 538-539. 362

would be strengthened since they would receive military supplies. He

also wanted Welles to "get the low-down" on Hitler and Mussolini, FDR

said. Welles’ trip to London and Paris was really "window dressing;"

the President already knew what they thought. It wouldn’t do any harm,

he said, and it just might do some good.^O

Interestingly enough. The Spectator guessed Roosevelt’s motives.

It regarded the mission as "a bold, a wise and a welcome initiative,

whatever comes of it" and argued that the President was motivated by

a desire to "give a breathing-space by postponing a spring offensive--

what the American Ambassador in London called 'all Hell being let loose

in a couple of months.’" No harm could conceivably come to the Allied

cause from his intervention. And some good "conceivably may," it

wrote.

The President seemed to think that any serious peace proposals were

clearly out of the question. That may have been his opinion; but not

Sumner Welles' and certainly never Joe Kennedy's. The Under Secretary thought til at he had been sent abroad to ascertain whether there still remained any step which the President of the United States could take

"to avert the dangers that would so clearly confront the people of this country, as well as the civilized world, if the European war continued.

^Israel, March 12, 1940, 64; Moffat, 291; FRUS, February 26, March 19, 1940, Vol. I, 21-117 has the dispatches detailing Welles’ mission; Langer and Gleason, Vol. I, 361-375 has an excellent discussion of the mission.

^^The Spectator, February 16, 1940, 200.

^^Israel, March 12, 1940, 64--reference in a footnote; Welles, 73. 363

After touring the Axis countries and talking with Count Ciano,

Mussolini, Hitler, and his well rehearsed chorus of Nazi officials,

Welles concluded that the "best that could be hoped for was delay, for what little that might be worth.His interviews in Rome and Berlin convinced him that never before in European history had "the Western powers fought a more defensive war than that in which they are now engaged. The allegations of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Goering that the

Western Powers wanted the war might have had some deceptive effect in

1914," he wrote in his memoirs. But "they were farcial in 1939."^^

France impressed him as a tired old country already poisoned by Nazi propaganda. But Britain's courage, determination, and morale were impressive and heartening, as was Kennedy's diplomatic skill.

Kennedy, who had returned to London only four days earlier, met

Welles at the airport, eager to be of assistance and to act as host to the Under Secretary and his party. He regarded the mission as a splendid opportunity to reexamine "the possibility of a negotiated peaceV^G and gave him a run-down on his hastily gathered conclusions about Britain's chances. He reported that the Government was somewhat concerned about a recent by-election in which a political unknown won on an anti-war plank. But it still refused to make peace with Hitler's

"gang" on any terms that would permit the Nazis to claim victory.

43welles, 109.

44Ibid., 119.

45ibid., 128.

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 542-543.

4?Moffat, 298, 364

"England,'' said Kennedy, "will only accept a peace if they are convinced

that it is a sure one. There can be considerable give so far as its details are concerned but they must somehow be assured that they will ^ O not be required in a short time to hop in again." "Security, is the thing everyone wants," Welles mused. "Tliat's the difficulty. There is no confidence anywhere. The English point of view is that Hitler lied yesterday and that he will lie tomorrow. And I confess I agree with them."49

Nevertheless, the Under Secretary did have a plan for peace. "There is only one possibility and that is to devise a mechanical peace....If the nations won't trust each other, the sanctions to enforce whatever arrangement can be agreed upon will have to be fashioned so that they will come into operation automatically. Even so, Welles saw little possibility of implementing his plan. He suggested an international air force or the creation of a strong neutral bloc. "But I have to ask myself where that bloc is. The three nations, other than ourselves, that are not at war are Russia, Italy, and Japan. How much can you trust them?" he asked, Kennedy sadly shook his head. Despite the unlikelihood of establishing the principle of collective security, Welles suggested his plan to Halifax, who replied that it seemed to raise too many problems.

4^TIie Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 551. 49ibid.

SOlbid., 555.

Sllbid., 560. 365

Kennedy also confided to Welles that unofficial peace feelers had been extended to Germany. Lord Tavistock, an ardent pacifist and a lover of "causes" told Kennedy that he, on his own initiative, had asked the

German Legation in Dublin to submit a plan for a negotiated peace in

January, 1940. He did receive a tentative proposal which impressed

Halifax as being quite reasonable. Still, Halifax distrusted Hitler and responded with a "provocative speech" later that month. Undaunted,

Tavistock, with the Foreign Secretary's permission, even went to Dublin unofficially in late February to inquire further. By that time the

Germans were no longer interested and the terms were repudiated by the

German Foreign Office. The negotiations were leaked to the British press who made a laughing stock of Tavistock and the proposals. Never­ theless, Tavistock persisted and asked Kennedy to convey the peace

CO proposals to Welles.^

Both men took the matter seriously and tried to authenticate the incident, but were unable to corroborate Tavistock's account. Neverthe­ less, that they tried indicates how serious they were about investigating all possibilities.

Kennedy also warned his guests that anti-American feeling was rapidly rising in the press and among friendly British officials who could see no reason why the United States had not already joined the Allies.

52lbid., 547. 366

Kennedy passed on Eden's off-hand sarcastic remark; "We're going to be r 7 very polite to Sumner Welles; that will surely be appreciated in America,"

Actually the British were quite resentful of this form of American intrusion. They regarded it as a grandstand play by Roosevelt; a poli­ tical gesture designed for use in the upcoming election of 1940. The

Economist wrote that the visit of "Mr. Roosevelt's Dove" should be inter­ preted in the light of American politics. Roosevelt was "far too shrewd a judge" of Europe's affairs to believe that peace could really result.

But "he is quite as shrewd a judge" of the American domestic political situation which was dominated by the 1940 elections. Welles' mission was supposed to placate and soothe American fears about the war. They did not want to go to war; neither did they want to be left out. "The Welles mission exactly expresses this paradox.The Foreign Office viewed the mission as "part of the President's campaign to wake up American opinion to the difficulties of ultimately keeping out of the war."^^

"Roosevelt is ready to play a dirty trick on the world and risk the ultimate destruction of the Western democracies in order to secure re- election of the Democratic candidate in the United States," Sir Robert

Vansittart at the Foreign Office argued. Furthermore, he added, Welles was a "lunatic" for advocating peace with Hitler.Even Chamberlain

S^Moffat, 298.

^^The Economist, February 17, 1940, 281-282.

S5po 371/24251/A1384/605/45, March 3, 1940, 72.

S^Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1971, 1 as cited in Bjerk, 165. 367 suspected Roosevelt's motives. Nevertheless, to maintain harmony in

Anglo-American relations, British officials reluctantly agreed to receive

Welles and cordially went through the pretense of seriously discussing the possibility of peace.

Though he was graciously received, a certain amount of British hos­ tility was aimed at Kennedy. Tlie Ambassador told Welles "of the rather extraordinary fact" that he had not received an invitation to join Welles at the Palace for tea with the King and Queen. Welles was stunned. "Was this intentional?" he asked in amazement. "Well," Kennedy replied, 57 "Stevenson, Halifax's secretary, could hardly have made it plainer."

"Tliis is just the kind of thing that the press will love," said the

Under Secretary. Some will argue that you and I have had a row, others will claim that "the British want to put something over on me," and have ignored you because "you are on to them," and still others will think that the British are mad at you because you oppose American intervention in the war. Any of these theories will "raise hell" in America and have CO serious consequences for the British, he told Kennedy. Fortunately,

Welles saw to it that Kennedy received an invitation and smoothed over the incident.

Tlie slight to Kennedy probably was intentional. How deep the hos­ tility actually went is difficult to determine but if Vansittart's reaction is any indication, it was extremely bitter. "Mr. Kennedy is a very foul specimen of double-crosser and defeatist," he wrote.He had no

5?The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 557.

SGlbid., 557-558.

59Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1971, 1; as cited in Bjerk, 174. 368

business being Ambassador. The sooner Kennedy was relieved of his post,

the better for everyone.

Together, Kennedy and Welles made the rounds of British officialdom

searching for some possibility for a peaceful solution. They talked with

the Cabinet, the leaders of both parties, Lloyd George, and the Royal

Family.

During Welles' first interview with Chamberlain, the Prime Minister

made it completely clear that he opposed any negotiated peace with the

Nazis. If the Nazis were removed from power and some other group put in,

"it might be possible to get somewhere," Chamberlain said. In that case,

he would welcome a reexamination of the touchy Polish and Czech issues,

problems on which he was "more than willing to be reasonable." But "it

was impossible to do business on any terms with the existing regime,"

Halifax interjected that he opposed any peace which would enable Hitler

"to save face with the German people....I think this is highly important," he added.

"I just don't see that," Kennedy remarked. If a proper solution could be found for Poland and Czechoslovakia, if Europe got peace and security

and if Hitler convinced the Germans that he had done something great for

them, "why should you object?" Kennedy rejected as too narrow and too rigid

the Prime Minister's assumption that peace was impossible as long as Hitler

and the Nazis remained in power. Chamberlain replied to Kennedy's argu­ ments with a polite "perhaps" and continued to defend his position. Making a distinction between the Germans and the Nazis he said: "Our quarrel is not with the German people." He doubted that the regime could be toppled by anti-Nazi German groups without "a real war." 369

Sounding very much like the Under Secretary himself, the Prime

Minister explained that the lack of confidence was the major inter­

national problem. Repeating Halifax's objections to Welles' suggestion

of an international air force; Chamberlain argued that on disarmament,

he had found it impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive

arms. "Though in my heart and soul I am for peace, I can see no real

peace without the restoration of confidence, and, of course, without

that we cannot even contemplate disarmament." "Someone will have to

start sometime," Welles remarked. "Confidence or disarmament, which is

to come first? It is like the old story of the chicken and the egg."

Both Kennedy and Welles were unhappy over the interview. Welles observed

that "Chamberlain seems to me a tired man whose mind is not too elastic."

Kennedy replied that the Prime Minister's call for the end of Hitler's

regime as a prelude to any peace was not much for Welles to work on.^^

Everywhere the response was equally pessimistic. The Labour leaders,

Attlee and Greenwood, believed that security was possible only after a war had taught Hitler that force could not succeed. Sir Archibald

Sinclair, the leader of the Liberal Party, was even more emphatic about

peace being impossible on any other basis than crushing Germany's military might. Reporting on a meeting with Churchill, Kennedy found him positive and emphatic. "We will, of course, win the war and that

is the only hope of civilization," Churchill had said. After the defeat of the Nazi Regime, a "monster born of hatred and of fear," Germany

GOfhe Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 563-572. 370 would have to be disarmed and her industrial plants confiscated. "All

of this will cost us dear," Churchill had admitted, gesturing as though he were speaking to thousands. After World War I, "the victor forgot,

the vanquished plotted on." Welles reminded Churchill that the war had not yet really begun but that when it did, it would mean wholesale

devastation and total economic destruction. "I am not sure of that,"

Churchill replied, rejecting this doomsday thesis. That had not happened after the last war he argued, in fact the world's standard of living had vastly improved.

"That is taking a short view of it," Kennedy interjected. "The well that the water has been taken out of has become drier and drier. This is the climax of your process of 'raising standards;'" it was the product of the economic conditions which Churchill extolled. "Just to maintain those standards," Kennedy continued, "it has now become necessary" to go out and tap other people's wells. That kind of an economic structure is nothing to brag about." Churchill simply ignored the remark and elaborated upon his theme of the necessity of destroying Germany. After their inter­ view, Kennedy and Welles drove back to the Dorchester Hotel saying little.

There "was so little to say," Kennedy remarked.

Their next series of conversations were with Lloyd George, Eden, and the High Commissioner of Australia, the spokesman for the Dominions.

Gllbid., 566-569. 371

Lloyd George was one of the few critics of Britain's policy of military destruction of the Nazi regime. He favored a negotiated peace. Nothing great or enduring would come from the present conflict. Nor did all the blame belong to Germany; Allied statesmanship had also been inept. "The totalitarian governments and I include Russia...have brilliant leader­ ship whereas the democracies have none," he said. Roosevelt was the only exception. "Here at home we have practically nothing," he remarked.

Chamberlain was "honest but second rate" and utterly ignorant of foreign affairs; Halifax was "not strong enough;" Daladier was a "very ordinary sort" and Reynaud, "just not big enough.

The Socialist James Maxton was also critical of Britain's leaders.

They were as power hungry as the Nazis, he said. Only the President of the United States could provide the leadership and construct a settle­ ment which the people of Europe would accept. Maxton's faith lay with the "masses" who would eagerly follow Roosevelt, should he decide to lead.63

At the conclusion of their interviews, one thing in particular stood out in Kennedy's mind. "The old men who run the government are all so near the grave that they run the war as if there were no genera­ tions to follow them. The young ones look at it as a job and they love it and will not give it up. There seems no real fire anywhere, no genius, no sense of the shambles that are to come," he told Welles.

G^Ibid., 570.

63ibid., 572. 372

"Yes," the Under-Secretary replied. The British keep talking about making war to restore moral values, "but they don't seem to realize that these moral values will have a very slim chance to survive [a] war of devas­ tation.

The British, disappointed because Welles' first interview with

Chamberlain had proved so fruitless, arranged a second interview with the Prime Minister and Halifax. Again Chamberlain repeated his conviction that Britain could not enter into an agreement with Hitler and that confidence must be firmly established before disarmament negotiations could begin.He then introduced a new proposal which indicated that his position was more flexible. If another group gained power in Germany, then an agreement might be arranged along with a solution to the political problems of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The British Empire would give assurances to the United States that it would fulfill its commitments to Germany, Chamberlain suggested. This would have a moral effect and bind the Governments of the Empire regardless of who was Prime Minister.

This seemed to be a practical proposal for a negotiated peace. Welles posed a question to Chamberlain: Assuming that Poland could be recreated, that a rump Czechoslovakian state could be built from Bohemia and

Moravia, that a plebiscite was held in Austria, that the Germans gave a commitment to disarmamemt, and that a central authority composed of

G4ibid. GSibid. 373

the nations of Europe could be established--then would you be willing

to negotiate a settlement? After some hesitation, Chamberlain replied,

"Yes."66

If Hitler agreed to these suggestions and if the British still refused to make peace, Kennedy joked, "Why I myself would like to lead the opposition to the Chamberlain Government." If what Welles suggested could be worked out, it would be nothing short of a "miracle," Chamberlain said. "The chances are one in a thousand," Welles replied, "but there seems to be a chance and therefore, I must explore every possibility."

Kennedy was elated! Welles had managed to modify Chamberlain's position that a military defeat of Germany was a necessary pre-condition of peace. But Welles had just come from Germany where his interviews with Nazi officials had convinced him that there could never be a negotiated peace with Britain. IVhy then did he dare to hope that such a peace was possible? IVhy had he not explained the German view to

Chamberlain? Perhaps he, like Kennedy, so desperately wanted peace that he would grasp at any straw. "Even if nothing comes of it," Kennedy later told the Prime Minister, "the record will show that England was at least willing to try."^^ it would undermine Hitler's charge that Britain's aim was the destruction of Germany.

The evening of the interview Welles and Moffat attended a stag dinner given by Chamberlain, in which Britain's leading political figures were

66lbid., 575.

6?Ibid., 577.

68lbid. 374

present: Churchill, Hoare, Attlee, and others. Moffat, who had previously

been very critical of Kennedy's capacity and performance as Ambassador,

now altered his opinion. He was particularly impressed by Kennedy's dip­

lomatic skill.

Throughout the dinner the war was scrupulously avoided. Conversation was light and rambled from personal observations about the last war, to

the habits of the Slavic peoples, to Chamberlain's opinion of Mrs. Andrew

Carnegie, and the Reverend Endicott Peabody, and how much sleep each of

the ten guests needed. At the end of the evening, Kennedy maneuvered

the conversation around to the touchy war issue. Under the guise of

good natured banter and jesting, he got across many distasteful truths

to the British politicians concerning Anglo-American relations. Somehow the conversation revolved around America's distrust of Churchill.

Kennedy, ready with a quip, said he told Hull that even if the ship on which the American Ambassador was sailing was blown up, it would not be a cause for war, "I thought that would give me some protection against Churchill's placing a bomb on the ship,,,.Not I," said Churchill, who refused to be outdone, "I am certain that the United States will come in later anyway.Kennedy's performance "was superlatively done," wrote Moffat in his memoirs. "He made it clear that certain things, such as taking out ships into the combat area, could not be done without risking

69Tlie Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 578. 375

a serious f l a r e - u p . Because of Kennedy's persuasiveness, even Churchill

ultimately accepted his arguments. Welles had also impressed the British

political leaders. They publicly praised him in the House of Commons, 71 "a rare occurrence," Kennedy told Welles.

At the end of his tour, Welles kept thinking about a phrase Paul

Reynaud had used. He had told Welles that what was needed above all else 77 was "daring statesmanship." Welles sadly concluded that Roosevelt was the only democratic head of State at that time who possessed it and only the United States could give Hitler pause. However, Welles was realistic enough to note that no Washington executive with any sense of political authority or awareness of constitutional prerogatives could accept the responsibility of warning Hitler that the United States would aid the democracies should he continue his policy of aggression and conquest.

"And yet," Welles sadly concluded, "it was only that threat which would have the remotest chance of averting the greatest calamity that the modern 73 world had known." Tlie Welles mission was futile. The only peace settlement which the Axis wanted was one which they themselves imposed.

Moffat's assessment of Kennedy's performance was in marked contrast to the British appraisal. Tlie British were plainly worried about Kennedy's return to London. An unnamed but "very reliable" American journalist told a Foreign Office official that Kennedy was returning to London,

^^Moffat, 301.

371/24251/A1945/605/45, March 9, 1940, 191

^^Welles, 134.

73%bid. 120. 376

"not because he wants to or because the President or State Department have the slightest confidence in him, but in order to get him out of the way. He is in a position to control 25,000,000 Catholic votes." He also suggested that Welles' mission was "not altogether uninspired by

Mr. Kennedy."7^ After all, Kennedy received his appointment to pacify the

East Coast Irish and owes his position to the fact that "he represents a

Catholic, Irish, anti-English group. He must therefore continue to exhibit this type of attitude,

Kennedy's comments to American newsmen destroyed whatever good will may have existed in London. Harold Nicolson wrote that "Kennedy has been spreading it abroad in the U.S.A. that we shall be beaten and he will use his influence here to press for a negotiated peace.The British Foreign 77 Office thought his remarks "quite amusing and quite offensive." In particular the touchy Sir Robert Vansittart in the British Foreign Office fiercely disliked anyone whom he considered to be "playing Hitler's game"

74fO 371/24251/A1723/605/45, March 7, 1940, 62.

^Spo 371/24251/A1723/605/45, March 6, 1940, 174.

^^Nicolson, February 29, 1940, Vol. II, 60; Hie Foreign Office had heard "disquieting accounts of Mr. Kennedy's ideas of peace, which would seem in fact to amount to a German victory." Several Foreign Office officials suggested that either Halifax or the Prime Minister might have "a firm talk" with Kennedy. FO 371/24251/A1384/605/45, February 14, 1940, 6; Aso see FO 371/24251/A605/605/45, January 18, 1940, for further evidence. 77 FO 371/24251/605/45/, March 18, 1940, 9.

78 Interview with Vansittart, London, July 30, 1972, as cited in Koskoff, 239. 377

and he too was quite concerned that the Ambassador had returned to press

for a negotiated peace,"He is a malevolent and pigeon-livered," one

foreign Office official charged. "I don't believe we can [alter his

views],"Mr. Kennedy is a very foul specimen of double-crosser and 81 defeatist. He thinks of nothing but his own pocket," another wrote.

The Foreign Office decided to be much more reserved in front of Kennedy

and spread the word that he was no longer to be "treated like an honorary

member of the cabinet,Jadogan passed the word on in highly secret 83 notes to other department and state heads,

Kennedy too was uneasy and dejected about returning to his post.

Upon his return he stopped briefly in Paris and conferred with Robert

Murphy at the American Embassy, He complained constantly throughout

the conversation about "his bad health, his discontent over returning

to London, his belief that everything he could do there could just as well be done by a $50-a-month clerk that he wanted to quit but didn't see how he gracefully could before the elections. He said the United

79 Nicolson, February 29, 1940, Vol. II, 60,

BOpo 371/24251/A1945, March 2, 1940, 86; also cited in Koskoff, 239.

Blpo 371/24251/A605/605/45, January 18, 1940,

GZpo 371/24251/A605/605/45, March 3, 1940, 87; also cited in Koskoff, 239, 83 Koskoff wrote that Cadogan's message was so secret as to have been omitted from the minutes, but copies of responses have been received from other responses and are contained in the Foreign Office files, FO 371/ 2 1/A605/605/45; March 3, 1940, 87ff, also cited in Koskoff, 239, A letter from W, B, Brown in the Foreign Office to Cadogan promised to "give oral warning to any members of this Department likely to be concerned," FO 371/24251/A1945/605/45, March 21, 1940, 378

States would be crazy to go into the war, and that he didn't mind

telling the British that they were kidding themselves if they believed

otherwise.

Nor did he enjoy the same friendly relationship with the press.

Kennedy denounced newsmen's charges of "Uncle Shylock" and Americans

getting fat on the world's misery as complete "poppycock." He emphasized

that "there can be no general advantage from the war for the United States."

Americans, he explained, were neither selfish nor callous; they simply

felt like the British prior to Munich. They all say "we don't want to

fight," Kennedy replied. In response to a reporter's question about the

strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States, Kennedy replied

"If you mean by isolation a desire to keep out of war I should say that

it is definitely stronger." Then he tactlessly added "I think it is

stronger because the people understand the war less and less as they go

along." Writing in his Memoirs years later, Kennedy mused that "those

remarks which I believe correctly summarized American thinking at that

time, were not received graciously by the British press. In fact, the

press lashed out at me quite bitterly.

"My Dear Ambassador IVhy Didn't You Tell Them?" replied Beverley A. 87 Baxter, a columnist in the Sunday Graphic and a one time Kennedy fan

84Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York, 1964), 38.

DC New York Times, March 8, 1940, 8; Times (London) March 8, 1940, 8; FO 371/24238/A1904/131/45, March 13, 1940, 274.

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 542.

87pO 371/24238/A1904/131/45, March 13, 1940, 274; The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 542. 379 whom Kennedy accused of confusing "my function as the American Ambassador

to Britain with that of Lothian as the British Ambassador to the United

States."88 And a writer in the Daily Express, England's largest news­

paper, argued that Kennedy's experience and knowledge gave him the respon­

sibility for educating his countrymen.89 Kennedy was even harsh with his old friend, Neville Chamberlain. Tlie former Prime Minister recorded in his diary on July 1, "Saw Joe Kennedy who says everyone in the U.S.A. thinks we shall be beaten before the end of the month.

Suddenly the man who had been the most popular American ambassador in living memory was finding London very chilly. He was hurt and dismayed by the change. "It soon became evident that a coolness had developed towards me in those circles, official and otherwise, whose main use for

America was to embroil her in the war," he remarked.Kennedy himself had drawn the line of national self interest. Many of his former British friends chose to remain on their own side. "The British had come to think of him as one of their own," wrote one correspondent from London. "They expected him to plead the British cause when he went home. Joe was shocked by the changed atmosphere. He spent more time with Embassy people and American friends since the British social invitations were not

O O The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 542.

G^Whalen, 280-281.

99iain MacLeon, Neville Chamberlain, 279; IVhalen, 239.

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 542. 380

as numerous as in pre-war times." At one of the few English parties which Kennedy did attend, he noticed that "the atmosphere was distinctly

anti-American." Even his American born hostess, Nancy Astor, who kept

insisting that anti-Americanism had not increased, couldn’t resist a few well-placed barbs echoing the current critical English attitude toward the

U.S. Anthony Eden, playing diplomat, tried to soften some of the comments.

He told Kennedy that anti-American attitudes were caused not by your

Government’s general attitude toward the war, but by its failure to assist the Finns "in their gallant struggle.... Knowing too well the cold calcu­

lations of Halifax and Chamberlain that had always placed the question of

Finnish aid wholly subsidiary to the interests of Great Britain," Kennedy Q % wrote, "I had some difficulty in containing myself...."

Harold Nicolson blamed Kennedy’s social intimates for his pessimistic views. "Were I to frequent only those circles in which Mr. Kennedy is so welcome a guest, I also should have long periods of gloom," he wrote in Tlie

Spectator. Upon his return, Kennedy would be warmly received, he pre­ dicted, by the bankers and isolationists, the knights and baronets, by

^^McCarthy, 83; Bilainkin also gives evidence for the change in Kennedy’s social life. He wrote that "Kennedy does not go out to any dinners now a days, in the old days he wanted as much as a month’s notice for a luncheon or dinner appointment." Instead "he works hard, he says, and reads much." April 8, 1940, 61.

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 550. 381 the "shiver-sisters of Mayfair," and the "wobbleboys of Whitehall," by the "native or unhyphenated rich" hoping for a raft of appeasement upon which to comfortably float for a year or so, by the Anglo-American colony in London and the Christian Pacifists, by the friends of Herr von Ribbentrop and members of former pro-Nazi organizations and by

M. Maisky, the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. "Few envoys, on returning to their posts, can have received a welcome of such embarrassing variety,"

Nicholson sarcastically wrote. This reception committee was only the

"rind of British opinion" which had been "flecked in places by the frosts of this eventless war." The central core was firm and tough.

If the Ambassador could only go in disguise to Leicester and Glasgow he would realize that "the lisps of the pusing popinjays of Belgravia, the sights of the ageing egoists of Mayfair, are but as the ripple of water in the reeds.

Even Kennedy's reception in the American Embassy was cool. He had always kept his distance from the Embassy crowd and even before his vacation there was a distinct anti-Kennedy feeling among his staff.

One official there grumbled to a member of the Foreign Office that he deplored the Ambassador's holiday speeches.Another defended his boss against the biting criticism of a conservative English politician but in doing so gave "the impression of agreeing" with his critic's charges.

^^The Spectator, March 8, 1940, 327.

^^Mr. Jebb's note, FO 371/24418/C2461/1285, February 14, 1940; Koskoff, 548.

B^Gage Minute, FO 371/24251/A1945, March 2, 1940, 193. 382

When Kennedy returned to London, he had become so unpopular with his

own staff and the American press corps that American newsmen "wax 97 indignant at the mere mention of Kennedy's name."

Regardless, Kennedy continued stoutly to defend his views. He

told a British reporter that his much berated Boston speech "was not an

iota different from what I had said here." It "should not have come as

a surprise," he remarked. "I have very little idea what it's really

all about, and nobody else seems to have much more." He mentioned a

census conducted by the Sunday Express, Kennedy added; it showed that

a third of its readers, even people in Britain, did not know what the war was about. "If I had said anything else, favouring anything but

isolation, think what our Press would have said over there. They would have shouted, 'Here is another Walter Page; he is the British Ambassador and not the American Ambassador any longer.'" It would completely have undermined his position and opened the way to wholesale attacks, the

Ambassador argued. "As for myself, I don't care what the hell they say,"

n Q Kennedy proclaimed.

Nevertheless, the one person with whom Kennedy continued to maintain a steady, friendly relationship was Neville Chamberlain. Tlie day after his return to London, the Ambassador paid a courtesy call upon the Prime

371/24251/A1945, February 3, 1940, 86; Koskoff wrote "those to whom [he] spoke certainly did." 548.

^^Bilainkin, April 8, 1940, 58-60. 383

Minister. "Chamberlain was his usual gracious self and welcomed me back with a warmth that indicated that the newspaper comments on the remarks that I had made in America and those I had made on my arrival had had no effect upon his regard for me," Kennedy wrote.^9

Even the German News Agency took pot-shots at Kennedy. In a story released from the Hague in mid-March, the Nazi press claimed that

Kennedy had lost "the good will of the British Government" because of his "confidential" reports criticizing Britain's diplomatic blunders and the ineffectiveness of the Allied air power and blockade methods.

The report was completely denied by Hull. He told Roosevelt that the story "is clearly intended to be a trouble-making story. It is wholly unsupported by any facts." No such diplomatic despatch had even been made, the State Department flatly said.^^® Kennedy labeled the charges:

"the best fairy tale I've read since 'Snow IVhite. ' Not a word of truth in it."^°^

A few weeks later, the publication of the German White Book gave reporters even more ammunition with which to attack the Ambassador.

TJie German publication allegedly contained documents confiscated from the Polish Government during the Nazi invasion of Poland, These docu­ ments contained conversations which the Polish Ambassador supposedly had

G^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 548.

lO^Times (London), March 18, 1940, 8.

lOlpO 371/24238/A1904/131/45, March 17, 1940, 275. 384 with Ambassadors Kennedy and Bullitt and "proved” that not only the

Allies but also the United States had encouraged Poland to acquiesce

in the Nazi demands.

Throughout the German White Book, both the Ambassadors' names fre­

quently appeared. Kennedy was mentioned in a despatch to Warsaw from the Polish Embassy in London which stated that he would intervene with

Halifax to ensure that the Poles received the loan they had requested.

In one document, Jan Wsyelaki, the Polish Commercial Counsellor in London, reported that he had spoken with Kennedy on June 16, 1939, and said:

"The Ambassador agreed that cash was of the greatest importance, saying that if England would now withdraw its help in this matter they would have to give ten times this amount later in order to obtain the same effect. He added that he was going to see the Premier [sic] Lord

Halifax, and that he would mention the necessity of helping Poland immediately with cash." Kennedy confirmed the first statement but couldn't recall the second. In his Memoirs, he wrote that "I could very probably have told Halifax that the Poles needed cash and not sterling credits. 102

^Q^The Landis Papers, Chapter 41, no pagination; Bilainkin, Kennedy's friend, took the release of the documents quite in stride. "Perhaps a diplomat de carrière might have been more aloof, but then we must pay for having business celebrities as ambassadors, and surely if Kennedy did speak in the way suggested, it was no heinous crime." Bilainkin, March 30, 1940, 55. 385

The Nazi publication contained several other references to Kennedy.

