BLOCKADE BEFORE BREAD: ALLIED RELIEF FOR
NAZI EUROPE, 1939-1945
B y
Meredith Hindley
Submitted to the
Faculty of the College for Arts and Sciences
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
In
H istory
Chair:
Richard Dr-Breitman
Anna K. Nelson
Weslev^K. Wdrk
Dean of^ie CoHegeMArtsand Sciences
D ate
2007 American University Washington, D.C. 20016
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 3273596
Copyright 2007 by Hindley, Meredith
All rights reserved.
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
® UMI
UMI Microform 3273596 Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. © COPYRIGHT
by
Meredith Hindley
2007
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BLOCKADE BEFORE BREAD: ALLIED RELIEF FOR
NAZI EUROPE, 1939-1945
BY
Meredith Hindley
ABSTRACT
This study provides the first analysis of Allied relief policy for Nazi-occupied
territories— and by extension Allied humanitarian policy— during the Second World War.
When the war began, Britain implemented an economic warfare campaign that sought to
prevent Germany from importing any goods that would fuel the Nazi war machine. Food and
clothing, the building blocks of relief programs, were included in the ban. In order for relief
goods to pass Britain’s blockade against Germany, humanitarian organizations had to prove
to Britain, and later the United States, that the goods would not aid the German war effort.
Consequently, from the being of the war, a fundamental contradiction existed between Allied
strategy and the humanitarian impulse. How the Allies negotiated that contradiction while
pursuing victory is the subject of this study.
Over the course of the war, relief programs were allowed for political reasons or
when conditions became so inhumane as to demand action. As a result of having to address
the relief issue, a decision-making rubric for responding to humanitarian crises was in place
long before the Allies had knowledge of the Final Solution. The existence of such a policy
reinforces the need to see Allied response to the Holocaust as grounded in decisions
regarding the conduct of the war. The study also shows an unprecedented critique of Allied
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. strategy by the British and American people, Mass movements in favor of relief developed
both countries that forced British and American officials to justify the conduct of the war.
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Perhaps one of the most satisfying parts of completing this project is getting to
acknowledge those who have helped me along the way.
An American University College of Arts and Sciences dissertation fellowship
allowed me to conduct research in Washington, D.C. and London. A grant from the Franklin
and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute supported two weeks of research at the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library. A Cosmos Club Foundation Young Scholar Award allowed me to do research at the
Quai D’Orsay in France and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
Talbot Imlay lent his insights on British war planning, gave me a place to write, and
shared the giddiness that comes from making great finds in the archives. Andrew Apostolou
lent his knowledge of wartime Greece and offered poignant observations. Drew Erdmann
asked questions that made me think and frame my argument. Keith Neilson helped me make
sense of the Foreign Office records keeping system. He also vouched for me at the PRO after
a theft nicked my wallet on the Tube. Bob Beisner helped me focus my writing efforts and
shared his own writing experiences. Neville Wylie traded information with me about the cast
of characters that made up the staff of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Marc Selverstone,
Jason Parker, and Richard Wiggers shared their work on Anglo-American relations and
cheered me on. I have also been benefited along the way for the historical insights and good
company provided by Alan McPherson, Simon Kitson, Peter Jackson, Marlin Thomas,
Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, Mark Stoler, Elizabeth Stewart, Dennis Pool, David Nickles, and Doug
Selvage.
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I would like also like to extend my thanks to the helpful staffs at the Public Record
Office (Kew), Lambeth Palace Library, The Friends’ House, Peace Pledge Union, Quai
D ’Orsay, National Archives and Records Administration, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Library of Congress, the Hoover Institution, and American University’s Bender Library.
I wrote this study while I working at the National Endowment for Humanities.
NEH’s Independent Study and Research Development program provided me with time off to
conduct research to fill in the gaps that cropped up as I wrote. My colleagues— Amy Lifson,
Anna Gillis, Peter Losin, Russ Wyland, and Michael Hall— gently encouraged my progress,
gave me a push when I needed it, and made me laugh. Mary Lou Beatty, my boss and
mentor, made it possible for me to go to finish my Ph.D. I owe her a tremendous debt.
The writing life can be lonely at times, but good friends make it tolerable. There is
no better friend that Sara Wilson. Spending time with her and her family— husband Ed and
children Casey and Jared— is always a joy. My fiction book group— Jocelyn Beer, Katherine
Cooper, Steve Gripkey, Paul Marquardt, Eric Robinson, and Gimena Sanchez— rescued my
mind from the depths of World War II and provided adventures away from the laptop.
Some special words must be said about my committee, Richard Breitman, Anna
Nelson, and Wesley Wark. Despite the delays in finishing this project, they stuck with me,
providing wonderful advice and incisive comments. I also could not have asked for a better
advisor in Richard Breitman. He taught me how to ask questions, weigh evidence, and tell a
story with insight.
Finally, I have to thank my mom, Virginia Hindley, for supporting me throughout
this process and putting up with my saying “I can’t talk now, I’m writing.”
Any defects in this study are my responsibility alone. My views also do not reflect
those of the federal government.
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv
C hapter
1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
2. A CONTROVERSIAL STRATEGY ...... 14
3. THE SENTIMENTAL AMERICANS ...... 61
4. A NIGHTMARE CONTINENT ...... 121
5. MR. ROOSEVELT’S W ISH ...... 178
6. MR. BLOCKADE BUSTER ...... 242
7. FAMINE COMES TO GREECE ...... 295
8. EVERYBODY ELSE ...... 357
9. TO THE EN D ...... 412
10. C O N C L U S IO N ...... 457
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 465
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CH A PTER ON E
INTRODUCTION
As Adolf Hitler’s plans for conquest materialized into stunning victories for Nazi Germany
during 1939-1942, millions of European civilians found themselves living under brutal occupation
governments. Operating on the general principle that the occupying forces should live off the land,
the German army requisitioned and seized from local communities supplies deemed essential to the
German war effort.1 While the severity of occupation policies varied across Europe, the advent of
Nazi rule in Western Europe generally brought with it a reduced standard of living, rationing of
consumer goods, and contraction of the local food supply. As the war dragged on, the civilian food
supply became particularly tenuous, owing to the impact of the fighting on the planting cycle,
successive droughts, the rise of black markets, and continued plundering by Germany. In Eastern
Europe, Nazi occupation policies can only be described as savage and inhume. In Hitler’s mania to
acquire more living space for the German people, he authorized a campaign of exploitation,
enslavement, and extermination.2
Nazi Germany’s treatment of conquered civilian populations prompted an outpouring of
concern in Britain and United States. Concern about Poland, followed by Norway, the
1 Omer Bartov’s Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) provides a powerful account of the Wehrmacht’s destructive policies.
2 The scholarship on Nazi-occupation continues to grow, but some of the landmark works include: Alexander Dallin,German Rule in Russia, 1941-45: A Study in Occupation Polices(London: Macmillan, 1957); Theo Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford: Berg, 1989); Richard Lukas, The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles Under German Occupation, 1939-1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986); Robert Paxton,Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: Columbia University, 1982); and Mark Mazower,Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of O ccupation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993).
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2
Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Greece, led to the creation of hundreds of relief organizations
devoted to providing assistance. When the horror of the Final Solution became known in 1942,
Jewish and secular organizations also sought to help European Jews. As the war dragged on,
humanitarians, relief groups, and exile governments grew increasingly concerned that low calorie
counts, lack of adequate clothing, and rampant disease would render the body of Europe a hollow
shell by the end of war. To alleviate the suffering, they called on Britain and the United States to
provide relief to the occupied territories. The burgeoning humanitarian crisis presented Britain and
the United States with a difficult dilemma: how to balance the demands of total war with the moral
imperative evoked by a humanitarian crisis.
When it formally entered the war on 3 September 1939, Britain implemented its plans for
economic warfare, the centerpiece of which was an economic blockade. Britain sought to prevent
German imports of any material from neutral and non-European sources that could be used to fuel
its war machine. Food, clothing, and some types of medicine—the building blocks of relief
programs— were declared “conditional contraband,” because they could have both military and
non-military uses. In order for those goods to pass the blockade, relief groups needed to convince
Britain that the goods would not benefit Nazi Germany. And so, from the onset of the war, a
fundamental contradiction existed between the Allied strategy and the humanitarian impulse.
How the Allies grappled with this contradiction and how it influenced the way the Allies
conceived of and waged economic warfare are the subjects of this study.
I
One the striking things about the story of Allied humanitarian policy is the extent to which
historians have ignored the subject. The handful of works that consider the topic emphasize the
importance of Britain’s economic warfare campaign in determining the overall Allied approach to
the relief issue. The topic of relief was first considered by British historian W.N. Medlicott in his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3
two volume official history, The Economic Blockade, an account of the efforts of Britain’s
Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) to disable Nazi Germany’s war economy. Finished in the
1950s, the Medlicott’s study remains the most in-depth account of the relief issue to date. He
portrays relief programs to conquered territories as a threat to the integrity of Britain’s economic
warfare strategy and MEW officials as faithful handmaidens of the blockade. Medlicott does not,
however, treat the relief issue in a coherent manner. It pops up here and there over 1200 pages, a
sidelight to the extended discussion of neutral trade agreements and preventative purchasing
programs. As a result, the complexity of the politics surrounding the relief issue is lost. Also
obscured are the backroom conspiracies between MEW and the Foreign Office on the relief issue.
While they did bicker about the relief issue, the two ministries frequently joined forces— often
using a “good cop, bad cop” approach— to lobby other ministries and the War Cabinet to allow
blockade concessions.
Joan Beaumont uses the relief issue as a prism for talking about the limited ability of
British public opinion to influence British strategy. As the war dragged on, humanitarians, exiled
governments, and church groups waged varying campaigns to convince Britain to allow relief
into Nazi-occupied Europe, particularly Belgium. While the groups were successful in making
the blockade a subject of public debate, Beaumont argues that Churchill’s insistence on upholding
the blockade prevented a major policy adjustment.3
Bob Moore tackles the question of why the northern provinces of the Netherlands did not
receive relief until the final days of war, despite the fact that plans for sending relief had been in
the works since the Allies failure to take Arnhem in September 1944. Moore suggests that British
blockade policy played a prominent, but not decisive, role in the decision-making process and
3 Joan Beaumont, “Starving for Democracy: Britain’s Blockade of and Relief for Occupied Europe, 1939- 1945, ” War and Society, vol. 8, no. 2 (October 1990) 57-82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4
demonstrates that the United States, high ranking military officials, and the Dutch government-in-
exile all influenced the final outcome.4 Medlicott, Beaumont, and Moore all write from a
primarily British perspective and a British archival source base, which tends to play down the role
of United States.
Nothing focused specifically on American relief policy has been written. Biographers of
Herbert Hoover have, however, considered the relief issue. The former president played an active
role in several relief organizations, including the Commission for Polish Relief, the Commission
for the Relief of Belgium, and National Committee for Food for Small Democracies. Hoover
scholars debate the extent to which Hoover used the press coverage and prominence afforded to
him by his involvement in the relief issue to rehabilitate his political career. The focus on Hoover
means that the literature rarely engages issues concerning the conduct of the war in a
comprehensive manner. Hoover scholars agree, however, that Winston Churchill and the British
government presented the main obstacle to Hoover’s work, while the United States government
vacillated on the issue.5
Why has relief been mostly overlooked in the vast array of works about the Second
World War? The war has traditionally been thought of as a conflict in which nations harnessed
all their combined political, economic, and military resources to wage war. The idea of providing
aid to civilians during “total war” reeks of contradiction and seems counterproductive. Only after
World War II did relief take center stage with the Marshall Plan, which relieved the war’s
4 Bob Moore, “The Western Allies and Food Relief to the Occupied Netherlands, 1944-1945,”War and Society, vol. 10, no. 2 (October 1992) 91-118.
5 For competing views on Hoover’s commitment to the relief issue see Gary Dean Best’sHerbert Hoover: The Post presidential Years, 1933-1964, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford, 1988) and James H. George, Jr., “Another Chance: Herbert Hoover and World War II Relief,”Diplomatic History, vol. 16, no. 3 (Summer 1992) 389-407. George disagrees with Best’s contention that cross-blockade relief was a marginal activity for Hoover and seeks to construct a more nuanced picture of Hoover’s attitudes on the relief issue. He argues that Best portrays the issue as one-dimensional.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5
devastation and provided resources for rebuilding Germany, Austria, France, and Britain. A
product of the Cold War, the Marshall Plan also shared the same historical moment with two
important pieces of international law: the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949
Geneva Convention. These laws gave humanitarian organizations the legal right to provide aid to
civilians during war. Prior to their passage, the rules of war only covered the rights of soldiers
and prisoners of war— not civilians. The passage of the conventions paved the way for non
governmental organizations (NGOs) to play a major role in addressing the needs of civilians in
later conflicts.
Scholars have profded the evolution and efforts of some NGOs that provide humanitarian
assistance during military conflicts, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and
Oxfam.6 They have also looked at the distribution of relief to liberated areas and post-war relief
programs, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.7 But the majority
of work on wartime humanitarianism focuses on the lessons learned from recent conflicts, such as
6 Some of the more recent books include Caroline Moorehead,Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History o f the Red Cross (London: Harper Collins, 1998); Jean-Claude Favez,The R ed Cross and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).; David P. Forsythe,Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee o f the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977); and Nicholas O. Berry, War and the Red Cross: The Unspoken Mission (New York, 1997).
7 For the official histories see: C.R.S. Harris, AlliedMilitary Administration o f Italy, 1943-45, History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1956); F.S.V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe, 1944-46, History o f the Second World (London: War HMSO, 1956); R. M. Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1950). To avoid duplicating the work of their British counterparts, the U.S. Army chose to publish a document collection, Harry Coles and Albert K. Weinberg (ed3), United States Army in World War II: Civil Affairs—Soldiers Become Governors (Washington: GPO, 1964). The International Red Cross has issued a variety of official histories on its role in WWII, the most recent of which is Inter arma caritas: The Work o f the Red Cross during the Second World War (Geneva: The Committee, 1973). An outside perspective is offered by John F. Hutchison, Champions o f Charity: War and the Rise o f the Red (Boulder, Cross CO: Westview Press, 1996) and David Forsythe,Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee o f the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). David Hinshaw,An Experiment in Friendship (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1947) provides an overview of the work of the American Friends Service Committee. The most comprehensive account of the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration remains its three volume report,UNRRA, Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA (Washington: GPO, 1946). For a general summary, see House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, United States Congress, Final Report on Foreign Aid (Washington: GPO, 1948).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6
Rwanda, Bosnia, and the Congo, and the structure of future humanitarian efforts.8 While the
need to improve the mechanisms for humanitarian assistance has oriented scholars and
practitioners to the future, they nevertheless grapple with two of the same questions that
confronted policymakers and humanitarians during World War II: how to distribute relief
supplies in a manner that ensures supplies reach those in need and how to resolve the moral
dilemma of helping to alleviate an aggressor's burden of caring for the population in conquered
territories.
This subject also poses unusual difficulties because of the transnational nature of the
topic and the archival and geographic challenges it presents. Although there are extensive
records documenting the debate over relief—ranging from telegrams between Roosevelt and
Churchill to reports from relief workers— they are not to be found in the fdes regularly used by
scholars to chronicle the intricacies of the Anglo-American alliance or Allied relations with
exiled governments. Because of its geographic tentacles, both the British Foreign Office and the
American State Department found it difficult to classify the relief issue. The Foreign Office
assigned it to the General Department, a catch-all department for issues that did not fit neatly into
the Foreign Office's geographic organization. Although it made bureaucratic sense to lodge the
relief issue with the General Department, it nevertheless meant that historians trolling for material
on Anglo-American relations in the bulging files of the American Department or material on
Britain’s relations with exiled governments in the Northern or Southern Departments would
overlook this important issue. The same can also be said for how the Ministry of Economic
Warfare, which ran the economic blockade and had significant input on British relief policy,
handled the issue. A similar phenomenon occurred in the State Department. It relegated the relief
8 Some representative works include David Rieff,A Bedfor the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002) and the forum on R ieff s book inForeign Affairs, November/December 2002; and Kevin M. Cahill, ed.,A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (New York: Basic Books/Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7
issue to a pre-existing "refugees" category and made it the responsibility of the Special War
Problems Division, a tiling arrangement that fails accurately to describe or capture the dynamism
of the issue.
What is needed— and what this study provides— is a coherent look at the relief issue
through the use of a broad range of archival sources. It considers how Britain and the United
States grappled with the relief issue over the course of the war. From the beginning, the Allied
coalition was split over the appropriate response to the humanitarian crisis. The Soviet Union
officially expressed no interest in any humanitarian activities, regarding the relief question as an
unnecessary distraction to the business of waging war. Britain and the United States, on the other
hand, possessed a somewhat less calculated attitude. They recognized that while the war constituted
a fight to save Western civilization from the Third Reich, it also chipped away at the very existence
of the European people they fought to preserve. Britain and the United States, however, frequently
disagreed on how to balance strategic considerations with humanitarian considerations.
Drawing on private and government archives in Britain, the United States, France, and
Germany, this study also takes advantage of the recent releases of intelligence records and long
classified materials from both the Allied and Axis sides of the conflict. The relief issue also
captured the attention of the British public resulting in the creation of a number of organizations
dedicated to lobbying the government to alter its policies. To capture the efforts of these groups,
I conducted research in the archives of the Church of England, Society of Friends, and the Peace
Pledge Union. Herbert Hoover’s efforts to launch a number of relief programs also prompted
research in the records of the Committee for Polish Relief, Committee for the Relief of Belgium,
and National Committee Food for Small Democracies. Where they are accessible, personal
papers of the participants have been consulted, as have the relevant records of the German
Foreign Office and the French Foreign Ministry.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8
II
“As the records become available,” observed Michael Howard, “the heroic simplicities of the
Second World War crumble way.”9 Over the past sixty years, historians have sought to explain,
chide, celebrate, and lament the conflict that engulfed the world for six years. The well-
developed body of scholarship on the war reveals a complex military, diplomatic, and economic
undertaking. An account of the relief issue consequently expands our understanding of some of
the key issues of World War II.
This study contributes to our understanding of the inner-workings of the Anglo-American
alliance. During the war, Britain and the United States became so intertwined that traditional state
sovereignty was often subordinated to the common goal of achieving the defeat of the Axis powers.
Not surprisingly, the close wartime working relationship between Britain and the United States has
been the subject of much debate. Scholars have been particularly interested in assessing how the war
forged the “special relationship” and its implications for the Cold War political order.10 One school
of thought, consisting of historians such as H.C. Allen and Winston Churchill, emphasizes the
sentimental and cultural dimensions of the Anglo-American relationship.11 It views the “special
relationship” that emerged during World War II as the natural outgrowth of two countries bound
together by common culture, language, and institutions in what Churchill described as “the fraternal
9 Quoted in David Reynolds,The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981) 1.
10 These schools of thought are suggested by John Baylis’s introduction toAnglo-American Relations since 1939: The Enduring Alliance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). Baylis is primarily concerned with Anglo-American relations since 1945, but his essay suggests a useful way of thinking about World War II historiography. This essay notes the presence of a third school of thought: the Terminal, which emphasizes the effect of the “special relationship” on British foreign policy during the Cold War. Historians in this school argue that by clinging to the “special relationship,” Britain failed to adjust to her diminished status as a medium-sized European power.
11 H.C. Allen, The Anglo-American Predicament (London: Macmillan, 1960); Winston S. Churchill,The Second World War, 6vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-1953).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9
association of the English-speaking peoples.”12 They also stress the value of the Anglo-American
relationship to the general welfare of both countries and the pivotal role it played in fostering
international peace and stability. A competing school of thought aims to deflate the mythology
surrounding the alliance. Historians such as David Reynolds, Christopher Thome, and Randall
Woods regard the “special relationship” as one marked not only by the cooperation and harmony, but
also disagreement and friction. Despite being bound by a common threat, Britain and the United
States jealously guarded and pursued their own national interests, resulting in an alliance based on
“competitive cooperation.” Indeed, Reynolds contends that the “special relationship” should be
viewed as a "tradition invented as a tool of diplomacy."13
An examination of the relief confirms and highlights the competitive nature of the “special
relationship.” Just as Britain and the United States possessed different views on when and where to
launch an invasion of Europe, they also had different views on the relief issue. During the first years
of the war, the relief issue revived long-standing debates on the rights of belligerent to impose
conditions on the conduct of a neutral. When a formidable American relief movement developed
during 1939-41, the Roosevelt administration used Britain’s need for the support of a benevolent
neutral to promote the efforts of American relief groups. Even after the United States became a
belligerent, the Allies rarely agreed on whether or not relief programs should be allowed in occupied
territories, particularly when one sensed that the other’s support for a program stemmed from
national— rather than Allied— political considerations. This study, therefore, further illuminates the
12 Speech by Winston Churchill at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946. R.R. James, ed., Winston Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, vol. VII (London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974) 7289.
13 David Reynolds, “A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain, and the international order since the Second World War,”International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 1, (Winter 1985/86); David Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1981); Christopher Thome,Allies o f a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War A gainst Japan (London: Hamilton, 1979); Randall Bennett Woods,A Changing o f the Guard: Anglo- American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10
ways in which the histories, interests, and immediate positions of Britain and the United States
influenced conceptions of the proper way to wage war and resolve humanitarian crises.
This study also expands our knowledge of Allied humanitarian policy. To date, the
Allied response to the Holocaust has been the primary lens through which Allied humanitarian
policy has been viewed. Scholars have been haunted by the question of why more was not done
to help the Jews escape the grip of the Final Solution. They take issue with closed immigration
quotas for Jews, the decision not to bomb concentration camps and railway lines into the camps,
and the failure to devote adequate resources to rescue and relief measures. The explanations
offered for these policy choices are unsettling, mainly for the apparent lack of compassion
demonstrated by the American and British governments. Scholars, such as David Wyman and
Monty Penkower, identify anti-Semitism as the fundamental reason for the seemingly casual
response of the American government to the Holocaust. Other historians, such as Richard
Breitman and Alan Kraut, acknowledge the role of anti-Semitism in American thinking, but also
emphasize the limitations the war placed on the United States’ ability to react. Surveying British
policy, Bernard Wasserstein and Louise London argue that while anti-Semitism played a role,
Britain’s decision to place winning the war before all other considerations ultimately determined
its meager response to the Holocaust. At the other end of the spectrum, William Rubinstein, in an
attempt to revise what he considers to be historiographical myths, contends that nothing the Allies
could have done would have saved the Jews from the Final Solution.14
14 David S. Wyman,The Abandonment o f the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-45 (New York: Pantheon, 1984); Monty N. Penkower,The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the H olocaust (Chicago: University o f Illinois, 1983); Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut,American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1987); Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews o f Europe, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). Louise London,Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). William Rubinstein,The Myth o f Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis (New Y ork: Routledge, 1997).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11
As the debate over the Allied response has evolved, the question of providing relief to
Jews has gotten lost. In particular, scholars have overlooked the efforts of the U. S. War Refugee
Board. Created by executive order in January 1944, the War Refugee Board was charged with
providing for the rescue and relief of individuals jeopardized by Nazi extermination policies. The
Board’s rescue mandate, however, has meant that scholars have not devoted much attention to its
efforts to provide Jews with relief. This study will consider the work of the Board, along with the
larger issue of how the Allies handled the question of providing relief to Jews in the occupied
territories.
By doing so, this study locates the Allied response the Holocaust in a larger framework.
Like the Holocaust, alleviating the suffering of starving civilians required the Allies to intervene
directly in Nazi-controlled territory and morally challenged them to take responsibility for the
general welfare of the people they sought to liberate. But before Britain and the United States
learned about the Final Solution, they had already adopted a number of policies that highlighted
the possibilities and problems of helping civilians in occupied territory. These policies, namely
the importance of promoting Britain’s economic warfare campaign, played a major role in
influencing how the Allies thought about providing aid to European Jews.
This study also expands our understanding of the connection between Allied
humanitarian policy and wartime intelligence activities. In the eyes of many scholars, World War
II served as the catalyst for the creation of the modem intelligence community and as a testing
ground for operational methods later employed during the Cold War. Conducting intelligence
operations in Nazi-occupied territories provided the Allies with a means to strike at regions which
conventional forces were unable to reach and to foster local support for the Allied cause.
Throughout the war, Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) and America’s Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) regularly penetrated Nazi-occupied territories in order to gather
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12
intelligence and conduct sabotage operations. In the process, SOE and OSS forged close ties with
underground resistance groups that provided assistance to Allied operations.
With the release of previously classified intelligence documents, we are gaining a better
understanding of the contribution of intelligence activities to the Allied war effort, but almost no
attention has been paid to how intelligence aided the formulation and implementation of Allied
relief policy.15 Decisions about providing relief were informed by intelligence on Nazi
Germany’s economic position and political and social conditions in the occupied territories. The
Allies also used relief programs to inspire and cajole resistance groups to rebel against German
occupation authorities. Furthermore, relief programs also drew on the logistical and
communications networks of Allied intelligence agencies.16 Consequently, an examination of
Allied relief policy expands our knowledge of the operational methods employed by intelligence
agencies and enhances our understanding of the milieu from which the modem intelligence
community emerged.
15 A comprehensive overview of British intelligence is provided by the official history series, F.H. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 4 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979- 1984). Operations in occupied territories are treated in David Stafford,Britain and European Resistance: A Survey o f the Special Operations Executive (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), .M.R.D. Foot, S.O.E. in France: An Account o f the Work o f the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940- 1944 (London: HMSO, 1966), and Foot’s more general survey,SOE: An Outline History o f the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984). SOE activities in the northern tier o f Europe are treated in Charles Cruikshank,SOE in Scandinavia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), while the limitations of SOE’s reach are discussed in Josef Garlinski,Poland, SOE, and the Allies (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969). The scholarly literature on the OSS is very uneven in both quality and coverage. The official history of the OSS, Kermit Roosevelt, ed.,The War Report o f the OSS, 2 vol. (Washington: GPO, 1976-1979), is marred by large redactions of the text. The best general survey remains Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins o f the CIA(New York: Basic Books, 1983), which, however, was written before the declassification of the better part of the OSS records.
16 1 have demonstrated elsewhere that the War Refugee Board's Norwegian relief program succeeded because it drew on the communications and logistical networks run by OSS/Stockholm. Before the Board began relief efforts, the OSS routinely smuggled relief supplies into Norway to aid the resistance groups with which it worked. Meredith Hindley, “The Strategy of Rescue and Relief: The Use of OSS Intelligence by the War Refugee Board in Sweden, 1944-45,”Intelligence and National Security, vol. 12, no. 3 (July 1997) 145-165.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13
III
The scope of events and the records of World War II make providing a comprehensive account of
the relief issue impossible. Consequently, this study will examine the major conflicts,
developments, and issues that shaped Allied relief policy over the course of the war. It also
confines itself to considering efforts to aid civilians living under Nazi rule, while excluding
consideration of prisoners of war (POWs). Under international law, POWs and those who sought
to aid them were accorded rights of visitation and assistance not accorded to the general civilian
population. It was also not possible to represent the efforts of all the relief groups that sought to
provide aid to European civilians, which numbered more than four hundred at one point during
the war. Instead, the study focuses on the handful that tested the boundaries of Allied policy by
asking to conduct relief operations in occupied territory or running large-scale campaigns to
convince the Allies to alter their policy.
This study begins with a survey of the relationship among the blockade, relief, and
economic warfare before 1939. The question of providing relief to civilians was not specific to
World War II. The relief issue had a long contentious history before the war— one that
influenced how policymakers and humanitarians believed the war should be fought. From there,
it follows the dynamics of the war, as the pace and brutality of Nazi Germany’s conquests
generated concern for the plight of European civilians.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER TWO
A CONTROVERSIAL STRATEGY
But we will see how long they keep nations at war. There can be, however, no doubt of one thing. We will take up the gauntlet and we will fight as the enemy fights. England, with lies and hypocrisy, already has begun to fight against women and children. They found a weapon which they think is invincible: namely, sea power. And because they cannot be attacked with this weapon they think they are justified in making war with it against women and children— not only of enemies but also of neutrals if necessary.1
With these words, Hitler told a rapt audience in Danzig on 19 September 1939 of his intent to
fight the naval blockade that Britain had enacted against Germany. Hitler’s charge that Britain
had decided to make war on women and children sprang from the experiences of the First World
War, when Britain’s blockade of the Central Powers led to massive food shortage. According to
German cultural myths, the deprivation led the German people to revolt against their leaders and
demand an end to the war.
The basic idea of the blockade was to keep Germany from importing any goods that
might fuel its war effort. All ships entering the waters around the British Isles and the
Mediterranean were asked to call at contraband control stations to have their cargoes inspected
and their final destination verified. Any ship attempting to transport goods to Germany ran the
risk of being impounded by Britain and having its cargo destroyed. By cutting off Germany’s
ability to import goods from outside Europe, Britain hoped to hasten its defeat. If Germany did
not have wool, it could not clothe the troops; if it did not have iron ore, it could not build
1 Text of Hitler speech, New York Times (NYT), 20 September 1939.
14
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15
munitions; if it did not have food, it could not feed its soldiers or the German people. The
blockade, however, was a controversial weapon. While it could be an effective way of disrupting
an enemy’s capacity to fight, it also had the nasty side effect of creating deprivation among
civilians. Faced with wartime shortages, governments often gave priority to feeding and clothing
their troops, forcing civilians to endure severe rationing and food shortages. Herein lay the
blockade’s critical vulnerability: it did not use large-scale violence to achieve its objectives, but
bred economic rot which in turn yielded a starving and disease-prone populace. The blockade’s
ability to leave civilian cupboards empty— whether they belonged to friend or foe— made it a
dubious weapon in the eyes of many.
Despite the known humanitarian risks, Britain enacted its blockade against Germany
without reservation. For Britain, economic warfare was an ideal strategy, since it played to its
strengths, harnessing its naval superiority and financial acumen, while inflicting minimal
casualties. It is impossible to comprehend the debates and conflicts over relief during the Second
World War without first understanding the origins of Britain’s zeal for the blockade and its belief
in the power of economic warfare. What made the blockade so important that British officials
willingly and knowingly dismissed its possible repercussions for civilians? The answer lies in
lessons and experiences of the decades that preceded the Second World War.
Defining the Blockade
As the world’s predominant naval power, Britain was also no stranger to the use of naval
blockades. After Elizabeth I turned a motley collection of ships into a formidable navy, Britain
used its naval power to defend the home island and secure the growth of its vast trading and
colonial empire. One of the most potent weapons in its arsenal was the naval blockade. In a
traditional naval blockade, a state deployed its fleet to block the entry and exit of ships into an
enemy port. All ships, regardless of whether they flew an enemy or neutral flag, were inspected
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16
for the presence of contraband, supplies that the enemy could use to enhance its military position.
The blockading navy seized the contraband goods, claiming them as a “prize,” while allowing
non-military supplies to pass. During the Revolutionary War, Britain blockaded the Atlantic coast
to reduce the ability of the American colonists to finance their rebellion through trade. French
ports were blockaded during the Napoleonic Wars to prevent the bellicose general-cum-emperor
from importing war materiel. During the Crimean War, Britain and France used their navies to
disrupt Russia’s ability to reinforce its troops and conduct trade.
Despite its widespread use and utility, the blockade was a controversial weapon. For
centuries, custom, rather than treaty, enforced the rules governing blockades, leading to violent
quarrels over their conduct. Warring states often found it difficult to agree on which goods
should be classified as contraband or whether a neutral power could conduct trade with both sides
in a conflict.2 Dutch jurist and scholar Hugo Grotius tackled the contraband problem in hisOn
the Law of War and Peace (1625), the foundational text of international law. He urged naval
powers to adopt a widely recognized system to classify goods according to their military
usefulness.3 Grotius’s suggestion, however, went unheeded.
Nothing was done to standardize the conduct of blockades until the 1856 Declaration of
Paris. During the Crimean War (1853-56), numerous controversies erupted over the treatment of
contraband and the rights of neutrals to conduct trade. At the peace conference, the Great Powers
acknowledged that a treaty governing the administration of blockades was sorely needed. The
resulting declaration stated that all goods, except contraband, could be carried on any ship and
2 John B. Hattendorf, “Martime Conflict,”The Laws o f War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, eds. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 98-105.
3 Henry Wenger Halleck,Halleck’s International Law (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1878) 217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17
neutrals were free to trade with both sides in a conflict.4 Nearly fifty years passed, however,
before the next major naval conflict, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), invoked the terms of the
declaration. While the war marked the first time an Asian power defeated a European power in
modem history, it also demonstrated the extent to which the declaration favored neutrals. Neither
side could prevent the other from benefiting from neutral trade.5
After the war, the Great Powers squabbled over how to revise the declaration to
strengthen the rights of belligerents. The first attempt to modify the declaration came during the
1907 Hague Conference, but was foiled by Britain’s insistence on championing neutral rights.6
Casting itself as a benevolent neutral— albeit a capitalist one— in future conflicts, Britain wanted
to preserve its right to trade freely with both sides.
Britain’s advocacy of neutral rights did not last long. In 1908, after years of growing
antagonism between Britain and Germany, British strategists reached the sobering conclusion that
Germany’s ambitious naval building program had produced a fleet capable of challenging Britain
in its home waters. The summer months also saw the culmination of a series of studies by the
Admiralty on Germany’s vulnerability to a blockade. The studies highlighted Germany’s
dependence on overseas trade and its reliance on neutral ports. The Admiralty concluded that a
blockade cutting off food and industrial goods could damage civilian morale and hamper the
German economy.7
4 Marion C. Siney,The Allied Blockade o f Germany, 1914-16 (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1957)3-4.
5 A.C. Bell, A History o f the Blockade o f Germany, 1914-1918 (London, HMSO, 1961) 9.
6 John W. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899-1915 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 86, 89, 138.
7 Anver Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 217-232. An account of how the two traditionally friendly powers became enemies can be found in Paul Kennedy, The Rise o f Anglo-German Naval Antagonism, 1890-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1980).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Keenly aware of its new vulnerability and the benefits of strengthening belligerent rights,
Britain convened the London Conference in December 1908, calling together Europe’s naval
powers, the United States, and Japan. Over the next three months, the delegates hashed out the
rules governing contraband, creating three categories. Absolute contraband referred to goods
with distinct military uses, such as armaments and munitions.Conditional contraband referred to
goods with both military and civilian uses, such as food, clothing, and fuel. Non-contraband
referred to goods given free passage, such as medical supplies. A belligerent could legally seize
absolute contraband if it was destined for enemy or enemy-conquered territory. Conditional
contraband could be seized if it was destined for enemy territory, but it couldnot be seized if it
was off-loaded at a neutral port. For example, Britain could not capture food consigned to
Germany if it was shipped to a port in neutral Holland. They also agreed to establish an
International Prize Court to arbitrate any conflicts over the disposal of ships or cargo.8
All of the conference participants regarded the resulting Declaration of London as a
compromise— each country had to relinquish certain features of its prize rules. Britain, however,
was the only country that needed to make substantial changes to its prize law before it could sign
the declaration. This twist gave the declaration’s critics an opportunity to mount a powerful
opposition campaign.
The British debate turned on the question of food imports. During peacetime, Britain
imported ninety percent of its food. Critics feared that under the terms of the declaration any
commercial port in England could be declared a military supply base, making any goods,
including food, destined for those ports fair game for seizure. Since continental European
countries could use overland routes to import food, it was a problem specific to Britain and
something the declaration could not equalize. After extensive debates in Parliament during 1911-
8 Offer, 271-272
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19
2, the naval prize bill failed, thereby preventing Britain from signing the Declaration of London.9
Although the declaration was never fully ratified, the Great Powers nevertheless treated its
substance as law. Britain even incorporated its provisions into the Royal Navy’s 1913 prize
book, which instructed the fleet in belligerent rights. When war broke out in August 1914, the
Central Powers and Entente agreed to abide by the terms of the declaration.
From Naval Blockade into Economic Blockade
Despite the prewar studies indicating Germany’s vulnerabilities and the fight over the
Declaration of London, Britain never fully incorporated the blockade into its strategic plans prior
to the First World War. In fact, in the rush to put forces on the continent to counter Germany’s
advance into France and Belgium, Britain initially overlooked using the blockade. That changed
in mid-August 1914, a few weeks into the war.10 On 9 August 1914,The Times abandoned its
regular restraint and printed a sensational story alleging rampant starvation among German forces
in Belgium. The story claimed that because Germany failed to make proper arrangements for
feeding its troops, “many Germans, including officers” had “surrendered for bread.”11 Despite
the questionable accuracy of the story and others like it that followed, the idea that Germany
suffered food shortages began influence the thinking of British officials. Foreign Secretary
Edward Grey and others suddenly viewed wheat shipments from the United States to the neutral
port of Rotterdam with suspicion. Meanwhile, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill, who closely
followed the British army’s dismal progress, became convinced that Germany’s continued
success depended on importing supplies through Dutch ports. He believed Germany must be
9 Coogan, 125-137. Bell, 20-22.
10 Coogan, 154.
11 “Starvation in Belgium,”The Times o f London (Times), 9 August 1914.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20
prevented from using Rotterdam as a supply base, even if that meant seizing conditional
contraband bound for neutral ports.12
Grey and Churchill joined forces to argue that Britain should blockade Germany, even if
it meant violating the Declaration of London. They proposed that Germany’s North Sea coast be
placed under formal blockade and all food consigned to Rotterdam be seized as conditional
contraband, unless it could be proven that the shipment was not destined for Germany or the
armies of the Central Powers. Their proposal met with strong resistance from the Cabinet,
especially from the Admiralty, which believed that a blockade was impossible to enforce and
represented a violation of international law. Undeterred, Grey and Churchill offered a second
proposal, which called for the doctrine of continuous voyage to be applied to all conditional
contraband. This time, Churchill exercised his prerogative as First Sea Lord. He made sure that
the Cabinet never heard Admiralty’s objections.13
Grey and Churchill’s new gambit received a boost from unconfirmed reports that
Germany had nationalized its food supply. These reports allowed them to argue that all food
destined for Germany could be considered as destined for the enemy and therefore eligible for
seizure. This fanciful interpretation, based on hearsay not fact, cleared the way for the Cabinet to
issue an order-in-council on 20 August 1914 declaring food as contraband. By the end of August,
the Royal Navy detained more than fifty ships carrying grain to either Germany or the
Netherlands.14 At the end of October 1914, Britain issued another order-in-council further
restricting neutral rights, placing the burden of proving a cargo’s final destination on the neutrals.
It also gave the Grey, as foreign secretary, the power to declare a neutral country to be an enemy-
12 Coogan, 158.
13 Coogan, 156-157. The Cabinet’s very first Order-in-Council (the term given to wartime policy proclamations), rehashed the declaration’s terms.
14 Coogan, 160-163.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21
supply source, thereby allowing all contraband— both absolute and conditional— to be
intercepted.
In three short months, Britain had trashed the Declaration of London, turning a naval
blockade into an all-out assault on Germany’s economy. Under Grey’s guidance, the Foreign
Office worked with other ministries to develop a coherent plan to deny Germany raw materials
for industry and food for its workers. Eventually, the Cabinet created a new department, the
Ministry of Blockade, to coordinate all the work.
Over the course of the war and the succeeding decades, “blockade” came to mean not
only a naval blockade, but also an economic blockade. It is technically incorrect, however, to call
Britain’s economic campaign against Germany a blockade. Britain never formally proclaimed a
blockade as required by law and custom, nor did it use the traditional tactic of deploying its navy
to block the German coastline and ports. Instead, Britain conducted what amounted to a “paper
blockade.” Every ship attempting to enter the waters around Europe needed to have a navigation
certification— or navicert— for its cargo. Issued by British embassies and consulates around the
world, a navicert attested to the nature of a ship’s cargo and its final destination. Ships and
cargoes sailing without a navicert were intercepted and impounded by the Royal Navy.
Keeping supplies from reaching Germany, however, was not an easy task. Overseas
imports could reach German ports by two routes: via the English Channel and the Dover Straits
or around the north of Scotland. In order to intercept ships using the Channel, Britain laid a
minefield in the Dover Straits. Patrolling the sea north of Scotland proved more difficult, since it
encompassed an area of more than 200,000 square miles. Faced with more blue water than ships,
Britain used a squadron of armed merchant cruisers to supplement the Royal Navy. During 1915,
Britain stopped and inspected more than 3,000 vessels, sent 743 into port for examination, and
brought outbound trade from Germany to a complete halt. Despite these early successes, two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22
things threatened the effectiveness of Britain’s economic warfare campaign: the reaction of its
main enemy, Germany, and the reaction of the most powerful neutral, the United States.
Germany responded to Britain’s economic warfare campaign by using its submarines to
target British merchant shipping. It hoped to accomplish with torpedoes what Britain
accomplished with navicerts.15 The first attack against British commerce came on October 1914
with the sinking of the Glitra. The success of this attack and subsequent ones bolstered
Germany’s belief that it could cripple Britain’s war effort by using its submarine fleet. In
February 1915, Germany declared a blockade against Britain, ordering its navy to treat the waters
around the British home island as a war zone and destroy all Allied merchant ships. The
submarine campaign, however, failed to damage British trade: of the 6,000 Allied sailings during
March, German submarines only sunk 21 ships. The hostile reaction of the neutrals to Germany’s
tactics also created problems. The torpedoing of the Norwegian steamship Belridge in the
English Channel in February 1915, followed by additional sinkings, angered the neutrals and
made them fearful for the safety of their merchant marines. Germany also found itself on the
brink of war with the United States after the sinking of the British liner Lusitania, bound from
New York to Liverpool in May 1915. Among the 1198 dead were 128 Americans, producing a
wave of outrage from the American public. The United States, however, decided to remain
neutral, issuing diplomatic protests rather than a declaration of war.
Ironically, Germany’s attempts to cut Britain’s supply line and break Britain’s blockade
pulled the United States into the war. In February 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine
warfare against Britain. If Germany attacked all shipping destined for Britain, German military
officials believed that Britain would capitulate within six months. At the high point of the
campaign in April 1917, Germany sunk 875,000 tons of shipping. The crippling damage forced
15 Bell, 191.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23
Britain to adopt the convoy system, which concentrated merchant shipping into large groups for
escort across the Atlantic by the British navy.16 Unrestricted submarine warfare, along with
German attempts to entice Mexico to attack its northern neighbor, brought the United States into
the war on the side of the Entente in April 1917.17 With American help, the Entente began to
produce ships faster than the Germans could sink them. By 1918, Germany’s naval advantage
had evaporated, its navy crippled by irredeemable losses to its submarine fleet.
As Britain fended off Germany’s attempts to bust the blockade, it also carefully watched
how the United States reacted to its tactics. While the neutrals grumbled about Britain’s
treatment of their shipping, only the United States possessed the political and economic power to
challenge its outlaw strategy. In February and March 1915, President Woodrow Wilson proposed
that Britain allow Germany to import food through neutral ports in exchange for Germany
abandoning its submarine warfare campaign against British merchant ships. The Cabinet rejected
Wilson’s proposal, believing it was in Britain’s interest to maintain the blockade.18 Another
review occurred after the formation of a new coalition Cabinet in May 1915, following the
dissolution of the Liberal Government. The growing diplomatic difficulties caused by the
blockade— mainly neutrals angry at having their trade restricted— brought the issue to the table
again. In the intervening months, Wilson’s personal envoy, Colonel Edward House, also tried to
build support for Wilson’s proposal. The new Cabinet, however, chose to reaffirm Britain’s
commitment to the blockade. The decision reflected not only public support for the blockade, but
16 Paul G. Halpren,A Naval History o f World War (London: I Routledge, 1994) 335-370. The classic work on the Royal Navy during the First World War is Arthur J. Marder’sFrom the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 5 vol. (1961-70).
17 For more on Germany’s courting of Mexicoto attack the United States see Barbara Tuchman,The Zimmerman Telegram (New York: Viking, 1958).
18 George H. Nash, The Life o f Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914-17 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988)296-297, 344.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24
also a feeling among British officials that, despite racking up a series of victories, Germany was
beginning to feel the economic strain of war.
Britain’s decision to flout international law presented Wilson with a serious dilemma:
should the United States lodge a formal protest or attempt to convince Britain to abide by the
declaration? Britain made it very clear that it would not revise its stance on conditional
contraband. Sympathetic to Britain’s aims, Wilson balked at formally protesting the blockade.
Instead, he decided that the United States should accept it in principle and protest flagrant
violations of American neutrality. For the first three years of the war, the United States
complained to Britain about the blacklisting of American shipping firms, cable censorship, and
the “hovering” of Royal Navy ships off the American coast. Most of the complaints were lodged
because Britain’s practices were inconvenient rather than an infringement on American
sovereignty. The success of Wilson’s strategy depended on American public opinion remaining
sympathetic to the Entente. Fortunately, the American public’s compassion for the Entente and
disdain for Germany’s submarine campaign overrode objections to Britain’s sometimes high
handed treatment of American shipping.
Historians have offered varied explanations for Wilson’s reluctance to protest Britain’s
disregard for international law and American neutral rights. The customary view argues that the
British blockade fell within the boundaries of international law; therefore challenging it would
have been a futile exercise. A second view suggests that Britain treated American complaints in a
conciliatory manner; therefore American interests did not suffer. A third view is that Wilson
wanted to play a role in peace negotiations and needed Britain’s support to do so, prompting him
not to confront Britain about the ethics of its blockade.19 As John Coogan has noted, explanations
of W ilson’s behavior are commonly marred by the mistaken assumption that Britain acted within
the confines of international law. The question of why Wilson proved so accommodating
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25
remains compelling, since American acquiescence allowed Britain to establish an effective
economic warfare campaign. While Wilson’s political motives cannot be discounted, Britain’s
determination to pursue the blockade also needs to be taken into account. Britain was willing to
risk a certain amount of disharmony with the United States in order to keep the blockade intact.
Wilson shrewdly recognized British obstinacy and used it for his peace agenda.
Britain’s blockade targeted all sectors of the German economy, but the blockade’s
postwar notoriety came from its success in depriving the German population of food and
consumer goods. By the end of 1916, German civilians, expected to make sacrifices for the good
of the war effort, bore the brunt of the blockade: leather and wool for shoes and clothing became
scarce, while shortages of milk and meat became acute. By late 1917, daily rations of the urban
population were 1,000 calories.20 Hoping to rectify the shortages, the German government
assumed responsibility for food production and distribution in 1916— two years after Grey and
Churchill claimed. Even after the food supply was nationalized shortages continued.
The strong cultural myths that grew up around the blockade in Germany have made it
difficult for historians to assess whether German civilians really did starve. Studies suggest that
generally the food supply was abundant enough to meet basic nutritional requirements. This is
not to say that periods of deprivation did not exist, but that they were episodic. Instead, the
trauma for the average German came in the radically altered nature of their diets— gone was the
fat and protein rich diet that marked prewar eating patterns— and in the disruption of the market
for food. Rationing and the black market replaced traditional shopping patterns. These
19 Arthur Link, Wilson, vol. Ill (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) 127; Coogan, 217.
20 Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany, Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997)286-289, 295-296.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26
alterations to the rhythms of daily life served as a source of psychological stress and hurt civilian
m orale.21
The cultural myths surrounding the blockade became an important part of the interwar
political debate. Disgraced on the battlefield, German military leaders propagated the “stab-in-
the-back” theory to explain their defeat. According to this theory, Germany could have continued
to fight the war if the civilian population, tired and hungry from the deprivation caused by the
blockade, had not betrayed the army by demanding a peace settlement. General Hermann von
Kuhl described the British blockade as having “disheartened the nation.”22 Certainly, German
civilians were tired and hungry, but they were not responsible for the successive German defeats
at the Marne, Argonne, and Ypres in the fall of 1918. Nevertheless, the “stab-in-the-back”
theory resonated with many Germans, who felt aggrieved not only by the defeat, but also by the
harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty. One strong adherent of the theory was a young corporal
from Austria named Adolf Hitler.23 German writers and politicians also charged that Britain
intentionally targeted civilians, thereby ushering in a new era in inhumane warfare.
Britain did not inaugurate a new era so much as a new weapon. By controlling the flow
of supplies to and from Germany, Britain wreaked havoc with the German economy. By
expanding the doctrines of contraband and continuous voyage, Britain accomplished by other
means the traditional results of a naval blockade and, in the process, transformed and adapted a
long-used weapon to modem warfare. It was a lesson not easily forgotten, particularly by
Churchill, and one that fundamentally shaped Britain’s approach to the next war.
21 Bell, 672. Offer, 45-53. For a detailed account of the effects of the food shortages see Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires Buring: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 2000).
22 Bell, 674.
23 For the shaping o f Hitler’s world view see Ian Kershaw,Hitler 1899-1936: Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27
Hoover and Relief for Belgium
In the opening months of the war, the Central Powers seized control of Belgium, the
provinces of northern France, and the territories comprising the former Kingdom of Poland. The
static nature of the fighting meant that Germany occupied these regions until late 1917 and early
1918. In both the east and the west, occupation led to economic ruin as Germany extracted
supplies to support its armies.
The plight of the German-occupied territories, however, did not go unnoticed and various
international efforts to aid civilians arose. Herbert Hoover, a successful mining engineer who
later became the thirty-first president of the United States, was at the center of a remarkable effort
to provide relief to Belgium, France, and Poland. Hoover’s efforts garnered him international
accolades, but it also put him in direct conflict with Britain and Germany, which frequently found
his relief efforts to be counterproductive to their strategic objectives. The First World War
demonstrated that a large-scale relief program could be run in the middle of a war.
Because of the central role that Hoover played in relief efforts, the topic has been
primarily the provenance of his biographers. George Nash provides a thorough account of
Hoover’s work, although frequently at the expense of the “big picture.” Hoover’s own account of
his activities can be found in his memoirs, but as he wrote them forty years after the war, he tends
to emphasize great triumphs and play down problems. Nash and other Hoover biographers agree,
however, that Hoover’s relief work set him on the path to becoming president.24
24 George Nash’s The Life o f Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914-1917 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988) provides the most in-depth account of relief during the First World War. Hoover’s version of his activities can be found inA n Am erican Epic, 4 vols. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959, 1960, 1961) his multi-volume autobiography. In addition, see Suda Bane and Ralph Lutz,Organization o f American Relief in Europe, 1918-1919 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943); George I. Gay,Public Relations o f the Commission for Relief in Belgium (2 vols., Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1929); David Hinshaw,Herbert Hoover (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Co., 1950); and David Burner,Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York: Antheneum, 1984).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28
At the end of September 1914, the Belgian government asked Hoover to organize a relief
program for the nine million Belgians and French living under German rule. After putting up a
valiant defense, Belgium found itself a nation wracked by hunger as Germany refused to supply
food to feed the Belgian population. For the most densely populated country at the time— and
one that imported the majority of its food— the war brought disaster as it ended regular imports
and destroyed much of the agricultural production. In Brussels, American and Belgian
politicians and businessmen formed the American Relief Committee to organize some form of
aid. Seeking more help, Brand Whitlock, the American ambassador to Belgium, asked his
counterpart in London, Walter Hines Page, for suggestions. Page suggested that they recruit
Hoover. Page knew of Hoover’s extensive ties to the international business community and had
first-hand knowledge of his organizational abilities. At Page’s request, Hoover had coordinated
the return home of the more than 200,000 Americans from Britain following the outbreak of the
war. Page believed that Hoover possessed the common sense and managerial skills necessary to
direct a large-scale relief program.25 After three days of discussions with Page and Belgian
officials, Hoover agreed to take the job. Nash argues that this decision resulted in more than nine
million people being rescued from hunger over the course of the war.26
Hoover directed his aid efforts through the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which
began operations in late October 1914.27 From his office in London, Hoover made arrangements
to purchase food and ship it to Rotterdam, where it was then sent by rail or canal barge to
25 Burner, p. 73.
26 Nash, 33, 362. Accepting the job also meant that Hoover had to relinquish a chance to enhance his personal fortune. Because of his mining investments, Hoover controlled a large share of the world’s supply of base metals, particularly zinc and lead, key components in armament production.
27 Frank M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland,American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period: Operations o f the Organizations under the Direction ofFIerbert Hoover, 1914 (Palo to 1924 Alto: Stanford University Press, 1931) p. 12-13. The commission continued to August 31, 1919, eight and one-half months after the armistice, the point at which Belgium and France judged to be in a position to secure their own supplies. Figures for cargoes and tonnage are only available for the full five year period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29
Belgium and northern France. The distribution of food in the occupied territories was then
overseen by two organizations under the direction of the commission— Comite National de
Secours et d’Alimentation in Belgium and Comite d’Alimentation du Nord de la France— which
coordinated the work of more than 4,700 local committees.28 The commission sent its first
shipment of food— flour, beans, and peas— to Belgium at the beginning of November 1914. Over
the next five years, it was followed by 2,313 shipments bearing more than five million tons of
food. By 1917, three-fourths of Belgium’s children received hot lunches at commission
canteens. 29
The commission was financed through a combination of loans, subsidies, and charitable
contributions. Hoover ran the commission as cheaply as possible and tried to keep overhead to a
minimum— there were no lavish salaries, plush offices, or hefty yearly bonuses. The people who
worked for the commission did so out of charity, rather than profit. Hoover charged the Belgian
government for the commission’s expenses and the cost of food, shipping, and insurance. When it
began in 1914, the relief program cost $5 million per month, but by 1918, that amount climbed to
$30 million because of increased commodities prices and greater need. Initially, Belgium used a
series of loans from France and Britain to finance the relief program. Later in the war, Hoover
convinced the Entente to relieve some of the financial strain on Belgium by subsidizing food
purchases. When the United States entered the war in 1917, it also loaned Belgium money. In
addition to the government subsidies and logins, the commission collected more than $52 million
in charitable contributions worldwide.30
The commission generated its fair share of controversy. A relief program on the scale
conducted in Belgium and France had never been done before. Furthermore, the burden of
28 Surface and Bland, 5.
29Nash, 362-364.
30 Surface and Bland, 14-15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30
feeding civilians traditionally fell to the occupying power, a requirement enshrined in the 1907
Hague Rules of Land Warfare.31 The scope and work of the commission, therefore, represented a
new chapter in modem warfare. Its revolutionary nature challenged how nations waged war. The
commission operated as a neutral organization beholden to no government, whose only objective
was to provide relief to civilians. “We are turning barren neutrality,” Hoover remarked of the
commission, “into something positive, a thing which has never been done before.”32 The
commission’s neutral status gave it freedom of action, but those actions frequently clashed with
the irreconcilable strategic objectives of Britain and Germany.
Hoover the man also became a source of controversy. Although the commission needed
someone like Hoover, a man of vision and tenacity to succeed, he frequently did his cause
disservice through his actions. “Tact is not one of his many qualities,” observed David Lloyd
George.33 Hoover’s disregard for social niceties was frequently accompanied by a propensity to
do what he wanted and ask permission later. The most spectacular example of this was Hoover’s
decision to ask neither Britain, which ran the blockade, nor Germany, which controlled Belgium
and northern France, for permission to begin relief operations. He simply devised a plan and
starting shipping food. While his British and German counterparts could appreciate his vision,
they disliked being bullied into embracing it.
Throughout the war, Hoover tangled with Germany over administration of the
commission’s relief program. Governor General Baron von Bissing, responsible for directing
German occupation of Belgium, treated the commission with little respect— he frequently ignored
agreements worked out between Hoover and the German High Command in Berlin. Hoover
31 The text of the 1907 Hague Rules of Land Warfare can be found in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws o f War(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
32 Burner, 74.
33 Quote cited in Burner, 83.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31
continually quarreled with von Bissing over the occupation government’s practice of extracting
foodstuffs from Belgium for use by the German army, especially during 1915. The requisitioning
of supplies left little for Belgian civilians and made Hoover’s job that much harder. They also
clashed over the staffing of the commission. Hoover believed the commission should be allowed
to determine how many staff members it needed and be allowed to travel at will in order to
supervise operations. Von Bissing, however, feared that the Allied intelligence services could use
the neutral commission as a cover for gathering information. Despite these conflicts, David
Burner suggests that Germany never posed a serious threat to the commission’s operations. The
German High Command, which reined in von Bissing when appropriate, realized that the
commission’s work alleviated German responsibility for feeding Belgium and generated goodwill
abroad.34
Not surprisingly, Hoover came into conflict with Britain over the blockade. The
commission made arrangements for Belgium to be supplied with a steady stream of food
shipments from the United States before Britain perfected its blockade machinery. While Britain
considered forcing Hoover to shut down the commission, it decided against it in the end. The
political repercussions were too severe— Belgium might decide to join the Central Powers and the
American public might turn against Britain. Despite allowing the commission to continue, some
British officials harbored a great deal of concern about its effect on Britain’s economic warfare
campaign. Both Churchill and Lord Kitchener, the hero of the Boer War, characterized the
commission’s efforts as a “positive military disaster.”35 Meanwhile, Grey tolerated the
commission only because it offered a vehicle for courting American public opinion. Fortunately
for Hoover, other influential British politicians, notably Henry Asquith and David Lloyd George,
proved to be sympathetic champions.
34 Burner, 82.
35 Quoted in Burner, 82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32
Britain required Hoover to guarantee that Germany would not— and did not— use the
food imported by the commission to feed the German army.36 Hoover understood that should
any evidence of mismanagement come to light, Britain would have sufficient grounds for refusing
to allow the commission’s shipments to pass the blockade. Throughout the war, he played down
supply leaks, black market trafficking of imported food, and incidents of German plunder.
Hoover became so good at obfuscation that Nash admits that it is difficult to determine the extent
to which commission supplies were misused.37
In 1916, Britain learned that some of the commission’s more enterprising representatives
had sold thousands of tons of imported rice to Germany. Meanwhile, a thriving black market in
commission-issued rations also developed. In agricultural areas, where food shortages were not
as severe, Belgians sold their rations to traders, who resold them on the black market in harder-hit
urban areas. To make matters worse, the German army continued to extract Belgian agricultural
products, thereby threatening Hoover’s agreement with Britain. While Britain acknowledged that
Hoover could only marginally influence German policy, it regarded the duplicity of the
commission’s staff as unconscionable. Unless Hoover restored confidence in the commission,
Britain would stop all imports.38
Using new accounting and inspection methods, Hoover and the commission cracked
down on the illicit traffic. Help also came from an unexpected quarter: in April 1916, von
Bissing banned the army from requisitioning indigenous Belgian foodstuffs. As Hoover
tightened up the commission’s operations, he found himself in a power struggle with the local
Belgian committee, which wanted to cut him out and deal directly with Germany and Britain.
Believing the commission’s recent scandals and the brewing coup d ’etat reflected a failure in
36 Nash, 132.
37 Nash, 168.
38 Nash 160-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33
leadership, Hoover offered to resign. Grey convinced him to stay on, arguing that without
Hoover and the neutral commission acting as overseers, the Belgian committee would lose its
neutral status, imperiling the relief program. Hoover agreed to continue provided that Britain
understood further leaks might occur.39
The success of the commission’s work in Belgium generated calls for a similar program
to be implemented in Poland. The dire circumstances of the Poles came to the attention of the
international community when representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation toured the Eastern
Front in January 1915. German occupation authorities and senior officials in Berlin attributed the
poor conditions in Poland, which were worse than Belgium, to the British blockade. Those same
officials also indicated that they would welcome a Polish relief program. Plans were drawn up
for an “International Commission for Relief in Poland,” but difficulties quickly developed. First,
money proved to be a problem. The Rockefeller Foundation only offered to advance a small
portion of the amount necessary to finance the relief program, and the Central Powers balked at
providing the rest, believing it should be funded entirely through international charity.40 Second,
Britain abhorred the idea. British officials feared that another relief program would further
diminish the blockade’s effectiveness, especially one that depended on continuous large-scale
shipments of goods to Eastern Europe.
Hoover was initially cautious about the prospects for a successful relief program in
Poland, but its declining fortunes prompted him to take up the cause. During the summer of
1915, a Central Powers offensive broke through Russian defenses. As the Russian army
retreated, it used a “scorched earth” policy; Germany then compounded the destruction by
39 Nash, p. 174.
40 M.B. Biskupski, “The Diplomacy of Wartime Relief: The United States and Poland, 1914-1918,” Diplomatic History, Vol 19, No. 3 (Summer 1995) 434-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34
attempting to exploit what remained of the Polish economy.41 To convince Britain to grant the
necessary blockade concessions, Hoover privately courted Foreign Office and Cabinet officials,
while drumming up public sympathy for Poland through a savvy media campaign. Tired of
having a public relations debacle on its hands, in February 1916 the Foreign Office offered to
support a Polish relief program if Germany agreed not to extract foodstuffs from Poland. The
idea quickly encountered stiff resistance from the Cabinet and became the subject of sharp press
attacks. If anything, British public opinion favored strengthening the blockade and blamed
Germany for Poland’s beleaguered state.42 A popular pamphlet written by Arnold Toynbee even
portrayed Germany as a “vampire” which was “draining the life-blood of its Polish victim into its
own exhausted veins.”43
The adverse reaction to the Foreign Office’s proposal led Britain to defer its decision. To
save political face, Britain claimed that it needed to consult with Russia, but the strategy
backfired when Russia publicly agreed to cooperate with Hoover in April 1916.44 Unable to
postpone further, Britain agreed to a Polish relief program provided that it included Austrian-
occupied territory and the Central Powers agreed to implement a similar program in the Balkans.
Britain was essentially approving a program that it believed Germany would never accept.45
The stalemate over Poland prompted Wilson and the State Department to intervene in
July 1916. The lack of official American involvement in the commission’s work helped it
41 Piotr S. Wandycz,The Lands o f Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 (Seattle, 1974) 34-41.
42 Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, 1917-1918 (New York, 1956) xxii.
43 Arnold Toynbee, The Destruction o f Poland: A Study in German Efficiency (London, 1916). During the war, Toynbee, who would later gain international fame for his 12 volumeA Study o f History (1934-61), worked for the intelligence section of the British Foreign Office.
44 Letter, Page to Lansing, 12 May 1916.Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1916 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1916), 892-94. “Rockefeller Foundation Plan Approved by Russians,”New York World, 17 April 1917.
45 FRUS: 1916, 895-7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35
maintain its neutrality, but Wilson meddled when its affairs provided a convenient foil for his
peace agenda. In the case of Poland, Wilson wanted to help aid the creation of an independent
Polish state as part of his commitment to national self-determination. He implored both sides to
agree on a relief program and promised American assistance. British officials dismissed W ilson’s
appeal as election-year politics and an attempt to court the Polish-American vote.46 It also did not
help that Anglo-American relations were frosty because of Wilson’s continued efforts to act as
peacemaker. Germany responded to Wilson’s appeal by launching a vitriolic attack on the British
blockade, while slyly acknowledging that it dragged out negotiations in order to embarrass
Britain.47 By the end of 1916, all hopes for a Polish relief program had evaporated due to money
woes and the refusal of Britain and Germany to compromise. Although plans for a Polish relief
program failed, M.B. Biskupski argues that the discussion focused international attention on the
plight of the Poles and generated post-war support for Polish independence.48
By the end of the war, the international community lauded Hoover as the “Great
Engineer.” In 1917, Wilson asked him to oversee the American Relief Administration, which fed
a devastated post-war Europe, including Germany and Bolshevik Russia. While vilified by some
for feeding Russia during the 1921-23 famine, Hoover defended his actions with a simple
statement: “Twenty million people are starving. Whatever their politics, they shall be fed.” Here
rests the essence of Hoover’s humanitarianism— war and politics should not interfere with basic
human rights, and famine should not be used as a weapon.
Hoover’s dedication to this philosophy forced Britain and Germany to adopt wartime
policies ripe with political and strategic contradictions. Although Germany resented the
46 Biskupski, 432, 446.
47 “Germany Explains Course in Poland,”New York Times, 17 April 1916. Telegram, Gerard to Lansing, 29 July 1916.FRUS: 1916, 906.
48 Biskupski, 449.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36
commission interfering with its occupation of Belgium and northern France, it acknowledged that
the commission’s presence alleviated it of the economic burden of feeding the civilian population.
For Germany, Hoover’s work provided a partial antidote to Britain’s economic warfare
campaign; for Britain, however, it represented a strategic threat. Despite acknowledging the need
for the relief program, Britain found it difficult to reconcile program’s humanitarian benefits with
its new appreciation of economic warfare. At the same time, challenging Hoover’s work proved
politically dangerous, particularly when the sympathies of the United States played a crucial role
in the war’s conduct and eventual outcome. This experience left Britain determined not only to
preserve its right to blockade, but also to prevent another relief program of the same magnitude
from operating.
Preserving the Blockade
During the interwar period, Britain and the United States continued to tangle over the
belligerent rights issue and its relationship to relief operations in a future war, with the naval
disarmament conferences providing a high-stakes forum for the debate. The world’s naval
powers, notably Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and the United States, came together to forge
agreements designed to prevent the development of a naval arms race. Instead of embarking on
reckless building programs that could strain economies and ignite international tensions, the
countries agreed to limit the number and types of ships that could be built. Although they wanted
to avert an arms race, each of the participants wanted an agreement that would allow them to
construct their ideal navy, while preventing others from doing the same. Scholars writing about
the naval talks have focused on the technical aspects— tonnage, gun size, keel length— of the
discussions. As a result, they have overlooked how concerns about belligerent rights and relief
programs shaped the discussions.49 At the center of the showdown between Britain and United
49 Christopher Hall,Britain, American, and Arms Control, 1921-1937 (London: Macmillan, 1987); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f British Naval Mastery (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1976); Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars: The Period o f Anglo-American Antagonism,19/9-/929
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37
States over how many and what types of ships to build lurked the question of allowing future
blockades and future relief operations.
Britain and the United States approached naval disarmament from conflicting
perspectives, because of their different conceptions of naval power. British strategists believed
that a country’s naval power derived from its ability to control its sea-lanes while disrupting those
of its adversary. The philosophy, popularized by Sir Julian Corbett, emphasized the use of
concentration and dispersal: a battle fleet, representing a concentration of naval strength,
established control of the seas either through intimidation or decisive victory, while a dispersed
naval force, consisting of cruisers operating alone or as part a small squadron, struck at enemy
lines of communication or fended off other ships.50 Using this strategy, the Royal Navy
effectively disrupted the Central Powers’ maritime supply lines during the Great War and
enforced Britain’s blockade against Germany. The success of this strategy meant that after 1918
Britain refused to entertain the idea of cruiser parity with the United States. In contrast, the
United States based its naval strategy on the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who believed
that a decisive battle resulting in the destruction of the enemy’s fleet would result in the
unopposed command of the seas. A student of history, Mahan idealized Britain’s victory over
France at the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805, in which Admiral Horatio Nelson orchestrated
the destruction of nineteen of thirty-three ships in the combined French-Spanish fleet without
losing a single ship. Nelson’s triumph shattered Napoleon’s plans to invade Britain.51
(London: Collins, 1968); B.J.C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-29 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Orest Babji, “The Royal Navy and the defence of the British Empire, 1924-1934,” Greg Kennedy and Keith Nielson, eds.,Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Frank Cass, 1996) 170-189; John Ferris, “The last decade of British maritime naval supremacy, 1919-1929,”Far-Flung Lines, 124-169.
50 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars. I: The Period o f Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919- 1929, vol. I (London: Collins, 1968) 433-66.
51 Kenneth Hagan, This People's Navy, The Making o f American Sea Power (New York, 1991), 275-6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38
These different philosophies led to different visions for the British and American navies
and what became known as the “cruiser problem.” Britain wanted to maintain a large number of
light cruisers— 3,500 to 7,500 tons armed with six inch guns— while the United States wanted a
smaller fleet made of capital ships (10,000+ tons) armed with eight inch guns. Under the terms of
the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, building ratios and limitations were established for capital
ships and aircraft carriers over 10,000 tons. The treaty, however, allowed for unlimited
construction of warships under 10,000 tons, including cruisers, minesweepers, destroyers, and
submarines, the very ships that made up the backbone of Britain’s fleet. Cruisers, in particular,
played a vital role in running a naval blockade and attacking an enemy’s lines of communication.
Consequently, the United States objected to limits being placed on capital ships and not cruisers,
while Britain disliked the fact that 8-inch guns gave the Americans a decided advantage in ship-
to-ship combat. In order to resolve the “cruiser problem,” the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty had
to be revised to address both British and American concerns.52
Preparatory talks began in 1927, but were unproductive. Britain’s Foreign Secretary
Austen Chamberlain began to suspect that the incompatibility of the British doctrine of
belligerent rights with American belief in freedom of the seas— and not technical issues—
prevented the two powers from reaching an agreement. The United States knew that cruisers
would play a central role in any future blockade mounted by Britain; therefore, limiting the
number of cruisers Britain could build would hamper its effectiveness. Chamberlain predicted
grave results unless the issue was resolved. “Any attempt by us to enforce our rights in a future
war where the United States were a neutral, as we enforced them in the late war,” he observed,
52 Roskill, 300-30. J.R. Ferris, “The Symbol and Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States, and the One-Power Standard, 1919-1921,” in B.J.C McKercher,Anglo-American Relations in the 1920'S: The Struggle for Supremacy (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1990) 55-80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39
“would make war between us probable.”53 Sir Esme Howard, the British ambassador to the
United States, reached the same conclusion independently. “Fear of future blockade,” he noted,
“is at the back of the minds of not only Senators but also for generals, and no doubt admirals. . .
The United States at present is in the mood for restricting the powers of blockade.”54
Chamberlain and Howard’s conclusions prompted them to ask the controversial question
of whether Britain should compromise its belligerent rights in order to improve relations with the
United States. In November 1927, Chamberlain put the issue before the Committee for Imperial
Defense (CID), the civilian-military body charged with masterminding Britain’s global military
strategy.55 The committee violently opposed the idea, objecting to the Americans using the
positive-sounding slogan “freedom of the seas” to describe their position. As the First Sea Lord
put it: “’Freedom of the Seas’ is, in effect, freedom to provide belligerents with the means to
wage war, or, put in another way, freedom to prolong the war and amass wealth at the expense of
the belligerents, who, when exhausted by war, may be at the mercy of the Power which has been
allowed his freedom.”56
While Britain wrestled internally with the belligerent rights issue, it became a source of
public debate in the United States. In February 1928, Senator Robert Borah introduced a
resolution calling for a new international agreement on the rules of war at sea. Chamberlain
feared that Borah’s proposal was the prelude to the United States convening an international
53 “Belligerent Rights at Sea and the Relations Between the United States and Great Britain” by Austen Chamberlain [CP258(27)], 26 October 1927. TNA/PRO, A1R20/310.
54 Letter, Howard to Tyrell, 22 September 1927. Printed as Appendix IT of CP258(27), “Belligerent Rights at Sea and the Relations Between the United States and Great Britain” by Austen Chamberlain, 26 October 1927. TNA/PRO, AIR20/310.
55 CPI 12(28), Chamberlain to Howard, 5 April 1928. TNA/ PRO, CAB16/79. “Belligerents Rights at Sea” by Chamberlain [CP286(27)j, 14 November 1927; “Memorandum by Sir. M. Hankey on Blockade and the Laws of War” [CP286(27)], 31 October 1927; Memo by R.L. Craigie [CP287(27>], 16 November 1927. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/7.
56 Note by the First Sea Lord [BR16], 1 February 1928. TNA/PRO, CAB16/79.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40
conference on belligerent rights.57 Rather than summon the dreaded conference, the Americans
seemed determined to build more ships. Since the end of the First World War, “Big Navy”
advocates called for the United States to build a navy that would be able to enforce the United
States’ right to trade without restrictions. Their cause received a boost from bogus stories about
secret deals between the British and French over cruiser ratios, rumors that brought Anglo-
American relations to a new low during the summer of 1928. Angry about what he termed
European obstructionism, President Calvin Coolidge used his Armistice Day speech to criticize
the European powers and called for American naval supremacy over Britain.58 Before leaving
office, he endorsed a bill before Congress cal ling for the construction of fifteen new cruisers.
Attached to the cruiser bill, courtesy of Borah, was a call for a new conference to codify
international law. The stage was now set for an Anglo-American naval race fuelled by old fears
about belligerent rights.
Changes in leadership on both sides of the Atlantic in 1929, however, averted an Anglo-
American naval race. The May 1929 general election in Britain brought the Second Labour
Government into office under Ramsay MacDonald. The new prime minister believed that Britain
and the United States shared a history, common language, and culture that made them natural
allies whose mutual cooperation on economic, diplomatic, and naval issues would prevent
international conflicts and promote peace.59 In the United States, newly-elected president
Flerbert Hoover announced that the United States would consider using a “naval yardstick” to
equate light and heavy cruisers. By using the yardstick, Britain and the United States could both
get the navies they wanted without having to make substantial concessions. MacDonald and
57 CPI 12(28), Chamberlain to Howard, 5 April 1928. TNA/PRO, CAB16/79
58 United States Office of the President, Address o f President Coolidge at the Observance o f the 10lh Anniversary o f the Armistice, Under the Auspices o f the American Legion(Washington: GPO, 1928).
59 David Carlton,MacDonald versus Henderson: The Foreign Policy o f the Second Labour Government (New York, 1970) 15-17; David Marquand,Ramsay MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977) 489-90.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41
Hoover's desire to avert a naval arms race led them to ignore or override the advice of their
technical experts in favor of political considerations.60
At the end of September 1929, MacDonald traveled to Washington to meet with Hoover
to smooth over the remaining differences between the two countries on disarmament.61 While
MacDonald found Hoover anxious to settle the cruiser problem, he also discovered that the
president’s humanitarian goals represented a formidable threat to the effectiveness of the next
blockade. In their private discussions, Hoover raised the possibility of granting “foodships”—
ships carrying food to civilian populations during war— immunity from the blockade. Hoover
wanted a treaty that would enshrine in international law the right to conduct relief operations
behind enemy lines during war.
By Hoover’s way of thinking, the rapid growth of industrial civilization during the
previous five decades created countries with populations far in excess of their domestic food
supplies, which resulted in weaker natural defenses. Consequently, the need to protect imports
and overseas supply sources fueled the growth of naval armaments and military alliances as
demonstrated by the Great War. Both sides placed a higher premium on securing or disrupting
overseas trade than on feeding civilians, thereby making the starvation of women and children a
major weapon of the war. He believed international public opinion would not permit another
blockade; therefore, granting foodships free passage would eliminate starvation as a weapon and
60 Orest Babji, “The Royal Navy and the defense of the British Empire, 1928-1934,”Far-Flung Lines, 177- 178. Britain conceded formal parity in vessels under 10,000 tons; Britain reduced its minimum cruiser requirement to 50; the United States dropped its demand for heavy cruisers to 21; and the United States allowed Britain an extra 24,000 tons of light cruisers to compensate for the U.S. Navy having more heavy ones than the Royal Navy.
61 “Memorandum respecting the Conversations between the Prime Minister and President Hoover at Washington (October 4 to 10, 1929)” [CP312(29)], by J. Ramsay MacDonald, November 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42
decrease the pressure for naval arms. Hoover hinted that if Britain agreed to such a treaty, further
discussions about belligerent rights would not be necessary.62
Hoover’s proposal stunned MacDonald. He later admitted to being unprepared “to
discuss this thorny subject in any detail.” MacDonald told Hoover that Britain would prefer to
have a separate Anglo-American understanding rather than a general treaty. Although the
immunity issue was discussed off-the-record, MacDonald proposed that it be mentioned in the
joint summary provided to the press. Otherwise, he believed “there was a danger of its being
issued in a more objectionable form after I had left the United States.”63
By agreeing to discuss the blockade, MacDonald believed that he prevented Hoover from
calling an international conference. His colleagues in London saw things differently.64 Sir
Maurice Hankey, the CID’s powerful head, believed that a statement acknowledging the need to
consider the issue “could be taken at this stage as being even the most partial surrender of our
belligerent rights at sea.”65 The blockade had to be preserved at all costs. He encouraged Foreign
Secretary Arthur Henderson and other Cabinet ministers to block any discussion of belligerent
rights.66
62 Recounted in CP312(29), “Memorandum respecting the Conversations between the Prime Minister and President Hoover at Washington, November 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82.
63 Telegrams 493 & 494, Howard to Henderson, 6 October 1929, appearing as part of Appendix A of CP312(29), “Memorandum respecting the Conversations between the Prime Minister and President Hoover at Washington, November 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82
64 Hankey failed to brief MacDonald on the findings of the C1D subcommittee appointed to study belligerent rights, most likely to discourage him from discussing the issue. “Anglo-American Relations: Question of an Agreement with the United States in regard to Maritime Belligerent Rights” by R. Craigie, 10 June 1929. TNA/PRO, PREM1/99.
65 Telegrams 505 & 506, Henderson to Howard, 8 October 1929, appearing as part of Appendix A of CP312(29), “Memorandum respecting the Conversations between the Prime Minister and President Hoover at Washington, November 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82.
66 Telegram 515, Henderson to Howard, 9 October 1929, appearing as Appendix A of CP312(29), “Memorandum respecting the Conversations between the Prime Minister and President Hoover at Washington, November 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43
In light of the Cabinet’s adverse reaction, MacDonald asked to have all mention of the
blockade removed from the joint summary. But he promised Hoover that his government would
informally examine the issue when he returned to London. “Mr. Hoover and Colonel Stimson
were clearly chagrined and disappointed by this decision,” he observed, but “eventually agreed,
with a reasonably good grace, to the omission of any specific reference to the maritime rights
issue.” MacDonald believed that had Britain missed a chance to capitalize on a “most favourable
psychological moment” without making any concrete concessions.67
The removal of foodship immunity from the joint statement left Hoover free to announce
it on his own terms. He chose to do so as part of his 1929 Armistice Day speech. The
centerpiece of the speech was the announcement that, as a result of recent discussions, the United
States and Britain had reached an agreement that would avert a naval arms race. While praising
the accomplishment, Hoover went on to raise the question of granting immunity to foodships and,
by extension, altering existing notions of belligerent rights. He argued that the protection of the
movement of food in wartime benefited all parties, whether neutral or belligerent, and decreased
the need for increasing naval strength. “If the world succeeds in establishing peaceful methods of
settlement of controversies, the whole question of trading rights in time of war becomes a purely
academic discussion,” argued Hoover. In the interim, “the time has come when we should
remove starvation of women and children from the weapons of warfare.” He pointed to the work
of the Commission for Relief in Belgium as proof that it could be done. Acknowledging that
granting foodships immunity required the revision of international law and setting aside “age-old
interpretations of right and wrong,” Hoover called for a “long and searching examination” of the
67 CP312(29), “Memorandum respecting the Conversations between the Prime Minister and President Hoover at Washington (October 4 to 10, 1929)” by J. Ramsay MacDonald, November 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44
issue. “No idea can be perfected except upon the anvil of debate,” he told the crowd gathered for
the American Legion ceremony.68
Carefully watching the American press reaction to Hoover speech, British officials
breathed a sigh of relief that foodship immunity was not “adopted as a sacred American
doctrine.” The American press welcomed the news of an agreement with Britain, but expressed
reservations about the foodships proposal. The New York American splashed Hoover’s contention
that “the time has come to remove the starvation of women and children form the weapons of
warfare” across its front page and gloated at the idea that “it will be many a long day before the
echoes of debate on that proposition cease to rebound from Chancellery to Chancellery in
E urope.” The Washington Post regarded the proposal as a stealth maneuver by MacDonald to
induce the United States to “accept the domination of the League of Nations.” The New York
Herald-Tribune expressed skepticism and thought that Hoover’s “interesting” suggestion “goes
back to the concepts of the pre-war Hague treaties and of the 18th century, when wars were waged
only by men in uniform.” The Philadelphia Public Ledger described the proposal as
“revolutionary,” observing that a treaty granting foodships immunity would change the whole
character of naval warfare. The New York Times believed that the proposal would prove
impractical in times of war. The New York World and Baltimore Sun, however, expressed
enthusiasm for Hoover’s proposal, judging it to be one of the “simplest, most dramatic, and far-
reaching proposal made by any responsible person since the Pact of Paris.”69
When he returned to London, MacDonald faced the ire of the Cabinet, prompting him to
remind them that he did not raise the issue, Hoover did. “Rightly or wrongly the question has in
the United States come to be closely associated with the question of naval disarmament, and it is
68 “President’s Armistice Day Speech,”NYT, 11 November 1929.
69 Telegram 2129, Campbell to Henderson, 14 November 1929, printed as part of BRL3, CID Sub- Committee on Belligerent Rights at Sea, PRO, CAB21/328.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45
useless for us to proceed as if no such association did in fact exist,” MacDonald told his
colleagues.70 Rather than treat Hoover’s proposal with “a carping spirit,” the prime minister
believed Britain should regard it as an opportunity. If Britain granted foodships free passage, the
United States would not make any further incursions into the “dangerous field” of belligerent
rights.71
Two considerations ultimately drove British deliberations: Britain’s obligations to the
League of Nations and historical precedent. As a member of the League, Britain could not agree
to a proposal that would limit the methods available to the League to exert pressure against a state
that violated the covenant. The pro-League elements in the Cabinet and Foreign Office believed
that a bilateral treaty with the United States granting foodship immunity would hinder Britain’s
ability to participate in League actions.72 Existing treaty obligations aside, there was also history
itself to consider. Drawing on the experiences of the First World War, Hankey crafted a
devastating critique of Hoover’s proposal, arguing that if Britain granted foodships immunity, it
would lose a valuable weapon. He pointed to evidence provided by German writers that the
deprivation caused by the blockade affected the morale of the German army and German
civilians. More importantly, according to Hankey, the food shortages in Germany caused by the
blockade helped the Allies avert defeat in March 1918, and led to victory in November 1918.
“Without the food blockade we should perhaps have lost the war,” he concluded, “but even if we
had not lost it, the war would certainly have been prolonged.” Hankey argued that Britain
allowed the Commission for Relief in Belgium to operate because it ensured the fidelity of the
70 CP312(29), “Memorandum respecting the Conversations between the Prime Minister and President Hoover at Washington (October 4 to 10, 1929)” byJ. Ramsay MacDonald, November 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82.
71 Memo, Craigie to Vansitart, 16 November 192:9, TNA/PRO, CAB21/328.
72 BRL4, Memo by Hankey, “The Food Factor in Blockade,” CID Subcommittee on Belligerent Rights at Sea, 23 December 1929. TNA/PRO CAB 16/82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46
Belgian government and army to the Entente. Hoover’s proposal also lacked a way to
institutionalize the leadership and integrity he provided. Although Hankey could appreciate the
idealism at work, he found one aspect particularly irksome: “One curious feature of the Hoover
proposal is that we are apparently to receive nothing in return for the sacrifice of our historic
attitude towards blockade, for the blunting of the one immediately ready offensive weapon we
possess.
Hankey’s historical bravado and the objections of the pro-League members of the
Cabinet made the question of compromise difficult for MacDonald. In light of the serious
opposition, the prime minister wrote the president expressing his regret that Britain could not
agree to an examination of the blockade or belligerent rights issue, even in reference to foodships.
MacDonald recognized that Britain’s refusal to open discussions on the topic placed Hoover in a
difficult position with Borah and other members of Congress who wanted to curtail Britain’s
belligerent rights. But amazingly enough, the president let the issue drop. With Hoover reluctant
to push for an examination of the blockade, the decisive issue of belligerent rights fell by the
w ayside.74
As Britain rejected Hoover’s overtures, it also took steps to strengthen its legal right to
impose by blockade by agreeing to participate in the Permanent Court of International Justice, a
body of the League of Nations. Britain joined the court to demonstrate its support for the League,
but also because membership would not hinder its freedom of action in the event of war. As an
added benefit, Britain no longer had to worry about the United States attempting to arbitrate
future blockades, since Britain could accept adjudication of disputes only by the court should its
policies be questioned. The United States was not a League member and was therefore excluded
73 BRL4, Memo by Hankey, “The Food Factor in Blockade,” CID Subcommittee on Belligerent Rights at Sea, 23 December 1929. TNA/PRO, CAB 16/82.
74 B.J.C. McKercher, Transition o f Power: Britain’s Loss o f Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47
from court proceedings. By joining the court, Britain agreed not to conclude any bilateral
arbitration agreements— exactly the type of agreement Hoover sought.75
Between MacDonald’s visit to Washington in the fall of 1929 and the opening of the
London Naval Conference on 21 January 1930, Britain and the United States drew closer, while
averting a major rift over granting foodships immunity. The conference formally resolved the
“cruiser problem” by granting the United States an extra 30,000 tons of eight-inch-gun ships and
Britain an extra 50,000 tons of six-inch-gun ships. Although the “cruiser problem” had been
settled, British and American approaches to naval warfare remained incompatible, laying the
seeds for argument in a future war.
O f all the powers capable of challenging Britain’s belligerent rights, the United States
possessed the highest chance of success. In the end, however, Hoover chose to maintain cordial
relations with Britain and withdraw the foodship proposal, rather than risk a serious rift. As a
result, international law remained the same and with it Britain’s right to impose another blockade.
What is particularly striking about Britain’s position is the collective lack of desire by British
officials even to consider a compromise. Any agreement that might weaken Britain’s ability to
use the blockade was unacceptable. Britain’s success in preserving the blockade meant that
humanitarians would face a formidable obstacle to providing relief in the next war.
Embracing Economic Warfare
After Hoover abandoned his proposal for granting foodships immunity, Britain did not
face any other challenges to its belligerent rights during the 1930s. No longer forced to justify
and protect the blockade, British planners concentrated on refining its effectiveness. The advent
of Nazi Germany and the willingness of British planners to embrace economic warfare as an
offensive weapon spurred the process. The First World War taught Britain that the blockade
75 CP 192(29), “The Optional Clause,” July 1929; CP200(29), “The Optional Clause,” 9 July 1929; CP235(29), “Committee on the Optional Clause Report,” 25 July 1929, PRO, CAB27/392.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48
could wreak havoc with the enemy’s economy by cutting off its imports and exports. But some
strategists believed that assaulting the enemy’s industrial capacity— destroying transportation
infrastructures, bombing factories, instigating work stoppages— could compound the damage
inflicted by the blockade. “There was a feeling that new opportunities were available, that
unorthodox enemies must be faced and that unconventional methods must be followed,” writes
Medlicott of the men who advocated and fashioned what became the Ministry of Economic
Warfare. They believed that “if war was to made at all it must be made ingeniously and
ruthlessly.”76 The fervor for economic warfare that developed during the 1930s profoundly
affected British strategy during the Second World War and played a central role in the story of
relief for civilians. For that reason it is important to understand how the belief in the potential of
economic warfare led to the creation of a ministry devoted to its application.