One document claimed that in March, 1939, he said "that England would

go to war if the Poles resisted a German attack, particularly on Danzig."

This was his opinion, he wrote and "I very probably voiced it." A

document of June 16, 1939, reported that Joe Kennedy Jr. "had recently

visited Poland and other European countries and had views on their

problems," and that the elder Kennedy had boasted that young Joe had

"the ear of the President and was listened to by him probably more than

I.... With considerable paternal pride," Kennedy admitted, "I had sent

some of young Joe's observations to the President and I could easily

have bragged about the interest that I thought the President took in

t h e m . " 1 0 3

Kennedy was convinced of the authenticity of the German White Book

and wrote years later "I thought both that the documents were not

forgeries and that the reporting ot the Polish Ambassador was reasonably

accurate." Not only were the statements made about him reliable but the

allegations attributed to Bullitt were identical with the views he had

so frequently expressed to Kennedy. Tlie Ambassador in Paris was quoted

as saying that the United States would join the Allies if a war broke

out over Poland and that we would "not take part in it at the beginning, but we shall end it."l^^

lO^ibid. 386

Sumner Welles too, agreed with Kennedy's assessment of the documents.

When he was in London, he told Kennedy that he was "amazed" at what the documents contained, Bullitt did not just limit his promise of assistance to the Poles; he also gave the French assurances of our support, "Bullitt, you know, has been mixing into almost every phase of the French Government and has even been advising them on military strategy," Welles said. He has even complained to the President of being worn out "because he had been practically running the French Government," Tlie Belgian Ambassador said that two of the most dangerous men in Europe today were Bullitt and

Ribbentrop, Bullitt was "an unbalanced war monger," Welles repeated to

Kennedy,

The publication of the documents caused a major uproar within the

Administration and the American press, Roosevelt insisted upon a cate­ gorical denial, Hull, deeply concerned about the allegations, repudiated the documents saying that they did not have "the slightest credence,"

"They have not represented in any way at any time the thought or the policy of the American Government," Breckinridge Long spoke to both

Kennedy and Bullitt regarding the documents and warned them against communicating either with Roosevelt or each other over the trans-Atlantic telephone,

^Q^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 553,

lOGlsrael, March 27, 1940, 73-74, 387

One State Department official viewed the problem as a local politi­

cal one, not a diplomatic one. "The Republicans are looking for some

issue which would indicate that the Administration is edging into this war," he wrote. In and of themselves, the documents released were not particularly important, but the remarks attributed to Kennedy and

Bullitt might have an "accumulative effect, as they both involve from time to time the President's name and attribute to him agreement with 107 the ideas allegedly expressed."

Despite its categorical denial, the State Department had "just a sneaking suspicion" that there was "more truth than fiction in some of the conversations. Not only do they have the ear-marks of authenticity," wrote Long, "but they indicate actions which are characteristic of both

Bullitt and Kennedy." Hull, long critical of both men, deeply resented their custom of "going over his head and talking to the President." He has had to get Roosevelt's consent to their instructions first before they were sent in order to maintain harmony between the President and himself and the State Department. The Secretary also feared that there were other documents, particularly dealing with Bullitt, which might be 108 even more revealing than those already published.

The publication of the German White Book raised a furor in the

United States as editorial after editorial warned against making com­ mitments contrary to American self interest. And for a while, some of

^^^Ibid., 73.

lOGlbid., 74. 388

the more ardent isolationists like Senator Reynolds of North Carolina

and Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York threatened to hold a Congres­

sional investigation. Kennedy, meantime, maintained a discreet silence.

He wrote his wife that he would welcome a Congressional investigation,

both from his own personal standpoint and for the country's welfare.1^9

He might also have relished a thorough investigation of his by now arch­

enemy, William Bullitt, whom he continued to blame along with Roosevelt,

for pushing the Allies into accepting the Danzig issue as causus belli.

He may have regarded the German White Papers as "proof" of his theory

that the Allies should have left Poland alone to negotiate as best she

could with the Germans.

Kennedy briefly discussed the incident with George Bilainkin, a

loyal admirer and "the ubiquitous diplomatic correspondent" for the

Allied newspapers. As they discussed the German documents and the

whole range of Anglo-American relations, Bilainkin noticed that Kennedy

showed signs of overwork and strain. 112 "I have been scrupulous all the

^^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 41, no pagination.

^^^Years later, Kennedy told James Forrestal "that Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington." Forrestal Diaries, 121-122,

ll^The Landis Papers, Chapter 41, no pagination.

^^^Bilainkin, April 8, 1940, 61. 389

time I have been here never to say what I could, or might not, do, in 113 my relations with your Government," he told Bilainkin. The United

States was doing all it possibly could by sending planes and economic

aid to Britain. "I am doing my best," Kennedy boasted. "IVhat good would it be to send American troops, even if you succeeded in making

the people favour intervention, which they most definitely do not at

the moment? It would take months to get them to Europe. American women don't want their sons involved in war. That feeling may have to

change," Kennedy conceded, but "not yet. Your mothers did not want this war either," said the Ambassador. Look at Britain! "If the situation

is what it is said to be now, after seven months of war, following a year in which you had time to do something after Munich, what could the position have been, must have been in September 1938?...That was why I favoured

Munich," he said solemnly. "Britons are fighting not for freedom of small nations, Poland or anybody else, but for self-preservation. They know if they did not have a crack at the Germans now, afterwards it would be too late. IVhen, if that situation faces America, the people's view will doubtless change."

What if the United States declared war?, Bilainkin asked. Would it act as a restraining influence on the Germans? "I think not," Kennedy replied. "America is definitely thoroughly isolationist in sentiment and that is not altogether due to anti-British feeling. Look at Finland!" he said. "Here was a definite case calling for real assistance; sympathy

^^^Ibid., 59. 390 throughout the United States was overwhelmingly pro-Finnish, a small nation being outraged by the large Soviet bear. "But then look what happened. America agreed to help, and in the end permitted money to be spent on lard, a useless commodity practically, for a nation fighting for its life."ll^

The only ripple in the omnious pause in the West during the "phony war" had been the Soviet invasion of Finland launched in November, 1939.

By March, 1940, the Red Army was forcing the Helsinki Government to accept a dictated peace.Prior to the Soviet-Finnish War, the Scandi­ navian countries had played no significant role in Hitler's plans.

Repeatedly he remarked that Nazi occupation of countries as large as

Norway and Sweden would be impracticable. On the other hand, Nazi con­ trol over bases like Narvik on the Norwegian coast could certainly be useful in the submarine war against the Allies. Throughout the winter months of the "phony war," the Nazis became concerned about Allied designs in Scandinavia and Hitler decided upon action to prevent an

Allied occupation of Norway and Denmark.On March 1 he ordered the occupation of these two countries. The objective was to prevent Allied

ll^ibid., 60.

ll^See Langer and Gleason for an excellent discussion of the Soviet-Finnish War, 376-385.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 391; also see Churchill, Vol. II for a discussion of Britain's interest in Norwegian ports, 513-519. 391 intervention, to gain control of the iron-ore route from Narvik and 117 to seize naval and air bases for use against the Allies.

The ramshackle British landings in Norway deepened Kennedy's gloom.

He sent off a long bleak report to Roosevelt and Hull describing British unpreparedness and inefficiency. But neither Roosevelt nor Hull were sympathetic. Kennedy, wrote Hull, possessed "a keen, not to say bril­ liant mind and intense energy, and always spoke bluntly and courageously when necessary. He was alert and conscientious in the performance of his every duty. Nevertheless, neither the President nor I could see 118 eye to eye with him in his extreme pessimism over Britain's future."

And on May 3 as the Norwegians unhappily signed an armistice with

Germany, Roosevelt took time out to bolster up his Ambassador's sagging spirits. "These are bad days for all of us who remember always that when real world forces come into conflict, the final result is never 119 as dark as we mortals guess it in very difficult days." Roosevelt publicly condemned the Nazi aggression. The American Government extended the Neutrality Law to include the entire Norwegian and

Finnish coasts and froze Norwegian and Danish funds in American banks to prevent their liquidation by the Nazis. This was the beginning of

ll^Langer and Gleason, 395-396; see Langer and Gleason 376-404 for the Finnish War and its effect on Hitler's thinking; see Churchill, Vol. I for a full discussion of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway and the Allied response, 523-539; Burns, 418.

ll^Hull, 763.

ll^Elliott Roosevelt, Vol. II, 1020. 392

America’s economic war against the Axis, Roosevelt declared that both

Greenland and Iceland, Denmark's possessions, were in the Western Hemi- 120 sphere and hence protected from confiscation by the Monroe Doctrine.

Through Kennedy's prompting, he also arranged for the safe transportation

of the Norwegian Crown Princess and her family and cabled the relieved

King and Crown Prince that his "deliglitful wife and children are safely with us tonight at Hyde Park and have stood the difficult voyage well.”121

Kennedy wrote to an American friend describing his complete dejection.

He felt useless and discarded and continued to insist that U.S. involve­

ment would prove disastrous. He wanted to resign and go home. Could

Roosevelt give him a position elsewhere, he mused? His friend suggested

that perhaps Kennedy could leave gracefully by becoming chairman of the

Democratic National Committee. Kennedy considered the suggestion and then said "no.” The war had begun a new phase. Leaving now "would be

too much like walking out in the pinches."122

Even before the disasters in Scandinavia Chamberlain's Government had faced a loud barrage of criticism; criticism became even commonplace at the bastion of pro-appeasement sentiment, Cliveden, Lady Aster's

estate. "No one was satisfied," grumbled one frequent week-end guest,

"that Neville C. is directing the war with the necessary energy and imagination."123 The English periodical, the New Statesman and Nation,

120[anger and Gleason, 428.

1 91 ^ FRUS, August 29, 1940, 183; June 12, 1940, 168-169; June 22, 1940, 172-177. These documents illustrate Kennedy's efforts.

122%nterview with Arthur Krock cited in IVhalen, 282-283.

123whalen, 283. 393

pointed out that although Americans were overwhelmingly hostile to Germany,

they were nevertheless distrustful and suspicious of England because she

was still ruled by "the Men of Munich." With his eye on the great resources

of the United States, the author argued for the removal of these men from

office since they were "an obstacle to an Allied victory.Showing no

premonition that Britain was on the eve of major events, Chamberlain had

addressed the Central Council of the National Union of Conservative and

Unionist Associations on April 4 and optimistically claimed "after seven

months of war I feel ten times as confident of victory as I did at the beginning....! feel that during the seven months our relative position

towards the enemy has become a great deal stronger than it was." How strange that Hitler had not yet used his military superiority to attack

France or Britain. "One thing is certain," he confidently declared. Hitler

"missed the bus."^^^ This ill-considered remark was to later haunt the

Prime Minister as Hitler invaded Denmark and Norway six days later.

The charges of inefficiency and unpreparedness reached their height in an acrimonious two day Parliamentary debate as Chamberlain's party deserted him to join the Opposition. "Missed the bus! Missed the bus!" jeered sullen MPs as Chamberlain entered the crowded House on May 7.

124po 371/24239/A3298/131/45, May 4, 1940, 33. 125 Churchill, Vol. 521; The Landis Papers, Chapter 41, no pagination.

^^^Nicolson, May 7, 1940, 76 also describes the scene and atmosphere in the House of Commons. Also see Halifax, Fullness of Days, 219; Duff Cooper, 277. 394

His feeble defense was only applauded by the Yes-men and followed by speeches from six relatively minor supporters. Of the five Tory opponents who criticized the Government amidst growing applause, Roger Keyes and

Leo Amery made the most speeches. Sir Roger Keyes, the Admiral of the

Fleet, was in his full uniform with six rows of medals. He made a blistering attack upon the conduct of the Naval General Staff at Narvik.

Point by point he provided technical details to support the complaints of the Opposition. Here was no party hack, no office seeking Cassandra, no conniving politician, simply a loyal Conservative who could no longer support the Government. 1 27 Amidst ringing cheers Leo Amery rose from the benches behind the Government. Enough was enough! "Some three hundred years ago, when the House found that its troops were being beated again and again by the dash and daring of the cavaliers, by Prince Rupert's cavalry, Oliver Cromwell spoke to John Hampton: 'Your troops are most of them old, decayed serving men and tapsters and such kind of fellows....'"

He concluded by dramatically quoting to his applauding colleagues Oliver

Cromwell's address to the Rump of the Long Parliament: "You have sat here to long for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!" 128 The atmosphere in the House that night was something more than anxiety; it was fear, fear that Britain was unprepared to face the grueling attack which many believed inevitable.

12?Cooper, 278.

^^%C, Debates, Fifth Series, May 7, 1940, Vol. 360, 1150. 395

The Parliamentary battle continued the next evening as Herbert

Morrison spoke for the Opposition. He announced that the Labour Party meant to put the matter to a vote. The motion was made "that this House do now adjourn.Chamberlain angrily rose to his feet and pleaded for support from his friends in the House. "I have," he remarked, "friends in this House."130 Once again, Chamberlain took the criticism personally.

Duff Cooper then spoke and called for a coalition government, followed by

Lloyd George who turned against appeasement as vigorously as he had defen­ ded it and called upon Chamberlain to make one further sacrifice--him- self.131 Churchill's speech in which he loyally defended the Services and accepted full responsibility for the debacle at Narvik was marked with constant clamour, jibes, and interruptions from the Labour benches. MPs filed back into the House to vote. One young officer in uniform, an ardent admirer of Chamberlain's, walked through the Opposition lobby with tears streaming down his face. When the vote was announced, it revealed the numbers of disgruntled Conservatives, some 44 Conservatives had voted against the Government while some 30 had abstained, leaving the Govern­ ment with a majority of 81 instead of 213. As the figures were announced.

Debates, Fifth Series, May 8, 1940, Vol. 360, 1251; Cooper, 278.

130HC, Debates, Fifth Series, May 8, 1940, Vol. 360, 1266; Nicholson, May 8, 1940; "The division was technically on the Motion for Adjournment, but in fact it became a vote of censure on the Government's conduct of the war," he explained, 78. 1 HC, Debates, Fifth Series, May 8, 1940, Vol. 360, 1283; Gilbert and Gott, 350. 396

one Conservative dissident began singing Rule Britannia but was drowned

out by shouts of "Go, go, go, go!" Chamberlain, looking pale and angry, walked out.l^^

Suddenly without warning, the Nazis attacked along the Dutch and

Belgian borders and rolled on toward France. Parachutists took airfields,

dive bombers cut through Allied lines in great sweeping circles, a

thousand almost cannon-proof tanks moved with blinding speed as one hundred and twenty six infantry divisions moved forward to make Belgium

a gigantic trap for the Allies. Kennedy's colorful choice of words was appropriate: "All hell [had been] let loose At the beginning of the battle. Hitler had promised his troops that it would "decide the destiny of the German people for a thousand years.The Dutch opened their flood gates hoping to drown the enemy in a swampy morass and the

Allies moved their troops up to buttress the Belgian army. But within

five days German troops broke through the Ardennes gap and began their sprint down into Northern France. 1

During the early hours of the attack, the State Department learned that neither Kennedy nor his British contacts were aware of the develop­ ments. Washington had not been able to reestablish contact with Brussels

l^^Cooper, 279; Nicolson, May 8, 1940, Division lists showed that 41 supporters of the Government voted in the Opposition lobby and about 60 Conservatives abstained, 79. 133 T!ie Spectator, February 16, 1940, 200.

l^^Burns, 419; Langer and Gleason, 447.

135churchill, Vol. II, 28; Langer and Gleason, 447-448. 397

or the Hague and was still unable to reach Paris. Kennedy immediately went to work, calling the capitals himself. He acted as a go-between, inquiring about the fate of Americans in the cities and relaying his conversations to Washington until the State Department was able to establish contact directly with the beleaguered cities.

In the confusion and panic many Britons assumed that Mussolini's entry was inevitable, although Kennedy told English friends that he had received information from the American Ambassador in Rome denying that the Italians had such p l a n s . ^^7 Nevertheless, he doubted Mussolini's ability to withstand the frenzy of anti-British propaganda. The Nazi invasion had made "a most profound impression in the United States,"

Kennedy reported to Halifax. People were willing "to go to almost any lengths" to aid Britain. Would the government loan us airplanes?,

Halifax asked. Kennedy suggested that the Prime Minister should take that up with the President. "You must pass the hat now," he quipped, 138 "while the corpse is warm."

Britain was tottering, neither the shaken Prime Minister nor his noisy critics had plans to give purpose and direction to the war.

"Everybody is mad and all want to do something and go places," Kennedy

13&israel, May 10, 1940, 90.

1 "^1 Nicolson, May 10, 1940, 82; FO 371/24239/A3242/121/45, May 13, 1940, 273.

371/24239/A3242/131/45, May 13, 1940, 273. 398 told Washington, "but no one has the slightest idea of what should be done." Kennedy believed that even Churchill's sun was setting. The number of men who were fit to lead was "terribly limited" and yet a 139 major change was absolutely essential, he reported.

Initially Chamberlain proposed forming a coalition government and met with representatives from the Labour Party to discuss the proposal.

When Labour's Clement Attlee passed on the Prime Minister's suggestion to

Party leaders attending the annual conference at Bournemouth, Chamberlain's plan collapsed: they declined his invitation. Finally on May 10 Chamber- lain agreed to resign— a few days short of his third anniversary in office.He preferred Halifax as his successor but as a member of the House of Lords Halifax could not have provided decisive leadership in the Commons. Tliat left one other possible choice, a galling one for

Cliamberlain. He turned to his oldest and most formidable opponent,

Winston Churchill.

On the evening of May 10 Churchill received the traditional summons to Buckingham Palace and was escorted immediately to the King. "I suppose you don't know why I have sent for you," his Majesty said in jest. "Sir, I simply couldn't imagine why," Churchill replied, llie

139 Kennedy's telegrams of May 7, 9, 10, 1940; April 26, 1940 as cited in Langer and Gleason, 446.

^^^Churchill, Vol. I, 591; Gilbert and Gott, 351.

^^^Churchill, Vol. I debates Chamberlain's supposed preferences for Halifax, 592; but Foiling confirms it, 441 399

King laughed and said simply: "I want to ask you to form a Government.”

Churchill immediately a c c e p t e d . ^42 That night as he went to bed at three o'clock in the morning he had a profound sense of relief: "I felt as if

I were walking with Destiny, and all my past life had been but a prepa­ ration for this hour and for this trial,” he wrote. He slept soundly that night and "had no need for cheering dreams. Facts are better than dreams

Me quickly formed a national coalition and assumed the offices of

Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. Chamberlain was appointed

Lord President of the Council, Halifax rema: 2d at the Foreign Office,

Eden became Minister of War and Sinclair, the leader of the Liberal

Party, became Air Minister. Two Labour leaders came in, Attlee, as

Churchill's deputy, and Alexander, as Lord Admiral.

On the evening of May 14 the Dutch surrendered to Germany. Churchill met with Kennedy and surveyed the dismal European scene until after mid­ night. Hie Ambassador reported to Washington that Churchill believed that if Italy entered the war, there would be little chance of an

Allied victory. He refused to send more troops to France because he believed that Britain would be attacked herself within a month. Con­ sequently, aid from the United States was desperately needed. Kennedy was sympathetic but failed to see how America could do anything "that would not leave the United States holding the bag for a war in which the

Allies expected to be beaten.” Reminding Churchill that the American

142[hurchill, Vol. I, 594.

^43ibid., 596.

144gee Churchill, Vol. II for an entire list of appointments, 12. 400

Fleet was in the Pacific, the army quite unprepared, and the supply of planes dangerously low, how, Kennedy asked, could the U.S. help Britain?

Churchill suggested that the United States could loan Britain thirty or forty destroyers and any planes which could be spared. In return, Churchill promised "...regardless of what Germany does to England and France, England will never give up as long as [I remain] a power in public life even if

England is burnt to the ground." If that should happen, then "the

Government will move to Canada and take the fleet and fight on."^^^

Britain's political transformation had a significant effect on Anglo-

American relations and on Kennedy's position and influence. Although

Kennedy thought that Churchill "has much more drive than Chamberlain, he missed the old comraderie and intimacy which he had enjoyed with

Chamberlain; instead he was now isolated, ignored, out of favor, not only with Roosevelt's Administration, but also with Churchill's. The new

Prime Minister simply ignored most of his advice and dealt directly with the President. For the most part, Kennedy was little more than a messenger boy.

Perhaps a little jealous of Churchill's direct relationship with

Roosevelt, Kennedy seemed at times to be attempting to turn his boss against the British leader. The Prime Minister "has developed into a

l45pRus, May 15, 1940, Vol. Ill, 29-30; JPK to Hull, Dispatch 1211, May 15, 1940, Safe: Kennedy, FDRL; Hull, 765-766; Burns 49; Langer and Gleason, 452, 481-482.

^^^Bilainkin, June 11, 1940, 106. 401

fine two-handed drinker,” he once remarked to Roosevelt.He also told him that Churchill had in America "a couple of very close friends who are definitely not on our team.”^^^ Tlie Ambassador suspected that

Churchill communicated with pro-war elements in America, "notably, certain strong Jewish leaders.

Even from the beginning of Kennedy's ambassadorship, he and Churchill had been antagonists, Kennedy, a loyal supporter of Chamberlain's appeasement policy, had advised the British to avoid conflict with Germany at any cost. Churchill had consistently argued for resistance. With the outbreak of war, Kennedy urged a negotiated peace; Churchill demanded nothing less than all-out war, the total military defeat of Germany, and the military union of Britain and America. On the surface the two were cordial; underneath their suspicion and dislike grew.^^^

Even when Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty, Kennedy had been extremely critical of his judgment and had blamed him for Britain's failures in Norway.Kennedy remarked to Malcolm MacDonald that Chur­ chill was "one of the few men who has achieved his great ambition and

^^^JPK to FDR, July 20, 1939, 2, copy in Hull Papers, Correspondence: July 2-31, 1939 as cited in Koskoff, 552,

^“^^JPK to FDR, November 3, 1939, PSF, box 8, Great Britain, FDRL; also Koskoff, 552.

l^^Koskoff suggests that this may have been a reference to Churchill's friend Baruch, 553.

^^^Ibid., 248.

l^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 543-544. 402

the final mark of his success of becoming Prime Minister as a result of

a great failure (the Norwegian campaign) for which he alone was respon­

sible." The evening Churchill kissed hands, Kennedy called him to con­

gratulate him. He wrote that he "laughingly" reminded the new Prime

Minister of his own role in Churchill's success; because of Kennedy's

advance report, the President had applauded Britain's decision to mine neutral Norwegian waters, "hence Nonvay, hence Prime Minister."

Kennedy continued to criticize the Norwegian campaign. And when Churchill defeated Chamberlain by assuming the blame himself, Kennedy wrote that he "could not help but feel at the time that for all [his] protested loyalty to the Government, he saw in the distance the mantle being lowered on his shoulders and took pains, despite an occasional loss 152 of temper, not to encourage too much enmity from any quarter." Ihough the Ambassador himself had pointed to the need for a change in Britain's government, once that change occurred, he minimized its significance to

Halifax and probably to himself. "As he saw it," Halifax explained to

Lothian, "the winning of the war had little to do with changes of Govern­ ment, or accusations of complacency or lack of drive; it was simply a

1 r T question of whether one had enough aeroplanes."

152Koskoff, 248-250.

153po 371/24239/A3242/131/45, May 13, 1940, Halifax to Lothian as cited in Koskoff, 551-552. 403

Tlie isolationist-minded Ambassador came to see Churchill as a danger to the United States— as a ruthless, scheming, unscrupulous, and hell-bent on dragging the United States into the war. "Maybe I do him an injustice,"

Kennedy confided in his diary, but "he always impressed me that he was willing to blow up the American Embassy and say it was the Germans if that would get the United States in," Churchill's barely-veiled threats about Britain's fleet falling into Hitler's hands worried Kennedy, as did his predictions that "after us, you will get it."^^'^ "It seems to me,"

Kennedy repeatedly told Washington, perhaps trying to counter Churchill's influence, "that if we had to fight to protect our lives, we would do better fighting in our own back yard."^^^

The two men also clashed temperamentally, Kennedy, by now habitaully pessimistic, was thoroughly convinced of Britain's doom;^^^ Churchill,

lS4Koskoff, 250.

ISSpRUS, May 15, 1940, Safe: Kennedy, FDRL; Hull, 765-766; Blum, 149; Langer and Gleason, 452, 481-482.

^^^Bjerk writes that others also offered bearish predictions, but that the Ambassador, because his dispatches were so consistently bearish, was singled out as the prophet of gloom and doom. By contrast, Hull in his Memoirs drew a picture of the "stiff upper lip" as characteristic of American officialdom and of Roosevelt's confident prediction that the Allies would emerge victorious. Breckinridge Long's Diary also reveals the mood of American leaders in the spring and summer of 1940. His journal indicates that Kennedy was never alone in his despairing predictions. Hull too confided his forebodings that the Allies would falter and Hitler emerge as Europe's master. Israel, 65. James Farley revealed how pessimistic Roosevelt was when France fell. Tlie chances for an Allied victory were about three to one against them, he thought. Farley, 252. The Embassies too were doleful. Alexander Kirk in Berlin told Washington in June that the Allies were finished unless the United States threw its military power into the balance. Others repeated Ambassador Joseph Davies who told the President in May that Germany would win the war. Israel, 65, 71, 101, 104-105; also see Davies to FDR, May 23, 1940, PPF, FDRL. 404

like Roosevelt, optimistic, confident, was sure of victory. As the

embodiment of Britain's old aristocratic imperial tradition, Churchill

offended Kennedy. He aroused the Irish in the Ambassador when he

referred to Cobh, in Eire, as "Queenstown," the old British name for the

1 r 7 Irish seaport. The frank, plain-speaking American envied Churchill

his oratory^^^ and regarded his moralistic view of the war as offensive,

certainly self-righteous, and perhaps a backhanded slap at himself. He

also suspected that Churchill did not keep him fully informed. He

resented personal slights. The Prime Minister repeatedly offered the

teetotaling Ambassador drinks and when Kennedy declined, Churchill helped himself to another. After one such round of offers, Kennedy rather

pointedly said he had sworn off drinking and smoking for the duration of the war. "My God," Churchill complained, "You make me feel as if I should go around in sack cloth and ashes."

l56cont.gjg^j^ argues that "Kennedy's defeatism in fact came very near representing the consensus within administration circles. Those who adopted that perspective did so because they were the realists of the moment. It was a logical perspective, for the events themselves pointed towards defeat. Bjerk points to the poll conducted in May showing that only thirty percent of the American people believed that the Allies could win. "To have been an optimist as things stood in May and June of 1940 required that one ignore the stark realities of the hour and face the future with sheer blind faith that somehow good would triumph over evil." Bjerk, 183-185. 157 Koskoff points out that the Prime Minister was not slighting Ireland. In fact "Queenstown" was the correct name for Cobh's harbor. Kennedy was extremely touchy on the issue, 552.

IS&phe Landis Papers, Chapter 40, 568. 405

Kennedy never made a secret of his disapproval. When someone asked him what kind of a man Churchill was, the Ambassador replied, "Churchill is a remarkable man, or as remarkable as any man can be who's loaded with brandy by ten o'clock in the morning." And when he succeeds in dragging America into war, "He'll reach for that brandy glass, lift his hand on high and say 'I have discharged my duty. Victory is ours! This is my crowning achievement. God save the King.

Churchill wasted little time. Writing as "Former Naval Person," he appealed personally to Roosevelt immediately after he had met with Kennedy on May 15 and gave a candid and detailed analysis of the situation; "the scene has darkened swiftly.... The small countries are simply smashed up, one by one like matchwood.... Mussolini will hurry in to share the loot of civilisation. We expect to be attacked here ourselves.... If necessary

...we shall continue the war alone...." However, he warned Roosevelt,

"the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long" and he painted a bleak picture of "a completely subjugated, Nazified Europe...." He asked that the U.S. proclaim non­ belligerency and offer Britain every kind of aid short of military participation. Britain immediately needed forty or fifty old destroyers to tide them over until new ones were built, several hundred of the latest types of airplanes, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition and ore. He hoped that Britain would still receive the supplies even after she could

IS^Koskoff, 249. 406 no longer pay for them in dollars. He also suggested that an American squadron visit Ireland and that the U.S. "keep the Japanese quiet in the Pacific" using Singapore as a base if needed. The only thing in

Churchill's report which particularly intrigued Kennedy was the Prime

Minister's statement that if need be he would move the Government to

Canada and carry on the war with the fleet. The Ambassador fully realized the importance of Britain's fleet for America's security and added in his cable "I think this is something I should follow up."^^^

This was a large order. In addition, Churchill arranged for Roose­ velt to receive the daily British summaries of the war effort. Conse­ quently, the President was fully informed of the gravity of the crisis and aware of the role America could play.

FDR immediately sent Churchill a telegram through Kennedy saying:

"I am, of course, giving every possible consideration" to the Prime

Minister's suggestions. However, the loan of forty or fifty destroyers could not be made without "the specific authorization of Congress." The

President warned: "I am not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment." He thought it

"doubtful" that the destroyers could be loaned even temporarily.