After coming to terms with the Americans on naval disarmament, planning for a future
blockade languished until the advent of Nazi Germany prompted Britain to reevaluate the
possibility of a war on the European continent. The appointment of Adolf Hitler as chancellor in
January 1933 signaled a new era in German politics and international relations. Under Hitler’s
leadership, National Socialism, a political philosophy that based on intense nationalism, racism,
and subordination of the individual to the state, infiltrated every aspect of German life and
culture. Like many others of his generation, Hitler believed that Germany did not suffer a
military defeat in World War I. Instead, it had been “stabbed in the back.” As chancellor, Hitler
not only intended to restore Germany’s power and status, but also acquire additional
Lebensraum— living space— for the German people by conquering large tracks of Eastern Europe
and Ukraine. Between 1933 and 1936, Hitler tore up the Versailles Treaty, restoring the military
76 Medlicott, vol. 1, 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49
draft and launching an overt buildup of Germany's land, air, and sea forces, in pursuit of his
dream of building the Greater German Reich.77
The new German threat stimulated the quiet revolution already underway in British
thinking about the relationship between economic planning and wartime mobilization. In the
winter of 1929-30, CID assembled a small working group to study and report on the industrial
preparations made by various countries for war. In March 1931, the working group morphed into
the ultra-secret Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) under the direction of Major (later Sir)
Desmond Morton. IIC provided the economic research and ideas that formed the core of
Britain’s economic warfare strategy.78 It also helped economic warfare gain a prominent role in
British strategy. Like the air force, economic warfare was the new kid on the block; but unlike the
air force, no bases, troops, or expensive hardware were needed to wage economic warfare.
Instead of fighting for a chunk of the budget, IIC and its supporters persuaded the services to
incorporate economic warfare into their strategic thinking by convincing them that economics and
trade could be used not only as a defensive weapon, but also an offensive weapon.79 As a result
of IIC’s efforts, economic warfare was widely discussed among the services during 1936-39. It
helped that Morton, economic warfare’s leading evangelist, was a military man and served as an
honorary member of the Joint Intelligence and Joint Planning Committees of the Chiefs of Staff.
He and IIC staff members also gave regular lectures on the utility of economic warfare to the
Imperial Defence College and the three service staff colleges. In wooing the services, IIC’s
decision to use the term “economic warfare” instead of “blockade” played a fundamental role in
77 Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy o f Hitler’s Germany, 1933-36: A Diplomatic Revolution in Europe (New York: Brill Academic Publishers, 1994).
78 W esley R. Wark,The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985) p. 160, 169. See also Robert Young, “Spokesmen for Economic Warfare: The Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s,”European Studies Review, vol. 6, (1976) 473-89.
79Medlicott, vol .1, 16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50
selling its merits. It helped planners conceptualize economic warfare not as the traditional naval
action conjured up by the term “blockade,” but as a campaign designed to wage a wholesale
assault on the enemy’s economic capacity to conduct war.80
The intense interest in economic warfare— coupled with growing international tensions—
prompted British planners to consider how to organize the next campaign. They did not have to
start from scratch, since British planners had worked on the issue during the 1920s. At the time,
the planners sought advice from Lord Robert Cecil, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, who ran the Ministry of Blockade. When the war broke out, the task of running the
blockade initially fell to a ministerial committee, but ensuing chaos hampered its effectiveness
and angered the neutrals. To provide order, the Cabinet created a new ministry charged with
managing all economic warfare activities and appointed Cecil to oversee it. Based on his
experiences, Cecil adamantly believed that “it should be laid down as a fundamental proposition
that all the blockade operations should be put under the control of one Minister.”81 He, however,
harbored reservations about the need to create separate ministry, believing that the minister could
run the blockade by using the existing bureaucratic framework of another ministry. Despite some
reservations, Cecil’s views prevailed, and in April 1929 a CID subcommittee recommended that
plans be adopted to create a “Ministry of Blockade” based out of the Foreign Office.82
Given unsettled conditions in central Europe in 1937, CID decided the question the of
organization needed to be resolved quickly and assigned the task to the Subcommittee on
80 Medlicott, vol. I, 14
81 Note b y C.N. Ryan, Secretary to ATB, ATB(MB)4, 20 July 1937. TNA/PRO, CAB47/10.
82 In 1924, the CID convened the Advisory Committee on Trading and Blockade in Time of War (ATB) to review Britain’s wartime experiences and make recommendations. Because another war did not appear imminent, the committee met occasionally over the next few years; however, their deliberations took on new urgency after the failure of the 1927 Geneva Conference. CID Paper No. 746-B (Third Annual Report of ATB), TNA/PRO, CAB 17/1; CID Paper No. 1107-B(?), aka ATB 66 Fifth Annual Report of ATB, TNA/PRO, CAB17/1. Note by C.N. Ryan, Secretary to ATB, ATB(MB)4, 20 July 1937, TNA/PRO, CAB47/10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51
Economic Pressure on Germany.83 Unlike in the 1920s, when the deliberations assumed more the
tone of intellectual exercises than hard-nosed planning, the subcommittee had a specific enemy in
mind— Germany— and operated in a climate more attuned to economic warfare. The
subcommittee consisted of representatives from Treasury, Foreign Office, IIC, Dominions Office,
India Office, War Office, Department of Overseas Trade, Home Office, Colonial Office,
Admiralty, Air Ministry, Board of Customs and Excise, and Board of Trade. The involvement of
so many ministries suggests a major undertaking by the British government. Britain’s
dependence on the committee system, which allowed ministries and offices to debate and make
policy recommendations, played an important role in building support for new plans. The
departments also wanted to be involved because it provided an opportunity to influence the final
plans. “The policy of applying economic pressure will always be governed by three different
factors: a) our sea power; b) our relations with neutrals; c) the economic strength of this country
and of the enemy,” noted the Foreign Office’s Orme Sargent, “and the Admiralty, Foreign Office,
and Board of Trade are likely to hold different views as to the relative importance of these
factors.”84
Once the subcommittee set to work, it immediately rejected the 1929 plan, opting
instead to create a new ministry. The Board of Trade’s E.E. Crowe cited the need for “a good
fighting machine which should be ready as quickly as possible after the outbreak of war so that
as few weeks as possible were lost before bringing economic pressure to bear.” 85 Sargent
echoed his sentiment, observing that “His Majesty’s Government should be enable to lay down
their policy without ambiguity or hesitation, and having done so to apply it with the utmost
83 The CID reconstituted the Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War (ATB) as the Economic Pressure on Germany Committee (EPG), which held its first meeting on July 1937.
84 Memo by Sir Orme Sargent, ATB(MB)5, 20 July 1937, TNA/PRO, CAB 47/10.
85 CID, ATB 24th meeting, Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War, 11 June 1937, TNA/PRO, CAB 17/1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52
despatch and efficiency.”86 Difficulty came, however, in deciding which ministry should serve
as the “parent,” providing the initial personnel and guidance in legislative, military, and
diplomatic affairs. Two contenders immediately emerged: the Foreign Office, with its
experience in politics and diplomacy, and the Board of Trade, with its knowledge of trade
issues.87 The subcommittee chose to recommend the Foreign Office, a decision that even the
Board of Trade’s J.J. Wills found difficult to begrudge: “the work of the blockade is closely
connected with the political work of the Foreign Office and blockade is a weapon of war and
must be regarded primarily from that point of view.” 88 The subcommittee also made one other
notable change: it recommended the new department be called the “Ministry of Economic
Warfare.”89
In March 1938, CID gave its approval for the establishment of a “Ministry of Economic
Warfare” in the event of a major war.90 The ministry was charged with initiating and directing
economic warfare policy, including coordinating work across ministries and administrating the
blockade. To accomplish its mission, MEW was organized into six divisions: 1) p la n s a n d
coordination to oversee general policy and planning; 2) foreign relations to negotiate with
neutrals and their traders on blockade-related issues; 3)p r iz e to track enemy exports and
imports; 4) financial pressure to prevent the enemy from financing trade, obtaining foreign
currency, and realizing assets; 5) intelligence to collect and analyze information about the
86 Memo by Sir Orme Sargent, ATB(MB)5, 20 July 1937, TNA/PRO, CAB 47/10.
87 Memo by S.D. Waley (Treasury), ATB (MB)3, 7 July 1937. TNA/PRO, CAB47/10.
88 Memo by J.J. Wills (Board of Trade), ATB(MB)2, 2 July 1937, TNA/PRO, CAB47/10.
89 CID, ATB 24th meeting, Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War, 11 June 1937, TNA/PRO, CAB 17/1.
90 Minutes of 26th meeting ATB Committee, 11 February 1938, CAB 47/1. Note by Secretary, “Organization of Ministry of Economic Warfare,” ATB167, 22 March 1938, PRO, CAB47/6. The approval was given at the 3 12th CID meeting on 4 March 1938. Note by Secretary, “Organization of Ministry of Economic Warfare,” ATB167, 22 March 1938, TNA/PRO, CAB47/6. The approval was given at the 3 12th CID meeting on 4 March 1938.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53
enemy’s industrial and economic position and neutral trade with the enemy; and 6) legal to
advise on questions of international law and agreements with neutral governments and
organizations.
The nature of the proposed divisions provides an indication as to how thoroughly
Britain intended to wage the next campaign— no aspect of economic pressure was overlooked.
The Foreign Office would serve as MEW’s parent department and “a complete exchange of all
current information” would occur between it and MEW. Additionally, MEW would work
closely with the Board of Trade on questions concerning enemy imports and exports.91 CID
also gave the ministry the power to negotiate with neutral countries on all blockade questions.
This provision afforded MEW a great deal of power during the war, since it did not have to
consult with the Foreign Office when it negotiated with neutrals on trade issues related to relief
for Nazi-occupied territories.
Along with developing a scheme for MEW, British planners also fine-tuned the
contraband list. More than just a catalog of goods, the list served as the foundation of the
blockade. Once war broke out, British officials around the world would use the list to decide
what goods could be granted navicerts for passage through the blockade. Any cargoes passing
through British contraband control stations without navicerts were automatically impounded. But
in order for the blockade to be effective, Britain needed to establish its contraband control
procedures immediately— it could not afford to waste time debating what should go on the list.
There was also a need for consistency. “In the last war, we probably gave more offence to
neutrals by reversing our contraband policy (i.e. by abandoning the Declaration of London) and
by continually adding new commodities to our Contraband Lists,” observed an Admiralty report,
91 Note by the Chairman, “Organisation of the Ministry of Economic Warfare,” ATB 166, 21 February 1937, TNA/PRO, CAB47/6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54
“than we should have done by having a firm policy and adhering to it. Neutrals should have less
cause for complaint if they “know where they stand” from the outset.”92
Crafting a list that to exploit Germany’s economic vulnerabilities, while not offending
neutrals, presented a formidable challenge. Although Germany appeared to be well prepared for
war, British planners believed it possessed one key weakness: a deficiency in gold and exchange
reserves, which meant Germany would not waste its credits on importing articles it did not need.
The contraband list, therefore, needed to include everything that Germany might conceivably
want to import. At the same time, the list needed to be somewhat restrained— if it was too long, it
would cause bureaucratic nightmares and aggravate the neutrals.93 Opting for thoroughness over
restraint, CID’s Contraband Subcommittee worked up a list containing nearly three hundred
items. The Admiralty, Board of Trade, Foreign Office, and IIC branded the list “imposing” and
immediately campaigned against it. “It is clear,” they complained in a joint report, “that the
publication of this list in extenso would only achieve our objection of enabling us to stop
everything that Germany is likely to import at the expense of producing a serious adverse
impression upon neutral merchants and exporters.” Instead, they recommended Britain model its
contraband list after the one issued by the United States when it joined the Entente in 1917. The
Americans used a short list containing a small number of comprehensive items. Using the short
list would achieve the same objective— disrupting German imports— while limiting neutral
objections, particularly from the United States. They also believed that the United States, the
92 Contraband Lists, Memomorandum submittedby Admiralty in consultation with the Foreign Office, the Board o f Trade, and Industrial Intelligence Centre, ATB(EPG)21, 10 June 1938, CAB47/9. Proposal for a Short Contraband List, Report by the Subcommittee on Absolute and Conditional Contraband Lists, ATB 177, 18 July 1938. TNA/PRO, CAB47/9.
93 Contraband Lists, Memomorandum submittedby Admiralty in consultation with the Foreign Office, the Board o f Trade, and Industrial Intelligence Centre, ATB(EPG)21, 10 June 1938; Proposal for a Short Contraband List, Report by the Subcommittee on Absolute and Conditional Contraband Lists, ATB 177, 18 July 1938. TNA/PRO, CAB47/9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55
most important neutral, would have little reason to complain if Britain’s contraband list mimicked
94 its own.
British planners also discussed abolishing the distinction between absolute and
conditional contraband in order to improve the blockade’s effectiveness. They questioned
whether Britain would again be allowed to apply the doctrine of continuous destination to
conditional contraband. The planners knew that Britain’s treatment of conditional contraband in
the First World War tested the bounds of legality, even if they “were in part based on the
principle of retaliation against the enemy for offenses against the laws of war.” If there was any
doubt whatsoever, the planners wanted items deemed “conditional” made “absolute.” The
lawyers, however, did not predict any difficulties: no court decisions had rendered the distinction
moot and they did not foresee any problems cutting off the enemy’s supplies. “In a state such as
Germany, the whole of economic life of the country will in wartime be controlled by the State,”
read the legal team’s brief, “and it will almost certainly be possible to prove that the State is the
real consignee for all imports. In other words, conditional contraband may be seized where ever
there is evidence of enemy destination.” They also noted that maintaining the distinction between
absolute and conditional contraband gave the appearance of flexibility.95
Recognizing its political and bureaucratic logic, CID chose to adopt the “short list” and
preserve the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. When war broke out in
94 Contraband Lists, Memo submitted by Admiralty in consultation with the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, and Industrial Intelligence Centre, ATB(EPG)21, 10 June 1938, CAB47/9. Proposal for a Short Contraband List, Report by the Subcommittee on Absolute and Conditional Contraband Lists, ATB 177, 18 July 1938. TNA/PRO, CAB47/9.
95 Report by the Legal Subcommittee, ATB17, CID Advisory Committee on Trading and Blockade in Time of War, 19 August 1925. Contraband Lists, Memomorandum submitted by Admiralty in consultation with the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, and Industrial Intelligence Centre, ATB(EPG)21, 10 June 1938. TNA/PRO, CAB47/9. Proposal for a Short Contraband List, Report by the Subcommittee on Absolute and Conditional Contraband Lists, ATB 177, 18 July 1938. TNA/PRO, CAB47/9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56
September 1939, the “short list” was published in newspapers and given to neutrals. It classified
absolute contraband into four broad categories:
1) All kinds of arms, ammunition, explosives, chemicals, or appliances suitable for use in chemical warfare, and machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof; articles necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
2) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means of transportation on land, in the water or air, and machines used in their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof; instruments, articles, or animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
3) All means of communication, too ls, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers, and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile operations; articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture or use.
4) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt, also metal, materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture.
The “short list” defined conditional contraband as “all kinds of fuel, food, foodstuffs, feed, forge,
and clothing and articles and materials used in their production.”96 The “short list” served as the
public face of the blockade, but British officials who issued navicerts used a detailed list with
nitty-gritty descriptions. The list expanded the definition of “food and feeding-stuffs” to:
Item 371: foodstuffs, defined as including ‘all articles for human consumption, whether ready for use (e.g., meat, flour) or requiring further processing (e.g. grain, livestock) as well as beverages,”
Item 372: forage and feeding-stuffs for animals;
Item 373: sugars and molasses, and saccharine and substances of a like nature or use;
Item 374: yeast.07
96 Proposal for a Short Contraband List, Report by the Subcommittee on Absolute and Conditional Contraband Lists, ATB 177, 18 July 1938. TNA/PRO, CAB47/9.
97 Contraband List and Confidential Supplement, Prepared by the Sub-committee on Absolute and Conditional Contraband Lists, ATB(CL)14, September 1938, TNA/PRO, CAB47/9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57
The adoption of the “short list” and its detailed counterpart possessed immense
implications for relief efforts during the war. First, the transport of food and clothing was
subject to blockade restrictions. Any organization that wanted to ship relief through the blockade
to Nazi-occupied territory needed Britain’s permission. To receive approval, the organization had
to prove that the goods would not fall into enemy hands or benefit the enemy’s war effort.
Secondly, the restrictions placed on the movement of funds— coin, bullion, currency, and
evidences of debt— meant that relief groups also needed permission to transfer funds. One way to
provide relief without shipping goods through the blockade was to purchase them in Europe. The
“Trading with the Enemy” provisions adopted by both Britain and the United States, however,
forbade trade with the Axis powers and territories under their control. Consequently, relief
groups could only buy goods from neutral countries.
The Munich Crisis during the fall of 1938 provided Britain’s new concept of economic
warfare with a brief trial run. After Hitler successfully annexed Austria in March 1938, he turned
his attention to Czechoslovakia and the Germans living in the region known as the Sudetenland.
In a 12 September 1938 speech, Hitler demanded the Sudeten Germans be given the right of self-
determination, a demand that led to pro-Nazi extremists to instigate bloody disturbances that
forced the Czech government to proclaim martial law. While Britain and France had resigned
themselves to Hitler reuniting Germany and Austria, dismantling Czechoslovakia by force was
another matter. Behind in their rearmament efforts, neither of them, however, wanted a general
European war. With France’s blessing, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain opened talks
with Hitler, who made it clear that he was willing to risk war over the Sudetenland. As
negotiations languished, the most serious international crisis since 1918 erupted during the week
of 24-29 September 1938 as the Czech government ordered its army to mobilize and other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58
countries took precautionary steps. In Britain, CID ordered the mobilization of MEW.98 The
signing of the Munich agreement by 29 September 1938, however, temporarily averted war by
giving Germany control of the Sudetenland. It also had the unfortunate side effect of allowing
Hitler to accomplish his goal of reestablishing German hegemony in Central Europe.
In the wake of the war scare, Britain assessed what could be learned from MEW ’s brief
mobilization. “To sum up, it seems fair to say that both the Ministry and the machinery of
economic warfare worked smoothly so far as there was time for them to work at all,” noted the
report. The contraband list was rushed into the hands of British diplomatic and consular
representatives. Shipping firms were requested to suspend deliveries of raw materials to
Germany and divert shipments already en route to British ports. From their generally amicable
discussions with the shipping firms, MEW gathered valuable information about who traded with
Germany. MEW also received numerous offers of service from the academic community and
individuals who previously worked for the Ministry of Blockade. When war began, MEW drew
on these two groups to create its staff, along with the staff of IIC, which became its intelligence
department.
The brief mobilization also pointed to the need for something to be done about office
space. Once MEW staffed up, it would burst out of the offices it had been allotted to share with
the Foreign Office in Whitehall. The problem of where to put MEW presented real policy and
logistical challenges: the Foreign Office was charged with chaperoning MEW, while MEW
needed access to the Foreign Office’s archive of political, economic, and military intelligence.
The issue was not resolved before the war began, forcing MEW to occupy every free comer in
Whitehall, a situation that bred unnecessary tension between it and the Foreign Office.
Eventually, MEW moved over to Berkeley Square, which provided more independence and
98 At the time, the CID had not official approved the final plans for MEW, but authority was given at the Ministerial Meeting on September 26th to summon the nucleus staff of MEW.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59
effectively ended the Foreign Office’s supervisory role." MEW would later be joined in
Berkeley Square by the Special Operations Executive, Britain’s wartime intelligence agency, and
the Office of Strategic Services, the United States’ wartime intelligence agency.
Geoffrey Best has argued that over the course of history, the principle of “humanity in
warfare” has guided belligerents in their treatment of food during wartime. With some exceptions,
belligerents have shied away from treating food as contraband, allowing it free passage. This
moral convention is grounded in the idea that civilized warfare makes a distinction between
combatants and non-combatants— between soldiers and civilians— in order to avoid inflicting
unnecessary suffering.100 The First World War, however, represented a rejection of this ideal.
When faced with a Herculean struggle against Germany in 1914, Britain found principle and
practice incompatible. As a result, over the course of the First World War and the succeeding two
decades, the role of economic warfare in British strategy expanded at the expense of humanitarian
considerations. The experience of the war hardened Britain’s views about the centrality of the
blockade to its military strategy, while hardening Hoover’s views about its immoral nature.
Britain and Hoover battled a second time over the blockade as part of the naval disarmament talks.
Once again, Britain triumphed in preserving its belligerent rights, while Hoover’s proposal to
provide foodships with immunity fell to the wayside. Free to pursue and develop its strategy
unhindered in the 1930s, Britain refined its ability to administer the blockade, aided by a new
awareness of the power of economic warfare.
In July 1939, CID adopted an official definition of economic warfare. “The aim of
economic warfare,” it noted, “is to disorganize the enemy’s economy as to prevent him from
carrying on the war.” In twenty words, the CID institutionalized a decade-long shift in Britain’s
99 Review of the Work of the Co-ordination Section, Foreign Office, during the Recent Crisis, Report prepared by the Foreign Office, ATB191, 17 October 1938, TNA/PRO, CAB47/6.
100 See chapters three and four of Geoffrey Best’sHumanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia Univesity Press, 1980).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60
strategic thinking. It was not simply a spur of the moment innovation, but rather a carefully
constructed strategy with the power of the British government behind it. When humanitarians
took their first tenuous steps to aid Poles in the first months of the Second World War, they
received an object lesson in Britain’s devotion to economic warfare.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER THREE
THE SENTIMENTAL AMERICANS
On 1 September 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland opening the Second World War.
Possessing greater mobility and superior numbers of troops and armor, Germany quickly
overpowered the valiant, if futile, defense offered by Poland. As Polish army units fought to hold
Warsaw, the Soviet Union invaded from the east on 17 September, turning Poland’s situation
from desperate to hopeless. The advance of the Red Army crushed the remaining Polish
resistance cells in the east. By the end of September, both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
firmly controlled Poland.1 The Germans and Russians captured one million Polish soldiers and
another 100,000 lay dead. Taking only what they could carry, more than 200,000 Poles fled to
Lithuania, Romania, and Hungary, and some even made it as far as France. The Polish
government fled first to Romania, only to be forced to flee again to France. Those who remained
in Poland faced a stark new reality. Dr. Zygmunt Klukowski, a physician in the village of
Szczebrzeszyn, recorded in his diary on 11 October 1939 that:
The town is crowded with Germans. They are quartered in all the larger houses. Most of them are from Austria and some from Vienna. In general the Germans are trying to clean up the city. For this work they are using only Jews. Jews must sweep the streets, clean all the public latrines, and fill all the street trenches. Plastered everywhere are German notices giving an idea of what we can expect in the future.2
1 In return for Nazi Germany recognizing the USSR’s dominant interest in Lithuania, the Soviet Union conceded premium territory in the Polish bread-basket originally promised to them as part of the Nazi- Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939. The original demarcation line was the Vistula River, but the new line was 93 miles to the east of it.
2 Zygmunt Klukowski, Diary from the Years of Occupation, 1939-1944 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993).
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62
For the Polish people, the demolition of their country also meant the destruction of their
homes, families, and civic society. Divided between two ruthless masters, the Poland they
knew no longer existed.
The desire of relief organizations to help the Poles opened the question of providing relief
to Nazi-occupied territory. For Britain, these relief efforts presented a worrisome challenge to its
embryonic economic warfare campaign, forcing it to weigh the political consequences of
squashing American humanitarianism. For the United States, the efforts raised concerns about the
relationship of relief efforts to American neutrality and the potential for those efforts
inadvertently to draw the country into the war.
Economic Warfare Begins
Although Britain and France honored their pledge to Poland by declaring war against
Germany on 3 September 1939, they provided the Poles with little in the way of material aid,
despite British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s admission that Hitler could only be stopped
by force. “His action,” Chamberlain told the British public, “shows convincingly that there is no
chance of expecting that this man will ever give up his practice of using force to gain his will.”3
But rather than immediately respond to Hitler with force, Britain and France chose to adopt a
defensive posture that placed a premium on avoiding fighting the enemy until the balance of
power shifted in favor of the Allies. They believed the “long war strategy” would allow them to
marshal their resources, enlist help from allies, and weaken Germany through use of economic
warfare.4 Years of strategic estimates and planning convinced Britain and France that they were
3 Radio Address by Neville Chamberlain, 3 September 1939. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School (http://www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm).
4 Robert J. Young, '"La Guerre de longue duree’: Some Reflections on French Strategy and Diplomacy" in Paul Preston, ed., General Staffs and Diplomacy Before the Second World (London,War 1978), pp. 41 -64; N.H Gibbs, Grand Strategy, vol. I, Rearmament Policy (London, 1976), pp. 657-684; J.R.M. Butler, G rand Strategy, vol. II, September 1939-June 1941 (London, 1957).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63
ultimately stronger than Germany. Time— rather than immediate military action— represented
their best ally.5 The decision to go on the defensive rather than take immediate military action,
however, yielded the curious illusion of war declared, but not fought.
Britain used the pause in the fighting to implement its economic warfare program.
During the winter of 1939-40, both the Chamberlain government and the British public regarded
economic warfare as Britain’s primary offensive weapon and expected stunning results.
Medlicott characterized it as a period of “great expectations,” but ones that never could be met.
The intense pre-war planning resulted in the newly formed Ministry of Economic Warfare
attempting to implement too many programs too soon, creating management problems for its
inexperienced staff. Some of the programs also floundered owing to the lack of a sufficiently
large body of wartime statistics upon which to calibrate various types of economic pressure.
Despite its growing pains, MEW implemented enemy export control in at the end of November
1939 and, on 1 December 1939, it instituted the navicert system: all ships passing the blockade
needed Britain’s approval. These initial successes and the sense of urgency that drove the new
ministry led to what Medlicott called a “fallacious sense of achievement.” By mid-January 1940,
Ronald Cross, the minister of economic warfare, claimed that after four-and-a-half months of
war, Germany’s economic position resembled its situation after two years in the Great War.6
Economic warfare, whether or not it could live up to expectations, suited the
Chamberlain government’s diplomatic priorities. Throughout the “Phoney War,” Britain focused
on neutralizing Nazi Germany as a threat and maintaining Britain’s status as a world power.
Although Britain made preparations for a long war, Chamberlain and his advisors believed that
5 For the most insightful analysis of the development and radicalization of this strategy, see Talbot Imlay’s Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and France, 1938-40(Oxford: OUP, 2003). 2003).
6 Medlicott, vol. 1, 43-44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64
the German economy possessed inherent weaknesses. A decisive assault against it would bring
about a wholesale collapse. The threat of economic ruin would encourage German “moderates”
to defy their Ftihrer and open peace negotiations.
As Chamberlain waited for Germany to collapse, he worried that Britain would become
economically dependent on the United States or that the United States would use its neutrality to
infringe on Britain’s trading relationships. Chamberlain and others also feared that American
assistance would bring about another Wilsonian peace, one that would require Britain to jettison
its empire.7 He wanted American help, but on a limited basis. “Heaven knows I don’t want the
United States to fight for us,” Chamberlain wrote his sisters in January 1940, “we should have to
pay too dearly for that if they had a right to be in on the peace terms— but if they are so
sympathetic they might at least refrain from hampering our efforts and comforting our foes.”8
Britain’s friendly, but not embracing, attitude toward the United States made it more than
willing to endure the conflicts that developed as a result of its economic warfare policies. Despite
taking a cautious approach to its treatment of American shipping and trade, Britain’s policies
inflamed the old belligerent rights controversy with the United States, prompting the State
Department to lodge a number of protests during the winter of 1939-40. The United States
particularly resented mail censorship and the diversion of its ships to contraband control stations
for inspections. Britain’s decision to reduce its agricultural purchases of cotton, fruit, and tobacco
also generated hard feelings. Rather than make its usual purchases, Britain placed orders with
neutrals, such as Greece and Turkey, with whom it desired to generate goodwill and discourage
economic collaboration with Germany.9
7 Reynolds, Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 76-79.
8 Quoted in Reynolds, Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 78.
9 Reynolds,Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 76-77; See also Robert Maston,Neutrality and Navicerts (New York: Garland, 1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65
The fact that Britain did not openly court American assistance suited President Franklin
Roosevelt just fine. It allowed him gradually to convert the American public’s sympathy for the
Allies into tangible assistance. “This nation will remain a neutral nation,” declared Roosevelt on 3
September 1939, “but I cannot ask the every American remain neutral in thought as well.”
Roosevelt's statement was a departure from Woodrow W ilson’s 1914 plea for the nation to
remain neutral in heart and deed as Europe plunged into war. In this war, however, Americans
were far from neutral in thought. An October 1939 Gallup poll found that eighty-four percent of
the respondents were pro-Ally, while only two percent were pro-German.10 Sympathy for the
Allies, however, did not mean that Americans wanted to become embroiled in the war. For
Roosevelt, the task became one of finding a way to help the Allies defeat Hitler while avoiding
being drawn into the fighting.
The 1937 Neutrality Act, a product of the anti-isolationist mood that gripped the country
before the war, presented a formidable obstacle to Roosevelt’s efforts to help the Allies. Concern
about events in Europe had resulted in a diverse coalition of interests— those disillusioned with
Wilsonian internationalism, those who believed the munitions makers and Wall Street tricked
America into entering the last war, those involved in the peace movement— working to prevent a
reoccurrence of the conditions that prompted the United States to enter World War I. From
1935-37, strong isolationist sentiment in Congress resulted in the passage of a series of neutrality
laws designed to provide legal safeguards against American involvement in another European
conflict. More stringent than its predecessors, the 1937 Neutrality Act barred loans and the sale
of arms to countries at war. Instead, it provided for what became known as “cash-and-carry”:
10 Public Opinion Quaterly, 4 (March 1940) 102
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66
belligerents could buy raw materials and other items that were not specifically military in nature
provided they paid in cash and used their own ships to carry the goods from American shores."
With American sympathies leaning towards the Allies in late 1939, Roosevelt
sought to revise the 1937 Neutrality Act. The law greatly limited Roosevelt's freedom of
action in conducting foreign policy, particularly in dealing with belligerents. Roosevelt
wanted to offer limited monetary support and materiel to the Allies, something existing
legislation prohibited. Hoping to revise the law, Roosevelt called a special session of
Congress, a move that mobilized the isolationists against him. Charles Lindbergh, the
famous aviator, captured the isolationist sentiment when he argued that “the destiny of
this country does not call for our involvement in European wars. One need only glance at
a map to see where our true frontiers lie. What more could we ask than the Atlantic
Ocean on the east and the Pacific on the west? An ocean is a formidable barrier, even for
modem aircraft.”12 After six weeks of contentious debate, a revised Neutrality Act
emerged. Signed into law on 4 November 1939, the act lifted the arms embargo,
allowing belligerents to place orders for war materiel, but the cash-and-carry provisions
remained. It also prohibited the American government and private firms from extending
loans to any belligerent, a provision that prevented America’s financial health from being
dependent on Allied victory.13 Roosevelt succeeded in providing aid to the Allies, but in a
limited way.
11 David Kennedy,Freedom from Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 400.
12 Charles A. Lindbergh, “Appeal to Isolationism,”Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 October 1939, 751-52.
13 Reynolds, Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 65-7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67
An Outpouring of Sympathy
Meanwhile, the plight of the Poles immediately produced an outpouring of sympathy
from the American public; a multitude of relief groups wanted to provide aid. Efforts to aid the
Poles initially centered in the Polish-American community, which numbered around five million.
Demonstrations of solidarity ranged from voting a day’s pay per week to help Poles until the end
of the war— as done by the New York State Conference of Polish Clubs— to mounting large-scale
fundraising drives— as initiated by the Polish National Alliance.14 Concern for the fate of Polish
civilians, however, extended beyond the Polish-American community. By the end of September
1939, a spate of new war relief organizations had been formed, including the Commission for
Polish Relief, American War Relief Committee, and the American Friends of France.15
Established organizations, such as the American Red Cross (Amcross), Community Chests, and
YMCA, also launched campaigns to collect money and goods for Polish civilians.16 By mid-
October, more than one hundred organizations were collecting funds and goods for Polish relief.
The State Department kept a close eye on the activities of the relief organizations. Under
the terms of the neutrality acts, organizations could only solicit funds for “medical aid and
assistance, food and clothing to relieve human suffering.” The organizations were also required
14 “Polish Organizations Form a Council Here,”NYT, 2 September 1939; “Vote A Day’s Pay Weekly to Poland,”NYT, 10 September 1939; “90,000 Pledge Aid to Poland,”NYT, 14 September 1939. “To Raise $10,000,000 for Poland,”NYT, 5 September 1939. “Permits Polish Relief Drive,”NYT, 13 September 1939.
15 Comporel was founded founded to provide aid to Polish refugees in Romania and Hungary. The American War Relief Committee intended to assist the sick, injured, and needy noncombatants in Allied nations. Anne Morgan, the daughter of J. Pierpoint Morgan and a relief activist in World WarI, created the American Friends of France, which sought to help refugees who sought sanctuary in France. “National Group Formed Here for Polish Relief,” NYT, 28 September 1939. “Nation-wide Appeal to Aid Allies’ Needy: American War Relief Body to Launch Drive at Once,”NYT, 18 September 1939. “French Relief Sought: Group is Formed Here to Aid Civilians and Children,”NYT, 10 September 1939; “Help for Civilians in France is Urged,”NYT, 29 September 1939.
16 “Community Chests Seek $85,000,000: Most of the 520 Groups in Nation to Open Drives Soon,” NYT, 13 September 1939.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68
to register with the State Department. Failure to register, comply with accounting practices, or
adhere to solicitation guidelines carried a $50,000 fine and a five-year prison term. At the
beginning of October, the proliferation of organizations and relief drives prompted the State
Department to tighten up the regulations. It required the organizations to hold regular meetings
and have their funds managed by a competent treasurer. The new regulations also forbade them
from using professional fundraising firms. The adjustments aimed to keep administrative
overhead low, organization leadership honest, and war profiteering at a minimum. In addition to
preventing enterprising individuals from profiting from American compassion, the regulations
also helped the State Department monitor the flow of money overseas.17
The American public's generous efforts to help the Poles raised questions about the
relationship of the U.S. government to these burgeoning charitable efforts. In mid-September
1939, President Franklin Roosevelt sent Norman Davis, the head of the American Red Cross, and
Myron Taylor, the president’s special assistant, to Herbert Hoover to seek his advice. Given the
bad blood between Hoover and Roosevelt stemming from the 1932 election campaign and FDR’s
refusal to be associated with Hoover’s Great Depression policies, it is somewhat surprising that
Roosevelt sought out Hoover’s opinion.18 It suggests, however, that Roosevelt believed the relief
issue might become a formidable problem, and even he had to concede that Hoover could offer
vital expertise. Fortunately, the tone of the discussion was helped by the fact that Hoover and
17 See State Department Press Release, “Rules and Regulations Governing the Solicitation and Collection of Contributions for Use in France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom, India, Australia, and New Zealand,” 5 September 1939; Memo by Berle, 25 September 1939; Memo, Berle to Hull, 27 September 1939; FDRL, Berle Papers, Neutrality, September-November 1939, Box 64. “Hull Curbs Profiteering in War Charity Drives,”NYT, 5 October 1939.
18 The evolution of the rivalry can be seen in Timothy Walch’s and Dwight Miller’sHerbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Documentary History (Greenwood Press, 1998).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69
Davis had a longstanding relationship. Hoover had appointed Davis, a successful Southern
businessman turned diplomat, as a delegate to the 1931 disarmament conference in Geneva.
The relief issue was never far from Hoover’s mind. In a July 1939 speech before the
Christian Endeavor Society’s National Conference, Hoover had outlined plans for an imaginary
relief operation in an enemy-occupied country. The speech idealized his Belgium program and
offered a romanticized view of private charity unshackled by government or military
considerations. Hoover envisioned a relief program conducted by single, neutral organization
paid for by the government of the citizens receiving the aid.19
Not surprisingly, when Davis and Taylor raised the possibility of creating a new
government agency dedicated to relief, Hoover rejected the notion. He believed the job should be
left in the hands of private charity. He acknowledged, however, that if coordination was
necessary, Amcross should appoint a “capable administrator” responsible for overseeing all
American relief activities, but Amcross should not run foreign relief programs. Davis and Taylor
then asked Hoover if he would be willing to serve as the capable administrator, spearheading a
Roosevelt administration-led relief effort.
The offer placed Hoover in a difficult position. He found the prospect of leading another
European relief appealing, because it would once again place him in the national and international
limelight. In his post-presidential life, Hoover found it hard to shake the public’s perception that
he did not do enough to pull the country out of financial disaster or address the human suffering it
produced. On the other hand, the offer came from his political nemesis. Rather than give an
outright refusal, Hoover made three demands that virtually precluded Roosevelt’s agreement. He
wanted to manage the relief effort independently, with no interference from the Roosevelt
19 Text of Hoover speech, NYT, 7 July 1939. Best,Herbert Hoover, vol. I.,,126-7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70
administration. He wanted a public invitation from Roosevelt to visit the White House to discuss
relief. And finally, he wanted the Red Cross trustees give his plans blanket approval.20
Hoover knew that Roosevelt would never give him the independence he craved, but he
had other plans. The exiled Polish government asked him to organize a relief program that would
help Polish refugees and those trapped under Nazi rule. By agreeing to oversee the creation of
the Commission for Polish Relief (Comporel), Hoover not only rejected Roosevelt’s overtures,
but also reaffirmed his belief in the capabilities of private charity.21 Hoover staffed Comporel
with veterans of his previous relief programs, a move that liberated him from the day-to-day
management of the organization and allowed time to him to serve as the organization’s public
face. Hoover’s participation also helped Comporel develop a network of support, as local
committees in Washington, Philadelphia, and Boston quickly followed a national office in New
York. Interestingly, William J. Donovan, who would later run the Office of Strategic Services,
headed the local New York Committee.
Hoover’s involvement allowed Comporel to distinguish itself early on from other
organizations. From his previous relief efforts and tenure as president, Hoover understood the
importance of using the press to promote his cause. Indeed, Comporel almost immediately
became “Mr. Hoover’s relief committee.” In its dealings with the media, Comporel played up
Hoover’s past success in Belgium and suggested that his experiences would serve as a blueprint
for a Polish program. Comporel also looked for ways to distinguish itself from Amcross, its chief
competitor for donations. Unlike the weeks-old commission, Amcross had longevity and brand-
recognition on its side. To counter this, Comporel continually emphasized that, unlike Amcross,
20 James H. George, Jr., “Another Chance: Herbert Hoover and World War II Relief,”Diplomatic History, Summer 1992, vol. 16, no. 3. Best, 132-134. Best believes Hoover’s claim that antipathy towards Hoover was the primary problem during the negotiations.
21 NYT, 16, 18, 28 September 1939. Also see Hoover, American Epic, 4:4-9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71
its only concern was the plight of Poland. It tried to cultivate an aura of expertise by holding press
conferences to release what little information there was about conditions in Poland.22
Hoover’s refusal to join the administration left the growing problem of coordinating
American relief efforts unresolved. Unless something was done, the State Department feared that
duplication of effort and the misuse of funds were inevitable. One possible remedy was for
Amcross to coordinate the relief efforts.23 It was a role for which Amcross was particularly well
suited. As a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red
Cross Societies, it could draw on and contribute to the efforts of other Red Cross societies.
Amcross also had strong leadership in the form of Davis, who, along with being an experienced
diplomat, was a close friend of and advisor to Roosevelt. After Hoover, Davis was the most
logical choice for running a federal relief agency, but it did not make sense to rob Amcross of its
leadership when the organization itself could be put to work.24 In mid-October, rather than create
a new federal agency, Roosevelt urged charitable organizations to coordinate their efforts for the
Poles with Amcross. In doing so, he stressed that that Amcross served as “our national relief
agency” and “represents all of our people in times of war and peace.”25 He also encouraged
22 “Americans Study Polish Relief Plan,”NYT, 5 October 1939. “Plea For Clothing for Warsaw Made,” NYT, 26 October 1939. Comporel News Bulletin No. 2, 29 October 1939, NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 2.
23 A 1905 congressional charter gave Amcross quasi-govemmental status and an annual federal budget allocation. Ties between Amcross and the government coalesced in 1911 when President Taft made Amcross the only volunteer society authorized to render aid to American soldiers and sailors. “The American Red Cross Experiences Growing Pains and Reorganization,” American Red Cross Website, Virtual Museum Tour, http://www.redcross.org/hec/1900-1919/reorg.html.
24 John F. Hutchinson, Champions o f Charity: War and the Rise o f the Red (Boulder,Cross CO: Westview Press, 1996) 156-8; 280-282.
25 Item 142, Request for Cooperation and Coordination of War Relief Agencies, 12 October 1939,The Presidential Papers o f Franklin D. Roosevelt (CD-ROM).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72
Americans interested in aiding the Poles to join Amcross and support its efforts.26
By elevating Amcross, Roosevelt made it a representative not only of the country, but
also the administration. It was a subtlety that was not lost on the belligerents in the coming
months. The privileging of Amcross— along with Hoover’s decision not to orchestrate the
administration’s relief effort— had the unfortunate side effect of reviving the Hoover-Roosevelt
rivalry and politicizing the relief issue. The splintering of American relief efforts reflected an
unresolved debate over the role of the government in providing charity begun in the Great
Depression. Roosevelt, the architect of the New Deal, chose to use federally supported
organization as a mechanism for providing aid. Hoover, an unabashed advocate for small
government, channeled his efforts into a private organization. While other organizations worked
to provide relief for the Poles, notably the American Friends Service Committee (the Quakers),
the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJJDC), and the YMCA, Amcross and
Comporel competed with each other.
Giving an initial boost to the animosity was Amcross’ early success in providing $1
million in relief to Polish refugees. In October, Amcross sent a team to survey conditions in
Romania and Hungary. The team reported that although the nearly 135,000 Polish refugees
received assistance through a combination of private and governmental charity, more needed to
be done to improve their care. Refugees in Romania fared better then those in Hungary. Their
care was financed by the former Polish clearing balance and the gold the Polish government
lodged with the Romanian state bank for safe keeping as it fled.27 In Hungary, camp conditions
26 “We are proud that our Red Cross knows no creed, race, or color, that it respects no boundaries as it goes forth on its never-ending errands of mercy, carrying prompt and practical aid to afflicted humanity everywhere.” Statement by Roosevelt, 18 October 1939. FDRL, OF 124, Box 2, File 1939.
27 “Red Cross Grants $1,000,000 War Aid,”NYT, 14 October 1939. Telegram 288, Swift/Taylor (Budapest) to Davis, 26 October 1939; Telegram 349, Swift/Taylor via Gunther (Bucharest) to Davis via State, 22 October 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73
ranged from fair to miserable, as the sheer number of refugees presented a serious financial
problem for the Hungarian government and under-staffed private agencies. Hungary also feared
that providing significant aid to the Poles would anger Germany. After assessing the situation,
the Amcross team arranged for the shipment of medicine, underwear, sheets, and blankets to both
countries and helped establish local committees to ensure proper distribution of the supplies.28
Negotiating for Access
Although American relief groups initially concentrated on aiding Polish refugees, they
also sought to aid the twelve million Poles living in the German-created General Government of
Poland. Germany had annexed Poland’s western provinces into the Reich and turned most of the
remaining area, encompassing Krakow, Warsaw, Radom, and Lublin, into the General
Government. A wide array of groups, including Amcross, Comporel, the Quakers, YMCA,
AJJDC, and Polish National Alliance, contemplated the idea. But the prospect having to work
with Nazi Germany, whose attitude on foreign relief remained untested, gave the organizations
pause. While Jews in the General Government needed aid, AJJDC could not abide having to
defer to Germany.
Both Amcross and Comporel decided to negotiate with Germany for permission to
operate relief programs. Amcross wanted to provide short-term relief to help meet the needs
during the coming winter and until occupation authorities had a command of the territory’s
resources. Comporel wanted to conduct a long-term feeding program that would supplement
rations. The tandem negotiations in Berlin with the German Foreign Office, which began in late
October 1939, raised the competition between the organizations to a fevered pitch.
28 Telegram 270, Montgomery (Budapest) to State, 11 October 1939; Telegram 220, Davis to Montgomery (Budapest), 14 October 1939; Telegram 290, Swift/Taylor (Budapest) to Davis, 30 October 1939, NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1, FI80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74
Neither organization— nor contemporary observers for that matter— fully understood the
extent to which the General Government reflected the aims and perversions of the Nazi regime.
According to Hitler, Germany needed Lebensraum— or living space— to ensure the security,
economic health, and expansion of the German people. Believing that Eastern Europe, with its
racially inferior populations, provided the best opportunity for military conquest, Hitler chose
Poland as his first victim. Germany treated the General Government as a colonial possession, one
whose resources could be plundered on command and one whose subhuman population could be
enslaved to serve the ascending German Reich. It became, in historian Richard Lukas words,
“the central laboratory of Nazi Germany’s Lebensraum.’’'’29
Under the direction of Nazi party legal advisor Hans Frank, occupation officials built a
state dedicated to atrocity. Maintaining exclusive control the administration of the General
Government allowed Germany to experiment with brutal policies that could be exported to other
conquered territories. “The treatment of the people of the newly conquered territory was
unprecedented,” observes historian Ian Kershaw, “its modem forms of barbarism evoking, though
in more terrible fashion, the worst barbaric subjugations of bygone centuries.”30 When Germany
invaded Poland, Hitler authorized the Einsatzgruppen to purify the population by executing
clergy, Polish nobility, and intelligensia, along with anyone else who displayed active resistance.
Eventually more than 60,000 civilians were shot. The killing action marked the beginning of an
extreme ethnic cleansing program— Volkstumskampf-—planned for Poland.31 Between 1939-41,
the Nazis used the General Government to test the methods eventually used to kill more than six
29 Richard Lukas,The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles under German Occupation, (Hippocrene 1939-44 Books, 1997) ix, 7.
30 Ian Kershaw,Hitler: Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton, 200) 239.
31 Kershaw, 241-3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75
million Jews and other racial undesirables.32 Any organization seeking to provide aid to the
General Government would have to deal with an administration apathetic to the health of the
population it governed and intent on keeping knowledge of its occupation policies secret.
In November 1939, Amcross opened discussion with the German Foreign Office, which
was responsible for negotiating with foreign organizations interested in conducting relief.
Amcross’ negotiating team consisted of Ernest Swift, Wayne Taylor, and James Nicholson, the
trio who had surveyed Flungary and Rumania. Swift served as Amcross’ vice president in charge
of foreign operations and former secretary general of the League of Red Cross Societies; Taylor
and Nicholson were experienced relief workers.33 Germany responded to Amcross’ initial
overture by inviting its team on an extended motorcar trip of the General Government under the
watchful eye of representatives from the German General Staff and Foreign Office. From the
trip, they glimpsed prevailing conditions and learned about Germany’s approach to relief. Polish
civilians received relief from the German Red Cross (Deutsch Rot Kreuz), which oversaw the
hospitals, and the National Socialist People’s Welfare (Nationalsozialistische Voikswohischaft), a
charitable organization, which provided general aid.34 While abysmal conditions provided both
organizations with plenty of work, Nazi occupation authorities dictated the scope of their
activities. In Warsaw, sixty-five percent of the buildings were uninhabitable due to damage
inflicted during the fighting. Overcrowded conditions prevailed throughout the city as more than
1.3 million people— a combination of Warsaw residents and refugees— sought shelter in the
remnants. The Amcross team worried about the squalor leading to epidemics, particularly since
winter weather increased the risk of exposure. They predicted that if German organizations
32 Kershaw, 245.
33 “Red Cross Mission Flying to Europe,”NYT, 5 October 1939.
34 Telegram 2127, Kirk to State, 24 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76
ceased to provide assistance, an “appalling situation will develop [in] Warsaw and immediate
outside assistance will be required.”35
The Amcross team learned that Germany would accept assistance provided it was
funneled through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for use by the German
Red Cross. Germany’s conditions did not come as a surprise. In the early weeks of the war, the
German Red Cross— backed by ICRC— opposed plans by the League of Red Cross Societies to
create a neutral committee to conduct relief work in Poland. International and organizational
politics had fuelled their opposition: League members consisted primarily of Germany’s future
victims and ICRC always opposed League projects believing they damaged its prestige.36
Ironically, the German Red Cross desperately needed money, but ICRC could not muster any
financial help. Davis hoped that the German Red Cross’ financial problems could be used to
induce Germany to approve a program that did not include ICRC.37 At the same time, he
recognized that Amcross’ program would have to be conducted with its assistance from its sister
organization.
In mid-November, Amcross formally applied to the German Foreign Office to provide
relief for the General Government, presenting a plan that allowed it to control the distribution of
supplies. It proposed establishing permanent offices in Berlin, Krakow, and Warsaw. In each
city, Amcross representatives, supported by a small clerical staff, would work with the German
35 Telegram 2005, Gray to State, 9 November 1939. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
36 The International Committee of the Red Cross was founded as a result of the 1864 Geneva Convention, which committed signatory governments to care for the wounded of war, whether enemy or friend. Later Red Cross societies were formed to aid and prevent human suffering more generally. The League of Red Cross Societies was formed in 1919 to act as a liaison between Red Cross societies and help coordinate their activities. Today the organization is known as International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
37 Telegram 146, Davis to Swift/Taylor (Geneva), 25 October 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77
Red Cross to allocate relief supplies to reliable Polish agencies, including Jewish organizations
and the Polish Red Cross.38 “It is most important,” Davis told Alexander Kirk, the American
charge d’affaires in Berlin, “that we are able to assure ourselves and contributors that
contributions and supplies for Polish relief reach those for whom intended and that there be no
discrimination between the needy.”39 Reports suggested that German-run relief programs
excluded Jews, and Amcross refused to discriminate.40
The German Foreign Office countered with an offer that drastically increased the
involvement of the German Red Cross. Whereas Amcross envisioned an amicable partnership,
the German Foreign Office outlined an unequal relationship. Germany proposed that Amcross
direct all of its shipments to Berlin, eliminating the need for satellite offices. Upon delivery of
the supplies, the German Red Cross would transport and distribution the supplies to relief
agencies in the General Government. Amcross representatives would be allowed occasional
supervised visits to the General Government to be kept apprised of relief needs. Germany’s
proposal derived from two principles: all foreign relief programs had to be administered in
conjunction with the German Red Cross, and no foreign relief organizations could maintain
offices or have continuous representation in the General Government.41
38 Telegram 2039, Kirk to State, 14 November 1939. Telegram 890, Davis to Amcross Delegation, 15 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
39 Telegram 832, Davis to Kirk, 4 November 1939. Telegram 849, Davis to Swift/Taylor (Berlin), 9 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1, F208.
40 Telegram 866, Davis to Swift/Tay, 11 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
41 Telegram 2084, Amcross delegation to Davis, 18 November 1939. Telegram 928, Davis to Nicholson, 21 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78
Amcross found Germany’s offer problematic, because it made observing the distribution
of supplies difficult.42 “[U]nless we are able give assurances that supplies furnished by us have
been impartially distributed as allocated,” Davis told his team in Berlin, “our ability to aid will be
greatly limited.”43 Davis wanted a firm guarantee— not just a promise— that Amcross
representatives would be allowed to visit the General Government. When Amcross’ team raised
the question of access with the German Foreign Office, it was told that on-demand visitation to
Poland could not be guaranteed because the German General Staff approved travel permits, but
every attempt to facilitate such visits would be made.44 Amcross had to decide whether or not it
could trust the German Red Cross to act honorably. “American Red Cross can render greatly
needed relief and make occasional inspections,” Nicholson wrote Davis, “only by preserving
attitude of complete confidence in Deutsch Rot Kreuz which maintains American Red Cross
should accord it the confidence it has extended in the past to other sister societies.”45 Davis
grudgingly accepted the terms, but wanted it made known that Amcross would discontinue its
program if Germany refused to allow Amcross to inspect the distribution arrangements.46 The
agreement cleared the way for Amcross to begin making preparations to ship $250,000 in relief
supplies to the General Government.47
42 Telegram 2084, Amcross delegation to Davis, 18 November 1939; Telegram 928, Davis to Nicholson, 21 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
43 Telegram 940, Davis to Nicholson, 22 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 1.
44 Telegram 2118, Nicholson to Davis, 23 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
45 Telegram 2133, Nicholson to Davis, 24 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 1.
46 Telegram 947, Davis to Nicholson, 24 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
47 Telegram 2165, Kirk to State, 28 November 1939; Amcross News Service Press Release, 28 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79
At the end of November, Germany announced that the terms governing Amcross’
program applied to all other foreign relief programs.48 The announcement came as a shock to
Comporel’s negotiating team, which was led by former senator Frederick Walcott. To provide
relief to the General Government, Comporel partnered with the Quakers, who were fondly
remembered by the Germans for their work in postwar Germany. Hoover also wanted to work
with Quakers to prevent them from working with Amcross.49 Although they were supposed to
be partners, Comporel dominated the partnership, treating the Quakers as a tool rather than an
equal. Rather than negotiate with the German Foreign Office, Comporel had pursued other
avenues throughout the fall. It approached the National Socialist People’s Welfare about
conducting a joint program, but negotiations bogged down when the Nazi organization insisted on
excluding Jews.50 Comporel also courted members of Air Marshal Hermann Goring’s entourage.
By dealing with Goring, Comporel believed it had an inside track. After it learned of Amcross’
agreement, Walcott tried to use his Goring connection to obtain a different deal— Comporel did
not want to work with the German Red Cross— but it proved to be a mistake. Comporel’s
relationship with Goring cast suspicion on its intentions, particularly since Goring and Foreign
Minister Joachim Ribbentrop distrusted each other. Unhappy with the turn of events, Comporel
accused Amcross of intentionally foiling its plans.51
48 Telegram 2121 (Section One), Kirk to State, 23 November 1939; Telegram 2151, Nicholson to Davis, 28 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
49 Letter, Hoover to Pate, 29 November 1939. Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), CPR, Box 1, File 11.
50 Letter, Hilgenfeldt to Elkinton, 10 October 1939; Letter, Morris to Hilgenfeldt, 26 October 1939; Letter, Rhoads and Walcott to Hilgenfeldt, 30 November 1939. Letter, Walcott to Pate, 1 December 1939. HIA, Commission Polish Relief, Box 27, File 18.
51 Telegram 2121 (Section Two), Kirk to State, 23 November 1939; Telegram 2176, Nicholson to Davis, 29 November 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, MI1284, Roll 1. Letter, Walcott to Pate, 1 December 1939. HIA, Commission for Polish Relief, Box 27, File 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80
Comporel wisely switched tactics and approached the German Foreign Office in
December. It received permission to distribute clothing, provide cod liver oil and condensed milk
to Polish and Jewish children, and send food packages worth up to twenty-five marks. The food
packages could not contain more than five kilograms of any one kind of food. Since mail service
in the General Government remained terribly disorganized, all food and clothing packages had to
be consigned to the German Red Cross, which would distribute them through Polish and Jewish
relief committees. Germany also agreed to allow cash remittances, but attached significant
regulations that severely limited their usefulness. Comporel, however, did not receive permission
to visit the General Government.52 Walcott regarded the agreement as a breakthrough, but
Hoover and his staff in New York thought otherwise. They wanted Comporel to maintain control
of the goods throughout the distribution process, not turn them over to the German Red Cross.53
They told him to try again, but Walcott believed his colleagues were being unreasonable. Not
only would Comporel receive adequate receipts for all its supplies, but visitation rights, so
Walcott believed, would also be forthcoming. “Ribbentrop assured me,” wrote Walcott, “he
would do everything [to] make [the] undertaking successful.”54 Walcott suggested that Comporel
52 Telegram 2283, Rhoads/Walcott to Comporel, 8 December 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1. Letter, Albrecht to Walcott and Rhoads, (3 December 1939. HIA, Commission for Polish Relief, Box 27, File 18. The food packages could not contain more than five kilograms of any one kind of food. Extensive regulations governed the cash remittances, including the amount and type of currency that could be sent directly to an individual, making such remittances difficult, but not impossible to make. For example, if the amount being sent to a named individual did not exceed 500 marks, registered marks may be used. Cash remittances in registered marks to individuals were not possible in the Generalgovemment, since the zloty currency was still being used. In such cases, cash remittances could be made up to 50 marks a month, but half had to be in German marks and the other half in American dollars, which would be exchanged by the German Grossbank into zlotys and forwarded to the named individual.
53 Memcon, Long and Pate, 12 December 1939; Telegram, Comporel to Long, 12 December 1939 (text of telegram forwarded Comporel reps in Berlin), NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
54 Telegram 552, Walcott to Comporel, 13 December 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1. Letter, Pate to Long, 27 December 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81
should obtain the State Department’s blessing if it was worried about the agreement.55 The State
Department, however, refused to officially sanction Comporel’s activities because it was a private
charity.56 Despite lingering concerns about distribution controls, Comporel made arrangements
for 15,000 gallons of cod liver oil to be shipped from Norway and began organizing clothing
shipments.57
By mid-December, Amcross and Comporel both had permission from Germany to
conduct relief programs in the General Government. Tensions between the two groups continued
to grow, fuelled in part by Comporel’s belief that Amcross’ agreement had a negative impact on
its ability to provide relief. Given the circumstances, it was natural that Amcross would have
more influence in this early stage: it was an established organization with historical and
institutional ties to Germany’s own Red Cross. Indeed, because of its upstart position, Comporel
should have worked through proper channels rather than depending on personal influence to
achieve its goals. Not surprisingly, the deference given Amcross did not sit well with Comporel.
The end result was open hostility towards Amcross, behavior that did not go unnoticed by
German officials. Nicholson observed that Comporel “protested their desire to cooperate but
their practices indicated a strong desire to be sole Polish relief agency.”58
55 Telegram 2452, Rhoads to Comporel, 22 December 1939; Telegram 2455, Rhoads/Gamble to Comporel, 23 December 1939; Memo, Long to Special Division, 27 December 1939; Telegram 2497, Rhoads to Comporel, 31 December 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
56 Note, Long to Messersmith/Green, 29 December 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
57 Letter, Rhoads to Pate, 27 December 1940. HI A, CPR, Box 27, File 18. Comporel News Bulletin, No. 5, 29 December 1939, NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
58 Telegram 306, Nicholson to Davis, 5 December 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82
American Red Cross in the General Government
Although they had Germany’s approval to conduct a program, Amcross and Comporel
needed Britain’s permission to ship relief supplies through the blockade. The organizations
needed Britain’s approval for two reasons. First, Europe’s war footing made it difficult to buy
goods, particularly foodstuffs, within Europe. Worried about the war spreading, countries
jealously guarded their agricultural products and their stocks of medicine. Ironically, Poland was
one of the largest prewar exporters of food, but its breadbasket had been demolished by fighting
or harnessed by Nazi Germany for its own purposes. The lack of supplies within Europe left the
relief organizations with no other choice than to purchase goods in the United States and ship
them to the General Government— and by extension through the British blockade. Second, after
the implementation of the navicert system at the beginning of December 1939, MEW closely
tracked supplies going to Germany and the General Government. If Amcross or Comporel failed
to obtain Britain’s permission to ship their relief supplies, they ran the risk of having their cargoes
seized by British contraband control authorities.
Obtaining permission from Britain meant, in practice, getting approval from both MEW
and the Foreign Office. MEW, as the administrator and guardian of the blockade, automatically
looked askance at anything that might dilute the effectiveness of Britain’s economic warfare
campaign. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, was more open-minded about the relief issue.
Throughout the fall of 1939, its officials helped British charities, such as the British Red Cross,
Save the Children, and the Polish Relief Fund, cut through bureaucratic red tape so they could
provide assistance to Polish refugees in Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania.59 Foreign Secretary
Edward Halifax also wrestled the Treasury into contributing £100,000 to their efforts after the
59 Letter, Raczynski to Halifax, 28 October 1939; Letter, Halifax to Raczynski, 31 October 1939; Memcon for meeting (W15607), 24 October 1939; Letter (266/38/39), Hoare to Halifax, 27 October 1939; Letter, Borenius to Humphrys, 24 October 1939, TNA/PRO, F0371/24103.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83
charities encountered difficulties raising money.60 The Foreign Office’s efforts on behalf of
Polish refugees did not necessarily translate into ready support relief for the General Government,
but the Foreign Office was conscious of how Britain's treatment of American relief efforts
affected its relations with the United States.
While Britain had the power to determine the fate of Amcross’ and Comporel’s relief
programs, the actions of the organizations played a large role in determining those destinies. In
Amcross’ favor was the fact that it was operating a short-term relief program, which posed less of
a threat to the blockade than a long-term feeding program. But in mid-December, Amcross got
off to a rocky start with MEW. Misunderstandings about what could be shipped and improperly
filed navicerts resulted in nasty paperwork feuds and impounded cargo. MEW gave Amcross
immediate assurances that medical supplies could pass the blockade, but it planned to carefully
60 The goods were then purchased from British sources, shipped to the continent, and sent to central Europe by rail. When a shipment arrived, representatives of the Polish Relief Fund, working with British officials, distributed the supplies to local relief organizations. By the second week of December, clothing, shoes, and blankets purchased with grant funds were bound for both Budapest and Bucharest. Providing relief to Polish refugees in Lithuania proved more difficult due to shipping problems. Britain ended up contributing in-kind goods to a program run by Comporel. See Minute by Randall, 31 October 1939; Letter, Hale to Randall, 27 October 1939; Letter, Halifax to Simon, 1 November 1939; Letter, Simon to Halifax, 7 November 1939; “Note of an Interdepartmental Meeting to consider the question of governmental supplies to Polish refugees,” 10 November 1939; Letter, Ronald to Secretary of Ministry of Health, 16 November 1939; TNA/PRO, F0371/24103; “Refugee Questions in the Foreign Office,” 10 November 1939, TNA/PRO, F0371/24106. Telegram 636, FO to Hoare, 8 November 1939; Telegram 15 Saving, FO to Kennard, 13 November 1939; Letter, Moyne to Humphrys, 8 November 1939; Telegram 728, Hoare (Bucharest) to FO, 15 November 1939; Telegram 164, FO to O’Malley (Budapest), 17 November 1939; Telegram 173, FO to O’Malley (Budapest), 29 November 1939. TNA/PRO, FO371/24103. Telegram 177, FO to O’Malley (Budapest), 4 December 1939; Telegram 178, FO to O’Malley, 4 December 1939; Telegram 187, FO to O’Malley, 15 December 1939. TNA/PRO, FO371/24104. Telegram 692, FO to Hoare (Bucharest), 22 November 1939, TNA/PRO, F 0371/24103. Telegram 815, FO to Hoare, 22 December 1939, TNA/PRO, F0371/24104. Note by Humphreys, 8 December 1939; Letter, Ronald to Kennard, 2 December 1939, TNA/PRO, FO371/24105. Memcon by Strang on visit with Counselor of Lithuanian Legation, 19 December 1939; Letter, Carvell to Moyne, 28 December 1939; Note of a Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Polish Relief Fund, 20 December 1939; MacDonald to Carvell, 21 December 1939; Letter, Carvell to Moyne, 28 December 1939, TNA/PRO, FO371/24106. Letter, FO to Washington, 15 December 1939, TNA/PRO, FO371/24105. Letter, Carvell to Preston, 22 December 1939; Telegram 1, FO to Preston (Kovno), 1 January 1940; Telegram 10, FO to Preston (Kovno), 11 January 1940; Telegram 18, FO to Preston (Kovno), 17 January 1940; Telegram 14, FO to Preston , 17 January 1940; Telegram 24, FO to Preston (Kovno), 24 January 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/24106.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84
consider the passage of all other goods.6' Although MEW intended to give “sympathetic
consideration to any application” from Amcross, it was also “anxious that [the] Americans should
not receive impression that they can rush us into relaxing our control on this point.”62 At the end
of the month, MEW stated its conditions for allowing Amcross ship goods to the General
Government: first, the shipments could only consist of food, clothing, and medical supplies;
second, Germany had to provide a written guarantee that the supplies would not be requisitioned
for military use; third, Amcross had to control the distribution of the supplies; and four, the
supplies were to be consigned to the American ambassador in Berlin.63 Unfortunately, MEW ’s
conditions did not match Amcross’ agreement reached with Germany, which specified that the
supplies were to be consigned to an Amcross representative— not the American ambassador— and
deposited in a warehouse in Krakow— not at the American embassy in Berlin.64 While the
consignment issue was easily fixed, the distribution controls proved to be a sticky problem.
During the second week of January 1940, Amcross successfully distributed its first batch
of relief supplies in the General Government.65 Amcross had slipped the supplies past MEW
before it implemented the navicert system. The supplies had been shipped to Trieste, Italy, and
then sent on by rail to Krakow for distribution under Nicholson’s supervision. As Nicholson
61 Telegram2567, Johnson to Davis, 8 December 1939. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 1.
62 Letter (C28/1), Leith-Ross to Rajchman, 6 January 1940, TNA/PRO, FO371/24105.Telegram 4 ARFAR, MEW to Brussels, 26 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
63 The ship carrying the goods was not a German ship and that on its return voyage, it would not carry any cargo of German origin. No other cargo was carried on the ship; and the goods were consigned to the American ambassador in Berlin; Amcross also had to inform MEW of a relief ship’s cargo at least one week before it reaches the contraband port at which it will call. Letter (18859/13884/48), Strang to Drogheda, 22 December 1939, TNA/PRO, FO371/24105; Letter, Drogheda to Johnson, 27 December 1939, TNA/PRO, F 0371/25237. Amcross also had to inform MEW of a relief ship’s cargo at least one week before it reaches the contraband port at which it will call.
64 Letter, Swift to Lothian, 2 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
65 Telegram 82, Nicholson to Davis, 11 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85
made arrangements to receive a second shipment, he learned that Germany refused to grant him
permission to visit the General Government, which meant that the German Red Cross would have
to take delivery of the supplies. Davis greeted the news with dismay— unless Nicholson could
secure visitation rights, Amcross could not meet Britain’s conditions.66 When Nicholson
attempted to revise the visitation arrangement, he was told that new regulations prohibited all
foreigners from traveling to the General Government. Frustrated, Nicholson attributed some of
his difficulties to Comporel’s ongoing negotiations with Germany, which he believed made
Germany distrustful of American relief efforts. “They will not be granted supervision within
Poland,” he told Davis, “and while they complicate relief distribution their countrymen suffer.”
With the help of sympathetic German Foreign Office officials, Nicholson plead Amcross’ case,
but to no avail. “Every argument has been completely exhausted,” he cabled Davis. “Occupation
authorities remain adamant that no representation nor occasional visit will be permitted for any
foreign relief work in Poland.” He might be granted a courtesy visit, but nothing more. “[I]
strongly doubt they wish continued foreign relief despite serious needs.”67
Given Germany’s new attitude, Nicholson urged that Amcross complete its current
program and withdraw, but Davis refused to give up.68 He discussed the situation with Hans
Thomsen, the charge d’affaires at the German Embassy in Washington, who agreed to urge Berlin
to grant Amcross visitation rights. Thomsen recognized that a withdrawal by Amcross would not
66 Telegram 137, Davis to Nicholson, 19 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
67 Frustrated with the situation, Nicholson looked to help from Lohmann and Hartmann. Both men agreed that Nicholson should visit Krakow and attempted to secure him the necessary papers. Telegram 102, Nicholson to Davis, 15 January 1940; Telegram 111, Nicholson to Davis, 16 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
68 Telegram 126, Nicholson to Davis, 22 January 1940; Telegram 167, Davis to Nicholson, 23 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86
help the already sorry state of affairs between Germany and the United States.69 Although the
State Department also worried about the repercussions, it refrained from becoming officially
involved. It allowed Kirk to make informal representations on behalf of Amcross to the German
Foreign Office, but nothing more.70 The German Foreign Office, however, assured Kirk that the
difficulties would be “settled satisfactorily.”''1
At the beginning of February 1940, Germany gave Nicholson permission to visit Krakow
for two weeks, allowing him to inspect Amcross’ warehouses and distribute supplies to local
Polish and Jewish agencies. While in Krakow, Nicholson had tea with Governor General Hans
Frank and discussed Amcross’ concerns about distribution. Frank promised that Germany would
continue to allow Amcross to control its supplies, including granting it permission to station
representatives in Krakow, Radom, Lublin, and Warsaw to observe distribution operations. Frank
also pledged that Germany would not requisition Amcross supplies.72
Frank led Nicholson to believe that official confirmation of the agreement he outlined
would shortly follow, but delays ensued once again, with a negative impact on public support for
relief in the General Government.73 “The long delay [in] decision [is] embarrassing,” Davis
cabled Nicholson, “and [has] complicated situation here [by] creating doubts as to possibility of
69 Telegram 176, Hull to Kirk, 24 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
70 Telegram 249, State to Kirk, 1 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
71 Telegram 195, Kirk to Hull, 25 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
72 Telegram 276, Nicholson to Davis, 2 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2. Nicholson apparently spoke quite freely during the meeting, questioning Frank about German policy. Frank told him that the “General Government must be self-supporting” with its resources marshaled to give “poorer classes opportunities . . .they never had.” When Nicholson asked about the treatment of the Jews, Frank told him that “Jews have commercial abilities lacking in Poles therefore necessary to the state. Jews, however, must wear armbands with blue star.”
73 Telegram 296, Nicholson to Davis, 5 February 1940; Telegram 323, Nicholson to Davis, 7 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2. The German Foreign Office signed off on Amcross' program. Telegram 336, Kirk to Hull, 7 February 1940; Telegram 385, Kirk to Hull, 13 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87
obtaining satisfactory cooperation [in] relief efforts.”74 Comporel was also causing trouble for
Amcross, by suggesting that Amcross’ supervision controls were inadequate. It urged Polish
groups not to contribute to Amcross, suggesting instead that they wait to support Comporel’s
program .75
Despite Frank’s promises to the contrary, Germany reconfirmed its policy prohibiting
American relief organizations from maintaining permanent offices in the General Government in
mid-February 1940. Since Germany had asked all foreign diplomatic and consular services to
withdraw, a permanent American relief presence could not be justified.76 Germany, however,
agreed to permit one representative to accompany the arrival of each shipment and to remain to
supervise the distribution of supplies. After the distribution was complete, the representative had
to withdraw.77 Germany believed that with these arrangements Amcross was “fully enabled to
carry out [its] work.”78 Tired of the delays, Davis decided to accept Germany’s conditions and
began making arrangements to ship additional supplies.79 As a demonstration of its intent to
74 Telegram 388, Davis to Nicholson, 16 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
75 Telegram 91, Davis to Nicholson, 12 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
76 Telegram 458, Nicholson to Davis, 20 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
77 Telegram 455, Kirk to State, 19 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
78 Letter, Thomsen to Davis, 20 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
79 Amcross shipped another $80,000 worth of supplies to supplement the $84,831 worth of goods already in Krakow or enroute from Genoa. As of February 24, 1940, Amcross had received contributions designated for Polish relief amounting to $389,089 and expenditures and commitments amounted to $397,165. This amount covered relief for the General Government and care of 120,000 Polish refugees in Roumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania. Letter, Davis to Thomsen, 24 February 1940; “Polish Relief: The American National Red Cross, September 1,1939 to February 24, 1940.” NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, Ml 284, Roll 2. As of February 24, 1940, Amcross had received contributions designated for Polish relief amounting to $389,089 and expenditures and commitments amounted to $397,165. This amount covered relief for the General Government and the care of 120,000 Polish refugees in Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cooperate, Germany again granted Nicholson permission to travel to Krakow to meet the
shipments and make distribution arrangements.80
Germany's consent to allow an Amcross representative to travel to Krakow played a key
role in resolving Amcross’ ongoing difficulties with MEW. During January, MEW ordered the
cargo from four ships chartered by Amcross impounded at Genoa. Improperly filed navicerts
first attracted the attention of British contraband control authorities at Gibraltar, but MEW
ultimately seized the cargo because it did not believe that Amcross’ existing agreement with
Germany met the “fundamental requirements of continuous American control over
distribution.”81 Indeed, MEW regarded Germany's declaration that Amcross supplies would be
properly distributed to have “absolutely no value whatsoever.” Lord Drogheda, MEW's joint
director, found it distressing that MEW was “continually being placed in the embarrassing
position of either having to hold up the goods or of allowing them to go through with no
guarantee that they will benefit Polish sufferers.”82 Drogheda asked Herschel Johnson, the
American charge d’affaires, to help him work with Amcross to resolve the situation. Drogheda
impressed upon Johnson that MEW remained “not only willing but glad to facilitate the passage
of any supplies which it can be known will go only to destitute Poles and not fall into the hands of
80 Telegram 446, Swift to Nichlson, 21 February 1940; Amcross News Service, “Germany Gives American Red Cross Additional Guarantee for its Relief Work in Polish Territory,” 21 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
81 Telegram 200, Davis to Wayne Chatfield-Taylor, 1 February 1940; Telegram 291, Taylor to Davis, 1 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2. The ships were the SSExiria, SS Exeter, SS Exochorda and SS M anhattan.
82 Letter (C.28/1), Drogheda to Johnson, 28 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Upon taking over MEW, Dalton appointed Henry Drogeda and Noel Hall joint directors of the ministry. After spending time in the foreign service, Drogheda left in 1918 for a successful career in the bar. Hall was head of the Economics Department at University College, London. See Hugh Dalton,The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931-1945 (London: Frederik Muller, Ltd. 1957) 334-335.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89
the Germans.”83 Taylor also traveled from Berlin to London, which allowed MEW and Amcross
to have a face-to-face discussion rather than trade a flurry of cables. At the end of January, MEW
agreed to release the supplies impounded at Genoa, but it would not approve additional shipments
until Germany gave Amcross permission to travel to Krakow to take delivery.84 “I quite
understand that the conditions which we have specified are difficult to accept because of the
attitude taken up by the German Government,” Drogheda acknowledged to Johnson, “but we feel
that we must absolutely insist on the American Red Cross retaining exclusively all the time the
effective control over the distribution of any goods sent to Poland for the relief of the Polish
population.”85 Amcross, however, did not object to M EW ’s stance, given its own concerns about
distribution.
The State Department, however, suddenly became indignant over MEW’s treatment of
Amcross. While MEW viewed the release of Amcross cargo as “entirely exceptional,” the State
Department found its refusal to “relent in the execution of its policies” untenable. “The American
Government feels that the right of its citizens to send medical and other related supplies to
victims of war,” expounded Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, “should not be
interfered with by the British Government or such interferences predicated by that Government
on policy which the German Government may adopt in the premises.”86 Although the State
Department’s ongoing quarrel with Britain over the treatment of American shipping definitely
played role in its hostile response, it is somewhat puzzling as to why Washington became upset
83 Telegram 253, Johnson to State, 27 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
84 Telegram 203, Davis to Nicholson, 27 January 1940, F183, NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
85 Telelgram 386, Johnson to State, 14 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
86 Telegram 351, Davis to Nicholson, 12 February' 1940; Telegram 273, State to Johnson, 13 February 1940; Telegram 284, State to Johnson, 15 February 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90
precisely at the moment MEW and Amcross managed to resolve two months of disharmony.
Nevertheless, the State Department’s indignation manifested itself in a determination to remind
Britain of America’s right to freedom of the seas. When told to take up the issue with the Foreign
Office, Joseph Kennedy, the American ambassador to Britain, refused, arguing that a forceful
representation would anger Britain, especially when accompanied by an appeal to
humanitarianism. “Many things were upsetting the American people about the British action,”
cabled Kennedy, “and many things were upsetting the British about American action.” Long
refused to budge, observing that if Britain quit being so antagonistic then “the American public
would have more reason to have sympathy with the British and would have less irritation to their
natural predilections for sympathy for the British.”87
In the middle of Kennedy and Long’s transatlantic spat, Germany gave Amcross
permission to visit the General Government, thereby allowing Amcross to renew its discussions
with MEW.88 Amcross wanted to finish its initial $250,000 program. To help Amcross, the State
Department told Kennedy to approach the Foreign Office as originally instructed— something his
tantrum allowed him to delay— but Kennedy passed the task to Johnson.89 Kennedy’s decision to
pass the task to Johnson helped Amcross in the long run, since the Whitehall respected Johnson, a
plainspoken lawyer from South Carolina, and disdained the appeasement-minded Kennedy. “1
have not yet received a reply,” wrote Johnson reporting on his meeting, “but I have been given
some encouragement to believe that the Foreign Office is more sympathetic to our views than the
87 Memcon, Long and Kennedy, 15 February 1940, NA, RG59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
88 Telegram 339, Hull to Johnson, 22 February 1940,FRUS , 1940, Volume II, 755. Letter, Swift to Hull, 22 February 1940; Telegram 339, State to London, 22 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
89 Telegram 416, London to State, 19 February 1940; Telegram 319, State to London, 19 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91
Ministry of Economic Warfare has so far shown itself to be.”90 Johnson conjectured that
increased British sensitivity toward American public opinion boded well for Amcross. “The
Foreign Office is beginning to show greater concern than in the earlier days of the war at the
trend of American public opinion,” he wrote . “One of the difficulties is that so few of the
officials have any American background and in the past have seemed to think that the formula
that they are ‘fighting for their lives’ was a sufficient answer to anything.” Johnson discovered
that Britain’s American policy was being reevaluated because of the relief issue and “certain
errors in judgment,” notably the paralysis of the Anglo-American trading relationship as a result
of Britain’s decision to scale back purchases of American agricultural products.91
Amcross’ request to continue its program raised the larger and more difficult question of
how much control Britain could exert over American relief efforts for to the General
Government. While inclined to be more sympathetic than MEW— and more alive to the politics
of the situation— the Foreign Office remained leery of the restrictions Germany placed on
American supervision. It regarded as somewhat dubious Amcross’ contention that it would
immediately discover any attempts by Germany to interfere with the distribution of supplies.
Despite its concerns, the Foreign Office recommended, and MEW agreed, to give Amcross
approval to ship additional supplies, which allow it to finish its initial program.92 Although
90 Telegram 447, Johnson to State, 23 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
91 The fall-out from this policy, which was adopted out of Treasury’s concern over exchange rates, along with the relief issue had forced the review. Telegram 480, Johnson to State, 27 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
92 By the beginning of March 1940, Amcross had shipped $175,000 worth of supplies to the General Government. The approval allowed Amcross to make additional shipments of medicine and clothing in mid-March. Minute (W3265/37/48), 22 February 1940; Telegram 200 (W3608/37/48), Halifax to Lothian, 28 February 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Telegram 661, Kennedy to State, 16 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2. Telegram 412, FO to Lothian, 16 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Letter (W3265/37/48), Humphrys to Johnson, 5 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Amcross News Service, “Red Cross Officials Tour Poland; Find Relief Impartially Handled; British Lift
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92
Britain approved Amcross’ program, Halifax remained circumspect about allowing other relief
programs. “I am not prepared to recommend that we should give all American relief organisations
carte blanche to send whatever they like to Poland.” Halifax also found it troubling that rather
than help to resolve the situation, the State Department inflamed it by asserting America’s right to
freedom of the seas. “My view,” he wrote Lord Lothian, the British ambassador to the United
States, “is that if the United States Government really desires to make certain that the Poles will
obtain the benefit of the supplies sent for them and not merely to satisfy American charitable
organisations by eyewash, they must insist on effective supervision by Americans and if
necessary pillory the German Government for refusing.” 93
In mid-March 1940, Taylor and Nicholson wrapped up a twelve-day trip to the General
Government where they observed the distribution of Amcross supplies through “entirely Polish
and Jewish channels” with the cooperation of German authorities.94 “I hope that this will serve
somewhat to relieve your anxieties,” remarked Lothian relaying the news to the Foreign Office.95
While upbeat about the distribution system, Taylor and Nicholson warned that the food situation
would be an ongoing problem. “The best opinion indicates that [the] situation will become more
serious until next harvest,” they cabled, “and the General Government cannot become food self-
sufficient for several years as huge population transportation in progress and continuing have
Blockade on Supplies,” 19 March 1940. American Red Cross, “Summary of Foreign War Relief Operations,” 31 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3.
93 Telegram 343, FO to Lothian, 4 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Also see Minute (W3734/37/48), 5 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
94 Telegram 659, Taylor/Nicholson to Davis, 16 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2. “Conditions in Poland Described by Red Cross Delegates; Urgent Need for Continued Relief from U.S.,” 22 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 3. Taylor and Nicholson reported that the Polish Central Relief Committee was headed by Prince Janucz Radziwill and Count Adam Ronickier; the Polish Red Cross represented by Countess Tamowska; and Jewish population represented by Marcele Biberstein, head of the Jewish community in Krakow.
95 Telegram 923, Lothian to FO, 20 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F 0371/25237.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93
complicated and aggravated already unbalanced position.” Children and the elderly already
showed signs of “serious malnutrition.” They suggested that a general feeding program or, at the
very minimum, the distribution of milk, would be necessary to improve the health of the Poles.96
The presence of effective distribution controls and the pressing need for additional aid
prompted Amcross to ask Britain for permission to send another $250,000 in relief supplies,
including vitamin-rich condensed milk. Deciding that an agreement was best worked out in
London, the State Department left Johnson and Taylor to negotiate with the Foreign Office and
MEW.97 Once again, Taylor’s presence greatly benefited Amcross. Fresh from his trip to the
General Government, he could attest to having seen Amcross boots and shoes on Polish feet and
cod liver oil used in hospitals. During the meeting with Sir Francis Humphrys, the Foreign
Office’s point person on the relief issue, Taylor initially dodged questions about distribution
procedures, fearing that the British would find fault. Encouraged by Humphrys’s curiosity,
Taylor eventually spoke about them in detail: Amcross supplies were shipped to Genoa and then
sent by rail to Krakow, where they were stored in a warehouse. Upon their arrival, representatives
from Amcross, the German Red Cross, and the Polish Central Committee discussed how to
allocate the supplies to meet the most pressing needs. They then allocated supplies to designated
Polish relief agencies for distribution to the Polish population. The relief agencies gave receipts
for the supplies they received and, in turn, obtained receipts from the individuals receiving the
supplies. “While this system of receipting is a little elaborate,” admitted Taylor, “it works well in
practice and it serves to emphasize the responsibilities of all the accountable organizations and
96 Telegram 659, Taylor/Nicholson to Davis, 16 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2. “Conditions in Poland Described by Red Cross Delegates; Urgent Need for Continued Relief from U.S.,” 22 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3.
97 Letter, Davis to Hull, 29 March 1940; Telegram 589, Davis to Taylor (London), 30 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, Ml 284, Roll 3. The original draft of the telegram closed with the sentence “Our Embassy at London will, of course, afford you necessary assistance in approaching Ministry officials.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94
individuals.” Distributions of supplies to individuals were scheduled so that Amcross
representatives could observe them and check the methods used at each distribution center.
Taylor believed that the work of the Polish Central Committee, which consisted of representatives
of the Polish Red Cross, the Catholic Charities, the Jewish community, and the Polish Self-Help
Committee, constituted the most important element of the plan. Without it, Amcross could not
carry out its relief program.98
Writing to Davis, Taylor observed that Britain’s “attitude on the conduct of war has
materially stiffened with particular emphasis on tightening the blockade, thus most questions
asked by Foreign Office involved food supplies rather than American Red Cross shipments.”99
The line of questioning worried Davis, who feared that Amcross’ request to send food would
delay the shipment of medical supplies and clothing. Amcross volunteers across the country had
made “innumerable articles of clothing” that needed to be sent to Poland soon in order to avoid
embarrassment.100 Consequently, Davis told Taylor to withdraw the request for food, but Taylor
never got the opportunity. Humphrys, who had become quite jaded about relief prospects for the
General Government, found Taylor and his account of Amcross’ work so impressive that he
recommended the approval of Amcross’ second program. He also recommended permitting the
program— and Halifax concurred— because it provided Britain maneuvering room for dealing
with Hoover and his plans for running a mass feeding program. “It seems difficult,” argued
Humphrys, “to forbid the entry of these comparatively harmless supplies into Poland especially as
98 Humphrys asked Taylor to put his description in of Amcross’ distribution system in writing so that he could share it with MEW. Minute [W5630/37/48] by Carvell on meeting between Humphrys, Johnson, and Taylor, 5 April 1940; Letter, Taylor to Humphrys, 8 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
99 Telegram 862, Taylor to Davis, 5 April 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3.
100 Telegram 598, Davis to Taylor, 1 April 1940; Telegram 632, Davis to Taylor, 6 April 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95
we are determined to take a strong line over Mr. Hoover’s food proposals.”101 The Foreign
Office not only saw the distinction between the two organizations, but also recognized the value
of maintaining it.
The Foreign Office encouraged MEW to approve Amcross’ second program arguing that
“it would be difficult to justify a refusal to allow these comparatively harmless relief supplies to
go to Poland. The withholding of them would have no adverse effect on Germany but would
cause a fuss in the U.S.A. out of proportion to their importance.” 102 MEW initially objected to
Amcross extending its program, but withdrew the objection when its own Contraband Control
Committee granted approval.103 The committee believed the Hoover scheme “ought to be resisted
by every means, and the Committee repeat that they are giving their consent to this scheme in the
confident belief that any proposals by Mr. Hoover will be successfully resisted.”104 With MEW
quelled, Amcross received permission to ship another $250,000 in relief supplies to the General
Government in mid-April 1940.105
As Amcross made arrangements to expand its Polish program, the calm of the Phoney
War was shattered by Germany’s attack on Norway and Denmark on 9 April 1940. The invasion
not only changed the rhythm of the war—putting an end to the military inactivity of the previous
101 Minute [W5630/37/48] by Humphrys, Cadogan, and Halifax, 8-9 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F 0371/25237.
102 Letter [W5630/37/48], Seymour to Mounsey, 11 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F 0371/25237.
103 Telegram 620 Arfar, MEW to Lothian, 27 April 1940; Letter, Mounsey to Seymour, 25 April 1940; Telegram 1187 Arfar, MEW to Washington, 27 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238.
104 Extract from minutes ofthe Contraband Meeting, 12 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238.
105 The approval, however, did not give Amcross carte blanche to ship what it wanted. MEW intended to keep a careful eye on the contents of the shipments, since it remained “unconvinced that supervision of supplies reaching Poland is anything like adequate.” MEW also informed the Foreign Office that until Amcross started taking its conditions seriously, contraband control authorities would be instructed to unload and detain any suspect cargo. Telegram 620 Arfar, MEW to Lothian, 27 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Telegram 941, Taylor to Davis, 13 April 1940, F261, NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3; Telegram 578, FO to Washington, 15 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96
six months— but also diverted attention away from the plight of the General Government.
Germany’s assault on Scandinavia surprised the Allies, who had interpreted intelligence reports
of large-scale action by the German navy as a precursor to a major Atlantic campaign. Germany
wanted to control Norway because it would ensure access to Swedish iron ore and other valuable
raw materials, while also providing bases from which to wage submarine warfare against Atlantic
convoys. At the end of May, Norwegian forces, with help from the Allies, reclaimed the key port
city of Narvik, only to have to withdraw to defend against the Germany’s continued assault on
Western Europe. On 7 June, the Norwegian king and his government departed for exile in
Britain.106 The Norwegian campaign served as the beginning of Nazi Germany’s assault on
Western Europe in the spring of 1940. By the end of June, Germany also controlled Denmark,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and part of France.
The expansion of the war—and its frustration with Germany’s obstructionist
tendencies— prompted Amcross to withdraw from the General Government. “I do not hold any
brief for Germany,” wrote Davis to Roosevelt’s secretary, General Watson at in mid-July, “but 1
must in all fairness say that we have, in agreement with Germany distributed some $800,000
worth of supplies in Poland through Polish agencies, under American Red Cross supervision, and
the Germans have never yet taken any of those supplies or interfered in any way with the
distribution.”107 Although a modest undertaking, Amcross’ program provided Polish civilians
with much needed food, clothing, and medicine. Britain and Germany understood that Amcross
had the Roosevelt administration’s endorsement, but it succeeded in providing relief for the
General Government, because it conducted its activities in a professional and responsible manner.
Its conduct inspired a trust in its personnel and methods.
106 Gerhard Weinberg, A W orld at Arm s (New York: Cambridge, 1994) 113-121.
107 Letter, Davis to Watson, 18 July 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97
What Hoover Wants
From his experiences with Belgium in the First World War, Hoover understood that a
long-term relief program required money— and more money. Both Hoover and the Polish exile
government believed that Britain, France, and the United States should finance Comporel’s work.
During the second week of December 1939, the Poles asked Britain and France to contribute £1
million each to support a mass-feeding program in the General Government run by Comporel
with the blessing of the Roosevelt administration. “The future of the Polish Nation,” Polish
ambassador Edward Raczynski told Halifax, “is a joint responsibility of the three Allied
Governments both on moral and political grounds.”108 Poland’s self-appointed relief expert, Dr.
Rajchmann, constantly visited the Foreign Office, alternately beseeching and bullying its officials
to support Comporel’s relief efforts with lurid facts and figures about Polish starvation that could
not be verified.109
Poland’s appeal seemed to have all the elements necessary for success— a defeated ally, a
relief organization with experienced leadership, and the fate of twelve million people— but it
failed to impress the Foreign Office. Instead, it raised a series of red flags. From reports sent by
Lothian, the Foreign Office possessed a fairly good picture of the nature of the American relief
movement. It knew that Hoover chose not to work with the Roosevelt administration.110 The
108 Letter (49/WB/670), Polish Ambassador to Halifax, 9 December 1939, TNA/PRO, F 0371/24105. Telegram 673 (W58/37/48), Halifax to Kennard, 22 December 1939, TNA/PRO, F 0371/25237.
109 Minute (W 19111/13884/48) by Cadogan, 21 December 1939; Memcon, (W 19111/13884/48) by Bulter on meeting with Rajchmann, 20 Decemberl939; Letter, Rajchmann to Humphreys, 20 December 1939, TNA/PRO, FO371/24105. Letter (Pol/792/1/40), Zaleski to Kennard, 31 December 1939; Telegram 2, Kennard to FO, 1 January 1939; Minute (365/37/48), Cadogan and Strang, 3-4 January 1940; Memcon by Humphrys on meeting with Rajchman, 26 January 1940; Memon by Strang on meeting with Rajchman, 30 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F 0 3 7 1/25237.
110 The discrepancy prompted the Foreign Office to do some of its own number crunching. Humphrys estimated that the feeding program advocated by the Polish government would require roughly £18 million per year to purchase food, provide transport, and oversee distribution. The money being solicited— £1
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98
State Department even went so far as to state that “it accepts no responsibility for the
Commission for Polish Relief.”111 The Foreign Office also knew that no relief organization had
been allowed into the General Government, thereby making Poland’s claims of starvation
somewhat suspect. Additionally, there seemed to be confusion about the nature of Comporel’s
plans. Lothian reported that Comporel had no plans to conduct a mass-feeding program, but
rather to supply cod liver oil to children and provide the population with clothing and blankets. It
also had only been able to raise $250,000.'12
Despite Poland’s attempt to play the sympathy card, Britain and France refused to
commit money to Comporel, because of the confusion and misrepresentation surrounding
Comporel’s plans. “We are not convinced that the Polish proposal is practical or wise,” Halifax
told Howard Kennard, the British minister to the Polish exile government at the beginning of
January.113 The refusal came despite the feelings of compassion Poles’ situation provoked from
some officials. “We must decide how much we must contribute,” remarked Carvell, “in order not
to be put to shame by the Polish government and America.”114 Halifax, however, rejected the
idea that shame or guilt should influence Britain’s decision. If Britain supported Comporel, it
would be on humanitarian and moral grounds, not out of sympathy for the Poles or to placate the
Americans. “I don’t really care much for currying American favour by doing it,” he told his
million from both the French and British governments— would not go very far.”Memo (W 1989) by Humphrys, 1 February 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
111 Telegram 53, Lothian to FO, 13 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
112 Telegram 28, Lothian to FO, 9 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
113 The Foreign Office found it particularly annoying that Rajchman, Poland’s expert on relief, constantly badgered Whitehall about Polish relief rather than let Kennard represent Poland’s interests. Memcon, Bulter on meeting with Rajchman, 4 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Telegram 2, FO to Kennard (Angers), 6 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
1,4 Minute (W18467/13884/48) by Carvell, 13 December 1939, TNA/PRO, FO371/24105.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99
staff.115 Hoping to change Britain’s mind, Hoover told the Foreign Office that he “would take his
coat off and throw himself into Polish relief’ provided his efforts received unconditional
support— including financing— from Poland, Britain, and France.116 Hoover calculated that his
pledge would automatically induce Britain to support Comporel. Britain, however, refused to
change its mind. If anything, Hoover’s solicitation made Britain more leery.117
In truth, Hoover bore much of the responsibility for the confusion surrounding Comporel.
Since the beginning of December, he had devoted his time and energies not to helping the Poles,
but to the Finns.118 After the Soviet Union invaded Finland on 30 November 1939, Hoover
started the Finnish Relief Fund. The attack on Finland aroused the passions of some anti
interventionists, including Hoover, who found Soviet Union more frightening and morally
suspect than Nazi Germ any.119 As a way to express solidarity for the Finns, the anti
interventionists turned their attention to providing relief. The Finnish Relief Fund quickly became
the most prominent and successful of the Finnish aid organizations, raising $2 million in four
months. Central to Hoover’s fundraising scheme was the use of newspapers. Hoover convinced
editors and publishers across the country to promote the fund and collect donations.120 By mid-
115 Minute (W 18467/13884/48) by Halifax, 15 December 1939; Letter (W18467/13884/48), Strang to Leith-Ross, 16 December 1939, TNA/PRO, F0371/24105.
116 Telegram 39, Lothian to FO, 11 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
117 Minute (365/37/48), Cadogan and Strang, 3-4 January 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Memcon by Humphrys on meeting with Rajchman, 26 January 1940; Memon by Strang on meeting with Rajchman, 30 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
118 Telegram 39, Lothian to FO, 11 January 1940, TNA/PRO, F 0371/25237. Comporel News Bulletin, No. 6, 10 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
119 Hoover’s biographers suggest that his enthusiasm for helping Finland stemmed from his ideological hatred o f communism and his personal ties to the country. After the First World War, he urged Wilson to grant American recognition to the fledging nation.
120 Letter, Hoover to Editors and Publishers of the United States, 7 December 1939; Press release by Finnish Relief Fund, 8 December 1939. H1A, FSD, Box 61, File 6.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100
March 1940, the participating newspapers had forwarded more than $560,000 to the fund.121 The
money collected by the fund was used to buy supplies for the General Relief Committee of
Finland, run by former Finnish prime minister A.K. Cajander. Unlike the General Government,
Hoover felt he could trust a local organization to distribute relief supplies.122
Hoover’s charge to action on behalf of Finland focused media attention on his relief
efforts and raised questions about his political motivations. “Mr. Hoover’s emotional appeals on
behalf of Finland do not ring entirely true,” charged the St. Louis Post Dispatch. “They sound
dangerously like presidential politics.”123 The Chicago Tribune reminded its readers that Hoover
rose to prominence through his efforts for Belgium in World War I.124 Speculation about the
connection between Hoover’s relief efforts and the 1940 presidential election increased when
information about the confidential September meetings between Davis and Hoover leaked out.125
Always keen on a good dust-up between Hoover and Roosevelt, the press jumped on the story.
T he New York Daily News claimed that Hoover refused Roosevelt’s invitation to head a relief
agency because he wanted to take another run at the presidency. Other papers speculated that
Roosevelt wanted Hoover out of the country to remove him from the 1940 election. Still others
suggested that the story was designed generate sympathy for Hoover by making him appear to be
121 Press release, “U.S. Newspapers Collect $561,594,” 21 March 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 61, File 7.
122 Interestingly enough, the fund was originally named the Commission for Relief in Finland, but it was changed because “the shorter name does not imply any responsibility for distribution of relief.”Memo on Finnish Relief Fund by Perrin Galpin, 7 December 1939; Letter, Hoover to Rickard, 4 December 1939; Telegram, Rickard to Hoover, 5 December 1939; Letter, Hoover to Rickard, 6 December 1939; Telegram, Hoover to Rickard, 6 December 1939; HIA, FSD, Box 61, File 6.
123 “Mr. Hoover Beats the Tom-Tom,”St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 20 December 1939; “Our Rising Hysteria Over Finland,”Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20 December 1939.
124 Justus D. Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon (London: Rowan and Littlefield, 2000) 79-80.
125 Hoover and Davis were both angry about the leak believing that it came from anti-interventionist Republicans intent on keeping the United States out of relief altogether. Transcript between Hoover and Davis, 16 December 1939. HIA, FSD, Box 82, File 1. Letter, Davis to Roosevelt, 8 December 1939. FDRL, OF 124, Box 2, File 1939.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101
the victim of nasty rumors.126 Although the story died down after a week, lingering questions
about Hoover’s intentions and motivations remained.
By mid-February, Hoover’s success with the Finnish Relief Fund stood in stark contrast
to the floundering efforts of Comporel. To draw attention to Poland’s cause, Hoover delivered a
series of speeches, widely reported by the press, in which he questioned the morality of the
British blockade and challenged the Roosevelt administration to fund European relief. In his 3
February 1940 speech before the Overseas Press Club in New York, Hoover offered a stinging
critique of the British blockade, arguing that “famine has become part of the strategy of war. To
starve women and children of your enemy by blockade and by submarine is one of the major
modem weapons.” Hoover called for Finland and Poland to be supplied with $30 million in
foodstuffs to avert famine and pestilence. By providing the aid, the United States would not only
feed starving people, but also secure a role in peace talks and prevent the spread of
communism.127 A week later, Hoover took aim at the New Deal, arguing that any amount of
federal money spent on European relief wou ld pale next to the “nearly $4,000,000,000” spent
annually on relieving destitution in the United States.128
By attacking his principle nemeses, Hoover sought to deflect the growing attention on
Comporel’s inability to make a relief program materialize. In addition to needing money, it also
continued to negotiate with Germany. Hoover wanted more men on the ground and permanent
representation in the General Government. “Please realize that situation different from world war
and that we are asking things definitely opposed to present national policy,” cabled J. Edgar
126 “War Relief Story Denied by Hoover,”; “Hopes the Mr. Hoover and Red Cross Can Work Together” by Arthur Krock. NYT, 15 December 1939.
127 “Hoover Urges U.S. to Keep Out of War,”NYT, 3 February 1940.
128 Memcon, Dunn on conversation with Polish Ambassador, 7 February 1940; Memcon by Dunn on meeting with Potocki, 30 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2. “Hoover Says Millions Need Food in Poland”NYT, 11 February 1940.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102
Rhoads, Comporel’s representative in Berlin. “It has been intimated to me that attempt to force
issue sending several Americans [to] Warsaw would result in refusal and might close work
entirely. I have been unwilling to put officials in this position.” By working quietly and
persistently, with care not to embarrass Nazi officials, Rhoads believed Germany would grant the
desired guarantees.129 Finding Rhoads’ tactics too passive, Comporel president Chauncy
McCormick sought help from Thomsen at the German Embassy.130 When he appealed for
assistance, McCormick suggested that Britain’s policies victimized both Comporel and Germany,
telling Thomsen that “the situation in Poland is due not alone to war destruction, economic
paralysis, and poverty, but also to the blockade.” Thomsen also tailored his message, telling
McCormick that Amcross— not Germany’s desire to limit foreign visitors to the General
Government— was to blame for Comporel’s predicament. The “chief difficulty arises from those
who have suggested, adopted and accepted other distribution system which we cannot use,”
McCormick told Hoover.131 Comporel, of course, could use the German Red Cross, but it
129 Telegram 26, Rhoads (Rome) to Comporel, 15 January 1940; Telegram 37, Phillips (Rome) to State, 17 January 1940; Telegram 337, Kirk to State, 7 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
130 Comporel considered recalling Rhoads, but did not do so on the advice of Kirk (Berlin) and Phillips (Rome). Both feared it would send the wrong signal to the Germans. The inference into Comporel’s affairs earned both men a stern rebuke from Long, and finally revealed where he stood on the issue of Comporel. “Department is of the opinion that it would be inadvisable to encourage person in question to return to Germany,” he told Phillips, “particularly since we are informed his return might further complicate the situation vis a vis the Red Cross which is entitled to the support of the American government.” Long could not expressly tell Phillips to dissuade Rhoads from returning to Berlin, so he did the next best thing: he instructed Phillips to adopt a “non-committal attitude” in all future conversations. Long’s vitriol for Comporel came from his conversations with Davis, who informed him that Comporel supposedly behaved in a “tactless” manner in Berlin, which made it difficult for Amcross. Telegram 11, State to Phillips, 17 January 1940; Memcon by Long on meeting with Davis, 17 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 1. Telegram (draft), State to Kirk, 7 February 1940, F91, NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3
131 Senator Arthur Vandenberg also met with Thomsen on behalf of Comporel. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs committee, Vandenberg wielded significant power in Washington, but he was also a vocal isolationist. His involvement with Comporel only served to fan suspicions about the organization’s political aims Telegram, McCormick to Hoover, 8 February 1940. HIA, CPR, Box 1, File 1. Memorandum
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103
refused. When Germany issued its conditions for conducting relief operations on 19 February
1940, it was clear that Comporel’s lobbying had failed to change Germany’s mind. Rather than
accept the conditions and begin a program, Hoover decided to keep negotiating— he wanted more
control over access to the General Government.132
As negotiations with Germany continued into March, Hoover looked to the United States
to solve Comporel’s money problems. Despite rejecting and maligning the Roosevelt
administration’s approach to relief, Hoover believed it still represented an important source of
funding.133 Hoover met with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, but left only with an assurance that
the State Department was studying the relief issue.134 Quickly realizing that the State Department
would not be an ally, Hoover turned his attention to courting Congress. By the end of February,
there were seven bills before the House Foreign Affairs Committee calling for $10 to $20 million
“for the relief of the distressed and starving men, women, and children of Poland” or “for the
relief of the anguished, stricken, and starving population of war-torn and martyred Poland.”135 To
promote the relief issue, Sol Bloom (D-NY), head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, held
a surprise hearing at the beginning of March with Hoover as the main attraction. Hoover testified
that between $40 and $50 million would be necessary to feed the General Government. He
of a casual conversation with the Ambassador of Poland, 31 January 1940. N A, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
132 The Polish ambassador to the United States was beside himself with the thought that supplies might not reach Poland due to what he regarded as Hoover’s stubbornness. Letter, Thomsen to McCormick, 20 February 1940; Letter, McCormick to Thomsen, 26 February 1940; Memcon, Long on meeting with Potocki, 27 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 2.
133 ’’Telegram 7, State to Biddle (Paris), 26 January 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2 Memcon by Henderson of meeting with Rajchman, 29 February 1940,FRUS, 1940, Volume 11, p. 756..
134 Memo by Long, 29 February 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 2.
135 The bills referred to the committee included HJR 430 and HJR473. There were also two bills before the Senate for European relief, SJR216 and SJR216.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104
believed that the United States should provide twenty-five to fifty percent of the funding. “Such
humanitarian assistance,” argued Hoover, “embraces no threat of involvement in European
w ars.”136
In the wake of Hoover’s headline-grabbing testimony, the Foreign Office braced itself for
another round of blockade bashing. Wanting to ensure that the role of villain received proper
casting, Halifax suggested that someone remind reporters that Germany— not Britain— invaded
Poland.137 Britain represented an alluring target for both the press and Hoover not only because
of its blockade policies, but also because of its refusal to commit money to Comporel’s program.
“It has become clear that the whole question of Polish relief apart from American Red Cross is in
utmost confusion,” Lothian told Halifax in during the second week of March. “Danger in present
situation is that everybody here will combine to try and establish an alibi for themselves by
suggesting it is refusal of the Allies to allow supplies through Contraband Control which is real
reason for delay of Polish relief.” The Americans, he suggested, should be left to solve their own
difficulties.138
While money and access continued to bedevil Hoover, Amcross’ successful relief
program created a new worry. Despite claims of being the Polish relief organization, Comporel
had nothing to show for months of rhetoric. To rescue Comporel’s imperiled reputation, Hoover
decided to do a “experimental shipment,” valued at $100,000, to test Germany’s cooperation. In
days following Hoover’s testimony, Germany agreed to allow more representatives to accompany
the distribution of supplies in the General Government. During the hearing, Hoover publicized
that Germany would only allow one representative. The American press attacked the requirement
136 “Hoover Backs Bill for Polish Relief,”NYT, 1 March 1940. McCormick also testified on 27 February 1940.
137 Minutes by Humphrys, Kilpatrick, and Halifax, 5-7 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
138 Telegram 328, Lothian to FO, 10 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105
with gusto, forcing Berlin to concede that the representative could have four assistants.139
Flanked by girls in Polish costumes, Hoover announced the shipment at a March 13 rally at
Madison Square Garden. “We are now in a position, except for the financial arrangements, to
start relief shipments,” he told the crowd of 15,000. “And as a matter of fact we will start
shipments of food this week.”140 By announcing the shipment at the rally, Hoover made a
calculated gamble— Britain had yet to approve Comporel’s program. It did so, three days later,
despite severe reservations.141 With all the media and public interest in Hoover, Britain could not
ignore Lothian’s judgement that the “pressure for action is increasing.”142
The components making up Comporel’s experimental shipment began to make their way
to the General Government at the end of March. Maurice Pate, Comporel’s vice president
described the shipments as “thimblefuls in proportion to the needs to be met.” The Polish
National Council provided 200,000 pounds of new and used clothing, while the Rada Polonii,
another Polish organization, provided $85,000 to purchase vegetable fats, lard, sugar, evaporated
milk, rye flour, and com grits.143 With supplies finally on the way, Comporel wanted to assume
complete control over the distribution of supplies and asked the Quakers to turn their personnel to
139 Letter, McCormick to Rosenberg, 6 March 1940; Memcon by Long on conversation with Pate and McCormick, 11 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2. Letter, McCormick to Hoover, 7 March 1940; Letter, McCormick to Hoover, 11 March 1940. HIA, CPR, Box 1, File 9.
140 “Polish Food Ships Win Safe Conduct,”NYT, 13 March 1940.
141 Telegram 412, FO to Lothian, 16 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Letter, Lothian to McCormick, 18 March 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 29, File 6. Comporel wanted Britain to issue a blanket navicert for the shipment which would have covered everything with having to provide information about the particular contents of the cargo. Britain refused. Letter, Lothian to Krueger, 30 March 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 29, File 6.
142 Telegram 336, Lothian to FO, 11 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Only a week earlier, Lothian had told McCormick that it was clear “that conditions for supervising the distribution of relief in Poland satisfactory either to your Commission or to the Allied Powers have not yet been established.” Letter, Lothian to McCormick, 1 March 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 2.
143 Letter, Pate to Baerwald, 4 April 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 28, File 1.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106
it. The Quakers were angry at Comporel’s attempt to push them aside, especially given that they
had represented Comporel’s interests in Germany for the past six months. “For more than twenty
years we have maintained continuous relations with the German Government,” AFSC president
Clearance Pickett wrote Pate, “and we are not willing to take any steps which would lead them to
feel that we are withdrawing from our interest in Poland.”144 Although the Quakers agreed to
allow its personnel participate in the distribution of Comporel supplies, a permanent rift had been
created.145
With the experimental shipment on its way, Floover presented his conditions for
conducting a long-term mass feeding program to the Polish exile government. Fie demanded that
one organization “act as a single channel” to funnel “large scale food and clothing relief into
Poland.” Poland, Britain, and France also had to recognize Comporel as the sole Polish relief
organization, with Britain and France refusing to grant blockade concessions to any other
organization, except to Amcross and only then for medical supplies. Comporel required an initial
sum of $5 million from the Polish government to establish stocks of food and rent warehouses for
storage. It also wanted to avoid having to devote its energies to fundraising. Finally, Poland,
Britain, and France all had to ask Hoover to assume leadership of Comporel. “The members other
than Mr. Hoover do not see their way to undertake this operation unless they can count on his
guidance,” McCormick told the Polish ambassador. “On the other hand they would gladly stand
aside for any other group which is willing to serve.”146
There are two ways to interpret the list— either Hoover understood the organizational
challenges of mounting a large relief program or he was an egomaniac. It is probably a bit of
144 Letter, Pickett to Pate, 8 April 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 27, File 19.
145 Letter, Pickett to Pate, 15 April 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 27, File 19.
146 Letter, McCormick to Potocki, 16 March 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107
both. Hoover believed that his past successes accorded him respect. Interestingly enough, the list
represented the first time that Hoover articulated his expectations to the Polish exile government.
Although they discussed the need for money during December, Hoover does not appear to have
spelled out precisely what he expected. Why it took six months for him to do so remains
uncertain. Polish exile government did, however, need to be galvanized. Although it pledged to
provide Comporel with £1 million, the Poles had only turned over £50,000. It had also failed to
convince Britain and France to contribute to Comporel’s efforts or give Hoover the recognition he
desired. Hoover hoped that by making his desires known, all that would change.
For the Roosevelt administration, Comporel’s demands brought to the forefront a
question simmering in the background for months: whether or not Comporel could accept money
from Britain, France, and the Polish exile government under American neutrality law.147 The
State Department found the money question more troubling than Comporel negotiating with
Germany and Britain. Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long believed that Comporel
should not be allowed to accept money, because it would place Comporel in political relations
with other governments and might create situations “which may be embarrassing to this
Government and over which we would have no control.” 148 When he met with Hull after the
rally, Hoover argued that a contribution from the Polish exile government could be interpreted as
a donation and therefore not a violation of neutrality law.149 After a lively debate, the State
Department decided that there was no objection to Comporel accepting a contribution from the
Polish exile government provided it was distinctly understood that Comporel was not acting for
147 Memcon by Long on conversation with Potocki, 22 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 3.
148 Memo by Long, 8 February 1940; Memcon by Long on conversation with Lothian, 6 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 3 (also FRUS, 1940, volume 11, 758).
149 Memcon by Hull on conversation with Hoover, 22 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108
or on behalf of the Polish exile government. Poland could not attach conditions to any donation
and Comporel could use the money as it saw fit.150 Deciding the issue tested the limits of the
State Department’s willingness to be involved with Comporel. At the end of March, Lothian
asked Hull point-blank if the Roosevelt administration supported Hoover’s Polish relief activities.
“Mr. Hull replied,” reported Lothian, “that the United States Government certainly did not want
to oppose them but indicated that the problem was so difficult of solution that the United States
Government did not want to commit themselves to details.”151
Throughout the spring, the Poles clung to the hope Britain, France, and the United States
would provide a substantial part of money Hoover demanded.152 Reconciling itself to the fact
that no financial assistance would be forthcoming in the near future and despite the strong
objections of many of its members, the Polish cabinet decided to provide Hoover with the money
he requested. “We feel that we are not only performing our obvious duty,” Raczynski told
Halifax, “but also that we shall be serving the cause of our Allies.”153 The money would come
from two sources: $3.25 million from Polish gold reserves lodged with the Romanian state bank
at the beginning of the war and $1.75 million from Poland’s loan from Britain. Raczynski knew
that Treasury adamantly opposed Poland using any part of its sterling loan, but he hoped the
150 Memo by Hackworth, 22 March 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M 1284, Roll 3.
151 Telegram 423, Lothian to FO, 27 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
152 Memo, Pate to Rickard, 6 April 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 23, File 10. Memcon by Humphrys on meeting with Polish ambassador (W4453/37/48), 13 March 1940; Letter, Raczynski to Humphrys, 13 March 1940; Letter, Humphrys to Raczynski (Polish Ambassador), 19 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Telegram 166 (W4783/37/48), Halifax to Kennard, 19 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
153 Letter, Raczynski to Halifax, 11 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F 0371/25238. The decision to give Hoover $5 million did not come without some grumbling. In a meeting with British Treasury officials, the Polish financial secretary observed that it was unusual to ask the country being helped to put up its own money in order to show that it desires aid. Letter, Sewley to Carvell, 11 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F 0 3 7 1/25237.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109
restrictions would be removed.154 The Poles knew convincing Treasury would be difficult, but
dealing with Romania proved to be a nightmare. Romania refused to hand over Poland’s gold,
claiming that it financed the care of Polish refugees in Romania. The Poles contended that the
war material— tanks, guns, mortars— it abandoned to Romania sufficiently covered its
expenditures on refugees. Romania disagreed, claiming that the equipment was in poor
condition, needed expensive repairs, or incompatible with Romanian materiel.155
Even though the Poles agreed to provide the start up funds, Comporel still needed to
convince Britain of the wisdom of a long-term feeding program. To start the program, Hoover
wanted to import six to seven tons of food to the General Government at the beginning of May.
The majority of the $600,000 cargo would be transported via Germany. The plan, however,
presented a number of political and strategic problems for Britain. As one official observed:
Every ton of food or raw material which reaches territories in the occupation of the enemy destroys the effectiveness of our blockade and tends to render nugatory our sea power which is our paramount weapon of defence and offence. On the other hand, if we do not help, our Polish ally will reproach us for abandoning the Polish people to extermination by starvation. The great sentimental humanitarian soul of the U.S.A. which is being exploited for domestic political ends will be shocked if we use the blockade to prevent American supplies reaching Poland or if we do not assist Mr. Hoover’s relief organisation.156
154 Treasury had no objections to Poland using the gold held by Romania to purchase dollars once it was pried loose. Telegram 152 [W6449/37/48], Halifax to Kennard, 16 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Minute [W6838/37/48] by Humphrys, 16 April 1940; Letter, Sewley to Carvell, 18 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238. Memcon by Humphitys on meeting with Polish ambassador (W4453/37/48), 13 March 1940; Letter, Raczynski to Humphrys, 13 March 1940; Letter, Humphrys to Raczynski (Polish Ambassador), 19 March 1940; Telegram 166 (W4783/37/48), Halifax to Kennard, 19 March 1940; Letter, Sewley to Carvell, 26 March 1940; Letter, Sewley to Carvell, 27 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
155 Telegram 191, Gunther (Bucharest) to Hull, 10 May 1940; Memcon by Long on meeting with Polish Ambassador, 29 April 1940; Telegram 546, Bullitt to Hull, 30 April 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3.
156 Minute (W18467/13884/48) by Carvell, 13 December 1939, TNA/PRO, FO371/24105.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110
To this thorough assessment, Halifax added one other concern: “The brutal treatment of Poles
by Germans, gives no grounds for hope that food-stuffs shipped to Germany would be allowed to
reach Poles or that safeguards could be devised.”
Despite his reservations, Halifax understood that Britain could not simply dismiss
Hoover’s desire to help Poland, since it would inflame the anti-interventionists and the Polish
American community against Britain. Instead, he proposed a compromise: if Hoover secured the
support of the Roosevelt administration and made satisfactory arrangements with Germany, he
would fight MEW to allow Comporel to send wheat and flour to the General Government until
the August harvest, after which time Comporel would have to purchase food from available
stocks in Europe. Britain, however, would not finance the program.157
Other British ministries quickly voiced strong objections to both Comporel’s mass-
feeding program and Halifax’s compromise. MEW argued that “the transport of food-stuffs via
Germany to German-occupied Poland on anything like the scale now proposed would knock such
a hole in the blockade that it ought to be resisted from the start.” It also did not like the idea of
allowing food imports until August, believing that they would be difficult to stop once they
began.158 The Contraband Control Committee felt that Germany’s decision to order the
evacuation of Warsaw’s remaining diplomatic community, including the American consul, did
not bode well for Germany adhering to any agreement.159 The committee also raised a
completely new concern: the tins used to pack milk. Britain considered tin to be contraband and
157 Telegram 450, FO to Lothian, 21 March 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25237. Also see Minute (W4880/37/48) sheet, 22 March 1940; Telegram 477, FO to Lothian, 27 March 1940; Telegram 406, Lothian to FO, 23 March 1940; Telegram 16, Kennard to FO, 26 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
158 Memcon (W4848/37/48) by Seymour on meeting with Drogheda, Humphrys, Mounsey, and the American department, 18 March 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25237.
159 The US consul had to be out of Warsaw by March 21. “U.S. Envoys Forced to Leave Warsaw,”NYT, 21 March 1940.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. therefore not eligible for shipment to Germany. “Although this particular consignment does not
involve a large bulk of tin going to Germany it may be regarded as the thin wedge,” the
committee concluded. If Britain approved the shipment in its current form, the committee
believed it would be difficult to refuse future requests involving more quantities of metal and
suggested the milk be packed in different containers.160
In mid-April, knowing that Britain would require some convincing, Hoover appointed
Hugh Gibson as his representative in London. Gibson appeared to be the perfect emissary: he
had worked for Hoover in Belgium during World War I, served as the American minister to
Poland from 1919 to 1923, and participated in the interwar disarmament conferences. He knew
the Foreign Office hands and they thought well of him. But despite having rapport, Gibson found
it difficult to sell Comporel. Part of the problem stemmed from Hoover’s aversion to committing
to a specific agreement with Britain regarding distribution of the supplies. Gibson told Humphrys
during their first meeting that, “I really felt the best course would be for him to give his
confidence to Mr. Hoover and his representatives as to working out of the most effective and
satisfactory general arrangement.”161 Gibson’s entreaties also reinforced the Foreign Office’s
perceptions that "the U.S.A. administration is not enthusiastic about Mr. Hoover’s proposals, but
does not wish to oppose them.”162
By the end of April, Hoover believed that time was “running perilously short” for
Comporel to implement a program in the General Government. Poland had yet to turn over any
the money it promised. France also refused to contribute, citing the need to reevaluate the
160 Minutes of the 202nd Meeting of Contraband Control Committee, 24 March 1940.
161 Memo by Gibson on conversation with Humphrys, 18 April 1940. Hoover Institution, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box86, WWI1 relief.
162 Minute [W6840/37/48] by Humphrys, 18 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238. Also discussed the possibility of Britain and France purchasing grain in the Balkans for Poland.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112
question of relief in light of the recent developments in Norway and the Baltic. While placating
Poland, the Quai d’Orsay confidentially told the Foreign Office that it believed Comporel would
have to abandon its program.163 “Unless the program can be settled quickly,” Hoover told
Gibson, “we do not feel that we should accept the responsibility before the world of an impending
catastrophe.”
We have the feeling that such a foundation of resources as the immediate remittance of five million dollars is a very meagre basis upon which we will have to build up five or ten times that amount, and to build it up in this emergency in the world. We are willing to try. On the other hand to set up such a machinery and to intervene without even this foundation of resources, we shall certainly fail, and do the cause great harm.
In fact, Hoover admitted to Gibson that some other group might be better suited for the task and
he would be “delighted to give them our every assistance.”164 Hoover was understandably
worried about failure— the world was watching to see if the “Great Engineer” could repeat this
past successes.
At the beginning of May, despite Hoover’s misgivings, Comporel pressed for permission
to make a second shipment. Valued at $400,000, the shipment would consist of flour, cereals,
fats, evaporated milk, sugar, dried vegetables, cocoa, soap, and clothing. It was a bold request—
Comporel had not even distributed its first “experimental” shipment. Germany’s invasion of
Norway forced the ship to return to New York, prompting Comporel to reroute the supplies
through Genoa for transport to Warsaw via rail. Comporel estimated that it would be weeks
before the goods finally reached Poland. “In view of this unforeseen delay,” Gibson wrote the
Foreign Office justifying the request, “it is important to have a supplementary stock of food near
at hand so that it may be brought into Poland as expeditiously as possible as soon as we are in a
163 Letter [W6842/37/42], Mack to Carvell, 18 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238.
164 Telegram 234, FO to Campbell (Paris), 23 April 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238. Text is the repeat of a cable sent to Gibson by Hoover and the Comporel leadership.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113
position to handle it.”165 After consulting France, the Foreign Office proposed an alternative
(one not unlike Halifax’s original proposal): Comporel would be allowed to ship wheat and flour,
but the shipments terminated with the August harvest. The other goods requested by Comporel—
cereals, fats, evaporated milk, dried vegetables, and cocoa— were known to be German
deficiencies. Britain “could only allow [them] to pass at the risk of increasing the German war
potential with consequent prolongation of the war with all the suffering that entails.166 Gibson
characterized the terms as “impossible,” telling the Foreign Office that Hoover undertook the
relief program at Poland's request and only it should have the ability to determine what kinds of
food should be sent and when the program should terminate.167
Gibson believed that Britain and France were “in no mood to take courageous action on
relief.” Indeed, he found Britain’s “attitude toward blockade and distressed populations
characterized by toughness unknown in last war,” which he attributed to a “hard-boiled belief that
suffering populations will exert definite pressure on Germany.” Gibson, the experienced
diplomat, calculated that Britain and France's agreement over Comporel could be broken and
decided to play the erstwhile allies off each other. With Poland’s help, he would convince the
Quai d’Orsay to withdraw its support of Britain’s conditions and force a showdown with the
Foreign Office.168
165 Letter, Gibson to Humphrys, 30 April 1940; Telegram 663, FO to Lothian, 2 May 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238. The last of the $100,000 shipment was to leave New York on May 5. The ship was originally headed for Bergen.
166 Telegram 699, FO to Lothian, 5 May 1940; Telegram 235, FO to Campbell (Paris), 23 April 1940; Letter [W6836/37/48], Humphrys to Gibson, 2 May 1940; Letter [W6836/37/48], Humphrys to Zaleski, 2 May 1940; Telegram 709, FO to Washington, 7 May 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238.
167 Letter, Gibson to Humphrys, 4 May 1940; Letter [W6836/37/68], Humphrys to Gibson, 8 May 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25238.
168 Telegram 10, Gibson to Hoover, 10 May 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M1284, Roll 3.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114
Gibson found his strategy, while a good idea in theory, hard to execute, because of the
nature of the Polish exile government. “The attempt to get action out of the Polish Government
has been about the most baffling job I have ever undertaken,” Gibson wrote Perrin Galpin, a close
friend and member of Comporel’s board. He arrived in mid-April at Angers, France, the home of
the Polish exile government, Gibson found a government “put together to represent as many
elements as possible, was torn with typical Polish dissension, accentuated by the fact that
everybody was trying to avoid responsibility and build up positions for the end of the war.”
Gibson also discovered “very little real heart-felt concern for the situation of the people in
Poland” and a strong concern for keeping the Polish gold reserves intact. He also suspected the
reason for Polish exile government’s reluctance to part with its money had to do with Hoover’s
behavior. “I formed a very definite impression that the Polish Government had never been
straightforwardly and adequately informed as to the conditions laid down by the Chief.”169
At the beginning of May, Romania’s continued refusal to turn over the gold threw the
Polish cabinet into heated deliberations over whether to draw the needed money from its paltry
reserves.170 Hoover inflamed the already volatile debate, by sending a sharply worded telegram
threatening to forsake Polish relief unless the $5 million was forthcoming.171 His telegram and
Germany’s invasion of Western Europe finally forced the cabinet to make a decision. Hoover
would immediately receive $1 million and the title to Polish gold held by Romania, but it would
be up to Hoover to pry the gold loose. Poland also pledged one million pounds and one million
francs, but access to these funds, which came from the loans extended by Britain and France, was
subject to each country's monetary controls. “If we submit an alternative to your proposal,”
169 Letter, Gibson to Galpin, 31 May 1940. HIA. Hugh Gibson, Box 86, File WWI1 relief.
170 Letter, Gibson to Hoover, 6 May 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
171 Memcon, Moffat conversation with Potocki, 4 May 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 3. Letter, Gibson to Zaleski, 1 May 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Polish Foreign Minister Auguste Zaleski wrote Hoover, “it is prompted by no disposition to
haggle but only by need to husband our resources in such a way as to secure maximum results for
our people.” Although it understood that Hoover might have to adjust his plans given the
financial constraints, Poland considered it “most important to ensure continuity of relief
throughout entire current year and the next year when distress in Poland is bound to become even
more acute.”172
Eight months after the Polish exile government had asked Hoover to organize relief and
two months after Hoover proffered his terms for providing a long-term relief program, they were
still arguing over money. When it came down to it, the country asking for the relief program did
not want to pay. In World War I, Belgium willingly shouldered the cost of the relief program, but
Poland was reluctant even to provide the start up costs. Despite the promises of money,
Comporel decided to wait for it to materialize before making plans. “The last time the Polish
government promised us $1,000,000,” Pate told Hoover, “it took two months from them to realize
a partial payment of £50,000 out of this amount.”'73 In the meantime, Gibson continued to
negotiate to Britain and France, impressing upon them to need to allow Comporel to ship more
than wheat through the blockade.174
Despite all the agitation over money and Britain’s conditions, Comporel still did not have
Germany’s approval to conduct a mass-feeding program, because of Hoover’s insistence on
172 Cablegram, Zaleski to Hoover, 11 May 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 5, File 5.
173 Memo, Pate to Hoover, 17 May 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box I, File 11. Memcon [W6839/37/48], Humphrys and Balenski (First Secretary of the Polish Embassy), TNA/PRO, F 0371/25238.
174 At the end of May, French Ministry of Blockade told Gibson that they did not object to “reasonable quantities of milk-powder, sugar, and fat” being sent to Poland along with wheat. Meanwhile, the Quai d’Orsay told the Foreign Office that consignments should be limited to wheat and wheat flour. Telegram 239, FO to Campbell (Paris), 30 May 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25238. Letter, Gibson to Monnet, 16 May 1940; Letter, Monnet to Gibson, 17 May 1940; Memorandum on conditions laid down by British and French governments to govern Polish relief operations, 29 May 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, File WWII.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116
continuing to negotiate.175 At the beginning of April, the legal department of the German Foreign
Office initiated a series of discussions with the Wehrmacht High Command, Gestapo, Food
Ministry, Economic Ministry, and the General Government about the implications of Comporel’s
program. Since the food supply in Warsaw and the Ruthenian districts east of Krakow was
inadequate, all of the ministries agreed that they would “warmly welcome” additional deliveries
of food. The Food Ministry and the Governor General, however, considered Comporel’s demand
that Germany not requisition local Polish produce during relief operations to be unfeasible, since
the administrative procedures to facilitate extractions were already in place. Disagreement arose
between the ministries over whether American representatives should be allowed to stay in the
General Government for long periods of time. The Wehrmacht High Command believed that the
Comporel’s demand for representation should not be allowed to ruin the operation. Similiarly,
Reich Minister Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Frank’s deputy, felt that four representatives could be
allowed into the General Government. The dissenting opinion came from the Gestapo, which
found an extended American presence of any sort in the General Government unacceptable.
The ministries were also attuned to the political implications of Comporel’s relief
program. “From the point of view of foreign policy it seems a ticklish matter that the
Commission is to operate mainly with Polish, French, and English government funds,” observed
Erich Albrecht, the deputy director of the German Foreign Office’s legal department, in a memo
prepared for Ribbentrop and Hitler. “It should also be taken into consideration that it seems
doubtful at least whether the English would permit the relief work to assume the scope
contemplated by the Americans.” Albrecht suggested that the relief issue be treated in such as
way that “the odium of failure” for relief for Poland fell on Britain. He also noted the potential
175 Telegram 1460, Hartigan (Berlin) to Hoover, 22 May 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48 Refugees, M l284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117
problems that Comporel’s success could generate for Roosevelt: “In the discussions the
American representative also pointed out that the carrying out of the relief operation would mean
a political success for Hoover and consequently a certain impairment of Roosevelt’s position.”
Allowing the relief program would also placate the Polish-American community and decrease
agitation for American entry into the war.176
Despite the political benefits, by the third week in May, Germany’s attitude toward relief
for the General Government had hardened. Ribbentrop issued a new set of instructions for
dealing with Comporel: under no circumstances was it to be given anything in writing; visiting
times to the General Government should be reduced to a minimum; and Governor General Frank
had to be consulted on all relief issues. Ribbentrop also instructed Foreign Office officials to
take a more negative attitude toward offers of relief. “It can be pointed out that we are taking
care of the Poles ourselves,” Albrecht told his colleagues in a memo articulating the new policy
orientation. The shift reflected the growing feeling among the German leadership that relief
operations in Poland would only “facilitate illegal traffic or the exchange of information.”177
Germany worried about relinquishing its tight control on information about conditions in the
General Government and the potential for relief programs to serve as a cover for Allied
intelligence-gathering operations.
Germany’s terms, along with the expansion of the war into Western Europe, put an end to
Comporel’s plans for a mass-feeding program. In the end, the “Great Engineer” could not
engineer Germany’s terms. Nor did it seem that he could make Poland produce the necessary
money. At the end of May, Gibson wryly noted that Poland had not “put up the cash, either in
176 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department, 20 April 1940, Document No. 144, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume 9 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1956) 209-212.
177 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department, 21 May 1940, Document No. 402, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume 9, 402.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118
Francs, Dollars, or Pounds, and the nearest approach to real money is the phantom gold.” He did
not believe, however, that it had to have turned out that way. “It is always easy to judge things
after the event, but I cannot help feeling that we might have got the whole five million in gold in
things had been put out clearly at the start.” 178 For its part, the Foreign Office took some
satisfaction in the final outcome. Humphrys remarked that “It is a matter for congratulation that
the odium of failure of the Hoover scheme of relief, which we always considered impracticable
will not fall on HMG [His Majesty's Government].”179
Hoover agreed to head Comporel because it offered him a chance to demonstrate the
power of private charity and act independently of the Roosevelt administration. But for
Comporel to be successful, Hoover and Poland needed to have agreed on their mutual
responsibilities. It appears, however, no such contract was ever struck. Further complicating the
situation was Comporel’s detachment from the very negotiations intended to secure its future.
Hoover attempted to arrange Comporel’s program from a distance, relying on the Quakers in
Berlin and Britain and Poland’s representatives in Washington. Not until Gibson’s arrival in
London and his subsequent departure to Angers did Comporel have a firm grasp on the politics
shaping its relief program. In the end, Hoover proved to be his worst enemy. His hubris allowed
him to believe that his previous successes entitled him respect, deference, and carte blanche to do
what he wanted, but it also made him blind to the political and military realities of the current
conflict.
178 Letter, Gibson to Galpin, 31 May 1940. F11A. Hugh Gibson, Box 86, File WWII relief.
179 Memcon [W6839/37/48] by Strang on conversation with Ciechanowski, 4 June 1940; Letter [W7870/37/48], Humphrys to Gibson, 6 June 1940; Minutes [W6839/37/48] by Seymour, Humphrys, and Cadogan, 7-8 June 1940, TNA/PRO, F0371/25238.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119
The relief question during the Phony War proved to be a morass of successes, failures,
and contradictions. Undoubtedly, Britain succeeded in shaping the nature of American relief
programs for the General Government. Given the pivotal role that economic warfare played in
British strategic thinking, it is not surprising that Britain looked with trepidation at American
relief efforts. Significantly though, the newly created MEW lacked the bureaucratic and political
muscle to override the Foreign Office. Under Halifax’s guidance, it found way to balance
economic warfare considerations and the need to maintain good relations with the United States,
despite Hoover’s ambitions and the State Department’s infatuation with freedom of the seas.
Britain’s policies triumphed, because of the fractured nature of the American relief
movement and the Roosevelt administration’s attitude toward it. Hoover chose not to work with
the administration, because he desired independence of action, but in the end that independence
did little to help his cause. In addition to assessing the merits of his relief program, Britain and
Germany could not ignore the fact that the Roosevelt administration did not endorse Comporel.
As a representative of the administration, Amcross, however, benefited from the deference it
received. It was also treated with respect, because of the way in which it conducted its affairs. It
did not bully, misrepresent, or malign its competitors or the governments with which it worked.
The State Department’s failure to craft a coherent policy also contributed to Britain’s
domination of the relief issue. It assumed three separate stances, often contradictory in practice:
it championed freedom of the seas, it informally supported to Amcross’ work, and it looked
askance at Comporel’s plans. The end result was confusion as to the attitude of the Roosevelt
administration towards relief. The State Department’s willingness to let events unfold, rather than
shape them, did little to help American relief organizations plead their cases in London and Berlin
or provide a strong argument for freedom of the seas. Lothian suggested to Halifax that it would
be best to let the Americans solve their own troubles. The problem was that no solution was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120
immediately in the offing. Unless Roosevelt did something more than endorse Amcross, the
administration’s relief policy would continue to drift.
While Britain could dictate its terms to American relief organizations— and they could
contest them all they wanted— Germany possessed the ultimate say in the matter. It determined
access to the General Government and the conditions governing the relief programs. Interested in
its public image, Germany agreed to allow relief, but under terms that limited the ability of
American organizations to observe in detail its plans for the General Government. It permitted a
little humanitarianism so long as it did not interfere with the making of the new German Reich.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER FOUR
A NIGHTMARE CONTINENT
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender . . . until in God’s good time, the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.1
Deploying cadences worthy of Shakespeare, Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced
Britain’s intention to persevere against Nazi Germany on 4 June 1940. Churchill’s brilliant
oration, however, could not mask the dire situation. Britain had spent the previous week
evacuating what remained of the British Expeditionary Force and the French army from the
beaches of Dunkirk.
The Allied military catastrophe began in April 1940 when Germany occupied Denmark
and launched an assault against the Anglo-French force defending Norway. Within weeks, the
Allies were forced to withdraw from Norway. As the Royal Navy evacuated the last of British
troops from Norway in early May, Neville Chamberlain’s government fell. The contenders for
leadership of the British government were Conservative Party standard-bearers Winston
Churchill and Edward Halifax. Although Halifax, former viceroy of India and current Foreign
Office Secretary, would have willingly given up his peerage to become Prime Minister, the job
1 Speech by Winston Churchill, 4 June 1940. David Cannadine, ed.,Blood, Tears, and Sweat: The Speeches o f Winston Churchill (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989) 177.
121
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122
was given to the pugnacious Churchill, sometime journalist, soldier, and First Sea Lord.2
Churchill, however, came to office as the head of a coalition government, the result of the
usually contrary Tory and Labor parties calling a truce. Halifax remained Foreign Secretary,
while Hugh Dalton, the out-spoken Labour leader and economist, became head of MEW.3
On 10 May 1940, the same day that Churchill became Prime Minister, Hitler expanded
his offensive against Western Europe, sweeping through the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg en route to France. As Germany closed in on a victory over France, Italy entered
the war on June 10, attacking France across the Alps. The next day, the French government fled
Paris for Bordeaux, one step ahead of German forces closing in from the east and south. On 22
June 1940, France asked Germany for terms. The resulting armistice divided France into two
zones: an occupied zone in the north under the control of German military authorities, and an
unoccupied zone in the south under nominal French sovereignty. With Paris under German
control, a new government under Marshall Philippe Petain took up residence in Vichy, a sleepy
2 The literature on the life and career for Winston Churchill is immense, owing in part to Churchill’s own pen. Martin Gilbert documented Churchill’s life in the eight-volume Churchill: A Life (London: Macmillan, 1971-1988). A distilled version is available in one volume. Two less hagiographic accounts are John Charmley’sChurchill, the End o f Glory: A Political Biography (New York: Harcourt, 1993) and Robert Rhodes James’sChurchill: A Study in Failure (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970). Three recent studies of Churchill are offered by Roy Jenkins,Churchill: A Biography (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), Geoffrey Best,Churchill: A Study in Greatness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), and John Lukacs,Churchill: Visionary, Statesman, Historian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). A scholarly reassessment of Churchill can be found in a collection of twenty-nine essays edited by Robert Blake and William Roger Louis,Churchill: A Major New Reassessment o f His Life in Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
3 Given Halifax’s role in Britain’s appeasement policy and his tenure of viceroy of India, he remains a controversial figure. He has given biographical treatment by Alan Campbell-JohnsonViscount in Halifax: A biography (London: R. Hale, 1941), Earl of Birkenhead Earlin o f Halifax: The Life o f Lord Halifax (London: Hamilton, 1965), and more recently by Andrew Roberts inThe Holy Fox: The Life o f Lord Halifax (London: Phoenix Press, 1991). Halifax also published his autobiography,The Fullness o f Days (London: Dodd Mead, 1957). Halifax would not become Earl of Halifax until 1944.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123
spa town whose name quickly became an epithet for the new regime.4
The military disasters of the spring not only transformed the strategic situation, but also
the relief question as the surrender of France left Britain standing alone against Nazi Germany.
If Britain was to persevere, Churchill’s government had to marshal the country’s beleaguered
resources and expand American support for the war effort. Not surprisingly, Britain embraced
economic warfare and the blockade with renewed vigor. British zeal for the blockade, however,
quickly collided with American sympathy for the plight of European civilians. Millions of
Belgian, French, and Dutch civilians took to the roads to flee the invading Germans, creating a
massive refugee population in need of food, shelter, and medical treatment. After the fighting
stopped, these same civilians faced a brutal new reality as Nazi occupation policies replaced
what remained of their civic society. As the summer progressed, Americans— ranging from
Roosevelt to Amcross to Hoover— emphasized the idea that the United States possessed a moral
obligation to help alleviate the suffering. Consequently, at the very moment Britain looked to the
United States for assistance in the summer of 1940, it found its strategy for survival threatened
by American humanitarianism.
Give as Generously as You Can
Roosevelt’s interest in refugee relief followed immediately on the heels of Hitler’s
triumphs in Western Europe. The Allied defeat in Norway and the swiftness with which German
forces conquered the Low Countries convinced an increasingly jittery Roosevelt to take steps to
4 Read together, Brian Bond’sFrance and Belgium, 1939-1940 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975) and Marc Bloch’s eloquent A Strange Defeat: A Statement o f Evidence Written in 1940, trans. Gerald Hopkins (New York: Norton, 1968) provide an insightful explanation for German victory over France. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L ’Abime: Politique etrangere de la France, 1939-44 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1986) offers a detailed account of the decision-making process that led France to sign an armistice with Germany. For the end o f the Anglo-French alliance see John Caims, “Great Britain and the Fall o f France: A Study in Allied Disunity,”Journal o f Military History (vol. 27, 1955) 365-409.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124
strengthen American military power. After having declined to build up American forces during
the fall, in part to prevent a war scare, Roosevelt asked Congress in mid-May 1940 for $1.18
billion in additional defense appropriations, of which more than half was for “a larger and
thoroughly rounded Army.” The need for a more powerful army was made clear by a War
Department report that indicated that the United States could only field five divisions of 80,000
men and possessed equipment for less than 500,000 troops. In contrast, Germany deployed 140
divisions of more than two million men against Western Europe.5
Intertwined with Roosevelt’s emphasis on improving American defenses was the
message that preparing for war did not absolve America of charity to those in need. Roosevelt
carried this message of defense and beneficence to the American people in a fireside chat on 26
May 1940. Over the course of speech, Roosevelt discussed in detail improvements to the armed
forces and arrangements designed to bolster the output of the American military-industrial
complex. That week, a previously frugal Congress had passed a massive defense-spending
program in response to Roosevelt’s request for additional appropriations.6 He also sought to
reassure the American public that defense preparations would not mean the undoing of the New
Deal and other domestic programs. “There is nothing in our present emergency to justify a
retreat— any retreat from any of our social objectives— from conservation of natural resources,
assistance to agriculture, housing, and help to the underprivileged.”
Because of its importance to discussions about America’s military readiness, historians
have tended to overlook the first section of the speech, which focuses on the plight of European
civilians as a result of the Nazi invasion of Western Europe. “My friends, at this moment of
sadness throughout most of the world,” Roosevelt began the speech, “I want to talk with you
5 Dallek, 221.
6 Dallek, 223.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125
about a number of subjects that directly affect the future of the United States. We are shocked by
the almost incredible eyewitness stories that come to us, stories of what is happening at this
moment to the populations of Norway and Holland and Belgium and Luxembourg and France.”
Invoking the appropriateness of “saying a word on behalf of women and children and old men
who need help” on the Sabbath, Roosevelt continued:
Tonight over the once peaceful roads of Belgium and France millions are now moving, running from their homes to escape bombs and shells and fire and machine gunning, without shelter, and almost wholly without food. They stumble on, knowing not where the end of the road will be. I speak to you of these people because each one of you that is listening to me tonight has a way of helping them. The American Red Cross, that represents each of us, is rushing food and clothing and medical supplies to these destitute civilian millions. Please— I beg you— please give according to your means to your nearest Red Cross chapter, give as generously as you can. I ask you in the name of our common humanity.”7
With these words, Roosevelt acknowledged that something terrible was happening to civilians in
Western Europe, giving credence to the almost daily stories run by American newspapers
depicting terror and atrocity. Roosevelt also suggested that Americans had a moral obligation to
help to abate the suffering by invoking the idea of a “common humanity.” Taken in totem, the
message of the speech was simple: America could build its defenses while extending a hand to
those in need.
In his speech, Roosevelt offered Amcross as the mechanism for providing aid European
civilians. Two weeks earlier, Amcross had launched a fundraising drive— endorsed by
Roosevelt— with the intent of collecting $10 million for European relief.8 Roosevelt’s Sunday
7 Fireside Chat, 26 May 1940. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy, eds.,FDR’s Fireside Chats (New York: Penguin Books, 1993) 153-162.
8 “Red Cross Appeal Seeks $10,000,000,”NYT, May 11, 1940. “I urge all Americans,” said Roosevelt endorsing the drive, “who have a feeling of deep sympathy for the peoples of these unfortunate countries who today have been added to the long list of those who are suffering the horrors of invasion and aerial bombardment to respond quickly and generously to this appeal.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126
night fireside chat was followed by an hour-long fundraising drive for Amcross. Produced by
CBS and carried on all the radio networks, the program featured radio and film stars, including
Eddie Cantor, Bob Hope, Jack Benny, Jimmy Durante, Judy Garland, Vivien Leigh, Laurence
Olivier, and Walter Huston, encouraging Americans to give to their local Amcross chapters.9
The broadcast also featured a live report from Paris on conditions in France by Wayne Taylor,
Amcross’ chief delegate in Europe. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt also made a pitch for
supporting Amcross: “If we turn away from the need of others we align ourselves with those
forces which are bringing about this suffering and which we must eventually try to defeat. We
are called upon to give now as we have never given before because the alleviating of human
suffering is in part our answer to the challenge to our belief in civilization.”10 In five days,
Amcross raised more than $4.7 million, with contributions ranging from $87.50 in gold to $750
diverted from funeral flowers at the request of the deceased family.11
Although the broadcast mobilized the American public to give in record amounts,
pressure began to develop for the American government, not merely Amcross, to provide money.
The tattered governments of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands individually asked the United
States for assistance in providing food, clothing, and medical supplies to civilians and refugees.
While grateful for Amcross’ work, they believed that the United States government was in a
better position to provide large-scale assistance. The State Department assured the countries that
9 CBS press release, “Entertainment World’s Brightest Names Volunteer for One-Hour Broadcast to Spur Red Cross Relief Drive,” 22 May 1940; NA, RG 59, M1284, 840.48, M1284, Roll 3. Broadcast was Sunday, 26 May 1940.
10 “First Lady Pleads for War Refugees,” ATT, 27 May 1940.
11 “Red Cross Fund Totals $4,378, 335,”NYT, 31 May 1940. Despite the success of the campaign, Amcross encountered some resistance from its chapters to providing relief to territories controlled by the Germans. Memcon by Brandt on conversation with Swift, 21 May 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127
their appeals would receive “due consideration,” but cautioned that American government
sponsorship of a large-scale relief program required Congressional authorization.12 By using
Congress as an excuse, the State Department avoided committing the Roosevelt administration to
a specific program of action and giving the impression that assistance would be immediately
forthcoming.
The State Department does not appear to have forwarded the appeals for aid, but
Roosevelt nevertheless received a steady stream of eye-witness reports about conditions in
Europe. William Bullitt, the U.S. ambassador to France, personally called Roosevelt from
France to request that the president ask Congress for $20 million for relief. "It is our duty to
ourselves and to humanity," he told Roosevelt "to try and save as many lives as we can save from
the onslaughts of barbarism.”13 Letters and cables from Amcross and State Department officials
rich in anguish and detail added weight to Bullitt’s appeal. Two images reoccured throughout
their accounts: the terror experienced by the refugees on the roads as they were strafed by
German airplanes and the physical toll that flight inflicted on their bodies.14 Despite being an
experienced war relief worker, Jay Malony was humbled by the distress around him and the
scope of the task that lay ahead. He cabled Davis that “Americans should be thankful [for the]
existence [of the] Atlantic Ocean.”15
12 Memcon, Long and Truelle, 24 May 1940; Memcon on “Relief to Holland similar to the relief of Belgium in 1914” between Long, Moffat, and Netherlands Minister, 20 May 1940; Telegram 1280, Kennedy to State. 20 May 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 3.
13 Telegram 772, Bullitt to State, 20 May 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 3.
14 Telegram 772, Bullitt to State, 20 May 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 3.
15 Telegram 804, Malony to Davis, 22 May 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 3. Telegram 857, Malony to Davis, 24 May 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128
These poignant accounts convinced Roosevelt that the United States should take steps to
provide assistance and not leave the task to the generosity of the American public alone. “Many
millions of dollars have been given to the American Red Cross for relief purposes in Europe,”
observed Roosevelt, “but I feel that the Government itself should greatly add to the assistance
that is now being given.”16 The President requested that Congress amend the pending relief bill,
which provided for over $1 billion for the relief of the needy and unemployed in the United
States, to include $50 million for foreign relief “as a token of our deep-seated desire to help not
only Americans but people who are destitute in other lands.” The majority of the funds would be
used in the United States to purchase and export food surpluses that developed when the war
closed down European markets. Providing relief would therefore not only help those in need, but
also, according to Roosevelt, “help the economics of our very large agricultural problem.”
Moreover, it would allow Amcross to concentrate on providing medical supplies and clothing.17
"World events have made it clear to the American people that in the interest of American defense
it is necessary for us to engage in a greatly enlarged program of training and armament," noted
Roosevelt. "At the same time our deepest sympathy has gone out to the civilian populations of
war-torn areas, and I believe that this sympathy should be expressed by a concrete example of
our inherent and decent generosity.” 18
Roosevelt’s proposal was favorably received. "The only criticism that any humane
person can make of the President’s request for a Congressional appropriation of $50,000,000 for
civilian relief in Europe is that it will not be enough,” noted the New York Times. “W e can
16 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Request for Appropriations in War-torn Areas (Item 62), 11 June 1940. FDRL, Presidential Papers. “Asks $50,000,000 to Aid Refugees,”NYT, 12 June 1940. Amcross had raised nearly $10 million by mid-June.
17 Letter, Davis to FDR, 13 June 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, January-June 1940.
18 Letter, FDR to Gamer, 11 June 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, January-June 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129
afford whatever is necessary rather than have it written in the histories in the years to come that
we hated tyranny but would not come to the aid of tyranny’s innocent and helpless victims.”
Clearance Pickett, secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, observed that “to cope
with the whole problem without Congressional help would be like trying to collect money to feed
the whole population of New York City— an impossible task.”19 It also received a warm
reception from Congress. Since the outbreak of the war, numerous resolutions calling for relief
for civilians in occupied territories had been introduced, the most recent one having been at the
end of May.20
On 26 June 1940, Congress passed the bill providing $50 million for foreign relief. Under the
terms of the bill, Roosevelt could designate an agency or agencies to make agricultural purchases in the
United States and “to transport and distribute agricultural, medical, and other supplies for the relief of
refugee men, women, and children, who have been driven from their homes or otherwise rendered destitute
by hostilities or invasion.”21 The allocation of money signaled that the United States was potentially
prepared to provide large scale aid to refugees in Europe.
American Red Cross in France
Amcross took the lead in organizing a large-scale relief program for France. After
spending the winter and spring working on Polish relief, Wayne Taylor and Richard Allen
19 “Uncle Sam: Samaritan,”NYT, 12 June 1940, 24.
20 On 24 May 1940, Malony and Mead introduced a Senate Joint Resolution (S.J. Res. 261) “for the relief of the distressed and starving men, women, and children of Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Finland, and other similiarly afflicted areas.” Called for $ 15 million to be spent under the direction of the president to purchase in the US and transport and distribute medical and food supplies to the people of those countries. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
21 In July, Roosevelt declared that all requests be routed to him through the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Public Resolution No. 88, 76th Congress, joint resolution making appropriations for work relief and relief, for the fiscal year ending June 30 ,1941; H.J. Res. 544 from Appropriations Committee, May 15, 1940; House Report No. 2186; Senate Report 1754; House (conference) Report No. 2681. Letter, FDR to Davis, 6 July 1940; Memo, Harold D. Smith (Director of Budget Bureau to FDR, 3 July 1940; Letter, Davis to FDR, 12 July 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130
tackled the problem of providing assistance to France’s massive refugee population. Amcross’
financial resources and political connections propelled its efforts, but not without difficulty or
controversy.
In May 1940, nearly 1.5 million Belgians crossed the border into northern France, along
with more than 50,000 Dutch and 70,000 Luxembourgers. “While army is fighting for life
France is welcoming Belgians, old and young, who arrive on foot, by wagons, on bicycles, in
trucks, automobiles, and train,” reported Taylor. “Some are wounded, some are sick, all are
hungry and completely exhausted. They bring with them practically nothing.” When the
Wehrmacht barreled into northern France, the refugees from the Low Countries and the French
population fled south. By the end of May, estimates suggested that three to five million civilians
clogged French roads in an effort to stay ahead of the German army. It would only be a short
time before the refugees consumed France’s stores of food, clothing, and medicine.22
Taylor decided the most effective way for Amcross to begin providing aid was to finance
the efforts of other relief organizations. A number of well-regarded relief groups had been
operating in France since the fall of 1939 when they began dispensing aid to Polish refugees. By
supporting their efforts, Amcross could bolster their local networks and community outreach
programs. It was a decision bred of expediency. Amcross had only recently established a small
office in Paris and possessed a limited cache of supplies, but it had significant financial
resources— Taylor had $1 million at his discretion.23 By the beginning of June, Taylor had
22 Telegram 752, Taylor and Carter (Paris) to Davis, 19 May 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48, M 1284, Roll 3. Telegram 925, Malony to Davis, 28 May 1940, NA, RG, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4.
23 Telegram 417, Davis to Taylor, 20 May 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. Watson to FDR, 20 May 1940; cover note from Watson to FDR (“Davis asked me to give you this as presenting a brief picture of the action taken by the Red Cross”) attaching the Red Cross Press release, “Red Cross Cables 25,000,000 Francs to Meet Refugee Needs in France: $1,000,000 in supplies brought,” 20 May 1940. FDRL, OF 124, Amcross, Box 3, January-June 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131
given money to the Red Cross societies of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg; Comite Francais
de Service Sociales; Association de Secours Aux Refugies Neerlandais; and American Friends of
France, a relief organization headed by philanthropist Anne Morgan, the sister of financier J.P.
M organ.
Taylor also decided to support the work of the International Commission for Assistance
to Child Refugees, an organization run by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).
Linder the direction of Howard Kershner, the commission operated thirteen relief centers and
coordinated work done by the Quakers, the Allied Relief Committee, the Committee of Mercy,
the International Committee for Refugees in France, and the Queen Wilhelmina Dutch Relief
Fund.24 Taylor financed Kershner’s efforts despite the fact that Amcross had never before
financed a Quaker program and the two organizations were running competing fundraising
drives. He justified the decision to Davis on the grounds that “in view tragic condition refugees
and large percentage children who have been lost or orphaned en route felt essential act
immediately.”25 Davis reluctantly agreed with the logic, but told Taylor to impress upon the
Quakers that Amcross would not finance their program indefinitely.26
In three short weeks, despite the best efforts of the relief organizations, the refugee
situation overwhelmed their resources. Allen, who traveled to Bordeaux to set up an Amcross
24 “Need of Refugees Pictured as Rising,”NYT, 9 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, Ml 284, Roll 4. The Allied Relief Committee (chaired by Winthrop Aldrich), the Committee of Mercy (chaired by Mrs. William Astor), the International Committee for Refugees in France (chaired by Mrs. John Crawahay).
25 Telegram 787, Taylor to Davis, 21 May 1940; Telegram 1076, Taylor to Davis, 7 June 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 3. Telegram 855, Taylor to Davis, 24 May 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4. By June 7, Taylor had handed out the following sums: 10 million francs and 4368 Swiss francs to French Red Cross; 2.5 million francs and $8,000 to Belgian Red Cross; 1.8 million francs to Comite Francais de Services Sociales; 1 million francs to Anne Morgan; 3 million to International Commission refugee children; 500,000 to Luxemburg Red Cross; 1 million to Association de Secours Aux Refugies Neerlandais.
25 Telegram [Amcross 566], Davis to Taylor, Allen, Jay, 3 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132
office, warned that it was impossible overstate refugee problem. Evacuation hospitals in the
northern departments needed medical and hospital supplies. “Men living today,” Allen
predicted, “will be dead or alive ten days hence depending on availability supplies.”27 France’s
southern departments, already swamped with refugees, continued to absorb “new hordes” each
day. It was not uncommon for trains carrying refugees to be shunted between towns and
departments unable to discharge passengers.28 Food shortages began, particularly of canned milk
and cocoa, as did shortages of clothing. Many refugees took to the roads with only the clothes on
their backs.29 By mid-June 1940, a third and fourth tidal wave of refugees flooded southern
France as the Parisian districts and Mediterranean region fled the German advance by every
possible means. A spirit of hospitality nevertheless pervaded the southern departments, as towns
offered refugees shelter in city squares and cathedral courtyards, and small peasant villages,
generally suspicious of outsiders, welcomed strangers.30
To help abate the growing humanitarian crisis, Taylor and Allen wanted to do more than
provide money— they wanted Amcross to distribute relief on a large scale. None of the already
over-taxed relief groups, however, possessed adequate transportation or distribution networks.
“No other private organization,” Taylor told Davis, “competent to deal with colossal civilian
relief problem exists.” To fill the void, Taylor and Bullitt worked with French businessman
Ernest Mercier to create Secours American aux Victimes de la Guerre (American Aid for
27 Telegram 162, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 15 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
28 Telegram 942, Malony to Davis, 29 May 1940, NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
29 Telegram 1077, Taylor to Davis, 7 June 1940; Telegram 1104, Taylor to Davis, 9 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4. Allen requested that tiny supplies sent by Amcross be packed in small cases or bales, since there was a labor shortage due men being called up for military service and no equipment for handling heavy cargo.
30 Telegram 53, Malony (Bordeaux) to Davis, 12 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4. For a general account see J. Vidalence,L ’Exode de mai-juin 1940 (1957).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133
Victims of the War— SAVG). Mercier’s extensive ties with French public utilities gave him
access to regional transportation networks and ensured the support of the French business
community. Under the partnership, Amcross would ship supplies to the port city of Bordeaux,
where they would be warehoused and sorted. The supplies would then be transported to
strategically-placed distribution centers where approved local organizations could obtain goods
for providing assistance. At each distribution center, Amcross field representatives would
oversee the distribution of supplies, observe local conditions, and work with SAVG
representatives. Amcross’ office in Paris, however, would have final approval on distribution
arrangements.31 Amcross announced the creation of SAVG during a 3 June 1940 radio
broadcast, which featured an endorsement of its plans by French Premier Paul Reynaud. “It is
now during these distressing times,” said Reynaud, “that France is especially appreciative of the
friendly gestures of those who have remained her faithful friends and who have been in a
position to prove their friendship, friends who are always there in the hour of danger.”32
Although the creation of SAVG provided Amcross with a mechanism for distributing
relief, getting the supplies to France proved more difficult. Amcross needed the help of the White
Flouse and Maritime Commission to obtain a ship, since all American government-owned vessels
were committed to carrying out trade with Britain. With the White House’s urging, the
31 Telegram 855, Taylor to Davis, 24 May 1940; Telegram 877, Taylor to Davis, 25 May 1940; Telegram 961, Taylor to Davis, 30 May 1940; Telegram 548, Davis to Taylor, 31 May 1940, NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. To lay the groundwork for the program, Lt. Epley from the American embassy’s military attache staff was sent to Bordeaux to scout for warehouses, shipping, and office and living quarters. Davis endorsed the SAVG plan, but was leery of Amcross maintain warehouses. SAVG was also affiliated with the French Red Cross and had ties toAssociation Declaree d ’Utilite Puhlique. SAVG’s board consisted of: honorary presidents Ambassador Bullitt and Pichat; President of Secours: National president Comte Clauzel, vice president of French Red Cross; vice presidents, Pierre Caillaux, president of Syndicat de Distribution d’Electricite, Desanges, president of Syndicat Du Gaz, Glasser, president Compaigne Des Eaux, Lambert Ribot, president Comite Des Forges; board of directors, Pillon, Secretaire General Secours National; also representatives of French Red Cross and six outstanding businessmen.
32 “Red Cross Widens Relief in France;” “Address by Reynaud,”NYT, 3 June 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134
commission secured the use of the S.S.McKeesport. Roosevelt agreed to pay the ship’s
expenses out of executive funds, thereby allowing Amcross to put the $63,000 towards
purchasing more relief supplies. The Maritime Commission also began working on obtaining
other ships for Amcross, but the ships would not be available until mid-July or early August
because they required reconditioning. While he appreciated the effort, Roosevelt told Admiral
Land, the head of the Maritime Commission, to “speed it up all you can because just as long as
we can get out ships into a French port we will need regular and frequent sailings.”33
In what Amcross and Roosevelt hoped would be first of many shipments, the
McKeesport sailed on 14 June 1940 carrying clothing, food, drugs, and medical supplies.34 The
McKeesport’s final destination, however, was source of much anxiety. Under American
neutrality law, the ship could not proceed to Bordeaux, France, until it received safe conducts
from all the belligerent governments— even from those that lay in ruin.35 By granting the
McKeesport safe conduct, the belligerents agreed not to molest the ship with their military, air, or
naval forces. To make it easier to identify, the ship was marked with the Red Cross emblem and
33 Letter, Land to FDR, 13 June 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, January-June 1940. Memo, FDR to Land, 14 June 1940; Letter, Davis to FDR, 4 June 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, January-June 1940.The commission was able to secure the ship at cost. The Maritime Commission also was working to obtain other ships for Amcross’ use, but they would not be ready until mid-July and August because they required reconditioning. FDR told Admiral Land, the head of the Maritime Commission that he appreciated his work, but “speed it up all you can because just as long as we can get out ships into a French port we will need regular and frequent sailings.”
34 Letter, Swift to Hull, 20 June 1940; Telegram 576, Davis to Taylor, 4 June 1940; Letter, Swift to Hull, 11 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. Letter, Davis to FDR, 13 June 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, January-June 1940.
35 “Act to Speed Ships on Red Cross Duty,”NYT, 19 June 1940. The changing fortunes o f the McKeesport^ journey prompted Long and Davis to testify before both the House and Senate foreign relations committees urging that the neutrality act be amended to allow relief ships to call at belligerent ports with less red tape. They argued that it was impossible to comply with the Neutrality Act because some of the governments names have no address, that governments sympathetic to Amcross do not feel able to guarantee their safety, and theM cKeesport might have to return. They wanted Section 2(a) amended to allow unarmed and uncoveyed vessels under the direction and control of Amcross to be allowed to proceed to belligerent ports to deliver personnel, medical supplies, food, and clothing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135
flew the American flag.36 The McKeesport had the most to fear from Germany, since its U-boats
stalked shipping routes across the Atlantic. Germany, however, agreed to give the McKeesport
safe passage and allow it to dock at Bordeaux, but warned that the port could be another Dunkirk
by the time it arrived.
In the end, Amcross did not confront a chaotic Bordeaux port— instead it confronted the
political and logistical chaos spawned by the collapse of France. As the McKeesport m ade its
way across the Atlantic, the offensive in the West came to a close with Germany’s victory over
France. The demise of the Third Republic and the division of the country into two zones
jeopardized Amcross’ relief plans.37 Amcross could no longer think in terms of providing relief
to single nation known as France: to conduct relief in occupied France, it now had to negotiate
with Nazi Germany; to conduct relief in unoccupied France, it had to negotiate with the newly-
created Vichy regime. The mystery with Vichy France was the extent to which it would heed the
wishes of the Franco-German Armistice Commission, a body subservient to the wishes of Berlin.
Amcross worried about its ability to control the movement of personnel and supplies between the
occupied and unoccupied zones. Immediately troubling was the loss of Bordeaux, which fell
within occupied zone, as a base of operations. Until new arrangements could be made, the
McKeesport had to dock at Bilbao, Spain, and Amcross faced the unwelcome prospect of having
to send the ship home full or devising a way to transport its cargo overland from Spain to
France.38 In the meantime, Taylor and Allen tried to buy supplies locally, but found it an
36 Telegram 1124, Hull to London, 7 June 1940; Letter, Davis to Hull, 7 June 1940; Letter, Davis to Hull, 11 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4.
37 Telegram 239, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 19 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
38 Telegram 178, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 16 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136
impossible task owing to the destruction of France’s communication and transportation
networks.39
Amcross decided to try its luck with Vichy first. At the end of June 1940, Allen asked
the Franco-German Armistice Commission for permission to distribute relief in conjunction with
SAVG. Amcross requested the safe conduct of supplies, designation of a port to receive them,
assistance with transporting supplies to distribution points, and permission for American
personnel to supervise the distribution. As with the General Government, Amcross wanted an
agreement that allowed it to conduct its relief program without interference. “In view of urgent
need for relief by civilian population,” wrote Allen, “it is hoped that prompt action will be
taken.”40 During the first week of July, the armistice commission gave informal approval to
Amcross distributing relief in Vichy.41
In mid-July 1940, the McKeesport docked at President Wilson W harf in Marseilles more
than two weeks after it was first expected at Bordeaux.42 “Inspiring and moving sight these
American supplies arriving,” Allen telegraphed Davis. “People of France most grateful this
evidence American generosity and interest These people pray that the McKeesport is first of
many ships to come carrying the supplies which are so urgently needed.”43 The milk and food
39 Telegram 193, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 18 June 1940. Telegram 206, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 19 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
40 Telegram 1662, Amcross to Taylor (Paris), 17 June 1940. Telegram 206, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 19 June 1940; Telegram 288, Allen to Davis, 28 June 1940; Telegram 293, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 29 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
41 Telegram 136, Allen (Marseilles) to Davis, 13 July 1940. Telegram 140, Davis to Allen, 14 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. .
42 Telegram 46, Bullitt (La Bourboule) to State, 11 July 1940; Letter, Swift to Hull, 6 July 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. The Vichy press covered the ship’s arrival with fanfare and the French Foreign Office expressed its appreciation for the aid.
43 Telegram 139, Allen to Davis, 15 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137
for children were especially welcomed. Before the McKeesport arrived with 19,000 cases of
evaporated milk, milk was only given on doctor’s orders because of acute shortages.44
Amcross distributed the McKeesport cargo in conjunction with SAVG. In each
department, a committee representing the community determined the allocation of supplies to
local organizations providing care for refugees. Although it varied by department, a typical
committee generally included the mayor, members of national health organizations, refugees, and
other professionals, with a SAVG director serving as chairman. The committees also included
prefets secours, government agents responsible for refugee care, aided by a staff of health
officers, social workers, and nurses. The SAVG representative presented requests for supplies to
the committee, which decided how to allocate them. Only under exceptional circumstances did
SAVG handle requests directly from refugees. “SAVG is in reality an unusual piece of
constructive community organization, not common in France and is a real contribution to
France,” wrote Allen of the system. “As is case all good social planning the personalized givers
of relief are restricted to planned rather than indiscriminate approach.”45 Drugs and surgical
supplies were distributed to local hospitals and clinics according to need. Despite the relatively
smooth distribution, Amcross found that the gas shortage, which plagued all of Vichy,
complicated its efforts, prompting the State Department to urge the Vichy government to provide
the necessary petrol.46
44 Telegram 374, Allen (Bordeaux) to Davis, 8 July 1940; Telegram 387, Allen to Davis, 9 July 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. Telegram 292, Allen and Taylor to Davis, 9 August 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5. Amcross and the other relief groups working Vichy believed that the supplies addressed the urgent needs of the refugees for the next two months.
45 Telegram 299, Allen to Davis, 19 August 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 5.
46 Telegram 143, Davis to Allen, 20 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138
As supplies poured into Vichy, Amcross began exploring ways to provide relief to
occupied France. Davis authorized Taylor to use $50,000 to purchase milk and children’s food
for distribution to the sick and wounded, along with children, in Paris and the surrounding area.47
Taylor purchased goods in Switzerland after occupation authorities assured him that they would
not divert or requisition the supplies while they were en route to Paris.48 He also asked Germany
for permission to distribute relief through SAVG or an equivalent organization. The program
would be staffed primarily by Americans, along with some French citizens, but not employ
personnel from any active belligerents. Taylor wanted to quell any anxiety on the part of
Germany that the relief program would be used by the Allies to gather intelligence. No supplies,
however, would be distributed until a relief survey had been completed.49
Taylor’s submission of Amcross’ plan coincided with Germany’s review of its policy of
allowing relief into the newly concurred territories, particularly France. Reluctant to have
France overrun by private and neutral relief organizations, Germany considered having all relief
activities coordinated by a single organization, such as ICRC.50 In mid-July 1940, the German
Foreign Office invited Taylor to Berlin for further discussions. Taylor had what he regarded as a
“very satisfactory conversation” with Lohmann, with whom he worked on relief for the General
Government.51 Germany appeared willing to accord a certain amount of recognition to Amcross’
47 Letter, Swift to Hull, 13 July 1940. Letter, Barnes (First Sec. US Embassy Paris) to Hull, 13 July 1940.
48Memo, Davis to FDR, 17 July 1940. FDRL, OF 124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
49 “Memorandum on Future American Red Cross Activities in France” by Wayne Taylor, July 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. (attachment to Letter, Barnes (First Sec. US Embassy Paris) to Hull, 13 July 1940.) Amcross wanted to use Paris as a base, and if necessary establish a headquarters in Vichy.
50 Telegram 2653, Kirk to Sec of State, 10 July 1940. NA, RG 59, M1284, Roll 4.
31 Telegram 92, Taylor to Davis, 17 July 1940. Telegram 176, Davis to Allen, 27 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5. Letter, Taylor to Davis, 22 July 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, July- December 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139
relief activities in the occupied zone, because Taylor was already operating in Paris prior to
surrender. Consequently, allowing him to continue his efforts would not create the precedent of
admitting a neutral welfare worker to occupied territory. “His future status and activities,”
reported Kirk, “will apparently depend on arrangements that he can make personally.”52
Despite Allen and Taylor’s successes, Davis cautioned them that the uncertain political
and military situation in France prevented Amcross from making further shipments until the
situation clarified.53 Both men greeted the news with dismay, urging that Amcross take
immediate steps to put the SAVG machinery to work and rush continuous large shipments of
food and other emergency supplies as long as funds and supplies were available. From his base
of operations in Marseilles, Allen emphasized the freedom of movement accorded to Amcross
and the lack of interference from the Vichy government.54 “Now is time to make lasting
impression on French people of American friendship,” he told Davis. “They badly need friends
now. Cannot describe pitiful gratitude all people for what we are doing.”55 Making a similar case
from Paris, Taylor stressed the growing food crisis in the occupied zone. “Best information
indicates food situation will be serious until next year’s harvest with especial stringency next two
m onths.”56
52 Telegram 3010, Kirk to State, 18 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5. Taylor believed that an answer in principle would be forthcoming by the beginning of August.
53 Telegram 142, Davis to Allen, 20 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
54 Telegram 192, Allen (Marseilles) to Davis, 26 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
55 Telegram 156, Allen to Davis, 19 July 1940; Telegram 163, Allen to Davis, 22 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
56 Telegram, Taylor to Davis, 6 July 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 140
At the beginning of August 1940, American relief efforts for occupied France began
without interference from German officials.57 The majority of the wounded soldiers and civilians
were in the north, causing military and civilian hospitals to run through the most basic supplies
by the end of July. As the refugees returned home from their temporary sanctuary in the south,
stocks of food, clothing, blankets, and medicine proved inadequate. American relief
organizations also faced other challenges. Germany had yet to establish a cohesive
administrative structure in the occupied zone due to rapid personnel changes. Deserving German
officers were posted to France for a few weeks on a tour-of-duty that was one part sight-seeing
trip and one part fact-finding trip, resulting in little administrative continuity. Gasoline shortages
also caused serious problems. “We are building our entire service in this area on the basis of
gasoline which really controls everything,” Taylor reported. “1 am sticking to the principle that
we would only purchase supplies which we could handle with our own transport, and our own
transport in turn must be controlled by the amount of gasoline available.”58
Although Amcross was now operating with success in occupied France, Davis believed
that the program had a limited future. “Aside from question of concluding satisfactory
agreement with Germany,” Davis wired, “we are forced to conclusion that for the present it is
impractical because of transportation difficulties and blockade and most adverse public opinion
to furnish relief in German occupied territory.” Taylor’s program to distribute milk and food in
Paris was proving to be very unpopular. “Many people,” wrote Davis, “are demanding that the
Red Cross cease undertaking responsibilities, the burden of which they feel should be borne by
57 Telegram 265, Anne Morgan to Cross Hamilton Lovett (via State cable), 14 August 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M 1284, Roll 5.
58 Letter, Taylor to Davis, 22 July 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141
Germany.”59 A potent indicator of increasing opposition to the relief program was the
development of a whispering campaign. Even before the McKeesport docked in Marseilles, a
rumor reverberated across the country that Amcross supplies were falling into German and
Italian hands, and that anyone who tried to warn Amcross faced severe punishment. Even
Roosevelt’s secretary, General Watson, who heard the rumor from a “friend,” repeated it to
Davis in the guise of a friendly warning.60 While patently false, the rumor played on American
fears that Germany would abuse its goodwill. “This is the ‘Fifth Column’ at work,” observed an
increasingly paranoid Davis, “and innocent Americans are being used to spread false rumors.”61
Taylor and Allen argued for relief to continue. “Because of military defeat and resulting
disorganization,” they wrote, “these French people in occupied area need both material and
m oral support.”62 They also noted that Amcross had “utmost freedom and cooperation” in their
work from occupation authorities.63 “The AmCross,” they wrote, “is literally only organization
left in which people have confidence to do large scale relief and which we believe will have full
support and cooperation all authorities.” Taylor and Allen believed that Amcross was in a
unique position to provide aid and if it failed to do so and in a generous manner, it may damage
the entire Red Cross movement.64 Despite a frank exchange of views, Davis and his team
continued to talk at cross purposes, owing to their different perspectives. In Washington, Davis
59 Telegram 182, Davis to Allen, 29 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
60 Memo, “K” to Watson, 15 July 1940. FDRL, OF 124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
61 Letter, Davis to Early, 16 July 1940; Letter, Taubles to Davis, 11 July 1940. FDRL, OF 124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
62 Telegram 292, Allen and Taylor to Davis, 9 August 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
63 Telegram 222, Allen to Davis, 31 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
64 Telegram 292, Allen and Taylor to Davis, 9 August 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142
could see opposition to Amcross’ relief efforts growing, while in France, Allen and Taylor could
see the seeds of a growing crisis. “Although 1 have tried to convey to Wayne the attitude of the
public with regard to relief in occupied territory,” Davis told Roosevelt, “he does not seem to
realize how deep the hostility is.”65
Davis, however, did not intend to abandon France completely, believing that Amcross
could play a role in Vichy. “My feeling,” he wrote Roosevelt, “. . .is that we should make every
effort to extend relief to children, at least in unoccupied France; that public opinion would
approve of relief limited to this; and that the British would most probably consent.”66 To that
end, Davis asked Britain for permission to provide food for children, improve medical care, and
distribute clothing to sick refugees.67 The question remained to be seen as to how Britain would
treat its former ally.68
Hoover and the Belgians
While Roosevelt and Amcross pursued complementary relief efforts, Hoover charted his
own path in much the same way he did with Poland. On 25 May 1940, he sounded the ominous
warning that “famine on a gigantic scale is now the fate of Europe if this war if prolonged” and
lamented that the conflict had been transformed into a war of soldiers against citizens. While
maintaining his non-interventionist stance, Floover argued that the United States had a role to
play: “We saved Europe with food from the pangs of hunger after the World War. We may have
65 Memo, Davis to FDR, 16 August 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
66 Letter, Davis to FDR, 22 July 1940. FDRL, OF 124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
67 Letter, Swift to Hull, 31 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 5.
68 Telegram 211, Davis to Allen, 2 August 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5. Telegram 279, Davis to Allen, 12 August 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5. Davis also told Allen that all money transfers must now receive individual approval.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143
to perform that service again, but when we give it we should have a right to a voice in the
settlement of this war.”69 For Hoover, relief offered a way for the United States to rescue
Europe from possible starvation, while earning the right to shape the postwar world. He once
again sought to organize a relief program for Belgium. Although it only took three days to
establish the Commission for Relief of Belgium and commence operations during the First World
War, reviving the organization a second time proved to be a torturous process.