Amidst this "nightmare of frustration," Roosevelt, as usual, remained calm, and confident.Rejecting Kennedy's advice, he decided to "keep

IGOpRUS, May 15, 1940, Vol. Ill, 29-30; Churchill, Vol. II, 21; Langer and Gleason, 482-485; Burns, 419.

IGlpRUS, May 16, 1940, Vol. Ill, 49-50; See Hull for a further explanation, 831-832.

^^%elles. Time for Decision, 148. 407

the fighting away from our own backyard. Tlie day after he received

Churchill's plea, he drove up Capitol Hill to make an unprecedented

request before a cheering Congress for nearly a billion dollars for

defense and to set a goal of at least 50,000 planes a year, ten times

the current annual production. His face was grave and the whiteness of

his knuckles stood out as he gripped the podium and appealed to Congress

not to delay the delivery of American made planes to foreign governments.

American rearmament was not to be at the expense of the democracies over­

seas. Responding to public pressure. Congress voted the funds and more.^^^

Early in the morning of May 15, Churchill had been awakened at 7:30

A.M. by a telephone call. "We have been defeated....we have lost the

battle....The front is broken near Sedan; they are pouring through in

great numbers with tanks and armoured cars." It was France's badly

shaken Premier, Paul Reynaud. "Surely it can't have happened so soon,"

Churchill replied and offered to go to Paris to calm his flustered

ally.165

The next day Kennedy notified Washington that Churchill had gone to

Paris to bolster up the sagging French morale. He offered his latest somber assessment. He had spoken to an "absolutely reliable" confidant

165h u 11, 766.

164%bid., 766-767; Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 194; Burns, 419.

16Schurchill, Vol. II, 37. 408

who described the situation as "deadly acute." Tlie "crackup can come

like a stroke of lightning..The President might start considering what

he can do to save an Allied debacle....Any action to be effective must

be conceived now....My friend does not believe that England can fight

alone and therefore there will be another fight in the Government

because Churchill said he will fight until England is burnt to the

ground....Nothing can save them from absolute defeat unless the President

with some touch of genius and God's blessing can do it."^^^

Upon his arrival in Paris, Churchill was appalled at the gravity

of the situation. It "was incomparably worse" than he had expected.

He was met at the airport by General Ismay who told him that the Germans

would be in Paris within a few days at most. The French Government,

gripped by hysteria, was packing to leave the capital immediately. Out­

side in the courtyard of the Quai d'Orsay clouds of smoke billowed from

large bonfires as officials fed wheel barrows full of Foreign Office

records into the flames. The French Ministers, Reynaud, Daladier,

Minister of National Defense and War, and General Gamelin, the Commander-

in-Chief, appeared totally dejected. Everyone remained standing as General

Gamelin explained the military situation to Churchill. "iVhere is the

strategic reserve?" Churchill asked. "Aucune" replied Gamelin. "This was one of the greatest surprises I have had in my life," Churchill later wrote in his memoirs.After a moment the Prime Minister asked Gamelin

IGGpRUS, May 16, 1940, Vol. I, 224-225.

IGTchurchill, Vol. II, 40-41. 409

when and where he planned to launch an attack. He replied: "Inferiority

of numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of method" and hope­

lessly shrugged his shoulders. "There was no argument," wrote Churchill,

"there was no need of argument.

Despite the appalling situation and the fatalism of the French,

Churchill refused to admit defeat and agreed to send ten additional

British squadrons to France. His fighting spirit intact, Churchill

promised the French that even if France was invaded and defeated, England would go on until the United States came to her aid. That would come; he was sure of that. "We will starve Germany out. We will destroy her

towns. We will burn her crops and her forests"--on and on he went until one o'clock in the morning conjuring up an apocalyptic vision of the war.

As England lay levelled by bombs, he pictured himself in the heart of

Canada leading the military might of the New World against the Old.^^^

The non-stop nightmare continued; Brussels razed. Cambrai, Arras,

Boulogne, St. Omer, Abberville— all ravaged. Tlie lines of communication from the northern Armies were severed as the Nazis came tumbling through at Sedan and raced toward the sea. The British Expeditionary Force was cut off from supplies. The demoralized French army stopped fighting.

Nazi tanks ran through the countryside, their officers cheerfully waving.

IGBlbid., 43.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 453. 410

as scores of townsmen and villagers watched. French prisoners marched

alongslide their enemy, still carrying their r i f l e s . Churchill was

deeply "shocked by the utter failure to grapple with the German armour,

which, with a few thousand vehicles, was compassing the entire destruc­

tion of mighty armies, and by the swift collapse of all French resistance

once the fighting front had been pierced. The whole German movement was

proceeding along the main roads, at no point on which did they seem to be blocked."171

The Belgian front was broken; Keng Leopold about to surrender. Tlie

French reorganized their Cabinet. Gamelin was dismissed. General Weygand was made Commander-in-Chief, Dadalier was transferred to Foreign Affairs.

Reynaud became Minister of National Defense and War as well as Prime

Minister. The aged Marshal Retain was summoned back from Spain and made

Vice President of the Council. When Churchill returned to England, he obtained from Parliament extraordinary, absolute power over the lives,

liberties, and property of all British citizens. The bill gave the

Minister of Labour power to order any citizen to perform any required ser­ vice, to regulate wages, and to organize supply committees. All property and business establishments were under the authority of the Government; it could examine business records and tax excess profits at 100%. A

l/Ochurchill, Vol. II, 48-69; Cadogan, May 20, 1940-May 23, 1940, 286-288; Nicolson, May 19, 1940-May 21, 1940, 86-87.

171churchill, Vol. II, 53. 411

Production Council and a Director of Labour Supply were also authorized.

The bill was presented in Parliament on May 22 and received the unanimous consent of both houses that afternoon and was signed by the King that night. Local Defense Volunteers, later called the Home Guard, sprouted up throughout Britain organized by Anthony Eden and armed with shotguns,

sporting rifles, and clubs and s p e a r s .

Kennedy called Welles to tell him that "the situation is very bad in England.The country was practically at a standstill; planes had stopped, ferries were shut down, and the French had refused visas to

U.S. citizens travelling through France. Americans were stranded; there was simply no way for them to get out of England. The Ambassador suggested sending them to Ireland and having a ship pick them up on the west coast, Kennedy received authorization to carry out his scheme while the State Department dickered over how to get their American citizens out of Ireland.A few day later, Kennedy repeated his dis­ mal assessment of the English condition. He told Hull that "the situa­ tion according to the people who know is very, very grim." The French condition was "precarious." They would try to retreat to some line and hold it while the British prepared for attacks of all kinds. They believed that they could fend the Nazis off during the day while night attacks would only be indiscriminate and haphazard. In this manner they planned

172ibid., 48-69.

173better to FDR from Breckinridge Long, May 20, 1940, PSF; Great Britain, FDRL; Long, May 17, 1940, 93-94. 174%bid. 412 to hold on till help arrived from the United States. "Frankly I don't think that, if the French and British expeditionary force are licked in their present struggle, things will turn out quite as well as the English hope." Tlie English seemed incapable of understanding that England could be beaten. "I do not underestimate the courage or guts of these people but...it is going to take more than guts to hold off the systematic air attacks of the Germans coupled with terrific air superiority in numbers."

Again, Kennedy urged Washington to be ready to sue for peace on behalf of the demoralized Allies. He reported that Halifax "is definitely of the opinion that if anybody is able to save a debacle on the part of the Allies if it arrives at that point it is the President. Halifax I still believes that that influence is one that the Germans still fear."

Tlie Economist noted optimistically that the new Government in London and the invasion of two more neutral countries had removed the "emotional foundations" of isolationist sentiment in the United States. "It is no longer possible either to tar the Allies and Hitler with the same brush or to believe that a defeat of the Allies would not affect America's own interests or safety.

Almost a week later on the evening of May 26, the British Admiralty ordered "Operation Dynamo." Tlie retreat to Dunkirk was on. A short service of intercession and prayer was held in Westminster Abbey that

175FRUS, May 24, 1940, Vol..Ill, 31-32.

Economist, May 18, 1940, 895. 413 day. Churchill, seated in the choir, could sense the "pent-up, passion­ ate emotion, and also the fear," not of death or destruction but of the defeat and devastation of Britain. 177

That Sunday evening Roosevelt addressed the American people by radio.

The previous two weeks had shattered the illusions of American isolation, he said. "We have lost the illusion that we are remote and isolated and, therefore, secure against the dangers from which no other land is free....

Let us have done with both fears and illusions. On this Sabbath evening, in our homes in the midst of our Amiercan families, let us calmly consider what we have done and what we must do." We would step up our defense, modernize our arms, and enlarge our factories. All this would be done along with the continuation "of the great social gains we have made in these past years...." The New Deal would not be abandoned.

And finally the Fifth Column activities would be fought like "undiluted poison....We defend and we build a way oflife, not for America alone, but for all mankind. OUrs is a high duty, a noble task.^^^ Five days later he asked Congress for additional appropriations for national defense, a request accepted "without a murmur," wrote The Economist.

It noted that during that crucial week, American public opinion had undergone an "almost revolutionary" transformation from a neutral to a

177churchill, Vol. II, 86. 178 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of F.D.R., 1940, 232-240; Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 196-197; Burns, 419-420. 414

"non-belligerent." A new credo was being taught from a thousand platforms,

"that the cheapest and most effective way in which Amerca can protect her

1 * 7 0 own security is by assisting the Allies."

The Nazis had bottled up the northern Army and pushed northward along

the coast hoping to cut off all escape by sea.^^^ Only a few Allied

strongholds remained— Calais, Dunkirk. On May 26, Churchill had made

the painful decision not to evacuate Calais. The defense of Calais held

down two armored German divisions, prevented them from attacking the

Allied lines of communication and bought time in which to organize the

Allied retreat at Dunkirk. The Allies remained boxed up in the town,

all exits blocked. After four days of intense street fighting, Calais was silent. Only thirty unwounded survivors were picked up by the

Navy.

With the retreat from Dunkirk underway by May 27, Kennedy cabled

"My impression of the situation here now is that it could not be worse.

Onl>[ a miracle can save the British expeditionary force from being wiped out or as I said yesterday [surrendered]." He predicted that the Germans would consider a peace move "with both the French and British now— of course, on their own terms, but on terms that would be a great deal better than they would be if the war continues." He also prophesied aerial blackmail; the Luftwaffe leveling one city after another till

I 70 Tlie Economist, May 25, 1940, 925.

^^^Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears, 289-290.

IGlchurchill, Vol. II, 72. 415 the Allies were forced to surrender. Kennedy was convinced that a row among British Cabinet members was certain between the "do and die" group like Churchill and Attlee who wanted to fight to the death and those who would support a peace settlement. "I realize this is a terrific telegram, but there is no question that it's in the air here....It is critical," he concluded, "no matter which way you look at it."^^^

The march to the sea having culminated on May 31 to June 1, the

"Mosquito Armada" from England's southern shore arrived to ferry more than three hundred thousand British and French soldiers to the ships lying offshore. Tlie "Mosquito Armada" had completed the evacuation by

June 4.

The stunning succession of Nazi victories in the spring and summer of 1940 gave the American public a rude awakening. Few had questioned that the war would be a long-drawn out struggle in which the democracies would ultimately triumph. No one was prepared for a swift German victory in the West. Public sentiment lay with the Allies, but their desperate appeals for aid had not seemed so urgent. Roosevelt too, had deluded himself by overrating the military strength of the democracies. He feared public reaction to any far-reaching program of aid to the Allies.

But after the Belgian army caved in and the Allies were routed at Dunkirk, excitement and apprehension reached its peak as Americans, picturing a

1 R 9 FRUS, May 27, 1940, Vo]. I, 233.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 496-470. 416

Nazified Europe, began clamoring for all possible aid to the democracies.

According to a British Forcing Office survey, 70% favored helping the

Allies by any means, short of war.^^^ "The U.S.A. is at last profoundly moved and frightened," the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, wrote to ] OC Lady Astor. "We shall doubtless get what help we want, short of war."

He cabled Halifax that more and more Americans claimed that France and

Britain are "their Maginot Line." There was even a growing sentiment that "the only right thing" for America to do is to enter the war. This of course, was only a minority view, Lothian reported, but it is never­ theless, an influential and growing minority."What an avalanche of blunders Great Britain has let loose upon the democracies of the world," wrote William Allen l^ite, the editor of the Emporia Gazette. "The old

British lion looks mangey [sic], sore-eyed. He needs worming and should 187 have a lot of dental work. He can't even roar." To shore up Britain's

"mangey [sic] sore-eyed" lion. White began organizing in late April the influential Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and urging

Americans through newspapers, radio, and letter writing campaigns "to

184po 371/24239/A3242/131/42, May 23, 1940, 274.

IGSwhalen, 286.

l^^FO 371/24239/A3946/G, June 6, 1940, 374.

l^^Langer and Gleason, 470. 417

TOO become the nonbelligerent ally of France and England.” Within one

month the response to his widespread appeal was so overwhelming that

White asked his old friend, Roosevelt for "sailing orders.” He was

all dressed up and ready to go, but he needed a road map. Would the

President give him one? Roosevelt’s reply must have been evasive since

he too was caught up in a similar dilemma. He too wanted to help but

he wasn’t sure how.

Meanwhile Washington was making a frantic attempt to put its own

military house in order and to respond to the urgent appeals for aid.

Bullitt repeated Reynaud’s plea that the Administration make a state­

ment saying that the vital interest of the United States could not

permit France or Britain to be defeated. Roosevelt immediately warned

Bullitt that "anything of this kind is out of the question.” 1 8Q Kennedy

too, without changing his mind about Britain's chances, softened his

mid-May position and began urging aid to Britain. He had lived too

long in Britain to be indifferent to its struggle or to be unimpressed by British "courage” and "guts.” His relationship with Chamberlain still

remained excellent and one of his last acts before resigning from office was to call up the dying statesman. Even the arch anti-appeaser Churchill, so temperamentally different from his predecessor, could sometimes mollify

Kennedy's pessimism and win his sympathy. Although Kennedy’s advice was

frequently ignored, he joined Bullitt in urging the sale of war materials

IGBibid., 487.

IBSgurns, 420; Langer and Gleason, 489; see FRUS, May 22, 1940, Vol. Ill, 232 for Reynaud’s request. 418 to the Allies and calling for quicker production.Rifles, ammunition, and machine guns from America's military stockpiles after the B.E.F.'s hasty retreat at Dunkirk^ and fifty destroyers were not too much to give an old friend. Adding his own voice to the growing British chorus pleading for destroyers, Kennedy argued that their "psychological effect would be of even more value than the actual help,"

Kennedy also cared enough to set the record straight and to guard against anti-Americanism. He suggested to Hull "that some kind of statement should be made over there by some important person or over here...explaining just why the United States is limited as to what she can give the Allies. I suggest that in order to save a great deal of ill-will that will arise towards the United States if nothing is done.

..." Kennedy clearly regarded this as a "major matter" and believed that

"it would be much better to explain why we could not meet their wishes.

..." He also added a note of national self-interest: "Particularly if at some later date we might want the British to take action on the

Navy, that might be of service to us. We do not want a hostile people in England."192

Hull regarded Kennedy's suggestion as "admirable" and argued that the statement should be made by the British purchasing agent in the

l^Opimes (London), June 7, 1940, 6.

l^lpanger and Gleason, 493; Craig, 670; IVhalen, 289. 192 FRUS, June 6, 1940, Vol. Ill, 33; also mentioned in Mialen, 290. 419

United States and sent to the governmental agencies in London. He also informed Kennedy that "a very considerable amount of armaments and ammu­ nition, together with a considerable number of airplanes" have been released for resale in England. "In all probability," he added, "the 193 number of airplanes to be made available can be still further increased."

Kennedy was extremely disappointed with the statement issued by the

British Purchasing Commission because it "does not at all answer the situation" and urged the Secretary to give "further serious considera­ tion of this matter.... Let me reiterate," he emphasized, "that the feeling of the people of Great Britain toward the United States is going to be a matter of importance, not only in this crisis but for many years to come." He stressed that there was a definite growing "anti-American feeling in this country based primarily on the fact that the majority of the English people feel America should be in this fight with the

Allies...." Although Roosevelt himself was still quite popular with the

British, Kennedy explained, many officials complained that the only thing they got from the United States was words. "If things go badly for

Great Britain everyone here is going to look around for somebody to blame....We are well on our way to becoming the 'patsys'" for the British.

Undoubtedly overestimating Britain's acquiescence, he wrote "I can vis­ ualize their possible eventual acceptance of a German victory," but he added, "they will never forgive us for not having come to their aid...."

IS^Ibid., 33-34. 420

His pungent conclusion underlined his vieiv of American self interest.

ITie British would conveniently forget that they themselves were unpre­ pared: "the entry of the United States into the war would be only to hold the b a g . Regardless of which role America adopted, Kennedy believed that in years to come it would continue to be severely and unjustly criticized by the British.

Why should he make happy, hopeful statements pledging all-out

American support, Kennedy asked Bilankin: "IVhat the hell are you worth if you just mislead them?.... I told them they could expect zero help. We had none to offer and I knew we could not give it, and in the way of any material, we could not spare it. I could easily have said the usual blaJi and poppycock, but what's the bloody good of being so foolish as that? An ambassador's duty is to be frank, not to mislead. I considered that my duty and I discharged it."^^^

Regardless of where the British placed the blame, Kennedy continued to assume that England's cause was lost. Therefore, the United States should look to its own defenses and make the Western Hemisphere an impregnable fortress.

As Nazi troops overran Western Europe, Mussolini hungrily eyed the victor's spoils. Repeatedly, Roosevelt made tempting offers to the

Duce trying to woo him from Nazi Germany. Again and again Roosevelt

IG^ibid., 34-35. 195 Bilainkin, June 11, 1940, 105.

l^^Langer and Gleason, 481-482, 712. 421 had promised that the Allies would seriously consider Italy's claims in the Mediterranean and in long coveted areas of Africa, like Tunisia and

Libya, with the President himself assuming personal responsibility to act as mediator and guarantor. Further, Italy would be seated at the peace conference as an equal participant. But Mussolini portrayed himself as the much abused "prisoner within the Mediterranean" long obsessed by

Britain's control over the Suez Canal and Gibraltar.Only participation in the war, a share in the victor's spoils and a seat at the conference table would soothe his wounded pride. "I only need a few thousand dead to enable me to take my seat, as a belligerent, at the peace table," he bragged.Everything would be agreeably settled by September. His major concern was to declare war before France collapsed and before

Britain fell; participation would gain everything and cost nothing. He dickered with Hitler as to the most convenient time for Italy's grand entrance into the war, Mussolini suggested June 5; Hitler preferred

June 10; June 10 it was.

On May 29 Roosevelt received an ominous telegram from Ambassador

Bullitt: "A1 Capone will enter war about the fourth of June unless you can throw the fear of the U.S.A. into him."^^^ Meanwhile, Mussolini was

^^^Hull, 779.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 502.

199lbid., 462. 422

busy rallying public opinion. "Never has there been a better hour to

strike inexorably at our enemies, without pity, with thumbs down,"

insisted the Fascist newspaper. Regime Fascista. Tlie Fascist leader,

Farinacci, declared in a public speech: "The place of Italy is by the

side of the heroic Germany of Hitler, which is struggling against the

common enemy."1.200

As Roosevelt was preparing to leave to deliver the commencement

address at the University of Virginia on June 10, he received from

Ambassador Bullitt the long expected announcement that Mussolini would

formally declare war on France that afternoon. Reynaud called it a

"stab in the back." Accompanied by Eleanor Roosevelt and their son,

Franklin Jr., a member of the graduating class at Virginia Law School,

FDR on the train to Charlottesville turned Reynaud's phrase over and over in his mind. Discretion, he later recalled, warned him against using

it; it might alienate the Italian-American vote in the upcoming election;

it might so prejudice Mussolini as to make him uncooperative at the peace pn 1 table; but "the old red blood" demanded "Use it!" He reinserted the phrase in the carefully prepared State Department draft. That evening, speaking carefully, measuring his words, he delivered a long description of his repeated efforts to prevent Mussolini from entering the war. In a cold, biting voice heavy with indignation, the President lashed out:

"On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor."

ZOOlbid., 4 63.

20lRosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 198-199; Hull, 784-785; Burns, 421, 423

On the other side of the Atlantic, at the Admiralty War Room, Churchill and his officers worked late into the night waiting for the President's address.Roosevelt announced a further step to aid the Allies: "We will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense,..." This was still 20 ^ "a measure short of war," but one step closer to total aid to the Allies.

In London earlier that evening, Kennedy had found Churchill roundly cussing Mussolini. "Words fail me in repeating what he thinks of Musso­ lini," Kennedy cabled Washington. "He still is pleading for destroyers and I should judge from his conversations that he believes that with the bombing of well-known places in England, the United States will come in."

England's morale was sagging. Kennedy thought the only way they could get a moral boost "would be by a declaration of war by America even though nobody can point out just where America would fight the battle.

Before going to bed that niglit, Churchill sent another "Former Naval

Person" message. He complimented FDR on his speech : "It was a magnifi­ cent speech, instinct with passion, and carrying to us a message of hope."

Again, he persistently pressed Roosevelt for aeroplanes and destroyers.

ZOZchurchill, Vol. II, 114; IVhalen, 292.

^^^Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 199; FO 371/24239/A3242/131/45, June 10, 1940, 297; Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of F.D.R., 1940, 259-264.

204pRuS, June 10, 1940, Vol. Ill, 35. 424

"The Italian outrage" meant that Britain would face a larger number of submarines in the Atlantic possibly housed in Spanish ports. "Nothing is so important as for us to have the thirty or forty old destroyers you have already had reconditioned....They will bridge the gap of six months before our wartime new construction comes into play....The next six months are vital....Not a day should be lost." He closed his plea with a premature Churchillian flourish. "I send you my heartfelt thanks and those of my colleagues for all you are doing and seeking to do for what we may now, indeed call the Common Cause"— a presumptuous but not inaccurate reading of Roosevelt's motives. 20 ^

Churchill also asked Lothian to try to initiate naval staff confer­ ences with the United States, a suggestion made repeatedly by the British.

Hull vaguely replied that he doubted whether there would be any need for staff conferences but that he would nevertheless pass the suggestion on to the President. Again, Lothian repeated Churchill's promise not to surrender the fleet. 207 Kennedy displayed little enthusiasm for Roose­ velt's Charlottesville policy; the United States was doing too little, too late to make any real difference, he told Bilainkin. "Is there nothing America can do to expedite supplies?" the London correspondent asked Kennedy the day after Roosevelt announced his policy. "It is not a case of America being in time," Kennedy replied. The United States

ZOSpRUS, June 11, 1940, 52; Churchill, Vol. II, 114-115.

^^^See Lothian to Hull, June 24, 1940; PSF: Great Britain, FDRL, for a further illustration.

207Secretary of State Hull from the Marquess of Lothian, June 11, 1940, PSF; Great Britain, FDRL; FRUS, June 11, 1940, 36. 425 simply did not have any first rate material to spare. America was having her problems just as the other democracies were. "We have little to give you and it's no use pretending that we have."^08 still, the United states wanted to help. When Bilainkin asked if American supplies would reach

Britain by December, Kennedy sharply replied: "For Heaven's sake, George, come down to practical politics; this is not a question of months, and you know it, it's a question of days How in God's name have you English been so foolish, and so stupid, with all your wealth, not to have taken a better measure of the enemy than you have done? Is it not just fantas- tic?it209

"Sign and signals call for speed— full speed aliead," said Roosevelt at the University of Virginia. Full speed was indeed essential, for

France was crumbling. "How many days do you give France?" Kennedy demanded of a knowledgeable British correspondent. "Very few," was the reply.

The Germans renewed their assault on France on June 5. As the demoralized French armies fell back the French introduced one of their all to frequent and purposeless reorganizations of th- Cabinet. Daladier was dismissed and Reynaud himself became Foreign Minister. Paul Baudouin, reputed to have earlier urged an understanding with Germany, was appointed.

20^Bilainkin, June 11, 1940, 104.

209lbid., 104-105.

ZlOlbid., 104. 426

Secretary to the War Cabinet and Charles de Gaulle, the uncompromising 211 advocate of continued resistance, became Under Secretary for War.

As the German forces broke through along the Somme, swallowed up the French in the Lower Seine and in Normandy, Reynaud, busy packing up the Government to retreat to Tours, sent an urgent appeal to Roosevelt on June 10. "For six days and six nights our divisions have been fighting without one hour of rest against an army which has a crushing superiority in number and material," he wrote. "Regardless,

We shall fight in front of Paris, we shall fight behind Paris, we shall close ourselves in one of our provinces to fight and if we should be driven out of it, we shall establish ourselves in North Africa to continue the fight and if necessary in our American possessions....We are determined to sacrifice ourselves in the struggle that we are carrying on for all free men.

He thanked Roosevelt for replying "generously" to his previous appeal and warned him that French resistance depended primarily on American support. "It is my duty," he explained "to ask you for new and even larger assistance." Hë begged the President to publicly declare "that the United States will give the Allies aid and material support by all means 'short of an expeditionary force'" and to do so "before it is too l a t e . " 2 1 2

The next day, in response to Reynaud's request, Churchill again crossed the Channel determined to bolster the sagging French morale and to meet with the Supreme War Council at Briare. Displaying "the smiling

211 Langer and Gleason, 501

212FRUS, June 10, 1940, Vol. I, 245-246; Hull, 787. 427

countenance and confident air" suitable for depressing situations,

Churchill did his best to support the "resisters," Reynaud, cheered on by de Gaulle and perhaps a majority of his Cabinet, against the "defeat­

ists," General Weyand and Marshal Retain.^13 The French demanded more

British air squadrons; Churchill instead gave them eloquence. He promised that "if one of two comrades fell during the course of the struggle, the other would not lay down his arms until his friend was on his feet again.Regardless of what happens, "we shall fight on

forever and ever and ever," if necessary, by drowning as many Germans as possible in the Channel and knocking the others on the head as they 215 crawled ashore. Since Churchill daily expected Hitler to hurl his

Luftwaffe against Britain, he refused the French request for British air squadrons; they were essential to Britain's survival.Nevertheless, he encouraged the French to fight on by defending Paris house by house, if necessary, by establishing a redoubt in the Breton Peninsula, easily

Zl^churchill, Vol. II, 132.

^^^Langer and Gleason, 499.

Zl^churchill, Vol. II, 133-134.

^^^Actually, the recently published Cabinet Records indicate that Churchill did want to send fighter planes to France. The commanders of the RAF opposed his plan and warned that this would leave Britain virtually defenseless against a Nazi attack. Air Chief Marshall, Sir Hugh Dowding, the RAF commander explained to the Cabinet that "If the home defense force is drained away in a desperate attempt to remedy the situation in France, then defeat in France will involve the complete and irremediable defeat of this country." The Prime Minister was over­ ruled by his Cabinet, an event which Churchill neglected to explain in his memoirs. Boston Globe, January 24, 1971, 40. 428 accessible to British and American supply lines and by trying to enlist

American support. Upon his return to London, Churchill sent Roosevelt a description of his meeting at Briare through Kennedy. He believed that there were many elements in French society determined to fight on. "This is the moment for you to strengthen Reynaud the utmost you can, and try to tip the balance in favour of the best and longest possible French

resistance," the Prime Minister u r g e d .

In London, Kennedy was in an "I told you so" mood. "Nobody here seemed to take any notice when I kept on telling them about the strength of the Germans, and of course, nobody dreamed that they would achieve so much in a month's warfare. "Don't forget," he lectured Bilainkin

the war has only been on since May 9th or iQth. The Germans have made no mistakes up to now and I don't think they are fools, do you?...Right at this moment they have men and machinery stashed in Denmark, poised for the attack on Britain. If the Germans occupy the northern coast of France and begin operations from Norway and Denmark, they will also land troops at your back door, in Ireland....All of Europe will soon be involved, the Balkans and Russia, too....

"Tliat, I feel, will just about rescue you," he predicted.

I always told your people you were not ready last September. I said it was no good, you'll remember my words, putting out the tongue when you must be able to hit the other man in the jaw. You'd remember, too, I told you that the British people would yet put up a memorial of gratitude to Chamberlain, for Munich. Now suppose he had led the country into war in 1938,

217FRUS, June 12, 1940, Vol. I, 247; Churchill, Vol. II, 154, 429

what would have happened? Through Munich you gained a year in which to prepare— and yet, nine months after that, you are in the position of having only two or three divisions fighting in Prance,218 the Ambassador complained.

By June 12 France was prostrate and Churchill once again flew to

France to plead with his allies to fight on. Just as Churchill was explaining his meeting at Tours to his Cabinet that evening, Kennedy arrived with Roosevelt's personal reply to Reynaud's appeal of June 10.

"Your message of June 10 has moved me very deeply," Roosevelt cabled.

"This Government is doing everything in its power to make available to the Allied Governments the material they so urgently require, and our efforts to do still more are being redoubled...." He congratulated

Reynaud on "the magnificent resistance" of the Allied armies and said that it had made a profound impression on the American people. "I am

Bilainkin, June 11, 1940, 104-106. Tlie recently released British Cabinet papers indicate that the Government feared that the Germans would use Ireland as a base of operations against Britain. They had received reports of German plans for a parachute assault on Ireland. The British Government asked Ireland's Prime Minister, Eamon de Valera, to permit British troops to guard against this. The Prime Minister refused. Churchill "bribed" him with a promise of reunifi­ cation. De Valera still refused. The British were also worried about Ireland's ports which cut across her sea lanes. The Cabinet considered a proposal to seize the ports but ultimately decided against it. Boston Globe, January 24, 1971, 40; also see Mary C. Bromage, Churchill and Ireland, (Indiana, 1964), for a detailed analysis of Churchill's plans for Irish ports, 122-181. Kennedy also undertook to ask Roosevelt to use his influence on Mr. de Valera. He told Halifax that the President's influence could be helpful. See FO 371/24240/A3483/131/45, June 27, 1940, 429. 430

particularly impressed by your declaration that France will continue to

fight on behalf of democracy even if it means slow withdrawal, even to

North Africa and the Atlantic," the President wrote. "It is most impor­

tant to remember that the French and British fleets continue mastery of

the Atlantic and other oceans; also to remember that vital materials from

the outside world are necessary to maintain all armies....! am also

greatly heartened by what Prime Minister Churchill said a few days ago

about the continued resistance of the British Empire and that determination would seem to apply equally to the great French Empire all over the world.This reply, so exaggerated and misunderstood by both Churchill and Kennedy, was simply a reaffirmation of FDR's Charlottesville policy and a promise of redoubled efforts to aid the Allies. It supported

France's continued resistance even from North Africa and modestly suggested that the Allies might still be victorious.

Churchill thought Roosevelt's message was "magnificent" and cabled the President that "the British Cabinet was profoundly impressed and P20 desire me to express their gratitude for it...." Churchill's enthu­ siasm rested on his ot«i exaggerated interpretation of the President's reply. He mistakenly believed that the message contained what he so ardently wished to read; the promise of material aid, implying active assistance and the "call to go on fighting even if the Government were driven right out of France," both tantamount to a declaration of war. 221

Zl^FRUS, June 13, 1940, Vol. I, 247-248.

ZZOfRUS., June 14, 1940, Vol. I, 250-251,

991 Langer and Gleason, 530. 431

After midnight on June 14 Churchill held a lengthy discussion

with Kennedy who persuaded him to call FDR to ask if his message could

be published. Kennedy repeated Churchill's argument that French morale

needed to be "bucked up in order to keep them in the fight and he thinks

your note will do it."222 Immediately after this conversation Kennedy

cabled a detailed report to Washington at 1:00 A.M. on June 14. He

relayed Churchill's dismal assessment of the Tours Conference: "Weygand

was insisting on an armistice; the French Army could not fight any longer-

there was nothing but death and destruction ahead for all of France;

German propaganda was seeping through the Army as well as the populace;

it was only [a] matter of hours but that the Army would refuse to fight."

It seemed to him, Kennedy stated, that "it really got down to Reynaud

saying that unless the United States declared war on Germany and came

in France was not going to fight....I could not help but feel that

barring an absolute declaration of war by the United States the French

were about to give up and that Churchill was making [a] desperate effort

to have France continue guerilla warfare and with their fleet carry on

the Government somewhere else." Kennedy reported that Roosevelt's note

gave the British Cabinet "great courage" and Churchill thought that it was "sufficiently strong to warrant the French fighting on." Kennedy, however, felt that it would take much more than that and argued against

ZZZpRUS, June 14, 1940, Vol. I, 248-249. 432

its publication. "The danger of publication of your note to Reynaud as

I see it is that Churchill sees in your note an absolute commitment of

the United States to the Allies that if France fights on the United

States will be in the war to help them if things go bad at some later date." Kennedy too agreed with that conclusion. "Frankly as I read the message that is what I see in it. "I realize the tragedy of the present moment and how important it is for the success of these poor people that their morale should be bucked up; nevertheless I see a great danger 2p T in the message as a commitment at a later date." His old fear was seizing him: a naive America might yet be dragged into war. Like

Churchill, Kennedy misread the President's message. He found it thoroughly alarming.

Roosevelt must have been terribly surprised by Kennedy's phone call on June 13 in which he relayed Churchill's request for publication. FDR reacted immediately. For once he heeded Kennedy's warning. By 10:00 that evening, without waiting for his Ambassador's cable, he fired off a telegram: "My message to Reynaud not to be published in any circum­ stances ."

It was in no sense intended to commit and does not commit this Government to the slightest military activities in support of the Allies. This plan was care­ fully avoided in drafting the message to Reynaud. There is no course, no authority except in Congress, to make any commitment of this nature. The French fleet and its disposition for future use was the matter primarily in mind in sending the message.

^^^Ibid., Langer and Gleason, 530-531. 433

To avoid further misunderstanding, Roosevelt gave Kennedy firm instruc­

tions. "Insist that Churchill at once convey this statement to the

appropriate French officials." 77 A

He did; but it was too late. Working late, as usual, at 3:00 A.M.

that night, Churchill wrote to his despondent ally that "the light" which he so desperately wanted to see "at the end of the tunnel" was

there, shining brightly. The United States would enter the war. "Cabi­ net is united in considering this magnificent document as decisive in

favour of the continued resistance of France in accordance with your own declaration of June 10."

The promise of redoubled material aid is coupled with definite advice and exhortation to France to continue the struggle even under the grievous conditions which you mentioned, If France on this message of President Roosevelt's continues in the field and in the war, we feel that the United States is committed beyond recall to take the only remaining step, namely becoming a belligerent in form as she already has constituted herself in fact. Constitution of United States makes it impossible...for the President to declare war himself, but, if you act on his reply now received, we sincerely believe that this must inevitably follow....! do beg you and your colleagues...not to miss this sovereign opportunity of bringing about the world-wide oceanic and economic coalition which must be fatal to Nazi domination.225

In addition to writing to Reynaud that night, the determined Prime

Minister tried once again to prod FDR. "Mr. President," he telegraphed:

224pRus, June 14, 1940, Vol. I, 250-251

22Sibid.; Churchill, Vol. II, 160. 434

"I must tell you that it seems to me absolutely vital that this message

should be published tomorrow, June 14, in order that it may play the

decisive part in turning the course of world history. It will, I am sure,

decide the French to deny Hitler a patch-up peace with France..."

Publish now! he advised.

It was not until the morning of July 14 that Kennedy, undoubtedly

greatly relieved, talked with Churchill and made FDR's attitude "perfectly

clear to him." He repeated Roosevelt's opposition to publication and

explained that his June 10 reply to Reynaud primarily concerned the future

of the French fleet. Churchill was "obviously terribly disappointed."

He had so hoped that the publication of FDR's message would "put a little

stiffening into the French backbone" and was reluctant to inform his ally

of the President's refusal. "Convening such a message now to the French would merely dampen what fires remained," he told Kennedy.To under­ score his refusal, Roosevelt himself cabled a message to Churchill on

June 14. "My message of yesterday's date addressed to the French Prime

Minister was in no sense intended to commit and did not commit this 227 Government to military participation in support of the Allied Governments."

The confusion and misunderstanding surrounding this hectic midnight diplo­ macy had virtually no influence on Reynaud. He did not even receive

ZZGpRUS, June 14, 1940, Vol. 1, 250-251; Dispatch 1649, June 14, 1940, Safe: Kennedy, FDRL.

227pRus, Jure 14, 1940, Vol. I, 254-255. 435

Roosevelt's reply until June 14, twelve hours after Churchill had read it. But it did constitute a minor victory for Kennedy over Britain's tenacious Prime Minister.

On the morning of June 14 just as he was leaving for Bordeaux, and before he had received Roosevelt's reply to his appeal of June 10, Reynaud, depressed and anxious, met with Biddle, the Deuty Ambassador to France and gave him a message for Roosevelt requesting a guarantee that the United

States would soon enter the war.^^® In his memoirs years later, Hull wrote that Reynaud knew full well that no "clouds of war planes" would come swooping down to save the dying French Republic; neither would the

President declare war. Hull believed that Reynaud had finally succeeded in carrying out his cherished intention of getting on the record an appeal for an American declaration of war, which alone could save France.

Both FDR and his Secretary of STate understood his hopeless situation; but they did not accept his assumption that England's only salvation lay 229 in France or that if France fell, England's collapse was inevitable.

228pugs, June 14, 1940, Vol. I, 252-253; also see Langer and Gleason, 539.

229uull, 788; In his memoirs, Churchill gives the impression that Roosevelt was tormented by his inability to publish his note to Reynaud and that Kennedy had told him that he cound not because of the objections raised by the State Department. Langer and Gleason argue that "it would certainly have been most unusual for an Ambassador to make such a state­ ment, even if he had had information to warrant it." They write that there was "not a shred of evidence" to substantiate Churchill's theory. But the record does show that FDR, speaking to Kennedy on the phone, immediately rejected Churchill's request and did so without even receiving Kennedy's full report. Fuqther, the President also sent a strongly worded telegram denying any intention of making a commitment. Also see Langer and Gleason, 533-534. 436

On June 14 Paris fell. The next day the final act in France's tragedy began at Bordeaux. For two days the government waited for

Roosevelt's reply, and debate raged in the French Cabinet over whether or not to conclude an armistice. Reynaud suggested that the army capitulate and the Government then take the fleet and retreat to North

Africa. General Weygand, absolutely refused to "accept the casting of this shame upon the banners of the French Army;" Marshal Retain threatened

to resign if an armistice was not c o n c l u d e d . ^30 Reynaud worried over the fleet; would the British consent to an armistice provided the French did not surrender the fleet? Perhaps they should send the fleet to America, he suggested.

On the morning of June 16, Roosevelt's long-awaited reply finally arrived. The President congratulated the French Premier on the

"resplendent courage" of the Franch armies and stated emphatically that the American government was "making every possible effort" for the Allies to receive airplanes, artillery, and ammunition. FDR promised "that this Government so long as the Allied governments continue to resist will redouble its efforts in this direction." He also assured Reynaud that the United States would refuse to recognize "any attempts to infringe by force the independence and territorial integrity of France."

Roosevelt's unequivocal conclusion disappointed Reynaud: "I know that

230churchill, Vol. II, 173. 437 you will understand that these statements carry with them no implication of military commitments. Only the Congress can make such commitments.

Once again, Roosevelt had reiterated the Charlottesville policy, nothing more.

Reynaud had risked everything on Roosevelt's reply; tired and worn out, his hopes were shattered. There was still one small chance— Britain.

On that fateful afternoon, June 16, General de Gaulle reported from Lon­ don that the British Cabinet had approved a proposal for an "indissoluble union" of the French and British Empires. Some dramatic announcement was necessary to bolster Reynaud and to keep France in the war, de Gaulle had warned Churchill that morning. Reynaud was delighted and relieved when he heard the proposal. "For a document like that," Reynaud promised,

"he would fight to the last."^32 Armed with this proposal, he hoped to persuade the Cabinet to retreat to Africa and continue the war. Churchill opposed the policy but raised no serious objections during the Cabinet debate. "I was somewhat surprised to see the staid, stolid, experienced politicians of all parties engage themselves so passionately in an immense design whose implications and consequences were not in any way thought out," he wrote. "I did not resist, but yielded easily to these generous surges which carried our resolves to a very high level of unself­ ish and undaunted action."233

231pRUS, June 15, 1940, Vol. I, 255-256.

232churchill, Vol. II, 180; see Churchill, Vol. II, 178-179 for a full text of the Declaration of Union.

233ibid.176. 438

Twice Reynaud read the proposal to his colleagues. Their response was always the same— disinterest. It was just another trick to fore­ stall an armistice. Retain argued. "In three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken." To unite with Great Britain, he said, was "fusion with a corpse." It would reduce France to the status of a dominion, said the influential minister, Camille Chautemps. "Better be a Nazi province. At least we know what that means," said Jean Ybarnegaray who had been so firm twenty-two years before. "I prefer to collaborate with my allies rather than with my enemies," replied Reynaud.All to no avail. The proposal was never put to a vote; it collapsed of its own accord and the clamour began again for an armistice. Kennedy, too, regarded the proposal warily. "A noble sentiment but [it] just does 2 not mean much," he told Washington.

Late that evening, completely exhausted, Reynaud resigned and advised the President to send for Marshal Retain.He had neither "life or

234ibid., 183.

235jRK to Hull, Dispatch 1680, June 16, 1940, Safe: Kennedy, FDRL.

23&The British Cabinet papers for 1940 reveal that Reynaud originally proposed to surrender before the Battle of France was completely lost. The French Prime Minister suggested that Britain and France offer conces­ sions to Mussolini. In return for his neutrality and his promise to ask Hitler for peace terms for the Allies which would not affect their inde­ pendence they implied that they would hand over Malta and Gibraltar. Both Chamberlain and Halifax wanted to accept but Churchill, then Prime Minister, refused and was supported by other ministers. They argued that the approach would have unfortunate repercussions. They finally won the day only after "considerable discussion." Boston Globe, January 24, 1971, 40. 439

strength to face an ordeal which would have taxed the rosurces of a 2 %7 Cromwell, of a Clemenceau, a Stalin or a Hitler." wrote Churchill.

By 10:00 that evening, Retain had formed a new Cabinet and half an hour

later it asked Germany for an armistice.

Apparently bearing no ill will, the day after he left office, Reynaud

cabled Roosevelt: "I feel that the reply which you made to my last

message went to the extreme limit of what was permitted by existing

circumstances.... France feels that, because America exists, the form of

civilization which is hers will not die, and that the day will come when 238 liberty will be reborn in old Europe."

That day, fearing arrest, the man whom Churchill called "the man of

destiny--the coming Constable of France" went to his office in Bordeaux 239 and made a series of appointments as a decoy. He drove to the airport with Britain's envoy to Reynaud, General Sir Edward Spears, whose plane was scheduled to leave for London. The two men shook hands and said

goodbye. Just as the engines began to roar. General Charles de Gaulle stepped into Spear's plane and slammed thedoor while the police and

French officials stood gaping, watching it soar. Inside the airplane.

De Gaulle carried with him "the honor of France.He was received by

^^Churchill, Vol. II, 174; Langer and Gleason, 541. Biddle had constant contact with Reynaud during these days and he make many references to his condition. FRUS, June 16, 1940, Vol. I, 260-261.

^^%ull, 793.

239churchill, Vol. II, 184.

240ibid., 187. 440

Churchill and offered the facilities of the British Broadcasting Company.

On June 18, dressed in full uniform with white gloves, and speaking over the BBC, he denied the legality of Marshal Petain's Government and proclaimed himself the leader of the French resistance,Five anxious days passed before the armistice was signed in Marshal Foch's old dining car, brought from the Musée des Invalides in Paris under Hitler's orders.

Roy Willis, (editor). De Gaulle (New York, 1967), 4, 16. CHAPTER VIII

"THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT"

Within six weeks, Britain, virtually unarmed, had found herself isolated and alone. By late June the swastika flew from the Channel

Islands to the Pyrenees, from the Atlantic to Brest Litovsk. American's sympathy for the beleaguered Allies had been steadily growing. Soon after his arrival in the U.S., Lord Lothian, Britain's new ambassador, noticed the rapid shift in opinion. In a letter to Lady Astor, he described the "staggering" change during the last two weeks and opti­ mistically wrote that "it would take very little to carry them in now-- any kind of challenge by Hitler or Mussolini to their own vital interests would do it."l The Economist marveled at America's about-face. The collapse of France has expelled any doubts that this was a world wide struggle, its editor wrote. "There is growing unanimity that 'everything 2 except men' must be sent across the Atlantic to assist the Allies."

The widespread belief in the United States now was that the Allies are fighting America's battle; arms sent abroad would defend not only the

Allies, but the United States as well.

^Whalen, 292.

^The Economist, June 22, 1940, 1070.

441 442

In London Kennedy noted the spread of this assumption among the

British. He told Hull that Churchill "expects the United States will be

in right after the election." When Americans saw England’s famous old towns and cities bombed and destroyed, "they will line up and want war."

Many Britons assumed that all that was needed was "an incident" to bring the United States in. "If that were all that were needed desperate T people will do desperate things," Kennedy commented.

Actually, Kennedy rather than Churchill more readily understood

American sentiment. True, public opinion had made rapid advances, but it still adamantly opposed American entry. A public opinion poll pub­ lished in June indicated that about 67% supported aid to the Allies; but only 27% supported an American declaration of war. Arthur Krock succinctly summed up the American attitude: "Armed intervention not yet, and never if it can be avoided without endangering our security; a desire to aid Germany's foe or foes to the full point where deprivation of our own defense needs begins; a belief that no official voice, whether that of the President or Congress should appear to promise more than we can render, thus arousing false hopes abroad; complete rearmament, favoring no group interest."^ Thus, American public opinion was willing

^FRUS, June 12, 1940, Vol. Ill, 37; also JPK to Hull, Dispatch 1603, June 12, 1940; Safe: Kennedy, FDRL

^New YorkYoi Times, June 20, 1940, 22; also mentioned in Langer and Gleason, 540. 443

to support Roosevelt's Charlottesville program, but no further. No one

understood that more fully than the President himself.

The British Ambassador in Washington, Lothian, warned his Government

that it was "a profound mistake for anybody in Europe to make appeals

to the United States to intervene...." The case for intervention was

already being made by a host of influential Americans. Americans were

understandably touchy about any Allied stampede to get their boys to

fight in Europe.^

Kennedy thought the British were desperate. Britain's war prepara­ tions were still "pitiful" and "appallingly weak" despite the fact that industrial production and war efforts were progressing well. "The real defense of England will be with courage and not with arms," he told

Roosevelt. "Short of a miracle this country...will hold on in the hope that the United States will come in." And in the unlikely event that

Britain could somehow deal German industrial production and air strength a crippling blow, "the United States will have plenty to worry about in their own country. The cry should be prepare for anything right there, right now."^ The worried diplomat told Bilainkin that "they have only been skirmishing with you to now in the air....If Hitler sends 750 or

800 machines here at a time...pouring the bombs, daytime and nighttime, what are you going to do?" The British kept hoping for a miracle

Kennedy noted. "Perhaps when the bombing begins in earnest, there will be a little less of this wishful thinking and they will come down to brass

^FO 371/24230/A3171/131/45, June 7, 1940, 373.

GpRUS, June 12, 1940, Vol. Ill, 37. 444 tacks. I think I'll have my baptism of fire, here, go through one good raid, before I quit and go back."^

Churchill realized that what really mattered was what Roosevelt thought. Thus he undertook to convince the President that Britain could

"hold on;" that not only was England's fight far from lost but that it could in fact be won. He turned to his most persuasive weapon— the

British fleet.^ In his "Former Naval Person" messages and through

Britain's Ambassador, Lord Lothian, he bluntly warned FDR of the perilous position in which the U.S. would be placed if the British Isles should be defeated and Hitler became Britain's master.

As early as mid-May, before France had fallen, Churchill had painted a bleak picture of what could happen if Britain were subjugated.

"Excuse me, Mr. President, putting this nightmare bluntly," he wrote to

FDR. But: "If members of the present Administration were finished and others came in to parly amid the ruins, you must not be blind to the fact that the sole remaining bargaining counter with Germany would be the fleet, and, if this country was left by the United States to its fate, no one would have the right to blame those then responsible if they made the best terms they could for the surviving inhabitants."

^Bilainkin, June 28, 1940, 135.

% a l e n , 293-294. 445

Obviously, he explained "I could not answer for my successors, who in utter despair and helplessness might well have to accommodate themselves to the German will."^

Lothian, concerned about America's complacent attitude, told his

Government that many Americans somehow believe that if Britain is defeated, the rest of the Empire will get the fleet for the United States and "that the United States need not face war until after this has taken place." Although he thought Churchill's June 4 speech was morally sound, the last words ("We shall never surrender") have "given encouragement to those who believe that even though Great Britain goes, the fleet will somehow cross the Atlantic to them,"^® IVhat should I do?, he asked

Churchill. The Prime Minister instructed Lothian to explain to Roosevelt that his last words in his speech, while pleasing to America's ear, ("We shall never surrender") were primarily addressed to Germany and Italy.

If England were defeated and some Quisling Government installed, it could receive easier terms from Hitler by surrendering the fleet. Thus

Germany and Japan would become the masters of the New World. Talk to him in this sense, Churchill instructed, concerned by complacent Ameri­ can assumptions "that they will pick up the debris of the British Empire by their present policy.Actually, they would run the risk, that

^Churchill, Vol. II, 50; FRUS, May 20, 1940, Vol. Ill, 51.

lOpO 371/24239/A3316/G, June 7, 1940, 372.

llchurchill. Vol. II, 344. 446 their sea-power would be "completely overmatched." Warn FDR that "if we go down, Hitler has a very good chance of conquering the world." Even at the height of the French crisis, the day before Reynaud resigned,

Churchill was warning FDR that if Hitler combined the naval strength of

Britain, Japan, France, and Italy with Germany's industrial resources,

"overwhelming sea power would be in Hitler's hands." The revolution in sea power could quickly happen before the United States would be prepared.

"If we go down you may have a United States of Europe under the Nazi command far more numerous, far stronger, far better armed than the New

World."We know President is our best friend," Churchill wrote to

Lothian. But "never cease to impress on President and others that if this country were successfully invaded....some Quisling Government would be formed to make peace....The British fleet would be the solid contribution by which this Peace Government would buy terms." IVhat really mattered,

Churchill told Lothian, was whether Hitler could defeat England within the next three months. Confident of Britain's ability to stave off a

Nazi attack, he suggested that the Ambassador adopt a "bland and phleg- 13 matic" mood.

Lothian gave Hull a copy of the memo entitled the "Situation of British in View of Collapse of French" in which he pointed out that the economic and manufacturing resources of nearly all of Europe are at the disposal

l^FRUS, June 15, 1940, Vol. Ill, 53.

l^churchill. Vol. II, 195-196. 447 of the Nazi and Fascist Powers for an attack on Great Britain. Because of this, Britain once again called for the immediate sale to Britain of destroyers, boats, aeroplanes, guns, rifles and ammunitions of all kinds if "the impending attack" of Britain could be beaten back. The British

Ambassador suggested that the United States would find it necessary to make "far-reaching changes in the industrial organisation of this country."14

Shortly after the White House received the news of the French armistice negotiations on June 16, Lord Lothian presented his credentials to the President. FDR praised Churchill's appeal to the French Fleet to regroup in British harbors and continue the fight overseas and stated that if Britain was faced with a similar crisis, he hoped that her fleet would retreat to the empire and continue the war. "Should British bases become useless," he went on to explain, "the fleet could certainly use

American facilities. And the U.S. Navy would join in patrolling the

Atlantic and protecting Canada and other British possessions. Tlie U.S. might not formally declare war on Germany because of constitutional difficulties," he stated, "but it would become in effect a belligerent,

'assisting the Empire in every way and enforcing the blockage on Germany.

l^Memo to Hull from Lord Lothian, July 5, 1940, PSP, Box 8, FDRL.

ISwhalen, 294. 448

Roosevelt’s sweeping promise of American support moved the U.S.

closer to aiding the democracies by "methods short of war" and was a

clear violation of American neutrality laws. Unlike Kennedy who argued

that England's position was hopeless, never it seems did the President

doubt that Britain could "hold.on." Neither did he accept the Prime

Minister's pessimistic prognosis; that a Quisling Government installed

in a defeated Britain would surrender the fleet. Throughout mid-June to July, as FDR began to believe that American assistance to England

could play the decisive role, he moved further and further away from his disgruntled ambassador.After all, he believed, this was our fight too. He may also have been influenced by Kennedy's warnings that the U.S. would be blamed if England was defeated.

Nevertheless, Roosevelt's decision was fraught with hazards. Some

Americans, shocked by the French disaster, turned inward. Quick to find a scapegoat, they blamed everything from social and moral degeneration to political corruption of Nazi Fifth column influence--everything but French unpreparedness and German military superiority. And that colorful, old isolationist. General Hugh Johnson could still command an audience.

Arguing over the radio on June 22, he declared that we were "being bum's- rushed toward a fateful choice between immediate involvement in war or keeping out of war as long as we can...." In reply to the argument that

American self interest dictated supporting Britain he remarked: "If we rely on England to that extent, in morality we should not confine our help to clever little schemes for a sleazy bootlegging of a few arms in

l^Langer and Gleason, 568. 449

violation of our own and international law. We ought frankly to declare

war tomorrow." But that would be madness since America was "utterly,

tragically unready for war or defense" and "as helpless as a toothless,

clawless rheumatic lion....Let's stay out until we are ready to get in. 17 If we get sufficiently ready, we shall never get in."

But most Americans willingly accepted Wm. Allen White's argument

that preserving Britain would keep us out of war. This thesis was

echoed in White's letter to the President: "If we have the good will of the Allies when they are defeated, which seems likely, we can make

arrangements to get their fleets. If we have their fleets, we can defy

Hitler with our fleet in the Atlantic Ocean and theirs in the Pacific

Ocean. If we do not help the Allies, if we turn our backs on them, they will see no reason for helping us by giving us their fleets." And if Hitler gained control over their fleets, he would be a considerable 18 threat to British possessions in the West Indies.

On June 19, Roosevelt took a step which he had been considering for six months; he introduced bipartisanship into the Cabinet and replaced

Harry Woodring, the staunch isolationist and a frequent critic of Roose­ velt's policies, with Colonel Frank Knox as Secretary of Navy. Colonel

Henry L. Stimson, another eminent Republican and a former Secretary of War and Secretary of State, once again became Secretary of War. Both men called for compulsory military service and an army of one million men.

^^Ibid., 566-567.

l^Ibid., 567. 450 for American domination of the Atlantic either by cooperation with the

British or further fleet construction, and for the creation of the world's greatest Air Force to aid the British— a policy far more advanced than anything Roosevelt had requested.

The Economist was delighted by the Cabinet changes. Although the inclusion of Mr. Stimson and Colonel Knox in Mr. Roosevelt's Cabinet was not analogous to a British Coalition, it explained to its English audience, it was "nevertheless a clear indication that Mr. Roosevelt's policy holds the country and a promise that it will continue." 20

The President, acting on Knox's prodding, agreed to send another

Republican to London as his unofficial observer. The man chosen was a high ranking naval observer, a distinguished World War I commander, a winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor, and one who maintained an avid interest in international and military affairs. Colonel Wm. (Wild

Bill) Donovan had been an eyewitness to the Italian-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War and was well versed on the techniques and strategy of modern warfare. He had also been a Republican contender for governor of New York and a classmate of Roosevelt's at Columbia Law School A man of great energy and immense personal charm, he never permitted political differences to interfere with his friendship with the President. 21

l^Ibid., 568, 510-511. 20 The Economist, June 22, 1940, 1070.

^^Whalen, 294-295; Langer and Gleason, 510, 715. 451

The British had long been worried lest Kennedy's pessimistic cables

might lead even sympathetic Americans to balk at contributing ships to a

navy which might soon be confiscated by the Nazis. Consequently they had

encouraged Roosevelt to send his own personal emissary to survey their

situation. By mid-July when Donovan arrived, his hosts rolled out the

red carpet, no doubt hoping that he would report more favorably than did

Kennedy. He scouted defense equipment, factories, and military installa­

tions; he talked candidly with King George VI, Churchill, members of the

Cabinet, military experts, ordinary citizens and American military autho­

rities attached to the Embassy. He met everyone and everybody in an

attempt to size up Britain's strength and morale. Everyone that is but

Kennedy. Donovan's snub was intentional. The White House had deliberately

not informed him of Donovan's arrival. 22 Despite Kennedy's loud protests

that he had been "slighted," that Donovan could not "possibly get any

information except through our existing military and naval attaches"

and that his trip would create "confusion and misunderstanding" for 23 British authorities, Washington maintained its stony silence.

In contrast to Kennedy's sustained predictions of Britain's

imminent destruction,^^ Donovan's report to Roosevelt was optimistic.

Britain's morale was good. Their preparations for defense were excellent.

Donovan even doubted that Hitler could defeat Britain unless he was

^^whalen, 295-296; Langer and Gleason, 715-716.

^^Memo from Welles to FDR, July 12, 1940, FDRL; The Tatler (London), October 30, 1940, PSF; Great Britain, FDRL.

^^Koskoff wrote that Kennedy's pessimism was "in general warranted. He continually predicted the worst and the worst usually came." 261. 452 willing to pay a huge toll. The airfields were scattered throughout the

country, the army and navy operated effectively, and the coastal defenses were strong. Thus, a concentrated attack on the RAF would be extremely

difficult. The British had a very good chance of pulling through, he

cheerfully predicted, if they obtained considerably more American aid.

The President agreed with Donovan's conclusions. In marked contrast to

Kennedy, FDR believed that Britain could continue the war effort and

looked sympathetically on their request for more military equipment and 25 destroyers. Donovan's mission had been extremely "useful," The

Spectator wrote approvingly. He took liome with him "a picture of Britain substantially different from that drawn officially by the pessimistic

Mr. Kennedy.In fact, the British were so delighted with him that when Kennedy resigned his post, the Foreign Office officials considered

"dropping a hint" to the State Department that Donovan's appointment as

Ambassador would be welcome.Thus, the road to greater and more far- reaching commitments like the famous Destroyer-Deal had been paved.

Kennedy, however, kept up his warnings. "Don't let anybody make any mistake; this war, from Great Britain's point of view is being con­ ducted from now on with their eyes only on one place and that is the

^^Whalen, 295-296; Langer and Gleason, 716.

^^The Spectator, December 13, 1940, 629.

^^FO 371/24251/A4995/605/45, November 28, 1940; no pagination. 453

United States. Unless there is a miracle they realize they haven't a chance in the long run."^^ He even doubted whether Britain could 20 resist land attacks. "

While Kennedy's pride was smarting under the humiliation of

Donovan's visit, he occupied himself with setting up a committee of the

American Red Cross, and acting as its honorary chairman. He called upon all Americans to "do your utmost, every one of you, to help the American 30 Red Cross....We cannot give too soon--or give too much." He also encouraged and supported the creation of voluntary relief organizations 31 in Britain and raised funds on their behalf.