After the Nazi invasion of Belgium, Hoover informed the Belgian government that he
would coordinate a relief program if it extended a formal invitation asking him to do so.70 Count
Robert van der Straten-Ponthoz, the Belgian Ambassador to the United States, regarded the
request with some trepidation. Although he respected Hoover’s previous accomplishments, he
also harbored concerns about how a formal relationship with Hoover would affect Belgium’s
relationship with the Roosevelt administration. An attempt to discuss the matter informally with
the State Department yielded no assistance. “Having talked the matter over at great length with
Mr. Berle, Mr. Long, and Jimmy Dunn,” wrote Pierrepont Moffat, State’s Chief of European
Affairs, "we all of us reached the conclusion that the Ambassador should not ask for even an
informal expression of opinion on this matter. He knew the factors and should assume
responsibility of deciding one way or the other.” The State Department’s refusal to provide
guidance compounded Straten-Ponthoz’s predicament, since the German advance made it
impossible for him to communicate with his colleagues in Belgium. Hoover forced the
ambassador’s hand when he informed the New York Times on 15 May 1940 of his willingness to
69 “Hoover Foresees U.S. Hand in Peace,”NYT, 26 May 1940. Hoover spoke before the annual meeting of the Nassau County Bar Association in Long Island, New York, and received a medal for outstanding achievement in public life.
70 Telegram, Straten-Ponthoz to Hoover, 15 May 1940; Telegram, Hoover to Straten-Ponthoz, 15 May 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 10, File 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144
spearhead a Belgian relief program. The next day, Straten-Ponthoz issued a formal invitation to
H oover.71
It soon became clear, however, that Straten-Ponthoz had moved ahead of his own
government.72 While Hoover wrestled an invitation in Washington, Gibson also attempted to
extract one from Belgian officials in Paris. Over the course of the discussions, Paul-Henri Spaak,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Paul Letellier, the Belgian ambassador to France,
expressed concern that working with Hoover would involve Belgium in internal American
politics and possibly antagonize the Roosevelt administration. Spaak also worried that enlisting
Hoover’s services before Belgium surrendered would send the message to the world that
Belgium did not intend to fight. Despite their reservations, they agreed to raise the question of
relief with the Belgian cabinet.73 When Gibson called at the Belgian embassy a week later to
receive a progress report, he encountered a visibly irritated Letellier. The ambassador expressed
dismay at Gibson’s attempts to rush Belgium into making an “imprudent commitment” and
demanded to know what financial obligations Belgium would assume by asking Hoover to direct
a relief program. “1 simply could not understand a Belgian of his age and with his memory of
what had been done by Mr. Hoover and his associates in the last war, asking me such a
question," noted Gibson, who described the meeting with Letellier as akin to "explaining to him
that we were not trying to take the fillings out of his teeth!"74
71 Memcon on “Reconstitution of CRB” between Straten-Ponthoz and Moffat, 14 May 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M 1284, Roll 3. Letter, Straten to Hoover, 16 May 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 6, File 1; "Hoover Again Head of Belgian Relief," NYT, 16 May 1940, page 11. Letter, Hoover to Straten, 17 May 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 6, File 1.
72 Memcon, Davies and Baron Herve de Gruben, 25 May 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
73 Memcon, Gibson with Spaak and Letellier, 14 May 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, File WWII.
74 Memcon, Gibson and Letellier, 19 May 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, File WWII relief.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145
However befuddling Gibson found Letellier’s anxiety, it convinced him that he needed to
persuade the Belgians that working with Hoover would not be a political burden. “What I laid
before you was neither a proposal nor a request, but an intimation that our services were at your
disposal if you cared to ask for them," Gibson wrote Letellier. "There was no question of
obligations on the part of the Belgian Government in return for this service.” The letter worked
like a charm, and a considerably calmer Letellier agreed to cable King Leopold advising that he
enlist Hoover.75 While heartened by the turn of events, Gibson did not believe Belgium would
take action quickly. His experiences in Paris suggested that Belgian officials were not in a hurry
to organize a relief program, particularly in the days following Belgium’s surrender. “The bottom
has dropped out of this whole business with the capitulation,” he observed. “The Belgians are a
pitiful lot; most of them wish they were dead.”76
Two days after receiving the telegram from Letellier, King Leopold took action. On 2 1
May 1940, five days before Belgium’s surrender, the king cabled Roosevelt asking for assistance.
The king cited the "splendid relief given to Belgium during the First World War by the United
States through the auspices of Hoover’s Commission for the Relief of Belgium, “which for years
was regarded by as us as the incarnation of human ideals and American generosity.” Arguing
that Belgium now faced a "more dreadful" situation, he appealed for assistance from the United
States. King Leopold believed his cable constituted a direct appeal for Hoover’s services, but he
never specifically stated that Belgium wanted Hoover to reconstitute the commission. Instead,
the vaguely worded telegram conveyed an appeal for humanitarian aid, using Hoover’s work as
75 Memcon, Gibson and Letellier, 19 May 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, File WWII relief.
76 Letter, Gibson to Galpin, 30 May 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, File WWII relief.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146
an example of American generosity.77 Roosevelt no doubt detected the message implicit in
Leopold’s muddled appeal, but he chose to not to refer to Hoover in his response. Expressing
sympathy for Belgium’s plight, the president emphasized that the American people were
"prepared to respond quickly and generously in this tragic time" and cited donations given to
help refugees and the assistance provided by Amcross to the Belgian Red Cross.78
Roosevelt's reply left the Belgians confused as to how the president felt about their
working with Hoover. On 27 May 1940, the day after Belgium surrendered, Straten-Ponthoz met
with the State Department’s Joseph Davies, informing him that he needed an answer about
Hoover. Davies told the ambassador he already possessed the answer: the United States did not
intend to become involved with private relief organizations because of the limitations posed by
the Neutrality Act. Davies intended for Straten-Ponthoz to extrapolate from the State
Department’s position that the Roosevelt administration would continue to refuse to comment on
a partnership between Hoover and Belgium/9 Attempting to speak directly with Roosevelt,
Straten-Ponthoz failed to gain an audience, but learned from General Watson that Under
Secretary of States Sumner Welles ordered him not to discuss Belgian relief with Roosevelt,
because the situation continued to evolve and more important matters demanded his attention.80
77 Telegram, Bullitt to FDR, 21 May 1940. FDRL, OF14, Box 1, Gov’t of Belgium, 1940-45. Telegram 1727, Cudahy to Sec of State, 7 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
78 Amcross arranged to transfer money to the Belgian Red Cross to facilitate purchases of medical supplies and provide assistance to refugees. Amcross chapters were also making bandages and surgical dressings. Telegram 115, Cudahy to Davis, 11 May 1940. Telgram 133, Cudahy to Davis, 14 May 1940; Letter, Davies to Swift, 14 May 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 3. Telegram 1642, Sec of State to Cudahy, 15 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4. Telegram, FDR to King Leopold of Belgium, 21 May 1940. FDRL, OF 14, Box 1, Gov’t of Belgium, 1940-45.
79 Memon, Davies and Count van der Straten-Ponthoz, 27 May 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 4.
80 Memcon, Davies and Straten-Ponthoz and Theunis, 1 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147
Unfortunately, the only thing Straten-Ponthoz accomplished by visiting the White House was to
annoy the State Department, which regarded his actions as an attempt to usurp its authority.81
In mid-June 1940, Welles encouraged Straten-Ponthoz to refrain from pushing Belgian
relief for a few weeks, because the situation might remedy itself. Although Welles could have
been referring to the impending congressional vote on the relief package, Straten-Ponthoz
believed the suggestion had more to do with awaiting the outcome of the Republican convention,
which would decide whether Hoover would challenge Roosevelt. Over Sunday lunch at his
house, Davies tried to convince the ambassador otherwise, arguing that neither Hull nor Welles
nor Roosevelt would let political conditions or personality conflicts affect a humanitarian
project. Instead, they adopted a cautious attitude because of the volatile European situation,
particularly the uncertain nature of France’s future. In addition, Britain and Germany’s attitude
toward relief for Belgium remained untested, and the financial arrangements needed to be
worked out. The administration also could not be seen to favor one private relief organization
over another. 82
The influence of Hoover’s political aspirations cannot be discounted. Even though his
relief efforts occupied a large portion of his time, Hoover campaigned to become the 1940
Republican candidate for president. Gary Dean Best, one of Hoover’s official biographers,
laments that the relief issue distracted Hoover’s attention away from his re-election efforts.83
Throughout the spring, Hoover polled well among Republican voters and newspaper editors, who
81 Note, Long to Moffat and Davies, 6 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
82 Memon, Davies and Straten-Ponthoz and Gruben, 17 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4
83 Gary Dean Best’sHerbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933-1964, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford, 1988) 133-44. For a more generous assessment of Hoover’s relief efforts see James H. George, Jr., “Another Chance: Herbert Hoover and World War II Relief,”Diplomatic History, vol. 16, no. 3 (Summer 1992) 389-407. George disagrees with Best’s contention that relief was a marginal activity for Hoover and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148
looked kindly on his experience in handling international affairs. He was also aided by the
inability of other candidates to arouse much interest. But Hoover’s base of support started to
erode in May as momentum began to build around Wendell Willke, a former anti-New Deal
Democrat. By the time the nominating convention arrived the last week in June, only a
blockbuster speech could rescue Hoover’s candidacy. He offered the delegates a tour-de-force
articulation of the Republican platform, arguing for nonintervention in foreign wars, indicting the
New Deal and the burden its spending policies placed on the economy, lamenting the lack of
preparation given to national defense, and supporting the extension of “such aid as shall not be in
violation of international law or inconsistent with requirements of our own national defense.”84
Despite the warm reception, Hoover failed to win the convention— that honor went to Wendell
W illke.85
Hoover’s failure to gamer the nomination allowed him to devote himself full time to
relief. As of 8 June 1940, the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Inc.— or “CRB” as it was
known in the media— was officially recognized by the State Department. CRB intended to “to
relieve suffering and distress and otherwise promote the well-being of the population of Belgium
and Luxemburg and their refugees and stranded citizens in other countries.” The commission
received its initial $10,000 start-up fund from the Belgian American Educational Foundation, an
organization created after the First World to continue to ties forged between the two countries as
a result of Hoover’s work.86 CRB used much of the same staff as Comporel: Hoover served as its
seeks to construct a more nuanced picture of Hoover’s attitudes on the relief issue. He argues that Best portrays the issue as one-dimensional.
84 Cited in Best, 163.
85 Best, 164-5.
86 Belgian American Educational Foundation, Inc. Executive Committee Meeting, 21 May 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 6, File 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149
chairman and spokesperson; Edgar Rickard and Maurice Pate directed the commission’s daily
operations; Gibson served as its general representative in Europe; and Hartigan negotiated with
Germany in Berlin. Hoover intended, however, for CRB to serve only as a distributing
organization. Appeals for money, food, clothing, and medical supplies would be conducted by a
separate organization, the Belgian Relief Fund, under the direction of Dave Hennen Morris,
former U.S. ambassador to Belgium.87 Hoover believed that CRB would have an easier time
receiving approval for its programs if the organization was removed from fundraising and the
politics surrounding it. His experiences with Comporel made it clear that it would take months,
rather than days, to organize Belgian relief. “In the vast and desperate struggle now going on,”
Pate wrote Gibson, “I do not know how much initiative we can take toward relief beyond letting
all interested Governments know that our men are willing to serve as the link of confidence if
and when the time comes.”88
CRB focused its efforts on publicizing the food situation in Europe, obtaining the money
required to start a long-term relief program, and securing Germany’s and Britain’s approval. The
centerpiece of CRB’s media campaign was a “food map” of Europe. Using statistics from 1938,
the last peace time year, CRB developed a map showing the imports, exports, and crop
production for Europe. CRB believed that the map showed ample evidence that Europe was
suffering from a deficiency in cereals, a severe problem given the prominence of bread in the
European diet. CRB predicted that unless the deficiency was corrected “serious food shortages
and famine are bound to develop in Western Europe, particularly in Belgium, The Netherlands,
87 Letter, Perrin Galpin to Members of the Belgian American Educational Foundation, etc., 8 June 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 6, File 1.
88 Letter, Pate to Gibson, 13 July 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150
Norway, Denmark and probably France.” 89 “This is indeed a serious matter which raises many
difficult questions to which careful and sympathetic consideration must be given,” Roosevelt
wrote in response to receiving• • the1 map. 90
CRB could not count of Roosevelt administration to publicize its findings, so it
attempted put the question of food shortages on the agenda of the Pan-American Conference held
in Havana from 21-30 July 1940. The United States called the conference to discuss ways to
resist German encroachments in the hemisphere.91 In an obvious attempt to tug at the
consciences of the delegates, CRB issued a press release that virtually screamed: “Famine-
Threatened Europe Watches Conference of Supplier Nations: Lack of Normal Imports from
Western Hemisphere Presages Early Food Deficiencies.” Citing the lack of imports, CRB argued
that the meeting represented a significant moment in determining the future health of the nations
of Europe. “With large gold reserves on deposit in the United States their incredible plight is one
for which only humanitarianism can be the ultimate panacea.” CRB urged that portions of
dormant funds be released for “the feeding of these people lest they succumb to starvation and
pestilence.”92
CRB failed to sway the ministers in Havana to take action. Indeed Britain worked very
hard to make sure that no “embarrassing” pro-relief resolutions would be introduced and
pressured the United States to help promote its policy at the conference. In a message to Hull
and Roosevelt, the Foreign Office acknowledged the “humanitarian ideals” motivating relief
89 Letter, Galpin to FDR, 25 July 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 11, File 24. CRB based its calculations on figures obtained from consular and trade agencies and League of Nations publications.
90 Letter, FDR to Galpin, 27 July 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 11, File 24.
91 Dallek, 234-5.
92 CRB Press Release, “Famine-Threatened Europe Watches Conference of Supplier Nations,” 24 July 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 3, File 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. efforts, but argued that “it would be false humanity to lengthen the war by allowing the enemy to
be assisted in the difficulties which confront him.” While cognizant that its decision not to
exempt relief goods from contraband control might inspire attacks from Nazi Germany and
neutrals, Britain hoped the United States would support its policy:
“fO]ur intention is to win the war in the shortest possible time; we believe that this decision will help us to do so and we therefore hope that the Administration will do all in their power to see that it is presented in the proper light, not as a measure which will inflict avoidable hardship on the helpless, but as one which will, we are confident, shorten the struggle and hasten the day when Germany’s victims regain their liberty.”93
Hull approved of Britain’s position, observing that experience showed that it was almost
impossible to organize a relief program that did not directly or indirectly benefit Germany.”94 In
the end, Britain succeeded in foiling CRB’s attempts to make food shortages an issue at Havana.
Beyond raising public awareness about the food issue, CRB also focused its efforts on
getting a relief program started for Belgium. The immediate obstacle was money. If Hoover’s
dealings with Poland taught him one thing, it was the importance of securing money up front.
Accordingly, CRB informed Belgium that $10 million would be necessary to “finance serious
operations and effective negotiations.”95 CRB worried that Roosevelt’s foreign relief fund would
cripple its fundraising efforts, a valid concern given that the parameters of the fund were not
favorable to CRB. Roosevelt intended the money be used by Amcross to aid refugees— not by
Hoover to run a relief program.96 The State Department also continually emphasized that the
93 Telegram 1249, Lothian to FO, 5 July 1940; Telegram 1526, FO to Lothian, 15 July 1940. PRO, F0837/1218.
94 Telegram 1386, Lothian to FO, 18 July 1940. PRO, F0837/1218; Aide Memoire, Lothian to Hull, 17 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5. Memcon, Hull and Lothian, 18 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5. 95 Letter, Straten-Ponthoz to Galpin, 15 June 1940.Letter, Galpin to Straten-Ponthoz, 25 July 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 10, File 3.
96 Letter No. 2164, Belgium Embassy to State, 12 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M 1284, Roll 4
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152
administration could not be seen to favor one private relief organization over another.97
Nevertheless, CRB hoped it could make a case for the administration supporting its efforts.
“From the terms of the President’s order it is quite likely that the American Red Cross will
probably be the designate agency,” CRB told Straten-Ponthoz, “. . . it would be helpful if
Belgium’s share could be distributed by an organization which stands ready to devote itself
exclusively to the interests of the Belgian population and Belgian refugees.” 98
German officials found the media attention given to the revival of the commission
insulting. In particular, they objected to the way in which the relief issue had become entwined
with American internal politics. The “improper” relationship made them disinclined to request
or permit relief work by neutral, particularly American, organizations. Kirk reported from Berlin
that “There is a strong determination in German official and welfare circles to take care of any
Belgian relief needs without calling for outside assistance ... if such assistance becomes
necessary recourse would be taken to the International RedCross and possibly the American Red
Cross.” Germany, however, acknowledged that Belgium needed cereals and claimed to be
making shipments to alleviate the wide-spread shortages, which developed when the fighting
disrupted imports (Belgium imported three-quarters of its food) and retreating British troops
burned grain reserves and fields. German officials even went so far as to claim that the Belgian
people were better fed than the German people.99
97 Letter, State to Straten-Ponthoz, 14 June 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4
98 Letter, Galpin to Straten-Ponthoz, 31 July 1940. Letter, Straten-Ponthoz to Galpin, 2 August 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 10, File 3.
99 Telegram 1865, Swift to Schaeffer, 5 July 1940; Telegram 2634, Schaeffer to Amcross, 9 July 1940; Telegram 2634, Schaeffer to Amcross, 9 July 1940; Telegram 2310, Heath to Sec of State, 3 July 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153
The task of negotiating for British approval of Belgian relief once again fell to Gibson,
who had spent three weeks trying to escape France. As the German army rolled south rolled
toward Paris, Gibson and the diplomatic community joined the torrent of refugees on the roads.
Gibson planned to make his way to Switzerland to join Hartigan, but found his plans temporarily
foiled when both the Polish and Belgian governments departed before issuing him travel papers.
After learning of Petain’s surrender and experiencing a close encounter with German forces,
Gibson headed west toward Spain and Portugal where he hoped to catch a ship to Britain. “In
these few days the whole aspect of relief had changed and knowing their was little chance of
getting through to Berne it seemed to me urgent to get back to England as soon as possible and
sniff out the change in the British attitude before doing anything else.” In the formerly tranquil
town of Biarritz, France, on the Franco-Spanish border, Gibson joined the thousands of people
besieging the Spanish and Portuguese consulates. With a bit of acting and bravado, he convinced
the Portuguese consulate to give him— an important diplomat— the necessary papers to cross the
frontier. Gibson barely made it through before the Germans arrived to shut down the border. As
he waited in Lisbon for transport to Britain, he attempted to telegraph his network of contacts
across Western Europe, but received no replies. “All our people have disappeared.”100
Gibson’s experiences in Paris and on the roads of France renewed his resolve to organize
relief, but that resolve was accompanied by a change in tactics. After getting settled in London
100 Letter, Gibson to Galpin, 2 July 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, File WWII relief. Before leaving, Gibson tried one last time to convince Spaak to appoint someone to act for Belgium on relief matters. “I persisted but to no avail as demoralization had set it,” Gibson recounted. “Everybody was completely rattled.” When he became stranded in France, Gibson appealed to a French general that he knew in passing for help, telling him about his relief efforts and suggesting he might soon be doing the same for France. “He got the point and made me up a document that beats anything I have ever had before. Whenever shown to a soldier, he curled up round the edges and turned pale. It got us gas when pumps were dry and took us through traffic jams like magic.” Aided by the benefit of a car, Gibson made it to Vichy the first night, where it was “standing room only,” and pushed on to Dijon. As he made for the Franco-Swiss border, he found his progress impeded by the refugee columns. “The deluge of refugees was flowing like a river the whole breadth of the roads leaving no room for an eel to go against the current.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154
at the beginning of July, Gibson intentionally avoided the Foreign Office. As long as
Flumphreys, “an accomplished obstructionist,” worked on the relief issue, “it was a waste of
time.” “The gentleman handling our problems,” Gibson told Floover, “was against any and all
relief: he had responded to my efforts to deal frankly and openly with him with methods of
Asiatic diplomacy that were beyond by depth— and that so long as he had a comer on relief
questions, I felt it was dangerous for me to have any dealings with the Foreign Office.”101
Instead, Gibson intended to use informal meetings and discussions to cultivate support for relief.
“My Leitmotif is that the only way to get anything done is to approach the whole subject in an
affirmative way and reasonably,” he wrote. “It must be on the assumption that the Governments
of the occupied countries don’t want to beat their heads against a stone wall and insist on doing
things that cannot be done— or things that will help the Germans. On the other hand the British
Government while determined to make the blockade effective has no interest or desire in
preventing relief that does not benefit the Germans.”102 By pursing this “affirmative” approach,
Gibson believed real progress could be made. “It seems to me that this is the only grown-up way
to deal with the question— and the only way that will give us all a clear understanding.”103
By the third week of July 1940, the Foreign Office found Gibson’s silence distressing,
not to mention suspicious, and sent Harold Farquhar, an old friend, to call on him. Over lunch,
the two men discussed the relief issue, with Gibson emphasizing Poland and Belgium’s
obligation to help their citizens, partly as a means of building up a “clear record” for use at the
end of the war. “So far, the British attitude had been one of obstruction and refusal,” Gibson told
101 Letter, Gibson to Hoover, 26 July 1940. Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
102 Letter, Gibson to Millard Shaler (CRB rep in Lisbon), 9 August 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
103 Letter, Gibson to Shaler (CRB rep in Lisbon), 9 August 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155
Farquhar. He suggested that the Foreign Office appoint a new person to deal with relief and hold
informal meetings without minutes, “so that we should all be free to say what we liked without
the fear of having our words rise up to haunt us later.” Farquhar wanted to know what would
happen if the discussions yielded the conclusion that general relief was impossible. Gibson
suggested that the next step would be to examine what was possible— relief for children, relief
for expectant and breastfeeding mothers, relief for the elderly— and “keep on going until we
found out what could be done.” Britain needed to approach the discussions in a “generous
spirit— if instead of granting grudging permission for a minimum effort it honestly sought out
what could be done, and then gave its blessing and its support.” Any other approach would be a
waste of time.
Gibson’s suggestions did not go unheeded by the Foreign Office. Although Farquhar’s
colleagues agreed with Gibson’s approach, the relief issue was not specifically anyone’s job.
The Foreign Office was organized in regional sections, but the relief issue transcended them,
falling between the neatly delineated bureaucratic cracks. “It all boiled down to finding the right
sort of man who would undertake to do the job as it should be done,” Farquhar told Gibson.
Increasingly, the Foreign Office’s designated relief man was Christopher Eden Steel, who
worked for the General Department and served as Farquhar’s deputy. Gibson also succeeded in
enlisting the help of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the former counselor of the British embassy in Berlin
and now a key man in the Ministry of Information. Kirkpatrick agreed to put together an
informal group of Foreign Office, MEW, and Ministry of Information officials to discuss
relief.10'1
104 Letter, Gibson to Floover, 26 July 1940; Mention, Gibson and Farquhar, 13 July 1940; Memcon, Gibson and Farquhar and Steel, 22 July 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156
As Gibson’s informal discussions began to foster good relations with British officials, he
also began to hear the allegation that the Roosevelt administration would resent dealing with
Hoover on relief matters. The frequency with which it was lodged made him wonder if “there is
something systematic about it.” During a meeting at the Ministry of Information, Harold
Nicholson closely questioned Gibson on the subject in order to be certain that Britain was not
going to become entangled in American politics via the relief issue. “He asked me point blank
whether relief was going to become a campaign issue, a political football,” wrote Gibson. “He
said that while they wanted to cooperate with us they had to be very careful in times like these
not to get at odds with the American administration.” Gibson encountered the same problem
when he tried to tackle the Poles on money for Polish relief. Some Polish officials believed that
by joining forces with Hoover, Poland would not benefit from Roosevelt’s foreign relief fund or
Amcross’ largesse. Halifax also told the Dutch foreign minister that Hoover and the Roosevelt
administration were not always one.105 Whatever the source of the rumor, concerns about the
presidential rivalry remained strong and served as a potent handicap to any Hoover-organized
relief scheme.
Let Those Who Wish to Break the Blockade Fire the First Shot
The crushing defeats of the spring of 1940 forced Britain to assess the strategy necessary
to continue the war— and achieve victory— against Nazi Germany. By the end of May, Britain
had settled on a three-pronged strategy: defend the home island against any invasion, blockade
and bomb Germany and German-occupied territories, and encourage resistance against German
rule across Europe. The second prong emphasized Britain’s belief that economic warfare served
as an effective weapon. By denying Germany imports and bombing industrial targets, Britain
105 Letter, Gibson to Rickard, 21 August 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, Relief WWII.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157
hoped to slow the German military industrial complex and cripple Hitler’s plans for adding
Britain to the Great German Reich. In adopting this strategy, Britain understood, however, that
its success depended on the goodwill of the United States. Without its support, Britain did not
stand a chance against Nazi Germany.106 But over the course of the summer, American relief
groups generated a series of proposals and initiatives to provide relief to the newly conquered
territories— proposals that contradicted the very tenets of economic warfare. These proposals
forced British policymakers to grapple with the question of whether or not relief efforts could
complement— rather than deter— British strategy.
The collapse of France prompted MEW to contemplate the future of Britain’s relief
policy. “From the point of view Economic Warfare alone all relief schemes are to be
discouraged,” argued Drogheda. “The precedents of the last war are not applicable to the present
situation, and we would be very reluctant to see a revival of the Hoover relief administration in
Belgium during that war.” Drogheda’s reaction was more than just a knee-jerk response— it was
also based on the magnitude of the relief problem generated by Hitler’s conquest.
In practical terms, the scope of the relief problem expanded threefold as the Netherlands,
Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France—-more than 138 million people spread out
across more than 265,000 square miles—joined Poland as victims of Nazi occupation. Any relief
program for these countries would face the usual problem of establishing effective distribution
controls, but getting the supplies there was another matter entirely. No convenient neutral and
unoccupied port existed for relief ships to use, because Germany controlled all the major ports
serving western Europe. MEW regarded the lack of a “safe” port as a serious problem, because
only North and South America possessed food in quantities sufficient to feed Europe. Another
106 Weinberg, 142, 145. David Reynolds, “Churchill and the British “Decision” to fight on in 1940: right policy, wrong reasons,”Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War,ed. Richard Langhome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 147-67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158
concern was the “me too” syndrome: any relief concession Britain granted to one country would
mostly likely have to be extended to all countries in order to preserve relations with the exile
governments.107 In this regard, the exile governments possessed an important weapon, since
Britain increasingly depended on allied merchant marine fleets to supplement its shipping. If the
exile governments refused to let Britain use their ships— or if their crews refused to serve unless
their families received relief—Britain could be forced to relax the blockade.108
Despite agreement that economic warfare played a pivotal role in Britain’s long-term
strategy, MEW officials disagreed about the possible effects of deprivation on European
civilians.109 While arguing that all relief schemes should be discouraged, Drogheda also
challenged his colleagues to understand the implications of that policy. Given the current
military circumstances, economic warfare could only bring about Germany’s defeat by denying it
essential war supplies or by starving Europe by depriving it of food shipments from North and
South America. Drogheda argued that if the latter occurred:
we would have to face a nightmare continent in which our friends and late allies would suffer as much as, and earlier than, our enemies; a continent where pestilence would be bred by famine; a continent which would soon be consumed by hatred of England . . .
He also maintained that the United States would not accept such a ruthless policy, observing that
“humanitarianism will make it extremely hard to induce them to accept and to force it on to their
South American neighbors.”110 Other MEW officials, however, dismissed his concerns believing
that deprivation would cultivate hatred for Germany. “It is certainly unlikely that semi-starving
107 Minute by Drogheda, 16 June 1940; Minute by Leith-Ross, 19 June 1940; Minute by Drogheda, 27 June 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
108 Minute by O’Reilly, 15 June 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
109 Minute by Leith-Ross, 19 June 1940; Minute by Drogheda, 27 June 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
110 Minute by Drogheda, 16 June 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159
Dutch and Belgians will bless us,” argued one official, “but it is more than possible that they will
curse and hate their German oppressors even more than before, especially if we let it be known
that foodstuffs will pour into their laps the moment the Germans have evacuated their
countries.”111
Despite the strategic and moral challenges that lay ahead, Hugh Dalton, the newly
appointed Minister of Economic Warfare, intended to defend the blockade against all
opponents.112 “Unless we can rigidly blockade Europe, victory will be long delayed, if not
rendered impossible,” wrote Dalton. “I shall therefore do my utmost to resist all proposals to
permit the entry of food or other war materials into enemy or enemy-occupied territory.” Dalton
believed MEW should not precipitate a discussion of Britain’s relief policy. “Let those who
wish to break the blockade fire the first shot,” he told his staff.113
The opening salvo came at the beginning of July 1940. In the space of a week, Britain
received four inquiries regarding relief for France: the Brazilian Red Cross wanted to send relief
to refugees;114 the French embassy in Washington asked that French ships be allowed to pass
Gibraltar to carry food to Vichy France;115 the French Food Mission wanted to send to
Casablanca a ship loaded with food originally intended for refugees in northern France; 116 and
111 Minute by Villiers, 24 June 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
112 Dalton states in his memoirs that “1 was against all moderation in this [the blockade] and all the other forms of economic pressure which my Ministry was supposed to exercise.” Dalton,The Fateful Years, 325.
113 Minute by Dalton, 2 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
114 Telegram, International Red Cross to MEW, 4 July 1940; Telegram 1518, FO to Kelly (Berne), 7 July 1940; Minute by Nicholls, 6 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
115 Telegram 1237, Lothian to FO, 4 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/24326.
116 Telegram 27, FO to Rabat, 28 June 1940.; Memo, “The question of shipping food to French territory” (C6951/6926/17), by J.G. Ward, 27 June 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/24326. Telegram 56, Hurst (Rabat) to FO, 30 June 1940. PRO, F 0371/24326. At the end of June, the Dutch steamer “Prince Frederic,” carrying a cargo of canned meat, fish, and milk, returned to London from Nantes, where it had been unable to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160
Howard Kershner asked to receive food shipments in Marseilles to support the work of the
International Commission for Assistance to Child Refugees."7 Public pressure for action was
also growing in the United States, spurred in part by Roosevelt’s interest in refugee relief and his
appeal to Americans’ humanitarian instincts."8 Despite the mounting pressure, MEW and the
Foreign Office agreed that Britain should not revise its relief policy. For the time being, Vichy
France would be treated like other Nazi-occupied territories and Britain would discourage relief
programs that needed to import food.119 MEW, however, would sanction any relief program
that purchased food within Europe.120
The problems presented by Vichy France quickly tested Britain’s mettle. In the weeks
following France’s surrender to Nazi Germany, Britain openly quarreled with the newly
established Vichy regime, regarding it as a product of defeat and deceit. Smarting from the loss
of its most robust ally and suspicious of the intentions of Petain’s government, Britain worried
about the fate of the French navy. If the French fleet fell under German control, it would shift
the naval balance of power in favor of Germany and Italy, particularly in the Mediterranean.
Mistrustful of French assurances that its navy would only be used for “supervision and
minesweeping,” Britain decided to immobilize the French fleet. On 3 July 1940, Britain seized
all French ships in British-controlled ports, encountering only minor resistance. But when the
discharge its cargo. The food was provided by the Ministry of Food as a result of an arrangement made with the French a month earlier to meet the problem created by the influx of Belgian and French refugees in northern France. French Food Mission wanted to send it to Casablanca to help mounting problems feeding refugees, some of which they claimed where British.
117 Telegram 492, Hoare (Madrid) to FO, 6 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/I226.
118 Telegram 1249, Lothian to FO, 5 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
119 Minute by Nicholls, 11 July 1940; Minute by Nicholls, 14 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
120 Minute by Nicholls, 8 July 1940; Minute by Stirling, 11 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226. Drogheda, C.W. Stirling, and J.W. Nicholls were MEW’s team on relief.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161
British navy appeared off the port of Mers el-Kebir on the Algerian coast and demanded the
ships either join the Allies or leave port, the French commander refused. The British navy
opened fire, destroying or damaging the French force. In the wake of this incident, Vichy France
severed relations with Britain on 4 July 1940. Eight days later, the last vestiges of the Third
Republic were tossed aside when the French parliament voted to establish an authoritarian
regime under Petain’s leadership.121
The turn of events presented Britain with a difficult dilemma— whether or not Vichy
France should be treated like the other occupied territories. The Foreign Office and MEW both
agreed that political expediency necessitated “a little latitude.” In the coming months, Britain
might want to allow relief into Vichy France in order to encourage the regime to resist German
demands and foster goodwill toward the Allied cause in the French colonies. Adopting a flexible
policy would also, in the words of Steel, “keep our hands free for the future.” 122 For their part,
MEW officials regarded the difference between Vichy and occupied France as ficticious at best,
but acknowledged that some concessions might be necessary to help the Vichy government deal
with the extraordinary refugee situation. Accordingly, MEW agreed to let three ships carrying
six thousand tons of meat already enroute to Marseilles from South America pass the blockade in
mid-July. “Little as I like seeing the 3 suggested ships go forward thereby relieving the Germans
to a certain extent of their obligations,” observed Drogheda, “I think that for political reasons it is
desirable to do so.”123 In the event of future pressure to give Vichy special treatment, MEW
intended “to take the line that France is well-known to be self-supporting in the essential
121 Weinberg, 145-6.
122 Minute (W8986) by C.E. Steel, 17 July 1940; Minute (W8986) by R. Makins, 18 July 1940; Minute (W8986) by W. Strang, 18 July 1940; Minute (W8986) by O. Sargent, 19 July 1940. PRO, FO371/25201. 123 Minute by Drogheda, 16 July 1940; Minute by Dalton, 16 July 1940. PRO, F0837/1226.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162
foodstuffs, and that we cannot be expected to allow supplies through when it is clear that by so
doing we should be encouraging the transfer to enemy hands of the surpluses available.”124
In making their decision about relief for Vichy France, the Foreign Office and MEW also
had to consider Britain’s increasingly aggressive policies toward the French colonies in North
Africa. During July, the Board of Trade made it an offense under the Trading with the Enemy
Act to trade with France, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. MEW also declared French colonies in
North Africa as enemy territories for the purposes of contraband and export control. The policies
were intended to prevent the French colonies from conducting trade with Vichy France, Europe,
and overseas markets.125 MEW pursued aggressive policies against North Africa because of its
robust trading relationship with France. In particular, MEW worried that the continued import of
food and Moroccan cobalt, a mineral vital to armaments production, would diminish the effects
of the blockade. It also wanted to prevent France from engaging in trade to obtain new assets in
foreign currency.126
At the end of July, Amcross asked permission to conduct a relief program in Vichy
France. The proposal emphasized the bad conditions, the complete freedom of movement given
to Amcross personnel, and the “pitiful gratitude for help from those in desperate need.” To
operate the program, Amcross wanted to ship milk, cereal, fruit, and clothing.127 Although
skeptical of the wisdom of approving the proposal, particularly given Hoover’s efforts to
124 Telegram 1527, FO to Lothian, 15 July 1940. PRO, F0837/1218.
125 Medlicott, vol. I, 548.
125 Report on the Resumption of Trade with French Morocco (EPFC21), 7 August 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25201.
127 Telegram 1622, Lothian to FO, 5 August 1940; Telegram 1644, Lothian to FO, 7 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226. Amcross wanted to send a ship to Marseilles carrying 2500 tons of milk, 1800 tons o f cereal, 900 tons o f dried fruit, 600 tons o f beans, 300 tons o f fruit and vegetable concentrate, and clothing for use in hospitals and clinics and to provide emergency care to children.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163
reinstate Belgian relief, Lothian recommended that Amcross be allowed to send one more ship
for political reasons.128 A number of French and American officials, including Bullitt, advocated
continuing relief efforts in order to encourage Vichy France to resist complete subordination to
Germany. They also believed that relief shipments would dilute the effects of a propaganda
campaign that charged Britain with failing to aid France in its hour of need.129 MEW, however,
regarded the proposal with apprehension, because of its possible repercussions. “The relief
problem is, I think, by far the most difficult and unpleasant question which we have to settle,”
observed Drogheda.130
Additional pressure came a week later when ICRC requested permission to conduct a
relief program— an “exclusively humanitarian action”— for children, women, the elderly, and the
sick and wounded in France. While concerned about all conquered areas, ICRC found “the grave
situation” of the refugees in unoccupied and occupied France troubling and the quantity of aid
provided to assist them “very minimal” in comparison to their needs. The program would be
supported by donations of food, clothing, and money from Red Cross societies from around the
w orld.131
In addition to the dilemmas posed by Amcross and ICRC’s requests, Britain’s
relationship to the burgeoning French resistance movement also became a factor. Following the
advent of the Petain regime, General Charles de Gaulle fled to England to continue the fight
128 Telegram 1538, Lothian to FO, 29 July 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10.
129 Telegram 1538, Lothian to FO, 29 July 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10.
130 Minute by Drogheda, 3 August 1940. 31 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
131 Letter, Odier to Dalton, 2 August 1940; Minute by Nichols, 19 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218. Fifty tons of clothing would come from Argentina and 500 tons of wheat could come from Turkey. The Red Cross societies of Bulgaria, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, and Yugoslavia all provided la Croix-Rouge francaise with funds.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164
against Germany as the self-anointed leader of the Free French. Broadcasting from London on in
mid-June 1940, de Gaulle appealed to the citizens of France to continue the war under his
leadership. Looking to promote himself and his cause, de Gaulle asked Britain at the end of July
to allow food into occupied France and publicize that it had been done at his request. De Gaulle
believed the gesture would encourage the growth of his movement and counter the anti-British
propaganda broadcast by the Vichy and German governments.132 “I think General de Gaulle’s
request is well worthy of consideration, even it if were only for the purpose of recruiting more
free Frenchmen to fight on our side and his,” observed Sir Robert Vansittart who oversaw the
committee studying Britain’s relations with French resistance.133 De Gaulle’s plan did not
enthrall MEW, which believed it would set a dangerous example— “once the precedent were
created, all the humanitarians in the United States as well as here and in other neutral countries
would clamour for similar relief to be sent.”134
The various requests for relief forced the Foreign Office to grapple with Britain’s policy
toward Vichy France. Its views were adeptly summarized in a memo by R.H. Campbell, which
Flalifax described to Churchill as “both sensible and convincing.”135 The memo gave full
exposition to an idea that percolated throughout the Foreign Office’s discussions of the relief
issue throughout the summer: the need to make a distinction between the Vichy regime and the
French people. “They have nothing whatever in common,” wrote Campbell. Vichy’s leaders
served as willing tools of their German masters and pined for Britain’s defeat. “We have little, if
132 Julian Jackson,France: The Dark Years, 1940-44 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 389-90.
133 Note, Vansittart to Halifax, 30 July 1940. TNA/PREM3/74/10.
134 Memo, Ingram to Drogheda and Leith-Ross, 31 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
135 Note, Halifax to Churchill, 31 July 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165
anything, to hope for from the Vichy Government, with whom sooner or later we are bound to
fall out; but we have much to hope from the French people.”136
Passing the memo to Churchill, Halifax conveyed his belief that M EW ’s view on the
issue remained too rigid. “What really matters to us is to stimulate French opinion to cause a
maximum degree of embarrassment to the Germans,” Halifax wrote Churchill, “and 1 should not
feel that we were running any risk of defeating our general blockade of Germany by allowing the
American Red Cross, for example, to bring certain food supplies into unoccupied France.” He
also believed that the political benefits of allowing relief shipments should not be overlooked. “I
am quite certain that before long we shall be under a good deal of pressure on this subject from
humanitarian quarters in the U.S.A. and if we can secure political results useful to ourselves by
our handling of it, I would prefer to do so before this pressure developed.”137
The growing stack of relief proposals and de Gaulle’s appeal for relief to encourage
French resistance sent the Britain’s relief policy for review before the War Cabinet on 9 August
1940.138 Prior to the meeting, Dalton made his opinion known to Churchill. “Till now, I am quite
unconvinced by the arguments in favour of such a plan,” he told the Prime Minister. “Indeed, I
am inclined to believe that it would be a most profound mistake.” 139 In preparation for the
meeting, Dalton circulated a paper in which he argued that concessions were a “mistake,”
because there was no reason to expect famine conditions in any part of Europe in the coming
winter. He also pointed to Germany’s frequent boasting of its ability to feed itself and the
136 “Anglo-French Relations” by R.H. Campbell, 30 July 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10.
137 Note, Halifax to Churchill, 31 July 1940. PRO, PREM3/74/10.
138 Amendment to minutes of the 37th meeting of Vansittart Committee, 31 July 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
139 Letter, Dalton to Churchill, 2 August 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10. Letter, Dalton to Halifax, 5 August 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25201.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166
occupied territories. Famine would only occur if Germany deliberately starved a specific country
or group. “This agitation [for concessions] rests upon a combination of sentimentality, ignorance
and producers’ self-interest,” noted Dalton. “Unless firmly handled soon, it may develop into a
formidable obstacle to British victory.” He acknowledged, however, there would be
repercussions to Britain’s policy:
But no doubt, throughout the Enslaved Area, there will be a shortage of fats. (Fats, however, are a most dangerous import, since they can be made into explosives). The populations will live on a depressing and monotonous diet, well below the optima devised by scientists. Even so, incidentally, have many British unemployed and their families lived for many years. The effect of this low diet in Europe will not be mass starvation, which would naturally revolt American humanity, but a lessening of physical and mental energy, a weakening of the will to go on fighting, a greater inclination toward discontent and even violent revolt; in short, a general lowering of morale.
With regards to unoccupied France, he rejected the idea that letting American relief ships dock at
Marseilles would win the goodwill of the French population. Positive publicity depended on a
free press, which Vichy did not have. “When recently three food ships were allowed by us to
unload at Marseilles, the local press boasted that they had ‘escaped the British blockade.’”
Furthermore, despite Britain’s decision to subject North Africa to contraband and enemy export
control, it did not have the naval power necessary to prevent traffic between French North Africa
and unoccupied France. Consequently, the recently gathered North African harvest would pass
freely across the Mediterranean. Rather than grant concessions, Dalton believed Britain should
announce that “it is our intention not only to permit, but to arrange in advance for, the entry of
food into any part of the Enslaved Area, when this part at least has been wholly cleared of
German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom.”140
140 Food and the Blockade: Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare, WP(G)(40)208, 7 August 1940; Memorandum by MEW, 3 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226. .Minute by Drogheda, 5 August 1940. PRO, F0837/1218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167
Dalton’s argument swayed Halifax, converting the Foreign Office from foe to friend. “I
may say at once that the argumentation in this paper strikes me as very forcible and has had a
great effect on my judgment,” Halifax wrote Dalton. “1 do not feel that the political arguments
which I might have wished to urge ought to outweigh the reasoning of your paper.” He
emphasized, however, that getting the Americans to understand Britain’s policy would be of
“immense importance” in the coming months.141
The 9 August 1940 meeting of the War Cabinet provides the first real glimpse into
Churchill’s attitude about the relief issue. The prime minister acknowledged that Britain needed
to be conscious of American public opinion and predicted that it might be necessary to run a
rearguard action in the future to offset any demands. In the meantime, Churchill recommended
that Britain explain its policy in the following way: first, Europe possessed sufficient food and
there could be no talk of famine right after the harvest; second, any food shortages resulted from
Germany’s “guns not butter” policy and poor distribution; and third, Germany would seize any
food allowed into Vichy France. “If, nevertheless, opinion in the United States should at some
later date be strongly in favour of sending food into, say, unoccupied France,” observed
Churchill, “we should ask them to explain what administrative safeguards could be introduced.”
Halifax fortified the argument by observing that the people of Vichy France were no more
worthy of relief than those of Poland or the Netherlands. In the face of such strong arguments,
the War Cabinet voted not to relax the blockade for France.142 The decision meant no one—
Amcross, ICRC, or others— would be allowed ships supplies through the blockade to support a
r e lie f program in Vichy France. Relief would also not enter occupied France in the name of dc
Gaulle. France, the former ally, was to be treated like all other occupied territories.
141 Letter, Halifax to Dalton, 8 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F 0371/25201.
142 War Cabinet Conclusions, 223(40), 9 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F 0371/25201.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168
Britain Takes a Stand
When the War Cabinet voted to maintain the blockade, it decided, at Churchill’s urging,
not to make a public declaration of policy.143 Although, the minutes of the meeting do not spell
out Churchill’s reasons for recommending silence, it is safe to assume that flexibility of action in
the future prompted the decision. Despite their occasional disagreements, the Foreign Office and
MEW both recognized the benefits of a malleable policy. The closed-door meetings of the War
Cabinet meant, however, that the British and American people did not know that the question of
relief for Vichy France had been debated or that a vote was cast to treat Vichy France like other
occupied territories. In the days following the War Cabinet meeting, public pressure for an
official policy statement began to mount as an increasingly uncomfortable public debate over
relief coalesced not around France, but Belgium and the other occupied countries.
An interview given by John Cudahy, who had served as the U.S. ambassador to Belgium,
on 6 August 1940 sparked the debate. In his official history, Medlicott argues that American
pressure for food relief began with Cudahy’s interview. By overlooking previous relief efforts
and campaigns, Medlicott fails to acknowledge how events prior to August 1940 shaped attitudes
on both sides of the Atlantic. Fie is, however, correct about the influence of Cudahy’s interview
on the relief issue, since it triggered a series of events that forced Britain to articulate publicly its
relief policy.144
Significantly, the debate began just as Germany heightened its bombing campaign
against Britain. Originally, Germany assaulted airfields and ports along the English Channel, but
the battle between the Royal Air Force and the German Luftwaffe moved inland during June and
July. On 8 August 1940, Germany began an intensive assault against British airfields and radar
143 War Cabinet Conclusions, 223(40), 9 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25201.
144 Medlicott, vol. I, 554.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169
stations, launching almost 1500 aircraft a day. Over the course of the next week, British and
German air forces waged a pitched battle over Britain. Consequently, each morning, Britons
woke up to accounts of air battles in the skies above their homes and a raging debate over
whether Britain should modify the blockade to allow Nazi-occupied countries receive relief.
Having stopped over in London on his way back to Washington, Cudahy gave what the
Times o f London described as “a rather sensational interview.” “If you think the situation in
Europe is a horrible hell now,” he told the London press corps, “I think for the Belgians during
the winter no words in English will be able to describe it.” Given that the Belgian diet revolved
around bread, Cudahy was particularly concerned about Belgium’s wheat supply. Belgium
normally imported 75% of its wheat, but the British blockade prevented imports, and the
displacement of the Belgian population left the countryside without the manpower needed to
bring in the harvest. He predicted that the wheat supply would last until late September or early
October, with each Belgian receiving a daily ration of half of pound of bread. After that, unless
Belgium received wheat shipments, the Belgian people would be reduced to a condition close to
famine. “It is not my business to say what the United States should do,” said Cudahy, “but in
1914 a committee was organized to take over food to Belgium.” Cudhay acknowledged that he
had already discussed the possibility with German authorities, but cautioned that . . we have
got to wait and see what happens to England. The matter can only be dealt with by negotiation
after we see what happens.”145
Cudahy’s interview received widespread attention in British and American
newspapers— and destroyed his political career. During the press conference, Cudahy not only
confirmed everything that Hoover said about Belgium, but also endorsed Hoover’s work, which,
145 “Famine Fears in Belgium,”Times, 7 August 1940. “Bread and Freedom,”Times, 13 August 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170
as Gibson noted, “comes pretty close to being unforgivable.” Trying to control the damage,
Welles disowned Cudahy’s remarks, telling the press that while Cudahy’s sympathy for the
Belgian people could not be questioned, “the interview was in violation of standing instructions
from the Department of State, and certain of the views expressed by the Ambassador are not to
be construed as representing the views of this Government.” 146 A few days, later the State
Department announced that Cudahy was being formally recalled on Roosevelt’s orders “for
consultation.”147 Cudahy’s misstep dealt a blow for CRB, robbing the commission of a vital
source of influence. “The only trouble with him was that he was too frank and plain spoken,”
observed Gibson, who believed that Cudahy’s remarks would have been understood in a private
conversation, but were unsuitable for a press conference. He attributed Cudahy’s blunder to a
lack of understanding for the political complexities of the relief issue. “I’m sorry that he has got
in such a spot for he is a grand fellow and didn’t deserve it,” observed Gibson. “But why, oh
why, do these amateur diplomats feel obliged to give interviews?”148
Despite the State Department’s attempt to disavow Cudahy, it could not quell the
controversy. The British press speculated that Americans might demand Britain modify the
blockade in exchange for providing Britain with military aid. The Times' correspondent in
Washington, however, assured that paper’s readers that Britain had “no intention of yielding to
requirements whose acceptance would weaken British power.”149 German newspapers touted
Hitler’s claim, made in a speech before the Reichstag, that Germany could not be starved into
146 “U.S. and Food for Europe,”Times , 8 August 1940.
147 “Mr. Cudahy Recalled to America,”Times, 10 August 1940.
148 Letter, Hugh Gibson to Millard Shaler (CRB rep in Lisbon), 9 August 1940. HI A, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, WWII relief.
149 “U.S. and Food for Europe,”Times, 8 August 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171
defeat and challenged the idea that Germany was morally obliged to provide the occupied
territories with food. Instead, Britain assumed the obligation when it chose to enact the
blockade. “That does not mean,” wrote Dienst aus Deutschland, “that the Reich wants to evade
general humanitarian obligations, but Germany does want to refute the suggestion that she is
responsible for the increasing food shortage in the occupied territories.”150 Meanwhile,
Volkischer Beobachter and German radio declared that Germany’s first duty was to feed its
citizens. “Do the English really imagine that our food supplies which are indeed great, are
destined to feed the friends of England this winter?” 151
On 12 August 1940, the relief controversy intensified when the Times, citing sources in
New York, claimed that Hoover had directed Gibson to ask Britain for passage of food for
Belgium, Holland, Poland, and Norway. “I have of course made no such request,” an infuriated
Gibson telegraphed his colleagues in New York. “Contents and tone of despatch have stirred up
hornets nest. I am on [the] spot with press.” He avoided confirming or denying the statement in
the hopes of preserving what remained of his relationship with the Foreign Office and MEW.
“Cudahy’s statement has thrown monkey wrench into situation and crystallized opposition to
relief thus complicating our task,” he telegraphed. “Cannot afford to aggravate things by more
talk. If we are to work out our problems here what we need most is silence until discussions
finished.”152 Gibson feared the report from New York would cause further irritation and create
150 “Food Supplies in Europe,” Times, 10 August 1940.
151 “Hitler’s War Granary,”Times, 13 August 1940.
152 Telegram 98, Gibson to Pate, 10 August 1940. TNA/PRO, FQ371/25201.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172
the impression that “we have abandoned idea of discussions and [are] disposed to apply pressure
instead.”153
Gibson believed that a measured statement from Hoover would assuage the situation, but
unfortunately, Hoover only made it worse. Having gone on a fishing trip after the Republican
Convention, Hoover was unaware of the brewing controversy until the press tracked him down in
Yellowstone, Montana.154 Put on the spot by reporters, Hoover confirmed that Gibson was
negotiating with Britain. “There is no use mincing words,” said Hoover. “Unless something can
be done in the immediate future to get food into the four countries, people there will face
complete starvation. Germany will have to feed them or the blockade will have to be lowered to
permit the importation of food.”155 Believing that the reporters garbled his remarks, Hoover
issued a follow-up statement, in which he implored the need to arrange food for “27 million
innocent civilians.” He also chided the Roosevelt administration for recalling Cudahy and
ignoring reports about the need for relief. Hoover suggested that the exile governments use their
resources in the United States and elsewhere to finance a relief program, estimating that it would
initially cost $28 million a month and increase to $40 million by the end of winter.156
Hoover’s statements failed to sway the British press. “It is hardly surprising that the
British government wants to maintain their war policy,” commented the Times, which argued that
“it is both good law and common sense” to maintain the blockade.157 The Times suggested that,
153 Telegram 99, Gibson to Pate, 12 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25201. The Foreign Office had a copy of Gibson’s telegram, but it is not clear whether he gave it to Steel and Faquahar or whether it was intercepted.
154 Telegram 40, Pate to Gibson, 13 August 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25201.
155 “Food for the Vanquished,”Times, 12 August 1940.
156 “Mr. Hoover’s Latest Plea,”Times, 13 August 1940.
157 “Hitler’s War Granary,”Times, 13 August 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173
rather than provide relief now, “the time has come to plan in advance a definite policy for the
relief of Europe as soon as Hitler’s downfall is achieved.” The plan would provide an answer to
the Nazi charge that British policy was bringing starvation to Europe. ‘“ Bread and Freedom’ has
been the motto of more than one revolution,” it observed. “It should become the watchword of
the revolt against Nazi domination.”158 Across the Atlantic, the American press treated Hoover’s
views more sympathetically, an editorial trend that the Foreign Office’s American Department
found disturbing. “Friendly U.S. papers have been continually harping on the great moral
problem before the El.S., as to whether they are or are not to starve innocent people in Europe at
Britain’s request,” observed one official. “The U.S. will not stand for a blockade of Europe
merely to save the British Empire.”159
Despite the British press’s admirable defense of the blockade, the Foreign Office pressed
for a public statement of Britain’s relief policy. Steel and others believed that it would help
deflate American interest in relief, provide a basis for countering German propaganda, and
assuage British public opinion. The statement would also be useful for dealing with France. “We
clearly have nothing to hope for from the Vichy government,” observed Steel, “and it may well
be that by taking up our stand before conditions have become acute the real basis of our action
will be firmly implanted in the public mind— more especially of the U.S.— when the pinch
comes.”160 Lothian also lobbied for a statement. The State Department and others continually
impressed upon him the need to prepare American public opinion for the ban on relief shipments,
particularly since the “humanitarian element is bound to bring strong pressure once reports of
158 “Bread and Freedom,”Times, 13 August 1940.
159 Minute by T. North Whitehead , 11 August 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25201.
160 Minute by Steel, 13 August 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25201.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174
famine come over from Europe.”161 The ongoing controversy convinced Churchill, Halifax, and
the other members of the War Cabinet that Britain needed to make its policy known. An added
incentive was Germany’s announcement on 18 August 1940 that it was enacting its own
blockade against Britain.
Churchill asserted Britain’s relief policy in a 20 August 1940 speech before the House of
Commons. The speech is famous for its defiant attitude in the wake of the Germany’s intense
daylight bombing raids against Britain. “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed
by so many to so few,” said Churchill praising the courage and success of the Royal Air Force
pilots.162 The speech also revealed for the first time the bases-for-destroyers deal. Over the
course of the summer, Churchill and Roosevelt discussed how the United States could aid the
British war effort. They settled on an exchange: Britain would receive fifty aging destroyers in
exchange for giving the United States permission to build and operate bases on eight British
possessions in the Western Hemisphere. The deal allowed Churchill to obtain a long-term
American commitment to the war, while giving Roosevelt a way to sell the American public on
aid to Britain.163 While the exchange ultimately did little to bolster Britain’s defenses, it
solidified the Anglo-American alliance. According to Churchill:
Undoubtedly this process means that these two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. For my own part, looking out upon the future, I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop
161 Telegram 1647, Lothian to FO, 8 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
162 Speech by Winston Churchill, “The Few,” 20 August 1940. David Cannadine, ed.,Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat: The Speeches of Winston Churchill (Boston: Floughton Mifflin, 1989) 188.
163 Warren F. Kimball,Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World (New War York: William Morrow, 1997)56-58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175
it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on full flood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.164
While Churchill used the speech to make the growing relationship between the two countries
clear, he also insisted that Britain would not be pressured into modifying its strategy to appease
American humanitarians. “It is our intention to maintain and enforce a strict blockade not only
of Germany but of Italy, France, and all the other countries that have fallen into German power.”
He argued that Britons should not complain that Hitler enacted a strict blockade against the home
islands— the Kaiser had done the same thing in the last war. Instead:
What, indeed, would be a matter of complaint would be if we were to prolong the agony of all Europe by allowing food to go in to nourish the Nazis and aid their war effort, or to allow food to go in to the subjugated peoples which would certainly be pillaged off them by their Nazi conquerors. There have been many proposals, founded on the highest motives, that food should be allowed to pass the blockade for the relief of these populations. I regret that we must refuse these requests.
Although Churchill did not specifically mention Hoover, choosing instead to make a veiled
reference to him, the message was clear: Britain had no intention of allowing Hoover to
orchestrate a large-scale relief program.
In making the case for not allowing relief, Churchill used Nazi Germany’s own rhetoric
and championed the utility of economic warfare. The Germans, he observed, “have repeatedly
stated that they possess ample reserves of food and that they can feed their captive peoples.”
Before they were invaded, the conquered countries possessed considerable surpluses. If food was
unavailable, it was because Germany extracted large quantities to feed its citizens and armies.
“The only agencies which can create famine in any part of Europe now and during the coming
winter,” argued Churchill, “will be German exactions or German failure to distribute the supplies
164 “The Few,” 192.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176
which they command.” Food also served as more than just sustenance; it helped make weapons
that could be used against Britain:
Fats are used to make explosives, potatoes to make the alcohol for motor spirit. The plastic materials now so largely used for aircraft construction are made of milk. If the Germans use these commodities to help them bomb our women and children, rather than to feed the populations, who produce them, we may be sure that any imported food would go the same way, directly or indirectly, or be employed to relieve the enemy of the responsibilities he has so wantonly assum ed.
Churchill implored that Hitler should be made to shoulder his responsibilities. In the meantime,
the Allies would build reserves and make plans to deliver food in a speedy manner to the
European people, so that “the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food,
freedom and peace.”165
In the wake of Churchill’s speech, Britain refused all requests for food and clothing.
Neither Amcross nor ICRC would be allowed to run a relief program in Vichy France.166 In
accordance with international law, Britain would, however, allow medical supplies for the sick
and wounded to pass the blockade. For relief advocates, Churchill’s speech delivered an
ominous message. De Gaulle feared that the speech amounted to an irrevocable announcement of
policy and spelled an end to his plans for sending relief to the French people in the name of the
Free French.167 “The Prime Minister has upset the applecart with a vengeance,” observed an
angry and frustrated Gibson. “He was concentrating on the war and was irritated by anything
that distracted attention from the performance on the stage. In fact he was more intent on being a
Marlborough than a Pitt and was in no mood to listen to anybody.” Gibson believed that if that
165 “The Few,” 182-183.
166 Letter, Dalton to Odier, 24 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218
167 Memcon, Hancock and Boris (formerly Leon Blum’s private secretary and now working with DeGaulle), 19 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177
Cudahy mess happened a few weeks later, rather than at the height of the Blitz, Churchill’s
statement could have been prevented. Instead, Germany’s bombing campaign only fostered
Britain’s impatience with challenges to its strategy.168
The summer of 1940 has attained legendary status in the annals of British history—
Britain’s finest hour in which it chose to stand and fight Nazi Germany. Churchill amplified the
legend when he wrote in his memoirs that, “Future generations may deem it noteworthy that the
supreme question of whether we should fight on alone never found a place upon the War Cabinet
agenda.”169 The question of how to continue the war informed every decision Britain made
during that long, fateful summer. Given the importance that Britain placed on economic warfare,
it is not surprising that Britain chose to take a hard line on relief efforts. Doing so, however,
meant gambling that relief would not become a sore spot in Britain’s increasingly intimate
relationship with the United States. Not only did Britain have to worry about Hoover making
trouble, but it also had to be attentive to Roosevelt’s wishes. Despite their contrary political
natures and objectives, both men regarded relief as an important foreign policy tool.
Furthermore, by publicly articulating its relief policy, Britain gave American humanitarians an
important tool in promoting their cause. They could now point to and campaign against a
concrete policy.
168 Letter, Gibson to Rickard, 21 August 1940. HIA, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 86, File WWII relief.
169 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (London: 1948-54) II, 157.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER FIVE
MR. ROOSEVELT’S WISH
France knows today the most tragic hour in her long history. Three-fifths of her soil are occupied. Rare are the households which are not waiting anxiously for the return of one among the two million of prisoners held by Germany. Millions of refugees who have come from the most fertile regions of France, bringing with them nothing but the train of their weariness and wretchedness, await the hour of deliverance when they can return to their abandoned homes. Today they share with Belgian, Czech, Austrian, Spanish, and Polish refugees settled on our territory, the sorrows and privations of the French people of free France. The war has ravaged within a few weeks half of our soil, bringing about the destruction of our bridges, our roads, our railway stations and a great part of our factories— a case without precedent in the annals of our history.
Petain’s description of Vichy’s dismal state of affairs was part of a personal appeal to
Roosevelt at the end of August 1940 requesting American assistance in organizing regular food
shipments. “In this work of relief and assistance to the people of France,” wrote Petain, “your
generous country, which is bound to mine by century-old friendship, and which has already
accomplished an immense effort, would perhaps be desirous of taking its share tomorrow.”1 The
letter capped off a month of increasingly frantic overtures.2 Following Churchill’s 20 August
1940 speech, obtaining American help became even more important, since, as the French Foreign
Ministry observed, “the question of relief is a dead point between Britain and France.”3 Despite
1 Letter, Petain to FDR, 27 August 1940.FRUS, 1940, Volume II, 540-41.
2 Memcon, Berle and T ruelle,3 July 1040. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 4. Aide-Memoire, French Ambassador (de Saint-Quentin) to Hull, 6 August 1940.FRUS, 1940, volume II, 539. Note, “Etas-Unis Assistance a la France en matiere de ravitaillement,” 23 August 1940. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293. Vichy wooed the United States with the knowledge of the Franco-German armistice commission. See Isabel Boussard, “Les Etats-Unis et le ravitaillement en France,”Guerres mondailes et conflicts contemporians, No. 185, 1997, 58.
3 Note, Question du ravitaillement, 26 August 1940. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293.
178
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179
the growing relationship between Britain and the United States, Vichy believed that “the
friendship that has existed between the United States and France over the centuries would not be
suspended by the misfortune that had befallen one of the two.”4 The United States could not
“ignore the vital importance of bringing about a solution to the urgent problem of the relief of
France.”5
Vichy’s appeal for assistance provided the United States with an opportunity to develop a
relationship with the new regime. It remained to be seen, however, whether Vichy would chart
its own path or serve as Hitler’s willing vassal. The armistice terms of June 1940 provided
plenty of leeway for Germany to exert influence on Vichy. It divided France into an occupied
zone in the north and an unoccupied zone in the south; disarmed the French fleet; demobilized the
army except for 100,000 soldiers used to help maintain internal order; demanded the captivity of
French POWs until the end of the war; and specified ongoing payments of huge sums to finance
the German occupation.6 The nature of the new regime also raised eyebrows. In the weeks
following the armistice, Petain and his deputy Pierre Laval abolished the remnants of the Third
Republic and established an authoritarian regime. Although Petain became Head of the State,
vested with more power than any French leader since Louis XIV, a power struggle immediately
began among his deputies.7
4 Telegram 359-60, Vichy to Washington, 28 August 1940. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293.Telegram, Vichy to Washington, 31 August 1940. Quai, Vichy B, Volumes 29 & 30, USA, Amerique, 1939-45.
5 Telegram 218-225, Vichy to Washington, 1 August 1940. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, File 293, Series Y. A version of this telegram was also hand delivered to the Foreign Office by Chartier. See Note from Vichy Government, 2 August 1940. TNA/TNA/PRO, FO371/25201.
6 Julian Jackson,France: The Dark Years, 1940-44 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 126-127. See also Jean-Baptiste Duroselle,L ’Abim e (Paris: Imprimerie nationale,1986).
7 Jackson, 133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180
Despite the uncertainties surrounding Vichy— or more precisely because of it— the
United States decided to use its neutral status and longstanding connection with France to
cultivate a relationship. Worried about the prospect of Franco-German collaboration, the United
States used relief shipments to encourage Petain to resist German overtures for economic and
military assistance. Although historians have slighted the use of relief in America’s relations
with Vichy, portraying it as a sop to French public opinion, relief offered the United States an
important political tool.8 The United States’ decision to use relief, however, challenged Britain’s
publicly stated intention to reject all overtures for such programs.
To Keep Hope Alive
Even before Roosevelt received Petain’s letter, the question of aiding Vichy was on his
mind. He needed to find a way to ensure that the French fleet was not used against the United
States, prevent Germany and Italy from seizing French North Africa, and encourage Vichy adhere
to the terms of the armistice.9 If any of these came to fruition it could spell disaster for Britain’s
war effort and the United States’ attempts not only to aid Britain, but also stay out of the war.
Rather than arrange for food shipments, Roosevelt wanted Britain to consent to Amcross
providing the children of Vichy with milk. In the wake of Churchill’s speech, the President
broached the possibility with Lothian. In doing so, Roosevelt made it clear, however, that he
remained “entirely against” relief for Nazi-occupied Europe, including occupied France, and was
8 The primary example of this is William Langer’sVichy Gamble (New York: Knopf, 1947), which portrays Roosevelt’s policy toward Vichy as opportunistic, but necessary. In the course of his 400 page book, Langcr devotes two paragraphs to the relief shipments. Louis Gottschalk offers a critique of T.anger and the State Department’s pro-Vichy policies in “Our Vichy Fumble,”Journal of Modern History, vol. 20 (March 1948) 45-56. The majority of works on American relations with France during World War II focus not on relations with Vichy, but on De Gaulle and the Free French. See for example G.E. Maguire,Anglo- American Policy towards the Free French (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), Milton Viorst,Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle (New York: Macmillan, 1965), and Dorothy White Shipley,Seeds o f Discord: De Gaulle, Free France, and the Allies (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964).
9 Langer, 80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181
against providing general relief to Vichy. “He thought that it would enable the United States to
keep a hold on unoccupied France and keep alive there the hope of a British victory,” reported
Lothian. “He thought it would be a calamity from the point of view of the future if we allowed
great numbers of children in unoccupied France to die or grow up with rickets and other diseases
for want of milk, etc. which they are no longer able to obtain from Northern France.” Roosevelt
also mischievously hinted that he might “shortly express publicly” his opinion. “Personally, I
think the President’s solution is the right one,” Lothian told the Foreign Office. “American public
opinion is still definitely against assistance for any occupied area. On the other hand,
humanitarian, religious, Quaker, and other agencies are beginning to mobilise for a formidable
attack on the policy of starving children in unoccupied France.”10
Roosevelt’s suggestion— and the hint that he might float it publicly— sent the Foreign
Office and MEW into a panic. Throughout the summer, all indications from Washington
suggested that the United States would support Britain’s uncompromising attitude on relief.11 “I
do not think,” Halifax wrote Dalton, “that we can afford to let the President surprise us with some
public appeal of a plausible kind such as is extremely possible, for such an appeal might well
contain features which we could on no account accept and which we should incur much odium by
refusing.” If the president persisted, Halifax suggested that Britain obtain Roosevelt’s agreement
to support Britain’s blockade measures as a whole in exchange for the concession.12 While he
acknowledged that Roosevelt’s heart was in the right place, Dalton refused to consider a
concession. “Lord Lothian must do his best to hold the first line,” wrote Dalton. “The argument
10 Telegram 1890, Lothian to FO, 26 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
" Letter, Halifax to Dalton, 1 September 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25201.
12 Letter, Halifax to Dalton, 1 September 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25201. Letter (W9899/8434/49), Halifax to Dalton, 1 September 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182
of the thin end of the wedge should be strongly presented and the risk, that if once we open the
dykes our blockade as regards foodstuffs will soon be washed away on the humanitarian tide.”13
Hoping that American enthusiasm would wane, the Foreign Office and MEW instructed
Lothian not to discuss Amcross’ milk program with either Roosevelt or Davis.14 “I quite
appreciate the motives underlying the President’s conclusions,” Halifax told Lothian, “but
children are just as much children whether they are to be found in occupied or unoccupied
territories and there is a very serious risk that we shall be strongly pressed to extend to occupied
territories any concessions now made.” If Roosevelt pressed the issue, he should be asked “to
hold his hand” until more reliable information about conditions in Vichy could be obtained. “I
should regard it as a major misfortune,” wrote Halifax, “if the President were to commit himself
irrevocably in this matter to an attitude which we should feel bound to resist and which might
therefore bring us into an open conflict of views from which only the enemy could profit.” 15
After talking with Lothian, Roosevelt agreed to consult Britain before making any public
statements, but he also reaffirmed his belief that it would be a “wise thing” to send relief to Vichy
to “prevent agitation among humanitarians here and lessen indignation in France.”16
Given Britain’s position on the blockade, Davis began to reassess Amcross’ activities in
France. Amcross could only render limited aid by purchasing supplies in Europe and those
would be increasingly difficult to obtain. “I am coming to the conclusion,” Davis wrote Allen
and Taylor, “that because of blockade and other difficulties further civilian relief in occupied
13 MEW also noted that milk could be readily purchased in Europe, particularly in Holland. Minutes by Nicholls, Drogheda, and Leith-Ross, 27 August 1940; Minute by Dalton, 2 September 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
14 Minute of meeting between FO and MEW, 2 September 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
15 Telegram 2141, FO to Lothian, 3 September 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1226.
16 Telegram No. 1954, Lothian to FO, 6 September 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183
France is becoming impractical.”17 Davis also harbored serious doubts that Amcross would be
allowed to continue its work in Vichy, because of the lack of safeguards against German
extractions. “Without an absolute assurance from Germany and France that no livestock, food, or
clothing would be requisitioned or sent out of unoccupied France, blockade and public opinion
will be insuperable obstacles to further shipments.”18
Taylor and Allen, however, strongly opposed a withdrawal by Amcross. “Never in her
history,” they argued, “has France so needed friendly impartial assistance from abroad and the
coming winter will present serious trials for the entire population but especially for children.”
Instead, Amcross should stay— even in a reduced form— to provide what help it could while
preparing the ground for the time when more supplies could come. “The relief supplies which
A.R.C. ships would bring to France are tremendously important to the French people,” observed
Allen, “but even more important than the supplies themselves is the message of sympathy and
understanding by the American people for the French people in this hour of need.” To bolster
their case, they pointed to Allen’s meeting with Petain at the end of August. During the meeting,
the marshal expressed a desire that Amcross continue its work and pledged the cooperation of
French officials.19 They were also conscious of the fact that if Amcross withdrew, it would
relinquish its domination of American relief efforts in both occupied and Vichy France. “If
Amcross should withdraw even temporarily the Quaker or Hoover organization would
unquestionably be asked to step into the gap and would doubtless do so with alacrity.”20
17Telegram 463, Davis to Allen (Marseilles), 12 September 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
18 Telegram 463, Davis to Allen (Marseilles), 12 September 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
19 Memo, Davis to FDR, 12 September 1940 forwarding Letter, Allen to Davis, 26 August 1940. FDRL, OF 124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940.
20 Telegram 355, Amcross to Allen (Marseilles), 6 September 1940; Telegram 384, Allen to Amcross, 9 September 1940; Telegram 561, Taylor to Davis, 13 September 1940; Telegram 744, Taylor, Allen, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 184
Along with Davis, the State Department had doubts about relief for Vichy.21 Hull found
reports that Germany required Vichy to turn over 58% of all of its cattle, horses, and mules
particularly troubling.22 H. Freeman Matthews, the American charge d’affaires in Vichy,
attempted to validate the existence of the agreement, but found his task impeded by Germany’s
insistence on secrecy. Senior French officials also refused to acknowledge German demands,
since doing so would contradict the regime’s claims that all shortages stemmed from the British
blockade.23 Indeed, Vichy’s proclamation— approved by Germany— announcing the
implementation of “severe” rationing at the end of September 1940 blamed the shortages on the
war, which led to bad crops and decreased production, and the British blockade, which “only
aggravates an already bad situation.”24
With a little persistence, Matthews assembled by mid-October a bevy of statistics
cataloging German extractions and Vichy acquiescence. For example, Germany requisitioned
118,000 quintals of wheat at Moulins. O f the 17,000 sheep that arrived in Nice from Algeria,
more than 11,000 were routed to Italy with their final destination unknown. In Aix-en-Provence,
the potato supply was bought up wholesale— including those still in the ground. Matthews
personally witnessed German officers checking food shipments arriving from Algeria and
Jay (Paris) to Davis, 17 September 1940; Telegram 978, Allen to Davis, 28 September 1940. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
21 Telegram 562, Matthews (Charge d’affaires in Vichy) to Hull, 13 September 1940.FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 542-43. Telegram 577, Matthews to Hull, 16 September 1940.FRUS, 1940, Volume II, 543.
22 Telegram 484, Hull to Matthews, 17 September 1940.FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 543-44.
23 Telegram 586, Matthews to Hull, 18 September 1940. FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 544-46.
24 Telegram 596, Matthews to Hull, 20 September 1940.FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 546-49. Rationing was to go into affect on 23 September 1940 for individuals and 30 September 1940 for restaurants. Rations were to consist of: 350 grams of bread per day; 500 grams of sugar per month; 300 grams of coffee per month (children excepted); 100 grams of rice per month (for children only); 50 grams of cheese per week; 100 grams of fat per week; 360 grams per week of butchers meat, pork sausage, etc.; and 125 grams of soap per month. Milk was to be rationed, but the amount had not been decided. Restaurants were instructed to request ration coupons before serving their patrons.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185
received a steady stream of reports from Marseilles of large “purchases’’ of foodstuffs. Although
he found it difficult to confirm the existence of an agreement requiring Vichy to provide 58% of
its livestock, his sources indicated that France was to deliver of one million hogs and 500,000
cattle to Germany, the bulk of which would come from Vichy because of shortages in occupied
France. With French officials scouring the countryside counting livestock, a number of villages
slaughtered their cattle, sheep, and pigs to prevent them from being requisitioned.25
Into this environment of growing suspicion about Vichy came Gaston Henry-Haye,
Vichy’s new ambassador to the United States. It was not the first time Henry-Haye represented
his country in the United States. During the First World War, he served as a member of the
French Military Mission, instructing American troops on trench warfare. He went on to make a
name for himself in French politics first as mayor of Versailles and then as a member of the
French Senate. He was also known to be a close friend of Otto Abetz, Hitler’s agent in France.26
Fluent in English— and never one to shy away from a dramatic phrase— Henry-Haye quickly
made an impression on official Washington and the press corps.
Shortly after arriving, Henry-Haye took up the question of food shipments for Vichy. In
his initial meetings with Welles and other State Department officials, Henry-Haye established a
pattern that marked his overtures in the coming months: extravagant claims and the convenient
bending of the truth. In his initial discussions, he suggested that if the United States did not
supply Vichy with food during the coming winter, the terrible conditions would inspire the
French people to riot, thereby giving Germany a pretext for occupying Vichy. He also claimed
that Vichy had not exported any food to Germany. Ray Atherton, the acting chief of European
25 Telegram 650, Matthews to Hull, 27 September 1940. FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 550-1. Telegram 727, Matthews to Hull, 9 October 1940.FRUS, 1940, vol. 11,551-2. Telegram 730, Matthews to Hull, 10 October 1940. FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 552-53
26 Memo on appointment of Henry-Haye, 12 September 1940. FDRL, PSF, Diplomatic Correspondence, France 1940, Box 29. He succeeded Saint-Quentin on 11 September 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186
Affairs, found the claim so implausible that he asked Henry-Haye to repeat it— which he
promptly did.27
Despite Henry-Haye’s insistence that Vichy faced imminent starvation, supplies
continued to pour into France from French North Africa, creating a serious breach in the
blockade. The Royal Navy was under orders not to intercept French ships sailing in convoys or
in French territorial waters. Since mid-September, at least fifty ships had sailed through Gibraltar
unchallenged. Vichy even boasted that from mid-September to mid-October, more than 200,000
tons of goods from French North Africa entered French ports. MEW also possessed ample
evidence that the Germans and Italians seized a large percentage— perhaps as high as sixty
percent— of the supplies coming from French North Africa. The Committee on Allied Resistance
reported to the Cabinet in mid-November that not only did Vichy’s continued trade with French
North Africa dilute the blockade’s effectiveness, but it also reinforced Vichy’s control over
French colonies. “We are not only blunting the spear-head of our own attack,” lamented the
Committee, “but also strengthening the force of the Vichy Government’s potential attack against
the Free French colonies— or against ourselves.”28
Britain also found Vichy’s gestures of friendship with Germany troubling. Towards the
end of October 1940, Petain and Laval met with Hitler at Montoire. After the meeting, Petain
announced to the French people that “I enter into the way of collaboration.” By working with
Germany, he hoped to assuage the nation’s suffering.29 The meeting prompted Churchill to ask
27 Memcon, Welles and Henry-Haye, 20 September 1940.FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 549-50.
28 “Breach in the Blockade of Metropolitan France and French Colonies,” Committee on Foreign (Allied) Resistance, CFR(40)83, 9 November 1940. Churchill asked to have this memo considered by Cabinet. See Memo, Coleville to Harris, 13 November 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10. Also minute by Stevens with comments by Hall, Beerenson, and Dingle-Foot, 13 November 1940; “Reports Regarding Enemy Levies on North African Produce Imported into France,” 19 October 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1227. This report was a series of extracts from intelligence sources about German treatment of food.
29 Paxton,Vichy France, 16-11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 187
Roosevelt to warn Vichy against concluding a military pact with Germany. Roosevelt sent a terse
personal message to Petain stating that the United States would regard the use of the French fleet
in “hostile operations” against Britain as a “flagrant and deliberate breach of faith.” Any military
agreement with Germany would “most definitely wreck the traditional friendship between the
French and American peoples, would permanently move any chance that this Government wold
be disposed to give any assistance to the French people in their distress, and would create a wave
of bitter indignation against France on the part of American public opinion.”30
Despite issuing a firm rebuke, Roosevelt did not abandon his interest in providing Vichy
with relief. If anything, its actions only reinforced the need to encourage Vichy to resist
Germany’s overtures. At the end of October, Roosevelt warned Lothian that he intended to press
the issue after the November elections. He also warned that Britain should be prepared for
“formidable” public agitation on the issue. Dreading the attacks on the blockade, Lothian
suggested that Britain preempt the agitation by devising a system for providing relief to occupied
Europe.31 The stream of messages coming from Washington suggesting accommodation sent
Dalton into a fury. “1 am increasingly dissatisfied with the failure of H.M. Representatives at
Washington,” he wrote Halifax, “to appreciate, support and expound the policy of His Majesty’s
Government regarding the blockade which was most clearly stated by the Prime Minister on
August 20th and has not since been varied.” Dalton believed that rather than contributing to the
demise of the blockade, Lothian should be bolstering it. “I wish sometimes that we had even a
scintilla of evidence that either Lord Lothian or his subordinates ever forcibly presented the
30 Telegram 636, Hull to Matthews, 25 October 1940. U.S. State Department,Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41 (Washington: GPO, 1943)580-1.
31 Letter, Lothian to Dalton, 27 October 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. policy of His Majesty’s Government either to the President (we sought for this assurance some
while since but never received it) or to any of those other pseudo-humanitarian busybodies.”32
As promised, after Roosevelt’s reelection, Amcross submitted a formal proposal for a
relief program to provide milk and vitamins to children. The program would supplement, rather
than replace, existing rations. “The American Red Cross does not wish to extend this system to
occupied France,” reported Lothian, “because it accepts the British principle that not anything but
medical supplies should be allowed to enter any country controlled by the Germans.” Amcross’
proposal had the full support of the president and the State Department. “They think that any
activity of this kind will encourage unoccupied France to resist Laval programme, and keep alive
hopes of eventual release,” noted Lothian. A cagey negotiator, Roosevelt made it known that he
drew a direct connection between relief for Vichy and food for Spain. “There is the strongest
opposition,” reported Lothian, “to doing nothing for France if food is to be allowed to proceed to
a country in alliance with the Axis.”33 Alarmed by rumors of an alliance between Spain and
Germany, which would cut Britain off from the Mediterranean and allow Germany to use the
Canary Islands, Churchill had proposed that the United States send food to Spain. Although he
declared Spain neutral, Generalismo Francisco Franco’s was apparently sympathetic to the Axis
alliance.34
In addition to giving the details of the proposed program, Lothian attempted to make his
colleagues in London understand the importance of the concession to quelling relief agitation in
the United States. Both Roosevelt and Hull believed the milk shipment would deflate Hoover’s
32 Letter, Dalton to Halifax, 18 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
33 Telegram 2837, Lothian to FO/MEW, 29 November 1940. TNA/PRO, F 0371/25203. Hull told Lothian that the United States did not object to Britain sending wheat to Spain, but insisted the issue was connected to relief for Vichy. Telegram 2852, Lothian to FO, 29 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
34 Kimball, Forged in War, 68.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189
relief campaign. “I think distribution of food to children only, by American Red Cross workers,”
argued Lothian, “would satisfy a large proportion of those religious and humanitarian people who
are disturbed by Hoover’s agitation; and the movement for larger-scale distribution, now that the
blockade of Britain seems to be getting fiercer, would die away.”35 If Britain decided to allow
Amcross’ program, Lothian suggested that it either invite Amcross to undertake the program or
offer to pay for part of it. “It is important that impression should not be given that Britain is
yielding to American and Hoover pressure but that if it accepts policy it should say that it has
reached this conclusion independently itself.”36
Amcross’ proposal prompted significant discussion, particularly in light of the support it
received from Roosevelt.37 By linking relief for Vichy with wheat for Spain, the president made
it difficult for Britain to ignore American desires. The moderate nature of the proposal and the
fact that it would go a long way toward placating American public opinion also appealed to the
Foreign Office. Its officials, however, understood that British public opinion might not be so
accommodating. “I do not somehow feel that Mr. Norman Davis would get an enthusiastic
reception from the mothers of Bristol and Coventry if he were to broach his proposal to them in
35 Telegram 2922, Lothian to FO, 4 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219.
36 Telegram 2878, Lothian to FO, 30 November 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1227. Telegram 2983, Lothian to FO. 5 December 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203. Lothian also requested sufficient notice of any change in policy in order to give Britain’s friends—journalists, religious leaders, labor leaders— fair warning and time to adjust their stances.
37 The idea of providing milk to Vichy was also raised in November 1940, by M. Dupuy, the newly appointed Canadian charge d’affaires to Vichy. Before departing for Vichy, Dupuy suggested to Halifax that it would make a strong impression and serve as a “symbolic act of friendship” if he could tell Petain that Britain would agree to allow a shipment of milk and medicine for French children. Halifax found Dupuy’s argument persuasive, he was not prepared to fight Dalton on the matter. See Letter, Halifax to Dalton, 11 November 1940; Letter, Dalton to Halifax, 12 November 1940; Telegram 875, Halifax to Selbry for Dupuy, 14 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FQ837/1227.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190
person,” observed Steel.38 Not surprisingly, MEW objected and trotted out the “thin edge of the
wedge” argument, which the Foreign Office branded as both “disingenuous” and “tiresome.”39
Agreeing to Amcross’ program required Britain to modify its blockade policy, something
only the War Cabinet could do. Despite the Foreign Office’s enthusiasm for the plan, Dalton
prevailed, with a little help from Churchill, in maintaining the blockade.40 The joint telegram
from the Foreign Office and MEW informing Lothian of the decision argued that accepting the
plan would “open the door to a dangerous weakening of blockade, having effect of prolonging the
war, which we could contemplate.” They also did not believe that the distinction between
occupied and unoccupied territory could be easily maintained. Furthermore, what was “right” for
the children of France was equally right for the children of Norway, Belgium, and Poland,
countries that “have established a good deal stronger claims on our sympathy than France.” The
inevitable hostile reaction from Parliament and the British public also entered into the decision.
“We do not think the Davis scheme is necessarily impracticable in itself, but we are not really
convinced that feeling the United States is sufficiently strong or widespread to compel us to adopt
it.”41
In the middle of December, Lord Lothian died, robbing Britain of its ambassador in
Washington. Choosing a successor was not easy. Although Roosevelt and Churchill negotiated
the central features of the Anglo-American alliance, the British ambassador to the United States
needed to be a man of some political stature, since he was responsible for managing the day-to-
day mechanics. On December 21, Churchill asked Roosevelt for his consent to appoint Halifax
38 Minute by Steel, 3 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F03 71/25203.
39 Minute by Steel, Strang, Cadogan, and Halifax, 30 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
40 Minute by Steel, 5 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F 0371/25203.
41 Telegram 3363, FO to Lothian, 5 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1227.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191
as ambassador. “I need not tell you what a loss this is to me personally and to the War Cabinet,”
wrote Churchill. Given the war and Britain’s relationship with the United States, Churchill
believed “it is my duty to place at your side the most eminent of my colleagues, and one who
knows the story as it unfolds at the summit.”42 While sending Halifax emphasized the importance
Britain placed on its relationship with the United States, it also allowed Churchill to consolidate
his power in the Tory party. Churchill regarded Halifax as an appeaser and a constant obstacle to
his taking more aggressive action; Halifax, naturally, believed that he kept Churchill from
pursuing extreme solutions.43 Although the aristocratic Halifax found it difficult at first to adjust
to the informality of Washington politics, Warren Kimball notes that he “proved a popular and
well-respected representative of his government.”44 The arrival of Halifax also meant a
sympathetic ally on the relief issue.