Kennedy could also take fatherly pleasure in the successes of his two eldest sons. "Finished my thesis," Jack Kennedy proudly wrote to his father in the spring of 1940. "It was only going to run about the average 32 length, 70 pages, but finally ran to 150. Am sending you a copy...."

Jack Kennedy was a senior at Harvard and a candidate for an honors degree in Political science. "I had to work like hell," he later recalled, to make up for the semester's work he had lost by traveling abroad. He chose "Appeasement at Munich" as his honors topic and spent long hours

Z^whalen, 296.

^^Bilainkin, July 8, 1940, 152.

^^Times (London), June 24, 1940, 9.

3lTimes (London), August 21, 1940, 7.

^^Wlialen, 287.

^\asky, JFK: Hie Man and the Myth, 77. 454 researching in Harvard's Widener Library and thumbing through Parlia­ mentary Debates, newspapers, magazines, and other books and digesting a steady stream of paternalistic advice and information from London.

"Thanks a lot for your wire. Worked it in," he wrote in reply to his father's comments. Jack finally named it Appeasement at Munich: The

Inevitable Result of the Slowness of the British Democracy to Change

From a Disarmament Policy. "I'll be interested to see what you think of it, as it represents more work than I've ever done in my life."^^

At first glance. Jack's thesis was the usual undergraduate effort— pedantic, rather dull, overburdened with footnotes and statistics, and weak in sentence structure and spelling. He discussed the reasons for

Britain's inadequate rearmament in the late '30's. His thesis was

"mature and judicious" in its impartial description of the forces inherent in a democratic state which produce a Munich--a foolhardy pacifism, blind faith in the wobbly League of Nations, the anti-defense economizers, the self interest of business and labor, the petty political squabbling, almost everyone and everything except Stanley Baldwin and Neville 35 Chamberlain. "Leaders are responsible for their failures only in the governing sector and cannot be held responsible for the failure of a nation as a whole," he concluded.

^^whalen, 287.

3Sibid.

^^Kennedy, (Vhy England Slept, 215. 455

Interestingly, Jack's conclusions were virtually a carbon copy of

his father's. He presented the classical appeaser's view of Munich,

"The policy of appeasement, while it was partly based on a sincere belief that a permanent basis could be built for peace, was also formu­

lated on the realization that Britain's defense program, due to its

tardiness in getting started, would not come to harvest until 1939.

Munich was to be the price she had to pay for this year of grace"^?—

a "year of grace"— reminescent of Kennedy Sr.'s arguments. Chamberlain had not been "taken in," the young man wrote. "Chamberlain could not 38 have fought even if he wanted to." English opinion was just too

lackadaisical.

Kennedy claimed much of the credit for inspiring his son and told his London friends: "IVhen I was in the States with Jack, and heardsome professors talking about Munich, I realized they knew nothing about it."

Years later. Jack claimed the credit. "I wouldn't say ray father got me 39 interested in it. They were things that I saw for myself." Jack's efforts earned him a grade of magna cum laude on his thesis and enabled him to graduate from Harvard cum laude in political science in June,

1940. His mother and sisters came up for the traditional pomp and pageantry while Joe sent his love and stayed in London.

3?Ibid., 184.

38lbid., 186.

39whalen, 287; Lasky, 78. 456

Encouraged by his professors. Jack managed to transform "the typical undergraduate effort" into a best seller. He told his father: "I thought

I could work on rewriting it and making it somewhat more complete and maybe more interesting for the average reader— as it stands now— it is not anywhere polished enough although the ideas, etc., are OK."^^

Kennedy told his son that he had showed the book to several friends all of whom thought he had done "a swell job." However, he chided his son to

"check your references. I have found several instances where you have misspelled names and got your dates wrong.He also admonished Jack not to be too lenient with the appeasers. A statesman "is also supposed to look after the national welfare, and to attempt to educate the people...."^^ "Will stop white washing Baldwin," Jack obediently replied and incorporated whole sections from his father's letter into his conclusion.At the request of the elder Kennedy, Arthur Krock, a close personal friend, recommended an agent to Jack, advised him on rewriting the manuscript, and substituted for the cumbersome title Why

England Slept, a deliberate play on Churchill's book While England Slept.

Henry R. Luce, of Time, Inc., another of Joe's friends, agreed to write the foreward.

40 Burns, John Kennedy, 44.

41whalen, 288.

42Burns, John Kennedy, 43; Lasky, 78.

^^Burns, John Kennedy, 43; IVhalen, 288. 44ibid. 457

The book was hastily brought out in July by Wilfred Funk, Inc.

and published on the eve of the blitz in England. It sold 80,000 copies

in'the U.S. and Great Britain. It was also sponsored by the Book-of-the-

Month Club and well received by critics who marveled that it was the work of a 23 year old undergraduate.^^ The Spectator described it as

"an extremely able piece of work....Considering that the writer has

lived less than two years in this country, his sureness and maturity of judgment on varied aspects of its national life are remarkable.

His analysis was "devastating."^^ The London Times Literary Supplement 48 wrote, "A young man's book; it contains much wisdom for older men."

The delighted Ambassador wrote: "You would be surprised how a book that really makes the grade with high-class people stands you in good stead for years to come." He passed out copies to Queen Elizabeth, Churchill, and Jack's former professor, Lasky.It had indeed made the grade.

^^Bums, John Kennedy, 44.

'^^The Spectator, October 18, 1940, 391.

^^Ibid., December 13, 1940, 632. 4 8 The London Times Literary Supplement as cited in Lasky, JFK, 79; Whalen, 289. 49 Lasky, JFK, 79, Triumph and Tragedy, 70; Burns, 44, (Yhalen, 289. 458

IVhy England Slept earned about forty thousand dollars in royalties.

They enabled Jack to buy a Buick and to donate his English royalties to

the war-torn town of Plymouth.

Young Joe Jr. was his father all over. Handsome, tall, robust,

friendly, the heir apparent to the Kennedy family, he was being groomed

to fulfill his father's presidential ambitions. Young Joe had always

known what he wanted. Harold Laski, one of his professors at the London

School of Economics, later recalled how he "often sat in my study and

submitted with that smile that was pure magic to relentless teasing

about his determination to be nothing less than President of the United

States.His father suggested that he lay the proper foundation for

a political career; so Young Joe enrolled at Harvard Law School. He helped to organize a student organization at Harvard to Keep-America-

Out-of-Waf. Like his father, he spoke out against American intervention

in " foreign wars." Echoing Kennedy's infamous Trafalgar Day Speech, young

Joe once argued that it would be more advantageous for the United States

to barter with a Nazified Europe than to enter the war against Germany.

In 1940, only a few days shy of his 25th birthday, he launched his political career by running as a delegate to the Democratic National

Convention and was elected by the poor, staunchly Democratic Westend district of Boston as a Farley delegate, utterly opposed to a third

SOwhalen, 289.

Slbasky, JFK, 64. 459

term for Roosevelt. As the grandson of "Honey Fitz" and the son of the

Ambassador, he could easily have coasted to victory on the Kennedy name

alone. But young Joe chose instead to campaign vigorously, knocking on 52 doors, shaking hands, meeting the voters.

At the Chicago Stadium the Massachusetts delegation met other can­ didates opposed to a third term. There was the crusty old isolationist,

John Garner, FDR's twice elected Vice President who refused to be his running mate again and declared his own candidacy as a protest. So, too, had Maryland's Senator Millard Tydings. Cordell Hull also had a faithful small following as did Montana's Senator Burton K. Wheeler who had announced his candidacy to publicize his dovish views and to get a strong pro-peace plank in the party's platform.

As the convention floundered on through the next dull days, Roose­ velt remained stoically above it all. The President's men fretted— about

Roosevelt's plans, fretted about the third term, fretted about a surprise compromise candidate. To forestall any unpleasant surprises they went to work to bring pressure on the anti-Roosevelt delegates. Ihe pro-

Roosevelt forces cornered young Joe Kennedy and reminded him of the many honors the President had bestowed on his father. Surely his gratitude and loyalty dictated that he switch camps. They also hinted openly that his political career would be short-lived if he continued to back Farley;

52 Triumph and Tragedy, 70-71; IVhalen, 296. 460

C 7 so would his father's. The harrassed delegate sought refuge and advice

from Arthur Krock. Joe Jr. explained to him that he had given Farley his word and he felt compelled to honor it. That was all. There were no hidden strings attached. Krock patiently listened and suggested that he ask Farley to release him from his commitment. Kennedy refused to ask him. "Do what you think right, and don't worry about the old man.

He can take care of himself."^4 Roosevelt's frustrated supporters even put through a call to London to ask Kennedy if he would talk sense to the boy. "No," he firmly replied. "I wouldn't think of telling him what to do."^^ Acting on Krock's advice, each time the Massachusetts delegation was polled, Joe Jr. called out "James A. Farley."

The convention continued to grind out its predetermined verdict as the supreme vote getter's name was placed in nomination along with

Farley's, Hull's, Gainer's, and Tyding's. Roosevelt won overwhelmingly on the first ballot. They Farley, a loyal Democrat to the end, moved

Roosevelt's nomination by acclamation to a deafening roar of "ayes." But young Joe had fulfilled his promise; he stuck by Farley to the bitter end. As the convention ended, Krock sent him a cheery note. "You'll feel all right with yourself and your father tonight.

S3parley, 264; IVhalen, 298; Krock, 340.

^^ivhalen, 298; Krock, 340-341. r c ^Triumph and Tragedy, 71; Farley, 264; Also see Rosenman, 212, IVlialen, 298, and Burns, Tlie Lion and the Fox, 427-428.

•’^IVhalen, 298. 461

The British had kept a close eye on the convention proceedings.

"Of course, we want [Roosevelt] to run," the Prime Minister had told

Kennedy, "but we must take care that the United States does not know that," Churchill had said. "If we stirred up some action here in July, which seems more than likely, Roosevelt might then be more inclined to run," he mused to Kennedy. Indeed, by July the Bri'lsh had "stirred up some a c t i o n . "57 What effect Europe's problems had on Roosevelt's ulti­ mate choice is a matter of speculation, but certainly, they must have played a considerable influence in his decision to seek a third term.

The final German victory over England is now only a question of time," wrote General Jodi, Chief of Operations at the German High

Command and Hitler's favorite strategist. "Enemy offensive operations

CO on a large scale are no longer possible." The General, usually a prudent strategist, shared the widespread belief that the war was won and almost over. And if Britain still didn't realize it, only a little more force would be necessary to convince her. Hitler seemed to be marking time, waiting for the British to be reasonable, to sue for peace.

Only if all else failed did Hitler plan to carry out the invasion of

Britain. Finally after nearly two months of hesitation he issued

Directive No. 16, Operation Sea Lion, and set the target date for

September 5, 1940.

^^The Landis Papers, Chapter 41; no pagination.

SGghirer, 996. 462

During those two months, the British lived indaily fear of a

German invasion. They gained some breathing space on land as they continued their desperate struggle on sea. Throughout July, the

Luftwaffe had stepped up its attacks on British shipping and ports and

Nazi submarines had sunk a larger percentage of tonnage than at any other time during the war. Undoubtedly, the British desperately needed destroyers to patrol trade routes and protect food supplies. Of the fewer than one hundred destroyers in home waters, almost half had been sunk or damaged by the end of July.^^

On the eve of the Battle of Britain, Churchill who had remained silent for several weeks on the subject, again renewed his request for help. "It has now become most urgent for you to let us have the destroyers, motor-boats, and flying boats for which we have asked."

Britain's present rate of casualties could not be sustained for long.

Just in the last ten days eleven destroyers had been sunk or damaged by the Nazis. The war must hinge on this oneeasily remediable factor.

Therefore, it was necessary to have fifty or sixty of America's recon­ ditioned destroyers immediately. The next three or four months were decisive— if Britain survived, she would ultimately triumph. "Mr.

President, with great respect I must tell you that in the long history of the world this is a thing to do now.

^^IVhalen, 299.

371/24240/A3582/131/45, 513-515; Churchill, Vol. II, 345-346. 463

Even the King wrote to the President with a personal appeal. "As you know, we are in urgent need of some of your older destroyers to tide us over the next few months." He expressed sympathy for Roosevelt's

"difficulties" and then added a note of urgency. "The need is becoming greater every day if we are to carry on our solitary fight for freedom to a successful conclusion.

But what could FDR do? The President assured the King that he was considering his request but unfortunately he had not yet been able to find a solution. He was completely aware of Britain's urgency but he could not legally send destroyers to England unless the navy certified that they were not needed for America's defense; and naval officials had already testified about their potential value to American security.

And if he tried to get special legislation through Congress, Walsh,

IVheeler, Nye and Co., the guardians of isolation would raise a major fuss. He had even considered selling them to Canada by arguing that they were necessary for hemispheric defense, thus permitting Canadian destroyers to be used in Britain.FDR clearly needed some "molasses," a public assurance by Britain that the Fleet would never be given to

Germany and a promise that the Government would give air and naval facilities to the United States for hemispheric defense.

^^King George VI to FDR, June 26, 1940, PSF; Great Britain, FDRL.

62pO 371/24240/3582/131/45, August 1, 1940, 503; Burns, 437-438.

G3po 371/24241/A3640/131/45, August 3, 1940, 314. 464

Roosevelt discussed Churchill's request with Cabinet officials on

August 2. Secretary Knox offered a suggestion which he had been debating privately. He proposed exchanging the destroyers for British military bases in the West I n d i e s . ^4 The Cabinet also agreed to ask Lord

Lothian if the British Government would promise publicly never, "under any conceivable circumstances," to surrender the fleet to Nazi hands.

Roosevelt wanted to bring Willkie, the Republican nominee for President into the picture by asking him to line up Republican support on the Hill to ensure passage of the special legislation. Willkie, however, afraid of arousing the powerful isolationist Republicans who dominated his party in Congress, backed off and refused to take a public stand.

Initially Kennedy gave the appearance of favoring the Destroyer Deal.

Halifax told Churchill that Kennedy supported the deal and "promised to back it to the best of his ability. He quite agrees about the importance and urgency of the matter.And the Prime Minister was so pleased that he wrote Roosevelt and praised Kennedy as "a grand help to us and the common cause.

64po 371/24240/3582/131/45, August 1, 1940, 503.

^^FRUS, August 2, 1940, Vol. Ill, 58.

371/24240/A3582/131/45/513-515.

G?FO 371/24240/A3582/131/45, July 31, 1940. 465

But as the negotiations began in earnest, Kennedy took a "hard-

nosed approach" and sent Roosevelt his own résumé of Britain's position.

His advice was equivocal and on the whole negative. He argued that

granting the destroyers might be like "signing a blank check on all our

resources— finances, industrial, and man power....If we are contemplating

doing anything besides selling to the British in the ordinary course of

business we should definitely understand our position thoroughly before

we go a step on the way." He then lectured Roosevelt on the inefficiency

of the British Government, its inability to grasp the nature of modern

warfare, and enumerated the Allied military setbacks in Norway and

Flanders. "It seems to me only fair and proper that although we are

anxious about their future, partly because we sympathize with what they

stand for and partly because it is believed by some of us that their

defeat would make us more vulnerable, these or any other considerations must not so influence us that we take steps to help Britain before we have the ground prepared." He tried to impress upon Roosevelt the neces­ sity of getting British assurances to send the fleet to the United States if the war was lost and argued that Washington look to America's interests.

On the one hand, he opposed the deal because of America's lack of prepara­ tion and because the destroyers would not help the British, but on the other he admitted that without them, Britain didn't have "a Chinaman's chance."^8

^^Kennedy to Hull, Post Embassy Files, August 2, 1940, Vol. 32 as cited in Bjerk, 198-199; also see Koskoff, 266. 466

On August 8, the Battle of Britain began as two hundred Nazi Stukas

and Messerschmitts swarmed over British convoys; four days later the Nazis

struck again blowing up airfields and radar stations. The tempo increased

over the next few days as the Nazis stepped up "Eagle Attack"--the big

blow against the RAF aimed at making invasion possible.

"Eagle Attack" aroused Americans' sympathy to Britain. Millions

signed petitions supporting William Allen White's Committee to Defend

America by Aiding the Allies and demanded action on the destroyer issue.

Even old, sick General Pershing begged for action before it was too

late.70

"There is no room for doubt," The Economist wrote, "that an over­

whelming majority of the American people are in agreement with the policy

which is usually stated as 'giving the utmost possible help to Britain

short of war.'" However, it warned, the American people still have 71 "a long way to go."

But the sympathy aroused by Britain's plight also provoked isolation­

ists to a new level of virulence. A staunch isolationist newspaper like

the Chicago Tribune argued that selling destroyers to a nation during wartime would be an act of war. Though isolationist strength seemed to

G^Churchill, Vol. II, 280; Burns, 438-439.

70pO 371/24241/3670/131/45, August 3, 1940, 197, for further evidence of American opinion.

7^The Economist, August 10, 1940, 177. 467 be waning in the country, it still maintained a major voice on Capitol

Hill. And Roosevelt knew that any legislation authorizing the sale of destroyers would take forever to get through Congress.72

Others too, had been worried about the problem. A tightly reasoned letter appeared in the New York Times on August 11 and was signed by several influential New York attornies and Dean Acheson. Theirs was an ingenious solution: bypass Congress. Move to England's aid through executive authority but in so doing enhance American security and so stiffle criticism. They proposed a new twist to the old isolationist complaint that England had defaulted in her World War I payments. In exchange for her debts, Britain could make naval bases in the Western

Hemisphere available to the U.S. They proposed a quid pro quo; swapping fifty old World War I destroyers for ninety-nine year leases on British 73 military and naval bases.

The President sent the suggestion to Churchill who was immediately interested and began discussions in London. Initially, Kennedy was involved but the negotiations were quickly transferred to Washington where Roosevelt and Churchill haggled over the details through Lothian.

As the outsider in the negotiations, and kept ignorant of their progress,

Kennedy became annoyed. He cabled Washington: "It would be helpful to me here if I could know the gist of Lothian's message of August 8."^^

72 Langer and Gleason, 757.

^^New York Times, August 11, 1940, IV, 8-9.

74FRUS, August 14, 1940, Vol. Ill, 66. 468

Churchill had always maintained that the survival of the two English

speaking democracies was interdependent. Therefore, it seemed a good

idea to him to have these bases in American hands. However, out of

deference to imperial pride, he wanted to avoid the appearance of

giving away Britain's historic possessions for a few dozen worn out

vessels. He wanted American aid to appear as "a separate spontaneous

act on the part of the United States" growing out of their realization

that Europe's conflict vitally affected American self interest.Combin­

ing these two matters would make it seem like a business deal in which

the British, adding up the pence involved, would feel hoodwinked. He

also balked at the President's request for assurances that if Britain

were defeated, her fleet would either be sunk or sent overseas to fight

for the empire. Churchill argued that discussing Engalnd's possible

defeat on the eve of the Nazi invasion would be demoralizing. Further, he never wanted to be in the position where the United States Government

could say: "We think the time has come for you to send your Fleet across

the Atlantic in accordance with our understanding or agreement when we

gave you the destroyers. He instructed Lothian to make it clear that

the British Government had no intention of tolerating such a defeatist

^^Churchill, Vol. II, 351-353; also see p. 346-347.

7G%bid., 348. 469

announcement nor of compromising its freedom of action. "We have no

intention of relieving United States from any well-grounded anxieties

on this point," he told Lothian.

Roosevelt, of course, found it expedient to tie the bases to the

destroyers. Legally the ships could only be released if they were part

of an arrangement to improve American security. Politically, he could present the deal to the public as a one-sided Yankee horse-trade in which

American security was increased in return for a few old worn out flotillas;

a shrewd bargain which even the Chicago Tribune might applaud.

This was true, Churchill grumbled, "but it was not exactly a

convenient statement for me." He, of course, tried to stress that the destroyer deal "expressed and conserved the enduring common interests

7 0 of the English-speaking world." He told Parliament that the two democracies might be "somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage." But looking at the future, he said,

"I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if

I wished; no one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on— full flood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days."^^

Throughout the negotiations, Kennedy bitterly protested that he was not kept informed of events in Washington. He even carried his complaints

^^Ibid., FO 371/24241/2628/131/45, 217-219.

78churchill, Vol. II, 350.

79lbi^^ibid., 351; also HC, Debates, Fifth Series, August 20, 1940, Vol. 364, 1171. 470

to the President himself, who did his best to mollify his irritated

Ambassador by some trans-Atlantic back-patting. "The destroyer and base

matter were handled in part through you and in part through Lothian but

the situation developed into a mapping proposition where the Army and

Navy are in constant consultation with me here and the daily developments have had to be explained verbally to Lothian....There is no thought of

embarrassing you and only a practical necessity for personal conversa­

tions make it easier to handle details here....Don't forget that you

on are...essential to all of us both in the Government and in the Nation."

Despite Roosevelt's praise, the practice of ignoring the Ambassador in

London continued; so did his complaints. "Now, of course, as I told you,

I know nothing about the background in the United States for all these negotiations but I am sure that there is a complete misunderstanding on the part of the British Cabinet as to the situation in the United States," he cabled Hull. Some Britons grumbled that trading the destroyers in exchange for bases was a bad bargain. Roosevelt would undoubtedly make political hay out of acquiring the bases in exchange for some worthless destroyers. "Don't misunderstand me," Kennedy told Hull, "England never gets the impression they are licked and therefore they never can understand why they should not get the best of the trade. I have seen these under­ currents growing here and realize that delays have taken place but because

GOpDR to JPK, August 28, 1940, PSP, Kennedy, FDRL; also Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, Vol. II, 1061. 471

I had no background I have not been able to do anything about it." Again he complained that he was out of touch. "I may be completely out of tune 81 because I am not familiar with the background."

The discussions had reached a near-fatal deadlock when a State

Department official came up with a compromise that broke the stalemate.

Why not divide the bases into two groups: those in Newfoundland and

Bermuda could be presented by the British as an outright gift; the other five bases could be swapped for destroyers? Roosevelt was delighted and pulled Churchill reluctantly along.

On the evening of August 29, the details had been worked out.

Churchill got the destroyers and Roosevelt got the bases and the

Prime Minister's promise never to surrender the fleet. Kennedy told

Hull that the British "are inordinately happy about the result." He had just seen Churchill and Halifax and they had agreed that "England will handle her politics in a manner which she thinks best and the United

States will of course handle hers in her own way." Kennedy approved of the trade and thought that Roosevelt had driven a splendid bargain. "The

President has obtained something for his country that not even the remote possibility of a war between the two countries would have accomplished.

...It puts a ring of steel around the United States that it would be impossible for Germany to penetrate." And what could possibly be better than this? Regardless of any criticism the President could say: "'At least I have conducted the affairs of this country in such a manner

81FRUS, August 29, 1940, Vol. Ill, 71-72. 472 that it has been possible to obtain these important bases for 99 years oo with no real loss of anything worthwhile to America,'"

In his delight over a shrewd Yankee horse-trade, Kennedy apparently OT did not see that the United States had lost its prized neutrality.

This lesson, of course, was not lost on Churchill. In his six-volume memoirs on World War II, Churchill writes that the destroyer deal marked

America's transition from neutrality to non-belligerency. By all his­ torical standards, the German Government would have been entirely justi­ fied in declaring war upon the United States. It "brought the United

States definitely near to us and to the war," Churchill wrote and "was the first of a long succession of increasingly unneutral acts in the

Atlantic which were of the utmost service to us."

As Roosevelt had foreseen the old isolationist clique on Capitol

Hill set up a terrific howl against the "dictator" in the White House.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch wrote "Mr. Roosevelt today committed an act of war. He also became America's first dictator....Of all sucker real estate deals in history, this is the worst...." Willkie, warned in advance, condoned the trade but condemned bypassing Congress. It was

SZpRUS, August 29, 1940, Vol. Ill, 72-73. 83 Bjerk regards the destroyer deal as a complete defeat for Kennedy. But Koskoff says that Krock wrote in his Memoirs that the Ambassador really thought that the Destroyer Deal was the "'worst;' that we have no contract for the bases, and that when 'all the facts are known,' they will 'shock the American people.'" See Koskoff 266 and 558-559; footnote 204-206 for a further discussion of Kennedy's attitude.

G^churchill, Vol. II, 347-348. 473

"the most dictatorial and arbitrary act of any President in the history of the United States," he moralized.But once the clamour died down, the public generally approved of the bargain which Roosevelt had likened to the Louisiana Purchase.

The destroyer deal was announced on the first anniversary of the war, September 3. It came at the peak of tiie Battle of Britain. British pilots were inflicting losses on the Luftwaffe, but their own losses were even more damaging. In the last week of August and first weeks of

September, nearly one fourth of Britain's fighter pilots were killed or wounded.On September 3, just as Churchill, who "somehow contrives to look more confident every day,"^^ entered Westminster Abbey along with other members of the Cabinet and Kennedy to attend a service commemorating the outbreak of war, the Nazi High Command issued orders to begin the invasion. But the final order for Operation Sea Lion never came.

Angered by Britain's bombing of Berlin, Hitler turned his fighter planes on London in retaliation, giving the RAF a respite. By September 12, the Fuehrer learned that the British still controlled the Channel. The final order to invade was postponed again and again until it was finally shelved until the next spring. Just what effect the destroyer deal had on Hitler's plans is unknown, but it must have been at least a minor factor in his overall appraisal of Germany's chances.

85 Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 441.

^^Bums, 440-441.

^^New York Times, September 4, 1940, 1. 474

O O Kennedy had been right all along. "I have been saying for months

that, until the Germans have superiority in the air, and unless they do,

there is no chance whatever of their trying invasion." If the invasion

should begin, he said, the navy really does not matter. But "if they get

your air force whacked, and their own air force remains supreme, there 89 isn't a hope, not a chance in the world."

Much of the success in the destroyer deal as in earlier matters de­

pended on Churchill's ability to communicate personally with Roosevelt.

Their correspondence bypassed the usual Foreing Office channels and the

British censors. An Admiralty aide usually carried the Prime Minister's

letters to the American Embassy late at night in a sealed envelope and handed

them to the senior official on duty. Kennedy would read the despatches

and then send them to the code room where clerks worked around-the-clock.

The Gray Code, a quick, non-confidential code was usually used for the

Prime Minister's personal correspondence. On the staff of about two hun­

dred embassy officials, aides, clerks, and secretaries, there was a hand­

some young man, in his late twenties, quiet and reserved, a clerk in the

Code Room, who read and duplicated the messages between Roosevelt and

Churchill and wondered about their meaning. Tyler Gatewood Kent, a descen­

dant of an old Virginian family, whose father was a career official in the

American Consular Service, had accompanied his father on his various diplo­ matic assignments and had been educated at Princeton, the Sorbonne, the Uni­ versity of Madrid, and George Washington University. On the eve of his

88See Bilainkin, June 11, 1940, 106.

B^Bilainkin, August 20, 1940, 188-189. 475 twenty-third birthday in 1934, he entered the Foreign Service and two years later he was sent to the Moscow Embassy as a code clerk. A few weeks after the outbreak of war, he was transferred to London.

On May 18, 1940, a spokesman for Scotland Yard called on Joseph

Kennedy and told him that Kent "had become the object of attention by

Scotland Yard through his association with a group of persons suspected of conducting pro-German activities...." One of the suspects was Anna

Wolkoff, a White Russian, believed to be in communication with Germany.

Kennedy admitted vaguely knowing him and learned that Scotland Yard "had been on Kent's trail a long time. I was upset that they had not notified me of their suspicions earlier," he told a newspaper reporter in an interview four years later.Kent was arrested; his flat was searched and incriminating evidence uncovered. His rights as an American citizen were waived by Kennedy who received permission to turn him over to British authorities.^^ He was charged and convicted under the Official Secrets

GOwhalen, 302-303, 305; Whalen offers an excellent treatment of the Tyler Kent affair in which his sympathies lie with Kent and he gives a damning indictment of Kennedy. He also claims that the FDRL is holding back additional documents, a claim denied by its director. The FDRL does have a file on the Tyler Kent affair which includes a letter from A. J. Muste from The Fellowship of Reconciliation, to the Secretary of State, a reply from Cordell Hull, a copy of the petition from Mrs. Kent at the Democratic Party Convention and an article from the Times-Herald, November 12, 1941. Also see Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941, for further references to the Kent Case, 40-41 and Breckin­ ridge Long's War Diary in which he gives a very anti-Kent account and assumes that he was a spy and responsible for the leaks and the spy ring, 40-41, 100, 113-114.

^^Whalen, 306. Whalen writes how unusual it was that Kent was "permitted to continue at his post [at the American Embassy] and was not arrested until two days later." But perhaps the explanation is simply that Kennedy waited until he had received official permission approving the waiver of Kent's immunity. 306. 476

Act of 1911 and sentenced to seven years imprisonment, Ttvo of his accomplices were also convicted and received prison sentences— Anna

Wolkoff, violently anti-Semitic, anti-Communist and anti-Freemason and

Captain A. H. M. Ramsey, a Tory MP, a decorated World War I officer and 92 a "sincere but thoroughly muddled English patriot,"

In 1944 the Kent case just happened to gain attention in the United

States when an American correspondent sent a despatch which miraculously escaped the censors and reported that an MP asked a question about

Captain Ramsey in Parliament, He charged that Ramsey had been imprisoned because Kent had told him of the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence, A

Congressional public outcry erupted demanding to know what had happened.

The State Department vaguely explained that Kent's immunity had been 91 waived because Britain's interest was "preeminent,"

A few days later Kennedy granted an exclusive interview to Henry J,

Taylor, a reporter from the Washington Daily News, As Ambassador,

Kennedy had received weekly reports since the outbreak of war describing

Britain's strength in detail, "We had to assume that week by week this same data went to Berlin by way of Kent,,,," Kennedy told the reporter.