Halifax’s departure to the United States meant the dawning of a new era in the Foreign
Office as Anthony Eden became Foreign Secretary. Eden had served the Baldwin and
Chamberlain governments as Foreign Secretary from 1935-8, resigning after failing to agree with
Chamberlain on how to respond to Hitler and Mussolini’s aggressive moves. When the war
broke out, Eden became secretary of state for the Dominions, only to be called upon by Churchill
to serve as secretary of state for war in May 1940.45
Another personnel change occurred during the same period, as John Winant became the
American ambassador to Britain. Since expressing his vocal support of appeasement before and
42 Telegram C-48x, Churchill to Roosevelt, 21 December 1940. Warren Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Volume I: Alliance EmergingPrinceton: { Princeton University Press, 1984) 116.
43 Reynolds, 176-77. See also Andrew Roberts’sHoly Fox, a sympathetic biography of Halifax.
44 Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, vol. 1, 116.
45 For a biography of Eden, see David Dutton,Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192
during the war, Kennedy had become a bit of an embarrassment. He could not be relied upon to
provide accurate reports or support Roosevelt’s determination to forge closer ties with Britain.
When Kennedy, in keeping with custom, submitted his resignation after the presidential election,
Roosevelt decided not to renew his appointment. Instead, he appointed Winant, a former
Republican turned New Dealer who had spent the previous five years serving as the American
representative the International Labor Organization in Geneva. Because of his work with the
organization, Winant was on friendly terms with many of Britain’s labor leaders. Winant also had
one other qualification— he was amenable to Roosevelt dominating American diplomacy with
B ritain.46
Although the Foreign Office knew that the United States was unhappy with its policy, it
decided not to broach the relief issue until after Halifax arrived to take up his post.47 Roosevelt
and the State Department, however, had other ideas. Hull asked Johnson to provide insight on the
factors guiding Britain’s stance on relief, which he personally found baffling. In particular, Hull
wanted to know if Halifax and Churchill— and the Cabinet for that matter— understood the
“rigidity of the expressed position of the British government” and if the rigidity stemmed from
M EW ’s influence.48 Johnson affirmed that “the aggressive spirit of this policy is Mr. Dalton,
Minister of Economic Warfare,” but cautioned that Halifax and Churchill also supported it. “I
think it is also true to say that this policy is representative of both Parliamentary and public
opinion,” he noted. “The cruel loss of life not only in London but in places like Southampton,
Bristol. Birmingham, Coventry and Sheffield has greatly hardened both official and public
46 Reynolds, 178.
47 Letter, Steel to Stirling, 1 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1228. According to Steel, the Foreign Office thought about having R.A. Butler, the charge d’affaires, speak with Roosevelt, “but we don’t think it would be much good for him to take on the President if the later is going to write to the Prime Minister— it might enrage the tiger— and until Lord Halifax is there, we should, we think, do best to lie low.”
48 Telegram 3797, Hull to Johnson, 13 December 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193
opinion in this country against any sort of concession based even on humanitarian grounds which
might even indirectly benefit the enemy.” Johnson also stressed the “grave anxiety” with which
Britain regarded its former ally. “They have no accurate information of the Vichy Government’s
intentions and are mentally prepared for any kind of treachery to come from that quarter,” he
observed. “Certainly until the Vichy situation has cleared up, it would be politically difficult for
the Government to make a concession regarding milk for children in unoccupied France.” The
United States could push Amcross’ milk program again without garnering too much ire, but the
likelihood of Britain accepting it remained small.49
Armed with Johnson’s insights, during the last week of December, Hull, Davis, and
Welles strategized with the president on how to sway Britain to consent to relief for Vichy.50
Rather than tangle with the Foreign Office and MEW again, they decided that Roosevelt should
appeal to Churchill. “For some time,” wrote Roosevelt in the 31 December 1940 telegram, “I
have thought that for humanitarian and also political reasons limited quantities of milk and
vitamin concentrates for children should be sent to unoccupied France to be distributed under the
strict control and supervision of the American Red Cross.” American intelligence indicated there
was “a serious need of milk and vitamin concentrates for children and also layettes,” along with
medical supplies.
Given the circumstances, Roosevelt urged Churchill to reconsider Britain’s treatment of
Vichy as an occupied territory. “My belief is that it is logical and expedient to make a distinction
between occupied and unoccupied territories,” he wrote. While Roosevelt agreed that Germany
49 Telegram 4170, Johnson to Hull, 21 December 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6.
50 Memo, Davis to Hull, 27 December 1940. FDRL, OF124, Amcross, Box 3, July-December 1940. Telegram 3302, Butler to FO, 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1227. Memorandum of Conversation, Hull and Henry-Haye, 27 December 1940.FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 554-556. Davis was so confident that Roosevelt would be able to sway Britain that he ordered Allen make inquiries about arrangements and supplies. See Telegram 823, Davis to Allen, 7 December 1940; Telegram 823, Davis to Allen, 7 December 1940. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6. Telegram 3302, Butler to FO, 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1227.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194
bore responsibility for feeding the occupied territories, he argued that the strict controls used by
Amcross would ensure that its relief program would not benefit Germany or jeopardize the
British war effort. Providing relief would “help to win over the French people whose sentiment is
turning more favorably towards Great Britain and become more hostile to joining Germany.” It
would also strengthen the United States’ hand in dealing with Vichy by demonstrating that the
regime could receive assistance as long as it remained friendly to the United States and refused to
aid Germany. “I know you will appreciate,” wrote Roosevelt, “that this government has not the
slightest intention of undertaking any policy which would weaken or militate against the efficacy
of the British blockade.”
To sweeten the appeal, Roosevelt proposed that a ship sail immediately Marseilles via
Seville and Barcelona. Two-thirds of the cargo— flour and milk—would be sent to Spain, with
the remainder— medical supplies, milk, layettes, and vitamin concentrates— sent to Vichy for
distribution by Amcross. If the distribution of the first cargo proved a success, other shipments
could follow. “I feel that it is of the utmost importance to make every practical effort to keep
Spain out of the war or from aiding the Axis powers,” he told Churchill. But he cautioned that the
United States would have difficulty justifying to the American people and to Vichy the decision
to aid Spain while ignoring French children. “To make these isolated and conditional exceptions
to your Government’s general blockade policy,” Roosevelt argued, “would not in my judgment
weaken the blockade nor jeopardize its successful maintenance.”51
The timing of Roosevelt’s telegram to Churchill cannot be overlooked. Coming at the
end of the year, it took advantage of the spirit of generosity toward one’s fellow man that marked
the holiday season. But it also came on the heels of the United States agreeing to aid Britain’s
war effort. In early December, Churchill acknowledged that Britain was broke— or at least in a
51 Telegram R-19x, Roosevelt to Churchill, 31 December 1940. Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt, vol. 1, 117-118.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195
pitiful financial state. It was running short of dollars and could not pay for the orders of military
goods it placed with the United States.52 The situation prompted Churchill to write a letter, which
he called “one of the most important I ever wrote,” to Roosevelt. After surveying the state of the
war, Churchill told Roosevelt that Britain required assistance with shipping, supplies, and money.
To triumph over Nazi Germany and its armies, Britain needed to play to its strength as a maritime
power. “The decision for 1941 lies upon the seas,” he wrote. “It is therefore in shipping and in
the power to transport across the ocean, particularly the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the crunch of
the whole war will be found.” To continue the war, Britain needed warships, merchant ships, and
aircraft. It also needed American assistance in escorting supply convoys across the Atlantic
Ocean. “The moment approaches,” cautioned Churchill, “when we shall no longer be able to pay
cash for shipping and other supplies.”53
Roosevelt’s solution to Churchill’s plea was Lend-Lease. The United States would
produce the needed armaments and “lend” them to Britain, neatly sidestepping the sticky issue of
granting loans, credits, or subsides to a belligerent.54 On 29 December 1940, Roosevelt explained
the plan to the American public in a fireside chat. “Great Britain and the British Empire are today
the spearhead of resistance to world conquest,” he said. “And they are putting up a fight which
will live forever in the story of human gallantry.” If Britain fell, however, the “Nazi masters of
Germany” and their allies could “dominate the rest of the world.” Even as the United States
rearmed itself, it must also aid Britain by becoming “the great arsenal of democracy.” “Our
national policy is not directed toward war,” he reassured the public. “Its sole purpose is to keep
52 Kimball, Forged in War, 69-70.
53 Telegram C-43x, Churchill to Roosevelt, 12[?] December 1940. Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. 1, 87-111
54 Kimball, Most Unsordid Act, 107-117.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196
war away from our country and away from our people.”55 Churchill later called lend-lease “the
most unsordid act in the history of any nation.”
It was against this background of salvation that the Cabinet considered Roosevelt’s
telegram on 2 January 1941. Churchill told his colleagues that “he did not think that it was
politically possible to oppose this suggestion of President Roosevelt.” The Cabinet agreed.56
“We have been greatly impressed by your arguments in favor of this proposal,” Churchill wrote
Roosevelt the next day.
The anxiety which we have always felt about this project is that it would lead to similar demands on behalf of our German occupied allies. . . .1 feel sure that I can count upon your help to maintain this distinction for otherwise the whole fabric of our blockade would be fatally undermined and I need not stress to you what this would mean in terms of final victory.
Britain agreed to Roosevelt’s proposal on four conditions: first, the supplies were confined to
medical supplies, vitamin concentrates, dried or concentrated milk, and children’s clothing;
second, Amcross would supervise the distribution of supplies; third, Vichy must agree to allow
the press to publish accounts of the relief shipments and acknowledge Britain’s cooperation; and
finally, additional shipments would only occur if all the conditions were met. Churchill also
asked Roosevelt to help present Britain’s role in the scheme to the American public “in as
favorable light as possible.” “While it would be made clear that this step had been taken on your
initiative, we would like it stated that the relief goods are available only by good will of His
Majesty’s Government,” wrote Churchill. “The impression which we should like to see created is
that of Anglo-American cooperation for humanitarian ends.57
55 Fireside chat by Roosevelt, “The Arsenal of Democracy,” 29 December 1940. Buhite and Levy, eds., FDR’s Fireside Chats, 164-173.
56 Extract from War Cabinet Conclusions, 1(41), 2 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28815.
57 Telegram C-51x, Churchill to Roosevelt, 3 January 1941. Kimball,Churchill andRoosevelt, vol. 1, 125.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197
The job of seeking the Petain regime’s approval for the program fell to the new American
ambassador to Vichy, Admiral William D. Leahy, the former chief of naval operations. “We are
confronting an increasingly serious situation in France,” Roosevelt told Leahy, “because of the
possibility that one element in the present French government may persuade Marshal Petain to
enter into agreements with Germany which will facilitate the efforts of the Axis powers against
Great Britain.” Roosevelt believed that Leahy’s military background would allow him to develop
a rapport with Petain, “who at the present moment is the one powerful element in the French
Government who is standing firm against selling out to Germany.”58 Leahy was also Roosevelt’s
man— they had been friends since World War I, when Roosevelt served as secretary of the navy
and Leahy oversaw naval transport.
After a thirty-six hour car ride from Madrid, Leahy arrived in Vichy, France, at midnight
on 5/6 January 1941. When he presented his credentials the next day to Petain, Leahy conveyed a
message from Roosevelt. The United States recognized the “unfortunate situation” in which
France found itself and the need to protect its “own self interests as a people and a nation,” but it
did not regard that situation as a justification for providing military aid to Germany. As long as
Vichy confined its actions to the terms of the armistice, the United States would help it find
solutions to its most pressing problems, including obtaining relief for the civilian population and
promoting economic development in the French West Indies. Since accomplishing these goals
required Britain’s assistance, the United States hoped that Vichy would not act in any manner that
might “prejudice the successful conclusion of the requisite agreements,” specifically breaching
the blockade with food shipments from South America.59 “The Marshal expressed his deep
58 Cited in Dallek, 251.
59 Telegram 10, Hull to Leahy, 6 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, Volume II, 90-1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198
appreciation of the President’s message,” reported Leahy, “and said that I had brought him the
first ray of hope in some time.”60
Leahy’s first order of business was to obtain Vichy’s approval of Amcross’ relief
program. He found Petain and Pierre Flandin, the minister of foreign affairs, receptive to the
program, as Vichy’s food situation was a great concern. Vichy suffered from deficiencies in meat,
along with wheat, and com. They admitted that Germany had taken 500,000 head of cattle and 1
million pigs and the extractions were ongoing. If the spring crop in North Africa was not
harvested, Vichy’s food situation would become grave. Vichy’s predicament allowed Germany
to use the danger of starvation to quash any impulse it had to take independent action. “The
problem is an economic one at present,” Flandin told Leahy, “it may soon become political.” By
providing help with Vichy’s food supply, the United States would enable Vichy to maintain its
independence and prevent it from going beyond the terms of the armistice. It wanted to use
blocked French assets in the United States to purchase food and use French ships impounded in
American ports to transport the food, along with other vital supplies, such as lubricating oils for
French railways. Vichy hoped that the United States could convince Britain to adopt a reasonable
attitude towards the blockade. Vichy had recently entered into discussions with Britain in Madrid
on economic issues, although it was forbidden under the terms of the German armistice.61
After his initial meetings with Petain and his staff, Leahy was convinced that relief
should serve as the cornerstone of American relations with Vichy.62 “If we wish to retain the
confidence of the French people through the approaching critical period of food and fuel
shortage,” he wrote, “it is necessary for us to do something more than talk.” Amcross’s relief
60 Letter, Leahy to Roosevelt, 25 January 1941. FDRL, Diplomatic Correspondence, France, 1941, Box 29.
61 Telegram 31, Leahy to Hull, 9 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 92. Telegram 39, Leahy to Hull, 11 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 93-96.
62 Telegram 39, Leahy to Hull, 11 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 93-96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199
program would not only help “stiffen” Petain’s resistance to German demands, but also make it
more difficult for Petain’s detractors to attack him for failing to provide for the French people.
Petain also regarded American relief as vital to the future of his government, telling Leahy that
“his only hope for the coming months is that the good offices of the United States will succeed in
easing blockade restrictions on the import of essential foodstuffs to France, and in assistance by
the American Red Cross.”63
At the beginning of February 1941, the S.S. Cold Harbor sailed from Baltimore carrying
750 tons of milk, forty tons of children’s clothing, and medical supplies.64 As the ship made its
way across the Atlantic, Allen finalized transportation arrangements with Vichy officials and met
with SAVG directors to prepare the local networks to distribute the supplies. Allen worried in
particular about having enough petrol, but the Vichy government agreed to provide Amcross with
what it needed.65 On 10 March 1941, the Cold Harbor docked in Marseilles, after calling first at
Cadiz, Seville, and Barcelona.66 The arrival of the ship was marked by hundreds of
schoolchildren waving American flags and the French tricolor lining the docks “all cheering
themselves hoarse.”67 The arrival of the ship was accompanied by extensive newspaper reports
63 Letter, Welles to FDR, 6 Feburary, 1941; Letter, Leahy to Welles, 16 January 1941; Letter, Leahy to Roosevelt, 25 January 1941. FDRL, Diplomatic Correspondence, France, 1941, Box 29.
64 Telegram 116, Butler to FO, 8 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1228. Letter, Johnson to Steel, 3 1 January 1941; Telegram 16, FO to Contraband Control (Gibraltar), 31 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28815. Telegram 18, Amcross to Allen, 8 January 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6.
65 The newspapers mistakenly reported the name of the ship as the SSCold Comfort, prompting him to telegram Davis to make sure it was not true. Telegram 160, Allen to Amcross, 15 January 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6. Letter, Long to Swift, 17 January 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6. Long points out to him that Italy is asking for ten days notice before sailing, the most required by any belligerent. Telegram 101, Allen to Amcross, 24 January 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6.
66 “Marseilles Cheers U.S. Relief Vessel,”NYT, 14 March 1941.
67 “French Welcome First U.S. Relief Vessel,”NYT, 11 March 1941. “Marseilles Cheers U.S. Relief Vessel,” 14 March 1941. The schoolchildren were originally supposed to meet the ship when it docked, but when local officials realized they might have to wait a long time, the ceremony was rescheduled for a few days later.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200
and accompanying pictures. “All over France, the people found different ways of expressing
their appreciation,” wrote Allen, “and I do not think that there is any doubt that these supplies
raised the morale of the French people tremendously.”68
In the wake of the departure of the Cold Harbor, Amcross arranged for a second ship, the
S.S. Exmouth, to depart Baltimore in mid-March.69 A substantial amount of confusion
surrounded the sailing of theExmouth. At the end of February, Davis asked Roosevelt for help
with finding a second ship, which led to the President ordering the Maritime Commission to make
one available. The commission offered the Exmouth on the condition that it be used immediately,
a situation sent Amcross scrambling to assemble a shipment. Somewhere along the way,
Amcross failed to apply for a navicert for the cargo of milk, medicine, children’s clothing,
oatmeal, and farina.70 When MEW finally received the request, it came the day after Amcross
announced the ship’s impending departure, a situation that left MEW “slightly piqued.”71 MEW
brushed off the paperwork problem, but it insisted on Amcross removing the oatmeal and farina
from the ship because it went beyond the scope of Roosevelt’s original request. It also wanted
the ship delayed until Amcross could report on the distribution of the Cold Harbor shipment.72
Amcross acceded to MEW ’s wishes, pulling the offending cargo and providing a report from
68 Letter, Allen to Davis, 13 May 1940, with cover note from Davis to FDR. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corresp., France 1941, Box 29.
69 Telegram 593, State to Berlin (et al), 7 March 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6.
70 “Another Food Ship for France Sought,”NYT, 20 February 1941. Telegram 304-305, Washington to Vichy, 20 February 1941. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293. Telegram 593, State to Berlin (et al), 1 March 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6. “Red Cross to Send 2nd Ship to France,” NYT, 2 March 1941. Telegram 1427, FO to Halifax, 1 March 1941 [ex?]. TNA/PRO, FOS37/1221. Telegram 1171 ARFAR, Halifax to FO, 6 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28818.
71 Telegram 801, Winant to State, 3 March 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6. Telegram 1113 ARFAR, Halifax to FO, 4 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28818.
72 Telegram 1074 ARFAR, FO to Halifax, 5 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28818. Letter, Helm to Mitchell, 6 March 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 7. MEW also refused to allow Amcross to ship quinine, because it was a known German deficiency and had military uses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201
Allen. “All government officials are offering exceptional cooperation and facilities but leave us
completely free to determine methods to direct and to supervise distribution,” he reported. “All
terms agreement with British are being strictly (repeat strictly) adhered to.” 73
W hen the Exmouth docked in Marseilles at the beginning of April, it received a warm
reception and good publicity, but nothing to rival the welcome given the Cold Harbor. “ [TJhere
was definite cooling off on the part of French officials,” reported Allen, “and I was told by
several newspaper men here in Marseille that the papers had received instructions not to carry the
same type of publicity on the ‘Exmouth’ as has been carried on the ‘Cold Harbor.’”74
The arrival of the supplies allowed Amcross to run a milk program for children until the
end of June. The milk was given as a supplement— rather than replacement— to rations to
schoolchildren, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under school age. Children up to age
fourteen, when primary education ended, received milk at school. Expectant mothers and
mothers of children under school age were required to visit clinics or, where they did not exist,
distribution centers established for that purpose. At the clinics, children were weighed, and their
mothers were given a week’s allowance of milk to take home. If a child did not appear to be
improving in health and weight, a visit to the child’s home was made to determine if the milk was
being misused or misappropriated by other members of the household. In practice, the need for
such investigations rarely occurred. Pregnant women and any child who appeared to be suffering
from a vitamin deficiency also received vitamins. Once the schools let out for the year at the end
of June, only expectant mothers and children under school age received milk, because supplies
73 Telegram 1171 ARFAR, Halifax to FO, 6 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28818.
74 Letter, Allen to Davis, 13 May 1940, with cover note from Davis to FDR. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corresp., France 1941, Box 29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202
ran low. Allen calculated that between March and June 1941, the program met the needs of 2.5
million children and expectant mothers.75
To run the program, Allen directed a staff of twenty-eight full-time American workers,
along with fourteen American volunteers who provided assistance in the towns where they lived.
They, in turn, supervised the assistance provided by an array of American and French
organizations. In Marseilles, Lyon, Toulon, and Perpgnon, Amcross received assistance from the
Quakers. It also received assistance from the YMCA and Unitarian groups. Rockefeller
Foundation representatives advised Allen on organization, supervision, and distribution
arrangements. In addition to the American organizations, Allen worked with SAVG, French Red
Cross, Secours National, Goutte de Lait Association, and other well established local
organizations and societies dedicated to caring for children. Allen regarded SAVG as '"an integral
part of our program for the distribution of relief supplies in unoccupied France.”
So That France Can Eat
Although Vichy appreciated the milk program, it really wanted the United States to help
it import wheat and com. At the end of December 1940— as Roosevelt made his pitch for
Amcross’ relief program— Vichy launched an intense lobbying campaign. It claimed that its
stocks of wheat and corn would be exhausted by the end of March 1941. The deficit resulted
75 If the milk was tinned, then they were expected to return the tin the next week. To run the program, Allen directed a staff of twenty-eight full-time American workers, along with fourteen American volunteers who provided assistance in the towns where they lived. They, in turn, supervised the assistance provided by an array of American and French organizations. In Marseilles, Lyon, Toulon, and Perpgnon, Amcross received assistance from the Quakers. It also received assistance from the YMCA and Unitarian groups. Rockefeller Foundation representatives advised Allen on organization, supervision, and distribution arrangements. In addition to the American organizations, Allen worked with SAVG, French Red Cross, Secours National, Goutte de Lait Association, and other well established local organizations and societies dedicated to caring for children. Allen regarded SAVG as “an integral part of our program for the distribution of relief supplies in unoccupied France.” Amcross also benefited from an advisory committee in France consisting of Alan Arragan, a partner in Morgan & Company in France; Bernard Cartier, a director in the same company; W.D. Crampton, European representative of Standard Oil Company, and Tucker Barrett of Guaranty Trust Company in France. Letter, Swift to Helm, 11 March 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7. FO Memo, Foot and Allen, 6 October 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1222.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203
from faulty crop estimates and poor quality of the wheat crop. In order to carry the country to the
next harvest at the end of May, Vichy wanted to import a minimum of six million quintals
(roughly 670,000 tons) of wheat and two million quintals (roughly 230,000 tons) of corn for use
in feeding livestock. The necessary stocks could be purchased in Argentina, but Vichy required
the United States to unblock French dollars and release French ships impounded in American
harbors in order to take delivery. It also wanted American assistance in convincing Britain to
allow the supplies to pass the blockade.76
Vichy’s plea for assistance possessed a major flaw (among many)— the regime
acknowledged sending food, particularly meat, to the occupied zone to alleviate serious
shortages, especially in Paris.77 The French Foreign Ministry justified the transfer of goods by
insisting that it could not “renounce its obligation to feed the people of the occupied territory.” It
noted that Paris traditionally received meat in the spring from Correze, Cantal, and surrounding
regions and pledged that only “normal” quantities were being sent. It also emphasized the
symbiotic relationship shared by northern and southern of France with regards to food production.
The northern departments supplied the country with potatoes, sugar, wheat, wine, milk, and beef,
while the southern departments furnished fruits, spring vegetables, macaroni, mutton, oils, fats,
and products from North Africa processed through Marseilles.78 Hoping to build support for
sending food to France, Henry-Haye used every opportunity to deny publicly that any exchanges
76 Telegram 1201, Matthews to State, 31 December 1940.FRUS, 1940, vol. II, 556-7; Telegram 22-25 and Telegram 26-31, Vichy to Washington, 8 January 1941. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293; Telegram 21-23, Vichy to Madrid, 8 January 1941. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Vichy, Grande Bretagne, File 332. Telegram 44, Leahy to Hull, 13 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 97-99; Memorandum of Conversation, Welles and Henry-Haye, 10 January 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 92-93. F..L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1962) 100.
77 Telegram 32, Hull to Leahy, 13 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 100.
78 Telegram 58, Leahy to Hull, 15 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 100-1. Telegram 312, FO to Butler, 22 January 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25204. Telegram 64-68, Vichy to Madrid, 11 Janvier 1941. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Vichy, Grande Bretagne, File 332.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 204
occurred. “I want to again deny rumors that food is seeping into the occupied zone, including
Paris,” he told the New York Times in mid-January 1941. “They are absolutely untrue.” He tried
the same tactic with the State Department, which knew the truth about the exchanges, only to
receive a lecture from Hull on the failure of relief advocates to ask Germany to do its duty.79
When Leahy called on Petain at the end of January, he found the marshal worried about
Germany’s increasing demands. In particular, Petain feared that Germany would force him to
take Laval back into his government after having orchestrated his dismissal. Tried of Laval’s
attempts to supplant him, Petain maneuvered Laval into offering his resignation in mid-December
1940. He expected a letter from Hitler any day calling Laval’s dismissal a personal affront.
Petain also expressed concern about the food situation. “We would have enough to feed ourselves
but the Germans are stealing everything in the occupied zone,” he told Leahy. The meeting left
Leahy convinced that the United States needed to do something to bolster Petain’s determination
to resist Germany. “The Marshal needs support in taking a strong stand against German
demands,” wrote Leahy, “and I therefore urgently recommend that without delay ... it be
announced in Washington that the American Red Cross will begin in the near future to provide
and distribute food to the destitute people of unoccupied France.”80
By mid-February 1940, Vichy had received nothing more the sympathetic expressions
from the United States with regards to the wheat shipments. The lack of action prompted Henry-
Haye once again to put Vichy’s request before the State Department. He proposed the first wheat
79 “French Envoy Ask More Food Be Sent,”NYT, 11 January 1941. Memorandum o f Conversation, Hull and Henry-Haye, 18 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 102-103. “Repeats Plea of France,”NYT, 19 January 1941. “Henry-Haye Seeks Food for French,” NYT, 28 January 1941. Telegram 46, Hull to Leahy, 15 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 101-102.
80 Telegram 127, Leahy to Hull, 29 January 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 106-108.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205
shipment be carried by two French ships, Leopold and L ’lie de Re, now docked in New York and
paid for by $400,000 blocked French assets.81
To reinforce Henry-FIaye’s overture, the French Foreign Ministry gave Leahy a detailed
accounting of the wheat situation, which showed that 4,900,000 quintals were needed to carry
Vichy to the next harvest.82 It also expressed interest in having American “agents qualified in
questions pertaining to wheat to make contact with the French Administration” and invited
suggestions for improving the tracking the conversion of wheat into flour. For decades, France
had used a system to control the movement of wheat from grower to baker. Vichy would be
willing to modify the system to meet any distribution requirements imposed by Britain in
exchange for granting blockade concessions. Noting that the bread ration had been reduced
another twenty percent and bakeries were forbidden from making pastry, Leahy made an urgent
appeal for wheat shipments. “I am personally convinced,” he told Hull, “that the French are
genuinely disturbed at the existing wheat shortage in the unoccupied zone and that the reasons for
sending a quantity of wheat to this zone, as set forth in my several previous telegrams, are as
valid today as ever.”83
The renewed appeal for wheat was accompanied by a more menacing appeal from the
new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Admiral Jean Francois Darlan. Having served Petain as
minister of marine, Darlan gained expanded powers in February 1941 when he became vice
premier and assumed control of the foreign ministry, information ministry, and interior ministry.
Petain’s dismissal of Laval left relations with Germany in turmoil until Darlan emerged as a
81 Telegram 112, Hull to Leahy, 4 February 1941.FRUS , 1941, vol. II, 108-109. Telegram 164, Leahy to Hull, 6 February 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 110-111. Letter, Henry-Haye to Hull, 19 February 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 112-114.
82 Telegram 218, Leahy to Hull, 23 February 1941.FRUS, 1941, volume II, 114-6
83 Telegram 253, Leahy to State, 1 March 1940.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 118.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 206
suitable replacement. Robert Paxton argues that following his ascension, Darlan dominated the
Vichy regime, gradually acceding to Germany’s demands for military cooperation throughout
1941. It should also be noted that Darlan harbored no love for Britain. His long-simmering
animosity toward Britain, which derived from his experiences representing France at the interwar
naval conferences, morphed into outright hatred as a result of the Mers el-Kebir incident.84
Darlan wanted the United States to convince Britain to stop seizing French ships carrying
supplies from its colonies. “France, not prepared to live on her own resources, has need, in order
to exist, of her Empire,” he explained to Leahy. After the armistice, Vichy received permission
from Germany to resume maritime traffic with colonies on reduced scale. Darlan claimed that
since that armistice, Britain had “illegally” and without justification seized more than one
hundred ships. “If the English Admiralty continues to capture French merchant vessels,” observed
Darlan, “the loss of tonnage which would result therefrom for France will cause grave
consequences of a political and economic nature.”85
Welles emphasized to Halifax the growing hardships on the French population and the
potential, in Roosevelt’s opinion, for wheat shipments to strengthen Petain’s hand. Halifax
reminded Welles that Britain “had only agreed to an experimental consignment at the President’s
request” and would not be overjoyed to extend it. He also pointed out the faulty logic in deciding
the issue based on Petain—they could very easily find themselves dealing with Darlan
tomorrow.86
For Halifax, the meeting with Welles only confirmed his suspicion that the question of
food for Vichy was reaching a “crucial stage in which deeper issues are likely to be involved.”
84 Paxton,Vichy France, 108-111.
85 Telegram 240, Leahyto Hull, 26 February 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 116-18.
86 Telegram 800, Halifaxto FO, 20 February 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 207
He told the Foreign Office that the issue, which was very much on the minds of Roosevelt, Hull,
Welles, and Davis, was assuming more and more importance in American foreign policy. “And it
must be borne in mind that,” he observed, “the Americans think probably with some reason that
they have better means of judging the political situation in Vichy than we have.” For the sake of
its relationship with the United States, Halifax recommended that Britain “allow the Americans to
go forward with the carefully limited and controlled plans which they are convinced are practical
for unoccupied France.”87
The abrupt and inconclusive termination of the Madrid conversations at the end of
January demonstrated that Vichy did not have any real interest in establishing economic relations
with Britain. “While it is to our advantage that Petain should cling to the terms of the armistice
so far as the disposal of of fleet and bases is concerned,” wrote the Foreign Office, “it is to our
disadvantage that he interprets the armistice as meaning that he is to have no relations with this
country.” Given the growing trend in collaboration, Britain did not feel inclined to help its
former ally:
Neither the Vichy Government nor their agents in North Africa show any spark of nobility or courage or any active will to resist. They may hope for our victory but they will do nothing to help, since if we lose they may thus, they trust, have acquired merit in German eyes while if we win they assume we shall in any event restore France. Meanwhile, they expect us to allow them to be supplied from overseas.
The Foreign Office also offered a host of reasons, in addition to Vichy’s lack of political
fortitude, based on economic warfare considerations for not allowing the wheat shipment.88
87 lie also proposed that if Britain was not inclined to allow limited shipments, he suggested proposing the United States controlall imports into Vichy and their distribution to the population. He acknowledged that the United States might not want to assume extended control and Germany would certain object, but the refusals would provide Britain with ammunition for rejecting further proposals. However, if they agreed, it would solve the problem of controlling imports from North Africa and Martinique. Telegram 937, Halifax to FO, 28 February 1941; Telegram 938, Halifax to FO, 28 February 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
88 Telegram 1170, FO to Halifax, 3 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229. The Foreign Office’s perceptions of the regime were informed by reports made by Dupuy, the Canadian charge d’affaires. See:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208
On 10 March 1941, Vichy increased the stakes. Petain publicly appealed to the United
States to permit the purchase and transport of wheat. The same day, Darlan told the American
press in Vichy that if Britain continued to interfere with food shipments to France, he would
convoy French food ships and use the French fleet to protect them. The action was necessary “so
that France can eat.” Fie also characterized the British blockade as “imbecile” and “ineffective
for the purposes of war.” “The Germans in this instance,” he observed, “have been more
generous and humanitarian than the British.”89 Germany enthusiastically supported Darlan’s
threat believing that it would further damage Anglo-French relations.90
Darlan’s grandstanding prompted Churchill to ask Roosevelt’s help in offering Vichy a
barter agreement. Darlan’s threat made it more difficult for Britain to justify aid, but the dangers
presented by the situation prompted it “to make one last attempt to stop the Vichy drift towards
full collaboration with the Germans.” Britain’s growing unease with the number of German and
Italian military officers pouring into French North Africa also fortified its resolve. Britain,
however, wanted “solid political guarantees” in exchange for aiding France. “Admiral Darlan’s
declaration and threat,” he wrote Roosevelt on 12 March 1941, “make me wonder whether it
would not be best for you to intervene as a friend of both sides and try to bring about a working
agreement.” Since soliciting American assistance meant granting blockade concessions,
Telegram 360, FO to Halifax, 28 February 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6. The telegram also came out more hard-nosed than the tenor of the discussions internal discussions. The French Department supported the shipments because they would promote Anglo-American relations, potentially strengthen the resistance of the French people and Vichy government, and the benefits to Germany would not outweigh the benefits to Britain. The General Department agreed, observing that while the arguments for and against the cargoes were nicely balanced, “the American angle was so vital that it would probably be best to agree.” It suggested, however, that Britain receive something in return, such as Vichy sailing the French fleet at Toulon to North Africa. Minute by Strang (Z1458/54/17), 2 March 1940; Minute by Mack (Z1458/54/17) summarizing meeting with Cadogan, Bulter, Steel, Strang, and Scott. 3 March 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/28312.
89 “Vichy Says It Will Use Navy Unless British Let In Food,”NYT, 11 March 1941.
90 Paxton,Vichy France, 116.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209
Churchill made sure that Roosevelt understood the magnitude of the sacrifice Britain proposed to
make. “We fear very much prolongation of the war and its miseries which would result from
breakdown of blockade of Germany” he wrote, “and there are immense difficulties in preventing
Germany from profiting directly or indirectly from anything imported into unoccupied France.”
Despite Britain’s reservations, Churchill believed that it would be easier for the United States to
talk to Vichy rather than Britain attempting to renew discussions through Madrid or using the
press. He also conceded that “Darlan has old scores to pay out against us,” as a result of British
assault on the French fleet at Mers el-Kebir.
Churchill suggested that Roosevelt come forward on the basis of being worried about
fighting breaking out between Britain and France and offer a deal: in exchange for Petain
preventing further German and Italian infiltration into French North Africa and gradually moving
the French naval units from Toulon to Dakar and Casablanca, Britain would allow the wheat and
com shipment and permit regular shipments from French North Africa, with the provision that the
goods not be re-exported. To facilitate the arrangement, the United States would send a sufficient
number of observers to Vichy and French North Africa. British observers would accompany the
Americans or, alternatively, Vichy would readmit British consular officers to their former posts in
French North Africa. Provided that Vichy abided by the conditions, neither of which conflicted
with its obligations under the armistice, Britain would allow supplies to go forward. “It would
have to be made clear,” Churchill told Roosevelt, “that the relief accorded was limited to stated
quantities of food at agreed intervals and did not extend to other goods.” Britain possessed ample
evidence that war-related goods, such as rubber, were arriving in Vichy and going directly to
Germany and Italy. “For instance, there is a French ship, the Bangkok, with 3,000 tons of rubber
on board which is certainly not all for teats of babies’ bottles.” Churchill also did not want ships
used for “our life and war effort” used to carry the supplies to France. “I do not want the people
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210
here who, apart from the heavy bombardment likely to be renewed soon, are having to tighten
their belts and restrict their few remaining comforts, to feel that I am not doing my best against
the enemy.”91
Britain hoped that the United States could obtain Vichy’s agreement within a week.
“We cannot afford to let negotiations drift on whilst the Germans consolidate their position in
French Africa and increase their military forces in Tripoli,” the Foreign Office told Flalifax.
While Britain hoped that the barter deal would help stave off Franco-German collaboration and
Axis expansion in North Africa, it also believed that a refusal from Vichy would represent a
victory of a different kind. “If the French Government refuse an offer of this kind,” observed the
Foreign Office, “we shall know where we stand, and we can tell the French people that their
leaders prefer to collaborate with Germany rather than to secure bread for unoccupied France,
supplies for French North Africa and the maintenance of the Empire and the Fleet.”92
The State Department, however, found the terms upon which Britain proposed to help
Vichy uncomfortable. Hull did not like the idea of being pushed into the role of formal mediator
between Britain and Vichy. Additionally, he believed that it would be difficult to obtain a quick
response and preferred to proceed in gradual stages, fearing that the conclusion of a
comprehensive agreement would arouse Germany’s suspicions and prompt it to block its
implementation. “Once supplies began to be distributed the French people might begin to take
courage and we might then have a real hope of gradually getting our desiderata.” Halifax wrote
91 Telegram C-67x, Churchill to Roosevelt, 12 March 1941. Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt:, vol. 1, 146-7. The details of the scheme were actually worked out before Darlan’s threat. See War Cabinet Conclusions 23(41), 4 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28312. Telegram 1275, FO to Halifax, 9 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
92 The specifics of the barter agreement articulated in two telegrams, one from Roosevelt to Churchill and one from the Foreign Office to Halifax. See Telegram 1345, FO to Halifax, 12 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6; Telegram C-67x, Churchill to Roosevelt, 12 March 1941. Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt, vol. 1, 146-7. War Cabinet Conclusion, 28(41), 13 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28313.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211
Whitehall explaining Hull’s position. “At the worst we should be no worse off for French people
would know the source of supplies and if, owing to German conduct or further Vichy concessions
to Germany, these were stopped reason for explaining our position would be greatly strengthened
vis a vis not only French but also Government and public opinion of this country.”93
In mid-March, Hull met with Henry-Haye to promote what he called the idea of “a spirit
of mutual concession and cooperation” between France and Britain. He stressed that Darlan’s
recent statements suggested an intention to aid Hitler rather than the people of France— and that
the statements made it difficult for the United States to convince Britain to be helpful to Vichy.
“[I]t is as impossible to appease Hitler as it would be for a squirrel to appease a boa constrictor,”
Hull told Henry-Haye, “and hence this country is striving all the more to aid Great Britain and the
Western Hemisphere, and at the same time to win back the liberties of Europe.” Henry-Haye,
however, denied Darlan’s threat or Vichy’s intention to go beyond the armistice and emphasized
France’s desire for normal relations with the United States.94 Worried that Henry-Haye might not
convey the State Department’s position, Hull asked Leahy to deliver a similar message to
Petain.95 Leahy reported that Petain regarded Darlan’s plans to convoy French ships as too
dangerous. “Admiral Darlan seems to be getting closer to the Germans and to be playing more
with them,” Petain told Leahy. “I must watch him and I will restrain him as much as possible.”96
93 Telegram 1169, Halifax to FO, 15 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM4/74/6. Memocon, Hull and Halifax, 15 March 1941. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corres., Great Britain, 1941, Box 34.
94 Roosevelt also lent a hand to the negotiations, meeting with Henry-Haye and Davis to discuss the relief program. Memcon, Hull and Henry-Haye, 15 M arch 1941. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corres., France, 1941, Box 29. Telegram 497-490, Washington to Vichy, 17 March 1941. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293.
95 Telegram 229, Hull to Leahy, 15 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 124-5.
96 Petain also claimed that the efforts of French resistance groups made it difficult to unify the French people, harboring a particular disdain for DeGaulle, who he called a “traitor to his country, condemned to death.” Telegram 314, Leahy to Hull, 18 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II. 129-30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212
Unhappy with the terms proposed by Britain, the United States made a counter-offer.
First, the United States would pay for the wheat and com using money from Roosevelt’s special
relief fund. Davis suggested making the food a gift, because he was not enchanted with the idea
of Amcross supervising the distribution of food bought by Vichy. He also believed it would help
maintain the distinction between occupied and unoccupied France. If the Vichy bought food for
unoccupied France and not occupied France, it would come under fire for playing favorites. There
was also another reason to make the food a gift— the United States would receive credit for
giving Vichy food and Britain for allowing it through the blockade.97 Second, if the shipment
proved to be a success, Vichy should be allowed to use its own funds to purchase additional food
for distribution under American supervision. Finally, Britain needed to take a less aggressive
approach to dealing with French shipping. In return for Britain’s agreement, the United States
would help resolve Britain’s concerns about German infiltration of North Africa and encourage
Vichy to transfer the fleet.98 It would not, however, make them conditions of allowing the
shipment, preferring to treat them as separate issues.99
Churchill found the American position “baffling.” He welcomed the United States
making the shipment a gift, but found its disregard for the blockade curious. Although Britain
wanted to prevent Vichy from drifting into full collaboration with Germany, it could not come at
the expense of Britain’s overall strategy. “We cannot allow the blockade to lapse without
anything to put in its place,” he told Halifax. Churchill found the State Department’s attitude
about Britain’s treatment of French shipping particularly puzzling. “At the moment we are doing
97 Telegram 1193, Halifax to FO, 17 March 1941; Telegram 1590, FO to Halifax, 23 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28313.
98 Memcon, Welles and Halifax, 17 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 127-8. Telegram 1198 (1169), Halifax to FO, 17 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
99 Telegram 1225, Halifax to Churchill, 19 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28313. Telegram 1275, Halifax to FO, 21 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28314.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213
nothing to French ships, and convoys growing larger every day are passing in and out of the
Straits, the most part with only nominal escorts.” Churchill could not believe that the United
States wanted Britain simply to ignore such a major breach in the blockade. “We must know,” he
told Halifax, “with some precision what the U.S. wants and advises, or whether they would rather
not be asked,” he told Halifax.100 To drive home Britain’s concerns, Churchill met with Winant,
impressing upon him that Britain “could not let contraband control lapse, and a brush with the
French convoy escorts must be faced.” Britain would only wait a few more days before taking
action against one of Vichy’s convoys.101
Churchill’s desire for quick action came not only from Darlan’s threats, but recent
intelligence information. MEW had obtained a copy of the official German program for the
transport of goods between the occupied zone and Vichy from 16 December 1940 to 15 January
1941. The report provided conclusive proof of a “methodical system of looting employed by the
Germans.” More than 28,000 tons of cattle were sent from occupied France to Germany, along
with 75,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of apples, and 7,500 tons of barley. The information
about exports from Vichy proved especially troubling. Vichy sent 90,000 tons of oats and 2,500
tons of pulse to occupied France and Belgium, and 1,220 tons of pork to Germany. To occupied
France alone, Vichy sent 6,750 tons of soap and 900 tons of eggs. Additionally, more than
78,750 tons of hay traveled from Vichy to other German occupied territories. Vichy also
100 When his colleagues wanted to quibble over the new terms introduced by the State Department, Churchill cautioned them against it. “The United States seem however inclined to attach conditions to them,” Churchill told the Foreign Office and MEW. “All the better... .It is better to let these two ships go and leave it to the United States how they play the card. Beware of too much telegraphing. Let them move for the moment as they feel inclined.’’Note, Churchill to Halifax, 18 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6. Note, Cadogan to Churchill, 18 March 1941; Note, Churchill to Cadogan, MEW, and Butler, 19 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28313. Telegram 61, FO to Angora, et al, 14 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28819. Telegram 40, FO to Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 14 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28314.
101 Winant promised to relay the message to Washington, but wanted to wait a few days until after Colonel William Donovan left London. Roosevelt had sent Donovan overseas and Hull was annoyed that he had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 214
exported a number of valuable raw materials, including bauxite, aluminum, magnesium,
manganese, fluor-spar, pyrite, and pitch, along with contributing to the more than 45,000 tons of
lead sent to Germany from Vichy and occupied France. 102
While Churchill felt that he had made his concerns about the blockade clear to the
Americans, his colleagues began to voice concern that he was not taking a strong enough line.103
MEW felt that its concerns were being ignored— an impression reinforced by Dalton not being
called to attend War Cabinet meetings featuring discussions of Britain’s blockade policy toward
France. The oversight probably was not accidental, as Dalton made his concerns about the trend
in Britain’s Vichy policy well known. As he told Churchill, “[T]o lift the blockade on food in
general would go far beyond anything that has been discussed, and would be a grave reversal our
policy.”104 Not in the mood to soothe Dalton’s ego, Churchill made his position clear: “It is not
intended to reach at the present time any decision to allow all food to pass freely into unoccupied
France. On the other hand, if the French submit to contraband control, a certain moderate ration
of food might be allowed. At the present time I am leaving the initiative in the food negotiations
to the United States.”105
Dalton, however, was not the only one concerned. Sir Desmond Morton, the man
responsible for Britain’s fervor for economic warfare, expressed his concerns to Churchill and the
Foreign Office. “Rob a man of all he owns and then make him plead starvation,” wrote Morton
describing Vichy’s predicament and cautioned against becoming a victim of this “diabolic
not been consulted on Donovan’s mission. Memcon, Churchill and Winant, 19 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0 3 7 1 /2 8 3 13.
102 Telegram 1317 AFRAR, FO to Halifax, 19 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229.
103 War Cabinet Conclusions 30 (41), 20 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28314.
104 Note, Dalton to Churchill, 21 March 1941; Minute by Dalton, 21 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
105 Note, Churchill to MEW, First Lord, Sir Edward Bridges, 23 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 215
subtlety:” “Our hearts must not rule our heads when we are fighting for our lives. If policy
demands some relaxation of the blockade of France we must admit that Hitler has won a move in
the game.” Morton expressed an “unshaken conviction” that economic warfare had an important
role in play in the war. “A sword is inefficient if its edge be blunted. Economic warfare is no
magic short cut to winning this war but there are four horsemen of the Apocalypse not three.
Hitler and his men may not believe in the Bible but at least they believe this and act
accordingly.”106
After consulting with and obtaining the armistice commission’s approval, Vichy
informed the United States on 24 March 1941 that it agreed to the conditions governing the
shipment. When Henry-Haye delivered Vichy’s consent to Hull, he reaffirmed Vichy’s pledge
not take action beyond the terms of the armistice. As a show of good faith, he reported that there
were currently sixty-two German officials in French North Africa, and Vichy intended to oppose
any increase in their number.107
Despite the progress made on relief, tensions between Britain and Vichy escalated during
the last two weeks of March 1941. As Churchill promised, Britain did not remain idle. British
torpedo boats followed a French freighter into Port-Etienne, Mauretania, while a British cruiser
and five torpedo boats fought an armed French convoy off the coast of Algeria. After the Italians
used the port at Sfax, Tunisia, the Royal Air Force bombed French merchant shipping in the
106 M em o by Morton, “The Blockade,” 24 M arch 1941; Note, Morton to Strang, 24 M arch 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28314.
107 Letter, Boisangerto Hemmen, 20 March 1941. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293. Memcon, Hull and Henry-Haye, 24 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol..II, 132-3. Leahy reported that Vichy consented to the terms four days before Henry-Haye’s visit. See Telegram 238, Welles to Leahy, 18 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 131. Telegram 322, Leahy to Hull, 20 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 132.
108 Paxton,Vichy France, 116.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 216
At the end of March 1941, word came that Vichy had signed a barter deal with Germany.
According to the terms of the deal, Vichy would receive 800,000 tons of wheat, 200,000 tons of
sugar, 100,000 tons of bran, and 300,000 of potatoes from occupied France. In return, Vichy
would supply 1,390,000 head of livestock, 36,000 tons of table oil, 100,000 tons of salt, 60,000
tons of vegetables, and 8,000 tons of cheese.109 News of the barter agreement came from Paris,
suggesting to Leahy that the Germans knew about the negotiations between Vichy and the United
States and waited for the right moment to foil the outcome. By making the barter agreement
public, Germany would prevent the Allies from receiving sole credit for providing Vichy with
food.110 “It was impossible for the French to have it both ways,” Halifax told Welles, “and this
sort of news of course confirmed our view that as [the] Germans could and did treat [the] French
more roughly than we did, [the] French tended to be more accommodating to them. [The] result
was that we kept on getting the worse deal.”111
Believing that the barter agreement, along with reports that Vichy sought to buy food in
Latin America, “put the matter in a new light,” Churchill wrote Roosevelt on March 29. “If we
were to put up with this it would mean that the French ships unhampered by the needs of the
convoy would soon be doing a big trade and Germany would secure at least half of the import.”
Britain would allow the gift shipment to pass the blockade, but it also planned to tighten the
blockade of against Vichy. Churchill hoped that Roosevelt would not find the measures “unwise
or unreasonable.”112 The Foreign Office also delivered its own message to the State Department:
109 Telegram 270, Welles to Leahy, 27 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 133-4.
110 Telegram 1638, Halifax to FO, 29 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229.
Telegram 1430, Halifax to FO, 2 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28314.
112 Churchill also wondered how he would explain the barter agreement to Parliament and the British public given the increasingly tight rationing program. Telegram C-72x, Churchill to Roosevelt, 29 March 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 154-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 217
it trusted that the United States would not ask for additional shipments. “Darlan’s latest deal with
his German masters,” observed the Foreign Office, “shows that his Government is unaffected by
friendly offers from this country or the United States, and how little is to be gained by a policy of
continual concession.”113 The State Department, however, indicated that it did not envision
asking for additional shipments, believing that the current shipment provided “evidence of
outspoken sympathy for the French people.”114
The unfortunate job of explaining Vichy’s actions fell to Flenry-FIaye. On 31 March
1941, he presented the State Department with a business like aide-memoire that justified the
exchange of goods between the zones as an “absolute necessity for re-establishing, despite the
line of demarcation, the economic unity of France.” 115 Flenry-Haye’s discussion with Welles
revealed much more. He claimed not to have known about the agreement until news of it
appeared in the press. When he queried his government about the terms, he was told to obtain a
copy of it from the State Department. “The Ambassador said that he found himself in a very
humiliating position,” noted Welles, “in as much as he had been conducting his conversations for
relief in unoccupied France without having the slightest idea of the nature and extent of this barter
arrangement.”116
As if things were not bad enough, Britain received intelligence that Vichy had obtained
permission from Germany to transfer the battleship Dunkerque, escorted by the Strasburg group
for protection, from Oran to Toulon for repairs. At the beginning of April 1941, Churchill
113 Telegram 1745, FO to Halifax, 29 March 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
114 Telegram 1638, Halifax to FO, 29 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229.
115 Aide-memoire, Henry-Haye to Hull, 31 March 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 135-7.
116 Memcon, Welles and Henry-Haye, 1 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 137-139. Leahy was also instructed to convey the same message to Petain. See Telegram 280, Hull to Leahy, 31March 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 134-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218
confided to Roosevelt that he feared the immobilization would provide Germany with the perfect
opportunity to seize the ship.117 Despite his overwhelming desire to thrash Vichy, Churchill
understood the importance of having American support for any aggressive action. “[I]t will be
necessary to stiffen the blockade, and I am communicating accordingly with the Admiralty,” he
told Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Foreign Office’s permanent under secretary, that same day. “We
must however carry the United States with us.”118
Churchill’s telegram prompted the United States to tell Vichy that if the transfer
proceeded it would no longer help provide France with relief or lend its assistance on other
issues.119 Ironically, the job of conveying the rebuke, fell to Matthews, because Leahy was
observing Amcross distribute milk to children. During his meeting with Petain and Darlan, it
became clear to Matthews that Petain had no idea about the impending transfer. Darlan, however,
immediately surmised that the information came from Britain, prompting a complaint about
Britain’s obsession with being the only fleet in the Mediterranean. He claimed that the ship
needed to be moved to Toulon, because the required repairs could not be conducted at Oran and
he refused to let the ship deteriorate.120 Vichy, however, heeded Roosevelt’s warning and, three
days later, it begrudgingly agreed to delay the transfer of the ship. “But by postponing putting
117 Telegram 1282, Churchill to Roosevelt, 2 April 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. 11, 139-40. When Churchill sent the telegram, he still had not heard back from Roosevelt in response to his previous message. Churchill also noted to Roosevelt that the transfer contradicted previous American requests that Vichy sent its navy to French North African ports. “Here we have Darlan not merely failing to comply with your wishes, but deliberately flying in the face of them,” he told Roosevelt. “I earnestly hope that you may at once indicate to Marshal Petain that, if Darlan persists in this action, he will be cutting off relief from his country and finally forfeiting American sympathy. We ourselves in this situation could, of course, lend no assistance to the revictualling of France.” If Petain did not stop the transfer, Britain might be forced to sink the ship.
118 Note, Churchill to Cadogan, 2 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28314.
119 Telegram 290, Hull to Leahy, 3 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 140-2.
120 Telegram 1149, Roosevelt to Churchill, 5 April 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 143-4. In the middle of the crisis, Henry-Haye met with Hull, but had little offer to in the way of an explanation or rationalization for Darlan’s behavior. See Memcon, Hull and Henry-Haye, 7 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 144-6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 219
into final shape one of its most precious war vessels,” Vichy noted, “the French Government is
making heavy sacrifice of its self-respect and interest which affect its possibilities of defending its
empire as well as its means of protecting French maritime traffic.”121
In the wake of the Dunkerque crisis, S.S. lie de Re and M .S. Leopold L.D. left New York
for Marseilles on 16 April 1941 carrying 13,500 tons of flour.122 Amcross asked and received
permission to substitute flour for the originally agreed upon cargo of wheat and corn on the
grounds that it would be difficult to monitor the conversion of the grain into flour.123 Even as the
cargo was being loaded, Britain and the United States continued to mull over whether to allow the
shipment.124 “I do not think we should delay them. It is for the Americans to decide,” Churchill
told Eden, dismissing any remaining reservations.125 After weighing the arguments for and
against, the State Department also decided that the ships should be allowed to depart.126
Negotiating the food shipment and accompanying Dunkerque crisis left both the United
States and Britain a little battered and bruised. Accused of unduly pressuring Britain, the State
Department took a beating in the press on both sides of the Atlantic. Hull worried that the United
States was wrongly being portrayed as “sentimentally humanitarian.” “As a matter of fact
121 Telegram 413, Matthews to Hull, 8 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. 11, 146-7. Telegram 461, Leahy to Hull, 18 April 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 151-2.
122 Telegram 1062, Hull to Morris (Berlin), 12 April 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 147-8. Davis had taken up the issue of changing the cargo to flour with Henry-Haye in mid-March. See Telegram 525-527, Washington to Vichy, 20 March 1941. Quai, Guerre 1939-45, Serie Y, File 293.
123 Telegram 1254, Halifax to FO, 20 March 1941; Telegram 1563, FO to Halifax, 21 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28313.
124 Telegram 1652, Halifax to FO, 14 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229.
125 Note [Z2900/54/17], Churchill to Eden, 14 April 1941; Telegram 2049, FO to Washington, 16 April 1941; Telegram 1690, Halifax to FO, 17 April 1941; Note (written on 1690), Churchill to Eden, 18 April 1941; Telegram 1904, FO to Washington, 18 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
126 Telegram 1663, Halifax to FO, 15 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229. Letter, Johnson to Churchill, 15 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220
sentimentalism plays but a little part,” he wrote Winant. “We believe we see an opportunity to
benefit both the British cause and our own in the most practical way.” The United States did not
intend to pursue further concessions without Britain’s “full and complete agreement.”127
Nevertheless, Hull recognized that Britain reluctantly supported America’s food policy and
expressed concern to Halifax about the “disadvantage and danger” of disagreement between the
two governments on the issue. He even asked Halifax to put in a good word. “He said that if any
opportunity could be taken in London for saying that the United States Government had only one
purpose, which was to help us win the war,” Halifax told the Foreign Office, “and on this purpose
they and we were, as he put it, one hundred percent together, it would be helpful to the
administration here.”128
For its part, Britain did feel pressured into allowing the blockade concessions— and in a
very public way.129 In the future, however, Britain intended to take a firmer line with regards to
Vichy, considering concessions only if they were “accompanied by some solid quid pro quo o f
real advantage to our war effort.”130 Vichy’s actions demonstrated that it could not be treated as a
neutral country or relied upon to resist German demands. “Her territorial waters are abused by our
enemies to our peril,” wrote the Foreign Office. “She fires on our ships when carrying out their
legitimate duties of blockade. She never ceases to vilify us and the Frenchmen who are fighting
by our side.” Britain also judged its rights under international law to be more extensive than Hull
wanted to admit. Having declared Vichy enemy-controlled territory, Britain believed that it
127 Telegram 1294, Hull to Winant, 17 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 150-151.
128 Telegram 1507, Halifax to FO, 5 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229. Minute by Cadogan [Z3185], 18 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
129 Telegram 1809 ARFAR, Hall to Drogheda, 7 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229.
130 Telegram 51, FO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 3 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221
possessed the right to seize all goods consigned to France and examine all French vessels—
seizing them when they carried goods bound for Vichy, resisted being searched, or as an act of
reprisal. “The French Government can hardly be expected to accept our right to seize their ships
with all cargo on board,” observed the Foreign Office, “and we cannot be satisfied with anything
less.” 131
Toward Greater Collaboration
On 17 April 1941, the day after the ships carrying flour left New York, Henry-Haye
offered Vichy’s thanks for the gift— and then asked to purchase food with blocked French funds.
He claimed that the flour would only last ten days, leaving Vichy teetering on the brink of
starvation. Welles bluntly reminded the ambassador of Vichy’s conduct in the previous weeks,
notably Darlan’s “intimate cooperation with Germany.” Henry-Haye argued that until it could be
proven that Petain’s government had departed from the armistice, the United States should not
judge the regime on the basis of the “flirtation” between Darlan and Germany. “I replied that it
seemed to me the word “flirtation” was hardly apt,” wrote Welles. “I said that if the Ambassador
desired to employ amorous similes it seemed to me that the term “liaison” was far more
accurate.” Despite the terse words about Darlan’s conduct, Welles acknowledged that the State
Department would help Vichy find a “satisfactory solution” to its food problem provided it
adhered to the armistice.132
A week later, Henry-Haye returned with a concrete proposal. Vichy wanted two ships to
ply continually between Vichy ports and the United States carrying food to be distributed by
131 Telegram 67, Dominions Office to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 16 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28315. Letter, French Department to Chancery (Berne), 16 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
132 Memcon, Welles and Henry-Haye, 17 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 148-150.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222
Amcross. It requested that the shipments beginning no later than early July.133 In exchange for
the assistance, Vichy pledged to adhere to the armistice and take steps to limit Germany’s
presence in Vichy and French North Africa. “We feel that the political advantages of such a
gesture hold equally true regardless of the quantities of raw materials or manufactured products
which the occupied zone and/or the Germans may be acquiring from this area,” wrote Leahy
endorsing the proposal. “It is the only insurance against the effectiveness of the anti-blockade
propaganda which will surely be launched if this limited amount of aid is not forthcoming.”134
Hull also believed the proposal worth supporting, but instructed Leahy to tell Petain that if Vichy
continued to collaborate with Germany, the United States would not continue providing “practical
assistance and the moral support” to the regime or the French people. “In the considered opinion
of the United States,” wrote Hull, “the future liberty, independence, and greatness of France
depends upon continued resistance by Marshal Petain to these German encroachments.”135
Upon learning of the proposal, Halifax told Welles that it would come as “bomb-shell to
His Majesty’s Government.” Halifax was so blown away that an hour after their initial
conversation he telephoned Welles back to make sure he understood the magnitude of the request.
Welles, however, tried to portray the scheme as a continuation of an existing American policy,
one that benefited both countries. He acknowledged that since Britain ran the blockade, it had the
ultimate decision making power, but implied that if the United States was compelled to “drop the
scheme, they would drop a good deal else besides.” Welles was making a veiled threat about
American involvement in North Africa. Halifax found Welles intimidation tactics a “very
133 Amcross would be allowed to have a many staff members as necessary to control the distribution. Memcon, Welles and Henry-Haye, 25 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. 11, 154-55.
134 Telegram 488, Leahy and Hull, 25 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 155-158.
135 Telegram 375, Hull to Leahy, 30 April 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 158-160.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223
abrupt,” but attributed them to the “excessive compartmentalism of the American administrative
machine.”136
Halifax accurately predicted Whitehall’s reaction to the new proposal. While dreading
having to explain another concession to Parliament and the British public, the Foreign Office
thought Britain should agree to the proposal with as much grace as possible. “We must do all we
can to enlist U.S. cooperation against German encroachment,” wrote Cadogan.137 Eden also
found American threats of abandoning efforts to aid French North Africa persuasive.138 Not
surprisingly, Dalton disagreed. Churchill, however, diluted Dalton’s argument by pointing out
that Britain found it difficult to maintain an effective naval blockade against Vichy owing to the
heavy demands on its naval forces. Given the disarray of the blockade, the War Cabinet decided
not to take a stiff line with the United States and agreed to the shipments.139 To mollify the
adverse public reaction, Britain asked that the ships not leave until the beginning of June and
publicity kept to a minimum until their departure. Britain also trusted that the United States
would not ask for additional concessions until the distribution of the first shipments could be
evaluated.140
In mid-April 1941, Leahy wrote Washington detailing Germany’s growing encroachment
against Vichy’s sovereignty. Foreigners could no longer pass freely between the zones, Vichy
factories were forced to work for German accounts, and German soldiers conducted weapons
136 Telegram 1902, Halifax to FO, 30 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28315. Telegram 1925, Halifax to FO, 1 May 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
137 Minute by W.H. Mack, 1 May 1941; Minute by Cadogan, 1 May 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315. Despite agreeing with his staff about the need to be accommodating, F.den dreaded having to tackle Dalton on the subject. See Minute by Eden, 1 May 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
138 Note, Eden to Churchill, 3 May 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10.
139 War Cabinet Conclusions 47(41), 5 May 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
140 Telegram 2402, FO to Washington, 4 May 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28315.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224
searches among the population. Germany was also making arrangements to send two hundred
officers and soldiers to French North Africa to serve as a regional armistice commission. Leahy
believed that Petain had no power to actively oppose Germany’s interpretation of the armistice or
its demands. He continued, however, to regard the United States as Vichy’s only remaining friend
and the only hope for the future of his country and of his people. “This opinion seems to be
shared by all Frenchmen who are not in the pay of the Axis Powers,” noted Leahy, “and in order
that we may retain their good will it seems to me wise to continue or expand our Red Cross relief
work only to an extent that cannot be of any assistance whatever to the Axis Powers.” Aside
from the humanitarian benefits, Amcross’s work provided an effective means of influencing
public opinion.141
The telegram and letter prompted Roosevelt to have Leahy offer yet another message of
friendship and caution. During a May 13 meeting with Petain and General Charles Huntizger,
Vichy’s minister of war, Leahy stated that it would “rally popular enthusiasm” for continued
assistance if Petain ordered Vichy officials to resist German attempts to use French North Africa
as a military staging ground. By doing so, Petain would send a clear indication that his regime
intended “to comply honorably with the terms of the armistice but will not permit any
encroachment upon French liberties over and above the terms of the armistice.”142 In previous
days, German airplanes had landed in Syria and an arms shipment made its way from Syria to
Iraq. (Darlan had agreed to let Germany use Syrian air bases and equipment to help foment a
nationalist uprising in Iraq against British forces there.) Petain claimed that the planes landed
141 Letter, Leahy to Roosevelt, 21 April 1941. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corres., France, 1941, Box 29. Paxton, Vichy France, 116. Telegram 508, Leahy to Hull, 4 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 160-162. Telegram 540, Leahy to Hull, 12 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 165. Henry-Haye did not know the nature o f the agreement between Darlan and Germany. Memcon, Welles and Henry-Haye, 9 MayFRUS, 1941. 1941, vol. II, 163-65.
142 Telegram 395, Hull to Leahy, 8 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 162-3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225
without his permission and assured Leahy that he would not give “any voluntary active military
aid.” Huntziger dismissed the arms shipment as a by-product of the armistice agreement. The
excuses and disingenuous promise prompted Leahy to tell Petain that “any military assistance to
Germany beyond the strict requirements of the Armistice will bring about a permanent loss of
friendship and good will of the American people toward France.” Petain replied that he had
received the same message before.143
In the wake of the meeting, Leahy offered a blunt and gloomy assessment of the situation
in Vichy:
I feel that they time has come when I should make clear to the Department that the trend of French policy today is definitely toward greater collaboration, willingly or unwillingly, with Germany and that the Department should not anticipate a reversal of this trend under present conditions; nor should it expect any serious resistance to German demands where such demands are of sufficient importance to the Germans to warrant the exercise of degrees of pressure which are within their power.
Leahy believed that Germany kept Petain in power because the alternative— a Laval government
kept in power by machine guns— would cause more trouble and encourage the growth of an
underground resistance movement. “That he will relinquish more and more authority even on
matters of policy to Darlan seems likely; that he will resign and declare his reasons for so doing
seems highly improbable.” He also predicted that Petain would not openly renounce Franco-
German collaboration. Germany would be able to achieve any objective they desire— with or
without Petain’s permission. As evidence of this, Leahy cited Darlan’s meeting with Hitler on
May 11, which he characterized as reminiscent of Hitler’s summoning of the leaders of Austria
and Czechoslovakia before swallowing those countries.144
143 Telegram 544, Leahy to Hull, 13 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 166-7.
144 Telegram 547, Leahy to Hull, 13 May 1940.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 167-71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226
Hull found the state of affairs less than encouraging. “As you and 1 have agreed in our
discussions of our handling of the Vichy Government,” he wrote Roosevelt, “our only way to
keeping our relations with the Marshal stabilized as much as possible is to continue to keep in
touch with him and to support him insofar as we can without interfering with the British war
measures.”145
On 15 May 1941, Petain announced in a radio broadcast his approval of Darlan’s meeting
with Hitler and of Franco-German collaboration:
Their new meeting enables us to light the road before us and continue conversations in which we are engaged with the German Government. It is no longer a question today for public opinion, so often anxious because badly informed, to wait our chances, to measure our risks, to judge our gestures. It is a question for you Frenchmen to follow me without question of the paths of honor and national interests. If with rigid public discipline we are able successfully to conclude these negotiations, France can overcome her defeat and maintain in the world her rank as a European and Colonial power.146
Roosevelt responded by condemning the regime’s policies and called on the French people to
resist them: “It is inconceivable they will willingly accept any agreement for so-called
“collaboration” which will in reality imply their alliance with a military power whose central and
fundamental policy calls for the utter destruction of liberty, freedom, and popular institutions
everywhere.”147 Vichy claimed to be “surprised” by Roosevelt’s statement and offered its own
rebuke. “In May 1940, when France was abandoned by England, America did not feel that it
should answer her appeal. Today, France, desirous of maintaining her position as a great power
and the integrity of her territory and Empire, has the right to envisage with her conqueror the
145 Letter, Hull to Roosevelt, 13 May 1941. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corres., France, 1941, Box 29.
146 Telegram 561, Leahy to Hull, 15 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 170-71.
147 Telegram 411, Hull to Leahy, 15 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 171.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227
conditions of a common reorganization of continental Europe.”148 The emphasis on empire came
from Darlan, who believed that a German victory would enable France to preserve its naval and
imperial power. If Britain won, Darlan believed that France would be relegated to a second-class
power and treated like a “second-class Dominion, a continental Ireland.”149
The Roosevelt administration was already having second thoughts about the wisdom of
allowing Vichy to import additional food when a letter arrived from Allen detailing the problems
Amcross encountered in delivering the flour. Vichy officials attempted to strong-arm Amcross
on the distribution arrangements:
At one time, during our conversations with the Ravitaillement officials in Vichy, the ranking official at the Conference pounded the desk and said that, unless the wheat or flour could be turned over to the French Government to handle in the regular way, that it be sold through regular commercial channel, that we had best not send it. The representative of the Foreign Office, who was with me and the representative of the United States Embassy, immediately stood up and emphatically told the Ravitaillement man that he was being objectionable and the atmosphere improved somewhat.
148 Telegram 567, Leahy to Hull, 17 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 172-173. Following Petian’s announcement, the United States struggled to salvage its relations with Vichy and determine whether it could do anything to stem the tide of Franco-German collaboration. In response to a request for renewed assurances, Darlan testily replied that he hoped the United States would be more understanding of Vichy’s attempts to “attenuate” the demands placed on it by the armistice. Meanwhile, British intelligence learned that Darlan and Hitler had discussed increased political and military cooperation, including the transfer of troops and arms through Syria and the use of naval and air bases in French North African and the French empire. Hitler also indicated his desire— and Darlan consented— to incorporate French North Africa into the Greater German Reich. None of these developments boded well for the British war effort. “The efforts of Admiral Darlan and others of the Government to increase collaboration with Germany has definitely compromised our program of assistance to France,” Roosevelt confided to Leahy. The United States would not continue to provide relief to Vichy “unless we receive positive evidence not only from the Marshal but from his Government that our efforts to aid are creating a positive resistance to German demands for further collaboration in support of their military aims.” See Memcon, Hull and Halifax, 19 May 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 174. Memcon, Hull and Henry-Haye, 20 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 177-180. Memcon, Hull and Henry-Haye, 20 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 177-180. Memcon, Hull and Halifax, 23 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 181.Letter, Henry-Haye to Hull, 27 May 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 181-85. Letter, FDR to Leahy, 23 May 1941. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corresp., France 1941, Box 29.
149 Paxton,Vichy France, 113.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 228
After several more combative conferences, a distribution plan finally emerged, but one that Vichy
accepted without enthusiasm. Flour would be provided to departments suffering from a shortage,
but in return the departments had to turn over surplus goods for distribution to other departments.
W hen the Leopold and the lie de Re docked in Marseilles at the beginning of May 1941,
the regime forbade the press from reporting their arrival. Newspapers were eventually allowed to
print a three-paragraph account— written by Darlan— but were instructed to place the story inside
the paper and give it a small headline. Newspapers that ran the arrival of the ships as a major
story were rebuked by the regime. After the ships docked, German and Italian officials boarded
and questioned the captains about the cargo and the specifications of the ships. Italian officials
returned the next day and demanded to examine the cases of clothing that had arrived on the
Exmouth. Much to their surprise, the cases contained children’s clothing and layettes. “The
Italian commission,” noted Allen, “did have the good grace to seem embarrassed by the whole
procedure.” Despite the difficulties, the distribution appeared to be working well, but Allen
predicted that new problems would arise when it was time to publicize the availability of free
bread made with the flour.
When he learned that the relief program might be extended, Allen made the rounds with
Vichy officials to smooth the way. He learned, however, that Germany made it increasingly
difficult for Vichy to accept gift supplies from the United States, preferring that it purchase the
food. While Vichy welcomed the prospect of Amcross supervising the distribution of future
cargoes, it should not count on receiving any publicity. Officials also warned that Amcross would
find it increasingly difficult to carry out its work. “We do not find any tendency on the part of the
officials in the departments to hamper us in the least at this time,” wrote Allen, “and the
distributions of milk, vitamins and clothing are moving along very smoothly and according to our
pre-arranged plans.” He predicted, however, that the situation would not last. “1 believe definitely
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229
that we have reached the crest in our effectiveness here in France and that, from here on, we will
inevitably face great difficulties in giving relief to the people who needed it so badly and who
appreciate it so greatly.” Allen acknowledged that he did not sound very optimistic, but Franco-
German collaboration was a reality. “I believe it is accurate to say that a large majority of the
French officials in Vichy now are collaborationists.. . . founded on the conviction that the
Germans will win the war and that France should be on the winning side.”150
At the end of May, in light of growing Franco-German collaboration and Amcross’
difficulties, the United States withdrew its support for additional food shipments.151 Leahy also
noticed a change in the treatment of the American delegation— the embassy was under constant
surveillance and French acquaintances were warned not to visit. Vichy newspapers were also
instructed not to publish anything about the United States or Leahy. “Our friends in the
government offices frankly admit being ashamed of themselves,” he told Roosevelt.152 At the end
of June, the state of the food supply continued to be the talk of French cafes, but it faced stiff
competition from Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. “In general there is elation that two
detested powers are at last fighting each other,” reported Leahy, “and a vague feeling that during
the battle, at least, France may have some respite from German pressure and German threats.”153
Even Roosevelt found it difficult to predict what the future would hold. “You have
certainly been going through a life that has aspects akin to punching bags, roller coasters, mules,
pirates, and general hell during these past months,” he wrote Leahy.
150 Letter, Allen to Davis, 13 May 1940, with cover note from Davis to FDR. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corresp., France 1941, Box 29.
151 Telegram 652, Leahy to Hull, 7 June 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 186-7. Telegram 628, Leahy to Hull, 4 June 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 185-86.
152 Letter, Leahy to FDR, 26 May 1941. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corresp., France, 1941, Box 29.
153 Telegram 748, Leahy to Hull, 25 June 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 188.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230
I think that both you and I have given up making prophecies as to what will happen in and to France tomorrow or the next day. I feel as if every time we get some real collaboration for the good of the French (especially for the children) started, Darlan and some others say or do some stupid or not wholly above-board thing which results in complete stoppage of all we would like to do.154
Increasingly, power in Vichy rested with Darlan, who believed that acquiescing to German
demands was the only way to reunite France and restore something akin to normalcy.155 Vichy
wanted food, but Darlan would not let it interfere with its relationship with Germany.
Milk for Morale
At the beginning of July 1941, Amcross asked Britain for permission to ship supplies so
that it could continue its milk program for children. Along with the need to foster relations with
Vichy, the decision to renew the program— and Roosevelt’s support for it— can be traced to
Allen’s recommendations and letters from French children.
Allen recommended that Amcross import enough supplies to provide for the needs of
children through the coming winter. Specifically, he wanted to import 21,000 tons of powder
milk, roughly three shiploads. Since each gallon of powdered milk made seven gallons of milk,
Amcross would be able to distribute 147,000 gallons of milk. He also requested that layettes be
sent to help meet the needs of newborns. “Our organizations in the departments are now strongly
established,” wrote Allen, “and it seems a reasonable assumption that, if we have stores of
supplies in the cities, towns, and villages of France, that no one would be able to take them away
from the people without creating serious difficulties for themselves.”156
154 Letter, FDR to Leahy, 26 June 1941. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corresp., France, 1941, Box 29.
155 Paxton, Vichy France, 118-119.
156 Letter, Allen to Davis, 13 May 1940, with cover note from Davis to FDR. FDRL, PSF, Diplo. Corresp., France 1941, Box 29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231
At the same time Allen made his recommendations, he also forwarded to Roosevelt
letters of thanks from the children of the Marquise de Maupeou. Allen had filing cabinets full of
similar letters in his office in Marseilles, but these had the added charm of being in English. The
marquise wrote that for the families of Var, an “out-of-way place” where conditions were
particularly bad, the arrival of Amcross milk was a “godsend to rich and poor alike.” “I do wish
the people of America would realise all that their kindness means to us,” she wrote Roosevelt. “It
was so hard to see the little ones really going hungry many times and to know that they would
pay for it later on even more than at the present.” She believed that the milk would make a big
difference in her children’s health and strengthen their growing bones and teeth. Her son Auvian,
age 11, told Roosevelt that “We were so sade [sic] not to have had any milk all the winter and
now this is such a lovely surprise. All the little poor children round us are so glad to have theirs
and for my three little brothers and me it is a real Godsend.” Daniel, age 8, offered his thanks—
and the thanks of all the children of France— for the “the delicous delicous [sic] milk that you did
send us.” He hoped that he could visit Roosevelt and thank him personally. Pascal, age 7,
wanted Roosevelt to thank “all the kind people of AMERICA” for sending the milk. “I was sad
not to have any before and 1 am so happy.”157
With Allen regarding the program as feasible— and evidence that the milk seemed to be
making a difference— the State Department put the plan to the Foreign Office. It requested that
Amcross be allowed to make monthly shipments consisting of 500 tons of powdered milk and
2000 tons of condensed milk, along with clothing for infants.158
157 Letter, Allen to Davis, 12 May 1941; Letter, Auvian de Maupeou to Roosevelt, May 1941; Letter, Daniel de Maupeou to Roosevelt, May 1941; Letter, Pascal de Maupeou to Roosevelt, May 1941. FDRL, OF124, Box 3, Amcross, Jan-June, 1941.
158 Since the cargo did not require a separate ship, Welles suggested that the goods could be sent on ships leaving New York for Casablanca and then transferred to Marseilles. Memcon, Welles and Halifax, 8 July 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 188-89. Telegram 3239, Halifax to FO, 10 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232
Amcross’ made its proposal request just as Vichy requested to import via North Africa
100,000 tons of food from its overseas colonies to prevent starvation. MEW noted that that the
quantity far exceeded what Vichy required, which could only mean that Germany would siphon
off the supplies.159 As part of the agreement, Vichy also wanted to trade an equal number of
British and Allied ships in French ports for an equal number of French ships detained in British
ports. Permitting the exchange would provide Vichy, and by extension Germany, with a new
source of shipping. After extensive discussion by the Foreign Office, MEW, Admiralty, Colonial
Office, and the Ministry of War Transport, Britain decided to refuse Vichy’s request.160
Next to Vichy’s request, Amcross’ milk program looked positively modest, but that did
not stop MEW from finding it objectionable. MEW disliked Amcross’ proposal because it would
arouse a hostile response from the British public and parliament. It also did not believe that
Britain gained anything by granting the concession.161 The Foreign Office, however, took a
different view. “It is not a question of helping the Vichy Government,” argued Mack, “but of
helping the rising generation in France and of retaining the good will of their parents.” 162 Eden
suggested that Britain should perhaps begin to think beyond the children of France and about the
children of Europe more generally. “[I]f vitamins are to go to France, it seems to me indefensible
to deny them to Belgium when the need is much greater,” he wrote. “I believe we need a scheme
for vitamins of children in occupied countries, but the difficulties in working it out will be
great.”163
139 Telegram 3272, Halifax to FO, 12 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826.
160 Minute on meeting of chaired by Strang (Z5996/54/17), 16 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28316.
161 Letter, Nicholls to Steel, 16 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1229.
162 Minute by Mack, 17 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826. Minute by Strang, 17 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826.
163 Minute by Eden, 20 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233
Only weeks earlier, the Foreign Office had decried the conduct of Vichy’s leadership and
the failure of relief to impede Franco-German collaboration, but it now offered humanitarian
reasons for allowing Amcross’ program. Although the Foreign Office was always more open to
the idea of relief than MEW, its current stance came from a series of discussions with Allen, who
had traveled to London to make Amcross’ case. Just as Taylor’s frankness swayed the Foreign
Office to agree to Polish relief, Allen did the same for Vichy relief.
During his conversation with Sir David Scott, the head of the American Department,
Allen bluntly described the conditions in Vichy and the regime’s close relationship with
Germany. “Mr. Allen is one of those people who had at one time the illusion that the Germans
were efficient and honest,” noted Scott. “It was a great surprise to him to find that they were
neither.” Germany and Italy took ninety-five percent of the cargoes that arrive in Marseilles.
Food shortages occurred because of bad distribution owing to a lack of transport and the refusal
of departments to share surpluses. Despite Germany’s insidious presence, its officials did not
interfere with Amcross’ distribution of the flour. Instead, it attempted to prevent the French
people from learning the source of the generosity by clamping down on publicity and prohibiting
the flying of American and British flags to celebrate the arrival of the ships.
Along with Allen’s assessment of the situation, he also made a pitch for Amcross to be
allowed to continue its milk program. “Mr. Allen’s considered opinion is that it would be a great
mistake for us to allow any supplies to go into unoccupied France, with a single exception,”
reported Scott. “The French people . . . were prepared to take it, but the situation with regard to
the children was different.” Allen argued that regular consignments of milk, vitamins, and
medicine for children would “assure the continued good will of the people of France and they
would assure the health of the rising generation, about which everyone in France was worried.”
Although his conversation with Allen confirmed everything the Foreign Office believed about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234
Germany’s influence over France, Scott found Allen’s arguments very persuasive. “He convinced
me, however, that it would be in the interests of France itself, and in our own interests, to do
something for the children.”164 Others who talked with Allen had the same experience. “This
testimony is of great value: the American Red Cross have usually a comprehensible bias in favour
of relief,” remarked Strang.”165
Allen knew that he made a positive impression with the Foreign Office and believed that
it would be a matter of time before Britain approved further shipments.166 As July 1941 came to
a close, however, the State Department had not received word one way or the other. “A good deal
of water had followed under the bridges since the last shipments had been sent,” explained Strang
when Johnson inquired at the Foreign Office about the ongoing deliberations.167 In early August,
the War Cabinet debated the merits of Amcross’ program, deciding against it. “I realise that an
exception was made last winter at the President’s special request, but the situation has greatly
changed since then,” Eden told Halifax relaying news of the refusal. “Not only are feelings here
against Vichy more bitter, but conditions in occupied Allied territory are a great deal worse than
they were.”168 Believing that the issue was “dormant” in official circles, Halifax informally let
Davis know that decision.169
164 FO Memo, Mack on meeting between Scott and Allen, 15 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28316.
165 Minute by Strang, 17 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28316. Telegram 3348, Allen to Davis, 1 August 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7. Minute by Stirling, 15 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28316.
166 Telegram 3348, Allen to Davis, 1 August 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7.
167 FO Memo, Strang and Johnson, 24 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28826.
168 Telegram 4384, FO to Halifax, 3 August 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826.
169 Telegram 3675, Halifax to FO, 4 August 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826. Telegram 3766, Davis to Allen 20 August 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7. Davis decided that if Amcross was not allowed to continue its program, it would withdraw its personnel. “Much of the good we have done in France,” he wired Allen, “would be undone if [we] leave personnel there who would be required constantly [to] explain to [the] French why [the] program [was] not continuing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235
In mid-August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill held their first summit meeting of the war,
on war ships anchored in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Warren Kimball argues that the personal
rapport that developed between the two men was the most important result what became known
as the Atlantic conference. “I am sure that I have established warm and deep personal relations
with our great friend,” Churchill cabled Clement Attlee, lord privy seal and member of the War
Cabinet.
During their meeting, the two leaders discussed the conduct of the war and the shape of
the postwar world. While Britain had managed to hold its own against Germany in the Battle of
the Atlantic, it needed help escorting shipping, particularly ships carrying the fruits of Lend-
Lease. Roosevelt agreed to provide American escorts as far as Iceland. Roosevelt and Churchill
also agreed that their military chiefs should work out differences of opinion, rather than running
to them to arbitrate every disagreement. By encouraging teamwork, they provided the foundation
for a solid working relationship between the services on both sides. The conference also
produced the Atlantic Charter a statement of the common goals of the war. Britain and the
United States sought to provide freedom from fear and want and promote freedom speech and
worship. They also committed themselves to a postwar international system, self-determination,
and economic liberalism.170
When Roosevelt returned to Washington, he learned that Britain had refused to grant
Amcross permission. On 21 August 1941, he wired Halifax, who was visiting Churchill, and
asked him to “please take this up with Winston.” “Since the American Red Cross has its
supervisory organization there and the distribution of supplies previously sent was completed
August first, they must either withdraw entirely or send further supplies at once,” wrote
170 Kimball,Forged in War, 98-102.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236
Roosevelt. “I feel that in order maintain morale it is advisable to continue at least for the present
limited shipments of milk and clothing for children through American Red Cross.”171
Roosevelt’s personal appeal forced Britain to consider the issue again. This time, the
Ministry of Food raised a concern divorced from blockade considerations. When Britain
requested American help with meeting its need for 364,000 tons of milk per year, the United
States said that it could only provide 175,000 tons. Consequently, any milk sent to Vichy from
the United States would likely reduce the quantities available to Britain. Despite the tight supply
of milk, Eden once again raised the suggestion of providing the allied countries with milk, in
addition to Vichy. “I should have thought,” wrote Eden, “the sacrifice of a small allocation for the
occupied countries would be worth making, both as means of maintaining morale in these
territories and as a concession to opinion in the United States”172 MEW regarded Eden’s proposal
with dismay. Dalton believed the question of milk for Vichy should not be linked to question
milk for other countries.173
In the end, the need to appease Roosevelt prevailed, and the War Cabinet voted in favor
of the program. In mid-September 1941, Britain informed the United States that it would allow
an occasional shipment of milk and supplies for the children of Vichy, but made it clear that the
proposal created great difficulties for Britain. “We are under heavy pressure from some of the
allied Governments to allow relief to their peoples in Occupied territory, whose lot is far harder
than that of the population of Unoccupied France,” Eden wrote Winant. “These Governments are
continuing to support the Allied cause to the utmost of their ability, while the Vichy Government
is collaborating in an increasing degree with our enemy, and the grant of relief to Unoccupied
171 Telegram 3289, Roosevelt to Halifax, 21 August 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 190.
172 “Blockade Policy: Milk for Children in Vichy France,” WP(41)206, 28 August 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28827.
173 War Cabinet Conclusions, WP(88)41, 1 September 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/2827.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237
France will not commend itself favourably to our public opinion.” In coming to the decision,
Eden noted that Britain had not “overlooked the fact that supplies of milk from the United States,
even for ourselves, are likely to fall far short of requirements.”174
The tenor of Eden’s note prompted Davis to ask if Britain gave its consent
wholeheartedly. Although Roosevelt, Hull, and Davis believed it would be wise to continue
Amcross’ work, “we are all reluctant to assume the moral responsibility of urging this further
upon the British Government if, as indicated, it still thinks it would be unwise and politically
embarrassing.”175 Eden returned a “yes,” noting that he had personally discussed the details with
Allen and felt confident in the arrangements.176
At the beginning of October, Amcross began making arrangements to send a shipment.
The principles agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill in January 1941 again governed Amcross’
work— it could distribute milk to children and provide medical supplies for children and sick
adults.177 To carry out the program, Allen planned to send 5,000 tons of powdered and
condensed milk, medical supplies, and 20,000 layettes, for a shipment valued at $2 million.178 By
174 Letter, Eden to Winant, 16 September 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28827. There was an intense debate between the Foreign Office and MEW over what exactly would be said to the United States. Dalton wanted mention made of the United States not being able to meet Britain’s need for milk, but the Foreign Office believed doing so would amount to biting the hand that feeds you. Dalton also objected to any mention of the Allies being made in the reply. “This seems to me to be extremely foolish,” wrote Steel, “since the attitude of the Allies is the chief ground of our reluctance to feed the French and it is idiotic to not to tell the truth to the Americans without the gravest reason for not doing so. Eden agreed, observing that he was “perfectly willing to assume responsibility” for its inclusion. “These are matters which a Foreign Secretary may surely be allowed to judge.” See Minute by Steel (W 11292/49/49), 4 September 1941; Minute by Steel (W11292/49/49), 9 September 1941; .Minute by Eden (W 11292/49/49), 13 September 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28827.