The Ambassador believed that the data had been sent through Miss

Wolkoff, "Kent's reported friendliness with the Russian girl, Anna

Wolkoff, had its place in his attitude, but apparently she didn't have

0? Whalen, 309; also see Tlie Landis Papers, unnumbered chapter and no pagination, immediately after Chapter 18,

O^whalen, 312, 477

safe and regular channels into Germany, although both their trails

led to a small London photographic studio where Anna Wolkoff had left

two of Kent’s decoded messages and where British agents found these

reduced to microfilm by an employee proven to be in the German spy

ring."94

Kennedy argued that Kent also "used the Italian Embassy to reach

Berlin. For the most part he passed our secrets out of England in the

Italian diplomatic pouch. Italy, you recall, didn’t enter the war until

after Kent was arrested." The Ambassador disclosed a number of events which had not been brought out at the trial. "A telephone call to Kent

from the Italian Embassy put us on the trail of his Italian outlet to

Germany." Tlie Ambassador also accused Kent of deciphering the United

States Government’s confidential communication code. On May 20, "America’s diplomatic blackout started all over the world. I telephoned the President in Washington saying our most secret code was no good any place....The result was that for weeks, right at the time of the fall of France, the

United States Government closed its confidential communicating system and was blacked out from private contact with American embassies and legations everywhere....No private message could be sent or received....

This lasted from two weeks to a month and a half— until a new unbreakable code could be devised in Washington and carried by special couriers to our diplomatic representatives throughout the w o r l d . "95

94whalen, 312; also see The Landis Papers for Kennedy’s view of Ramsey and his "Fifth Columnist" activities.

95whalen, 313. 478

If this were so as Richard Whalen in the Founding Father points out, Kennedy could not have been able to communicate confidentially with Washington on May 24 and May 27, 1940, six and nine days, respectively after he knew about the allegations against his employee. But he did send confidential cables on these days and in one of them discussed the possibility of England's capitulation, information of tremendous strategic and propaganda value to Germany; if, of course, the code had been broken."Arrant lies,...Kennedy's statements are arrant lies," replied Kent's mother on hearing of the former Ambassador's allegations.^^

Right before Christmas, 1945, Kent was released and sent home. Con­ sidering Kennedy's strong charges against him, the State Department showed remarkably little interest in his fate. "We do not give a damn 98 what happens to him," a department official said.

Before her son's release, Mrs. Kent had tried for years to enlist

Kennedy's assistance, but he continued to ignore her, returning her lett ;rs unopened. One day they just happened to meet in a hotel lobby in Wi ishington. She made a personal plea. He could do nothing, the form îr Ambassador gently told her. She persisted. "This might strike one ,)f my sons," Kennedy said, ending the conversation. 99

During the last week of August, and the first week of September, the Germans pursued their first aim, the destruction of Britain's air

BGlbid.

9?lbid. 98ibid.

99lbid. 479 power. But on September 7, when Hermann Goering assumed command of the air battle, the Battle of Britain entered a new phase, the destruction of London. The Luftwaffe turned from daylight to night attacks and from assaults on RAF bases in Kent and Sussex to mass round-the-clock bombings of the world's largest city. For fifty-seven nights wave after wave of

German planes rained down their bombs. Never before had so many people and buildings faced such a continuous assault as during the London Blitz.

Londoners remained in their homes or huddled together in hastily constructed air raid shelters resolutely enduring what seemed like a never ending barrage. By September 10, as nearly two hundred German bombers flew up the Thames estuary to pound the sprawling metropolis, they were met with a barrage of open fire and a blaze of searchlights.

Tlie British counter-attack did little initial damage to the Luftwaffe, but greatly cheered the British. Then slowly, they increased their toll of German bombers and stepped up their retaliatory attacks on

Berlin. Hitler announced his new policy: "If they attack our cities, we will simply rub out theirs." He tried and failed. Britain's RAF remained unconquerable and supreme in repulsing the would-be invaders.

Later, Churchill was prompted to tell the House of Commons: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."^^^

^°°Churchill, Vol. II, 292-294.

lO^Churchill, Vol. II, 290. 480

Churchill loved the drama and the power of his office. All of

Downing Street throbbed with an excitement unknown since the days of

Lloyd George. Churchill stayed in bed half the morning and talked half

the night. And every afternoon, after lunch, the Prime Minister donned his pajamas and "like a babe, took a nap for an hour or two." 102 Every­ one, Cabinet officials, foreign dignitaries. Chiefs-of-Staff simply had

to resign themselves and accept the new routine as best they could.

Although they generally had to be at their desk at nine o'clock in the morning, woe to them if they were not men enough to come when summoned by the Prime Minister and stay up talking till dawn. As a frequent mid-night visitor to 10 Downing Street, Kennedy wearily complained that

London's "greatest problem" was lack of sleep. 10 s Frequently Churchill would invite seven or eight people over to lunch in the subterranean low-ceilinged room at 10 Downing Street, the former servant's hall, which had been converted into a dining room. On such occasions, he would frequently enter the dining room, looking every inch a Prime

Minister, wearing a blue siren suit giving him a remarkable resemblance to "a teddy bear with an air as autocratic as a monarch." His guests would struggle between "surprise at his comic appearance and awe at his dignity."

102virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man (Grosset and Dunlop) New York, 317.

^^^Bilainkin, September 19, 1940, 213. 481

The success of the luncheon depended entirely on what sort of mood he was in; sometimes he ate in such sullen silence your heart sank as you imagined that the war had taken some grave turn for the worse; at other times he was buoyantly talkative and held the table with a brilliant monologue. But whatever the atmosphere, Churchill was unquestionably the master. No one dared pursue a topic of conversation that did not meet with his approval; no one dared to ask any questions or take any liberties. Many guests would have found royalty easier to deal with, wrote one guest at his luncheon table.

The Blitz made Washington wonder if Britain could hold out and for how long. Was the German bombardment crippling Britain’s war effort?

IVhat effect was the indiscriminate bombing of civilians causing? Kennedy reported to Hull that the German air attacks were geared to military targets like transportation centers and power plants. Again, the Ambas­ sador warned "for the United States to come in and sign a blank check for the difficulties that are faced here is a responsibility that only

God could shoulder. "105

Anyone living through the London Blitz, "could hold up his head proudly whenever tales of war experiences were swapped," Kennedy told a friend that fall.^^^ The Ambassador kept a running tally of all the air-raids he went through and came up with the impressive total of two hundred and forty-four. Yet ever since the war began, he was in an air-raid shelter only twice; once on an inspection tour at the Embassy

lO^cowles, 325.

105j(ennedy to Hull, September 11, 1940, DSF 740.0011 European War 1939/5480-1/2 as cited in Bjerk, 203.

lO^whalen, 314; Bilainkin, June 24, 1940, 135. 482 and again in the House of Commons when Churchill's speech was interrupted 107 by the drone of the Luftwaffe and everyone was herded to safety.

The American Embassy warned Americans to live outside London and

Kennedy, despite the fact that it opened him to charges of cowardice and

a failure of n e r v e , followed its advice and returned home every night to his Windsor Great Park country home near Windsor Castle. In a chatty letter to his daughter Jean, the Ambassador wrote that the Air Ministry complained that his house was so colorful that it made "a perfect land­ mark for the German aeroplanes." It would have to be camouflaged, the

Ministry insisted. "From this you can see all the problems that one has over here during the terrible war that this is," he plaintively added.

Even camouflaging his house failed to prevent several near misses. During one raid, a bomb landed only 300 yards from the house and severed a beech tree in half.^^® On another occasion, he narrowly escaped being hit by a Messerschmitt 109 which had lost its propeller in a dog fight.

Apparently trying to make a forced landing on Kennedy's front lawn, the pilot missed the house by inches, skimmed the trees, and finally landed

10?whalen, 315.

371/24251/A1945/605/45, May 23, 1940, 78 and FO 371/24251/ A4485/605/45, 94 for evidence of this.

^^^Rose Kennedy, Times to Remember, September 11, 1940, 273; also The Landis Papers, Chapter 41, no pagination.

ll^New York Times, August 26, 1940, 1. 483

in the Royal Park nearby. He was so close "we could see the fuzz on

the pilot's face and almost count his buttons," the Ambassador jokingly

replied. "I don't know what else they [the Germans] can do unless they

come in my front room."^^^

ITiey almost did when two bombs destroyed several cottages on the

estate. That night Kennedy lay in bed as the walls of his house trembled

and lampshades flew across his bed.^^^ His garage was bombed twice and

the car in which he was riding was tossed up onto the sidewalk by a b o m b . "You know George," Kennedy told a friend after a particularly heavy raid, "I am not going to be killed by [a] bomb. I wrote to my wife last night and told her that.... Unless a bomb is actually dropped with your full name--you are all right."H^ His colleagues had found a bomb near his Windsor house with the initials JPK on it. "Initials don't count," Kennedy cheerfully said.H^ Dubbed the "most bombed" diplomat by the press, Kennedy said that the bombs did interrupt his sleep, but that "is nothing new to married men who like myself, have many children. "H ^

IH n c w York Times, October 2, 1940, 4.

ll^The Times, October 12, 1940, 4; New York Times, October 12, 1940, 4.

113pinneen, 79.

^l^Bilainkin, September 12, 1940, 208.

York Times, September 24, 1940, 3; The Landis Papers, Chapter 41, no pagination.

ll^New York Times, October 6, 1940, IV, 2. 484

"When you get as close to it as I am, if you could see what the bombs have done to London and to those who have to remain there, you would understand why I say this is not our war. In comparison with all of the strange and stupendous happenings in Europe recently, my experiences are insignificant." 117

Kennedy's letters to his family and friends in the fall of 1940 were filled with delightful personal anecdotes and sympathetic descriptions of the sufferings of Londoners. The Ambassador, who always enjoyed a good belly laugh, passed on an amusing tale to his youngest son, Teddy. After one particularly frantic day, Kennedy planned to attend an evening concert and then meet Duff Cooper, the Minister of Information, for dinner. He rushed home to don his dinner jacket and dashed to the concert hall to find the performance had been canceled. He returned to his office to do more work. After sitting there for three-quarters of an hour, I just happened to notice "by the merest chance that I had forgotten to shave for a couple of days, and I was going out to a dinner party without having shaved. So you can see how busy I am. I am sure everybody will laugh at this." In a fatherly way, Kennedy admonished his eight year old son to dedicate his life "to trying to work out plans to make people happy instead of making them miserable as war does...."

In mid-September, just after another bomb raid he wrote how "terrible" the war was. "All those poor women and children and homeless people down in the East End of London all seeing their places destroyed." The saddest thing of all was "that poor women and children are getting by far the worst of it. The soldiers aren't suffering in any such degree.... 485

I don't know where it is all going to end but everything I see confirms what I always thought, that it ought never to have started,” he told his daughter Eunice.

Even as late as September, Kennedy doubted that the air war had really begun. The "Germans are not using [a] twentieth or thirtieth of their bomber strength against Britain," he told Bilainkin.Could the

British stand the strain? Qualities like bravery, courage, and "guts" counted little alongside the physical destruction and tremendous disloca­ tion. Londoners simply could not take it, Kennedy predicted over the trans-Atlantic telephone to friends in the States. "Joe was [a] supreme realist who wanted the facts, not his own or somebody else's feeling to shape his decisions," a friend who spoke with Kennedy that fall remarked.

"During the Blitz, he looked at Britain's situation in cold, hard terms of pounds sterling. lŸhen Britain's reserves ran out, he thought the country would be finished.

The same bleak note ran throughout his despatches to Washington.

Hitler's night raids were causing "substantial damage," he cabled Hull, and the day raids had dealt serious blows to many industrial centers like Bristol, Liverpool, and Southampton. "Production is definitely falling regardiez' of what reports you may be getting." It would continue to fall, Kennedy darkly predicted, because of the serious dislocation

^^^Rose Kennedy, 273-274. 119 Bilainkin, September 19, 194Ü, 213.

^^^IVhalen, 316. 486 in transportation. There was no doubt in his mind; Britain was "in a bad way."^^^

Not only did Britain's declining industrial production spell certain defeat, but so did Churchill's conduct of the war. After the Prime

Minister's utter failure to land Free French forces under General de Gaulle in Dakar in French West Africa, Kennedy saw absolutely no chance for a British military victory. "I cannot impress upon you strongly enough my complete lack of confidence in the entire conduct of this war." Dakar had been a "bitter pill." It produced the first major break in Churchill's popularity, the Ambassador wrote. The

British had "a definite feeling that they have not a Prime Minister but 122 a Generalissimo."

As always, he warned against American intervention. The British

Government's repeated statements counselling American neutrality were only for "public consumption" and urged on by Britain's representatives in the United States. They were really "hoping and praying every minute 123 that something will happen that will bring the United States in."

Kennedy seemed to sense a cunning and diabolical conspiracy and he complimented Roosevelt on his recent statement refusing to enter the war. He then launched into a bitter diatribe against Britain's war effort and would have abandoned Britain to her fate.

l^lpRUS, September 27, 1940, Vol. Ill, 48-49.

122%bid. 123ibid. 487

To enter this war, imagining for a minute that the English have anything to offer in the line of leadership or productive capacity in industry that could be of the slightest value to us, would be a complete mis­ apprehension. ... If there was not the hope of the United States in the offing, Japan’s signing with Germany and Italy would be another nail in the coffin. If by any chance we should ever come to the point of getting into this war we can make up our minds that it will be the United States against Germany, Italy, and Japan, aided by a badly shot to pieces country which in the last analysis can give little, if any assistance to [the] cause. It breaks my heart to draw these con­ clusions about a people that I sincerely hoped might be victorious but I cannot get myself to the point where I believe they can be of any assistance to the cause in whicn they are involved.

Years later, in 1961, when the State Department released documents

from the German archives captured at the end of the war, there was

considerable evidence to indicate that this despatch, among others, had undergone substantial editing. One can never be certain what was deleted, but by comparing it to the remnants in the captured German archives, the original despatch appears to have been even more fatalistic than the published version. A "reliable informant" in Washington repeated the gist of Kennedy's "top secret" remarks to Hans Thomsen, the Charge d'Affaires in the German Embassy who promptly forewarded them on to

Berlin. In his despatch of September 27, 1940, the informant claimed that Kennedy had "warned the President urgently not to take irreparable steps. England was finished (completely through), and the U.S.A. would have to pay the billA footnote in the volume released by

^^"^Ibid.

^^^New York Herald-Tribune, April 26, 1961, 9. 488

the State Department explained that the phrase "completely through" was

in parentheses in English in the German version. The Ambassador also

allegedly said that "British Prime Minister Churchill was severely and

publicly criticized in England, that Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey 'would

seek to join the Axis because England no longer impressed them' and that

'the English will tr '^/ hard to bring the U.S.A. into the war as soon

as possible.'" Thus Thomsen argued that Kennedy's views were in

marked contrast to those of Roosevelt and his Administration. The

Ambassador consistently persevered "in his opinion that the defeat of

England in unavoidable.

Across the seas, Americans were gearing up for the Presidential

election of 1940. The Economist predicted that the election would

"certainly be one of the most interesting" in recent years. Both candi­

dates were "dynamic and colourful" personalities. However, to no one's surprise, it endorsed Roosevelt. "Mr. Roosevelt may have given the wrong answers to many of his problems ; but he has at least asked the right questions.... The known vices of Mr. Roosevelt are to be preferred

too to the unknown virtues of Mr. Willkie." Tlie Spectator echoed the same theme. Doubtful though the outcome seemed, the undecided voter would probably decide not to swap "horses when crossing a stream.... In America and out of it the knowledge that that tried hand was still at the helm would create universal reassurance.

12&ibid.

^^^IVhalen, 318.

^^^The Economist, August 10, 1940, 176-177.

Tlie Spectator, November 1, 1940, 430. 489

Right from the start, Roosevelt had taken Wendell Willkie seriously.

The President had promised his party at the Democratic Convention in

Chicago that he would stand on his record and refuse to campaign unless

it became necessary to correct "deliberate or unwitting falsification of

fact."^^® He was thus relieved of the necessity of defending his foreign policy before the electorate until he chose to do so and then in the injured voice of one unjustly accused. Throughout the campaign Roosevelt remained quietly above it all fulfilling his symbolic roles as Chief of

State and Commander in Chief. He dedicated schools and extended New Deal benefits; he toured military bases and inspected ships, tanks, and guns.

In the closing weeks of the campaign Willkie began painting Roose­ velt as a warmonger. Sensing that he finally had a winning issue, he pounded it again and again: "If his promise to keep our boys out of foreign wars is no better than his promise to balance the budget, they're 131 already almost on the transports." "Is there any one here," he scorn­ fully asked a Bronx audience, "who really thinks that the President is sincerely trying to keep us out of war?..." Playing on America's fear of a secret Anglo-American agreement, he challenged Roosevelt to state publicly whether there were any "international understandings to put

America into the war that we citizens do not know about.By mid

l^^Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 443. 131ibid.

^^^Beard, 303-304. 490

October, Gallup Polls showed that Willkie's "hoarse and strident voice" 133 was cutting dramatically into Roosevelt’s substantial early lead.

Deeply angered by Willkie’s charges, Roosevelt announced in mid October

that he would undertake a two week blitz to answer the "deliberate falsi­

fication of fact" in five election speeches. He spread the word to his men to go after Willkie with their bare hands. "I am fighting mad,"

Roosevelt told Iekes. "I love you when you are fighting mad, Mr. Presi­ dent," the old warrior replied.Roosevelt opened his campaign on

October 13 in Philadelphia. "I am an old campaigner," he told a respon- 135 sive throng, "and I love a good fight."

A brooding Kennedy remained in London, privy to his boss' deepest secrets and temperamentally out of sorts with the Administration. Pub- lically he was bound to defend FDR for his policies which had escalated from isolation to "limited intervention;" privately, he sided with the isolationist critics on Capitol Hill. This is my last public job,"

Kennedy had told reporters in December, 1 9 3 9 . Ever since then, there had been widespread speculation as to when he would resign. But each time he seriously considered it, another crisis arose. By the fall of

1940, Kennedy had made up his mind. Crisis or no, he was going home.

^^^Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 446.

^^"^Ickes, October 19, 1940, Vol. Ill, 352.

^^^Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 446.

^^^New York Times, October 6, 1940, IV, 2; Even before Kennedy's resignation, he had been mentioned for the Chairmanship of the National Defense Commission. See New York Times, November 7, 1940, 15; Decem­ ber 2, 1940, I, 16. 491

He had had enough of England, her war, and diplomacy. Bilainkin noted in his diary that he looked "mentally exhausted; physically tired, lacks i n t e r e s t . "137 Kennedy was homesick, thoroughly dissatisfied with the liberal clique surrounding Roosevelt and miffed at being constantly ignored by the State Department and the Administration. He also wanted to go home before Americans went to the polls on election day. He felt he had something important to say. Kennedy vowed to take his case directly to the American people. "I know more about Europe than anybody else in this country because I've been closer to it longer. I'm going to make 138 it a point to educate America to the situation."

Many British officials were quite fed up with Kennedy and his defeatist opinions. The Ambassador's "known views and attitudes have earned him the dislike and contempt not only of the British but also of the U.S. nationals and press in this country, by whom he is regarded apparently as little better than a Fifth Columnist," noted one Foreign Office secretary.^39 others questioned his courage and hoped that perhaps

"Mr. Kennedy's remarks will be attributed to a loss of nerve rather than to the actual state of affairs in.England.It looked as though he "has gone to pieces" and "was thoroughly frightened" one official snidely quipped.

^37gi2ainkin, October 21, 1940, 239. 1 38 IVhalen, 320. 139 FO 371/24251/A1945/605/45, J.V. Perowne's minute, September 3, 1940, 76; see 77 for further evidence.

^"^^FO 371/24251/A4485/605/45, 94.

l^^ibid. 492

And when Kennedy called on Lord Halifax to inform him of his decision to resign, the Foreign Secretary noted that he "seemed very much out of temper with the United States Government and with the President...."

During the interview he bitterly criticized the Administration for not keeping him adequately informed for the last two or three months. "If it had not been for what he learned in London," Kennedy told him, "he would have known nothing of what was going on." He also admitted that he had sent an article to the United States which would be published in Novem­ ber, if "by any accident" he failed to return. It was a stinging indict­ ment of Roosevelt’s Administration for having talked much and done little.

The impact of such an article "would be of considerable importance,"

Halifax stated since it would be published just five days before the election. Kennedy, little comforted by Halifax's attempts to soothe his feelings, left the interview "a very disappointed and rather embitteted man."142

British officialdom fretted that in his present "disappointed and rather embittered" mood, Kennedy could be "dangerous" to their negotiations with the Administration. Rumors circulated that Kennedy had decided to ally himself with Willkie and would publish a "sensational and influential" article endorsing him. The rumor confirmed their worst suspicions that

^^^FO 371/24251/A4485/605/45, October 10, 1940, 96. 493

"Kennedy's interest in Wall Street [has] been attracting him back to

that sphere," since Wall Street was solidly behind Willkie, "Kennedy

has decided to go along with it." They saw Kennedy's alleged support

of Willkie as a dangerous and deliberate attack upon FDR's policy of

preparing America for war. So dangerous did the Ambassador seem to

Britain, that Foreign Office officials urged that he be denied full

access to their financial statements. "He might make damaging use of

them, both against Mr. Roosevelt, and, indirectly of course, against us."143 Yhe Foreign Office also passed on the rumor that the President was deliberately trying to keep Kennedy in London until after the

elections lest he undermine public support of aid to Britain.

Repeatedly, Roosevelt had ignored his Ambassador's requests for permission to leave and dismissed reporter's questions about Kennedy's imminent resignation as merely "newspaper stories.So Kennedy took the situation in his own hands and leaked his pending resignation to the press. The New York Times predicted that Kennedy was "almost cer­ tain to give up his job here for good in two or three months. For months he has been planning to get home in time to vote in November and unless the Germans land in Britain he may still do it...."^^^

371/24251/A4485/605/45, October 15, 1940, 98; Koskoff argues that Kennedy's assessment of the situation was entierly accurate. No one was bypassed so completely as Kennedy. In fact most of American diplomacy was carried on by Bullitt. Roosevelt himself requested infor­ mation through Lord Lothian and worked out Anglo-American affairs through him. 268.

^^^The Times, October 5, 1940, 3.

l^^New York Times, September 23, 1940, 1. 494

Kennedy's dramatic test of wills with Roosevelt climaxed on October

16. Again, he sent FDR a cablegram demanding that he be allowed to come home; other Ambassadors more recently appointed to non-target areas had been allowed to return, he argued, whereas he had heard that he was to remain in Britain until after the election. Kennedy needed official authorization to prevent his critics from accusing him of running out on the English during the Blitz; therefore, he devised another strategy.

That same day Kennedy called Under Secretary Welles and said if he failed to "get a favorable reply to his cablegram, he was coming home anyhow."

He listed all his grievances and complained about how shabbily he had been treated. "He had been ignored for three months— including withholding from him information of the impending destroyer-bases deal— by the Admin­ istration, which had sent envoys to London without informing him in ad­ vance or without ordering these envoys to deal with or through him."

He also told Welles that he had prepared a statement with "a full account of the facts" which had been sent to Edward Moore, his secretary in New

York. Moore had instructions to release the memorandum to the press if

Kennedy had not returned before the elections. This thinly veiled threat to publicly state his views on American foreign policy and the conduct of the war achieved the desired effect. A few hours later he received official authorization to return to the United S t a t e s . ^^7

147Krock, 335. 495

Rumors and speculation increased as press hounds asked Hull whether

or not Kennedy would return to the United States on October 23. The

Secretary vaguely answered that thë Ambassador would be returning

"before long" but he refused to say when or to confirm the rumor that 148 Kennedy's resignation was imminent. He told a newsman from The Times

that "as far as I know, Mr. Kennedy will return to L o n d o n . "^49 White

House too, was surprisingly silent about the Ambassador's plans. Roose­

velt had heard the rumors, his press secretary said, but "I don't know whether there is anything new as between the present and the old reports.

Taking no chances on the Administration's change of heart, Kennedy imme­ diately told the press that he would leave for the United States on

October 23. "It is doubted he will return as Ambassador--and it is certain he will not if he has his way about it," a New York Times correspondent wrote. "He has made it no secret among intimate circles-- that he feels he has done his bit and that he is entitled to a long, peaceful holiday and to pick up his life with his family after a long separation."^51 That same day, FDR publically announced that Kennedy 1 ^2 would return home "for consultation" but "he will not resign."

^^%ew York Times, October 15, 1940, 4.

l^Sphe Times, October 16, 1940, 4.

ISONew York Times, October 15, 1940, 4.

l^^lbid., October 16, 1940 , 6.

^^^New York Times, October 16, 1940, 6 . 496

Many astute observers had been plainly baffled by Roosevelt’s obvious reluctance to allow Kennedy to return. The columnists, Joseph

Alsop and Robert M. Kintner, whose sources often came straight from the

White House, offered "a striking and highly vouched for theory,” that

Kennedy had been kept abroad to keep him quiet. They suggested that the leaked story of Kennedy's possible resignation may have been "the last move in an obscure but exciting little game." The talkative Ambas­ sador "has strong convictions and less than no remaining fondness for his chief. He will certainly express his opinions to every available

American listener the instant he gets through customs.... The President is represented as fearing he will reduce large numbers of leaders of opinion to such a state of hopeless blue funk that our foreign policy 1 C 7 will be half-immobilized by fear."

Arthur Krock wondered in his New York Times column why Kennedy was the only Ambassador in a German target area who had not been recalled to the United States. Krock discussed several explanations. One was that Kennedy's presence in the United States would remind Roosevelt of his failure to appoint a coordinating chairman of the Advisory Defense

Commission, a position for which Kennedy would be imminently qualified, given his close examination of Britain's rearmament. A "more interesting" theory was that "Mr. Kennedy continues to be 'gloomy' about the outcome of the war and, if he came home, would be sure to make a statement that would be embarrassing at that time. After the election, it will be

153whalen, 321. 497

different,...But if Joe is publicly pessimistic now, the impression might

be spread that the President is backing the wrong horse, which won’t be

helpful in November," said one source. "He did not add," wrote Krock,

"what seems a more high-minded explanation that such a public impression

might serve to diminish present widespread public support for full aid

'short of war’ to Great Britain." Two implications followed from this

argument; that Kennedy "is temperamentally unable to resist speaking what is in his mind," an explanation refuted by those who have seen

"demonstrations of his shrewdness;" or that Roosevelt defenders "prefer not to take even the smallest 'hance that Mr. Kennedy would say something which might unwittingly affect the foreign policy section of the Presi­ dential campaign."15^

Certainly, as later events proved, Roosevelt knew his man. Soon after Kennedy’s return, he did embark on a great "peace crusade."

Wherever he went, talk of appeasement and defeatist rumors trailed behind him.^^^ FDR fully realized that given Kennedy’s mood, he was best kept at a distance until he had simmered down. Roosevelt fully understood what his casual friends did not; that Kennedy's diatribes against his friends were so much excess verbiage, not to be taken seriously. Although he meant every syllable of abuse at the moment, it was all quickly forgotten. If reminded of an abusive remark later,

Kennedy would either deny saying it or claim he meant nothing of the sort, even if he had said it.^^^

^^^Arthur Krock, New York Times, October 8, 1940, 24; Koskoff, 272; McCarthy, 85-86. 1 New York Herald-Tribune, December 5, 1940, 4.

IS^whalen, 321. 498

Kennedy had long directed his attacks at the White House and the

liberal clique surrounding the President. He accused the Administration of under-filling its promises to help Britain and at the same time attacked FDR because Kennedy opposed "all this aid" to Britain. He was also angered by Roosevelt's insistence on sending military missions to 157 London which reported independently of the Ambassador. Moreover, he had long feared that Roosevelt and his Administration were taking steps to drag America into war; all the while giving Kennedy the strongest 158 assurances to the contrary.

Throughout the week, prior to his departure, Kennedy shrugged off press inquiries regarding his rumored resignation. "I tank I go home," he said coyly. "I'm in the same boat with Garbo.He busied himself in a round of official good-byes, lunching with the King and Queen at

Buckingham Palace, returning later that afternoon for tea with Their

Majesties and Princess Elizabeth and Princess Margaret, and having his picture taken shaking hands with Winston Churchill at 10 Downing Street.

He also made a farewell call upon the dying Neville Chamberlain whom he later said he was "closer to" than "anybody else in England,and held ten minute chats with European e n v o y s . As a British souvenir.

IS^Biiainkin, October 24, 1940, 244; October 29, 1940, 252.

ISScrock, 334.

l^^New York Times, October 18, 1940, 5.

^^^The Times, November 12, 1940, 4.

^^^Time, November 4, 1940, 19; McCarthy, 86. 499 he took home an air-raid siren, which he intended to use at his Cape Cod home to call his children ashore in time for dinner. It was a time for mutual praise and back-patting: "I did not know London could take it.

I did not think any city could take it, I am bowed in reverence.

The British press outdid themselves in praising Kennedy. "Forever in deeds if not in written words, we are Allies. Largely, that is Joseph

Kennedy's work. Good-bye Joe! Heaven bless you! Your job is done," gushed the Daily Herald. The Evening News, obviously desirous of "hands across the seas," wrote rather seif-servingly that "It is Mr. Kennedy 16’^ single handed who has strengthened Anglo-American friendship in London." “

It also noted that the Air Ministry had christened its Douglas DB7 bombers

"The Bostons" as a tribute to Kennedy's birthplace.The London Times paid him the frankest tribute. He would be missed here by his many friends, its editor wrote. "Nevertheless, Mr. Kennedy has been careful to avoid one of the pitfalls which yawn before all representatives of the United

States and England. He never allowed his private friendship to turn him into an Englishman and thus weaken his influence with his own people.