175 Telegram 4009, Hull to Winant, 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 191-2.
176 Telegram 4607, Winant to Eden, 29 September 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 192.
177 Telegram 4215, Davis to Allen , 3 October 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 8.
178 Allen asked and received permission to ship the layettes which were not covered by the War Cabinet’s decision. MEW also limited the types of medical supplies Amcross could import, prohibiting bandages, iodine, and quinine on the grounds they had military uses. During his discussions with MEW, Foot brought
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238
mid-October, Amcross and MEW had worked out all the details.179 Vichy gave its ready consent,
agreeing to give Amcross freedom of action and assurances that the program would supplement
rather than replace rations.180
Hull, however, raised a fuss about the conditions governing the voyage of the ship
carrying Amcross’ cargo. Not being attuned to the intricacies of Hull’s freedom of the seas
philosophy, Allen had agreed to let Amcross’ ship clear British contraband control at Gibraltar.
Hull found the condition an imposition given that the shipped sailed with British approval.181 His
protest sparked weeks of unnecessary debate and discord, resulting in the departure of the ship
being delayed. MEW did not want to wave the call at Gibraltar because it had been insisting that
1CRC ships carrying goods from Lisbon to Marseilles for French POWs call at Gibraltar. It
worried that if Amcross received an exemption, it would also have to grant one to ICRC.182 Since
the inspection would only take three hours, MEW did not believe it would constitute a major
inconvenience.183 Hull, however, would not budge.184
to Allen’s attention a secret report that claimed that tons of condensed milk shipped by Amcross to Vichy was now in a warehouse in Paris. Allen didn’t think that it could be accurate given the receipt system Amcross used and its strategy of not keeping large stocks together, but said that he would check. FO Memo, Foot and Allen, 6 October 1941; Letter, Allen to Foot, 7 October 1941; FO Memo, Foot and Allen, 9 October 1941; Minute by Dalton, 10 October 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1222.
179 Telegram 4824, Allen to Davis, 10 October 1941; Telegram 5035, Allen to Davis, 22 October 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 8. 180 Telegram 771, Hull to Leahy, 10 October 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 193. Telegram 4696, Hull to Winant, 24 October 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 193-4. Letter, Henry-Haye to Roosevelt, 16 October 1941. FDRL, OF203, France, Box 2, “France 1941-42.”
181 Telegram 4696, Hull to Winant, 24 October 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 193-4.
182 Letter, Foot to Law, 28 October 1941; Note by Law on Letter, Foot to Law (28 October 1941), 30 October 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28829.
183 Telegram 5137, Winant to Hull, 29 October 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 194-95.
184 Telegram 4854, Hull to Winant, 30 October 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 195-6. Letter, Winant to Eden, 31 October 1941; 9. Note by Eden (W12955/49/49), 31 October 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28829
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239
MEW found Hull’s assertions appalling and refused Eden’s suggestions that they let the
matter pass. “Cordell Hull’s message, on the face of it at any rate, appears to claim the freedom of
seas for a particular class of vessel,” it told the Foreign Office. “His Majesty’s Government has
never admitted such a claim before, and there does not seem to be any valid reason why we
should do so now.” MEW argued that no international law precedence or principle existed which
justified or supported the contention that a neutral vessel carrying relief supplies to enemy or
enemy-occupied or enemy-controlled territory possessed immunity from being searched on that
grounds that the ship was affiliated with the Red Cross. “Indeed, such a proposition is manifestly
absurd,” observed MEW. “If Red Cross status conferred immunity it would enable any neutral to
ship unlimited supplies to enemy territory under the guise of relief work.” MEW also did not
believe that America’s friendship with Britain changed the situation, pointing out that British
ships were brought in for contraband control.185
Eden reluctantly decided that “overriding political arguments” must prevail.186 In mid-
November 1941, Britain gave its consent to “waive the usual examination” of Amcross’ ship and
expressed its confidence in the United States’s ability to ensure that the ship’s crew would not
carry any illicit goods or mail.187 With the details of the voyage resolved, the S. S. Capulin began
loading cargo in Baltimore, intending to depart on Tuesday, 9 December 1941 and arrive in
Marseilles just before Christmas.188
On 7 December 1941, the war changed from a European war into a global conflict when
Japan attacked the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Not surprisingly, the
185 Letter, Foot to Law, 3 November 1941. TNA/PRO, FO371/28830. Letter, Foot to Law, 7 November 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28830.
186 Letter, Law to Foot, 5 November 1941. TNA/PRO, FO371/2230.
187 Letter, Eden to Winant, 13 November 1941. TNA/PRO, FO371/28830.
188 Letter, Shantz to Eden, 26 November 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28832.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 240
shipment did not depart as scheduled. Having trading in neutrality for belligerency, the United
States intended to reevaluate its commitments, including its relationship with Vichy. In the days
following the attack, Leahy told Petain and Darlan to prepare American policy to change owing
to its involvement in the war. “I told the Marshal,” reported Leahy, “that our formal involvement
in the war caused by the German-Italian declarations of today changes the situation and makes
any French assistance hereafter given to the Axis Powers a direct injury to the United States.”189
American policy toward Vichy alternatively has been called a “gamble” and a
“fumble.”190 During World War II, the Roosevelt administration’s decision to foster relations
with Vichy probably attracted more criticism than any other aspect of its foreign policy. Indeed,
while Roosevelt and the State Department recognized the questionable politics of Petain and his
colleagues, they gambled that they could have a positive influence. The relief shipments did not
prevent Vichy from collaborating with Germany, but the prospect of being cut off from aid and,
in turn, American friendship did force the regime to modify its behavior on a number of
occasions. If Vichy lost the United States, its only “friend” would be Germany—with a friend
like that, it did not need additional enemies. Using relief also did not constitute a fumble, because
of Amcross’ ability to maintain control of the supplies. The French people, not Germany,
benefited from American generosity.
Britain needed the United States to serve as “the arsenal of democracy,” while the United
States needed Britain to persevere against Germany to safeguard its neutrality. It was, however,
an uneven relationship owing to Britain’s perilous strategic predicament. Naturally, Britain
189 Telegram 198, Leahy to Hull, 11 December 1941.FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 198-90.
190 William Langer characterized American policy as “our Vichy gamble.” In 1943, Hull asked Langer to write a study of America’s wartime relations with Vichy in the hope of assuaging some of the criticisms leveled at the administration. An accomplished historian, Langer was mnning OSS’s Research and Analysis Branch. He received unfettered access to the State Department’s records and produced in 1947, Our Vichy Gamble, which explained and, as Hull predicted, justified American policy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 241
regarded American requests to send relief to Vichy as a threat to its war effort. But time and
again, United States got its way, because of Britain’s dependency on American materiel and
goodwill. Britain did not give in easily— it resisted the exhortations of the State Department and
defined the terms of the concessions. Only when Roosevelt intervened did Britain concede to the
relief shipments.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER SIX
MR. BLOCKADE BUSTER
27,000 million people who are innocent in this war are going to suffer beyond any kind of description unless something is done for them. And their cause will not be downed. The day will come when their sufferings will ring through the w orld. It is nonsense that the feeding of those peoples would make the balance in British victory or defeat— unless they gain defeat by losing the sympathy of these nations in the free world by allowing the Germans to pin the stench of famine upon them. Somewhere, somehow, somebody has a moral responsibility for these peoples. But moral responsibilities in war only operate when it is to the advantage of nations to operate them. Now the only pressures in getting moral responsibilities under way are public opinion. There is such a thing as public opinion still left in the world. The British are peculiarly dependent upon it. Their attitude over my proposals muffs one of the greatest opportunities that has come to them to further strengthen their moral position with many Americans, with the descendents of the Norwegians, Danes, Poles, Dutch, and Belgians in the United States, and with the peoples of these occupied territories after the war is over.
So wrote Herbert Hoover in August 1940 in response to Churchill’s public rejection of his plans
to provide Belgium with relief. “Had the British adopted these proposals and insisted on the
guarantees as I outlined,” wrote Hoover, “the Germans in their present arrogant mood would have
unquestionably refused the whole thing. Then the moral responsibility would have been on the
Germans before the world— where of course it belongs.” Hoover actually believed that by
marshalling public opinion, he could have forced a German acceptance. “After all, the Germans
would not continue to greatest propaganda machine on earth if they did not think public opinion
of the world was worth something.”1
1 Letter, Hoover to Swing, 19 August 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 1.
242
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 243
Lesser men might have regarded Churchill’s admonitions against relief as a deterrent, but
not Hoover. From the fall of 1940 through Pearl Harbor, he attempted to mobilize American
public opinion in favor of sending relief to the “small democracies”— Belgium, Norway, Poland,
the Netherlands, and Finland. The resulting campaign constituted the largest mass movement in
favor of relief during the war. Hoover’s efforts were driven by his personal conviction that
America possessed a moral and Christian obligation to help those living in the occupied
territories. Britain disagreed, resulting in a public battle of wills that frequently turned nasty.
Although British officials respected the humanitarian sentiment that inspired Hoover, they found
it difficult to ignore his advocacy of non-interventionism and his criticism of Roosevelt. In
Britain’s view, Hoover’s relief campaign not only challenged the blockade, but also threatened to
derail American support for its war effort.2
Standards of Decency and Christianity
In September 1940, a Gallup poll found that the American public opinion strongly
opposed sending relief to German occupied countries. “[T]he American public’s first reaction,”
wrote George Gallup of the results, “are that feeding nations now under Adolf Hitler’s control
would be only an indirect method of feeding Hitler’s Germany.” Gallup’s pollsters had asked
voters: “If there is starvation in France, Holland and Belgium this winter, should the United
States try to send food to those countries in our ships?” Thirty-eight percent said “yes,” while
2 Historians of American isolationism have not given much attention Hoover’s relief efforts, seeing them as a minor side show to the larger question of American involvement in the European war. The same can be said for Hoover’s biographers, who focus more on his role as elder statesmen of the Republican party, thwarted presidential candidate, and critic of I.end-Lease. For an overview of scholarship on the fight over non-invention, see Wayne S. Cole, “American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43 (March 1957): 595-617, and Justus D. Doenecke, "U.S. Historiography and the European War, 1939-1941"Diplomatic History, vol. 19 (1995) 669-98. For Hoover see Gary Dean Best’sHerbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933-1964, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford, 1988), Richard Norton Smith,An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover (Worland, Wyoming: High Plains Publishing Company, 1984), and James H. George, Jr., “Another Chance: Herbert Hoover and World War II Relief,”Diplomatic History, vol. 16, no. 3 (Summer 1992) 389-407. George disagrees with Best’s contention that cross-blockade relief was a marginal activity for Hoover and seeks to construct a more nuanced picture of Hoover’s attitudes on the relief issue.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 244
sixty-two percent said “no.” The poll also showed Democrats and Republicans equally opposed
sending relief. Interviews with those polled revealed two major concerns: that Germany would
be helped directly or indirectly, and that American ships carrying relief supplies would be
imperiled entering a European war zone. In a follow-up question, Gallup asked: “Would you be
willing to do this (send food), even if some of the food might go to the Germans?” Only one
voter in five said “yes.” Those who favored sending relief said that an effort should be made
regardless of the military and political consequences.3
Although unhappy with the poll results, Hoover thought that Americans would change
their minds once they were properly informed about the relief issue. “When the cries of some 30
million starving people in the innocent areas of Europe are heard this winter, there is going to be
a change in the attitude of the American people,” he told Arthur Sulzberger, the publisher of The
New York Times.4 The problem for Hoover was how to accomplish his task in the run up to the
1940 presidential election. Hoover supported and campaigned for Wendell Willkie, but feared
that if he also attempted to promote the relief issue, he might tarnish “so tender and difficult
3 “Sending Food to Hitler Victims Opposed by Voters, Survey Finds,”NYT, 1 September 1940, 9. Upset with the results, Hoover attempted to get Gallup to ask a question that would “properly present the question to the American people.” He wanted Gallup to ask Americans: “Do you believe Great Britain and Germany should consent to saving the lives of 30,000,000 starving people in Belgium, Holland, Norwary, Denmark, and Poland on Mr. Hoover’s proposal? That is 1) None of the present stock of food, nor the imported supplies, to be taken by the Germans from those countries; 2) The food not to be transported in American ships; 3) Food to be shipped only from surplus food countries; 4) Food not to be paid for by Americans, but by the Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, Danes, and Poles themselves; 5) All distribution to be in the hands of International Commission, which instantly stops supplies of [sic] Germans take any of them.” “What their decision would be on it would be important,” Hoover told Gallop. “I cannot believe that the American people would be against an action placed on this basis. I certainly would be a contribution to the cause of many millions of women and children if we should find that on the terms of which I proposed there is not an adverse American attitude.” Letter, Hoover to Gallop, 12 September 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2. Gallup told Hoover that he was impressed with his position and he would discuss the question with his staff. [Letter, Gallup to Hoover, 17 September 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2], In April 1941, Hoover again asked Gallup to conduct a poll using a question that he wrote. Letter, Hoover to Gallup, 1 April 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 1.
4 Letter, Hoover to Sulzberger, 1 September 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2. Once the Battle of Britain passed, Hoover believed that the British will return to their long-view vision, “which is not only humane but will take into account the possible hate and bitterness toward England that is being left in the minds of the people of the these little nation whom they started out to save.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 245
subject” with partisan politics. Hoover did not want either party to make relief an election issue.
In his eyes, relief was not a Republican cause or a Democratic cause— it was an American cause.5
Hoover decided to orchestrate a joint statement by four organizations— Commission for
Relief in Belgium, Norwegian Relief Fund, Queen Wilhelmina Fund, and Commission for Polish
Relief. Throughout the summer of 1940, these groups had worked with Hoover on ways to aid
their respective countries. According to the 20 September 1940 statement, Belgium, Norway, the
Netherlands, and Poland needed relief because they could no longer feed themselves. They all
depended on imports to maintain their food supply, but those imports ceased with the advent of
German occupation. The organizations called for the creation of an international commission to
manage the shipping and distribution of imported food. Before any relief program began,
Germany would also have to agree not to seize the relief supplies, stop requisitioning domestic
food supplies, and pledge to return the equivalent of any supplies already removed.
The relief organizations also made it clear that the United States would not have to
provide money or ships. Instead, the occupied countries would finance the relief programs by
using their large cash reserves in the United States, Congo, South America, and elsewhere, and
transport the supplies using their merchant marine fleets. The situation did, however, demand a
show of support from the American public. Although their country was not at war, Americans
possessed a vested interest in the relief issue. “The first interest is to save the lives of millions of
men, women, and children,” read the statement. “It must be part of American ideals to uphold the
standards of decency and Christianity. This deadlock can be broken only by the influence of
American public opinion.”6
The joint statement embodied a strategy that Hoover deployed throughout his campaign.
First, he did not directly criticize Germany’s role in creating and perpetuating the food shortages.
5 Letter, Hoover to Gibson, 4 October 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2.
6 Statement by Commission for Relief in Belgium, Norwegian Relief Fund, Queen Wilhelmina Fund, and Commission for Polish Relief, 20 September 1940. NA. RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246
Second, he avoided making any overtly anti-British statements. “The British do not realize that
there is a vast American public opposed to going to war, and that their action in this relief matter
is being used against them,” Hoover wrote Gibson. “We have taken great care that the statement
made by the four Relief Organizations should not support an anti-British attitude.” Hoover knew
that he could tap into isolationist sentiment, but refrained from doing so in order to avoid
needlessly (at least at this point) antagonizing Britain. In fact, he thought that it was only a matter
of time before Britain recognized that the relief programs amply protected British interests. If it
allowed relief, Britain would ensure the support of the Dutch and Belgian colonies and
demonstrate its appreciation to Norway for the use three million tons of shipping and the services
of 25,000 sailors.7 Finally, Hoover sought to focus the debate on questions of morality. In
response to the rhetorical question of whether the relief programs would hurt the Allied war
effort, the statement responded: “The real answer to this question is: Has humanity sunk so low
that tens of millions of innocent women and children are to die in order to create human
cesspools? We cannot argue with people of that kind.”8 Hoover’s efforts bore fruit at the
beginning of November 1940, when both the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Presbyterian
Church of the U.S.A endorsed his efforts.9 “The attitude of the religious leaders here,” Hoover
told Gibson, “is that Churchill, and not the English people, is the obstruction.”10
Hoover also pressed Gibson and his other European representatives to obtain statements
of support from politicians and citizens in Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands to bolster his
7 Letter, Hoover to Gibson, 4 October 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2.
8 Statement by Commission for Relief in Belgium, Norwegian Relief Fund, Queen Wilhelmina Fund, and Commission for Polish Relief, 20 September 1940. NA. RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 5.
9 Letter, Hoover to Gibson, 4 October 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2. Letter, Richmond to Hoover, 1 November 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 3. Letter, Richmond to Hoover, 2 November 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 3.
10 Letter, Hoover to Gibson, 4 October 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 247
campaign and legitimize his efforts.11 Gibson, however, sounded a warning about overplaying
the issue. Serious discrepancies existed between the figures being used by Hoover and the exile
governments of Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands with regard to each country’s food
supply. “In fact our figures are so different from those accepted here that I find that there has
been some irritation,” wrote Gibson, “in that people think we are trying to force the issue by
making public an over-pessimistic picture.” Hoover claimed that thirty million (he continually
revised his estimates upward) people faced starvation. The latest figures, however, indicated that
Belgium’s food supply would not become acute until the spring. The same also went for the
Netherlands. Meanwhile, Norway suffered only from a lack of clothing and fodder for livestock.
“It is increasingly clear that there is a disposition to discuss things in a good spirit,” wrote
Gibson, “if people can be convinced that we are playing the game, and not trying to put over
anything.”12
Not all Americans welcomed Hoover’s continued interest in relief. At the beginning of
October, a group of prominent Americans, including Carrie Chapman Catt, Harvard president
James Conant, Princeton president Harold Dodds, American Federation of Labor president
William Green, former Mount Holyoke president Mary E. Woolley, and religious leaders from
the Episcopal, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches, publicized their opposition. These were
voices with influence on moral and spiritual issues—the very ones Hoover thought he could
depend upon for support. They did not quarrel with the details of his plans, but, more damningly,
questioned whether it was in America’s best interest.13
Hoover also encountered resistance from William Allen White and his organization, the
Committee to Aid the Allies by Defending America. A lauded newspaper man and publisher of
11 Telegram, Galpinto Milshaler, 17 October 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/12187.
12 Letter, Gibson to Rickard, 3 November 1940. HIA, CRB, Box 11, File 8.
13 Statement Regarding Food for Europe, 3 October 1940. FDRL, OF115, Hoover, 1939-45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 248
K ansas’ Emporia Gazette, White formed the committee in May 1940 at the suggestion of
Roosevelt, who thought Americans should be informed of the dangers developing in Europe and
the Far East.14 The committee supplied the president with a means of influencing public opinion
without being seen openly to manipulate it and provided a counterpoint to the anti-interventionist
efforts of the America First Committee. Although Floover’s relief campaign did not espouse
isolationism per se, it did advocate busting the British blockade, a proscription the committee
regarded as dangerous to Britain’s war effort. The committee challenged Hoover’s assertions that
Europe teetered on the brink of starvation.15 White and others understood that Hoover’s message
had the potential to appeal to millions of Americans by providing them with an outlet for
expressing sympathy— they could not stop Hitler, but they could make sure that those he enslaved
were properly fed. For his part, Hoover recognized the threat represented by W hite’s committee.
On a number of occasions, false rumors were spread by Hoover and his associates in an attempt
to undermine the committee’s close, but informal, relationship with the British Embassy.16
While Hoover’s critics assailed his relief plans, Hoover focused his immediate efforts on
getting Willkie elected. As a staunch Republican, Hoover wanted to see Willkie elected, but he
also recognized that W illkie’s election would help his relief efforts. “. . .[T]he future of our work
depends much upon the American election,” he wrote Gibson at the beginning of October. “It
looks at the moment as if Mr. Willkie will be elected. He would naturally be favorable to relief
of these people.”17 Stumping for Willkie also gave Hoover an opportunity to beat up on
Roosevelt. In two nationally broadcast speeches, Hoover extolled Willkie’s virtues and
14 William M. Tuttle, "Aid to the Allies Short-of-War versus American Intervention, 1940: A Reappraisal of William Allen White's Leadership,"Journal o f American History, vol. 56, no. 4 (March 1970) 840-858.
15 Telegram 2620, Butler to FO, 9 November 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219.
16 Telegram 2339, Marris to Lothian, 17 October 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25202.
17 Letter, Floover to Gibson, 4 October 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2. Letter, Hoover to Rickard, 6 November 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 60, File 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 249
catalogued Roosevelt’s failings. The first speech, delivered in Columbus, Ohio, criticized the
unchecked growth of presidential power and the fallacy of a third term. “Methods of intellectual
dishonesty have been used in creating this personal power,” he told listeners. “A political
machine has been built which places all free election in jeopardy. An economic system is being
created which drifts steadily away from free and men and free enterprise down the suicide road of
National Socialism.” The second speech, given in Lincoln, Nebraska, attacked Roosevelt’s
handling of foreign policy. Rather than reelect Roosevelt because of his expertise in foreign
policy, voters should reject him for incompetence. “You are far more likely,” said Hoover, “to
get into war with Franklin Roosevelt as president than with Wendell Willkie.” 18 Hoover was
stunned to see Roosevelt not only win, but also win by a landslide.19
Hoover promised his inner circle that he would “break loose as soon as the election is
over” and force the relief issue once and for all.20 In mid-November, Hoover “put on the public
heat” starting with an address at Vassar College and a companion article in Collier’s Weekly that
made his case for helping the five small democracies— Belgium, Norway, Poland, the
Netherlands, and Finland.21 He attributed the food shortages to lack of imports, along with
“decreased harvests, war destruction and the blockade.” “The only hope,” argued Hoover, “lies
in restoration and protection of their domestic food by the Occupying Army and in import of food
from overseas through the British and the German blockades under full safeguards.” Hoover
again explained his conditions for distributing relief, suggesting that Britain had rejected them
based on timing rather than feasibility, since he had made his proposals at the height of the Battle
18 Cited in Best, 171. For more on Hoover’s role in the campaign, see Best, 170-173.
19 Best, 173.
20 Letter, Hoover to Gibson, 4 October 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 62, File 2. Letter, Hoover to Rickard, 6 November 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 60, File 5.
21 Telegram 2355, FO to Butler (Washington), 2 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO837/1240.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250
of Britain. Now that Britain had demonstrated its resolve, it was time for British officials to
reconsider his proposal.
Hoover also took aim at his critics at home and abroad. To those who said that American
food should be used to feed Americans, he noted that America possessed vast surpluses and the
government sold it to other countries on a daily basis. To those who feared that the Germans
would get the imported food, he pointed to his work in the last war. To those who championed
the need to preserve the blockade, he suggested that they clung to a false illusion: “That is that a
blockade is a sort of earth embankment and that if a single hole is permitted it will automatically
enlarge until the embankment is swept away. A blockade is nothing of the kind. It is a
notification that traffic cannot pass except by permission. That permission is in the control of the
dominant sea power. It can be extended and withdrawn at will, ship by ship.”
To make certain that his audience and readers understood what was at stake, Hoover
painted a vivid picture of the ravages of famine. “When the food supply falls to famine levels,
people don’t lie down and die from starvation,” said Hoover. “Long before they get to that point
their physical resistance is so lowered by malnutrition that they die of disease. The children
weaken first, the women and old men next.” Colds turn into pneumonia, the flu into a deadly
menace. Malnutrition leads to weakened immune systems, allowing typhoid and small pox to run
rampant. Typhus comes next, spread by lice that flourish from soap shortages, which develop
because the population eats its fat supplies. Hoover also talked about his experiences during in
the First World War:
In the service of those war years, I moved constantly in and out behind the trenches on both sides of the conflict. I witnessed its misery and its backwash upon civilians in its most hideous forms. I saw the nightmares of roads filled for long miles with old men, women, and children dropping of fatigue and hunger as them fled in terror from the oncoming armies. ... I saw the dreadful effect of the blockade in starvation. I have seen the women and children of whole cities practically at the exhaustion point of food. I have seen the raging of pestilence that is the implacable companion of famine. I witnessed their sufferings in over 20 nations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 251
His account lent his appeal measure of authenticity. He was a man who had seen the horrors of
starvation and did not want it to happen again. He also infused his speech with an appeal to
Christian charity. Despite being a Quaker, Hoover sounded more like an evangelical preacher
summoning his congregation to do the Lord’s work. “Truly the four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse— War, Death, Famine, and Pestilence— have come to them in a terrible host,”
observed Hoover of the small democracies.22
Exaggerated Risk
At the end of October 1940, Italy invaded Greece, a country with which Britain had close
historical and emotional ties. To help fend off the Italians, the British provided the Greeks with
naval and air support and began to amass forces in Egypt for a counterattack in early 1941.
Meanwhile, German wolf packs prowled the Atlantic intent on strangling Britain’s supply lines.
London had also just emerged from the most intense phase of the Blitz, during which the German
Luftwaffe continually bombed the city for fifty-seven days, dropping more than 13,000 tons of
high explosive bombs and one million incendiaries.23 In mid-November, London received a
reprieve when Germany shifted its focus to provincial cities, such as Coventry, Birmingham, and
Liverpool.
In his usual clumsy manner, American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy tired to calm the
Foreign Office’s fears about the relief issue. In his farewell chat with David Scott, head of the
American Department, Kennedy insisted that Americans would not get too worked up about
lifting the blockade unless something “very bad” happened, such as widespread famine. Kennedy
also warned of the demanding and sentimental nature of American public opinion. “He gave as
22 Speech by Herbert Hoover, “America and the Famine in the Five Little Democracies,” 15 November 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 29, File 15. The parable of the Good Samaritan is from Luke 10:25-37.
23 “Blitz” by Alfred Price in I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot (eds.),The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 139.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 252
an instance,” recorded Scott, “of how the Americans affected by sentimental reasons the
withdrawal of the American ambassador from Berlin ‘just because a lot of Jews had got beaten
up,’ in spite of the fact that America was one of the most anti-Semitic countries in the world.”24
Ironically, Kennedy identified exactly what Britain feared most: American public opinion being
consumed by sentiment rather than reason.
Another warning about American public opinion came from Roosevelt in October.
Before he departed Washington for a visit to London, Lothian met with the President, who shared
his thoughts about the relief issue. Roosevelt, reported Lothian, “felt sure there would be
formidable agitation after the Election” from a diverse group of Americans, particularly those of
Dutch, Norwegian, Belgian and Polish descent, along with the Quakers and other humanitarians.
They would be joined in some measure by Christian churches, which were divided between those
who refused to support an effort that might harm Britain’s war effort and those harboring pacifist
and neutral sentiments who wanted to satisfy their consciences. Then there was Hoover, “who
combines a conscientious concern for relief with a not inconsiderable appreciation of the value of
such an agitation as a means of putting himself back on to the front page of the newspapers.”
Roosevelt warned that if Hoover played his cards right, he could unite them into a powerful voice
for relief—one that could not be ignored on either side of the Atlantic.25
Lothian urged a concrete strategy of limited relief. Since the relief movement focused on
the blockade, Britain needed to find a way to redirect its energy and scorn towards Germany. To
that end, Britain should formulate conditions for relief that it found acceptable, but ones that it
knew Germany would refuse. “I understand fully the advantages from the British Government’s
24 Minute, Scott and Kennedy, 17 October 1940. TNA/PRO, F 0371/25202. The lack of any attempt by Hoover to promote the relief issue in the weeks prior to the November elections led the Foreign Office to speculate that a “very considerable propaganda offensive” was in the making. Steel and his colleagues did not think that relief would suddenly become a major issue in the election, but they feared what would follow. Minute by Whitehead, Balfour, Steel, and Sargent. 12-17 October 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25202.
25 Letter, Lothian to Dalton, 27 October 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 253
point of view of standing on a complete refusal to allow any food into German-controlled
Europe,” Lothian wrote Dalton. “It is a simple position, intelligible to all. On the other hand, I
am inclined to think that it is not really the best way of handling the problem.” Lothian even
suggested that Britain might use Hoover’s campaign to achieve these ends.26 Britain had to give
some concession so that, in Lothian’s words, “frustrated American women could come across to
Europe with powdered milk and themselves pour it in diluted form down the throats of starving
European children.”27
Through the back channels came a piece of advice from influential American columnist
Walter Lippmann: don’t let the situation deteriorate into a public quarrel between Britain and
Hoover. Britain would never win and Hoover’s influence would only grow as he cast himself as
David in a struggle with Goliath.28 The Foreign Office welcomed Lippmann’s advice, but MEW
regarded it as yet another attempt by the British Embassy in Washington to accommodate
American public opinion.29 Dalton believed that rather than contributing to the demise of the
blockade, Lothian should be bolstering it. “I wish sometimes,” he told Halifax, “that we had even
a scintilla of evidence that either Lord Lothian or his subordinates ever forcibly presented the
policy of His Majesty’s Government either to the President (we sought for this assurance some
26 Minute by O’Reilly, “Food Blockade of Europe,” 31 October 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218. Minute (W 11643) by Steel, 5 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
27 Minute by Scott, 12 November 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25203. Minutes (11698/8434/49) by Steel, Whitehead, and Maclean, 11-15 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
28 Telegram 2693, Butler to FO, 16 November 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
29 Minute (W 11837/8434/49) by Steel, Whitehead, and Scott, 18-20 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 254
while since but never received it) or to any of those other pseudo-humanitarian busybodies.”30
Dalton told his subordinates to ignore any recommendations that came from Washington.31
Spoiling for a fight, Dalton wanted to take to the airwaves to respond to Hoover. He
wanted to model his remarks after those given by J. B. Priestly, the host of a very popular weekly
radio program on the BBC. “Let’s look at the Nazis for a moment. What was their motto?”
Priestly asked his listeners. “It was Guns Before Butter. Having got the guns and denied
themselves the butter, they then proceeded to make use of the guns and grab other people’s
butter.” In addition to ridiculing Germany’s trustworthiness, Priestly took direct aim at Hoover:
“Mr. Hoover calls those who disagree with him armchair critics. He is fortunate enough to be
able to sit rather more comfortably in his armchair than those of us on this side of the water can
sit in ours, and I suggest that he should lean back and take a broader view.”32 After learning of
Dalton’s plans, Churchill decided to put a stop to them.33 “I doubt whether it is wise to feature
this issue prominently, or to argue with Hoover personally,” Churchill told Dalton. “The less
emphasis given to this controversy the better.”34
Churchill may have wanted to avoid a confrontation with Hoover, but the need to do
something to combat his message became pressing. Britain was losing the battle for public
opinion. White’s committee succeeded in curtailing some of the debate on relief, but whether it
30 Letter, Dalton to Halifax, 18 November 1940; Letter (W 11837/8434/49), Halifax to Dalton, 22 November 1940; Letter (W 11837/8434/49), Halifax to Dalton, 22 November 1940; Minute (W 11837/8434/49) by Steel, 20 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
31 Minute (W 11837/8434/49) by Steel, 20 November 1940. TNA/PRO, FO371/25203.
32 Letter, Thorton to Peck, 21 November 1940, plus enclosure of text of Priestly broadcast. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
33 Letter, PM’s Office to Lawford, 19 November 1940. Letter, Gaitskell to Peck, 20 November 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
34 Telegram, Churchill to Dalton, 23 November 11940; Note, Peck to Churchill, 22 November 1940; Letter, Dalton to Churchill, 22 November 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6. Telegram 3311, FO to Lothian, 1 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1227. Dalton got to deliver his radio address, but it was during the wee hours of the morning and, instead of tackling Hoover, he only reminded listeners of the prime minister’s August 20 statement. It was hardly what Dalton had in mind.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255
could continue to do so remained to be seen. Its main foe, the America First Committee,
continued to attract more members and more money. Rather than aid Britain, America First
advocated building up American military forces and defending the western hemisphere. “There is
little doubt that this move for relief in Europe,” Lothian told London, “is becoming mixed up with
defeatist and appeasement programme being run by Mr. Kennedy and American [First]
Movement with which I fancy Hoover is in sympathy. It attacks Great Britain for its food
blockade and goes on to press for a patched-up peace.”35 Lothian was not too far off the mark.
Despite being sympathetic to its objectives, Hoover declined an invitation to join America First’s
leadership, preferring to focus on relief. But both campaigns shared supporters, including Joseph
K ennedy, Chicago Tribune publisher Robert McCormick, and Sears Roebuck Chairman Robert
E. Wood.36 William Castle, a former diplomat and a member of America First’s brain trust, also
served as Hoover’s principle spokesman. Formal ties may not have existed between the non
intervention and relief campaigns, but there was definitely an association.
Britain’s friends pressed for a public statement on the relief issue. “The need for a clear
statement of His Majesty’s Government’s attitude to Mr. Hoover and his proposals is becoming
urgent,” telegraphed Lothian. “All our friends say that something definite is necessary to put an
end to the discussion.” W hite’s committee wanted a statement, as did the leaders of the
Congregational, Methodist, and Episcopalian churches. Hoover’s appeal to Christian charity had
struck a chord with their members, and they were under increasing pressure to endorse his relief
efforts.37 Hoping to galvanize religious support for Britain, Henry van Dusen, a professor of
35 Telegram 2922, Lothian to FO, 4 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219. For more on the America First Committee see Justus D. Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). Laura McEnaney "He-men and Christian Mothers: The America First Movement and the Gendered Meanings of Patriotism and Isolationism,"Diplom atic H istory 18 (Winter 1994): 47-58.
36 Best, 175.
37 Telegram 2936, Lothian to FO, 5 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 256
theology at Union Theological Seminary and a member of Committee to Aid the Allies,
organized a statement from thirty-four leading Protestants, including six bishops. “We must
protest,” said the statement, “the repeated implication in Mr. Hoover’s declaration that British
hesitancy is due to heartless cruelty.”38
On 8 December 1940, Hoover published a manifesto announcing the creation of the
National Committee on Food for the Five Small Democracies. According the manifesto, the
committee sought to “to raise a voice” on behalf of the thirty-seven million people of Belgium,
Norway, Holland, the Netherlands, and Finland. It did not want to run relief programs, but rather
facilitate agreements between Britain and Germany. Missing from the committee were France
and Denmark, two countries also suffering under the boot of German occupation. Hoover did not
include Denmark because “she did not ask me for aid.” As for France, Hoover’s interest
disappeared once he learned that the French ambassador had approached the American Red
Cross.39 It seemed that Hoover would help, but only if he alone could play savior. Hoover
recruited more than 140 prominent Americans as signatories, including World War I hero General
John J. Pershing, former ambassador to Belgium Henry Fletcher, and former vice president and
ambassador to Britain Charles G. Dawes, along with two members of the Roosevelt clan. They
were joined by fifty Protestant and Catholic clergymen, two governors, and assorted educational,
professional, business, and civic leaders.40
38 “Churchmen Assail Hoover Food Plan,”NYT, 2 December 1940, 16. For more on Van Dusen’s efforts see Dean K. Thompson, "World War II, Interventionism, and Henry Pitney Van Dusen,"Journal o f Presbyterian History 55 (1977): 32-45
39 Letter, Hoover to Taylor, 3 January 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 2.
40 Telegram 2979, Lothian to FO, 8 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219. Telegram 2980, Lothian to FO, 9 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218. Telegram 2981, Lothian to FO, 9 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219. Telegram 3423, FO to Lothian, 9 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219. “National Committee on Food for the Five Small Democracies,” 8 December 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 29, File 15. “Mr. Hoover’s Plan to Feed Europe,”Times , 10 December 1940. It exasperated both the State Department and the British Embassy that the manifesto appeared only days after Hull had asked Hoover to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 257
After weeks of dilly-dallying, Britain quickly released a statement from Lothian in
response. By releasing the statement in Washington, Britain wanted to send the message that
Hoover did not rate Churchill’s attention. The statement, which addressed both Hoover’s
entreaties and proposals to send relief to Vichy France, conveyed four messages. First, Britain
believed that any relief scheme for the occupied territories would help the German war effort.
“His Majesty’s Government,” stated Lothian, “have been unable to discover any scheme of
distribution by neutral authorities in these countries which, in the light of the Nazi record, could
provide guarantees against the strengthening of the German war potential by the importation of
foodstuffs.” Germany used the countries that Hoover wanted to feed as springboards for
attacking Britain. Second, the small democracies suffered from shortages, not famines. Third,
Germany’s policies— not the British blockade— created the food shortages. Finally, the statement
reminded Americans of the sacrifices being made by Britons:
Great Britain is risking starvation and undergoing every conceivable hardship in the fight for freedom not only for herself but for all freedom-loving peoples. We cannot in these circumstances endanger our existence and imperil our cause by weakening our blockade. The British people who are in the firing line have, through their representatives in Parliament, expressed their determination not to give assistance to Germany, such as would result from the adaptation of Mr. Hoover’s proposal. We trust that all those who share our love for freedom and hope for our victory will sympathize with and support our attitude.41
Rather than appeal to spiritual values, Britain asked Americans to imagine themselves in the same
situation. Britons wanted to help, but doing so might jeopardize their fight. Britons also made
sacrifices on a daily basis to wage the war. Not allowing relief was a hard choice, but one that
had to be made.
lessen his campaign for a few weeks in order to allow the administration time to consider his proposals. See Telegram 2922, Lothian to FO, 4 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219.
41 Telegram 3439, FO to Lothian, 10 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219. “Britain Bars Hoover Food Plan As Aiding German War Effort.”NYT, 11 December 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 258
“Britain Bars Hoover Food Plan As Aiding German War Effort” screamed the front page
o f the New York Times.42 Other papers across the country carried similar headlines. Columnist
Dorothy Thompson called Hoover’s plans “no great humanitarian effort at all” and suggested that
the greater moral responsibility lie in freeing the people enslaved by the Nazis. Another
columnist, Mark Sullivan, argued that no decision on food relief should be made until the United
States decided what role it wanted play in the war.43 Lothian’s statement also generated
declarations of support. Forty-four Catholic laymen, including six Notre Dame professors,
ambassadors William Franklin Sands and Carlton J. H. Hayes, and Colonel William J. Donovan,
declared that “any attempt to force the British blockade and feed the conquered populations of
Europe is contrary to the best interests of Christianity and America.”44 Donovan’s public support
for Britain is notable, given his hands-on support for Hoover’s Commission for Polish Relief.
The German Embassy also issued a little-noticed statement attesting that any relief supplies sent
would reach their destinations untouched.
Britain’s statement succeeded in annoying both Hull and Hoover. The blunt terms
Britain used to declare its position forced Hull to concede that the State Department did not
intend to challenge Britain on the relief issue, an admission Hull had studiously avoided. During
a December 11 press conference, he even suggested that relief organizations should first approach
Germany, rather than Britain, since Germany controlled the countries where they wanted to
provide relief.45 While Hull was annoyed that he had been forced to make such public
admissions, Lothian regarded his remarks an indication of the Roosevelt administration’s
continued reluctance to endorse Britain’s policy openly.
42 “Britain Bars Hoover Food Plan As Aiding German War Effort.”NYT, 11 December 1940.
43 Dorothy Thompson column, 18 December 1940.
44 “Catholic Laymen Fight Hoover Plan,”NYT, 11 December 1940.
45 Report of a press conference of the Secretary of State, 11 December 1940.DAFR, vol. Ill, July 1940 - June 1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259
He was right to some degree. The Roosevelt administration advocated relief for Vichy
France, but opposed to Hoover’s relief program. Hull worried that Britain’s statement meant that
it did not intend to give serious consideration to the American Red Cross’s milk program. He
believed that if Britain allowed the milk program, it would “take the wind out of Hoover’s plans”
by providing an outlet for expressing American humanitarian sentiment.46 Hull’s assessment,
however, failed to take into account that Hoover was only interested in relief for Vichy France in
so far as it could help his own plans. Britain’s statement also irked Hoover. “1 am told from a
private source,” Lothian reported to London, “that Mr. Hoover is very angry and that he has
expressed his determination to force us to modify our policy.”47 “There is indeed a great desire in
America,” said Hoover, “that humanitarian effort should not be brushed aside in this war.”48
As 1940 came to a close, Hoover enjoyed growing support from the American press. The
Anglophobe Chicago Tribune never tired of trumpeting his campaign, and Collier’s Weekly and
the Hartford Courant renewed their support. Fresh endorsements came from Newsweek,
Scribner’s Commentator, and the Hearst papers. Norman Chandler, the ultra-conservative owner
o f the Los Angeles Times, asked newspaper publishers across the country to cooperate in a
nationwide press campaign to support Hoover. Within a week, the Toledo Blade and the
Pittsburgh Post Gazette headed Chandler’s call. Hundreds of pro-Hoover editorials followed.
Life also ran a story, “Hunger: Americans Face a Terrible Dilemma,” which included pictures of
portraying starvation’s ill effects from the last war. Although a number of newspapers opposed
Hoover’s plans, none of their circulations matched Collier’s Weekly or Life. The situation
46 Telegram 3058, Lothian to FO, 12 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219.
47 Telegram 3058, Lothian to FO, 12 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219.
48 Statement of the National Committee on Food for the Five Small Democracies, 11 December 1940. DAFR, Vol. Ill, July 1940 - June 1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 260
prompted the British Press Service, which tracked how the American media covered the relief
issue, to warn that “Hoover’s persistence is effective and dangerous.”49
False Humanitarianism
Throughout the fall, the exile governments of Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands
kept their distance from Hoover. They did not ask Hoover for help publicly or privately.
Britain’s continued instance on not allowing relief, however, made them restless, especially
Belgium. In the days following Churchill’s August 20 speech, Belgium asked Britain to consider
allowing a relief program.50 The request was designed to test whether Britain disapproved of
Hoover or relief programs in general. Not surprisingly, Britain said no— there would be no relief
period. Unhappy with the situation, Belgium closely watched Hoover’s relief campaign
throughout the fall. Although leery of his motives and scornful of his bullying management style,
Belgium welcomed his efforts to publicize the plight of its people. After Britain rejected
Hoover’s scheme in December, Belgium decided to try its luck again.51 Britain again said no.
“Hardship, is . . . part of the price to be paid for victory,” Dalton told Spaak, “and His Majesty’s
Government are convinced that it is a price which will be greatly paid in order to hasten the
overthrow of the subjugated peoples from alien oppression at the earliest possible moment.”52
The price Britain paid for rejecting Belgian relief proposals was Belgium’s increasing support of
H oover.
Hoover’s campaign continued to amass supporters. He had assembled a noteworthy list
of bold face supporters, including twelve former State Department officials, and established more
49 BPS Report, Food Relief in Europe: December 17, 1940 - January 6, 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220. The report cited editorials in Collier’s Weekly (Dec 28), Hartford Courant (Dec 19), Life (Dec 28), LA Times (Dec 26), Toledo Blade (Jan 1), andPittsburgh Post Gazette (Jan 2).
50 Minute by Nicholls, 4 November 1940. TNA/PRO, F0837/1218.
51 Letter, Belgian Foreign Ministry to Halifax, 17 December 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/25204.
52 Letter, Dalton to Spaak, 31 December 1940. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261
than 650 local committees.53 A postcard campaign spread the relief gospel, while also providing
clues to what motivated supporters. The responses indicated that Americans who favored relief
did so either because they admired Hoover or because they regarded it as a moral imperative.
“Mr. Hoover is for it. That is reason enough for any American, including myself,” wrote Mrs.
O.O. McIntyre, the widow of the famous columnist. “O f what advantage is it to fight for
humanity, if we are not prepared to risk something to save the humanity we fight for?” wrote a
supporter from New York.54
While pleased with the growth, Hoover recognized that in order for his campaign to have
any validity, he needed current facts and figures about actual conditions. In January 1941, he sent
a delegation to Belgium to survey the food situation.55 Under the watchful eye of the German
Red Cross, the delegation spent five days in Brussels where they met with officials from Secours
d’Hiver (Winter Help Committee), the Belgian Red Cross, the agricultural, food, and economics
ministries, and German occupation officials. The delegation learned that, despite warnings from
Belgian authorities, German officials had only recently acknowledged the severity of the food
situation, which they now regarded as troubling.56
Before the arrival of the Hoover delegation, the Nazi chief of military administration in
Belgium had met with Belgian business leaders and urged them to cooperate— or collaborate— on
efforts to revive the economy and bolster the food supply. Occupation officials also deputized a
53 “Hoover Food Drive Gets More Backing,” NYT, 13 January 1941. Letter, Richmond to National Committee Member, 18 January 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 2. Only the famous, influential, or pedigreed were invited to become national members.
54 Memo, Richmond to Hoover, 21 January 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 2.
55 The delegation consisted of F. Dorsey Stephens, William C. McDonald, and Columba P. Murray, Jr.. Telegram 150, Berlin to State, 15 January 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6. Telegram, Hoover to Hartigan, 11 December 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 1. Telegram, Hartigan to Rickard, 17 December 1940. HIA, Comporel, Box 8, File 1. When Hoover asked John Haritgan, his representative in Berlin, to make arrangements in December, Hartigan replied back that “Full basis mutual confidence exists here in Berlin both our sides.”
56 Report on Food Conditions in Belgium by Stephens, Murray, and McDonald, January 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6. Letter, Stephens to Galpin, 1 February 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 262
delegation of Belgians to travel to Berlin to discuss food issues. Arrangements were also made
for another delegation to travel to Moscow to buy wheat. Even as it took steps to improve the
food supply, Germany chided Belgium for its refusal to embrace its place in the Third Reich. The
lead editorial in the 9 January 1941 edition of Brusseler Zeitung, the official German newspaper,
charged the Belgians with making a mockery of the rationing system by hoarding food and
patronizing the black market. It was not, as the underground claimed, a heroic act of patriotism to
sabotage the rationing system by treating it as a “game of cards.” The editorial further claimed
that “the diversion of goods now appears to have passed the stage of sickness and reached
epidemic proportions and there appears to be no remedy for this disease, which has struck the
very core of the economic body.” By continuing these practices, the Belgian people destroyed
their chances of receiving enough to eat. Indeed, the complete cooperation of industry,
commerce, and the Belgian people were “an indispensable prerequisite for the delivery of bread
grain by the German Reich.”57
Still Belgium needed food. The Hoover delegation calculated that given the current
supplies, Belgium had to import before the next harvest 300,000 tons of wheat, 50,000 tons of
rye, 450,000 tons of com, 200,000 tons of potatoes, 25,000 tons of meat, and 132,000 of fats,
bread, milk, and cheese, in order to maintain the rationing system. “Even allowing for the fact
that crops generally were bad in Belgium as a result of the severe winter and the disorganization
caused by the fighting on Belgian soil,” reported Stephens, “it is difficult to explain how, with the
application of the present rationing system, there could have developed such a marked shortage
so early in the crop year, except in the case of breadstuffs.” Stephens knew that German looting
57 Telegram 150, Berlin to State, 15 January 1941; Letter, Morris to Hull, 18 January 1941. NA, RG59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263
caused the shortages, but he intentionally censored his remarks, because he had to give the
German Foreign Office a copy of his report.58
The delegation also assessed the resources available for running a large-scale relief
program. It learned that the Winter Help Committee, the main Belgian relief organization, could
handle the job. It would be easy to expand the committee’s structure, particularly if it was
supplemented by a neutral commission. Most of the food, especially wheat, had to be imported
through the blockade, since European sources (or those inside the blockade) remained limited.
Germany reserved any Balkan surpluses for domestic consumption, leaving the Soviet Union as
the only remaining source of wheat on the continent. The Soviets were interested in exchanging
wheat for raw and manufactured materials. Germany, however, wanted to reserve Belgian
manufacturing output for its own use, limiting the goods available to the Belgians for trade.59
The delegation’s findings not only suited Hoover’s purposes, but they also allowed him
to make a major claim: Belgium would starve after February 15. Theoretically, each Belgian
received on a daily basis one half pound of bread, two ounces of fats and meat, one and a half
ounces of sugar, one and one tenth pounds of potatoes, and half an ounce of beans and peas. The
ration system, however, had ceased to function: only sixty percent of the meats and fats and
twenty percent of the potatoes were distributed, and the wheat supply would be exhausted by
mid-February. “My interpretation of this report,” said Hoover in a statement issued at the end of
January 1941, “is that no population could survive even if the outlined theoretical ration could be
maintained— and this ration is not available. One thing is plain. Major food supplies to maintain
58 Report on Food Conditions in Belgium by Stephens, Murray, and McDonald, January 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6. The Belgian Relief Committee: President: Paul Heymans, Former minister of economic affairs and professor at University of Ghent; other members include president of Belgian Red Cross, publisher of leading Belgian newspaper, leading industrialist, alderman of Antwerp and Brussels, nobel prize winner, aide-de-camp to the king, civil engineer, and lawyer.
59 Report on Food Conditions in Belgium by Stephens, Murray, and McDonald, January 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 264
any Belgian ration will be non-existent within a month. This means literal starvation unless
supplies are brought in from somewhere.”60
Hoover and his cohorts had already decided that a soup kitchen program offered the
quickest and most effective way of helping the Belgians. Throughout January 1941, they ironed
out the details. The kitchens would provide one meal per day to destitute Belgian adults and two
meals per day to children. Hoover estimated that the program, which would initially feed one
million adults and two million children, required 45,000 tons of imported food at a cost of $5
million per month. The soup kitchen scheme also simplified control issues. The organization
running the kitchens only had to keep track of the imported food— meat, fats, beans, peas, rice,
and wheat. The complicated tasks of managing Belgium’s food supply and ration program would
remain in the hands of the Germans.61 Since the soup kitchen program addressed and simplified
many of the problems associated with a more comprehensive program, Hoover believed that it
would pass muster with Germany and Britain. And as with his previous relief proposal, Hoover
did not intend for his organization to run the soup kitchens. “Our sole desire is to get it in
motion,” Galpin wrote Gibson about the new plan.62 Aside from offering a quick way to help the
Belgians, the soup kitchen program also represented a shift in Hoover’s long-term strategy:
rather than start programs in five countries simultaneously, he would begin with one and parlay
its success into additional programs. It was his version of MEW ’s “thin edge of the wedge”
argum ent.
Rather than publicize the soup kitchen scheme, Hoover initially kept it secret. He
surmised that working behind the scenes would be more productive than using the press to
60 Statement by Herbert Hoover, 27 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28816.
61 Telegram, Galpin to Gibson, January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816. Meals served by the kitchens would provide adults with 1500 calories. In addition to the soup, infants and children would receive another meal equal to 700 calories, which would include milk and vitamin supplements.
62 Telegram, Galpin to Gibson, January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265
bludgeon Britain and Germany. He asked Gibson to convince the exile governments to mount a
united front and press the scheme on Britain.63 Only Belgium, however, expressed any interest,
and presented the program to Britain at the end of January. Although the Belgians did not press
for an immediate answer, Eden predicted they would turn up the heat if conditions continued to
deteriorate.64 Aside from concern about Belgium’s restlessness, the Foreign Office regarded
Hoover’s new plan with some trepidation. “I think that Mr. Hoover’s organization,” wrote Steel,
“is waiting for a good horror story from Belgium to open up on us at full pressure in the U.S.
press.” Worried that Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, and Finland would also sign up with
Hoover, the Foreign Office set about trying to convince them otherwise. (Naturally, they did not
know that Gibson had already failed to mount a united front.)65 “We must make all the play we
can with our only real argument,” suggested Steel, “namely that though their people may undergo
great hardship, ours are being murdered in the thousands to win their freedom.” Much to
W hitehall’s relief, not one of them was interested in Hoover’s scheme, but they all declined to
speak out against it.66
Across the Atlantic, Hoover and Tuck paid a visit on Halifax the first week in February to
push their new plan. Along with being an officer for National Committee on Food for the Five
Small Democracies, Tuck also served as the president of the Commission for Relief in Belgium.
Word of Hoover’s new scheme had not yet reached Halifax, who had just taken up his new duties
as ambassador, a situation that made for a lively exchange replete with dogma and statistics. “It
63 Telegram, Galpin to Gibson, January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816.
64 Letter (W 717/49/49), Eden to Aveling, 17 January 1941. Letter, Spaak to Eden, 20 January 1941. Letter, Steel to Dalton, 22 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28815. Letter, Spaak to Eden, 30 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816.
65 Minutes (1126/49/49) by Maclean and Steel, 2-4 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816. Telegram 512, Halifax to FO, 3 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220.
66 Minute by Maclean, 4 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816. Minute by Steel, 4 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 266
was noteworthy,” Halifax reported to London, “that he spoke mainly about Belgium and,
although he mentioned his work in Poland which has now shrunk to small proportions, he did not
seem to have the same interest in, or so much information concerning, the other countries, thus
confirming an impression widely held here that his darling of the last war is the darling of this.”
Hoover also left Halifax with the impression that he did not care about Britain’s position. He also
asserted that he knew more about Belgium’s situation than Britain and intended to take action. “I
have little doubt that he is out to make trouble,” noted Halifax.67
Halifax was unnerved by his encounter with Hoover—he found Hoover a “difficult
person to talk to” and his claims unsettling. Could Hoover really orchestrate a “paralyzing
American movement” unless Britain bowed to his plans? If Hoover continued to attract
supporters and secured Congressional backing, Britain would be hard pressed to refuse his relief
program . 68
Eden also shared Halifax’s concerns and communicated them to Harry Hopkins,
Roosevelt’s close friend and envoy who was visiting London at the beginning of February 1941.
Eden confided that Hoover’s relief activities had become “embarrassing” for both Britain and the
exile governments. Would the Roosevelt administration make its feelings on Hoover clear in the
near future? “Truth was that,” Eden told Hopkins, “these peoples in Europe might indeed be
suffering hardships, but our own people, upon whom their freedom depended, were enduring
mass murder from the air and were watching their cities being destroyed.” Eden also told
Hopkins that he believed that Hoover’s agitation only helped Germany. “Mr. Hopkins said that he
entirely agreed,” noted Eden, “and had for some time felt that we were being placed in a most
unfair position in this matter owing to the silence of the United States leaders who did not agree
67 Telegram 546, Halifax to FO, 5 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220. Memcon, Tuck, Hoover, and Halifax, 4 February 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 3.
68 Memcon, Hull and Halifax, 5 February 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6. Telegram 569, Halifax to FO, 6 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 267
with Mr. Hoover.” In fact, Hopkins thought that “the same small crowd” that sought to delay aid
to Britain promoted Hoover’s efforts.69
During a 10 February 1941 meeting with Halifax, Roosevelt made it clear that he had not
changed his mind— his interest in relief extended only to Vichy France. “Though it seemed a
brutal thing to say,” Halifax recorded, “he thought that a condition of something approaching
starvation would after some time prevail in Europe and that this would be a very vital element in
breaking German hold on occupied territories. It was impossible to think that Germany would be
unaffected by such a situation.” Roosevelt judged Britain’s strategy of placing responsibility on
Germany as “the right one.” But a private endorsement was as far as the president would go—
neither he nor the State Department would disavow Hoover’s relief plans to the American people
or to the exile governments.70 Britain had to continue to go it alone. “There is no satisfactory
evidence .. .” complained Maclean upon hearing the news, “that the U.S. Government are going
to do anything concrete to help us maintain our position.”71
Roosevelt’s reticence made sense politically. His primary objective was the passage of
the Lend-Lease bill, which called for the United States to provide the Allies, particularly Britain,
with any supplies that Roosevelt deemed to be “in the interest of national defense.” The countries
receiving the goods would pay for (or return) them as “the President deems satisfactory.”
Roosevelt wanted to turn the United States into an “arsenal of democracy” and eliminate the red
tape and financial limitations that had made it difficult for the Allies to receive the supplies they
desperately needed. The fight over Lend-Lease quickly turned into a political bar-room brawl,
with Hoover throwing some of the harshest punches. If Roosevelt came out against Hoover’s
relief plans, it would give the latter yet another avenue of attack.
69 Telegram 744, Eden to Halifax, 8 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220.
70 Telegram 626, Halifax to FO, 10 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220.
71 Note by Maclean, “Present Position of the Food Relief Question,” 11 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 268
Hoover believed that Roosevelt intended to drag the country into war and that Lend-
Lease embodied that recklessness. He did not oppose helping the Allies— he was for anything
“short of war”— but he questioned how the bill proposed to handle payments for the leased goods.
He also wanted Britain to clarify its war aims and intentions regarding any peace settlement. In a
January 10 press statement, Hoover took these concerns public, along with his conviction that the
bill asked Congress to relinquish too much power to the president. Over the next six weeks, he
worked with congressional Republicans, notably Sol Bloom, Arthur Vandenberg, and Robert
Taft, on modifying the bill’s terms. He did not attempt to keep his involvement quiet either. “I
have been in constant communication with Republicans in the House and Senate,” Hoover told a
reporter. “We are developing a definite program. . . I think we are going to defeat the big issue in
this bill, that is giving the president the power to make war.”72
In the middle of his efforts to oppose Lend-Lease, Hoover publicized his soup kitchen
program during a speech in Chicago on 16 February 1941. The timing of the speech was no
accident: this was the moment when Hoover had predicted that Belgium would begin to starve.
As with previous speeches, Hoover emphasized the plight of the people of the small democracies,
who “are ground between the millstones of the occupying army and blockade,” catalogued the
ravages of famine, and appealed to Christian compassion. He told the crowd that he proposed to
test his soup kitchen plan in Belgium and had already began discussions with Britain and
Germany. Hoover also made it clear that he did not oppose aiding Britain, but American
generosity should not extend to it alone: “But if that aid is to be given to preserve free nations,
have we not a right to suggest that these other free peoples— friends of America all of our
national life— be allowed also to live? I sometimes think the world is to be saved from
72 Best, 176.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 269
everything except starvation.” By attempting to equate military aid for Britain with food for the
occupied territories, Hoover sought to extend the logic of Lend-Lease to his own plans.73
Hoover’s speech and accompanying media blitz led to an upswing in support. “When I
started this campaign I realized we had a large majority against us,” he told his friend Paul Smith.
“Editorial opinion throughout the country was running 7 or 8 against us. During the last 60 days
it has changed and is now running 7 or 8 to 1 in our favor.” O f the major newspapers, only the
New York Herald Tribune and the Washington Post continued to oppose him. If even they did
not endorse him, Hoover made sure that the newspapers devoted space to his efforts through a
constant stream of press-friendly events. Additionally, whenever Hoover or one of the committee
members spoke to the press, they spoke from the same script, delivering a consistent message.
The National Committee for Food for the Five Small Democracies had also grown to 600 national
members and 2000 local committees. Support on college and university campuses began to
mushroom, with more than 185 chapters either formed or assembling. “It is rolling up like a
snowball,” observed Hoover.74 Not all of Hoover’s supporters, however, found their efforts to
spread the relief gospel appreciated. One of the committee’s most diligent volunteers reported
that she had been accused of “traitorism” and asked to resign from one of her social clubs.75
After his speech, Hoover and his associates spread the rumor that Britain supported his
plans and the exile governments had agreed to pay for relief. Neither was true. Whitehall also
73 For Hoover’s announcement, see: “Hoover Reveals Proposal to Feed Belgians as Test,”NYT, 17 February 1941. Hoover had invited the local consuls of Belgium, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, and Finland to attend the speech and sit on the stage in a show of support. Although the allied governments told their consuls they could attend as private citizens, Britain worried that the distinction would be lost on the American press. The Foreign Office decided to “invite” the alliesto instruct theirconsuls not attend. Memcon, Welles and Butler, 12 February 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7.Telegram 647, Halifax to FO, 12 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816. Telegram 821, FO to Halifax, 13 February 1941; Telegram 852, FO to Halifax, 14 February 1941; Telegram 715, Halifax to FO, 15 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220.
74 Memo, Hoover to Paul Smith, 21 February 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 3. “Group of Students Will Help Hoover,” NYT, 2 February 1941.
75 Memo, Raymond to Hoover, 25 February 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 270
found it disingenuous that Hoover failed to acknowledge Germany’s recent claim that “the
problem of feeding Europe has been solved once and for all.”76 Germany had also prepared
80,000 tons of wheat for shipment if the Belgians showed signs of cooperating with the rationing
program.77 Hoover did not acknowledge either of these developments. The Foreign Office found
his ability to dissemble remarkable: he accepted Germany’s pledge that it would not seize relief
supplies, but he would not take its word that it was feeding the occupied territories.
Between the speech and his anti-Lend-Lease activities, the Foreign Office’s hostility
towards Hoover ran at an all-time high.78 Its officials mocked his position as the so-called “king
of the humanitarians.” Halifax even talked about Hoover as if he were a criminal mastermind,
expressing concern about “Hoover’s active underground organization” and his efforts to make
“converts” to his cause.79 Their assessments reflected a permanent shift in the Foreign Office’s
thinking regarding Hoover, one that transformed him from an annoying misguided humanitarian
into a formidable menace. In Whitehall’s eyes, all Hoover needed was a mask and a cape and he
could join D.C. Comics’ stable of Axis villains as Mr. Blockade Buster, intent on bringing defeat
to Britain’s war effort through false humanitarianism.
Germany welcomed Hoover’s speech, using it as an opportunity to condemn the British
blockade. The speech dovetailed nicely with a new German radio campaign that blamed Britain
for food shortages in Belgium. Every news bulletin ended with: “Belgians. Remember that Mr.
Hoover, former President of the United States of America, proposed to supply the Belgian
76 Telegram 778, FO to Halifax, 18 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220.
77 Telegram 601, Berlin to Washington, 18 February 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 6. Note by Aveling, 12 February 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1220.
78 Minute (W1602/49/49) by Maclean, 19 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28817.
79 Telegram 648, Halifax to FO, 12 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28816.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 271
population with food. In the name of the English Government Lord Halifax has given the most
brutal refusal.”80
Germany also liked Hoover’s soup kitchen scheme, settling on terms with his
representatives at the beginning of March 1941. Throughout February, Stephens had conducted
negotiations with the chief military administrator of Belgium under the watchful eye of the
German Foreign Office. Germany agreed to allow the establishment of a permanent American
commission consisting of three or four representatives headquartered in Brussels. All American
relief organizations desiring to work in Belgium had to go through the commission. The soup
kitchens would be run by the Winter Help Committee, with the German Red Cross overseeing the
transfer of relief supplies. Any Belgian working for Germany would not be served a meal.
Germany agreed to supply 80,000 tons of wheat from its own stocks, over and above the 20,000
tons had it recently sent, along with additional shipments of potatoes. It also agreed not to
requisition imported food or remove similar stocks.81 Although Germany agreed to provide the
wheat, the commission still needed to import 20,000 tons of meat, fats, beans, and milk through
the blockade each month. None of the supplies could be purchased on the continent. “This
proposal now more constructive and favorable than as originally presented,” Rickard
telegrammed Gibson. “It now covers every honest objection that anyone can raise.”82 Britain,
80 Minute by Maclean, 24 February 194F TNA/PRO, F0371/28818.
81 Hoover insisted on having a permanent commission, but Germany did not like the idea of having foreigners getting a close up view of its occupation. In Hoover’s favor, however, was his insistence that the commission remain small. Minute of meeting between Reeder, Stephens, and MacDonald, 13 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1219. Telegram 42, Hartigan to Hoover, 26 February 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 60, File 5. Telegram, Rickard to Gibson, 26 February 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1221.
82 Telegram 46, Rickard to Gibson, March 1940. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28818. In addition to approaching Germany, Hoover also sent Gilbert Redfem to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviets. Hoover wanted to purchase 100,000 tons of wheat for Belgium and contemplated making additional purchases for Norway and the Netherlands. Hoover intended to apply to the U.S. Treasury to have Belgian funds released to cover the cost of the wheat. Redfem told Steinhardt that Hoover was prepared to pay “almost any price in dollars.” Redfem, however, worried that the Soviet Union would not sell to Hoover because of his anti- Soviet statements at the time of the Finnish-Soviet War. Instead of being prejudiced, the Soviets were confused. Two delegations— one German and one Belgian— were already in Moscow negotiating to buy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 272
however, agreed to Hoover’s soup kitchen program only if no food or goods passed the blockade.
Also, no money could be transferred from the United States to Europe for purchases within the
blockade.
Unhappy with the response from the Foreign Office and MEW, Hurbert Pierlot, the
Belgian prime minister, made a direct appeal to Churchill at the beginning of March. Pierlot
conveyed his fear that if the soup kitchen program was rejected out of hand, it would break the
spirit of the Belgian people. Ever polite, Churchill promised to consider the scheme, even though
“the difficulties were very great” and the plan would “seriously prejudice the blockade.” He
worried that if Britain allowed relief for Belgium, it would have to do the same for other
countries. Churchill also expressed concern that the safe conducts needed for the relief ships
would hamper the work of British submarines in the Atlantic. Aside from the strategic concerns,
he reminded Pierlot that Hoover had not expressed any “friendly sentiments” toward Roosevelt or
himself. Churchill found it difficult to look favorably on the plans of a man whom he could not
call friend.83
Hoover adamantly believed that his agreement with Germany required Britain to
reconsider its position. He begged Belgium to convince Britain to hold off on issuing a public
refusal, but Belgium refused. Churchill’s references to friendship had resonated with Pierlot.
Belgium told Hoover that it had become increasingly difficult to separate his two sides: the
Hoover who wanted to feed Europe and the Hoover who criticized Lend-Lease. How could
wheat for Belgium. Redfem’s overtures made for number three. After talking with the Belgian delegation, Redfem decided to abandon his efforts. The Soviets did, however, agree to sell him $1 00,000 worth of bacon, ham, lard, milk for Comporel’s continuing work in Warsaw and Cracow. “I am forcibly struck,” wrote Steinhardt, “by the fact that all of the meat which the commission is purchasing from the Soviet Government for relief purposes in Warsaw and Crakow consists of bacon and ham, whereas the relief population of these two cities is primarily made up of orthodox Jews.” Telegram 360, Steinhardt to Hull and FDR, 24 February 1941; Telegram 377, Steinhardt to Hull, 26 February 1941; Telegram 477, Steinhardt to Hull, 10 March 1941; Telegram 480, Steinhardt to Hull, 11 March 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6.
83 Memcon, Churchill and Pierlot, 4 March 1940. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28818.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 273
Belgium continue to do business with a man who opposed providing Britain with the assistance it
needed to fight Nazi Germany? Hoover protested that Belgium misunderstood: he favored
helping Britain, but opposed giving the president powers. Belgium, however, refused to budge,
leaving Hoover angry over what he regarded as a betrayal at a crucial moment in the relief
battle.84
With no chance of delaying Britain (and having received an advance copy of its
statement), Hoover decided to strike first. On March 9, he publicly restated his case for the soup
kitchen program. For the first time, Hoover acknowledged Germany’s role in creating the food
crisis: “[W]e wish no misunderstanding of our sympathy with the British cause, or that we have
any doubt that the original plight of the people in the small democracies is due to the German
invasion.” Despite the admission, he refrained from criticizing Germany’s occupation policies,
since chastising the Third Reich would doom his scheme. Hoover also could not restrain his
impulse to proclaim that he knew best or to disparage Britain. In order to bolster his case that
“the food situation in the occupied democracies is far worse than the British statement would
seem to indicate,” Hoover asked a “committee of experts” to review the findings of his
delegation, along with U.S. government statistics and British reports. “They fully confirm our
conclusions,” stated Hoover. He also pointed out the apparent inconsistency in Britain’s relief
policy: the American Red Cross was allowed to break the blockade to feed French children, but
he was not allowed to feed Belgian children.85 The tidy comparison, however, ignored the
distinction between occupied and unoccupied territory.
84 Memcon, Halifax and Theunis and Belgian Ambassador (written by A.K. Helm), 8 March 1941. TNA/PRO, FO371/28820. Telegram 1056, Halifax to FO, 9 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1221.
85 A Washington Post editorial commenting on Hoover’s speech stated that “it would be the height of absurdity” to endorse Hoover’s plan to send supplies to “Hitlerland.” “Aid and Mr. Hoover,”W ashington Post, 11 March 1941. For the text of the speech, see: Statement by Herbert Hoover on behalf of the National Committee on Food for the Small Democracies, 9 March 1941. DAFR, vol. Ill, July 1940-June 1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941). For the report by the “committee of experts” see: Report, Coulter, Falconer, Hobson, and McCollum to Hoover, 5 March 1941. HIA, Comporel, Box 1, File 4. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 274
Britain’s statement the following day stressed that it too had considered all of the facts,
but reached a very different conclusion. Although it appreciated American interest in relief,
Britain regarded it as “false humanitarianism” to allow supplies into the occupied territories. It
would not allow the soup kitchen scheme. British officials in Washington and London believed
that not enough had been done to educate the American public, so the statement also included an
explanation of its logic and utility:
The blockade is not a food blockade or an oil blockade but a blockade directed against the whole economic war machine of the enemy. It is intended to deprive him of imported goods, to drive him into using in uneconomic ways the goods which he possesses or produces, to aggravate his transport difficulties, and to render as costly and burdensome as possible the distribution of supplies within the areas he controls and utilizes for his warlike operations. Every import of food stuffs into an occupied territory conflicts directly with one or other of these objectives.
Taking a page from Hoover’s playbook, Britain made a reference, albeit a timid one, to religious
sentiment. The British regarded “it as their primary duty to rid Europe of Nazi tyranny and to
restore the conquered peoples to physical and spiritual freedom.”86
Although the refusal contained an element of spite against Hoover, Britain believed that a
large- scale relief program would spell disaster for the Allied war effort. British officials also did
not consider the guarantees given by Germany as adequate or binding. The only penalty for
stealing relief supplies— or continuing to requisition and export native Belgian goods— was the
termination of the relief program. In British eyes, termination constituted an empty threat: once it
began, the relief program would have to continue, even if leakages occurred, because the political
experts were John Lee Coulter, consulting economist and former member of the U.S. Tariff Commission; Professor J.I. Falconer, Ohio State University; Professor Asher Hobson, University of Wisconsin; and Dr. E.V. McCollum, Johns Hopkins University.
86 “British Renew Ban on Hoover Project to Feed Europeans,”NYT, 10 March 1941. For original draft o f statement, see Telegram 1086, FO to Halifax, 27 February 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 275
and propaganda price of stopping it would be too high.87
At the end of March, after the battle over Lend-Lease subsided, Britain extended an olive
branch to Hoover. Gerald Campbell, Halifax’s second-in-command, called on Hoover at his
apartment at W aldorf Astoria in New York City. The purpose of Campbell’s visit was to
discover if any common ground could be found between Hoover and Britain. The meeting,
however, only served to reinforce their divergent approaches to the relief issue. Hoover found
Campbell’s explanation of Britain’s policies insufficient and bristled at Campbell’s suggestion
that his relief campaign exuded anti-British sentiment. “I said that to disagree with British
policies was a right even of Englishmen,” recorded Hoover, “and certainly I had not surrendered
that by being an American.” Hoover also chided Campbell for Britain’s refusal to listen to him.
“He expressed great sorrow that we could not find some kind of basis of common action,” noted
Hoover. “I said that it could be found if the British would stop misrepresentation in their
propaganda and try to find a determination of fact and logical and humane policies.”88
Expert Opinions
Belgium had tried to play Britain and Hoover off of each other, but only succeeded in
overplaying its hand and straining relations with both of them. Hoover’s latest attempt at
pressuring Britain to change its policy led to yet another public repudiation. If they wanted a
87 MEW also predicted that Germany would benefit substantially from allowing the program. “The Germans,” argued MEW, “could reduce the rations of all but factory workers to the point where more and more of them would be thrown on the soup-kitchens.” With Hoover assuming the burden of feeding destitute Belgians and children, Germany could give double rations to Belgians toiling for the Reich, making them more productive workers. MEW also found dubious Hoover’s contention that the food necessary to run the relief program for one month equaled one (or three or four) day’s worth of food for Germany. Hoover intended for the comparison to demonstrate that the benefit to Germany, should it seize the supplies, would be negligible, but MEW drew a different conclusion: “It shows that Germany could at very little sacrifice herself supply Belgian needs over a considerable period.’Telegram 1209 ARFAR, FO to Halifax, 11 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1221. Letter (W 2511/49/49), Strang to Stirling, 12 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28818.
88 Memcon, Hoover and Campbell, 26 March 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 276
relief program to come to fruition, they both had to change their tactics. Belgium decided to
work more closely with Britain and the United States, while Hoover decided to woo his enemies.
In mid-March 1941, Belgian officials and MEW met for what would be the first of many
“discussions between experts.” Both sides agreed to keep the talks secret. The Belgians, who
looked longingly at the Vichy milk program, intended to use the discussions to beat MEW at its
own game of facts and figures. Belgian officials believed that the picture painted by the
“experts” would show a country in crisis and compel Britain to act.89 The Foreign Office and
MEW, however, regarded the discussions as a “sop” to Belgian officials, who they did not hold in
high regard. The Foreign Office feared that relief had become Belgium’s raison d'etre. T he
longer Britain held out against relief, the more likely it was that Belgium would “publicly run out
on the blockade.” Whitehall, therefore, welcomed the talks as an outlet for Belgium’s
ambitions.90
The discussions centered on the findings of what became known as the “Bigwood
Report.” A professor at the University of Brussels, Edouard Bigwood had represented Belgium
on the League of Nations’ International Technical Commission on Nutrition and served as the
General Secretary of the Belgian National Committee on Nutrition. After fleeing Belgium in the
spring of 1940, Bigwood made his way to Lisbon, where he prepared reports on Belgium’s food
89 Letter, Stirling to Strang, 17 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28819. Minute (W 3117/49/49) by Aveling, 22 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28819.
90 Steel was particularly harsh on the Belgians: “The Belgian Government are a gang of particularly unsubstantial shadows and they have no national public opinion to keep them on a straight course. The essential smallness and egotism of Belgian politics, combined with their inability to exercise any real influence on affairs, mean that the Ministers here will turn more and more into querulous mouthpieces of their countrymen in Belgium.” Minute (W3117/49/49) by Steel, 24 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28819. The Belgians only confirmed the Foreign Office’s estimation of their abilities at the end of March 1941. In a broadcast on Radio Belgique, Pierlot acknowledged that occupation authorities had requisitioned food and sent it to Germany. Belgian food also fed the occupation army, along with the large German civilian population that had recently settled in Belgium. Pierlot sought to cast blame on the Germans for the food shortages, but in doing so he gave Britain three solid reasons not provide relief. Letter, Aveling to Churchill, 28 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28820.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 277
supply as he waited for passage to Britain.91 In mid-April 1941 , MEW ’s Nutrition Committee
reviewed Bigwood’s reports and accepted his conclusion that “there were serious deficiencies of
certain foodstuffs in Belgium.” Regretting that it had allowed things to progress so rapidly,
MEW tried to bog the discussions down by having the “experts” design an ideal relief program.92
The Belgians, however, quickly presented a plan to provide relief to endangered groups, Belgians
whose development or longevity would be adversely affected by malnutrition.93 MEW and the
Foreign Office wanted the discussions to take months, but the Belgians had maneuvered the
experts into making their findings in less than six weeks. That left MEW with only one option:
initiate a never-ending discussion of the relief plan’s merits.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Belgium attempted to win over Roosevelt. Belgian
officials decided to focus their efforts on the president, since his request led to the Vichy milk
program. They wagered that if he made a similar request on Belgium’s behalf, Churchill would
find it difficult to ignore. Tired of Eloover’s high-handed ways, Belgian officials also liked the
prospect of working with the American Red Cross. Belgium’s courtship of Roosevelt started at
the beginning of April, when Camille Gutt, Belgium’s finance minister, traveled to Washington
from London. Gutt’s public mission was to secure $280 million in Belgian assets held by the
91 Memcon, Nicholls, Hall, Bigwood, Borel de Bitche, Langenhove. 12 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28819. Letter (W2511/49/49), Strang to Stirling, 12 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28818.
92 Minute of MEW, Bigwood, and van Langenhove, 8 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28823.
93 Letter, Langenhove to Drogheda, 29 April 1941; “A Scheme for Allievating the Sufferings of Children and of People Needing a Special Diet in Belgium,” 30 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28823. The Belgians, however, quickly presented a plan to provide relief to “endangered” groups— those whose development or longevity would be adversely affected by malnutrition. Under the plan, 3.4 million Belgians— children, adolescents (14 to 20 years old), pregnant women and nursing mothers, invalids, people in weak physical condition, and the elderly— out of a population of 8.4 million would receive relief. The food would be distributed through canteens run by the Belgian Red Cross under the close supervision and control of a neutral commission. Germany would also have to refrain from looting, requisitioning, and exporting Belgian foodstuffs. Carrying out the program required the importation of 18,000 tons of food per month from the United States.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 278
Bank of France in the United States; his private mission was to lobby Roosevelt for relief.94 The
American press, which was more interested in lurid stories about starving women and children
than complex financial machinations, encouraged Gutt to talk about relief and conditions in
Belgium. “We are cooperating to the fullest extent with the British in our common end, which is
to win the war,” Gutt told reporters. “Certainly we are not going to break or impair a weapon in
their hands. On the other hand, we do fight to liberate Belgium, and not to liberate a generation
of crippled and disabled men and women.”95 But Gutt’s hopes for Roosevelt were quickly
dashed. The White Flouse and the State Department proved just as unreceptive to Belgian
overtures as Downing Street and the Foreign Office.96 If Gutt— and the Belgian government—
learned one thing from his trip, it was that the relief issue had to be settled in London.97
Having failed to enlist Roosevelt, Gutt intended to tell his government to take anything
Britain offered. “This,” observed Tuck, “is about an all-time low.”98 Hoover and his colleagues
found Belgium’s resignation infuriating, because they had focused their efforts on ratcheting up
their campaign. They remained convinced that American public opinion could change Britain’s
relief policy— it just had to be mobilized. To support their strategy, the committee published
“Must They Starve?,” a pamphlet that encouraged Americans to discuss the relief issue with their
friends and neighbors. The cover featured a photograph of two girls, a child and a teenager, who
94 Telegram 1714, FO to Halifax, 29 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28819.
95 “Belgium Starving, Emissary Reports,”NYT, 8 April 1941. “Belgian Minister of Finance Wary of Food Aid to People,” LAT, 8 April 1941. “Feeding of Belgium Aim of Gutt Here,” NYT, 18 April 1941.
96 Memcon, Hull, Gutt, Theunis, and Straten-Ponthoz, 11 April 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7. Gutt met with Roosevelt on 11 April 1941.
97 Letter No. 51, Aveling to Eden, 12 May 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28821. The frosty reception did not prevent Gutt from pressing his case in a letter thanking Roosevelt for meeting with him. “[W]e will find in you our strongest supporter,” he wrote, “for you will be thinking of our poor boys and girls, half famished, and of future mothers unable to bring to this world normal, healthy children.”Letter, Gutt to Roosevelt, 28 April 1941. FDRL, OF 14, Box 1, Gov’t ofBelgium, 1940-45.
98 Letter, Tuck to Hoover, 15 April 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 1., Tuck to Hoover, 7 May 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 2. “Lutheran Clergymen Favor Hoover Plan,”Washington Post, 11 December 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 279
appear beautiful yet beleaguered, an image intended to provoke both sympathy and identification
with their struggle. “Of the 37,000,000 people in Belgium, Holland, Norway, Central Poland,
and Finland, great numbers are facing death fromfamine and disease,” read the pamphlet’s cover.
“America could exert great influence to put an end to this. We are not asking for money,
supplies, or ships. What we need is an aroused public conscience
Hoover concentrated on building grassroots support by focusing on groups that appeared
to have a vested interest in the issue. Remembering their strong support for his efforts during the
First World War and his initial efforts for Poland, Hoover courted American labor unions. Labor
leaders, however, proved both “indifferent and unsympathetic” to his campaign.100 Raymond
Bellamy, who had the job of lobbying the unions, found the response shocking. “[Tjhere
appears,” he told Hoover, “a complete voluntary surrender of initiative and liberty of action to the
present administration in a blind form of allegiance to the President.”101 Hoover had better luck
with another group: women. In communities across the country, prominent women— socialites,
educators, community activists, philanthropists— headlined mass meetings calling for relief. The
outreach strategy provided the committee with access to a new source of support and offered an
alternative voice to that of patriarchal Hoover. Women were talking to other women about
women and children starving.102
Hoover also continued to court religious support. During the fall, he received
endorsements from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, the World Relief
99 “Must They Starve” by National Committee on Food for Small Democracies, 9 April 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7.
100 Letter, Bellamy to Hoover, 23 April 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 1.
101 Letter, Bellamy to Hoover, 23 April 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 1.
102 Memo, Hamilton to Hoover, 4 April 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 2. The focus on the grassroots level also meant that National Committee no longer actively recruited members, except in cases where “a key person gets “religion” and it is advantageous to have him on the Committee.” Memo, Richmond to Hoover, 7 April 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 280
Committee of the Northern Baptist Convention, International Society of Christian Endeavor, and
Catholic groups. During the spring, he continued to pick up endorsements from clergymen across
the country, including Reinhold Niebuhr.103 Hoover hoped that endorsements by church leaders
would result in Sunday morning sermons extolling the need for relief. Parishioners also pressed
their ministers to support Hoover. The Watchman Examiner, the largest Baptist newspaper,
reported that Baptist pastors in the North and South were inundated with appeals to support his
plans.104 Hoover also had his eye on world religious opinion. Wanting to “stir the decency and
the Christian spirit of the world into action and reason,” Hoover asked Cardinal William
O’Connell, the Archbishop of Boston, to ask the Pope issue an appeal for relief. O’Connell not
only passed on Hoover’s request to the Vatican, but also organized an endorsement signed by
three cardinals and seventeen bishops.105
To foil the sway of “Hoover and his 4000 pulpits,” Van Dusen and the Committee to
Defend America by Aiding the Allies mounted a counter campaign with the help of the British
Embassy. Van Dusen, in particular, worried about the inroads Hoover continued to make the
religious community and in the West. Like any good politician, Hoover had spun numbers,
agreements, and arrangements to suit his cause, resulting in, what Noel Hall, MEW ’s man in
Washington, described as “a number of partially correct statements, and also a large number of
misunderstandings.” There was no easy way for Britain to explain Hoover’s slight of hand— the
103 “Backs Hoover’s Proposal,”NYT, 17 November 1940. “Religious Leaders Back Hoover Plan,”NYT, 17 March 1941.
104 “Food as War Strategy,”The Watchman Examiner, 20 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28822. Hoover, however, could not count on the wholesale support of the American religious community. Many were reluctant to enter the realm of politics. The Watchman Examiner refused to endorse Hoover’s efforts on the grounds that “the question remains in the sphere of political partisanship and is embarrassing to religious bodies such as ours.”
105 Letter, Hoover to O’Connell, 12 March 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 4. Hoover also asked O’Connell to lobby the Pope at the end of December 1940. Letter, Forbes to Hoover, 23 December 1940. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 1. “Archbishops Back Hoover Food Plan,”NYT, 25 March 1941.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 281
explanations required qualifications, charts, and footnotes.106 Rather than nit-pick, the committee
decided to focus on one message: sending relief would hurt the war effort. As the pamphlet
“Shall We Feed Europe?” explained it:
The campaign to send food is weakening the defense of freedom. It is: Dividing and diverting aid-for-the-Allies efforts; Spreading a false impression of lack of unity within the Allied ranks; Encouraging Hitler to delay return of food stolen from conquered countries; Thus, actually aggravating suffering and need in the ‘Little Democracies.’ WE MUST NOT FEED THE AXIS WAR MACHINE.
The pamphlet concluded by encouraging readers to “Write or wire the President that you trust the
American and British governments to deal with the food question.”107 Van Dusen also took on
Hoover in the pages of The Times, highlighting Hoover’s involvement in the campaign against
Lend-Lease, suggesting that Hoover’s opposition alienated people from his relief efforts.
Notoriously thin skinned, Hoover charged Van Dusen with running a “smear” campaign and
being part of “a small but zealous group whose distortion of fact do the British cause daily
harm .” 108
In addition to courting American public opinion, Hoover waged a quieter campaign to
win an ally in the Roosevelt administration, Cordell Hull. The choice made sense given Hull’s
position and his interest in relief. Conversations between State Department officials and
Hoover’s committee members also had been friendly, even encouraging. James Dunn even told
106 Letter, Van Dusen to McGeachy, 19 May 1941; Letter, Hall to Van Dusen, 23 May 1941; Telegram 1873 ARFAR, Hall to MEW, 11 April 1941; Telegram 1811 ARFAR, MEW to Hall, 12 April 1941; Telegram 1873 ARFAR, Hall to MEW, 11 April 1941; Telegram 1811 ARFAR, MEW to Hall, 12 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1221.
107 “Shall We Feed Europe?” by Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, May 1941. HIA, CPR, Box 17, File 7. Statement of Policy by Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, 7 May 1941. HIA, CPR, Box 17, File 7. Van Dusen urged Halifax to get the White House to make a statement against Hoover. He believed the statement would help counteract the appeal of Hoover’s message to concerned Christians. Telegram 1427, Flalifaxto FO, 1 April 1941. PRO, F0371/28819.