IGZibid.

November 4, 1940, 19.

IG^McCarthy, 86.

^^^New York Times, October 23, 1940, 11. 500

On October 22, 1940, after two years and nine months of service,

Kennedy and his staff at the American Embassy bade each other farewell.

He was "an exceptionally hard task-master," remarked one admirer. As

he walked down the steps of the Embassy, Kennedy met a barrage of

reporters. "Turn this way and that....Shake hands. Face the Chancery,"

they commanded.

As he walked down Grosvenor Square, Bilainkin recorded, "the steps

seemed shorter and shorter. There he was turning the corner, and looked

just an ordinary man....He was only a figure whom none turned round to

study, none noticed. This was Kennedy whose labours in the United

States, whether he be in complete accord with Roosevelt or not, may

change our political pages decades hence. The man whose counsel may

implant in the United States a keener desire to help British endeavours

in the war, or may equally force a compromise peace. IVho knows?"^^^

Kennedy left London accompanied by his son Jack, his valet, and a

newspaperman and flew to Lisbon in a private plane provided by the British

Government.Arthur Goldsmith, one of the Ambassador's closest friends,

suggested that the President send him "a little note" had have him met by

"someone important" from the State Department.Sumner Welles was placed in charge of making the arrangements by which the President

IGGgiiainkin, October 22, 1940, 241-242.

16?Ibid., 242.

l^^New York Times, October 24, 1940, 5.

IG^Memo to"Missy"Le Hand from Lauchlin Currie, October 25, 1940, PSF: Great Britain, Kennedy, FDRL. 501

could immediately meet with Kennedy "before anyone else got at him to

t a l k . "170 As he arrived in Lisbon to board the New York-bound Clipper, he found a letter from the President asking him not to make any public statements or to say anything about resigning until he had conferred with R o o s e v e l t . 171 Obediently, he told the scores of reporters anxiously 1 yo waiting at the airport: "I have nothing to tell you, boys." A similar message awaited him at Bermuda and in New York where he was instructed to come immediately to the White House. He also received a Roosevelt- inspired wire from Senator James F. Byrnes asking him to keep silent until he had seen the President. FDR had called Byrnes to tell him of

Kennedy's arrival and to pass on the rumor that he might switch horses and endorse Willkie. Apparently the Ambassador "was dissatisfied about 173 something," Byrnes drily wrote. An Embassy aide, who knew his boss' moods well, warned him over the telephone: "For Heaven's sake do not say anything before you see Roosevelt at the White House, for, if you do, it 174 will mean, politically, gravely damaging things."

Tlie big blue and silver Clipper landed at La Guardia Airport on

October 27. In an effort to dodge reporters, the Ambassador nearly missed the family welcoming committee: his wife. Rose, and daughters.

170 Memo to FDR from E.M.W. (Colonel Watson, the President's Secretary), October 25, 1940, PSF; Great Britain, Kennedy, FDRL.

17lKrock, 335.

^7% e w York Times, October 24, 1940, 5.

173gyrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York, 1958), 125-126.

^^^Bilainkin, October 29, 1940, 252. 502

Jean, Kathleen, Patricia, and Eunice.Teddy, it seems, got held up in the traffic. IVhen he spotted his family, they all ran toward each other and embraced, each on the verge of tears and all patting whichever

Kennedy happened to be nearest. "Mr. Kennedy looked for all the world like a man bursting with things to say," wrote one reporter. "I have nothing to say until I've seen the President," he told newsmen. "I am going right to the White House, and I'll talk a lot when I'm finished 177 with that," he promised. A press conference was arranged for eleven o'clock the next morning at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.

The Ambassador and his wife, specifically invited by the President, flew directly to Washington. Rose found her husband tired, embittered by bureaucratic duplicity, and uninterested in supporting Roosevelt in the upcoming election. Along the way, she quietly lectured him: "The

President sent you, a Roman Catholic, as Ambassador to London, which probably no other President would have done," she reminded him. "He sent you as his representative to the Pope's coronation. You would write yourself doim [as] an ingrate in the view of many people if you resign 1 7R now." Always the acute political tactician, she may have considered the effect this could have not just on her husband's political career, but also on their sons'.^^S

^^%ew York Times, October 28, 1940, 1, 7.

l^^Time, November 4, 1940, 19.

l^^New York Times, October 28, 1940, 1, 7.

l^^Krock, 335.

179cail Cameron, Rose, 145. 503

When they arrived in Washington, Kennedy smiled cheerfully to reporters and doffed his homburg obligingly. They were picked up by a White House car and wished away to dine with the President,

When the Kennedys arrived at the White House, they were kept waiting only a few minutes and joined by Senator and Mrs. James F. Byrnes and

"Missy" Le Hand, the President's private secretary and the hostess for the evening. The presence of other guests "prov[ed]" Kennedy later remarked,

"that Roosevelt didn't want to have it out with me alone." The group chatted on for a while awaiting the arrival of the President. Byrnes cornered Kennedy and said: "I've got a great idea, Joe. IVhy don't you make a speech on the lines of what you have said tonight and urge the

President's re-election?" Network time had already been arranged by the

Democratic National Committee on Tuesday evening. Kennedy refused. His heart wasn't in it until he "got off his chest" the things that were bothering him. 180 Finally Roosevelt arrived and escorted his guests in to dinner. During the meal, Kennedy gave the President a personal message from Chamberlain and discussed Britain's war conditions and her economic situation. After dinner, Roosevelt turned the floor over to his smouldering, irate guest. Kennedy, hardly "a bashful man," needed no prompting and began to unburden himself. He noted how Roosevelt would turn to him whenever he or a member of his family got into a jam.

Always a forceful talker, his vocabulary included "many words not found

IG^Krock, 335-336. 504 in dictionaries,” Byrnes commented, most of which he used in denouncing 181 the State Department and describing its treatment of him. He had been treated "terribly,” he complained to Roosevelt "whose face turned white” while Byrnes just sat there "aghast.” He cited chapter and verse of State's shabby treatment of him. Particularly galling were the special envoys. Kennedy was "left to cool his heels while Presidential messengers conducted their business independently.” And furthermore, he continued, he would not returnHe made his arguments "in his most forthright TOT way— which was very forthright,” his wife recalled.

Roosevelt listened sympathetically nodding his head, as was his habit, and saying "yes, yes.” Finally, it was the President's turn. He took everyone by surprise when he not only offered no defense of State, but 184 enlarged upon Kennedy's criticism. It was a regular "harangue," Rose recalled.Roosevelt said he "understood entirely how Kennedy felt; as a matter of fact, he thought that Kennedy's views were charitable." The

"desk men" were all to blame for the whole deplorable mess. Bill Bullitt had suffered many of the same indignities. He, Roosevelt, "had put up with similar treatment" only because of the war. And after the election, there would be a thorough housedeaning. "Tliey" would never again treat

"friends of his, like Joe" so outrageously.

Byrnes, 126.

182Krock, 336.

^^^Rose Kennedy, 274.

^^^Byrnes, 126.

^^^Rose Kennedy, 274. 505

As FDR continued his blistering attack, Byrnes thought that Kennedy began to feel a bit uncomfortable and to even feel "a touch of sympathy for the State Department boys," In any case, after he had unburdened himself, Kennedy became noticeably more c o r d i a l . Roosevelt again asked him to make a speech advocating his re-election. "All right, I will," Kennedy replied. "But I will pay for it myself, show it to nobody in advance and say what I wish." The President agreed. At that point

"Missy" Le Hand jumped up and called the Democratic National Committee to give them the go ahead.

The outside world knew nothing of the conversation taking place over the President's dinner table and could only judge by appearances. As the evening progressed, newsmen learned that Kennedy had been invited to accompany the President on his campaign train. Reporters assumed that

Kennedy would accept and many drifted away. Only a handful of persistent newsmen still remained when the Ambassador emerged around 10:15. They learned, much to their surprise, that he had declined the President's invitation; something that "isn't done" wrote a columnist for the New York

Herald-Tribune. One simply "doesn't send 'regrets'" to the White House.

Kennedy also said he did not plan to attend the political rally at Madison

Square Garden the next evening, nor had he made plans to hear Roosevelt's

ISÔByrnes, 126.

IS^Krock, 336. 506 address in Boston later in the week. He intended to fly to New York and hold a press conference there the next day in which "he would say anything he had to say."^^^

Rumors of a terrific rift circulated throughout Washington and were carried over the late night news wires. "Kennedy Sees Roosevelt Amid

Signs of Break," read the headlines of the New York Herald-Tribune the next morning. "Mr. Kennedy's seeming intention to absent himself from

Mr. Roosevelt's impending major political speeches, led immediately, of course, to speculation as to the possibility of a break...," wrote a correspondent. "There had been reports from London that Mr. Kennedy intended to come home, tender his resignation to Mr. Roosevelt, and then make public his views on the Administration's conduct of foreign policy, 189 with which, it was stated, he did not agree."

Tlie next day suspense heightened as reporters waited at the Waldorf for the Ambassador who never appeared. Instead a secretary showed up with a press release announcing that Kennedy would address the nation that evening at nine o'clock. He was speaking under the auspices of Rose and their children and he himself had paid $20,000 for airtime.Kennedy, always a showman, had devised the melodrama himself. He paid for the airtime to heighten the suspense. Throughout the day he maintained his

^^^New York Herald-Tribune, October 28, 1940, 1, 4.

189ibid., 4.

^^^New York Times, October 29, 1940, 19. 507 sphinxlike silence. It was totally convincing. According to the London

Times, an upset aide in London feared Kennedy might be "giving the works," called his boss and kept repeating: "Do be careful! Do be careful!"^®^

On Tuesday evening Kennedy went on a national radio hookup of one hundred and fourteen CBS stations to urge Roosevelt's re-election. He explained that there could well be some "who will look askance" when the

Ambassador spoke over the radio in the last week of a Presidential cam­ paign. But it was precisely because I served as Ambassador to England that I was speaking tonight, so that you could have an accurate report of my evaluation of the future "on the eve of this, probably the most critical election year of our existence." Ever since 1938, Kennedy re­ minded his audience, "mine has been a ringside seat." He also responded to his critics who accused him of being "steeped in gloom." Mi at was there in the present world picture, he asked, that offered anyone an excuse for gaiety? "Gloom," under present conditions was nothing more than "facing the facts.

After establishing his expertise as a spokesman of foreign policy, he launched into a discussion of the war in Europe and America's respon­ sibility regarding it. Again, he repeated his belief "that this country must and will stay out of war." Americans were "overwhelmingly in favor of avoiding war" and of providing "all aid short of war" to Britain.

^^^The Times, October 29, 1940, 3.

^^^Rose Kennedy, 274; New York Times, October 30, 1940, 1, 8; The Times, October 31, 1940, 3. 508

Even the most fervent isolationist realized that "oceans alone are not

adequate barriers against revolutionary forces which now threaten a whole

civilization...." Rearmament was essential; it was "the only way in which

America can stay out of war."

In the present war-charged and revolutionary atmosphere, when the

entire social fabric of the world was in upheaval, America should make a

solemn decision. "IVhich of our two men will lead the destinies of our

people for the next four years?" Kennedy then enumerated all the reasons

why Roosevelt should be re-elected. He quickly dismissed the third term

issue as "the least of the considerations which the American people should

take into account." It was "insignificant" compared to the "gigantic

issues" which Americans faced. He, like other supporters, stressed Roose­

velt's indispensability. The President was the only man with the experi­

ence to govern. Any political newcomer would need two years of training;

under present conditions, two years "will be too late." America simply

did not have the time to educate "a green hand" regardless of his good­

will and general ability. He undertook to dispel the criticism of Roose­

velt's conduct of foreign policy. Blame was "not to be laid at the door

of the White House" for any lack of preparation in the rearmament program,

Kennedy argued. The President had provided a program and the nation's

experts and a Democratic Congress had provided ample funds. A democracy was difficult to rally if it was neither "desperate" nor "frightened."

"If blame there be, we all must share in the inherent weakness of our

democratic system...." Roosevelt had been charged with "trying to involve this country in the world war." This charge was totally false. Actually, 509

the Ambassador explained, from the British or American point of view,

"no more harmful step could be taken" than a declaration of war. It would "be foolish" and interfere with American aid to Britain. "If

President Roosevelt were as wicked as his opponents charge, which he is

not, and even if he had undisclosed commitments, which he has not, the

facts are against our participation in this war."1^3 it was true, Kennedy

confirmed, that he and Roosevelt had sometimes "disagreed sharply" with

each other. They had disagreed on issues as well as methods. "However, these are times which clamor for national unity— times when national teamwork is vital and when only fundamental disagreements should be considered. Happily, on these great momentous questions of foreign policy, trade, commerce and the future of our American way of life I find little basis for disagreement with the President."

He concluded on a personal note not as an ambassador or a politician, but as a father. "My wife and I have given nine hostages to fortune. Our children and your children are more important than anything else in the world. The kind of America that they and their children will inherit is of grave concern to us all. In the light of these considerations, I be­ lieve that Franklin D. Roosevelt should be re-elected President of the

United States.

193New York Times, October 30, 1940, 1, 8.

^^^Ibid. ; Tlie Times, October 31, 1940, 3. 510

"I have just listened to a great speech. Thank you," wrote FDR,

delighted with his Ambassador's r e m a r k s . ^^5 Byrnes too, was pleased.

He thought it was "most effective,Coming from one whose anti-war views were so well known, the speech was particularly persuasive to the

American electorate. Telegrams of praise poured in to the White House.

"If possible," said one message to the President, "have Ambassador Kennedy 1Q7 make more talks. Next to you he is the best vote getter." Another urged that if the Ambassador "made radio addresses every day and night for the rest of the campaign," we would carry 48 states.One "converted

Republican" urged that Kennedy's speech be rebroadcast every day. It was the "most potent factor in [the] campaign.Life magazine described it as a great vote getter, "probably the most effective of the campaign.

More than anything else, it put to rest the fear that Roosevelt would take this country into war."^®^ Even the London Daily Mail praised the speech. Joseph Kennedy "clearly and accurately" expressed the British point of view. An American delcaration of war would hinder, not help us, the newspaper commented. It would divert vital supplies from England to the American home front.

IS^Krock, 336.

IQôgyrnes, 126.

^®^F.A. Williamson, Los Angeles, California to White House, October 29, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL.

^^%.W. Nichols, Cincinnati, Ohio to White House, October 29, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL.

^^^Egerton Shore, Los Angeles, California to White House, October 29, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL.

ZOOLife, January 27, 1941, 27.

ZOlWew York Times, October 31, 1940, 9. 511

Wliy had Kennedy agreed to make the speech? Why had he made such an about-face? Had he been duped by the clever, charming politician in the

White House? Arthur Krock, as surprised as anybody, attributed his about- face to "the overwhelming pressures to which Kennedy had been exposed."

Roosevelt, without batting an eye, had sacrificed the State Department,

"to keep Kennedy on the reservation," The speech was totally "out of keeping with the Ambassador's private views and with his deserved reputa­ tion as one of the most forthright men in public life." All along, Krock believed, Kennedy, unimpressed by Willkie's presidential qualifications, had intended to sit out the campaign except for a speech warning against 20? American involvement in war. “ The quickness with which "Missy" Le Hand ran to the telephone to give the Democratic National Committee the go- ahead, indicated that the performance had been staged. But the real

"dupes" had been the Willkie supporters, confidentially believing that 20 % Kennedy would denounce Roosevelt and endorse Willkie.

Certainly Kennedy realized he was in the running for Chairman of the newly created Advisory Defense Commission, a post he wanted and for which he was eminently qualified. He had to know as well that his name was circulating in political circles as a potential nominee."The reason for the switch was simple," Stewart Alsop wrote later. "Roosevelt

ZO^Krock, 337.

203gy^j^gg^ 126; Wlialen, 325.

Z^^Arthur Krock, New York Times, October 8, 1940, 24; New York Times, October 24, 1940, 5. 512

offered Kennedy— or so Kennedy firmly believed— the Presidential nomina­

tion in 1944. When instead Roosevelt ran for a fourth term Joe Kennedy

was understandably bitter.

Probably, one major reason for Kennedy's change of heart, was Roose­

velt's charm. Rose herself, an astute observer present at the dinner

table that night, wrote "I must confess that I was as susceptible as most

people to Roosevelt's charm and blandishments. He was undoubtedly a genius

in his personal relationships....Nevertheless, even while I knew I was

being charmed, the charm was difficult to resist."^^6 Kennedy simply

could not say no. He could not go against his chief.

Another factor was that the Ambassador in a very real sense did

believe that Roosevelt was indispensable. A year earlier Kennedy had

argued: "The problems that are going to affect the people of the United

States, political, social, and economic, are already so great and becoming

greater by war that they should be handled by a man it won't take two years

to educate."207 After his speech urging the President's re-election, he

talked with a reporter from the Boston Globe. Did Kennedy have any private misgivings, the reporter asked? No, the Ambassador replied. "I supported

Roosevelt because I feel he's the only man who can control the groups who

20^Saturday Evening Post, August 13, 1960, 26.

^^Opose Kennedy, 275.

^O^According to the New York Times, October 28, 1940, 7. 513 have got to be brought along in what's ahead of us." He was not referring to those who controlled the nation's economy. "I mean the have-nots.

They haven't any stake of ownership. They've got to take it in whatever faces us."^^^ And despite their differences in foreign policy, Joe completely agreed with FDR's program to give England all possible aid and to step up American rearmament; to make the United States impregnable against attack. He believed that if England fell, we would be next on

Hitler's list.^^^ He argued that the United States had an obligation to Britain for bearing the brunt of the war and that the Administration should give, not lend, Britain the money for armaments when their dollar

21 n reserves ran out.

But certainly, the major influence, by Kennedy's own admission was his wife, the "firm-jawed favorite daughter of 'Honey Fitz.'" The Ambas-

211 s a d o r himself admitted that her advice "carried the greatest weight."

That next evening after the Ambassador's radio address, Roosevelt campaigned in Kennedy's home town and gave a major speech in which he announced his cecision to allow the British to order billions of dollars of munitions from the arsenal across the seas. It would mean jobs and prosperity for a nation still recovering from the Depression; hopefully, that would offset any criticism about America's violation of her neutrality.

208whalen, 326.

ZO^Rose Kennedy, 275.

ZlOfO 371/24251/A4485/605/45, October 19, 1940, 95.

^l^Cameron, 145. 514

No serious politician could even think of going near Boston without stopping in to meet "Honey-FitzRoosevelt met him at the railroad station, along with Jack Kennedy, whose job it was to accompany "Grandpa."

Ever a genius at the personal touch, the President greeted "Honey-Fitz" warmly. "Everywhere I went on my South American trip they were asking about you. They all remember your singing 'Sweet Adeline' when you were down there." Fitzgerald beamed. "Yes," the adroit charmer added, "all 212 the Latin Americans are singing 'Adelina Dulce' down there now!"

FDR made a further gesture to the Boston Irish at the Boston Garden that night by welcoming back to America, "that Boston boy, beloved by all of Boston and a lot of other places, my Ambassador to the Court of St. 213 James's, Joe Kennedy." ' His speech writers protested at the use of the personal pronoun and suggested using "our Ambassador;" but Roosevelt would have none of it. "My" was correct, he insisted.

By the next day, every Republican orator had seized upon the word

"my" as evidence of his overwhelming egotism and dictatorial aspirations.

"It used to be 'my friends.' Now it is 'my Ambassador.' Pretty soon it will be 'my generals,' then it will be 'my people,"' Willkie bellowed, trying to make political hay out of Roosevelt's choice of pronouns and linking him to Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon, and Hitler. A1 Smith,

21 2Burns, John Kennedy, 46.

^^^New York Times, October 31, 1940, 14.

214gherwood, 191-192. 515 grown conservative in later years and stumping for Willkie argued that

Ambassadors represent the American people and must be confirmed by the 21 ^ Senate. So "Joe is 'our Ambassador' and not 'my Ambassador.Argu­ mentative old General Johnson charged both Roosevelt and Kennedy of war- mongery. "'My Ambassador' was brought back to save the President's threatened fiasco," he chortled.

Roosevelt's impolitic choice of words raised a considerable storm of protest and telegrams poured into the White House. "IVhat do you mean my Ambassador Joe Kennedy? IVho pays Joe, you or we, the people?" demanded an angry Bostonian.A man from Toledo wrote that "I was under the

9 1 Q impression he was the Ambassador of the United States." Several

Americans criticized Roosevelt for his "dictatorial slant" in referring to Kennedy and suggested that "because of the growing atmosphere of 219 dictatorship throughout the world," Roosevelt correct his language.

"I have no quarrel with your having a personal representative in London on your personal pay-roll," wrote a man from Kansas City, "but as an obscure American I respectfully ask you to take over Mr. Kennedy on your personal pay-roll and immediately designate an ambassador to England to

New York Times, November 1, 1940, 1, 8.

21Glbid., 4.

91 7 A.C. Clifford, Fanwood, New Jersey, October 30, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL.

Zl^G.J. Mundy, Toledo, Ohio, October 30, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL.

Zl^Abbott K. Hamilton, Darien, Connecticut, October 31, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL; also see F.M. Pratt, Tuckahoe, New Jersey, October 31, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL. 516 represent the American people "^20 Actually, Roosevelt was technically

correct. An Ambassador is regarded as the personal representative from one head of State to another, said the Department of State, in a clari- 701 fying statement.

Throughout his campaign, Roosevelt's central theme had been peace.

In Boston that night he made a solemn promise which would later come back to haunt him: "And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers,

I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys will not be sent into any foreign war."222

On November 5, the nation went to the polls and gave Roosevelt a decisive third term victory. The popular vote was uncomfortably slim,

27,243,466 to 22,304,755; but the electoral vote was sweeping, 499 to 82.223

The British breathed a sigh of relief. To The Economist it would have been "unfortunate" for "the democratic cause throughout the world 224 if there had been a change of administration...."

As did most leading appointees, Kennedy submitted his resignation the day after Roosevelt's re-election. It was no pro forma gesture, he

220oupery C. Warwick, Kansas City, Missouri, October 30, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL.

221{vjew York Times, November 2, 1940, 7.

222%ose Kennedy, 275.

Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 454.

22^The Economist, November 30, 1940, 663. 517 assured his boss. Nevertheless, he was persuaded to remain on until his successor had been chosen. Thus, his resignation was never formally accepted until February, 1941.^25 while he was at the White House, Kennedy and Roosevelt surveyed the British situation. The President agreed with

Kennedy about staying out of the war. If the Germans persisted in destroy­ ing England's ports, the United States would be completely unable to help them; and if they struck in the Western Hemisphere, we would be powerless to stop them. "You will either go down as the greatest President in history or the greatest horse's ass," Kennedy remarked. "There is a third alternative," Roosevelt replied, "I may go down as the President of an unimportant country at the end of my term."^^^

The day after the election, Kennedy went to the State Department and had a lengthy conversation with Hull, Welles, and Long. "He is quite a realist and he sees England gone," Long wrote. England was broke, Kennedy told them, the British Empire was gone and maybe the Navy too. England would soon be forced into an understanding with Germany, Churchill would be dismissed with Lloyd George taking his place. Kennedy predicted a new

European political and economic philosophy which would exclude America from European, Far Eastern, and American markets. He suggested that the

United States implement a realistic policy of economic collaboration

225 Rose Kennedy, 275.

22&Krock, 336. 518 with Germany and Japan. Kennedy was at a loss to explain how this should be done although he still maintained that the existing policy was wrong.

He also opposed the European trend toward socialism which affected

England, as well as Germany and Italy. Tlie United States would have to

"assume a Fascist form of government here or something similar to it if we are to survive in a world of concentrated and centralized power."

The "spirit and the morale of the world is broken," Kennedy concluded.

People had lost their faith in God. Kennedy told the State Department officials of his plans to see publishers like Hearst and McCormick and

"try to set [them] right.

Several days after Roosevelt's re-election, Kennedy returned to

Boston for a physical check-up and to see old friends and Harvard class­ mates. He greeted everyone with his "hail-fellow-well-met" manner and 228 talked freely, expressing his opinions to anyone within earshot.

He was still "pessimistic over the outcome abroad," he told newsmen because he "saw no hope of immediate peace." He supported continued aid to Britain as "an insurance policy" and added that "I am strongly against the United States entering the war by the back door, the front door, or 229 any door." Three reporters in particular were especially interested

227gong, November 6, 1940, 146-148.

^^^Dinneen, 81.

The Times, November 9, 1940, 3. 519

in the Ambassador's views: Louis Lyons of the Boston Globe, an effective,

cautious and sensitive reporter who was one of nine applicants chosen

for a Nieman Journalism Fellowship at Harvard, who had joined the staff

in 1919 and had not recently interviewed the Ambassador. Lyons brought with him Ralph Colgan, another Nieman Fellow and Charles K. Edmondson, both writers for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Under the rules of the

Fellowship, only Lyons, who had been assigned to write a feature story

for the Globe, could report the interview, which he understood to be

on the record. Because Kennedy liked the strong isolationist policy of the St. Louis newspaper, he agreed to give Edmondson and Coglan a background briefing on American foreign policy and on England and the war effort.. 230

On Saturday, November 9, the newsmen went to Kennedy's suite in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. Tlie Ambassador had generally had a highly favorable press and long realized that candor and first name familiarity were partially responsible. His technique for dealing with the Fourth

Estate was to "appear guileless without technique" as he imposed the responsibility on them for protecting his career by censoring his out- rageously candid remarks. 2 Kennedy chatted amicably for an hour and a half, his mind running from England's war effort, to Eleanor Roosevelt,

230whalen, 332.

^^Ipinneen, 84-86. 520

to American foreign policy,to the Queen. As the reporters left,

Kennedy casually remarked "Well, I'm afraid you didn't get much of

a story."

Lyons and Coglan dashed for a cab eager to return to their office

to compare notes and savor every crumb of Kennedy's comments. "I

wouldn't be in your shoes," Coglan remarked. "How do you know what

you can write? He just puts it up to you to follow your own conscience

and judgment and protect him in his diplomatic capacity. The last time

I interviewed him in 1936, he poured himself out just like this, without

laying any restriction on me, and I wrote every bit of it, and it went

all over the country--the interview in which he said why he was for

Roosevelt; and he said, it was the best interview he'd ever had, but he

wasn't Ambassador then. It all depends on how you handle it," Coglan

said. "Any story can be told if it's told right."

Kennedy never saw the story in advance and knew nothing about it

until the next morning when Joseph Dinneen, a reporter for the Boston

Globe who was filling in as Sunday editor called him in Bronxville,

New York, to ask him for a statement regarding Neville Chamberlain's

death. The impatient Ambassador told him that Rose was waiting to go

to Mass. He promised to prepare a tribute and asked Dinneen to call him back. By the way, Dinneen casually said: "That's quite an inter­ view you gave Louis Lyons for this morning's paper.'. .. Why? What did he say?" Kennedy asked. "What did he say?" Dinneen repeated, incredu­

lously. "He wrote everything you told him. I've got it here. 'Tlie

Queen is one of the most intelligent women you ever met. It will be 521

the Queen who will save what's left of England and not any of the

politicians,"' he read aloud, skimming through the long story. "She's

got more brains than the Cabinet... Democracy is finished in England. The

Country will go Socialist....You'll spend everything you've got to keep us out of the war. If the United States gets into it with England, we'll be left holding the bag....You're going to see Hearst about a campaign to keep us out of the war....Our congressmen are dopes who don't under­ stand the war on our relationship to it....The only reason why the English haven't taken over Irish ports is because of American public opinion."

There was dead silence for a moment. "Do you want me to keep going," the reporter asked, wondering if they had been cut off. "He wrote all that?" Kennedy asked in amazement. "All that and a lot more," Dinneen replied. "Anything wrong with it? You said it, didn't you?" A pause-- finally Kennedy replied: "I said it. ... I want you to read the whole thing to me, but not now. Rose and I have got to go to Mass. I'll be back in an hour. Call me."

In the meantime Dinneen had called the managing editor and repeated

Kennedy's admission that he had been accurately quoted. His confirma­ tion was passed on to the deluge of inquiries pouring in from wire services and newspapers. Mien he tried to call again, Kennedy's phone was jammed up for hours b> calls from London's Daily Mail and New

Chronicle, New York reporters, UP, AP, and INS, requesting confirmation and a complete text of the interview. 232 Finally after filing his

ZS^ibid. 522 request with the operator and waiting his turn, Dinneen got through and spent the next half hour reading three full columns to Kennedy. The story ran on page one under the unusual headline: PINCH COMING IN U.S.

TRADE LOSS. It was almost as though the writers knew the story was dynamite but didn't know what to do with it. Forty-one paragraphs later

Kennedy's statements elaborated on the headline. "It's the loss of our foreign trade that's going to threaten to change our form of government.

We haven't felt the pinch of it yet. It's ahead of us." The second heading was equally unrevealing: AMBASSADOR ASKS AID TO ENGLAND BE VIEWED

AS "INSURANCE;" BEGS AMERICA WAKE UP, GIVE MORE POWER TO MOBILIZE

INDUSTRY. Under Lyon's byline in the Globe was the copyright line— the first hint of the story's unusual nature. The story unfolded leisurely, in rambling "feature" fashion. Six paragraphs later, it got to the dynamite. "I'm willing to spend all I've got left to keep us out of war....There's no sense in our getting in. We'd just be holding the bag....I know more about the European situation than anybody else, and its up to me to see that the country gets it."