108 Letter to the Editor (Feeding Europe: Mr. Hoover on His Purposes: Four Conditions For Germany) by Herbert Hoover, Times, 16 April 1941. Letter to the Editor (“Feeding Europe: Mr. Hoover’s Scheme: Why Americans Do Not Support It”) by Henry Van Dusen,Times, 6 May 1941. Gibson also came to Hoover’s defense, but did not address his role in opposing Lend-Lease. Letter to the Editor (“Mr. Hoover and Britain: A Reply to a Critic”) by Hugh Gibson,Times, 12 May 1941.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 282
Tuck that there was “no rooted opposition in the State Department to the Hoover Plan.109 Rather
than meet with Hull, Hoover decided to write him, sparking the beginning of an extraordinary
correspondence between March and June 1941. “I feel deeply concerned,” wrote Hoover at the
beginning of March, “that America should ever be thought of as opposing the saving of these
millions of people.” He suggested that the administration suffered from “an entire
misunderstanding of the actual situation in these countries.” (It was typical of Hoover to believe
that anyone who disagreed with him did so out of reason rather than misinformation.) Hoover
also told Hull that he regarded it as improper for the administration to attempt to influence the
allies regarding his work.110 Hull, however, declined to extend such an assurance.111
Hoover’s overtures failed to sway Hull, a fact he made clear to his persistent
correspondent.112 Indeed, Hull and the State Department were increasingly leery of Hoover.
Since the fall of 1939, State had received reports of misdeeds by Hoover’s representatives,
including overly friendly relations with high-ranking Nazis, the use of strong-arm tactics on
Baltic officials, and politically inopportune remarks after imbibing too much wine, but they were
more gossip worthy than politically explosive. But during a visit to Moscow, Gilbert Redfern,
one of Hoover’s representatives, spoke candidly about his work and Hoover’s organization with
Lawrence Steinhardt, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union. Redfem had reluctantly
concluded that “Hoover and at least some of his associates are engaged in deliberate campaign to
break the British blockade and that while humanitarian motives might be ascribed to some of the
individuals associated with this effort he is convinced that the Germans are consciously making
109 Memo, Tuck to Hoover, 24 January 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 63, File 2.
110 Letter, Hoover to Hull, 5 March 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6. Letter, Hoover to Hull, 27 March 1941; Letter, Hoover to Hull, 3 June 1941; Letter, Hoover to Hull, 24 April 1941; Letter, Hull to Hoover, 10 May 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7.
111 Letter, Hull to Hoover, 14 March 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 6.
112 Letter, Hull to Hoover, 11 April 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 283
effective use of the hostility of Hoover and some of this associates toward the administration.”
Redfem characterized Stephens as “sincere and well intentioned,” while charging the Berlin-
based Hartigan and Murray with being pro-Nazi and anti-British. The Germans, he claimed,
intentionally fed them false reports of starvation in the occupied territories in order to fan
Hoover’s efforts. “I assume that he has unburdened himself of the foregoing,” Steinhardt told
Hull, “in an effort to square his conscience with his present activities and at the same time prevent
what he sincerely, so far as I am judge, considers to be a deliberate attempt to break the British
blockade on a substantial scale throughout Europe.”113
The State Department did not think that Hoover was a closet Nazi. Hull did, however,
believe that the conduct of Hoover’s envoys could be used to discredit him. He also liked the
idea of sabotaging Hoover, but he did not want to get his hands dirty. Instead, he hinted to
Halifax that Britain would be better suited to the task, including using its intelligence networks to
dig up more dirt. What Hull did not (and could not) know was that British intelligence had been
keeping tabs on Hartigan and Murray for months— the Foreign Office and MEW knew all about
their pro-Nazi leanings. In fact, Halifax had recently received a “read and bum” telegram from
Eden with the latest news. Hull also was not the first person to propose going after Hoover
through his representatives. The Foreign Office and MEW, frustrated with “the rascal Hoover,”
regularly devised, but never carried out, schemes to expose them and cast Hoover in a sinister
lig h t.114
By the end of June 1941, Hull had enough of Hoover and his moral puzzles. “I cannot
consistently elaborate in writing,” he wrote Hoover, “on the difficult and highly complicated
113 Telegram 396, Steinhardt to Hull and FDR, 28 February 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M 1284, Roll 6.
114 Telegram 1852, Eden to Halifax, 5 April 1941. TNA/PRO, FO371/28820.Telegram 1559A, Halifax to Eden, 9 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28820. Letter (W2015/49/49), Steel to Bowes-Lyon, 12 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28817. Letter (W2015/49/49), Bowes-Lyon to Steel, 18 March 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28817. Letter, Stirling to Steel, 23 April 1941; Minutes (W 5015/49/49) by Maclean, Steel, Ronald, and Scott, 1-2 May 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28821.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 284
military and other closely allied considerations involved in this proposal.” Rather than pose his
own rhetorical questions, Hull decided to call Hoover’s bluff and demanded that Hoover produce
concrete evidence to back his proposals: “If there is any explanation satisfactory to you as to
why, when the Hitler regime claims to have abundance of stocks of food, the rulers of that
country have not made provision at least to restore the to occupied countries the vast stocks of
food they have extracted from them since their invasion of those countries, such data would be of
interest to this Department.”115 Unable to provide such explanations or data, Hoover ended their
correspondence. He would have to look elsewhere for support.
Hand to Mouth
In June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The showdown between the two
former allies captured the attention of the American public and diverted interest away from the
relief issue. The new twist in the war, however, was the least of Hoover’s worries. He had
developed a major credibility gap. The spring and summer harvests took the edge off the food
situation in the occupied territories, making Hoover’s previous claims of impending starvation
sound alarmist. Hoover also found it difficult to shake charges that none of the exile
governments had asked for his help.116 Neither Norway nor the Netherlands came forward to
claim him. Belgian officials no longer cooperated with him, a predicament that forced Hoover to
consider importing Belgians from occupied Belgium to testily to conditions in order to bolster his
campaign.117 Hoover and Poland continued to fight over money promised, but never delivered.
As for Finland, it had spent months trying to unshackle itself from Hoover’s campaign. Since
Germany did not occupy Finland, it was not subject to the British blockade and could receive
115 Letter, Hull to Hoover, 28 June 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 7.
116 Telegram 93, Galpin to Gibson, 22 April 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28821.
n7Telegram, Hoover to Galpin, 30 July 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 285
relief supplies. Lack of public support from the exile governments cast a shadow on the
authenticity of Hoover’s appeal.
Rather than give up, Hoover regrouped and turned his attention to securing Congressional
support.'18 The first victory came in June when Elmer Thomas, a Democrat from Oklahoma,
introduced on behalf of himself and thirty-six senators a resolution that urged the United States to
work with Britain and other governments to set up “systematic and definite relief for all stricken
and hungry countries, beginning with Belgium, where the need is now most acute.” The
resolution, which received tri-partisan support in the form of sixteen Democrats, twenty
Republicans, and one Progressive, signaled that relief was not merely the concern of an old-
school Republican."9 But the improved food situation in the occupied territories made it difficult
for Hoover and his supporters talk with any authority about starving women and children.
Indeed, Raymond Richmond, who led Hoover’s lobbying efforts in Washington, reported that
“our situation was becoming most embarrassing with our friends.” Hoover told him to forge
ahead, emphasizing that the harvest merely delivered a temporary reprieve. Aware of importance
of timing, Hoover hoped to have hearings on relief delayed until September. At that point, the
food situation for the impending winter would be clearer and a stronger case for taking action
could be made.120
Hoover regarded congressional hearings as inevitable— and desirable— but not everyone
wanted to debate his plan. Thomas’ resolution was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which would decide whether to forward it to the Senate for a vote. Five members of
the committee— Arthur Capper (R-KS), Guy Gillette (D-IA), Hiram Johnson, Nye, and
118 Letter, Van Dusen to Cavert et al, 15 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28827.
119 77th Congress, S. Res. 124, 2 June 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 7. “Senate Group Urges Food for Conquered: Parties United in Resolution— British Cooperation Sought,”NYT, 3 June 1941.
120 Telegram, Hoover to Tuck, 7 July 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 2. Letter, Hoover to Richmond, 11 July 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 286
Vandenberg—were “Hoover’s men.” But they faced formidable opposition from Claude Pepper
(D-FL) and Tom Connally (D-TX), who opposed an open hearing, believing that Hoover wanted
to use it to attract publicity. “The situation is one that will have to be watched very closely,”
Richmond told Hoover. “The reason is that the statements made by Senators Pepper and
Connally, both strong administration men, indicate that the administration will jump on us and
put us out of business if they can get the right opportunity. It would be a feather in their cap with
Roosevelt and Hull if they could catch us unawares and kill us off.” Until the hearings
materialized, Hoover consented to have his correspondence with Hull discretely passed around
Capitol Hill. He believed that it demonstrated the State Department’s obstructionist position on
the relief issue.121
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office found the Belgians increasingly testy about relief.122
Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union closed off the best source of supplies within the
blockade and attempts to organize a food parcel scheme from Portugal became bogged down in
red-tape.123 The Belgians had also caught on to M EW ’s game of dragging out the discussions,
robbing the British government of a valuable safety valve. “The disappearance of the possibility
of arranging supplies from Russia leaves us in an awkward position,” wrote Maclean. “Owing to
MEW ’s unimaginative stone-walling, the opportunity to show that we are willing to help in
opening up this source has been missed. There is now no major source of supplies within the
blockade and the fact must be faced that there is no gesture of any substance which we can make
121 Letter, Richmond to Hoover, 10 July 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 3. Letter, Richmond to Hoover, 8 August 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 3.
122 Letter (W 7140/49/49), Steel to Stirling, 21 June 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28823. Minute (W7831/49/49) by Steel, 28 June 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28823.
123 Letter, Dalton to Spaak, 10 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28823.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 287
to the Belgians without breaching the blockade.”124 Given the situation, the Foreign Office
expected the Belgians to become even more outspoken on the relief issue, which would play right
into Hoover’s hands. Only the harvest, paltry as it was, saved Britain from having to deal with a
full-scale revolt by Belgium.125
After a quiet August, Hoover ramped up his campaign in September with the publication
of “The Food Situation in Belgium as of July 1941.” The pamphlet featured an introduction by
Hoover that emphasized the plight of Belgian children and the text of the previously secret
Bigwood report. With its ominous prediction that the “situation next winter may lead to a
catastrophe,” the Bigwood report appeared tailor-made for Hoover’s campaign.126 The data used
by the report, however, was almost five months old. It did not, for example, take into
consideration that Germany had imported wheat to maintain the bread ration since March.127
The publication of the Bigwood report made a minor splash in the American press, but
generated a tempest in London.128 Since the report had served as the basis for the secret
discussions between Britain and Belgium, the Foreign Office and MEW regarded its publication
as a violation of trust. It turned out, however, that Bigwood had been duped: he gave Gibson a
copy of the report after receiving assurances that Hoover was no longer interested in relief and
with the understanding that it not be published. Gibson passed it on to Hoover, who decided to
124 Minute (W 7831/49/49) by Maclean, 28 June 1941; Minute (W 7831/49/49) by Steel, 30 June 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28823.
125 Letter No. 69, Aveling to Eden, 30 June 1941; Letter (W 7831/49/49), Steel to Stirling, 2 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28823. Letter (W8891/49/49), Eden to Aveling, 19 Julyl 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28824. Minute (W9249/49/49) by Eden, 30 July - 4 August 1940. TNA/PRO, F0371/28825.
126 Report by E.J. Bigwood, “The Food Situation in Belgium as of July 1941.” FIIA, FSD, Box 7, File 3.
127 Telegram 5005 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 10 September 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826.
128 “Belgium Reported Slowly Starving,”NYT, 8 September 1941, p. 9. “Belgian Adults Being Starved, Says Report,”LA T, 9 September 1941.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 288
publish it. While Bigwood disliked being made a fool, Belgium welcomed the renewed attention
to its plight.129
As Congress returned to session, Hoover found widespread support in the House of
Representatives as a result of Richmond’s summer lobbying efforts.130 A canvassing of the
southern states in the dog days of August revealed support from twenty-one congressmen.131
That was just the beginning: by the middle of October, Richmond had signed up 222
congressmen, of which 102 were Democrats. “This is the largest number of Democrats in the
present House that have opposed the Administration on any policy,” Richmond told Hoover.
When it comes to passing a bill, the devil is in the math. In the fall of 1941, the House consisted
of 432 members (there were three vacancies owing to deaths), meaning that more than half of the
House supported Hoover. “So far as the House is concerned, the cards are in our hands,”
observed Richmond. “It merely remains for us to use them, if, as and when we decide to.”132
The White House also had its own cards to play. During September 1941, Richard Allen
met with British and Belgian officials in London to discuss the feasibility of the American Red
Cross providing Belgium with a milk program. Unfortunately for Belgium— and much to the
relief of the Foreign Office and MEW— the American Red Cross did not feel that it could do a
milk program for Belgium while ignoring the other occupied territories. So what would it take to
do an inclusive milk program? To provide one pint of milk per day to the 19.6 million children
129 Letter, Langenhove to Leith-Ross, 19 September 1941; Letter, Langenhove to Leith-Ross, 16 September 1941; Telegram 5464 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 20 September 1941; Telegram 299 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 22 September 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28826.
130 Letter, Richmond to Hoover, 15 August 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 2. Richmond has 4 or 5 people working with him, along with consultants as needed.
131 Memo, Homer to Hoover, 26 August 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 2. A resolution supporting Hoover had been introduced in the House by Representative Lensinski in June. See 77th Congress, H. Res. 245, 20 June 1941.
132 Memo, Richmond to Hoover, 18 October 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 3. Fifty representatives refused to sign up and another 44 were clearly “administration men.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 289
(fourteen and under) in Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, occupied France, Vichy France,
Greece, and Yugoslavia, required importing more than 320,500 tons of powdered milk. Each ton
cost $650, bringing the price tag to $208,338,050. Aside from the considerable cost, there was
the simple fact that such a large quantity of powdered milk was not available. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture said that it would take several years of increased production before the
numbers could be met.133 The cost and supply problems meant that the occupied territories would
not be receiving a milk program anytime soon. Even though the outcome of the discussions
proved depressing for Belgium, they demonstrated that the United States and Britain (albeit
reluctantly) were willing to consider options. They also temporarily quelled Belgium’s
agitation.134
On 18 October 1941, Roosevelt asked Congress for $50 million in foreign war relief, a
move interpreted in some quarters as a response to Hoover. The request supplemented the $50
million already made available to the American Red Cross, the majority of which had been spent
helping refugees, mainly in Britain and Vichy France. Roosevelt’s new request expanded the
definition of those who could be aided. Aid could be given to not only refugees, but also to “the
sick and destitute.” In all likelihood, most of the money would be used to help refugees, but the
expansive language gave Roosevelt discretion to help other groups should he so desire.135
The timing of Roosevelt’s request could not have been worse for Hoover. The following
day he delivered a speech designed to re-launch his relief campaign. There is no clear evidence
that the White House deliberately sought to steal some of Hoover’s thunder, but the president’s
133 Letter, Allen to Davis, 29 September 1941. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 8.
134 Letter (W11648/49/49), Law to Foot, 26 September 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28827.
135 “President Requests $50,000,000 for Food,” NYT, 19 October 1941. On 5 October 1941, the committee appointed by Roosevelt to study relief issued an interim report that urged all American relief activities be coordinated through a central body to prevent duplication and waste. The committee consisted of Joseph E. Davies (who also served as chair) Frederick Keppel, and Charles Taft. See “New Deal Urged for War Relief,”NYT, 5 October 1941.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 290
disdain for Hoover cannot be ignored. In renewing his appeal, Hoover posed the question: “Can
Europe’s Children Be Saved?” (It also served as the speech’s title.) “Today there are somewhere
near 40,000,000 million children in German-controlled democracies,” said Hoover. “Millions of
them are in jeopardy.” He claimed that he was not blind to the war’s atrocities— women and
children killed by bombing, the sinking of ships, executed hostages, and men dying on
battlefields across Europe. “1 pray all these things may be stopped,” he said. “But I know they
will not be stopped now. There is, however, the possibility that this one horror of the sacrifice of
children could be stopped.” Hoover portrayed helping Europe’s children as a shared duty:
We talk much of our responsibility to the future of civilization. Is not the preservation of these children also part of this responsibility? Hitler cannot be defeated with armies of starving children. In conclusion, I do not believe it would make the slightest difference in the military outcome of this war if we assured food to the needy among the whole 40,000,000 democratic children in Europe. The Germans will not lose this war from a shortage of food.
To meet the needs of Europe’s children, Hoover advocated the adoption of his soup kitchen plan
and urged the U.S. government to use “every influence in its power” to bring about an agreement
that would permit distribution of food in countries under supervision of a neutral government,
such as Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, or Argentina.
Hoover also used to the speech to attempt to reestablish his authority to make appeals for
the small democracies. He acknowledged that his appeals were made on behalf of the people of
the small democracies— not the exile governments. “And I would like to say something to the
exiled governments of some of the small democracies,” said Hoover. “A year ago officials of
each of them appealed to me to lead this cause for their people. I am well aware that they have
ceased these appeals. Some of them inform me they must obey the policies o f the western
democracies.” He included the statement to defuse the frequent criticism that he acted without
the blessing of the exile governments. (Those same governments, however, would certainly have
quibbled with his portrayal of them and thei r relations with Britain.) Hoover also stated his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 291
conviction that Lend-Lease gave the American people the right to voice an opinion about the
conduct of the war. The large number of Americans who supported relief deserved to have their
views taken seriously. “Surely such an expression of American compassion,” said Hoover,
“deserves more adequate attention from our Government than to be dismissed by a curt letter
from our State Department.” 136
Despite his best efforts, Hoover could not parlay his support into concrete action. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee indefinitely postponed consideration of his relief plan.
Every time a vote was scheduled to decide whether to hold hearings, the committee lacked the
necessary quorum.137 The delay prompted the L.A. Times to rant that “open discussion of issues
is the American way and Congress should express itself one way or another.”138 Even the
publication of the correspondence between Floover and Hull did little to move the issue.139
Supporters on both sides believed it confirmed what they already knew: the State Department
refused to consider Hoover’s arguments or Hoover’s possessed an outsized ego that could not
cope with being out of office during a time of crisis. The second assessment gained more
currency as Hoover spoke with increasing frequency against Roosevelt’s policy choices. In the
wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Hoover charged that “the ideological war to
136 “New Hoover Plea Made to Nation,”NYT, 20 October 1941. “Text of Hoover Talk on War Relief Plan,” LA T, 20 October 1941. “Food Lack Won’t Beat Axis, Says Hoover in Plea for Plan,”Washington Post, 20 October 1941. Hoover also mentioned the plight of Polish Jews in his speech. He noted that the deaths of Jews living in Warsaw had increased 15 times the normal rate in July 1941, forcing the municipal newspaper to appeal to people not to throw the bodies in the streets.
137 Letter, Johnson to Richmond, 27 September 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 3. The postponement occurred because the committee lacked a quorum, so a vote could not be taken. Newspapers interpreted the postponement as an omen that Hoover’s scheme had been shelved. Hiram Johnson, however, told Richmond that was not the case— the committee could vote to hold hearings at any time in the future.
138 “Mercy or Expediency in Trying to Feed Europe,”LAT, 19 October 1941.
139 “Hoover Assailed Hull for Food Stand,”NYT, 17 October 1941. “Hoover Raps Hunger Policy,”NYT, 17 October 1941. Telegram 6027 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 18 October 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1222.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 292
bring the four freedoms to the world died” when the United States agreed to aid Stalin.140 In mid-
September, Hoover again criticized Roosevelt’s handling of the war, specifically allowing
American warships to flirt with danger zones and sending American merchant ships loaded with
supplies across the Atlantic. He believed that these policies inched the country towards war,
robbing Congress of its declaratory rights.141 Hoover’s opining prompted a rebuke from Willkie,
who suggested that Hoover followed a “wholly unrealistic doctrine.” Assailing isolationism,
Willkie urged Americans to rally around Roosevelt and an end “all trivial controversies.”142
For more than a year, Britain had looked for a way to defeat Hoover’s relief movement.
Every time Britain blocked one of his proposals, he rebounded with a new version. The weapon
that finally accomplished that Herculian task was not a public relations campaign or the use of
political dirty tricks, but an infamous twist in the war: Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941. With America on a war-footing, the nation’s focus turned to mobilizing men
and materiel and away from feeding civilians in the occupied territories. The United States also
lost its neutral status, rendering Hoover’s proposals obsolete. “We do not wish to embarrass our
Government in time of war,” Hoover wrote his committee members at the end of December 1941.
“Therefore we will not press our public educational activities. But we shall hope that the
international situation, and a constantly growing need, may advance the subject with the
Government officials concerned.” He told his supporters that the committee would “remain in
140 “Appeal to American Reason: Mr. Hoover’s Programme,”Times, 1 July 1941. Hoover also said that neither the United States nor Nazi Germany would be in a position to wage war against each other for at least ten years.
141 “Mr. Hoover Talks o f ‘Steps to War,’”Times, 18 September 1941.
142 “Willkie Attacks Advice by Hoover,”NYT, 18 September 1941.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 293
existence and await an opportunity for service in behalf of world democracy,” but by the end of
January 1942 everyone working for it was out of a job.143
The majority of the scholars who have written about Hoover’s post-presidential years
have discounted his involvement in the relief issue, focusing instead on his political aspirations
and involvement in the isolationist movement. Part of the reason for the portrayal comes from an
unwillingness to dig into the maze of politics surrounding the relief issue and a failure to
understand the magnitude of the campaign. When placed beside issues such as Lend-Lease and
isolationism, relief appears to be a minor consideration. A closer examination of Hoover’s relief
efforts, however, reveals that it is almost impossible to separate them. From the fall of 1940 to
the end of 1941, Hoover conducted the largest pro-relief campaign of the war. He mobilized
American public opinion by relying on traditional campaign tactics, supplemented by an appeal to
Christian charity. Hoover fashioned himself as the Good Samaritan, the man who would succor
the occupied countries despite their thieving overseers. His egocentric approach, however,
alienated the Allied governments, robbing him of an important leverage of support. They did not
like his high-handed methods or his role in the isolationist movement. If Hoover had succeeded
in unifying the Allied governments behind his plan, he would have created a political force that
Britain would have found difficult to resist. At the same time, Hoover’s isolationist stance and
ongoing criticism of Roosevelt gave the State Department and the White House a reason to ignore
the relief movement.
British officials viewed Hoover as Mr. Blockade Buster, a man intent on breaking the
blockade no matter the strategic implications for Britain’s war effort. British officials respected
Hoover and his work during the First World War, but he lost their respect when the relief
movement became cozy with the isolationists and he attacked Lend-Lease. Even if conditions
143 Letter, Hoover to Committee Member, 27 December 1941. H1A, Comporel, Box 29, File 6. Memo, Tuck to Hoover, 17 December 1941. HIA, FSD, Box 64, File 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 294
deteriorated to the point where Britain realized that it had to do something to help the occupied
territories, they would not do it in partnership with Hoover. He was, in Churchill’s words, no
friend of Britain.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER SEVEN
FAMINE COMES TO GREECE
In mid-April 1942, Burton Berry, the American consul in Istanbul, reviewed some
photographs taken by a neutral observer who had just spent two weeks surveying conditions in
occupied Greece. Unable to obtain copies, Berry described the photos and the observer’s
experiences to his superiors at the State Department:
There were pictures of garbage cans overflowing; with men, women, and children searching among the garbage for bits of things that they could put into their mouths. He told me stories of seeing gangs of children following German soldiers who, on the streets, were eating olives. When a soldier spat out a seed, the children rushed for it and the successful contender popped it into his mouth and sucked it until clean. He told me of processions of people seen walking to the “city dumps” where they picked over the long-discarded tin cans. When someone found a sardine or similar can, he would clean the inside can with his tongue, much as cats used to clean the inside of freshly opened sardine tins. He showed me pictures of people on the streets who had fallen from exhaustion and died. He said that often, even in the centre of towns, these corpses had remained for twenty-four hours before the city sanitary services could find the time to collect them all. He showed me photographs of trucks of the city services heaped high with dead bodies and transported in the same fashion as fuel wood used to be transported. He showed me pictures of the congested morgue and the yard before it that was filled with bodies. He let me see close-ups of some naked corpses which, except for the staring eyes, looked more like nude Egyptian mummies than anything I have seen.”1
Those were not the only stories coming out of Greece during the spring of 1942. There were
accounts of German soldiers singing “gay marching songs” to drown out the wails of the starving
families they passed on the streets, mothers having to decide which of their children to feed and
to which to let starve, and even cannibalism. “I was in the children’s ward,” reported a visitor to
1 Memcon, Berry and “Mr. B,” 15 April 1942 Letter (W6860/62/49), Osborne to Howard, 7 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
295
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 296
the Red Cross hospital in Athens, “when attendants were removing from a bed a dying child
whose right cheek had been partly eaten away by the child next beside it in bed.”2
The “horror,” as Eden called it upon reading the reports, stemmed from a wide-spread
famine in Greece that developed during the winter of 1941/1942 after Greece fell under Axis
rule.3 Greece was not part of Hitler’s immediate plans for territorial conquest. Instead, he
preferred to dominate it, along with the rest of southeastern Europe, through political and
economic means. Once Germany defeated the Soviet Union, it could turn its attention to
conquering the Balkans. During the summer of 1940, Hitler made Mussolini pledge not to open a
Balkan front, so when Germany sent troops to Romania, Mussolini regarded it as evidence that
Hitler viewed him a junior partner. “Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am
going to pay him back in his own coin,” Mussolini told his foreign minister. “He will find out
from the papers that I have occupied Greece. In this way, the equilibrium will be re
established.”4 At the end of October 1940, Italy attacked Greece.
The Greeks put up a valiant fight, pushing the unprepared Italians back into Albania in
mid-November. Although already over-stretched at home and in the Mediterranean, Britain came
to Greece’s aid by first supplying air and naval support, followed by six divisions of the British
Expeditionary Force in the spring. The bungled Italian invasion and British involvement forced
Germany to intervene. Hitler could not risk giving Britain a foothold in the Balkans. At the
beginning of April 1941, Germany attacked Greece through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, swiftly
conquering Greek forces before they could be reinforced by the British troops from the south. By
2 Memcon, Berry and “Mrs. B.,” 7 April 1942 as part of Letter (W6860/62/49), Osborne to Howard, 7 April 1942. TN A/PRO, F0371/32463.
3 Minute (W6860/62/49) by Maclean, Steel, Dixon, Sargent, and Eden, 13-18 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
4 Quoted in Weinberg, A W orld at Arm s, 209.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 297
the end of the month, Germany controlled Greece. Still, the Italians became the principle
occupying power, with Germany controlling key points.
Britain wanted to treat Greece like the other occupied countries in terms of the blockade.
But Greece’s descent from deprivation into famine forced Britain and the United States to
reconsider their policy. Not only did the Allies break the blockade to help Greece, but they also
orchestrated an international relief program to the feed the Greek people.
A Drop in the Ocean
At the end of April 1941, as soon as hostilities ceased, the exile Greek government
appealed to Britain, the United States, Egypt, Turkey, and assorted South American countries for
food and medical supplies.5 The Foreign Office was “rather perturbed” that Greece had not
consulted Britain before making the wide-ranging appeal.6 Aside from not wanting to make an
exception, the Foreign Office feared what would happen if Greece made common cause with
Floover. Given the “heroic examples set by the Greeks to other nations,” the Foreign Office
believed if Britain refused to help the Greeks, it would give “such a humanitarian handle to the
isolationists in the United States.”7
Britain needed a way to provide Greece with food, but one that did not bust the blockade.
In May 1941, the Foreign Office and MEW investigated the feasibility of buying wheat from the
Soviet Union. They recognized that Greece’s wheat supply would soon become a major concern
given that it imported eighty percent of its stocks during peace time. What stocks remained
would soon be exhausted or plundered. Although both ministries favored the purchase, they
5 Memo (3048/St/41), Royal Greek Legation to Foreign Office, 25 April 1941. PRO, F0371/28821.
6 Telegram 918, Foreign Office to Canea, 1 May 1941. PRO, FO837/1230. The telegram was also sent to Washington, Cairo, Angora, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo.
7 Letter, Ronald to Stirling, 8 May 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 298
quickly reached an impasse over the question of transportation. MEW favored sending the wheat
by rail from the Ukraine down through the Balkan peninsula to Greece, thereby avoiding the
dicey naval situation in the Aegean Ocean. The Aegean’s waters led to Greece’s largest ports,
particularly Pireaus, and hosted a tense game of cat-and-mouse between the British and German
navies.8 Despite the risks, the Foreign Office favored shipping the wheat, because it could be
done rapidly and it would make it easier to supply the Greek islands. “We are under the very
great moral obligation,” observed Steel, “to ensure that the Greeks, both on the mainland, and in
the islands, are not allowed to starve.” The Foreign Office also thought that MEW failed to grasp
the nightmarish transportation situation in the Balkans caused by recent Axis campaigns. Indeed,
the Foreign Office was so gung-ho about the shipping idea that it considered sending clandestine
shipments from Cairo (which constituted a breach in the blockade). It had to abandon the idea
when Admiralty groused about the difficulty of arranging safe passage across the Mediterranean.9
In June, Eden told Dalton that if the wheat was shipped by rail, it would not reach Crete
or the Greek islands, both of which were in need of food. “It would be interpreted by the Greeks
and by their sympathisers in the United States,” wrote Eden, “as an attempt on our part to take
away with one hand what we had offered with the other.” If the supplies could not reach Greece
by sea, it would be tantamount to admitting that the Royal Navy was so ineffective in the Aegean
that Britain could not help one of its allies. “The truth is that unless we take a bold course we run
a serious risk of alienating a great deal of important sympathy,” wrote Eden, “and if we do not act
quickly the Germans may well forestall us by entering the Ukraine, and leave us with the onus of
having done nothing to help our most gallant Ally while wheat could still be obtained from that
8 MEW minute, 12-15 May 1941; Letter, Nicholls to Ronald, 21 May 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
9 Telegram 54, Alexandria to FO, 4 June 1941. PRO, FO837/1230. Minute by Steele, Nicholls, Sargent, and Maclean (W6902/49/49), 7-15 June 1941. PRO, F0371/28822
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 299
source under peace conditions.”10 Dalton found Eden’s argument unimpressive. “It would put
me in a very embarrassing position,” he told Eden, “however, if other allied governments could
say that we had allowed wheat to be imported into Greece through the blockade.” He also
contended that since Britain could not guarantee the immunity of ships in the Aegean, which was
a “sink on sight” zone, it was safer to send the food by rail.11 As Eden and Dalton quarreled,
Germany invaded the Soviet Union, shutting off any chance of obtaining wheat.
Greece did not care where the wheat came from or how it arrived—just that it was sent.
Charalambos Simopoulos, the Greek prime minister, told Eden that Greece had earned the right to
be treated differently, because of its valiant fight against Italy and Germany.12 Greece also had its
own ideas about relief and proposed to send supplies from Egypt. The goods would be supplied
by the Greek War Relief Association— also known as the Vanderbilt Committee— and distributed
with the assistance of the American Red Cross.13 Created in the aftermath of Italy’s attack on
Greece, the Greek War Relief Association channeled the aid efforts of the Greek-American
community. Led by Spyros Skouras, the flamboyant president of the National Theaters
Company, the association drew its support from more than 2,000 voluntary groups in the Greek-
American community. By mid-November 1940, it had spawned 964 chapters of its own. The
association also intentionally cultivated support outside the Greek-American community to
enhance its appeal and fundraising efforts. Harold S. Vanderbilt, railroad tycoon and society
yachtsman, agreed to serve as the association’s honorary chairman and spearhead a $ 10 million
10 Letter (W 7061/49/49), Eden to Dalton, 18 June 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
11 Letter , Dalton to Eden, 20 June 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
12 Letter (No. 3916/St/41), Simopoulos to Eden, 9 June 1941; Minute by Cadogan, 14 June 1941. PRO, F0371/28823.
13 Memorandum (4199/St/41) by Greek government, 27 June 1941. PRO, FO837/1230. Memorandum, Maclean to Southern Department, 2 July 1941. PRO, F0371/28823.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 300
fundraising campaign. Eleanor Roosevelt also joined the association’s national committee, along
with other notables including Clare Boothe, journalist Herbert Bayard Swope, and Standard Oil
heir William Hale Harkness.14 Between November 1940 and April 1941, the association cabled
its central committee in Athens approximately $3,800,000, which was used to purchase food,
clothing, and medicine.15 Locked out of Greece by the Axis occupation and the British blockade,
the Greek War Relief Association sought ways to continue to provide aid. Its ability to raise
money also made it an important source of support for the cash-strapped Greek exile government.
The Foreign Office and MEW both rejected the plan, because Egypt fell outside the
blockade. “I am afraid it is quite impossible,” observed Steel, “to allow the Vanderbilt
organization to send supplies from Egypt without compromising our whole position with the
other occupied Allies who would immediately demand food relief from overseas.” Aside from
the political fallout, there was the fact that it was very difficult to protect ships traveling between
Greece and Egypt. German and British aircraft heavily patrolled the Mediterranean shipping
routes hoping to sink the other’s convoys.16 Sending supplies from Egypt also required the
Cabinet’s permission, a concession Eden did not want to ask for just yet. Instead, he ordered his
14 “Greek Aid Headed by H.S. Vanderbilt,”NYT, 20 November 1940, 4. “Greek Fund Aided by Mrs. Roosevelt,” NYT, 1 December 1940, 22.
15 Alexandras K. Kyrou, “Operation Blockade: Greek-American Humanitarianism during WorldII,” War in Eugene T. Rossides (ed.), G reece’s Pivotal Role in World War II and Its Importance to the U.S. Today (Washington, D.C.: American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 2001. Kyrou argues that decisive role played by the Greek War Relief Association has been overshadowed by accounts of emphasizing state actors. According the Kyrou, the Greek War Relief Association was entirely responsible for the Greek relief program, including organization, implementation, finances, and diplomatic agreements. He has been misled by his limited source base, which consists mainly of Greek-American newspapers and the records of the Greek War Relief Association and the State Department.
16 Letter (7061/49/49), Steel to Stirling, 28 June 1941; Letter, Stirling to Steel, 30 June 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 301
staff to turn up the pressure on MEW and force it to agree to allow imports from Turkey.17
At the beginning of July 1941, MEW finally agreed to allow food to be purchased in
Turkey provided that no money passed through enemy hands. Despite Dalton’s objections, even
he could not ignore the fact that Germany bought food in Turkey. Purchasing food for Greece
would limit the supplies available to Germany— a classic economic warfare tactic. Naturally,
there was a catch: Dalton wanted the concession limited to the Greek islands on the grounds that
mainland could be supplied by rail. He also did not want Britain to grant formal safe conducts. “I
propose instead, if the Admiralty agree, a tacit understanding with the Greeks that we will wink at
shipments of food and will not attack the ships engaged in this traffic,” he told Eden. “We must
try and keep up appearances in the Aegean!”18 The Foreign Office was furious. Steel called
Dalton’s plan “practically as unconstructive as it could be.” Eden regarded the distinction
between the mainland and islands as specious at best, declaring that he would personally deal
with any complaints from the allies about the Greek mainland receiving food.19 After an appeal
by Eden, the Admiralty agreed to allow ships carrying relief from Turkey to Greece to pass
through the northern Aegean.20 A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, saw no problem in
granting safe conducts on the sly, provided Admiralty received reasonable notice of the sailings
and it involved a limited number of ships.21
17 Minute by Steel, Sargent, and Eden (W7672/49/49), 25-26 June 1941; Memorandum, Maclean to Southern Department with comments by Steel and Eden, 2 July 1941; Letter, Eden to Simopoulos, 9 July 1941. PRO, F0371/28823.
18 Letter, Dalton to Eden, 3 July 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
19 Letter, Cadogan to Dalton, 5 July 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
20 Letter (W7672/49/49), Eden to Dalton, 28 June 1941; Letter, Eden to Alexander, 28 June 1941. PRO, F0371/28823.
21 Minute (W8169/49/49) by Steel and Sargent, 4 July 1941; Letter, Cadogan to Alexander, 5 July 1941; Letter, Alexander to Eden, 6 July 1941; Letter, Alexander to Cadogan, 10 July 1941. PRO, F 0371/28823.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 302
The fight with MEW convinced the Foreign Office it needed to shepherd the
arrangements in order to avoid any other delays. It asked the British Embassy in Ankara, headed
by Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC) to
help Greek officials arrange for the purchase and shipment of food.22 The Foreign Office thought
that Knatchbull-Hugessen could help smooth relations between the Greeks and Turks, while
UKCC could help with arrangements. As a semi-official government agency, UKCC aided
Britain’s economic warfare campaign by purchasing goods in neutral countries. It also worked
closely with British intelligence. In mid-July 1941, Turkey agreed to sell food to Greece in
exchange for free exchange or sterling. Since Greece had neither, UKCC arranged to finance the
relief program’s start up costs by selling 5,000 tons of olive oil from Mitylene and Izmir. The
transaction had the additional benefit of economically helping the Greek islanders, while keeping
the olive oil, a hot commodity on the black market, out of German hands.23
Turkey offered to sell meat, vegetables, and fruit, but it could not provide wheat and milk
(the two dietary staples Greece needed most), because it also suffered from shortages. Bread
served as the foundation for the Greek diet, but by the summer of 1941, the average family could
not afford it. The price had skyrocketed due to poor harvests, Axis looting, and the cessation of
wheat imports. Plundering by Axis forces of livestock and a lack of fodder for those remaining
led to the decline in milk production. Responding to pressure from the Vatican, Italy arranged to
22 Minute (W 8169/49/49) by Steel and Sargent, 4 July 1941; Minute (W8450/49/49) by Steel, 10 July 1941; PRO, F0371/28823. Telegram 10, Foreign Office to Johannesburg, 9 July 1941; Telegram 1573, Foreign Office to Angora, 13 July 1941; PRO, FO837/1230.
23 Letter, Davidson to Hambro, 21 July 1941; Telegram 1068 ARFAR ENCOM, Istanbul to MEW, 22 July 1941; Letter, Kahn (Treasury) to Davidson (MEW), 2 August 1941. TNA/PRO, FO837/1230. Minute by Maclean (W9254), 25 July 1941. PRO, F0371/28825. Alexandras Kyrou argues that credit for the Turkish program should go to the Greek War Relief Association, which presented the idea to the State Department in October 1941. UKCC already had the Turkish program up and running by the time the association approached the State Department. The Greek War Relief Association does, however, deserve credit for financing part of the program. See Alexandras Kyrou, “Ethnicity as Humanitarianism: The Greek American Relief Campaign for Occupied Greece, 1941-1944, in Dan Georgakas and Charles C. Moskos, eds., New Directions in Greek American Studies (New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 1991).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 303
distribute milk to children under four, but the age restraints left older children without calcium
and vitamin D .24
As soon as it became clear that milk and wheat would not be coming from Turkey, Greek
officials in Ankara, London, and Alexandria began making trouble. Hoping to kill the Turkish
program, they dragged their feet on making arrangements, while registering daily pleas for
shipments from Egypt and the United States.25 They also ignored British warnings about the
dangers of the Mediterranean, resulting in the sinking of more than one ship sent to Greece from
Egypt.26 “We are beginning to despair of the Greek ambassador at Angora, who seems to enjoy
making the worst of things,” Steel confided to Charles Hambro, the head of UKCC. Unhappy
with the situation, the Foreign Office asked UKCC to provide a list of food available for purchase
in Turkey in the hopes of forcing the Greek ambassador in Ankara to do his job. According to
intelligence sources, Axis firms regularly bought cattle, fish, poultry, eggs, butter, and even
powdered milk.27 “They [the supplies] may not be much but they are something,” the Foreign
Office wrote Ankara. “We have the impression here that Greek Ambassador is content to await
some American deus ex machina and has no intention of getting down to the necessary business
24 Worried that more effort would be put towards supplying wheat, Maclean urged his colleagues not to overlook the importance of providing milk: “The Greeks are not alone in loving their children, but though they treat their animals abominably, they probably love their children more than most people, and unless we do something for them we are presenting a bull point to German propaganda.” Minute (W8725/49/49) by Maclean and Steel, 18-19 July 1941. PRO, F0371/28824. Telegram 1760, Angora to FO, 17 July 1941; Letter, Leith-Ross to Cadogan, 9 July 1941; Minute by Collier et al, 8-9 July 1941, PRO, FO837/1230. 25 Telegram 1648, FO to Angora, 23 July 1941. PRO, FO837/1230. Note No. 64 (W9393/49/49), Eden to Palairet, 30 July 1941; Foreign Office minute (W 9383/49/49) by Maclean, et al., 30 July 1941; Note by Ronald, 4 August 1941. PRO, F0371/28825.
26 Telegram 1898, Angora to FO, 5 August 1941; Telegram 1899, Angora to FO, 5 August 1941; Telegram 1757, FO to Angora, 8 August 1941; Telegram 1648, FO to Angora, 23 July 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
27 Letter, Steel to Hambro, 9 August 1941. PRO, FO837/1230. Steel was more blunt about his feelings regarding the Greek ambassador in Ankara in a departmental minute: “The Greek ambassador seems to be unusually incompetent.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 304
of organisation.”28
After more dilatory behavior by Greek officials in Ankara, UKCC assumed responsibility
for organizing the relief shipments. In mid-August 1941, it made arrangements to export
unlimited quantities of fish and wild boar meat, along with 5,000 tons of potatoes, 5,000 tons of
onions, 2,000 boxes of eggs, 5,000 tons of chickpeas, and 40,000 to 50,000 goats and kids.
Legumes would be available after the fall harvest. The International Red Cross, which had
personnel stationed in Greece, agreed to handle the distribution of the food, coordinating with
local Greek officials and welfare organizations. Turkey offered use of ship, the S.S.Kurtulus ,
which was painted with the symbol of the Turkish Red Crescent to identify its humanitarian
mission. Along with the ship’s charter, UKCC also had to obtain war risk insurance on the ship
and cargo, buy coal and oil, arrange wages for the crew and life insurance for the two Red Cross
delegates traveling with the ship, and dole out bribes to move things along.29 When the first
shipment was finally ready to go at the end of September 1941, Turkey refused to allow the
Kurtulus depart until UKCC agreed to a new contract for the ship, which included an outrageous
price increase for use of the ship. With no other ships available, UKCC had no choice but to
consent. On October 13, the Kurtulus left for Greece carrying 1600 tons of food.30
UKCC’s efficiency meant that the bills quickly piled up, raising questions about who
should pay for the Turkish program. When UKCC took over arrangements, Treasury sent it
28 Telegram 1683, FO to Angora, 30 July 1941. PRO, FO837/1230.
29 Telegram 1916, FO to Angora, 28 August 1941. PRO, FO837/1230. Telegram 2128, Angora to FO, 1 September 1941. PRO, F0837/1232.
30 Telegram 641 ARFAR, Angora to MEW, 2 October 1941; Telegram 675 ARFAR, Angora to MEW, 16 October 1941; Telegram 127 ENCOM, Istanbul to UKCC, 21 November 1941. PRO, F 0371/28832. Turkey also made UKCC promise that it would use the ship for UKCC work after it finished its relief duties. UKCC contracts were very lucrative.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 305
£100,000. By the end of October, having spent its advance, UKCC requested another £50,000.31
As Treasury well knew, the Greek government didn’t have any money. Britain and Greece,
however, wanted the Greeks living under Axis rule to believe the food they received was paid for
by their government. To preserve the illusion, they agreed that Greece would reimburse Britain
with funds obtained either from the Greek War Relief Association or the American Red Cross.32
The Greek War Relief Association had pledged $300,000, but not paid a single penny. Naturally,
it did not stop the association from pressuring Britain in the press and through private channels to
provide wheat to Greece.33 In mid-November, Treasury decided to ignore its balance sheet and
advance UKCC another £100,000 to keep the relief program going.34
By the beginning of December 1941, Treasury’s fiscal instincts began to overrule its
humanitarian impulse. UKCC had sent four shipments at a cost of £343,000 ($1,382,210), but
Britain had only received $300,000 from the Greek War Relief Association. Believing its
generosity abused, Treasury refused to advance UKCC any more money until it obtained
sufficient reimbursement. Treasury officials regretted their stance, but felt they had to impose
limits “because of the complete lack of authoritative information as to how we are to recover our
expenditure.”35 Britain was strapped for cash and Greece refused to spend any of its money— it
31 Letter (W12569/49/49), Sargent to Simopoulos, 25 October 1941. PRO, F 0371/28829.
32 Telegram 2023, Angora to FO, 19 August 1941. Telegram 2029, Angora to FO,21 August 1941;Letter (W 10278/49/49), Maclean to Kahn, 22 August 1941; Letter, Kahn to Maclean, 22 August 1941; Telegram 1882, FO to Angora, 24 August 1941. PRO, FO837/1230. Telegram 120, Geneva to FO, 23 September 1941; Letter, Camps to Maclean, 23 September 1941; Telegram 87, FO to Geneva, 4 October 1941. PRO, F0837/1232.
33 MEW Intercept, Diamantopoulos (Washington) to Greek Legation (Cairo), 27 September 1941; Letter, Skouras (GWRA) to Halifax, 30 October 1941. PRO, F0837/1232. Letter (W 12569/49/49), Simopoulos to Sargent, 4 November 1941.
34 Letter (W 12569/49/49), Maclean to Hambro, 7 November 1941; Telegram 99 ENCOM, UKCC to Istanbul, 13 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1232.
35 Letter, Balcon to Maclean, 11 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/28834.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 306
had taken a £5 million loan from Britain to fund the exile government— on the Turkish program.
Greece believed the money would be better spent on reconstituting the Greek army. In mid-
December, British officials learned that the Greek War Relief Association had not only raised
enough money to cover the shipments, but also had embarked on a new appeal to finance future
ones. The State Department and U.S. Treasury, however, refused to transfer the money until
UKCC provided a full accounting of how the first $300,000 was spent.36
The money debacle threatened to derail the Turkish program. UKCC needed to purchase
food offered by Turkey; if it failed to make the purchases, Turkey could rescind the options,
perhaps even give them to the Axis. If that happened, UKCC would have to start all over,
delaying the next shipment for months. “Conditions in Greece are literally appalling,” an agitated
Knatchbull-Hugessen telegrammed London upon receiving the news.37 The Foreign Office
pleaded with Treasury to reverse its stance, arguing that the Turkish program had to continue
because the blockade prevented Britain from doing more. After further pressure came from
UKCC, whose officials relished their humanitarian mission, Treasury relented and forwarded
UKCC another £100,000.38 Greece also offered belated assurances that it would cover the cost of
the shipments should the money from America fail to materialize. Given Greece’s precarious
financial position, the assurance amounted to an empty promise, but one that seemed to calm
Treasury’s anxieties.39
36 Telegram, FO to Angora, 19 December 1941. TN A/PRO, F0837/1233.
37 Telegram 181 ENCOM, Istanbul to UKCC, 3 December 1941; Telegram 2898, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 12 December 1941. TN A/PRO, F0837/1233.
38 Letter, Maclean to Kahn, 15 December 1941; Letter, Kahn to Balcon, 17 December 1941; Letter, Kahn to Balcon, 17 December 1941; Telegram 285ENCOM, UKCC to Istanbul, 20 December 1941. TN A/PRO, F0837/1233.
39 Letter, Sargent to Simpoulous, 15 December 1941; Letter, Simopoulos to Sargent, 16 December 1941. TN A/PRO, F0837/1233.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 307
Treasury decided to give UKCC what amounted to a blank check, allowing UKCC to
make purchases as food became available.40 By the beginning of January 1942, UKCC had
arranged for five shipments of food totaling more than 6,400 tons to be sent to Greece.41 The
shipments, which included salted fish, eggs, dried vegetables, onions, beans, potatoes, and fruit,
allowed the International Red Cross to run soup kitchens in Athens and Pireaus, where conditions
were the worst on the mainland.
Turkey then decided to withdraw the Kurtulus contract, claiming a shortage of shipping,
and suggested that UKCC use caiques, smaller ships that could carry approximately fifty tons.42
The Foreign Office was not happy. Maclean observed that using smaller ships was “all right. . .
but cannot take the place, from the political point of view, of the regular major shipments.” 43
After some tough negotiating, Turkey agreed to allow theKurtulus to make two more trips in
return for Britain providing a ship of similar size for Turkey to use for trips between southern
Turkey and Egypt.44 Unfortunately, in late January, theKurtulus, on its way to Pireaus loaded
with food, sank after running aground on a small island in the Sea of Marmora.45 When Turkey
played coy about providing a replacement, Maclean turned to the Ministry of War Transport,
which refused to help on the grounds it was too dangerous to send an Allied or Greek ship to
40 Letter, Maclean to Kahn , 29 December 1941; Letter, Kahn to Maclean, 30 December 1941. TN A/PRO, F0837/1233.
41 Letter, Balcon to Maclean, 5 January 1942. TN A/PRO, F0371/32455. Telegram 203 ENCOM, Knatchbull-FIugessen to UKCC, 8 December 1941; Telegram, Istanbul to UKCC, 22 December 1941; Telegram 372 ENCOM, Istanbul to UKCC, 14 January 1942. TN A/PRO, F0837/1233 42 Telegram 2999, Morgan to FO, 29 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
43Minute (W 15602/49/49) by Maclean, 30 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28835. Admiralty, which had been working to shut down the caique traffic in the northern Aegean and between the Greek islands, also did not want to give safe conducts. Telegram 2694, FO to Cairo, 31 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
44 Telegram 11, Angora to FO, 4 January 1942; Telegram 336ENCOM, Istanbul to UKCC, 6 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234.
45 Telegram 172, Angora to FO, 21 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 308
Axis-occupied Greece. “Awful depravity of M.W.T. who think that food can be safely sent, but
not a ship!” complained Anthony Camps, MEW’s new man on relief.46
In mid-February 1942, Turkey cancelled the licenses for potatoes, chickpeas, beans, and
onions, the food that kept the soup kitchens in Athens and Pireaus operating.47 “The Turkish
Government state that they regret this necessity,” Knatchbull-Hugessen reported, “but that these
commodities will now be used for mixing with wheat flour for the manufacture of bread in this
country.” UKCC, however, could continue to purchase figs, dried fruit, nuts, and meat.48 “This
is a lamentable development,” replied Eden. “The quantities have not been large but they have
made a useful impression and have no doubt contributed to saving many people from death by
starvation.” Eden asked Knatchbull-Hugessen to deliver a personal appeal to the Turkish foreign
minister requesting that the exports be reinstated.49 Pleased with Eden’s message, the foreign
minister promised to help.50 At the beginning of March, Turkey reinstated the licenses.51 UKCC
continued shipments to Greece on the SS Dumplinar, a Turkish ship.52
46 Telegram 370, FO to Cairo, 21 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234.
47 Telegram 321, FO to Angora, 7 February 1942; Minute by Ward, 7 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457. 48 Telegram 303, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 11 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
49 Telegram 279, Eden to Knatchbull-Hugesssen, 16 February 1942; Minute by Steel, 14 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
50 Telegram 373, Angora to FO, 23 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32459.
51 Telegram 453, Angora to FO, 4 March 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
52 It also expanded its scope to include the Greek islands, particularly Samos, Chios, and Mitylene The islands were supplied by caiques, a situation that did not enthrall Admiralty, but one it tolerated. Inmid- May 1942, growing opposition by the Turkish public prompted the government to once again cancel exports to Greece. The public had been swayed by critics who charged that the newly reduced bread ration stemmed from ongoing exports to Greece. After considerable pressure by Britain— and appeals from other countries— Turkey again allowed UKCC to purchase food. Telegram, FO to Angora, 19 December 1941; Telegram 81, Angora to CinC Med, 24 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233. Telegram 964, Angora to FO, 12 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1236. Telegram 144, Angora to Cairo, 29 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32464.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 309
By September 1942, Turkey had reached the limits of its generosity. It faced an acute
shortage of food and no longer had enough dried vegetables to feed its own army, let alone help
Greece. Turkish public opinion also continued to oppose the shipments, giving the government’s
critics a powerful weapon against the regime. Given the circumstances, Turkey had no choice but
to cancel the shipments and withdraw the Dumplinar charter.53
Ironically, the Greek government and the Greek War Relief Association, the two earliest
and most contemptuous critics of the Turkish program, cried loudest about its demise.54 They
worried about the fate of the soup kitchens in Athens and Pireaus. The International Red Cross
depended on the Turkish shipments to run these kitchens, which ensured that the populations of
Athens and Pireaus received at least one meal a day. In many cases, it was their only m eal.55
For its part, Britain fronted more than £1,100,000 to operate the Turkish program. The Greek
War Relief Association provided $900,000, leaving Britain to absorb the rest or wrangle it from
G reece.56
Collapsing in the Streets
While the Foreign Office stubbornly attempted to make the shipments from Turkey work,
it could not ignore the fact that Greece needed wheat. There were also plenty of people willing
to remind it. At the beginning of October 1941, the Vatican appealed to Britain to allow Greece
to import 35,000 tons of wheat from Australia.57 Greece had contracted to purchase the wheat
53 Telegram 903, Steinhardt (Ankara) to Hull, 12 September 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. 11, 777-8. Letter (W12630/62/49), Steel to Winant, 22 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32473.
54 Telegram 424, State to Steinhardt, 3 September 1942. FRUS , 1942, vol. 11, 772-3. Steinhardt is the ambassador to Turkey.
55 Minute (W3831/62/49) by Maclean, 19 March 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
56 Letter, Balcon to Davidson, 9 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1236.
57 Telegram 2215, Beme to FO, 6 October 1941. F0837/1231.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 310
before the Italian invasion, but had never taken delivery. General Georgios Tsolakoglu, the ruler
of Greece’s puppet government, even accused Britain of illegally detaining the wheat so that the
Greeks would starve.59 The Foreign Office found the Vatican’s appeal suspicious and wondered
if the Holy See acted of its own accord or at Mussolini’s behest. Greece was the only country in
which Italy served as an occupying power, which meant that Italy would be held responsible “for
the appalling sufferings of the Greek people.” The Vatican also had not spent much time
lobbying for relief to Catholic countries, such as Belgium and France. Intelligence reports
indicated that Italy experienced food shortages, making “it all too clear why she should be
anxious that foodstuffs should be allowed through the blockade into territory under her control.”60
Given the circumstances, it seemed likely that Mussolini was pressuring the Vatican. “If the
innocent Italians took over a waste from Germany,” observed Cadogan, “we must remember that
it was the Italians who without shred of justification dragged Greece in to the war.”61
The Foreign Office politely reminded the Vatican that Italy, as an occupying power of
Greece, was obligated to feed its populace.62 The Vatican chided Britain for what it regarded as
an overly “judicial” response. The Cardinal Secretary of State admitted to Francis D’Arcy
Osborne, Britain’s ambassador to the Holy See, that “with the best will in the world, Italy could
not herself feed Greek population nor force the Germans to do so.”63 The Vatican hoped that
appealing to the “magnanimity of His Majesty’s Government,” it would prompt Britain to “once
more demonstrate their humane and Christian sentiments by granting facilities asked for, thereby
59 Intercept PR/39A/2968, “No. 73. Athens,” 7 October 1941. F0837/1232.
60 Telegram 1572, FO to Berne, 4 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1231.
61 Minute (W 12671/49/49) by Steel, Sargent, Cadogan, 26 to 31 October 1941. PRO, F0371/28829.
62 Telegram 1419, FO to Berne, 10 October 1941. F0837/1231.
63 Telegram 2373, Berne to FO, 24 October 1941. PRO, F0371/28829.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 311
giving proof of noble chivalry to the Greek nation and to the world.”64 If the British government
refused to alter its policy, the Pope intended to appeal directly to King George.65 Annoyed with
the Vatican’s meddling, the Foreign Office ordered Osborne to find out whether the Vatican or
the German Catholic Church had “approached the German government on behalf of the Greeks or
any other pillaged and starving peoples of Europe.”66 Osborne learned that the Pope had no
intention of appealing to Hitler to help Greece, believing it a useless exercise. The Vatican also
admitted that Germany had decided to wait and see if Britain would aid Greece before providing
it with wheat from its own stocks. Osborne called Germany’s stance “a monstrous example of
evasion of responsibility combined with blackmail.”67
The Vatican courted Britain again at the end of November, emphasizing that its interest
in helping Greece was motivated by reports it received from an Apostolic Delegate sent to
investigate conditions in Athens— not Italian pressure. The Greek Catholic Archbishop of Athens
had also implored that all in Greece “were waiting, from the intervention of the Holy Father with
the English Government, the salvation of the Greek people from the terrible scourge of
starvation.”68 The Vatican’s earnestness convinced Osborne of the beneficence of its motives.
“In spite of the Vatican’s sensitiveness on this score, I am satisfied that there is no reason for any
such suspicion,” he told London. “They were pleased to help Greece because she is not a
64 Telegram 2375, Berne to FO, 24 October 1941. PRO, F0371/1231.
65 Telegram 2376, Beme to FO, 24 October 1941. PRO, F0371/28829. The Apostolic Delegate in London also petitioned the Foreign Office. See Letter, Godfrey to Eden, 24 October 1941; Letter (W 12644/49/49), Steel to Godfrey, 12 November 1941, PRO, F0837/1231.
66 Telegram 1572, FO to Beme, 4 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1231.
67 Telegram 2376, Beme to FO, 24 October 1941. PRO, F0371/28829. Telegram 1572, FO to Beme, 4 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1231.
68 Note, Vatican to His Britannic Majesty’s Legation to the Holy See, 24 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1234.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 312
Catholic country.” 69
The Catholic Church was not the only religious body concerned about Greece. The
Church of England expressed similar concerns. At the end ofNovember 1941, Cosmo Lang, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, wrote Eden asking if more could be done to provide Greece with
wheat from Turkey. “As you probably know in the streets of Athens it is common thing to see
small children searching among the garbage tins for something to eat,” wrote Lang. “It might
make a great difference to the lives of at least some of these people who are being so cruelly
oppressed because of the splendid resistance they made.”70 Lang’s appeal differed from others in
that it did not ask for Britain to break the blockade. Nevertheless, the last thing the Foreign
Office wanted was for the Church of England to actively campaign for Greek relief.
In addition to Rome and Canterbury, the exile Greek government also exerted pressure.
“I am not of course forgetful of the facilities from Turkey which have been offered,” Emmanouil
Tsouderos, the Greek prime minister, told Eden in mid-November. “But we have seen how slow
the transport of foodstuffs from that country is and how small the quantities in each shipment. A
mere 2,500 tons every ten days and that only if the ship is not held up by bad weather.”
Tsouderos wanted permission to privately trade Greek chemicals for Turkish wheat, maize, and
rice. “The quantities involved in the private transactions of this sort,” he argued, “are so small
that even in the enemy were to seize them the matter would be without significance.” He also
issued a threat: if Britain continued to prevent the Greek Government from helping the starving
population of Greece, it would be forced to encourage even the most extreme measures to deliver
food.71 Eden, however, did not flinch. He reminded Tsouderos of the reality of the situation,
69 Letter No. 113 (40/33/41), Osborne to Eden, 26 November 1941 .PRO, F0837/1234. Telegram 2676, Beme to FO, 1 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28832.
70 Letter (W14504/49/49), Lang to Eden, 29 November 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
71 Letter (W 13748/49/49), Tsouderos to Eden, 17 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1232.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 313
namely that Turkey suffered from wheat shortages and should not be asked to deprive its own
people to aid Greece. “The Axis must, I am afraid, be forced to shoulder their responsibilities,”
wrote Eden.72 Tsouderos pleaded with Eden again at the beginning of December, this time citing
a Red Cross report claiming that between thirty and forty people died each day from starvation.73
Again, Eden told him it was impossible to send wheat or to allow Turkey to re-export wheat it
received. The responsibility for feeding Greece rested with Germany.74
Nonetheless, the Foreign Office and the State Department were troubled by a series of
reports written in the fall of 1941 by Berry, who surveyed conditions in Greece first-hand. The
reports painted a harrowing picture of suffering. The food supply in the “barren” Italian area of
occupation was almost completely exhausted owing to the Germans having “carefully prepared
and scrupulously executed program of pillage.” Food prices had climbed 1000% to 2000% over
the past six months. The government promised a daily bread ration (1/4 pound), but there was
frequently no bread for distribution. “Tragically apparent in Athens is the need for foodstuffs,
particularly wheat,” reported Berry. “Meeting groups of children dressed in clothes which are
well tailored but begging in restaurants and at doors for food is normal; it is common to hear of
bakeries being raided by mobs; and it is not at all unusual to see people faint on the street.” Most
Greeks remained strongly pro-British, but their support was beginning to waiver as the food
supply dwindled. Every day of hunger made Germany’s claims that Britain was to blame for the
lack of food seem more plausible. “Today in Greece mass starvation is a fact,” concluded
Berry.75 His account prompted the State Department to begin considering how to help Greece.
72 Letter (W 13415/49/49), Eden to Tsouderos, 18 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1232.
73 Letter (14143/49/49), Tsouderos to Eden, 26 November 1941. PRO, F0837/1232.
74 Letter (W14143/49/49), Eden to Tsouderos, 6 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
75 Telegram, American Embassy (Rome) to Washington, 17 November 1941. FDRL, Welles Papers, Office Correspondence, Norman Davis, Box 68.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 314
“If this report is accurate, as I assume it undoubtedly is,” Welles wrote Davis, “it raises in my
mind the question of whether it is in the interests of the British and ourselves to try to expedite
and increase assistance, at least via Turkey.”76
The Foreign Office, which received Berry’s reports from Osborne, found his assessment
disquieting. Since the beginning of the war, the Foreign Office had received a constant stream of
reports claiming suffering, shortages, and famine-like conditions in the occupied territories. The
appeals grew increasingly shrill as the war progressed, making it hard to separate fact from
fiction. This was particularly the case with Greece, whose officials seemed to specialize in
embellishment. Berry, however, was an experienced diplomat with no agenda other than to
report on conditions. His professionalism lent his reports credence and made his assessments
difficult to ignore. “From what the American Secretary has told me,” wrote Osborne, “there is no
comparison between the tragic condition in Greece and those in other countries.” Osborne
pleaded for wheat to be sent either from Egypt or Australia, arguing that “despatch of this to
Italian-occupied Greece would save hundreds of thousands to lives.” He had also learned that
“Axis Powers are quite ready to guarantee freedom of shipment.”77 Berry’s reports also jarred the
General Department. Steel and Maclean reminded Osborne that Germany was “callously and
cynically waiting to see whether we could first be blackmailed into shouldering their burden,” but
they did so without enthusiasm. It was becoming harder and harder for them to rationalize
Britain’s policy toward Greece.79 Even MEW officials, stalwart defenders of the blockade, were
76 Letter, Welles to Davis, 18 November 1941. FDRL, Welles Papers, Office Correspondence, Norman Davis, Box 68.
77 Telegram 2592, Beme to FO, 21 November 1941. PRO, PREM3/74/5. Telegram 2593, Beme to FO, 21 November 1941. PRO, F0371/28832. Note, Churchill to Eden, 26 November 1941. PRO, PREM3/74/5.
79 Telegram (14036/49/49), FO to Beme, (no day) November 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/5.
81 Minute (T550/29) by Drogheda, 1 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1232.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 315
disillusioned. In the wake of the discussions with the Vatican, Drogheda called Britain’s policy
toward Greece “repugnant.”81
The next plea for action came at the beginning of December 1941 from Miles Lampson,
the British ambassador to Egypt. “I keep on hearing most heartrending accounts of conditions in
Greece,” wrote Lampson. “A British officer who has just come back says that four or five
hundred people are dying of starvation every day in Athens area alone, and similar reports reach
me from reliable Greeks who have also recently escaped.” Lampson proposed sending 8,000 tons
of wheat to Turkey, which would then re-export it to Greece. Each month, Britain supplied
Turkey with wheat and barley from its stocks at the Middle East Supply Centre with the
understanding that Turkey would not re-export them. By helping Turkey with its food supply,
Britain hoped to keep the Turks from being too friendly with Germany. The wheat for Greece
could be added to the Turkish shipments without attracting too much attention. Lampson also
had a solution for the problem of how to supply the wheat. Every month, Britain sent between
70.000 and 80,000 tons of wheat to the Middle East to feed British troops across the region.
Lampson intended to skim these shipments and cut comers elsewhere to arrive at the proposed
8.000 tons. Occupation authorities also agreed to allow the International Red Cross or the Greek
Orthodox Church oversee the distribution of the wheat and pledged not to interfere. Lampson
acknowledged that Axis promises held questionable value, but argued that the shipments could
quickly be stopped if German and Italian officials went back on their word. “I cannot believe that
at the worst our blockade would be seriously impaired if even one full cargo found its way into
German bellies, nor can I believe in the long run that to allow the Greeks to die in the streets is
going to help us to win the war on their behalf,” wrote Lampson.”82
82 Telegram 3874, Lampson to FO, 9 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233. War Cabinet Conclusions 134(41), 24 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1231.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 316
Lampson’s plea coincided with a bullying overture from the State Department. A few
days before Pearl Harbor, Hull ordered Winant to convey three points to the Foreign Office:
Greece suffered from appalling need, well-disposed Greeks in the United States resented Britain
withholding wheat already purchased by Greece, and the United States wanted to provide with
wheat, either through Turkey or Egypt. Turkey agreed to provide Greece with wheat provided
Turkey’s stocks were quickly replenished. Winant was also told to convey America’s
willingness to cooperate and its confidence in Britain’s ability to decide the appropriate policy.83
The implication, of course, was that Britain only had so long to act before the United States
would intervene.
The American gambit, which Maclean called “out of tune,” surprised the Foreign Office,
since the State Department had previously taken a hard-line approach to the blockade. It also
chagrined the Foreign Office that the Americans believed the bogus story that Britain refused to
release Australian wheat belonging to Greece. In the Greek-American community, the story
served as implacable evidence that Britain intended to let Greece starve.84 The truth, of course,
was much different. In May 1941, when Greece was occupied by the Axis, the exile Greek
government agreed to let Britain assume control of cargoes of wheat en route from Australia.
Britain paid Greece for the cargoes and agreed to provide, when circumstances allowed, wheat to
unoccupied Greece or Greek forces.85
The tussle with the Vatican, Berry’s reports, Lampson’s scheme, and the State
Department’s not-so veiled threat prompted, as Maclean judged it, “some heart-searching both
83 Telegram 5630, Hull to Winant, 3 December 1941. FRUS, 1941, vol. II, 724-725.
84 Minute (W 14933/49/49) by Maclean, 19 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F 0371/28834.
85 Letter, Ministry of War Transport to Steel, 7 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32455.Telegram 180, Winant to Hull, 13 January 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 732. Telegram 44, Hull to Winant, 5 January 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 731.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 317
here and in MEW as regards our relief policy.” 86 All signs pointed to the need for Britain to do
something decisive and soon. Indeed, MEW officials, with notable exception of Dalton, waited
anxiously for the Foreign Office to force them to act.87 In mid-December 1941, the Foreign
Office called a meeting of all the its departments with a stake in the relief issue to discuss what to
do about Greece, since a change in policy would have a ripple effect. While the General
Department shepherded the relief issue, the Southern Department dealt with Greece, the Northern
Department with Norway and Belgium, and the American Department with the United States.
The departments agreed that a convincing case could be made to treat Greece exceptionally, but
two considerations overrode it. First, the other allies would never accept that Greece alone should
receive relief. Second, wheat reserves in the Middle East were already inadequate and should not
be strained further. They concluded that Britain should maintain the blockade, while
“energetically pursuing all the palliatives which present themselves.” Eden agreed with the
conclusions of his staff, noting that “I do not see that we can do more.”88
The Foreign Office decided to take its “palliatives” to the Cabinet for approval, raising
the question of Greek relief on 22 December 1941. Since Eden was in Moscow trying to smooth
over relations with Stalin (Churchill did not have the same rapport with Stalin as he did with
Roosevelt), the task of wooing the Cabinet fell to John Anderson, one of Eden’s deputies. Rather
than present a plan, Anderson explained the pressure being exerted on Britain to modify its
blockade policy. Both Churchill and Winant had received appeals from Greece “to which it was
86 Minute (W14933/49/49) by Maclean, 19 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28834.
87 Minute (W 14933/49/49) by Steel, 20 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28834. Minute (T550/29) by Camps, Stirling, Drogheda, Leith-Ross, and Dingle Foot, 11-12 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233. Memo (W15358/49/49) by Sargent, 18 December 1941; Minute (W15385/49/49) by Warner, 13 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28835.
88 Memo (W15358/49/49) by Sargent, 18 December 1941; Minute (W15385/49/49) by Warner, 13 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28835.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. almost impossible to return a flat negative.” Tsouderos told Churchill that “starvation is
rampant” and implored him to allow Turkey to provide Greece with wheat no matter what it cost
the blockade. “It will be, my dear Prime Minister,” wrote Tsouderos, “an act not only of charity
but also of political wisdom not to leave that gallant people in a state of utter despair.” Despite
repeatedly asking Britain for assistance, Greece had not “yet received a satisfactory reply.” “I am
counting on your broader view of the matter,” wrote Tsouderos, “and trust that you will give your
departments definite instructions in a manner that will have no opportunity for the dilatory and
dangerous reaction of red tape.”89 Anderson told the Cabinet that in order for Britain to help
Greece, “we might have to connive at a fairly large scale evasion of our blockade of Greece,
particularly as regards wheat.”90
Two days later on Christmas Eve, Anderson presented the Foreign Office’s proposal to
the Cabinet. Britain could no longer wait for Germany to feed Greece. As long as Germany
treated Greece as a military base and derived no industrial benefit from its occupation, Germany
would let the Greeks starve. The transportation and communication problems that ravaged the
Balkans, particularly since the Yugoslav uprising, also provided Germany with little incentive to
send food. The Foreign Office recommended expanding the Turkish program, commencing
secret deliveries of wheat via Turkey, and publicly offering safe passage to Axis vessels carrying
food to Greece.91 Anderson argued that the clandestine shipments, which involved Turkey
secretly providing Greece with wheat in return for receiving compensatory stocks from Egypt,
offered a “means of glossing over the breach of principle.”92
89 Letter, Tsouderos to Churcill, 14 December 1941; Letter, JHP to Tsouderos, 15 December 1941. TNA/PRO, PREM3.74/5.
90 Cabinet Conclusions, WM(41)133rd, 22 December 1941. TN A/PRO, F0837/1233.
91 Foreign Office note on “Greek Relief,” 22 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
92 Letter, Anderson to Dalton, 22 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 319
The Foreign Office’s proposal fell woefully short of the grand scheme for which MEW
officials had hoped. It was also completely unrealistic. Given Greece’s penchant for gossip and
Turkey’s proclivity for blackmail, there was no hope of keeping the scheme secret. “It would
make no difference how much our Ambassador at Angora was instructed to impress upon the
Greek and Turks the necessity for the utmost discretion,” observed Drogheda. “Far too many
people would have to know about the scheme, and it would be an open secret in less than no
time.”93 Even Anderson privately admitted to Dalton that “our position with our other Allies will
be rendered difficult and perhaps acutely so if this scheme should leak.”94 Not surprisingly,
Dalton gleefully poked holes in the proposal, even going so far as to question whether conditions
in Greece were truly as bad as all the reports suggested. On Christmas Eve, the Cabinet voted to
reject the secret wheat shipments.95
The Foreign Office deserved coal in its stocking for its bungled and ill-conceived attempt
at expanding the Greek relief program. Regret over the lost opportunity compounded when a
telegram arrived from Lampson that same evening. “I am being besieged by prominent Greeks . .
. who are pressing me on the subject of food situation in Greece which further information shows
has become really pitiful,” he wrote. “Even the German controlled wireless in Athens has had to
appeal for doctors and helpers to deal with the cases of people collapsing in the streets from
hunger.”96 Many in the Foreign Office believed that if Lampson’s telegram had arrived earlier, it
could have “blasted” Dalton’s claims that conditions in Greece had improved.97 Steel, however,
93 Note by Drogheda, 23 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
94 Letter, Anderson to Dalton, 22 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
95 War Cabinet Conclusion 134(41), 24 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1231.
96 Telegram 4055, Cairo to FO and MEW, 24 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28835.
97 Minute (W 15392/49/49) by Steel, 27 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28835.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 320
predicted that pressure from the United States— not another woeful report— would finally force a
policy change. “My own feeling is that sooner or later Mr. Roosevelt will weigh in but then it will
be too late to do anything on the sly,” he opined. “It will all be done in a public hurry and the fat
will be in the fire with the other allies.”98
Like Churchill, Roosevelt was also being lobbied to help the Greeks. In the days before
Christmas, Tsouderos sent the president a heartfelt appeal. Citing the mounting death toll from
starvation, he begged Roosevelt to choose charity over international law:
. . . [A]n unending insistence on refusing shipments of wheat threatens to bring about a real disaster in that gallant country and to contribute to the annihilation of the race. The emotion of the Greeks is indescribable in the face of this situation and from every quarter within and without Greece I receive desperate appeals on behalf of our starving people. The principle according to which the invader is obliged to feed the population in occupied areas is one of International Law but the brutal Germans have long since discarded respect for any law and their only object is the reduction of the world by fire, sword, and famine. Therefore, we cannot take refuge behind a principle of International Law and deliberately ignore a state of affairs which exists.
Tsouderos acknowledged that “my expressions are sharp,” but hoped that Roosevelt would judge
them “by the measure of my grief.”99
Hull also received a copy of the letter and pressed the issue with Roosevelt after
Christmas. He confirmed that Tsouderos’s account corresponded with the reports received from
the State Department’s representatives in Rome, Ankara, and Cairo. “There can be little doubt
that conditions in Greece are desperate,” he told Roosevelt. Hull recommended that the United
States release money raised by the Greek War Relief Association to facilitate purchases of milk in
Switzerland by the International Red Cross and food in Turkey by UKCC. Hull also discussed
the Greek situation with Davis and they agreed that wheat shipments from Turkey should be
98Minute (W15392/49/49) by Steel, 27 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0371/28835.
99 Letter, Diamantopoulos to Hull, 22 December 1941.FRUS, 1941, 725-26. An appeal was also forward to the State Department. Letter, Diamantopoulos to Welles, 24 December 1941.FRUS, 1941, 726-727.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 321
pursued with more vigor. Hull urged Roosevelt to take advantage of Churchill’s visit to discuss
Greek relief.100 (In the wake of Pearl Harbor, Churchill had sailed to the Untied States to discuss
strategy with Britain’s new ally.)
Three days into the new year, the State Department agreed to release money raised by the
Greek War Relief Association, thereby facilitating milk purchases in Switzerland and
reimbursement of UKCC’s expenses in Turkey.101 State’s new policy signaled that, at least when
it came to Greek relief, money transfers would no longer be a problem. If any other policy
changes were brewing, Churchill appeared content to wait until he returned home to Britain to
deliver the news.
Eden, however, was not so patient. “On my return I, like you, was dissatisfied with the
Cabinet decision on Greek relief,” he wrote Lampson.102 Eden decided to change tactics in
dealing with the Cabinet. At its 5 January 1942 meeting, he warned of the dangers of ignoring
recent American overtures. “It is the United States’ intervention which I consider the most
serious,” he observed. “It is, indeed, only the United States Administration’s support which has
prevented United States public opinion from getting out of hand before.” He argued that Britain
needed to enlist the full cooperation of the United States on blockade policy. It needed to take
measures not only to help the Greeks, but also to satisfy American public opinion. Swayed by his
argument, the Cabinet agreed to let the Foreign Office and MEW to devise a plan to provide
Greece with relief.103
100 Letter, Hull to FDR, 31 December 1941. FDRL, OF 206, Gov’t of Greece, Box 1, Gov’t of Greece, 1941. Telegram 7320, FO to Halifax, 29 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
101 Telegram 57, Halifax to FO, 3 January 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234.
l02Telegram 293, Eden to Lampson, 17 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32455.
103 “Greece: The Blockade,” WP(42)6, Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 January 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/5. War Cabinet Conclusions 2(42), 5 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32455.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 322
Over the next week, the Foreign Office and MEW worked out the details of scheme to
provide Greece with a one-time shipment of 8,000 tons of wheat from Egypt.104 Rather than ship
the wheat to Turkey first, as Lampson suggested, it would go directly to Greece. The shipment
would ease conditions, while giving Britain time to devise a long-term solution if the situation
continued to deteriorate. It also put an end to any discussion about sending clandestine
shipments. “We made it quite clear to the Foreign Office representative,” wrote Drogheda, “that
in no circumstances would we agree to the suggestion of a surreptitious shipment of relief.”105
Drogheda held the line on no secret schemes, while blatantly defying the “categorical
instructions” he received from Dalton not to reach an agreement with the Foreign Office. He
could no longer tolerate fronting a policy that he despised. Given the sticky situation, Steel
agreed to give Drogheda one week to convince Dalton of the merits of the plan. If he failed,
Eden would confront Dalton in the War Cabinet.106 “[W]e shall, I think, have to bring some
larger artillery to bear,” observed Steel of the impending duel.107
A few days later, the Foreign Office acquired the only weapon it needed: Churchill. On 9
January 1942, Lampson sent a telegram directly to Churchill, who was sailing back across the
Atlantic, questioning the wisdom of the Cabinet’s decision about the wheat shipments from
Egypt. Almost 1,000 people died in Athens and Pireaus every day from starvation, and Lampson
predicted that number would climb in coming weeks. As he wrote Churchill:
Effects of this ghastly suffering will not be forgotten for generations and however much the enemy is to blame, history will I believe pronounce a stem judgment on our policy. I appeal not only to mercy, but to
104 Minute (W323/62/49) by Maclean, 7 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32455.
105 Memo by Drogheda, 7 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1231.
106 Note (W323/62/49), Steel to Strang, 8 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32455. Minute (W323/62/49) by Makins, 9 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32455.
107 Note (W323/62/49), Steel to Strang, 8 January 1942; Minute (W323/62/49) by Makins, 9 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32455.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 323
expediency. Already I am informed that Greeks are being weaned from their loyalty and allegiance to our cause by enemy propaganda which attributes their suffering to our blockade. 1 can hardly blame them. Principles become blurred in a man’s mind when his stomach is empty and he asks whether liberty is worth purchasing at the expense of seeing his children starve to death.
Lampson argued that Britain could monitor wheat shipments and immediately stop them if
Germany or Italy interfered. “At least we should be absolved in the eyes of the Greeks and of
humanity from starving a magnanimous ally.”108 Because Churchill was traveling, Lampson’s
telegram could have been held until his return, but Clement Attlee, who was gatekeeping
Churchill’s affairs, ordered it sent on. Attlee told Churchill that he intended to present
Lampson’s telegram at the next Cabinet meeting.109
On the heels of Lampson’s telegram, Eden sent one of his own. While Lampson offered
sentiment and obligation as reasons to aid Greece, Eden proffered politics and strategy. “The
only function of the Greek government as far that Greek population is concerned is to procure
food,” wrote Eden. “If they can show no results it is not impossible that they will resign. This
would create a most damaging situation for us both at home and abroad.” Knowing Churchill’s
fondness for the blockade, Eden also attempted to downplay the impact of any concession. “This
is not the first breach in blockade or thin end of the wedge,” he wrote. “Vichy has been receiving
for months far greater supplies of actual German deficiencies than we proposed to send to Greece.
Moreover wheat is not a German deficiency and we would reject any attempt to extend
concession to anything but wheat.” Eden conceded that the other allies would be unhappy, but
with American support, Britain could hold its position.110
108 Telegram 117 Nocop, Lampson (Cairo) to FO, 9 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32455.
109 Note, TLR to Eden and Dalton, 10 January 1942. Telegram TAUT 456, Private Office to Martin, 10 January 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/5.
110 Telegram Taut 513, Eden to Churchill, 11 January 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 324
Lampson and Eden’s voices functioned like the chorus in a Greek tragedy, urging
Churchill to make the moral choice lest Britain be sharply judged by history. Churchill found
their arguments persuasive, calling Lampson’s “impossible to resist.”111 Indeed, it is likely that
Lampson’s telegram was the first time Churchill heard one of his own officials make such an
impassioned plea. The Greek government dashed off letters with inflamed rhetoric almost on a
daily basis. But here was one of his own officials expressing rage, frustration, and remorse over
the Greek situation, giving public voice to all the sentiments privately expressed by Foreign
Office and MEW officials over the previous months.
On 12 January 1942, the War Cabinet took up the question of sending wheat to Greece
from Egypt. Despite all of the terrible reports, Dalton continued to insist that no evidence
existed proving that Germany shirked its duties. The rest of the Cabinet, however, dismissed his
arguments. The First Sea Lord even found a new reason to support the plan: Greek sailors were
threatening to strike to protest British policy, which, if it came to pass, would wreck havoc with
Allied shipping. After Eden swore to do everything in his power to hold the concession to
Greece, the War Cabinet gave its approval.112
The Foreign Office had secured the wheat, extra shipping, and the Cabinet’s
permission— but it still had not acquired American approval, a prospect it regarded with a bit of
trepidation. The United States’s new role as partner, rather than sympathetic neutral, required
Britain to be more sensitive to Washington’s opinions. The Foreign Office, however, could not
decipher how the State Department made decisions about relief issues. “The American part in all
111 Telegram Grey 337, Churchill to Attlee and Eden, 11 January 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/5.
112 Eden also had to get Churchill’s permission, but that wasfait accompli at that point. Greek Relief: Notes for the Secretary of state for to-day’s Cabinet, 12 January 1942; War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (42)4, 12 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456. Letter, Bridges to Sargent, 13 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32455. Telegram 247, Hull to Winant, 21 January 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 735. Telegram 254, Hull to Winant, 21 January 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 735-736.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 325
this,” observed Steel, “has been extraordinarily ambiguous and muddled.”113 Nevertheless, the
Foreign Office desperately wanted the State Department to agree to the one-time shipment— and
only that shipment. When the State Department dallied in providing a response, the Foreign
Office suspected that the cause of the delay might be concerns about raising or transferring
money to pay for the wheat. To move things along, the Foreign Office slyly infonned the State
Department that Britain was providing the wheat. That tidbit of information prompted a blessing
from the State Department.114
At the end of January 1942, Dalton announced to Parliament and world that Greece
would receive 8,000 tons of wheat in a matter of weeks.115 Not everybody was happy with the
news. “ .. .[A] shipment of 8,000 tons of wheat made on a single occasion, is something that
might as well not have been undertaken, because, if, in fact, it stops at this figure, it can do no
good whatsoever,” Tsouderos told Eden. “It will be like a drop of water on the lips of a man
whose life is ebbing in a raging fever of hunger.” Tsouderos wanted regular shipments that
would provide Greece with 33,000 tons of wheat per month, a level comparable to prewar
imports.116 Despite the biting criticism, the exile Greek government grudgingly agreed to pay the
shipping costs, intending to use money raised by the Greek War Relief Association.117 Again, the
113 Minute by Steel, 20 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456.
114 Telegram 413, FO to Halifax, 18 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234. Telegram 414, FO to Halifax, 18 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32456. Telegram 283, FO to Lampson, 16 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234. Minute by Steel, 20 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456. Letter, Winant to Eden, 22 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234. Minute by Maclean, 23 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456. Minute by Maclean, 23 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456. Telegram 254, Hull to Winant, 21 January 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 735-736. Letter, Eden to Winant, 3 Februrary 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456.
115 Statement of the Minister of Economic Warfare (Dalton), House of Commons, 27 January 1942.DAFR , vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942).
116 Letter, Tsouderos to Eden, 30 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457.
117 Letter, Eden to Winant, 3 Februrary 1942; Letter, Sargent to Simopoulus, 3 February 1942; Letter, Sargent to Simopoulus, 3 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 326
illusion that Greece was providing for its people was preserved. The International Red Cross
Committee consented to oversee the distribut ion of the wheat.118
Having gotten everyone’s agreement, the Foreign Office now faced the problem of how
to transport the wheat from Egypt to Greece. Allied shipping resources were stretched to the
limit and the Ministry of War Transport had already demonstrated a reluctance to lend a ship for
Greek relief. The Greek government suggested using Greek ships, which operated as part of the
British merchant fleet, but they proved unsuitable either in size or type.119 “[I]t is becoming more
and more important that humanitarian enterprises,” observed Maclean, “should not use shipping
which is required for war purposes.” On this point, fortune smiled on both Britain and Greece:
Sweden not only volunteered its assistance, but it also commanded a fleet of ships sitting idle in
the Baltic Sea. As a measure of its neutrality, Sweden had struck a deal whereby neither the
Allies nor the Axis could use its merchant marine fleet.
Sweden’s offer of assistance altered the course and scope of Greek relief. At the end of
November 1941, Victor Mallet, the British minister to Sweden, reported that Swedish
businessmen and humanitarians wanted to aid Greece.120 Prince Carl, president of the Swedish
Red Cross, proposed that the organization charter a ship to deliver food to Greece, prompting the
owners of the S.S. Hallaren to offer the use of their ship at cost for relief work. Unlike the Turks,
the Swedes were not out to make a buck.121 While the Foreign Office welcomed the Swedes
118 Telegram 513, FO to Cairo, 29 Janaury 1942; Telegram 397, MEW to Berne, 27 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234. Telegram 4 ARFAR, Geneva to MEW, 3 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457.
119 The Greek government was particularly keen to have the SS Varvara dedicated to Greek relief, but the ship had been outfitted to carry petrol, which made it unacceptable for carrying food. Telegram 61, FO to Angora, 9 January 1942; Telegram 209, Lampson to FO, 15 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234.