The Ambassador's indiscreet personal opinions were now public knowledge. After quoting his generous remarks about the Queen, came

Kennedy's views on Eleanor Roosevelt. "She's another wonderful woman.

...And marvelously helpful and full of sympathy. Jim will tell you,"

--a reference to James M. Landis, Dean of Harvard's Law School, who arrived as the reporters left--"She bothered us more on our jobs in

Washington to take care of the poor little nobodies who hadn't any influence, than all the rest of the people down there together. She's always sending me a note to have some little Susie Glotz to tea at the

Embassy." 523

He had equally candid opinions on the future of democracy in

England and America. "People call me a pessimist, I say, 'IVhat is

there to be gay about? Democracy is all done.'...You mean in England

or this country, too?" one of the reporters asked. "Well, I don't know.

If we get into war it will be in this country, too. A bureaucracy would take over right off. Everything we hold dear will be gone.

They tell me that after 1918 we got it all back again. But this is

different. There's a different pattern in the world....! say we aren't

going in. Only over my dead body." Later he returned to this theme:

"Democracy is finished in England. It may be here. Because it comes

to a question of feeding people. It's all an economic question....

National socialism" would come to England, he predicted.

There were other remarks that would infuriate Englishmen. "It isn't that she's fighting for democracy. That's the bunk. She's fighting for self-preservation, just as we will if it comes to us." He also commented that he and Senator Burton K. Itfheeler, the die-hard isolationist, 233 were "buddies." And "Lindbergh's not so crazy either."

At the close of Dinneen's lengthy telephone conversation, Kennedy quietly replied "He didn't miss a thing. He has destroyed me as an

233pbid.; The Times, November 13, 1940, 3; FO 371/24251/3132/605/45, November 10, 1940; Lester David, Ted Kennedy: Triumph and Tragedy, 49 for a discussion of Kennedy's interview. 524

Ambassador. There is nothing left for me now but to resign. . .. IVhy did

you say it, Joe?" Dinneen asked. "I understood that I was merely

giving them background and that it was all off the record," he said.^34

The next day, Kennedy issued a formal statement repudiating his

Boston Globe interview, despite the fact that he had earlier confirmed

it. He claimed that the story contained many "inaccurate statements"

and was based on an off-the-record conversation given with the under­

standing that nothing would be published. "I have read the interview

that I am supposed to have given to Mr. Louis M. Lyons of the Boston

Globe," the Ambassador’s statement began. "When Mr. Lyons came to see

me in Boston I made it clear...that T should be very happy to give them

(Coglan and Edmondson) my thoughts off the record, but I would make no

statements that should be printed at this time." Throughout our conver­

sation, Mr. Lyons made no notes. The statements attributed to me in the

Globe show this to be true "because they create a different impression

entirely than I would want to set forth." The reason I apologized because he "didn’t get much of a story," Kennedy wrote, was because

"I assumed the entire conversation had been conducted on the basis of my original statement that it was an off-the-record discussion." The

interview was the "first serious violation of the newspaper code on an

^^^Dinneen, 86. 525

off-the-record interview...! may be guilty of errors of judgment, but 235 I hope never guilty of errors of good taste."

But the Globe, having sworn that the story was accurate, had no

choice but to stand by Lyons. The Globe's statement "regrets that

Ambassador Kennedy takes exception to publication of the interview" and

explained that Lyons believed that he was allowed to use any of the

Ambassador's remarks, except those which Kennedy specifically stipulated

were "off the record.

The outraged Ambassador insisted that Lyons publicly state that the

conversation had been off-the-record. The reporter refused. Kennedy

demanded a retraction from the Globe. A retraction was prepared but

was killed by Lawrence Winship, the managing editor, who threatened to

resign if it was printed. In retaliation, Kennedy withdrew all his

liquor advertising.

Lyons resigned from the Globe to become the Curator of the Nieman

Foundation. Arrangements had been made several weeks before the infamous

interview. The reporter has continued to insist that his version of the story is accurate. 2 *^7 Ralph Coglan placed part of the blame on Kennedy

235 'The Times, November 13, 1940, 3; FO 371/24251/A4485/605/45, 99; New York Times, November 12, 1940, 5.

^^^New York Times, November 12, 1940, 5.

^^^Dinneen, 87. 526

for the misunderstanding. The Ambassador should have stated clearly

that his opinions were off-the-record but Lyons should have exercised

O *7 0 discretion and protected him. The publisher of the St. Louis Post

Dispatch wrote a letter to Kennedy in which he deplored the publication

of the interview and denounced "it as a breach of faith."^39 James

Landis, present for part of the conversation, believed that Lyons really had misunderstood the conditions of the interview.

It was an incident which reflected little credit on any participant but had the greatest effect on Kennedy himself. ITie Ambassadorship to the Court of St.James's the height of Kennedy's career, was now drawing to an inglorious close. The very directness and candor which had always made Kennedy such good copy had ruined him. Since he had already resigned, the interview did not cost him the Ambassadorship. But it did cost him a graceful exit from the Administration in which he would leave behind a

President indebted to him for his campaign speech.

Tlie day after the article appeared, Kennedy went unexpectedly to the White House and had a "long and leisurely discussion" with the

President. Their conversation was "amicable" and both found themselves in general agreement on Anglo-American policy. However, the Ambassador

238whalen, 337.

239Krock, 337.

240jvhalen, 337. 527 was critical of the degree of aid to Britain, "thinking it incommensurate with the p r o m i s e s . "241 Kennedy announced to the press that evening that he had tendered his resignation on November 6, In a prepared statement, he said: "Today the President was good enough to express regret over my decision, but to say that, not yet being prepared to appoint my successor, he wishes me to retain my designation as Ambassador until he is. But I shall not return to London in that capacity." Kennedy told newsmen that after a short vacation, he planned "to devote my efforts to what seems to me the greatest cause in the world today, and means, if successful, the

241n 0w York Times, December 8, 1940, IV, 3; Joseph P. Lash in his volume, Eleanor: The Years Alone (New York, 1972) writes that Mrs. Roose­ velt recalled how angry her husband was with Kennedy and his defeatist talk. FDR asked her in a "glacial" tone to take Ambassador Kennedy, serve him lunch, and see him to the train. Lash wrote that "she had not known what was up until Ambassador Kennedy began to talk with her. Then she understood FDR's fury..." 287. Koskoff writes of the same episode, originally described by Gore Vidal, New York Review of Books, November 18, 1971 in which Mrs. Roosevelt said after Kennedy "came back to Boston and gave that unfortunate interview in which he was...well, somewhat critical of us....Well, my Franklin said, 'We better have him down here --we were at Hyde Park--' and see what he has to say." So Mr. Kennedy arrived at Rhinecliff on the train and I met him and took him straight to Franklin. Well, ten minutes later one of the aides came and said, 'The President wants to see you right away.' This was unheard of. So I rushed into the office and there was Franklin, white as a sheet. He asked Mr. Kennedy to step outside and then he said, and his voice was shaking, 'I never want to see that man again as long as I live....get him out of here....'" p. 8. Koskoff was properly suspicious of the story which he believed was "in large part erroneous." Tfie episode could have been correct if Kennedy visited Hyde Park immediately after the Globe interview. But Koskoff doubts,this. The Ambassador did see the Presi­ dent in Washington on December 1, 1940 according to FDR's appointment book. During the period between the Globe interview on November 9 and December 1, Roosevelt did go to Hyde Park from November 20-November 24. During those days, Kennedy was probably in Galifornia. He went there on November 13 and was probably still there from November 20 to November 24, p. 571. I am indebted to Dr. Melvin Leffler for calling this episode to my attention. 528

preservation of the American form of democracy. That cause is to help

the President keep the United States out of war."^42

Although Roosevelt told the press that Kennedy was "giving the 243 government here much valuable information and advice," he did not

send him a "Dear Joe" letter, publicly praising his efforts, nor was

there any hint that Kennedy could continue to consider himself a member

of the President's official family. In fact, Roosevelt later confided

to Ickes that he believed that Kennedy's Globe interview was "authentic"

regardless of subsequent denial. His statement to Lyons was "substan­

tially the same" as those he expressed at a private gathering in

Hollywood.Kennedy told the two hundred people present that England would be defeated and democracy would be destroyed.

"Well," said Kennedy, after saying his good-byes to the State

Department. "I'm out of a job now and off the payroll here." His

242fjew York Times, December 2, 1940, 1; The Times, December 2, 1940, 4; FO 371/242S1/A1945/605/45, December 3, 1940, 78; The New York Times, December 3, 1940, wrote that Roosevelt's press secretary, Stephen Early, emphasized that the President's conversation with Kennedy had been "very pleasant and agreeable" and that Roosevelt had "no objections whatsoever" to Kennedy's desire to resign and campaign to keep America out of war. p. 14.

New York Times, November 9, 1940, 8.

^44ickes, December 1, 1940, Vol. Ill, 386; also Davis and Lindley, How War Came (New York, 1942), 117 wrote that "Mr. Roosevelt had no doubt that the Ambassador had been quoted accurately." 529 associates within the State Department, "now visibly relieved to be his associates no longer" resolved to make his unemployment permanent. Since

Kennedy had offered to work on any international problems after resigning, a reporter asked Roosevelt's press secretary if he might serve at some other government post. "I don't see anything like that in the picture

right now," he r e p l i e d . ^45

Kennedy's ill-considered remarks and his resignation released a storm of protest on both sides of the Atlantic. Once he lost the pro­ tection of the Presidential mantle, a host of critics, with hatchets raised, accused him of almost everything— being a Nazi sympathizer, a turncoat, a Roosevelt hater, a reactionary.

Ickes, always an "àrch-Kennedy critic, dubbed him a "wet blanket... defeatist."^4^ "Apparently Joe Kennedy is out to do whatever damage he can," Ickes wrote in his diary.^4? The New York Times newsmen labeled 24 o him a "defeatist propagandist" and Sumner Welles called him a "reck­ less talker."^49

The columnists, Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, staunch interven­ tionists, noted that wherever Kennedy went "there have been sudden crops of defeatist rumors and appeasement talk!" They marveled at Kennedy's

^4^New York Times, December 5, 1940, 4.

24&ickes, November 17, 1940, Vol. Ill, 370.

24?ibid., December 1, 1940, Vol. Ill, 370.

^4%ew York Times, November 24, 1940, 42.

^4^Ibid., December 4, 1940, 22. 530

denial of defeatism. He has been "frightened into something approaching

a fit," they wrote. "Let there be no mistake about it. When Joseph P.

Kennedy grandiloquently announced he was laying down his office to fight

for the cause of peace he really meant he was going to peddle appeasement

all across the United States." The columnists belittled the Ambassador's

bullish claim to "know more about Europe than anybody else in this country,"

and rejected his boast that he had not succumbed to British "blandish­

ments." Though he escaped the cajolery of Winston Churchill and Ernest

Bevin, the present leaders of Britain's "gallant battle for survival," who probably did not even waste their compliments on him, he nevertheless was quite susceptible to the "men who prepared Britain's disaster--

Montagu Norman and Sir Horace Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Simon

and their cronies;" men who thought with "their pocketbooks instead of

their minds." Kennedy "swallowed their theories of European politics whole, without a gulp." Of course, the columnist argued, it was only natural that his closest associates would be those with the "mentality of the City of London," since Kennedy himself was a businessman.

Thougli the Ambassador might now deny that he accepted the appease­ ment arguments, the columnists cited chapter and verse of Kennedy's despatches, detailing his appeasement views and his blatant hints to

Roosevelt to pressure the Poles into accepting Germany's demands.

Throughout the war, his despatches were repeatedly marked by "almost unalloyed defeatism." The State Department came to ignore his dire warnings, especially when Kennedy had second thoughts and contradicted himself in later cables, or called the Department and requested that a 531

particular despatch be disregarded. As an adviser to the American people,

they warned, "Kennedy deserves about the same degree of respectful atten- 250 tion as would be accorded, say, to Sir Horace Wilson in London."

Kennedy critics like the syndicated columnists. Drew Pearson and

Robert S. Allen, made much of his trip to California and his visit to

Wm. Randolph Hearst. The newsman reported that Kennedy had told a private

gathering of movie moguls:

1. That England, although fighting heroically, faced overwhelming odds, and the United States might as well realize that England was virtually defeated. 2. That the United States should carefully limit its aid to Britain so as to gain time to become fully armed, in order to be in a better position to do business with the Axis victors. 3. That Holywood producers should stop making films offensive to the dictators.

Kennedy's off-the-record remarks caused a major sensation and were reported

immediately to Washington, Pearson and Allen wrote.

Those praising the Ambassador were every bit as partisan as his

critics. Representative Louis Ludlow told the House of Representatives:

"Thank God for Joseph P. Kennedy." Unlike other ambassadors, Kennedy

"stands four square, first, last, and all the time for America....He

has not become infected with foreign prejudices and predilections and

has retained his Americanism pure and undiluted." Ludlow likened him

to the "Rock of Gibraltar" and thanked him for his "wise and patriotic

250 New York Herald-Tribune, December 5, 1940, 4.

251iiThe Merry-Go-Round," Boston Transcript, November 26, 1940, OF 3060, FDRL. 532 recommendations.” He gave hope to millions, gushed the Hoosier, when he resigned to help President Roosevelt "keep America out of war."252

Arthur Krock, of course, rushed to Kennedy's defense. The Ambassador's endorsement of "aid short of war" and his explanation of how it could be increased and speeded up, "can hardly be the plan of an 'appeaser,' though it can be the plan of a noninterventionists," wrote the loyal columnist.

The more judicious New York Times editorialized that "the American people would be ungrateful if they did not recognise and remember the good work which Ambassador Kennedy did for them in London." In some ways, Kennedy has been the most "effective Ambassador" in over a decade.

He was "a dynamo of energy and common sense" and will be remembered for trying "to bring sense to the madmen who were bent on aggressive war."

Though his service is tainted by "off-the-record" interviews, Kennedy can only blame himself. "Unguarded talk" was always one of his serious defects; another was faith in his "hunches" rather than hard, cold analysis. Those who knew him well knew how to ignore his "ingrained gloom," but the British did not. Consequently, they were now labeling him a "defeatist.

252New York Times, December 20, 1940, 7.

^S^ibid., December 8, 1940, IV, 3.

254ibid., December 3, 1940, 24. 533

Indeed, they were; that and worse. The Lyons story brought a storm

of protest on the other side of the Atlantic. Arthur Krock described the

British as rising up "in indignation that developed into an anger against 255 and a dislike for the United States Ambassador that remains unabated."

"I never saw a more democratic country than England is today, I saw no

signs of a decline of democracy in England. 1 saw quite the contrary,"

Lord Lothian retorted.The British Foreign Office, long anti-Kennedy

in sentiment congratulated itself on having had his number all along.

"The American Department [of the Foreign Office] long ago exposed the hollowness of any belief that Mr. Kennedy was a friend to this country," wrote one o f f i c i a l . Furthermore, another claimed, despite Kennedy's

denial, "1 hear that Mr. Kennedy in private conversation has been making

statements very similar to those attributed to him by the Boston reporter,

and that he has even suggested that Britain could make peace on very 258 reasonable terms at the present moment...."

Joseph P. Kennedy "deceived many decent English people" while he was

Ambassador, wrote A. J. Cummings in the News Chronicle. Cummings perhaps, bore a grudge since he had had his anti-appeasement opinions censored in a newsreel at Kennedy's request before Munich. "While he was here his

^^^Ibid., November 26, j.940, 4. ^S^Ibid.

2S?F0 371/242S1/A1945/605/4S, November 25, 1940, 72.

371/24251/A4485/605/45, October 11, 1940, 9. 534 suave, monotonous style, his nine over-photographed children and his hail-fellow-well-met manner concealed [a] hard-boiled businessman's eagerness to do a profitable business deal with the dictators...."

Cummings wrote: "It is all to the good that the British people now know where Kennedy stands." Kennedy's "greatest cause in the world" was keeping the U.S. out of war; Roosevelt, "being of less ignoble human mold than his uncomfortable supporter," believed that the "greatest cause in the world" was helping the British defeat "the criminal 259 activities of the Nazi gangster."

Sir Evelyn Wrench, the stately, aristocratic founder of the English-

Speaking Union told a Boston crowd: "1 cannot believe that Mr. Kennedy made so ridiculous a statement. If he did he was wasting his three years in England. He had entirely misunderstood the British attitude.

George Murray wrote a scorching open letter in the London Daily Mail:

"You have said things about us that we regret to hear. They are things which in time, I think, you will regret having said.... Perhaps you were always a defeatist and never owned to it in public....We can forgive wrongheadedness, but not bad f a i t h . The Spectator called his remarks

^^^New York Times, December 7, 1940, 6; Lasky, RFK: Tlie % t h and the Man, 58

260Lester, 49.

ZGlwhalen, 340. 535

"offending" and "absurd" and thought his repudiation inadequate. "If

Mr. Kennedy did make such a statement, or anything like it, he compels

the conclusion that he used his opportunities for observation in the

past three years singularly ill." His "defeatist" remarks have "left

a very bad taste in the public m o u t h . The Economist accused

Kennedy of touring the United States and "making statements about British weakness and insincerity which no friend of Britain or lover of the truth would permit himself.Even the staid Times of London was critical

of Kennedy's habit of "distilling the sort of gloom which he has apparently

adopted as his second nature.Bilainkin, one of Kennedy's closest

friends and a diplomatic correspondent, argued compassionately that

judgment be suspended. "Let us be just to Kennedy, wait till fuller records are available. 1 have never doubted his friendship for the people of this country.

The barrage of criticism startled Kennedy. He issued a statement to the American press denying that he made anti-British remarks and repudiating the "gossip" in London that he expected the British to lose the war. "This is nonsense," the Ambassador said. "1 am personally very sorry that such an impression — should have cropped up in England.

^^^The Spectator, December 13, 1940, 631.

^^^The Economist, November 30, 1940, 664.

^^^The Times, November 26, 1940, 4.

^^^Bilainkin, December 23, 1940, 262. 536

If an interview, which was repudiated by me, and a story in a gossip

column are going to be sufficient to wipe out the broadcast I made,

coupled with my two years and nine months in London, then 1 am beginning

to wonder if 1 ever had very much standing in L o n d o n . "266 a letter

to Bilainkin one month after the infamous interview, Kennedy said: "Much

to my amazement was the fact that the English would use that as an excuse

to write attacks on me and...on the children, why then, 1 can't understand

it. To be attacked here by columnists, and bitter partisans, that's

understandable, but to have England jump into the fray is beyond me...."^^^

Me cabled an official in the American Embassy in London that he didn't mind the attacks on him but he resented the "personal observations on

[his] family. . . .As far as 1 am concerned," Kennedy replied, "1 don'f

give a damn."^^®

As a force in American politics, Kennedy was through and he knew it.

Me spent the remaining months of his ambassadorship leading a one man crusade to keep America out of war. Speaking on the radio on January 19, he denied being an "'Apostle of Gloom,— a defeatist'" and dismissed the charge of "appeaser." He criticized the "real-defeatists"--the fatalists who claimed that we were bound to be drawn into the war— "people who

266po 371/24251/A1945/605/45, December 1940, 71; New York Times, November 30, 1940, 6.

ZG^Bilainkin, December 23, 1940, 262.

26Spo 371/24251/A194S/605/45, December 9, 1940, no pagination. 537 have lost hope for peace in America." Again, he reiterated his theme:

"I oppose the entrance of this country into the present war...." He rejected the argument that England was "fighting our battle. This is not our war. We were not consulted when it began. We had no veto power over its continuance." Still a champion of aid to Britain, he argued for giving "the utmost aid to England." Such a policy would secure for ourselves "the most precious commodity we need— time--time to rearm....Let America devote its energies to armaments--and I have little doubt but that we can be secure against any power or group of powers in the wide world." Me closed with a dramatic call to unity.

"America has had enough words. America must unite--now. America must sacrifice— now. America must work--now. Then and only then can we hope to spare ourselves and our children from the dismal destiny of blood and tears.

Despite his advocacy of "utmost aid to England," Kennedy argued in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee against Lend-

Lease which would grant the President the authority to "sell, transfer, lease, land or otherwise dispose o f" any "defense articles" to any nation whose defense was considered "vital" to the security of the United States. 270

Tlie visitors gallery was jammed as Kennedy testified and occasionally he

^^^Life, January 27, 1941, Vol. 10, No. 4, 27; New York Times, January 19, 1941, 1. 270 New York Times, January 26, 1941, IV, 1. 538 was applauded as he argued against the bill's sweeping language and its delegation of vast powers to the President. Kennedy reasoned that the present danger was not great enough to justify "this surrender of the authority and responsibility of the Congress." 271

Kennedy spent most of 1941 publicizing his views against American involvement in war by testifying before Congress, writing articles, talking with influential friends, and giving countless speeches. He also spent much of the year with his family--the last one they would ever have together again. 272

On December 7, 1941, Kennedy was vacationing in Palm Beach as he turned on the radio and heard the shattering news of the Japanese attack

27% on the United States fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor. He quickly put aside past grievances and immediately cabled Roosevelt: "In this great crisis all Americans are with you. Name the battle post. I'm yours to command." 274 His telegram went unanswered. No command was given. Several days later Kennedy did receive a form letter sent by a

Roosevelt aide such as thousands received thanking him for his offer of assistance. Then, nothing. As if to remind Roosevelt of his offer.

^^^New York Times, January 19, 1941, 1; also see January 22, 1941, 1, 4 and January 26, 1941, IV, 1.

277 Rose Kennedy, 277.

273whalen, 353.

274pDR from JPK, December 7, 1941, PPF, 207, FDRL. 539

Kennedy sent him several bottles of champagne for Christmas. He received

a polite thank-you note. Again, nothing. Then Kennedy heard from several representatives on Capitol Hill that the President had privately remarked that he was surprised at not hearing from the former Ambassador.

Kennedy called the White House to straighten out the misunderstanding; the President was unavailable. He left his number but his call was not returned. 275

Swallowing his pride, he wrote to Roosevelt and sent the letter to

Grace Tully asking her to personally deliver his note to her boss. He also forwarded copies of his telegram and the perfunctory White House reply. "I don't want to appear in the role of a man looking for a job for the sake of getting an appointment, but Joe and Jack are in the service and I feel that ray experience in these critical times might be worth something in some position. I just want to say that if you want me, I am yours to command at any time."^^^ Several days later he finally received a reply. "It is mighty good to get your letter and I am very certain I did not get your telegram of December seventh. This was probably because several thousand came in at the same time and were handled in the office without ray ever seeing thera," the President wrote. 277

2?5whalen, 353.

27GpDR from JPK, March 4, 1942, PPF, 207, FDRL.

277j p k from FDR, March 7, 1942, PPF, 207, FDRL. 540

He held out the possibility of Kennedy serving in the shipbuilding

industry which was stepping up its production from eight million dead­ weight tons in 1942 to twenty-three million tons by 1943.

IVhen Kennedy's old foes heard the news that he was being considered

for a government position, they launched a violent attack against him.

Joe Curran, the head of the C.I.O.'s National Maritime Union, complained;

"If you want to win the war you don't put in a key spot, like shipping,

0 7 0 a man who wants to make peace with Hitler."' The vendetta against

Kennedy continued throughout the war years as he was denounced for virtually everything— as "a Nazi sympathizer, an isolationist, a reactionary, 2 79 a turn coat, a Roosevelt hater." Die doors to government service 2 80 remained completely locked.

278Time, May 4, 1943, Vol. XXXIX, 15.

2^^Lasky, RFK: Die Myth and the Man, 59.

280gee the letters on Kennedy in the FDRL under OF 48, box 2, written by many "ordinary" Americans. Diey are unrestrained in their virulence and hatred. 541

CONCLUSION

Before leaving for Britain in the Spring of 1938, Kennedy remarked

"I've got nine children and the only thing I can leave them that will mean anything is my good name and reputation." But two and a half years later as he left England and resigned his Ambassadorship, the Kennedy name was synonymous with pro-appeasement, pro-Nazism, anti-Semitism, defeatism, and flagrant indiscretions.

Roosevelt had broken diplomatic tradition and greatly honored Joseph

Kennedy by appointing him. He chose him because Kennedy had campaigned hard for Roosevelt's election in 1932 and again in 1936 and because

Kennedy had proven an admirable Chairman of both the Security Exchange

Commission and the Maritime Commission. Further, Kennedy was reputed to have Presidential ambitions. Washington gossips and newsmen claimed that he wanted to be the first Catholic President of the United States. Roose­ velt probably did not seriously regard him as a rival; but was perhaps concerned that Kennedy at home might become a critic of the faltering New

Deal.

As ambassador, Kennedy had an unusual opportunity to influence

American foreign policy. Not until his second administration did Roose­ velt try to create a systematic foreign policy. Since Roosevelt at first had no firm commitments, Kennedy had an opportunity to influence his decisions. Furthermore, as a loyal Democrat and Roosevelt supporter, his views would command more respect from the President than those of career diplomats. 542

When Kennedy first arrived in Britain he was an avid supporter of

Chamberlain's appeasement policy and interpreted Germany's expansion as

an attempt to alleviate its economic problems. His economic orientation

continued to influence his attitudes. Before the outbreak of war, he

believed that economic internationalism and political isolationism

should be the foundations of American foreign policy. Like the Secretary

of State,; Cordell Hull, he thought economic solutions could solve poli­

tical problems. Kennedy argued that measures like the Anglo-American

Trade Agreement could be effective instruments in the maintenance of

peace. However, economic internationalism did not, in Kennedy's opinion,

imply an acceptance of political commitments or any form of political

intervention.

Politically, Kennedy was a staunch nationalist, an isolationist in

the tradition of Senator William Borah. After Chamberlain at Munich gave way to Hitler's demands for the annexation of the Sudetenland, Kennedy

developed a fatalistic attitude regarding appeasement, the inevitability of w^r, and Britain's chances of victory. He began to urge rapid American I rear|Tiament, the extension of limited financial and military aid to Great

Britain, the Destroyer-Deal, and the repeal of the Neutrality Act. Yet he spill believed that the U.S. should maintain a policy of neutrality and isolation. He wanted the Western Hemisphere to become an isolated I fortjress, Even throughout the war, prior to American entry, he continued to alivocate a compromise settlement between Britain and Germany.

Kennedy's abhorrence of war was motivated partially by personal considerations and fatherly concern for his four sons and because he 543

feared the economic and political consequences of war. War was irrational

and debasing; it destroyed capital and the bases of civilized life.

His belief in the capitalistic system matched that of Chamberlain.

The self-made Wall Street manipulator and the Birmingham banker were

impressed with one another. They developed a close personal relationship

which had a considerable impact on Kennedy's views about Anglo-American

relations. It led Kennedy not only to staunchly support Chamberlain's

appeasement policy, but to try his own hand at personal diplomacy and

to urge Washington's endorsement of the Prime Minister's efforts. Forced

to make a choice between the evils of Communism and Nazism, Chamberlain

chose to befriend Germany. He received the unqualified support of the

American Ambassador. Both men thought that Germany should be allowed to

expand eastward.

Kennedy's relationship with Churchill was not nearly so intimate.

As the embodiment of British pugnacity and as a descendent of an old and

illustrious line of British aristocrats, Kennedy found Churchill politi­

cally and personally offensive. Churchill's attempts to unite the

foreign policies of Britain and America ran directly contrary to Kennedy's

views. The proud ambassador must also have resented Churchill's direct

access to Roosevelt and perhaps held him responsible for some of the

criticism leveled against him in Washington.

Throughout his Ambassadorship, Kennedy was constantly criticized

by American liberals like Harold Ickes, and Roosevelt imtimates like

Henry Morgenthau. They accused him of being pro-Fascist, pro-Nazi, and

anti-Semitic. Ultimately, Roosevelt himself became increasingly wary and 544 hostile to Kennedy. Originally friendly, the relationship between the two began to degenerate into one of barely concealed hostility. As

Roosevelt began to reexamine American foreign policy after Munich and

to urge American aid to the Allies, Kennedy's influence dwindled. He held the President's ear while Roosevelt was still groping for a prac­ tical definition of American foreign policy. But once PUR decided upon a course, Kennedy's influence declined.

Further undermined by Roosevelt's personal emissaries, Welles and

Donovan and by Churchill's personal correspondencd with Roosevelt,

Kennedy's oft repeated predictions of Britain's impending destruction stood in marked contrast to the more optimistic and favorable reports of Britain's chances which Roosevelt received. The rift between the

Ambassador and the President widened as Roosevelt became convinced that

Britain could in fact hold out and even be victorious.

After remaining in London for more than a year after war broke out and after being snubbed by the British because of his isolationist and defeatist positions, Kennedy finally returned to the United States and submitted his resignation on November, 1940.

Although Kennedy had been successful as an Administrator, a reporter, and a negotiator, he nevertheless was largely a failure as a diplomat.

Coming from the specialized world of business and looking at the world through the bars of the dollar sign, he found it difficult to adopt his thinking to international political realities. Like many diplomats of the "30's," Kennedy did accept the views of his host country. But until the American Government adopted a specific conception of foreign policy and devised practical means for implementing it, Kennedy like other 545 ambassadors was left foundering. Receiving no guidance from Washington,

Kennedy could only rely upon his wits and judgment. And when Washington finally decided on a sustained course of action and began to pursue

"methods short of war," political decision making was shifted entirely to Washington and negotiations were conducted between the two heads of state. Kennedy was relegated to the role of messenger boy. The rift between Ambassador and President continued to grow because Kennedy resented his loss of influence, because they held increasingly diverging concepts of America's international role, and because they differed markedly in their estimates of Britain's chances. 546

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