120 Telegram 697, FO to Stockholm, 20 November 1941. PRO, FO371/28830.
121 Telegram 721, Mallet to FO, 1 December 1941; Telegram 731, Mallet to FO, 6 December 1941; Telegram 2577, FO to Angora, 11 December 1941; Telegram 761, Stockholm to FO, 17 December 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1233.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 327
generosity, it could not figure out in mid-December 1941 how to make use of theHallaren , since
the Kurtulus carried all of the food Turkey could provide. After the Christmas debacle in Cabinet,
Maclean gambled that an expansion of the Greek relief program was imminent and began making
arrangements to charter the Hallaren. By the end of January 1942, the ship was leased, insured,
and sailing under safe conduct to the Mediterranean.122 After some initial reservations, Germany
agreed that the Hallaren could carry food from Turkey to Greece, freeing Britain from Turkey’s
capricious approach to chartering ships. When the plan to ship wheat from Egypt to Greece
materialized, Sweden also volunteered the use of the S.S.Radmanso, which was already in the
M editerranean.123
Unfortunately, the arrangements for Radmanso shipment did little to inspire Britain’s
confidence in the International Red Cross’s professionalism. The International Red Cross agreed
to handle the safe conducts, since its staff would be responsible for distributing the wheat. When
the Radmanso was ready to set sail on February 20, nothing had been heard from Germany or
Italy.124 After a polite reminder, Germany consented the following day, but it took Italy another
three weeks. The delay mainly stemmed from a series of mix ups between the International Red
122 Before Sweden would commit the H allaren to Greek relief, Britain had to agree to cover all o f its expenses in the event that the Greek government could not pay. The ship was insured with the Swedish War Trade Risks Board for 1,500,000 kronor. Since Britain financed the charter, Hthe allaren 's owners agreed to waive a deposit on the ship. It cost 20,000 kronor per month to charter theH allaren, even with the owners waiving their profits. War risk insurance, and the crew’s hazard pay and war accident insurance ran another 35,000 kronor per month. Letter, Steel to Fraser, 1 January 1941; Letter, Fraser to Steel, 2 January 1941; Telegram 40, Mallet to FO, 17 January 1942; Telegram 32, Mallet to FO, 14 January 1942; Telegram 55, Mallet to FO, 22 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234. Telegram 85, Stockholm to FO, 31 January 1942; Telegram 112, Mallet to FO, 10 February 1942; Telegram 98, FO to Mallet, 11 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457.
123 Telegram 179, FO to Angora, 28 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234. Letter, Hartmann to Burckhardt, 9 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1231. Unfortunately, Radmthe anso could only carry 7000 tons of wheat, which left Britain with the problem of how to get the remaining 1000 tons to Greece. There were also problems with theRadm anso's crew. Only eight of the crew came from neutral countries: the captain was a Dane and the chief engineer a Norwegian. Fortunately, some fancy footwork by the Ministry of War Transport in Cairo smoothed over Axis objections.
124 Telegram 357, Angora to FO, 21 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32459.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 328
Cross and the Italian Foreign M inistry.125 Italy also had not taken kindly to an article in the Times
o f London about the wheat shipment. Filed from Geneva, the article leaked the details of the
shipment, chastised Italy’s occupation administration, and lauded the work of the International
Red Cross in Greece. The Foreign Office also found the article maddening. “It is full of
inaccuracies and is patently inspired by the Committee’s well known enthusiasm for blowing
their own trumpet,” wrote Steel. “The I.R.C. has in fact only been used as a channel for obtaining
a safe conduct, and it is monstrous that they should steal the thunder of the unfortunate Greek
government in whose interests the whole scheme has very largely been contrived.”126 The
International Red Cross denied responsibility for the article, claiming that none of its staff spoke
to the reporter.127 The Foreign Office probably would have tolerated some grandstanding if the
safe conducts had not been botched. As the Radmanso waited in port, it sustained damage from a
bad storm and required repairs. Finally on 13 March 1942, it sailed for Greece.128
W hen the Radmanso, arrived in Pireaus harbor it received a hero’s welcome. News of the
ship’s arrival quickly spread throughout the city. Crowds of women and children soon lined the
quay and small boats filled the harbor around the ship. Shipyard laborers “wildly waved their
hats and cheered the vessel every time they passed it.” The ship was also boarded by a small
party of young Austrian marines under the command of an older German officer. The officer
summoned theRadmanso crew to the deck, inspected their papers, and ordered them not to go
ashore. Fie was also surprising well-briefed about relief, observing that the Radmanso w as the
first ship in blockade history ever to dock and leave an occupied country. He even knew about
125 Telegram 2, Beme to Cairo, 21 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32459.
126 Minute by Steel, 18 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32458.
127 Telegram 640, Kelly to FO, 21 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/1231.
128 Telegram 29A, Geneva to FO, 7 March 1942; Telegram 196, Cairo to FO, 7 March 1942; Telegram 210, Cairo to FO, 8 March 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 329
relief sent to Belgium via the Netherlands during the First World War. The Austrian marines, an
affable bunch brimming with nasty things to say about the Italians, remained on board during the
Radmanso’’s fifteen-day port call. Flaunting German orders, some of the crew sneaked ashore at
night. They reported the complete absence of rice and bread, astronomical prices for sugar, and a
shortage of coffee.
Despite being confined to the ship, the captain and ship’s master saw ample evidence of
the Greek population’s distress. Stevedores refused to unload the ship until they received food
and, owing to the weakened condition of the dock workers, the unloading took twice as long.
From conversations with Swedish Consul and Red Cross delegate, the captain learned that
650,000 Greeks were destitute and received their meals from charitable sources. Moved by
Greece’s plight, the captain volunteered to transport another relief cargo. “Apart altogether from
the value of the cargo in meeting immediate needs, his personal view is that its beneficent
propaganda value throughout the Eastern Mediterranean countries is conclusive and
overwhelming,” noted the intelligence officer who conducted the captain’s debriefing. The
Foreign Office could not have been more pleased with the shipment.129 “There seems to be no
doubt,” wrote Maclean, “that the shipment fulfilled every hope and promise of propaganda value
for us and the Greek Govt, so far as the Greek people are concerned.”130
Although the Foreign Office was pleased with the shipment’s reception, it became
outraged over its distribution. In order to preserve the illusion of Greece’s generosity, the
Foreign Office allowed Greece to negotiate the distribution terms with International Red Cross.
It made it very clear, however, that the bread should be provided to the populace gratis or on the
129 Telegram 3 SAVING, Cairo to FO, 23 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32463.
130 Minute (W 6719/62/49), 7 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 330
basis of need and that International and Greek Red Crosses should not profit from its sale.131 The
International Red Cross arranged for the wheat to be ground into flour, which was then forwarded
to bakeries and bread distributors, which sold the bread at a nominal price to cover the milling,
baking, and distribution. Soup kitchens in Athens and Pireaus also distributed some of the
bread.132 Given its prohibitions, the Foreign Office was shocked to learn that the International
Red Cross had turned a profit of more than ten million drachmae on the bread made from the
Radmanso cargo.133 Shock turned to anger when it learned that the profits had accumulated as a
result the decision to include the cost of the wheat in the price of the bread as a way to raise
money for the Greek Red Cross.134 The Foreign Office was angry for a number of reasons. First,
the wheat was a gift, but the Greek people were forced to pay for it. Second, Greece and
International Red Cross had no problem exploiting starving people by overcharging them for
bread. Finally, the profits were intended for use by the Greek Red Cross, a suspect organization
owing to its ties to the occupation government. “I understand,” noted Camps, “that the Foreign
Office are proposing to blow up the Greek Government about their past behavior.”135 The
incident left the Foreign Office determined to impose tighter control over relief in Greece and the
actions of the Greek government. “Once a Greek always a Greek,” observed Steel.136
Britain knew that the Radmanso cargo would not be enough and arranged for other wheat
shipments in the spring and summer of 1942. On its way to the Mediterranean, the Hallaren
131 Telegram 736, FO to Beme, 19 March 1942; Telegram 869, Berne to FO, 13 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32461.
132 Telegram 357, Angora to FO, 21 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32459.
133 Telegram 1126, FO to Cairo, 28 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1236.
134 Letter (W7870/62/49), Steel to Stirling, 29 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1236.
135 Minute by Camps, 30 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1236.
136 Minute by Steel, 2 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32464. Telegram 761, Cairo to FO, 5 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1236.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 331
stopped off in Lisbon, picking up wheat and salted fish.137 After dropping its Lisbon cargo, the
Hallaren plied between Pireaus and Haifa, delivering wheat from Britain’s stocks in the Middle
East Supply Centre. By mid-March, Britain had provided Greece with enough wheat to tide it
over until the May harvest; by the end of July, British shipments totaled more than 20,000 tons,
ensuring the bread supply until mid-September.138 Britain also agreed to allowed Greek War
Relief Association send 2,300 tons of flour from New York to Turkey; in return, Turkey agreed to
supply the equivalent amount to Greece. The State Department urged Britain to accept the plan,
because it constituted a one-time shipment and it would help the association with its fundraising.
Greece depended on the association to finance the costs of relief, but the association was having
difficulty raising money.139 The willingness of the Americans to find workable solutions gratified
the Foreign Office. “I need not, of course, emphasize the importance of keeping in step with the
Americans on this subject if we are not to be pushed into unwelcome schemes,” Eden told
Dalton.140 Britain, however, refused to allow 20,000 tons of wheat to be imported from
Argentina, despite urging from Greece and the United States. Doing so would have let an Axis
ship, which had been enjoying a nice tropical vacation, sail into the European theater and
established a precedent of shipments from South America.”141 Britain also declined to approve a
137 Telegram 1261, FO to Washington, 24 February 1942. PRO, F0371/32459.
138 Telegram 315, Cairo to FO, 25 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32461. Telegram 380, Cairo to FO, 7 April 1942; Relief for Greece: Note for Secretary of State” by Maclean, 15 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32462. Telegram, International Red Cross to MEW, 21 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32464.
139 Telegram 616, Hull to Winant, 17 February 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, p. 737. Memo by Shantz, 18 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32458. Minute by Steel on Shantz memo, 18 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458. Telegram 706, Halifax to FO, 7 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457. Minute by Steel, 10 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457. Telegram 752, Winant to Hull, 18 February 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, p. 737. Letter, Dalton to Eden, 22 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32459.
140 Letter (W2544/62/49), Eden to Dalton, 20 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32458. Letter, Dalton to Eden, 22 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32459.
141 Telegram 1299, Welles to Winant, 28 March 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 749-750. Letter, Tsouderos to Eden, 13 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 332
food parcels program and other food shipments from the Middle East, on the grounds that the
Cabinet confined the concession to wheat.142
We Look to the Swedes
Britain could not continue to supply Greece on an ad-hoc basis from the Middle East
Supply Centre, particularly with the North Africa campaign heating up. Starting in November
1941, British and German forces traded blows in the Western Desert. By the end of January
1942, Germany appeared to have the upper hand owing to Rommel’s willingness to attack when
least expected. After being pushed back to just west of Tobruk, Britain realized that victory in
North Africa would not come without significantly reinforcing the 8th Army. The high-stakes
campaign made the already perilous Mediterranean even more dangerous as Britain and Germany
scrambled to supply their troops and disrupt the other’s supply lines. Faced with a new strategic
calculus in the Mediterranean theater and on-going need in Greece, Whitehall set out to
orchestrate a large-scale relief program for Greece, a task that required finding a fleet of ships,
devising a trustworthy distribution system, and securing a reliable source of wheat, not to mention
money to pay for all of it.
MEW recommended the creation of a neutral commission that would work with, but not
be beholden to, the International Red Cross. Given recent experiences in Greece, MEW did not
entirely trust the International Red Cross. In fact, MEW would have preferred to work with the
American Red Cross, but the entry of the United States into the war made that impossible. The
commission should also have full freedom of movement and right of inspection. It would also
142 Minute (W2468/62/49) by Maclean and Steel, 19 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32458.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 333
report to Britain and the United States, which could order its shutdown in the event of supply
leaks and Axis interference.143
The Foreign Office was thrilled with MEW’s plan. “This amounts to a decision on the
part of M.E.W.,” wrote Maclean, “to throw in their hand and permit the organised despatch of
food to Greece.”144 For its part, the Foreign Office suggested sending Swedish ships from the
Baltic to Canada to pick up wheat or flour. Using Swedish ships would eliminate the need to
divert ships from the Allied shipping pool or draw upon wheat stocks in the European theater. It
also had the added advantage of further invol ving Sweden.145
The Foreign Office and MEW each provided key pieces to solving the puzzle of how to
run a relief program in Greece. There were masterful solutions to three big problems— supply,
shipping, and organization— unfortunately, they could not agree on the terms governing the
commission’s operation. MEW wanted Germany and Italy to agree to a complete ban on the
export of Greek goods and to occupation authorities requisitioning local Greek goods. The
Foreign Office regarded the terms as too extreme. If MEW ’s conditions were followed through
to their logical conclusion, the commission would have to buy all the food produced in Greece,
because only those working for the Axis had any money.146 It also worried that MEW’s
conditions would prevent the scheme from getting off the ground. “Since we want to get food to
143 Memo on “Draft Conditions for Admission of Further Relief Foodstuffs into Greece” by Dingle Foot, 4 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Letter (W1299/62/49), Lawford to Harris, 4 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456. Letter (W1567/62/49), Sargent to Drogheda, 4 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
144 Minute (W2059/62/49) by Maclean, 9 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457.
145 Minutes of meeting attended by FO, MEW, MWT, and MOF by Maclean, 10 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457.
146 Memo, Sargent to Eden, 13 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/321458.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 334
Greece to keep the Greeks alive,” observed Maclean, “it follows that we want the Germans to
accept our conditions.” 147
In mid-February 1942, the Cabinet considered whether to allow a long-term relief
program in Greece. Because they continued to disagree, the Foreign Office and MEW presented
separate plans. True to form, Dalton provided a shrieking account of the need to maintain tight
controls over imports in order to prevent Germany or Italy from plundering. The Cabinet judged
the plan to use Swedish ships to send 15,000 tons of wheat per month to Greece an inventive
solution. It agreed to allow the plan go forward, telling Dalton and Eden to sort out their
differences.148 Britain was going to punch a permanent hole in the blockade for Greece. In the
wake of the Cabinet meeting, MEW agreed to replace the ban on Axis use of Greek food products
in Greece with the stipulation that the Axis had to replace what it consumed. The general ban on
the export of all Greek native food products remained part of the conditions, but the Foreign
Office considered it a negotiable item.149
Britain still needed both the United States and Sweden to say “yes.” The Americans
wholeheartedly supported the idea and gave their immediate blessing.150 That left the Swedes.
At the beginning of March 1942, Mallet approached the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with
147 Memo, “The Ministry of Economic Warfare’s War Cabinet Paper on Relief for Greece,” by Maclean, 15 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
148 WP(42)80, “Greece: The Blockade,” Memorandum by Minister of Economic Warfare, 14 February 1942; War Cabinet Conclusions, WP(21)42, 16 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1231.
149 Memo on “Food for Greece: Regular Wheat Shipments, Maclean to Eden, 18 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32459. Although the United States had agreed to support Britain’s plans for Greek relief, they did not inform Johnson of scheme until after the initial meeting with Boheman. The Foreign Office, which liked Johnson from its previous dealings with him while he was stationed in London, instructed Mallet to brief Johnson on the plan and enlist his assistance. Telegram 399, Johnson to Hull, 2 March 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 743-44. Telegram 121, Welles to Johnson, 3 March 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 745.
150 Telegram 1223, Eden to Halifax, 22 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/1235. Telegram 845, Winant to Hull, 22 February 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 739-741.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 335
the help of Herschel Johnson, the recently appointed American minister in Stockholm. In their
conversation with Erik Boheman, Sweden’s Secretary General, they laid out the conditions
governing the program:
1) all belligerents to give safe conducts in both directions for ships engaged in carrying food to Greece;
2) a neutral commission in Greece to be established and have direct control of distribution of all goods imported as relief;
3) food imported as relief through the blockade reserved solely for the Greek population and distributed where the Commission sees greatest need;
4) food produced in Greece is reserved for Greek population, unless occupiers replace with equivalent imports;
5) Commission has right to observe that conditions are being fulfilled and have adequate staff and freedom of movement to accomplish task; and
6) Commission would report to HMG all matters connected with the working of the scheme.
They also asked Sweden to provide the necessary shipping and requested that the program be
administrated by the Swedish Red Cross or another Swedish body under the auspices of the
International Red Cross. While another governing arrangement could have been devised, the
Greek relief program needed Swedish shipping to become a reality.151 “Secretary General was
enthusiastic and promised immediately to seek the approval of the Swedish Government
regarding which he was confident,” Mallet reported to London. “He thinks sufficient tonnage is
available in the Baltic.” Boheman, however, believed that condition four— use of food produced
in Greece— would probably have to be clarified.152
Four days later, Boheman informed Mallet and Johnson that Sweden would be happy to
participate. Sweden could supply seven or eight ships averaging 7,500 tons each, resulting in 45-
151 Telegram 132, FO to Mallet, 27 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Aide-memoire by Mallet, 2 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
152 Telegram 158, Mallet to Eden, 2 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 336
50,000 tons. Sweden also volunteered to defray the administrative costs of the commission.
“[H]e said that his Government realized the cost would not be great but that it would like to make
this small contribution to so worthy an undertaking,” reported Mallet.153 Sweden was also
prepared to enter immediately into negotiations with Germany and Italy. Rather than use the
International Red Cross as an intermediary, Boheman believed that a direct approach by Sweden
would be more effective. After it obtained Germany and Italy’s consent, Sweden would then
work with the International Red Cross. Boheman conceded that Germany would be anxious
about letting Swedish ships out of the Baltic, but thought German fears could be dissipated by
offering to have the ships return to their “prison” after dropping off their cargo. In the meantime,
he stressed the importance of not doing anything that Germany might consider an affront to its
prestige. Boheman asked that Britain and the United States limit publicity about the need for
adequate safeguards to prevent plundering by occupation forces.154 Casting aspersions on
Germany’s honor (what little could be had in Greece) would not encourage Berlin to approve the
program .
Despite their gratitude to Sweden, Foreign Office and MEW officials were a bit
apprehensive. Britain was turning all of the arrangements for the largest relief program of the
war over to another country. The Foreign Office and MEW knew what Sweden was getting into,
but did Sweden? In the manner of control freak who realizes that it has lost its grip, the Foreign
Office and MEW peppered Mallet with advice and proscriptions for the Swedes: Make sure the
commission has enough Swedish members. Do not let Germany and Italy stack the commission
153 Telegram 166, Mallet to FO, 6 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.Telegram 447, Johnson to Hull, 6 March 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 745-7. Telegram 456, 7 March 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 748.
154 The Foreign Office agreed to do what it could to avoid publicity, but cautioned that its hand might be tipped by Parliamentary questions and Axis propaganda. Telegram 166, Mallet to FO, 6 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.Telegram 447, Johnson to Hull, 6 March 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 745-7. Telegram 456, 7 March 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 748. Telegram 135, Welles to Johnson, 11 March 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 749.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 337
with representatives of the German and Italian Red Crosses. Insist that the commission report
directly to Britain and the United States. “We look to the Swedes,” wrote the Foreign Office, “to
ensure that actual allocation and control of relief remains solely in their own hands.” Despite the
hand wringing, one resounding message came from British officials: “We are anxious to press
on.”155
While Sweden courted Germany and Italy, Britain approached Canada about providing
wheat for Greece. Canada had given Britain a billion dollar gift of wheat to aid its war effort.
Britain suggested that the wheat for the Greek relief program could come from those stocks.
Alternatively, Canada could donate wheat, a gesture that would help the Greeks and earn Canada
international praise. (It also would, of course, mean that Britain would not have to give up its own
stocks.)156 In mid-April 1942, Canada informed Britain that it was “glad to be associated with
proposed gift.” But rather than draw on Britain’s stocks, Canada proposed to give Greece the
stocks it intended to contribute for postwar relief. Canada, Argentina, Britain, and the United
States were in the middle of finalizing the International Wheat Agreement, which called for the
creation of a pool of wheat and flour that could be rushed to liberated areas.157 Neither the
Foreign Office nor MEW liked the proposal, worrying that the arrangement would encourage
other allies to seek similar arrangements. Why should Belgium or Norway wait until after the
war to draw on the wheat pool? They also did not like the idea of involving Argentina, even
peripherally, particularly when Britain actively discouraged Greek proposals to import Argentine
155 Telegram 153, FO to Mallet, 12 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
156 Minute by Maclean, 18 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32460. Telegram 640, DO to Canada, 28 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
157 Telegram 728, Canada to DO, 12 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 338
wheat.158 Given its reservations, Britain asked Canada to reconsider its proposal.159 Canada’s
reputation for generosity prevailed, and at the end of April 1942, it agreed to donate 15,000 tons
of wheat per month from its own stocks to the Greek relief program.160
Sweden found Germany and Italy a little tougher going. Italy responded favorably, but
had not given a firm commitment. Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano conveyed his
pleasure that Italy would not be expected to pay for the wheat. Italy also needed to consult with
Germany, which would take time. For its part, Germany agreed to consider the plan, but
registered preliminary objections.161
Exasperated with the delays, the Foreign Office suggested that Germany be publicly
scolded for its procrastination. Nothing had been heard from the Germans for over a month,
despite polite reminders. Sweden, however, insisted on privately calling Germany’s bluff one last
time. If nothing happened, then Boheman had no qualms about shaming Germany in the press.
Rather than send its usual reminder, Sweden asked Germany if Britain should be informed that
negotiations had collapsed. Two days latter, on April 30, Germany agreed in principle to the
relief program.162
158 Minutes (W5616/62/49) by Maclean and Steel, 14-15 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32462. Minutes (T550/29) by Camps, Holland, Stirling, and Drogheda, 13-14 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235
159 Telegram 813, DO to Canada, 18 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
160 Telegram 830, Canada to DO, 25 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/1235.
161 Telegram 697, Johnson to Hull, 31 March 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 750-51. Telegram 238, Mallet to FO, 2 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
162 Telegram 205, FO to Mallet, 4 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32462.Telegram 840, Johnson to Hull, 15 April 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 753. Telegram 247, Mallet to FO, 7 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 755, Johnson to Hull, 7 April 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 752. Telegram 238, FO to Mallet, 17 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 295, Mallet to FO, 18 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32462. Telegram 293, Mallet to FO, 18 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 892, Johnson to Hull, 19 April 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 756.Telegram 325, Mallet to FO, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 269, FO to Mallet, 29 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32462. Telegram 334, Mallet to FO, 29 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 339
Germany agreed to the use of the Swedish ships from the Baltic, to the distribution of
relief only to Greeks, and to reserve food produced in Greece for consumption by the civilian
population, except where excessive exports occurred. It cautioned that providing relief to the
islands would prove difficult because of geography and the fact that both the Allies and the Axis
conducted air and naval operations on and around them. Both Germany and Italy, however,
objected to the Swedish Red Cross controlling the commission and asked that it include members
of the German and Italian Red Crosses. Sweden countered with an offer to form a new joint
commission with the International Red Cross.163 Italy, however, continued to insist that the best
solution was to add Swedes to the existing relief commission. In its favor was the fact that the
International Red Cross did not like Sweden’s proposal, because it diminished its role and
influence.164 In Greece, the High Commission of the International Red Cross coordinated the
activities of the German, Italian, and Greek Red Crosses, along with the Turkish Red Crescent.
The High Commission ran the “Committee of Action,” which oversaw the distribution of relief
under the direction of Swiss and Greeks. M. Brunei, the Swiss head of the High Commission,
believed that relief operations could only be conducted with assistance from the Axis, which
provided cars, trucks, and fuel.165 The International Red Cross’ arrangement with the Axis,
however, represented everything that Britain, the United States, and Sweden wanted to avoid.
163 Telegram 294, Mallet to FO, 18 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 890, Johnson to Hull, 19 April 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 753-754. Telegram 293, Mallet to FO, 18 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 891, Johnson to Hull, 19 April 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 755. Minute (W5890/62/49) by Maclean, Steel, and Sargent, 22-26 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32462. Telegram 262, FO to Mallet, 25 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 339, Mallet to FO, 30 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 340, Mallet to FO, 30 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463. Telegram 1019, Johnson to Hull, 30 April 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 756-758. Telegram 1020, Johnson to Hull, 30 April 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 758.
164 Telegram 1108, Johnson to Hull, 8 May 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. 11, 760-1. Telegram 357, Mallet to FO, 8 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
165 Telegram 340, Mallet to FO, 30 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463. Telegram 1019, Johnson to Hull, 30 April 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 756-758. Telegram 1021, Johnson to Hull, 30 April 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II., 758-760. Letter, Montagu-Pollack to Eden, 30 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 340
Naturally, the Foreign Office and MEW could not resist playing backseat negotiators.
They did not like Germany’s attempt to reserve exports and asked the Swedes to take the point up
“vigorously.” They also found it suspicious that not one word had been said about freedom of
movement, particularly since it was a source of contention with Polish and French relief.166 For
its part, MEW began to wonder if, in the rush to get the scheme off the ground, Britain was
conceding too much.167
By mid-June 1942, Sweden believed that a viable agreement had finally emerged. It
called for the High Commission to evolve into the Swedish-Swiss Commission, via the addition
of Swedish and Swiss representatives. The Swedes and Swiss would supervise the distribution of
relief supplies sent by their respective countries and, as members of the Committee of Action,
help supervise relief from other sources. The German and Italian Red Crosses would not be
involved in distributing relief sent under Swedish auspices. The Swedish delegates would file
regular reports, via the Swedish charge in Sofia, for distribution to Sweden, Britain, and the
United States. Germany and Italy also promised that they would not interfere with the
distribution of relief and would allow the delegates freedom of movement. The agreement
provided Sweden with both independence of action and organizational support for its work. It
also did not openly undermine or assail the prestige of the German, Italian, and Greek Red
Crosses.168 Sweden urged Britain and the United States to accept the terms and quickly. It
wanted to start work as soon as possible to prevent black market profiteers from draining current
166 Telegram 284, FO to Mallet, 9 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
167 Minute by Camps, Drogheda, Foot, and Selbome, 17-22 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Letter, Camps to Maclean, 25 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 416, Mallet to FO, 6 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
168 Telegram 1465, Johnson to Hull, 10 June 1941. FRUS, 1942, vol. IF, 761-2.Telegram 1466, Johnson to Hull, 10 June 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 763-4. Telegram 424, Mallet to FO, 10 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 425, Mallet to FO, 10 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 341
stocks. “We both feel that the Swedish Government can be trusted to safeguard our interests and
that they are most keen to do a good job,” wrote Mallet of his and Johnson’s opinion.169 Within a
week both the United States and Britain had agreed.170
With the relief machinery in place, the program itself could be put in motion. Swedish
ships were painted with identifying marks to make it easy for with Allied and Axis forces to spot
their neutral status and safe conducts were arranged. As usual, the Italians dragged their feet.
Sweden also requested permission to import ten cars, three trucks, two vans, and the necessary
petrol and oil. By having its own motor pool, the Swedish-Swiss Commission would not be
dependent on occupation powers for transportation assistance. In favor of anything that limited
Axis involvement, Britain and the United States agreed to make the vehicles and fuel part of first
shipments.171
Before the first ships headed to Canada, Sweden made a delicate, but insistent, request: it
wanted Britain or the United States to guarantee payment of the contracts for the ships.172
Although the Swedish Red Cross chartered the ships, the Greek Government bore responsibility
for payment of the contracts. The owners did not want Greece as the only responsible party.173
Britain agreed to underwrite the charters, provided that nothing was said to Greece about the
arrangement— or to anyone else. The illusion that Greece was providing relief to its people
169 Telegram 426, Mallet to FO, 10 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 2731, Hull to Winant, 13 June 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 76-5. Telegram 1576, Johnson to Hull, 21 June 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 765-6.
170 Telegram 2731, Hull to Winant, 13 June 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 76-5.
171 Telegram 370, FO to Mallet, 26 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 1641, Johnson to Hull, 29 June 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 767-8. Letter, Ward to Fisher, 15 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
172 Telegram 456, Mallet to FO, 20 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
173 Telegram 1466, Johnson to Hull, 10 June 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 763-4. Telegram 424, Mallet to FO, 10 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 342
needed to be preserved to maximize the propaganda value of the program.174 This arrangement is
indicative of one of the most extraordinary things about the Swedish-Swiss Commission: Greece
had nothing of consequence to do with it. Certainly, the Greek government lobbied and
encouraged others to agitate for relief to be sent. But when it came to realizing a long-term relief
program— finding the ships, obtaining the wheat, securing Axis approval— Greece had no role
whatsoever. It was all orchestrated by humanitarian-minded British, Swedish, and Canadian
officials. Greece nodded, agreed to pay what it could not afford, and gladly took credit for
organizing manna from overseas for its people. And that is the way everybody wanted it.
During late 1941 and early 1942, the Foreign Office and MEW believed that the
International Red Cross intentionally sought to embarrass Britain on several occasions by
announcing relief shipments for Greece for which it did not have approval. The International Red
Cross mistakenly assumed that the press attention would force Britain to make the desired
concessions. Not surprisingly, Britain objected to being blackmailed. It also loathed the High
Commission making a profit off the wheat Britain donated to Greece. Already dubious about the
organization, Britain’s estimation declined further when the International Red Cross publicly
billed itself as the star of the relief program, relegating Sweden to a minor supporting role.175
With suspicion already simmering, the Foreign Office and MEW boiled over at the
International Red Cross’s request that the wheat coming from Canada be consigned to it rather
than the Swedish Red Cross. “We appreciate that this would correspond to previous
arrangements,” the Foreign Office told Mallet, “but this is essentially a Swedish scheme and we
rely on the Swedish Government to keep a firm hold on it.” They worried that if the International
Red Cross received title to the wheat shipments, it would try to claim “a decisive voice in the
174 Letter, Mallet to Hansson, 25 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32470.
175 Telegram 132, Geneva to FO, 22 June 1942 with note by Camps. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 343
disposal of them” and treat Sweden’s delegates as its lackeys. Britain also believed that Sweden
demonstrated more sensitivity towards British policy. “Stockholm must remain the hub of the
scheme if unnecessary tangles are to be avoided,” wrote the Foreign Office.176 Britain also
decided to settle the question of profiteering once and for all. It impressed upon Sweden the
importance of the International Red Cross not continuing its practice of selling gift wheat to “a
puppet Greek ministry of rativaillement.” And under no circumstances was the Swedish-Swiss
Commission to turn a profit. The price should cover basic costs of milling, baking, and
distributing— nothing m ore.177
Sweden sided with Britain on both issues. Very conscious of the power dynamics at
work, Sweden had every intention of asserting its leadership role. At the end of June, Sweden
politely, but firmly insisted that the wheat be consigned to its representative, Paul Mohn.178
Sweden had spent the previous weeks maneuvering to have Mohn, the Swedish consul at Rome,
placed in charge of the Swedish-Swiss Commission.179 Mohn would work with, but not answer
to, Marcel Junod, who had overseen the High Commission’s relief work in Greece. Together
they would manage the thirty delegates— fifteen Swedes and fifteen Swiss— of the Swedish-
Swiss Commission.180 Although Britain was leery of Junod, since he masterminded the
176 Telegram 370, FO to Mallet, 26 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 378, FO to Mallet, 29 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
177 Telegram 388, FO to Mallet, 4 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 1765, Johnson to Hull, 9 July 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 769.
178 Telegram 476, Mallet to FO, 27 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 378, FO to Mallet, 29 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 1694, Johnson to Hull, 3 July 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 768. Telegram 511, Mallet to FO, 8 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
179 Telegram 476, Mallet to FO, 27 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
180 Telegram 1576, Johnson to Hull, 21 June 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 765-6. By mutual agreement, Sweden and Switzerland covered the expenses of the delegates with private money.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 344
profiteering from the Radmanso wheat, Sweden regarded him as very capable and found his
assistance with the Italians invaluable.181
By the end of the first week of August 1942, three Swedish ships had docked in Montreal
to pick up the first shipment of wheat.182 Another two followed at the end of the month, with
three more ready to go when the Commission gave the word.183 After seven months of
negotiations and planning, a large-scale relief program finally began in Greece.
Greece Is the Sole Exception
When the Swedish delegates arrived in Greece and began work at the end of August
1942, their first order of business was to distribute the wheat shipments. They also had a second
task: determine what else needed to be done to help Greece. British and Swedish officials
understood that Greece needed more than wheat. Although wheat would help redress the bread
deficiency in the Greek diet and increase daily caloric intake, other shortages remained, including
milk and vegetables.184 The Allies intended to redress the shortages, but they wanted to do so in
the manner recommended by the commission, not on an ad hoc basis.
At the end of September, the Swedish-Swiss commission filed its first report on
conditions in Greece and its own progress. The fall harvest yielded 300,000 tons of wheat, of
which the occupation authorities took 35,000 tons. The rest of the wheat would stay in the
181 Junod recounts his experiences in Greece and his work as a delegate for the International Red Cross in his memoir, Warrior without Weapons (Geneva: ICRC, 1982.) Telegram 1108, Johnson to Hull, 8 May 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 760-1. Telegram 357, Mallet to FO, 8 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Telegram 1466, Johnson to Hull, 10 June 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 763-4. Telegram 424, Mallet to FO, 10 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0837/1235.
182 Telegram 565, Mallet to FO, 24 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235. Press release issued by State Department, 7 August 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 771-2. Telegram 497, FO to Stockholm, 28 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471.
183 Letter, Stopford to Long, 15 September 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 778-9.
184 Telegram 439, FO to Mallet, 28 July 1941. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 345
countryside, leaving shortages in large cities. Unfortunately, the vegetable and fruit harvest was
below normal and mainly consumed or seized by the occupation forces. The same applied to the
fish catch. Milk production remained dismal, because of the lack of fodder.185 The commission
had also been busy: it assumed control of the bread supply for Athens and Pireaus. After
orchestrating the elimination of the corrupt Ministry of Ravataillement, it arranged for wheat to
be delivered directly to the mills, effectively cutting out both the middle man and the
accompanying graft. The commission also enacted new policies for bakeries. Bakeries that sold
bread at a price higher than the one set by the commission were subject to closure. A new bread
rationing system for Athens, Pireaus, and the provinces was being devised as well. To make
more milk available for children, sick persons, and the elderly, the commission started an
exchange program, offering bran for milk.186
The commission also began submitting requests for additional supplies. First on the list
was wheat, namely another 10,000 tons per month. Canada and the United States agreed to
supply the additional wheat, but finding the shipping proved more troublesome. Germany had
taken a tougher attitude toward the Swedish ships, demanding that the Hallaren return to the
Baltic Sea, rather continue to work in the Mediterranean. Germany’s attitude toward the
Hallaren made Britain and Sweden leery about asking for more ships to be released from their
Baltic prison. Instead, the commission was told to speed up the time it took to unload supplies in
Greece. If the current fleet of ships could be turned around faster, no extra ships would be
needed. If that proved unmanageable, Eden intended to tangle with Germany.187
185 Telegram 720, Mallet to FO, 27 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/321473.
186 Telegram 2686, Green (Charge in Stockholm) to Hull, 28 September 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 786.
187 Minute (W 13920/62/49) by Eden, Maclean, and Steel, 13-15 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 346
Before the Swedish-Swiss Commission made its recommendation, it wanted to assess
Greece’s food situation and the soup kitchen system. During the month it took to do the
evaluation and write the report, the Greek exile government stirred up trouble. Impatient as
usual, Greece did not want to wait for the commission’s recommendation. It zealously lobbied
for the inclusion of dried vegetables, also known as pulse, expounding on the tragic conditions
that would occur if the soup kitchens closed.188 Using pulse imported from Turkey, the
International Red Cross had been serving 700,000 meals per day through soup kitchens in Athens
and Pireaus. The termination of the Turkish imports, however, jeopardized the continued
operation of the soup kitchens.189 The Foreign Office and MEW found Greece’s new campaign
ironic, since Greece had spent months mocking the Turkish program. Hoping to move things
along, Greece submitted a request in mid-September to the U.S. Lend-Lease Administration
asking for 2,000 tons per month of pulse. Like its London compatriots, the State Department
tabled Greece’s request until it learned the views of the Commission.190 Greece, however, found
State’s wait-and-see attitude worrisome.191 Canada could not supply regular shipments of pulse,
which meant that it had to come from the United States or not at all.192
188 Telegram A-105, Greek Series from Biddle, Winant to Hull, 11 September 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 775-6. Telegram 903, Steinhardt (Ankara) to Hull, 12 September 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 777-8.
189 Telegram 916, Steinhardt to Hull, 16 September 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 779-780. Telegram 1206, FO to Angora, 28 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1235.Letter (W 11183/62/49), 16 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471. Telegram 1676, Angora to FO, 12 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1237.
190 Telegram 772, Hull to Johnson, 14 September 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 778.
191 Minute (W12525/62/49) by Maclean, 15 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32473.
192 Greece was not the only one attempting to make arrangements independent of the commission. Worried about the fate of the soup kitchens, Brunei visited Ankara to lobby Turkish and British officials for pulse shipments. While Brunei’s concerns were understandable, his overtures made an already complicated diplomatic situation more so. It also did not help matters that he received assistance from the same Greek officials who attempted to foil the Turkish program. Britain and the United States respected Brunei’s opinion, but as far as they were concerned only the views of the Swedish-Swiss Commission were “valid for administrative purposes.” Letter (W 12630/62/49), Steel to Winant, 22 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32473. Memcon, Berle and Diamantopoulos, 25 September 1942.FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 785.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 347
Greece was not the only one attempting to make arrangements independent of the
commission. Worried about the fate of the soup kitchens, Brunei visited Ankara to lobby Turkish
and British officials for pulse shipments. While Brunei’s concerns were understandable, his
overtures made an already complicated diplomatic situation more so. It also did not help matters
that he received assistance from the same Greek officials who attempted to foil the Turkish
program. Britain and the United States respected Brunei’s opinion, but as far as they were
concerned only the views of the Swedish-Swiss Commission were “valid for administrative
purposes.”
At the beginning of October, the commission submitted its request for pulse. Worried
that conditions in the coming winter would be harsher than those previously, the commission
recommended keeping the soup kitchens open. “Stocks are exhausted and the population has lost
its powers of physical resistance and parted with much of its possessions in order to buy food at
inflated prices,” wrote Mohn. “Mortality has increased to an alarming extent.”193 In order to
speed up delivery, Canada agreed to provide the first shipment of pulse from stocks on-hand in
Montreal, but all subsequent shipments came from the United States under Lend-Lease.194
Although the initial request for pulse called for 2,000 tons per month, by the beginning of
December everyone agreed that the amount should be increased to 3,000 tons.195
Telegram 5895 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 28 October 1942; Telegram 5153, Halifax to FO, 16 October 1942; Letter, Camps to Maclean, 20 October 1942; Telegram 5791, MEW to Washington, 20 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
193 Telegram 732, Mallet to FO, 1 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
194 Telegram 5760 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 16 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
195 Telegram 4617, Halifax to MEW, 24 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475. Telegram 1645, FO to Angora, 29 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475. Telegram 961, Hull to Greene, 6 November 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 790. Telegram 649, MEW to Stockholm, 20 November 1942; Telegram 4950 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 22 November 1942; Telegram 673 ARFAR, MEW to Stockholm, 1 December 1942; Telegram 6375, MEW to Washington, 1 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 348
The commission also made one other major request: it wanted milk. Even though the
Foreign Office and MEW resigned themselves to the inevitability of the request, it compromised
British policy in general. From an economic warfare standpoint, it would be daft to allow milk
shipments. During peacetime, Greece produced all of the milk it required, so any shortages under
Axis occupation came from the pillaging or requisitioning of local stocks. Allied intelligence,
however, indicated that Germany seized the local milk production for its forces. From a relief
policy standpoint, allowing milk shipments to Greece would open Britain up to incredible
pressure from the other allies, particularly Belgium, to allow milk programs in their countries.196
Despite their anxieties, the Foreign Office and MEW intended to support any reasonable
request.197
As it had with pulse, the Greek government refused to wait for the commission’s
recommendation. Meeting with Anthony Biddle, who was visiting London as Roosevelt’s envoy,
Tsouderos insisted that if Greece did not receive milk “. . . we shall have to face new
tragedies.”198 Things also got nasty in the press. A leaked letter from the Foreign Office to
Greece denying a request to import dried milk from Argentina caused a ruckus in the editorial
pages o f The Times and in Commons. “It seems to me that we may be landed in considerable
difficulties,” observed Foot, “if the Greek Government make a practice of disclosing to outside
persons the nature of the correspondence which passes between HMG and themselves.”199 The
guilty party turned out to be the Greek Red Cross, which leaked the letter to spite Britain—
196 Letter, Camps to Maclean, 26 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1237.
197 Telegram 484 ARFAR, MEW to Stockholm, 29 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32472. Minutes (W 11753/62/49) by Maclean and Dixon, 3-4 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471. Telegram 2420, Johnson to Hull, 7 September 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 774-775.
198 Telegram A-105, Greek Series from Biddle, Winant to Hull, 11 September 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 775-6.
199 Letter, Foot to Law, 3 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1237.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 349
because it disagreed with its policy— and to needle Tsouderos— because he failed convince
Britain to change its policy. Unfortunately, the incident only confirmed the Foreign Office and
MEW ’s perception that the Greek government could not control “their intriguers and disaffected
elements.”200 In fact, Britain was beginning to think that the relief program would be better off if
Greece had nothing to do with it.
At the end of September, the commission requested permission to import 100 tons of
dried milk per month to provide milk to children. Greece’s milk production had declined
significantly because of slaughter and the lack of fodder. The decline, coupled with
requisitioning by Axis occupation forces, created a severe milk shortage.201 “Both departments
are satisfied that the despatch of milk to Greece and not to other Allied occupied countries can be
defended by clear evidence that the need of Greece is of quite a different order than the need of,
say, Belgium,” Sargent wrote Eden of his conversations with MEW. “H.M. Government have
recognised that the famine and mortality in Greece puts the relief of that country in an altogether
different category from any of the other occupied countries.” Although the Foreign Office and
MEW both supported the request, they still needed the Cabinet’s approval because the original
concession applied only to wheat. Since the Cabinet had not looked favorably on previous
requests to allow milk into occupied territories, they faced the worrisome possibility of being told
“no.” Lord Selborne, the new head of MEW, considered ignoring the Cabinet and granting the
request based on the commission’s recommendations, as had been done with pulse. Eden, who
was thinking along the same lines, convinced Selborne that Churchill’s blessing would suffice.
(Eden was also relieved finally to have a like-minded soul heading up MEW.) While Eden
200 Letter (W13385/62/49), Law to Foot, 19 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
201 Telegram 720, Mallet to FO, 27 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/321473. Telegram 732, Mallet to FO, 1 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474. Telegram 2686, Green (Charge in Stockholm) to Hull, 28 September 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 786. Telegram 574 ARFAR, MEW to Mallet, 16 October 1942; Telegram 397, Stockholm to MEW, 18 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 350
smoothed things over with Churchill, he ordered his staff to figure out how to obtain the milk,
which continued to be in short supply on both sides of the Atlantic.202
In mid-October, Britain approached the United States with the idea of having the
American and Canadian Red Crosses, with assistance of the Greek War Relief Association,
organize the milk shipments. The State Department liked the idea, but dragged its feet on
implementing it. 203 Breckinridge Long suddenly insisted that a general review of relief policy
needed to be conducted, including sending milk to Greece. Frustrated with the turn of events, the
Foreign Office told Halifax to make arrangements to obtain the milk with or without the State
Department’s help.204 The Greek War Relief Association’s finances did not allow it to help, but
word soon came that Lend-Lease could supply 2,000 tons of milk, which was forwarded to
Montreal for loading.205 The Canadian Red Cross also agreed to make available 30 tons of
milk.206 Once again Long made a silly demand: he insisted that the amount of wheat shipped to
Greece be reduced by 100 tons to adjust for the milk. “When the nutritional fallacy as well as the
technical difficulty of carrying out this suggestion had been explained to him,” Halifax reported,
“he said that he did not want arithmetical precision but thought that for the time being their
should be a corresponding reduction in the wheat in respect of milk and pulse.”207 The Foreign
Office promptly ignored Long.
202 Memo, Sargent to Eden, 18 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
203 Telegram 5760 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 16 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
204 Telegram 5153, Halifax to FO, 16 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475. Telegram 5791, MEW to Washington, 20 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
205 Telegram 4951, Washington to MEW, 21 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Letter, Long to Hall, 4 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32480.
206 Telegram 5895 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 28 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
207 Telegram 4617, Halifax to MEW, 24 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 351
Before the milk could be sent, Eden needed Churchill’s approval, because the program
had grown beyond the scope approved by the Prime Minister. “The Commission is a reliable
body and it is known from other reports that infantile mortality is still appalling high in Greece,”
wrote Eden. “If therefore we do not accept their recommendation, we risk a situation this winter
comparable with that which forced us to take action before. Public opinion, which understands
that we are doing the necessary minimum at least for Greece, would certainly be deeply
disturbed.” He considered the addition of milk to the relief program as “merely an extension of
the special treatment that we are already according to Greece.” Swayed by Eden’s arguments,
Churchill agreed to extend the blockade concession on one condition: “Greece is the sole
exception.”208
By the end of October 1942, arrangements had been made for Greece to receive 100
tons of milk per month, with the first shipment scheduled to arrive in December.209 Even the
mischievous Greek Red Cross could not help but express its thanks to MEW, albeit somewhat
disingenuously. “It is unnecessary for me to tell you how the announcement of the permit for
milk to be shipped to Greece has filled the hearts of all Greeks with joy,” wrote its president.
“Our brave soldiers, sailors, and airmen, who are continuing to fight wherever they can, will be
happy to know that their wives and children are not being permitted to starve.”210
The commission also looked for a way to provide relief to the Greek islands. Under
the original agreement, relief was limited to the Greek mainland and the Peloponnese, with the
208 Note (PM/42/231): “Milk for Greece,” Eden to Churchill, 21 October 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/5.
209 Memo, Greek Embassy to the Department of State, 29 October 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 787. Telegram 961, Hull to Greene, 6 November 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 790.
210 Letter, A.P.Cawadias to Selborne, 28 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1237.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 352
question of supplying the islands to be determined later.211 The commission did not want to
ignore the islands, where conditions rivaled those of Athens and Pireaus. The International Red
Cross’ experiences attempting to supply the islands demonstrated the need to control both the
transport and distribution networks. Captains charged outrageous sums to ferry relief supplies,
only to skim the cargo. Black market traffickers attempted to delay the arrival of relief ships so
that they could make a last minute profit or devise ways to plunder the supplies. Local
government and church officials violently opposed free distribution of food to the poor,
demanded supplies for themselves, and charged large sums for transportation to outlaying
villages.212 In May 1942, the German contingent on Mitylene seized the wheat sent by the
International Red Cross, selling it on the black market at a healthy profit. The isolation of the
islands allowed such behavior to flourish, aided by threats of retaliation against those who voiced
opposition.• • 213
The best option for delivering relief to the islands was caiques, but the Royal Navy
strongly opposed their use for relief work. It had spent the past year trying to limit caique traffic
to and between the islands in order to prevent the Axis from reinforcing its position.214 Axis
occupation authorities were not keen on the commission working on the islands, but eventually
consented.215 They were concerned that the Allies would use the commission’s activities as a
211 Letter (W 11753/62/49), Maclean to Romanos, 9 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471. Telegram 523, FO to Stockholm, 13 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32472.
212 Letter, Hahn (Ankara) to Eden, 16 October 1942, plus report by IRC representative Courvoisier on visit to Chios, Mitylene, and Samos (24 July 1942). TNA/PRO, F 0371/32476.
213 Secret report: Greece, Economic, Mitylene (CX/41128/A/15420), 24 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32472. Telegram 132 ARFAR, Izmir to MEW, 28 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32464.
214 Telegram 1141Z, CINC Med to Admiralty, 13 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32466. Letter, Marshall to Maclean, 16 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F037/32466. Letter (W9299/62/49), Maclean to Marshall, 20 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32466. Letter, Camps to Maclean, 7 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32472. Letter (M0893/42), Marshall to Maclean, 22 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
215 Telegram 2595, FO to Cairo, 29 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1237.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 353
cover for gathering intelligence. Those suspicions seemed to be confirmed when the first attempt
at delivering flour to Mitylene resulted in the ship going into a forbidden port. Axis authorities
cried foul, impounding the ship and imprisoning the crew, while the Royal Navy bellowed about
the use of the forbidden caiques. Clearly, another solution had to be found.216
At the end of October, the commission proposed that one of the ships delivering wheat
from Canada drop off some of its cargo at Izmir, Turkey, which would help provision the
Cyclades, the group of 220 islands that make up the Greek archipelago in the Aegean, along with
the islands of Chios, Samos, and Mitylene. From Izmir, the food could be distributed to the
islands using routes approved by the German and British navies. Germany found the plan
appealing and offered the use of a small ship crewed by Greeks to deliver food to islands
occupied by its forces. The commission did not like the idea of depending on Germany for
transportation and received permission to use a small ship (600 tons) of Swedish registry.
Unfortunately, Germany and Britain could not agree on shipping routes, preventing any relief
deliveries to the Cyclades after November 1942. The commission, however, had better luck with
Crete, obtaining permission for the Swedish ships to unload some of their cargo at Kalamata, the
largest port on Crete, on their way to Pireaus.217
By the end of December 1942, the commission boasted a staff of 550, organized into
branches dealing with distribution, documentation and coordination, transportation, and medicine,
216 Letter (18/421/42), Chancery (Angora) to General Department, 28 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476.
217 The Greek War Relief Association had provided $2 million to cover the costs of the shipping the relief supplies. Beginning in 1943, the costs had to be borne by the Lend-Lease Administration, since the organization had problems raising money. Letter, Marshall to Maclean, 31 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476. Telegram 445 ARFAR, Mallet to MEW, 12 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Telegram 5767, Hull to Winant, 17 November 1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 791-2. Letter, Coe to Eden, 19 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Telegram 1840A, Admiralty to CINC Med, 22 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Letter (3/586/42), Ross to Selborne, 15 December 1942, with Aide- Memoire by Allard, 11 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32480. Letter (W15736/62/49), Steel to Winant, 19 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Telegram 7291, Matthews to Hull, 23 December
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 354
and children.218 German objections, military obstacles, and resistance activities kept the
commission from reaching all of the Greek islands and some provinces. In January 1943, the
Lend-Lease Administration assumed financial responsibility for the charters of the Swedish ships,
which expanded to fourteen in number, with the Greek War Relief Association providing
assistance with other shipping costs. By the beginning of 1944, the commission received more
than 20,000 tons per month of food, which consisted of wheat, pulse, and milk, but also soup mix,
cured fish, milk, rice, sugar, and baby food. Britain eventually agreed to allow Argentina to
contribute shipments of wheat. The commission also distributed clothing.
During the winter of 1943-44, the Germans burned villages across Greece as reprisals for
resistance activity. To help the homeless families, the commission received permission to import
shoes and clothing for children and adults donated by the Greek War Relief Association, the
American and Canadian Red Crosses, and the Lend-Lease Administration. The commission
continued its work until the liberation of Greece in October 1944, when it was replaced by the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Allied postwar relief
organization. 219
With the advent of the Greek relief program, Britain, and its new partner, the United
States, punched hole in the blockade to solve a humanitarian crisis. What made Greece different
from Belgium, Norway, or the Netherlands, was the presence of actual famine conditions. People
weren’t just hungry or unhappy with their diets under the rationing system— they were starving
and dying in the streets. During the winter of 1941-42, it is estimated that 100,000 Greeks died.
1942. FRUS, 1942, vol. II, 792-794. Foreign Economic Administration, “Survey of Greek Relief,” March 1944. FDRL, WRB, Box 49, FEA, Vol. II.
218 Telegram 768, Mallet to FO, 21 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
2,9 Foreign Economic Administration, “Survey of Greek Relief,” March 1944. FDRL, WRB, Box 49, FEA, vol. II.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 355
After trying to feed Greece within the strictures of the blockade, Britain recognized that
intrablockade purchases were not going to be sufficient and it was going to have to break the
blockade. In doing so, Britain designed a relief program for Greece that limited the economic
benefits to Germany and ensured that the food would reach those in need— no involvement by the
puppet occupation government, no profiteering from deprivation, no plundering by the Axis.
Britain wanted to fill stomachs, not coffers. Enlisting Sweden’s assistance proved a stroke of
genius. The Swedes provided diplomatic savvy, responsible leadership, and conscientious
handling of an immense undertaking. Canada also provided valuable assistance by donating
stocks wheat. Despite being an equal partner in the fighting, the United States continued to play a
secondary role on the relief issue as a result of the State Department’s uneven policy. The United
States, however, supported the relief program in two key ways: Johnson’s presence in Stockholm
aided discussions with Sweden, while the Lend-Lease Administration provided essential supplies.
As for the Greek exile government, its citizens received relief despite the actions of its
government.
Accounts of the Greek famine have been the domain of scholars of Greek history, and
they have not been kind to Britain. They downplay Britain’s role in aiding Greece, while
celebrating the efforts of the Greek exile government and the Greek War Relief Association.
“Had matters been left to British civil servants, it is doubtful whether the blockade would have
ever been lifted,” writes historian Mark Mazower.220 The bad press that Britain has received
220 Mark Mazower,Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation (New Haven, CT: Y ale University Press, 1993) 46. Mazower’s assessment typifies the anti-British streak that runs through the literature about the Nazi occupation, a period that Greek scholars tend to view through the prism of Greece’s post-war politics and the Cold War’s ideological battles. John Louis Hondros’sOccupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941-1944 (New York: Pella, 1983) also offers an account of the war period. Although there is a healthy body of literature on British policy towards Greece during the Second World War, it mostly ignores Britain’s role in relieving the famine. See Procopis Papastratis,British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (New York: Cambridge, 1984); G.M. Alexander, The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1982); Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, eds.,British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 356
stems from the willingness of the British officials to let the Greeks take credit for organizing
relief. It would have been impossible for the Greek exile government, given its status and limited
financial resources, or the Greek War Relief Association to organize a large-scale relief program.
While Britain could have responded sooner, the timing of the famine should be noted. It
began in the fall of 1941, when Britain stood alone in the fight against Nazi Germany, clinging to
every weapon in its arsenal. For a government that believed the blockade had helped it survive,
punching a hole in it seemed like reckless course of action. British officials, however, could not
ignore their hearts and the moral imperative to aid the Greeks. Despite their frequently vicious
pens, it was the personal convictions of Foreign Office and MEW officials that something had to
be done— not American or British public opinion— that led them to take a stand, argue in favor of
relief, and then make the program a reality.
Yugoslavia and Greece (London, 1975); E. Barker, F.W. Deakin and J. Chadwick, eds., British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in(London: 1944 St. Martin’s, 1988); Elizabeth Barker, British Policy in South-Eastern Europe during the Second World (London: War St. Martin’s Press, 1976); Anne Karalekas, Britain, the United States, and Greece (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER EIGHT
EVERYBODY ELSE
Some people may be startled or momentarily depressed when, like your President, I speak of a long and hard war. But our peoples would rather know the truth, somber though it may be. And after all, when we are doing the noblest work in the world, not only defending our hearths and homes but the cause of freedom in other lands, the question of whether deliverance comes in 1942, 1943, or 1944 falls into its proper place in the grand proportions of human history. Sure I am that this day— now— we are the masters of our fate; that the task which has been set us in not about our strength; that its pangs and toils are not beyond our endurance. As long as we have faith in our cause and an unconquerable will power, salvation will not be denied us.1
Churchill shared his realistic assessment of the “long and hard war” that faced the Allies
when he addressed a joint session of the United States Congress on 26 December 1941. He had
traveled to Washington in the weeks following Pearl Harbor to discuss how meld British and
American resources. Britain had finally gotten its wish— the United States was no longer neutral,
but a full-fledged ally in the fight against the Axis. The Arcadia Conference established the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, which coordinated Anglo-American strategy and resources. It also
laid the groundwork for “Europe First” strategy, making the defeat of Germany a priority over
Japan. Even with the Americans in the war, 1942 was going to be a slog for the Allies. It would
take time for American troops and industrial might to make a difference. Britain and the United
States also had to make adjustments to their relationship. For Britain that meant consulting, not
merely proclaiming. For the United States that meant listening, not making assumptions.
1 Speech, “A Long and Hard War” by Churchill, 26 December 1941. Robert Rhodes James, Churchilled., Speaks, 1897-1963: Collected Speeches in Peace and Wartime (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1998)782.
357
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 358
The same challenges that faced the Allies in meshing military commands and styles also
applied to relief policy. The Greek relief program demonstrated that relief could be delivered to
the occupied territories, which made the exile governments even more determined to obtain their
own relief program. It also helped fuel the burgeoning relief movement in Britain. Given the
high political stakes, the Foreign Office and MEW hoped that the Americans would tackle the
relief issue in a logical way, which meant their way.
The Least Dangerous of Relief Measures
At the end of January 1942, after laying low on the relief issue following the implosion of
Hoover’s campaign, the Belgian exile government renewed its request for relief, emphasizing the
need to help children.2 (It also made a plea for something to aid Greece.) To help make the case,
Bigwood produced a new report, which found that the situation in Belgium remained unchanged.
“The true rations,” read the report, “are far from reaching the quantities allowed for by the ration
cards.” 3
Britain’s continued refusal to allow a large scale relief program meant that the Belgian
exile government had few options. Exile governments and their agents could buy food from
neutral countries in the blockade area— Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, and Turkey— provided
the food was indigenous. Belgium adeptly exploited this option, purchasing about 1000 tons of
2 According to Bigwood, Potatoes and fats were in short supply, and the daily bread ration amounted to only to 14 pound per day. “The great majority of the population in urban centres live on about 1,000 calories per head per day, whereas the average requirements of an adult are of the order of 2,400 calories when living on a purely sedentary occupation.” Cases of tuberculosis and rickets had also increased. “Most of the reports agree that the only way out of this most critical situation would be to double the bread ration and to supply milk and cheese to the population. It is feared that, unless this is achieved, the health of the children and adolescents in Belgium will be definitely undermined.” Bigwood’s report acknowledged that Germany fed Belgium, but questioned whether it would maintain the bread ration until the autumn harvest. Note (W1226) by Steel, 23 January 1942; Note by Beyens, 23 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456. Letter, Stirling to Cadogan, 9 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457.
3 Report by E.J. Bigwood, “The State of the Health of the Belgian Population under German Occupation,” January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32456.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 359
food per month, mainly fish, figs, and vegetable extracts, from Portugal. MEW also allowed four
tons of food parcels per month to be sent from Portugal on behalf of Belgians living in England.
A similar program was about to start for the Free French and Norwegians.4 With supplies in
Portugal limited, the Belgians considered Turkey. Buying food in Turkey, however, would
require transporting it by ship to Trieste, Italy, and then on to Belgium by rail. Aside from the
transportation problems, MEW did not like the scheme, because it did not want the Belgians to
compete with the Greeks for Turkish commodities. It could not, however, tell the Belgians that
and did everything possible to discourage it unofficially.5
Another relief scheme for Belgium trickled out of Bern in mid-February 1942. The
International Red Cross and its bankers, Banque Internationale Suisse (BIS), proposed that
Belgium be allowed to buy food in Hungary and Romania for distribution by the International
Red Cross. More than one hundred million francs belonging to Belgian banks languished in
blocked accounts in Hungary and Romania. By offering to pay for the food partly in Swiss francs
(provided by BIS) and partly in the local currency, the Belgians hoped to secure release of these
blocked funds. The scheme would accomplish three things: 1) provide Belgium with additional
food; 2) allow Belgium to access to new source of financing for relief; and 3) provide Hungarian
and Romanian banks with Swiss francs, the most desirable currency in wartime Europe. Not
surprisingly, the governments of Hungary and Romania agreed to the deal.6 Before the scheme
4 Letter, Camps to Markbreiter, 20 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
5 MEW hoped that Admiralty would scuttle the plan on the grounds it could not guarantee the safety of the ships. Admiralty, however, refused to play the spoiler. While the relief shipments would hamper operations, Admiralty pledged to protect them if they were desirable for political reasons. The Belgians returned with another plan: ship the goods to Trieste without benefit of safe conduct. Letter, Camps to Marshall, 1 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457. Letter, Waldockto Camps, 26 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1234. Letter, Camps to Marshall, 23 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457. Telegram 216 Arfar, MEW to Angora, 28 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32459.
6 Telegram 505, Berne to FO, 12 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458. BIS did not expect Belgium to repay the loan during the war and the loan did not constitute a lien on Belgian assets blocked with Allies.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 360
went forward, BIS wanted assurances from Britain and the United States that it would not be
violating neutrality policy or the blockade. It also needed the U.S. Treasury to approve the
disposal of some of its assets in the United States.7
The Foreign Office didn’t quite know what to make of the BIS scheme. “The main point
for H.M. Government,” observed Maclean, “is whether or not we are to agree to the purchases of
food in enemy territory which means the foreign exchange in one way or another accruing to the
enemy.”8 Steel thought, however, that Britain would be ill-advised to turn down the scheme on
economic warfare grounds, believing that Germany would receive only limited indirect financial
benefit. Refusing it might also irritate Belgium, he predicted: “The position of the Belgian Govt,
in view of the extension of relief to Greece will be very difficult indeed and, if we insist on using
our financial control to queer their pitch, I think they will have a very good case for letting us
down in any way they can.”9 Aside from the financial questions, the Foreign Office could not
make sense of the exile Belgian government’s role, particularly given Spaak’s previous and
adamant opposition to making purchases in enemy territory. It turned out that Belgian officials in
Bern, when presented with the scheme, were intrigued and asked for more specifics. The
International Red Cross, however, mistook Belgian interest for its consent. When the details
finally reached Spaak, he killed the scheme.10 By the beginning of March, all that remained was
BIS’s offer to loan Belgium one million Swiss francs for use in purchasing food and medicine in
7 Telegram 564, Bern to Washington, 13 February 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 9. Telegram 521, Berne to FO, 13 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
8 Minute (W2296/62/49) by Maclean, 18 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
9 Minute (W2296/62/49) by Steel, 18 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
10 Telegram 825, MEW to Berne, 19 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 361
Switzerland."
Although it did not open up Eastern Europe as a source of relief, the aborted BIS scheme
had two consequences. First, it provided Belgium with a means of rapidly purchasing goods in
Switzerland. When a high demand item, such as dried milk, became available, firms would only
wait so long to receive payment, particularly when there were plenty of other buyers. The BIS
loan allowed Belgium to snap up such supplies before they disappeared.12 Second, the
undesirability of the original scheme kept the Foreign Office and MEW thinking about ways to
provide relief to Belgium and other occupied countries. As long as Britain’s policy remained in
place, the more outlandish the schemes would become.13
Despite pursuing other options, Belgians again made a push for a milk and vitamin
program in mid-February 1942.14 The Archbishop of York also registered an appeal for Belgium,
a development that worried the Foreign Office and MEW. The last thing the relief issue needed
was for British churches to mobilize like their American brethren. Maclean urged his colleagues
to agree to Belgium’s request or a variation of it in order to forestall others. He also believed that
a milk program could serve as a badly needed “a symbol of solidarity between the Belgian
Government and His Majesty’s Government.” He acknowledged, however, that the other exile
governments, especially Norway, would lobby for similar programs.15 Steel and Cadogan,
however, remained unconvinced. “[I] do rather question the wisdom of rushing at the Belgian
11 Telegram 675, Berne to MEW, 23 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458. Telegram 1067 Arfar, MEW to Berne, 6 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
12 Telegram 1067 Arfar, MEW to Berne, 6 March 1942; Telegram 1092 Arfar, MEW to Berne, 8 March 1942; Telegram 921, Berne to MEW, 13 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
13 Minute (W2062/62/49) by Maclean, 16 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32457.
14 Aide-memoire from Belgium, 18 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32458.
15 Minute (W3329/62/49) by Maclean, February 23, 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 362
question quite at once,” remarked Steel. “People are not dying of starvation in Belgium and the
country being what it is they are unlikely to do so for some time.”16
Thinking more along the lines of Maclean, MEW made inquiries into the supply situation
for dried and condensed milk. If relief had to be extended beyond Greece, MEW wanted it to be
in the form of a milk and vitamin program, which it regarded as “the least dangerous of the relief
measures,” because it provided direct benefits children and pregnant and nursing mothers.17
Unfortunately, the milk supply remained tight— there were no exportable surpluses outside the
Southern Dominions, North America, or Ireland. The only possible source of vitamin
concentrates was the United States and its limited surplus went to Britain. The Ministry of Food
warned MEW against approaching the United States.18
But there was the appeal of helping children. The Foreign Office found the milk program
advantageous from a political standpoint, since it would pacify the exile governments. MEW
regarded child relief as the least objectionable type of program, since it wouldn’t help the German
war machine. At the end of February 1942, the Foreign Office and MEW met with the Ministries
of War Transport and Food for a brainstorming session. The program on the table called for milk
concentrates to be provided to children in allied territories occupied by the Nazis, including
France. “There was general agreement that if supplies could be found we should try and arrange
for the International Red Cross to organise a pool of supplies which they would allocate between
the various countries, according to need,” recorded Maclean. “The sort of figure to be aimed at
for this pool was 10,000 tons a month, though it was considered unlikely that the Americans
could produce so much. If the milk were delivered at Marseilles, two 10,000 ton ships would be
16 Minute (W3329/62/49) by Steel, February 24, 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32460.
17 Memo by MEW, “Possible Relief Measures,” 8 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
18 Letter, Browne to Camps, 31 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F032458.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 363
required on permanent service to secure this rate of delivery.”19 The ministries believed the
program could be justified on the grounds that children were suffering in all the occupied
territories, while only adults starved in Greece.
Was milk available? “It is likely that the public here,” wrote Steel, “may have to be
called on for some sacrifice— if only symbolic— in order to secure a cut in U.S. consumption
which alone would provide the necessary large quantity.”20 The Ministry of Food, however, had
no intention of allowing a relief program to interfere with Britain’s milk supply. Since the war
began, Britain had depended on the United States to supply milk, and the Ministry of Food did
not want to divert one drop of it to the occupied territories. Lord Woolton, the ministry’s
director, believed that Britain deserved the milk, because unlike the occupied countries, it actively
resisted Nazi Germany and Italy.21 If a milk program materialized, Woolton wanted purchases
for it to remain under Anglo-American control to prevent the exile governments getting into a
bidding war or trying to wrestle private concessions.22 Despite its sour attitude, the Ministry of
Food agreed to make discrete inquiries with the United States and gauge the supply situation.23
While Foreign Office and MEW worked on the milk scheme, Spaak appealed to Eden for
a relief program.24 The General Department debated as to whether the Foreign Office should give
Spaak a hint about the milk program in the works. It hesitated to do so for two reasons: all relief
19 Minute (W3329/62/49) by Maclean, 27 February 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
20Minutes of meeting between MEW, FO, MOF, and MWT, 27 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223. Minute (W3329/62/49) by Steel, 2 March 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
21 Letter, French to Drogheda, 16 February 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
22 Letter, Stirling to MOF, 6 March 1942; Letter, MOF to British Food Mission, 9 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
23 Telegram 2885 Ration, British Food Mission to MOF, 13 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
24 Letter, Spaak to Eden, 5 March 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 364
programs required Cabinet approval and the Belgians were terrible at keeping secrets.25 “The risk
that we may not be able to do much is considerable,” noted Steel, “and the discretion of the
Belgian Govt, weak and hypnotized by their fears of their own pubic as they are is not very easily
to be trusted.26
Despite his staffs reservations, Eden fretted over the anxious tone of Spaak’s note and
suggested to Selborne that they give the Belgians an inkling of what they were working on. “The
concessions which have been made to Greece, coupled with the fact that the Belgian Government
here has little standing at home, are both factors which explain the rather desperate tone of
Spaak’s letter,” wrote Eden. “I fully appreciate that there is considerable risk in giving this
particular hint of future benefits to come, both from the point of view of leakage and also because
we may not be able to achieve very much after all. At the same time, I feel that it is a risk which
we shall have to take, and I very much hope that you will agree.”27 Selborne, however, asked
Eden to remain circumspect. “This is unsatisfactory,” groused Eden.“I thought that MEW has
made up their minds to do something for Belgium. Now we begin again at the beginning.”28
MEW had in fact decided to help Belgium, along with Britain’s other allies, but it did not
want to offer false hope. Major supply and shipping problems needed to be resolved, not to
mention the approval of the War Cabinet and the United States. MEW also wanted to get the
milk program right, intending it to be, in the words of Foot, “our last word on the subject.”29
25 Minute (W3526/62/49) by Steel, 11 January 1942; Minute (W3526/62/49) by Makins, 11 January 1942; Minute (W3526/62/49) by Cadogan, 13 January 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
26 Minute (W3526/62/49) by Steel, 14 January 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
27 Letter (W3526/62/49), Eden to Selborne, 18 March 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32460.
28 Letter, Selborne to Eden, 25 March 1942; Letter, Eden to Spaak, 3 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32460.
29 Minute by Foot, 20 March 1942; Minute by Drogheda, 20 March 1942; Minute by Stirling, 18 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 365
In mid-April 1942, the Ministry of Food stuck to its contention that nothing should
interfere with Britain’s ability to buy all of the dried milk the United States could produce,
leaving three options for a relief program. Option one consisted of full cream powder, which was
suitable for children up to the age of two. The United States had production facilities, but
probably could not make the 33,000 tons per year needed. Option two was dried skim milk,
which was appropriate for adults and older children. While the United States had a surplus of
this, it did not contain fat, which was sorely lacking from diets in the occupied territories.
Finally, option three consisted of evaporated milk, which was available in large quantities along
the American seaboard, but required significant tonnage to deliver in any quantity. “[W]e would
emphasize to you that 33,000 tons of full cream powder is represented by 100-120,000 tons of
evaporated milk,” noted the Ministry of Food, “so on shipping grounds there is a positive
disadvantage in sending evaporated milk instead of powder.”30
At the end of April, the Foreign Office presented a milk program to the War Cabinet for
consideration. Eden presented the program as a way for Britain not only to manage the relief
issue, but also turn it to its advantage. The recent concession to Greece had placed the other exile
governments in a difficult position. Belgium had already asked for food for children, while
Yugoslavia requested relief for Belgrade. “It will not for long be possible to refuse such requests
unless an alternative can be offered,” predicted Eden. “I am, however, convinced that it would be
disastrous to accede to such indiscriminate demands. The result would an endless series of
piecemeal and probably ill-conceived concessions growing continually in volume in response to
an insatiable demand.” Rather than indiscriminately chip away at the blockade, Britain should
devise a limited form of relief that can be offered to exile governments under Anglo-American
auspices. After consulting with MEW, the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that the best
30 Letter, Wall to Maclean, 22 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 366
plan would be a milk program for children. “In my view,” argued Eden, “such a concession will
be substantial enough to achieve its purpose if means can eventually be found to provide
2,000,000 children on the scale applied by the American Red Cross in France.” The program
would require 33,000 tons of powdered whole milk per year. Eden also hoped to enlist Sweden
to provide shipping and supervisory personnel.31
During the 27 April 1942 Cabinet meeting, Eden did his best to portray the program as
being in the best interests of Britain, particularly as a propaganda and morale building tool, while
stressing that it would not interfere with Britain’s milk imports. Selborne offered MEW ’s
endorsement, emphasizing the need for Britain to gain control of the relief issue. Their
colleagues, however, remained unconvinced and expressed fear that the milk program cascade
into demands for more relief. Rather than vote on the program, the Cabinet agreed to reconsider
it again in a week. After the meeting, Woolton expressed tempered support, telling Eden that “I
am in agreement with your proposals in principle.” Woolton, however, offered no such support
in the Cabinet session, which would have helped Eden make his case.
On balance, the Cabinet regarded the milk program as a catalyst for more problems.32
The Foreign Office took some solace in the fact that the program had escaped outright rejection.
“As soon as we reach the point where (as in Greece) people begin to die in the streets we shall
31 War Cabinet Paper W.P.(42)175, Milk for Children in Occupied Europe by Eden, 23 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
32 During the 27 April 1942 Cabinet meeting, Eden did his best to portray the program as being in the best interests of Britain, particularly as a propaganda and morale building tool, while stressing that it would not interfere with Britain’s milk imports. Selborne offered MEW’s endorsement, emphasizing the need for Britain to gain control of the relief issue. Their colleagues, however, remained unconvinced and expressed fear that the milk program cascade into demands for more relief. Rather than vote on the program, the Cabinet agreed to reconsider it again in a week. After the meeting, Woolton expressed tempered support, telling Eden that “I am in agreement with your proposals in principle.” Woolton, however, offered no such support in the Cabinet session, which would have helped Eden make his case. Letter, Woolton to Eden, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.War Cabinet Conclusions, W.M. (42) 53, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM 3/74/2. Minute (W5077/62/49) by Maclean, 4 April 1942; Minute (W5077/62/49) by Steel, 8 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32462.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 367
have to do something and meanwhile the Belgian Govt, may make serious trouble,” noted Steel.
“Actually, I think that conditions in Belgium are such that the children will die first and it would
help a good deal if we had this scheme in [being] even if only on a token basis.”33 Eden,
however, was not ready to give up. “All the same we are right in our main thesis,” he told his
staff.34 For Eden, the question was “when and how” to return to the charge.35
While the Cabinet mulled over the milk plan, worrying news came from across the
Atlantic. Roosevelt was rumored to be backing a mass food parcel plan for Norway. The details
remained sketchy, but the president’s interest in the scheme was not.36 The American relief
movement also appeared to be regenerating. “Doctor Van Dusen tells me that he sees signs of a
revival of concern about sending food to Belgium amongst church leaders, Roman Catholic and
Mission, supporters of the administration and friends of Great Britain,” Halifax told the Foreign
Office. “These people say that the situation in Belgium is bad now and that after the slight relief
to be expected from the harvest it will approach starvation conditions by December.” Van Dusen
believed that public agitation could be avoided if the Allies made a symbolic gesture. He
suggested that the American Red Cross be allowed to send powdered milk and vitamins to
Lisbon, after which the International Red Cross assume responsibility for transport and
distribution to Belgium.37 The news that American relief agitation might revive did not surprise
the Foreign Office. “Dr. Van Dusen has been one of our most useful allies in the relief battle and
33 Minute (W6397/62/49) by Steel, 30 April 1942; Minute (W6397/62/49) by Strang, 30 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
34 Minute (W6397/62/49) by Eden, 30 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
35 Minute (W7002/62/49) by Eden, 18 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
36 Minute by Selborne, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5. Minute by Camps, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5. Minute by Drogheda, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5. Minute by Selborne, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
37 Telegram 2692, Halifax to FO, 9 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 368
has consistently supported us against Mr. Hoover,” observed Maclean. “It is interesting therefore
that he should arrive at precisely the same conclusion as ourselves, namely that now is the time
for a limited concession.”38
During a meeting at 10 Downing in mid-May 1942, the Belgians used a two-pronged
strategy: first, they portrayed milk and vitamins as medical supplies necessary to fight
tuberculosis and rickets among Belgian children; and second, they emphasized the political
warfare benefits of providing relief. The Belgians contended that the lack of assistance provided
to children could become a potent propaganda tool for Germany. “For the most part, Belgian
public opinion places the responsibility for this situation on Germany, and realizes that, in the
present circumstances, it is not possible for the Allied Governments to improve it,” wrote Cartier
in a follow up letter. “Nevertheless, there is a danger that German propaganda may find fertile
ground if nothing at all is done.” If Britain allowed medical supplies— the desired milk and
vitamins— to pass the blockade, it would “no doubt stir up Belgian gratitude to Great Britain, and
stiffen resistance to Germany.” The Belgians left the meeting with nothing more than a promise
from Churchill to consider their argument.39
At the end of May— one month after the Cabinet meeting— Eden decided to push the
milk program again. In a personal note to Churchill, he expressed concern that the Cabinet, and
possibly Churchill, did not grasp the nature or the objective of the program. “Briefly, the idea
was that in order to forestall more far-reaching and embarrassing plans,” he reminded Churchill,
“we should jointly with the United States Government seek to make available about 30,000 tons
of milk annually for distribution to children in aft occupied territories under proper supervision
and where need is greatest.” A large portion of the supplies would go to Belgium, owing to the
38 Minute (W7002/62/49) by Maclean, 12 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463. Minute (W7002/62/49) by Steel, 12 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
39 Letter, Cartier to Churchill, 14 May 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/2. Letter (W6690/62/49), Cartier to Eden, 28 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32463. Cartier pressed Eden again at the end of April 1942.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 369
bad conditions and the concentration of its population in urban areas. Eden also made it clear that
he had colluded with Selbome— the Foreign Office had not gone rogue on the issue.40 Selbome
also added his voice, reinforcing Eden’s contention that the program would not damage the
blockade. “Any benefit to the enemy would be negligible; but the moral gain with our Allies
would be important,” he told Churchill.41
Bowing to pressure, Churchill asked the Cabinet to reconsider the milk question at the
beginning of June 1942.42 The program again received a lukewarm reception. Rather than see
the propaganda benefit espoused by Eden and Selbome, the Cabinet thought that trying to obtain
credit for the program would be risky. The exile governments might regard the concession as too
little too late and press for more. The Cabinet also discussed the fact that refusing previous
requests by the exile governments had not spoiled Britain’s relations with the exile governments.
Faced with overwhelming opposition, Eden withdrew the milk program from consideration
before it could be rejected outright. Although aggrieved, Eden wisely obtained a pledge from
Churchill: if the Belgians made serious trouble, the Cabinet would consider the milk program
again.• 43
In the wake of the Cabinet decision, the Foreign Office fretted about how to deal with
new appeals from Belgium and other exile governments.44 As Steel noted in the Cabinet post
40 Letter (PM/42/109), Eden to Churchill, 24 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
41 Letter, Selbome to Churchill, 27 May 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/2.
42 Letter, Morton to Morrison, 31 May 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/2.
43 War Cabinet, WM(42) 71,2 June 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/2.
44 In the week following the Cabinet meeting, Churchill asked the Foreign Office for “fresh suggestions” to use in his responding to the Belgians on the relief issue. The General Department found the request somewhat disingenuous given that Churchill declined to support the Foreign Office’s freshest idea. Britain’s policy remained unchanged, so there was nothing new to say. That did not keep Churchill from dressing up the refusal in rah-rah language. “By her acts of aggression against Belgium and other countries Germany has made herself responsible for supplying them,” he told Cartier, “and I am sure that it is in the interests of none of us to weaken this principle by any concession which could postpone even for a single
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 370
mortem, the milk program would languish unless other factors intervened: “The Foreign Office
can only regret this decision but for the moment there is clearly nothing to be done until either 1)
the Belgian Govt, stake some overt step or 2) the U.S. Govt, take an interest in the question.”45
No matter what, the Foreign Office did not want the United States learn that a milk program had
been considered and rejected.46 Nor did it want to stir up more ferment among British
humanitarian activists.
On the Grounds of Christian Flumanity
The Peace Pledge Union was the first British group to start campaigning in favor of
relief. Founded in 1934 by Canon Dick Sheppard, by 1937 more than 135,000 people had taken
the union’s pledge, “I renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will I sanction
another.” Germany’s assault on Europe and its bombing of Britain led to a drastic decline in
pacifist sentiment. By April 1941, the union had shrunk to 8,500 members. Prominent union
members, including Bertrand Russell and A.A. Milne, resigned, rejecting the union’s contention
that no matter how reprehensible Nazi Germany was Britain should negotiate with it.47
During the fall of 1941, spurred by reports on conditions in Greece, the union published a
series of leaflets advocating food for the occupied territories. It questioned why Britain did not
support Floover’s plans and the logic of the blockade. “[W]e hope to reduce the people of these
countries— our comrades, our allies and our friends— to such a condition of exhaustion that
Germany will be forced to use her supplies of food to save them, and so Germany will be
day, our common victory.” Minute (W8238/62/49) by Maclean, 6 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32464. Letter, Churchill to Cartier, 14 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0 3 7 1/32465. Letter, Millard to Brown, 17 June 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/1.
45 Minute (W8238/62/49) by Steel, 6 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32464.
46 Telegram 3809, FO to Washington, 15 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32464.
47 Richard A. Rempel, “The Dilemmas of British Pacifists during World War II,”Journal o f Modern History, vol 50, no. 4 (December 1978) 1213-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 371
compelled to surrender,” read one leaflet. It also argued that relief would be done properly
without benefit to the Germans, citing as examples the American Red Cross’ work in France,
Hoover’s relief efforts in the First World War, and the International Red Cross’ parcels program
for POW s.48 The union held its first meeting devoted solely to relief on 24 January 1942,
featuring Vera Brittain, Stuart Morris, the union’s secretary, and Roy Walker, author Famineof
Over Europe,49 Brittain, author ofTestament o f Youth, became the driving force behind its food
relief campaign.
Despite a good turnout for the first meeting, the Peace Pledge Union faced a serious
obstacle in getting its message out. Its radical views were at odds with the war ethic of the
nation. John Middleton Murry, an eminent literary critic and member of the Bloomsbury group,
became the most outspoken member of the union following Shepard’s death. During the first two i years of the war, Murray publicly advocated peace with Germany, supported Petain and Vichy,
railed against supporting Stalin and Russia, urged the United States to stay neutral, and suggested
that Hitler’s brand of imperialism was no worse than Churchill’s.30 Many critics suggested that
Murry and union were pro-Nazi or at the very least sympathetic. In article for The Partisan
Review in 1941, George Orwell suggested that “many pacifists spin a line of talk
indistinguishable from that of the Blackshirts .. . and the actual membership of the PPU and the
British Union (of Fascists) overlap to some extent.”51 Aside from having bad public image, the
union could not use the mainstream British press to promote its relief message. The BBC banned
48 Leaflet 3.81, “Britain Backs Food Relief,” 1941; Leaflet 3.82, “That Food Blockade,” 1941; Leaflet 3.83, “The Blockade of Europe,” 1941. Peace Pledge Union Archives.
49 Leaflet 3.84, Meeting notice for “Food Relief for Europe,” 24 January 1942. Peace Pledge Union Archives.
50 Rempel, 1224.
51 Sonia Orwell and lan Angus (eds.),The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters o f George Orwell: My Country Right or Left, 1940-1943 vol. 2 (London 1958)251.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 372
pacifist speakers from its airwaves and all of the major newspapers disdained the union’s politics.
That meant its message was relegated to small niche publications, such as Peace News, The
Friend, a Quaker weekly, and The Christian Pacifist, a monthly magazine.52
The Society of Friends (the Quakers) also considered ways to arouse public support. Like
the Peace Pledge Union, the Friends advocated pacifism, but unlike the union, it had positive
public image and a reputation for reasonableness. Its membership was split between those who
wanted nothing to do with the war and those who contributed to war effort through service and
relief work. Edith Pye, a well-regarded member of the Friends’ Service Council, which
coordinated overseas missionary and relief work, had been corresponding with the American
Friends Service Committee. Pickett and Kershner shared with her their experiences promoting
relief, in particular their predicament as pacifists in the middle of popular war. “I believe that it
would be possible to rouse public opinion in this country on the desperate situation and terrible
needs of the children but to do this some group would have to take the matter in hand,” she wrote
in January 1942 memo. “I think that any such propaganda would entirely fail if it were
undertaken by the P.P.U. which is the only organization that I know of interested.”53
The Friends’ Service Council decided to promote relief, but without the help of the Peace
Pledge Union. At the end of March 1942, it published a pamphlet written by Pye entitled “Food
Conditions in Europe: A statement on the effects of war and blockade on people in German-
controlled countries.” The pamphlet advocated controlled relief, using facts and figures from
government agencies, exile governments, and eye witness reports to make its case. It focused on
the urgent needs of Greece, which was still months away from receiving regular imports, along
with those of European children. The pamphlet also stressed the need to keep the issue apolitical.
52 Rempel, 218.
53 Memo by Edith Pye, January 1942. FDRL, Winant Papers, Friends Service Council, box 197. Letter, Sturge, Cadbury, and Pye to Pickett, 27 January 1942. FDRL, Winant Papers, Friends Service Council, box 197.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 373
Those interested in the relief issue were urged to form a local committee, enlist the support of
prominent members of their community, and write or visit their members of Parliament to discuss
the issue.54
The Friends relief campaign needed an influential ally, and one appeared in the form of
George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester. Although he wore a habit, Bell had the soul of an activist.
During the late 1930s, he helped German pastors and their families, targeted by the Nazis for their
opposition or Jewish heritage, escape the regime.55 And like Pye and the Quakers, Bell came to
his beliefs through his religion. Bell believed that the Church should provide moral guidance
during wartime— and the relief issue was no exception. In November 1939, he published an
article arguing that the church should not hesitate “. . . to condemn the infliction of reprisals, or
the bombing of civilian populations, by the military forces of its own nation. It should set itself
against the propaganda of lies and hatred. It should be ready to encourage the resumption of
friendly relations with the enemy nation. It should set its face against any war of extermination or
enslavement, and any measures directly aimed to destroy the morale of a population.”56 On 27
January 1942, the very day that MEW announced in the House of Commons that Britain was
sending wheat to Greece from Egypt, Bell made a speech in the House of Lords entitled “The
Case for Controlled Food Relief in Europe.”
In April 1942, Bell and Pye decided to join forces to raise awareness about need for relief
in the occupied territories. They did not, however, want to work with the Peace Pledge Union.57
54 Friends Service Council, “Food Conditions in Europe,” March 1942. FDRL, Winant Papers, Friends Service Council, Box 197.
55 See Andrew Chandler, Brethren in Adversity. Bishop George Bell, The Church o f England and the Crisis o f German Protestants, 1933-1939 (London: Woodbridge 1997).
56 Article published in George Bell, The Church and Humanity (1946).
57 Letter, Pye to Bell, 26 April 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 374
The first meeting of what became the Famine Relief Committee was held on 22 April 1942. Bell
and Pye met with other churchmen, members of the Friends Service Council, and pacifist
activists. Also attending was Professor Gilbert Murray, a retired classics scholar from Oxford
University, who helped establish the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief. (The committee later
evolved into Oxfam, Britain’s largest private charity.58) After intense discussion, they decided
that the best strategy would be to form a coalition of churches who would work with other
organizations on the relief issue. “But we felt it was not for the committee to go campaigning,”
reported Bell to his fellow bishops. “We have really to choose between two methods, (a) that of
making representations to the Government in a personal way, assuming their readiness to do what
they possibly can, or (b) that of making a public agitation.”59 Bell and the others believed that a
mass campaign, like the one waged by Floover, would be regarded as an attack on the
government, which would alienate the very officials whose minds they wanted to change. The
emphasis on personal representation over campaigning was possible because of the close ties—
family and school— between Church leaders and those in leadership positions in the Foreign
Office and MEW. Many officials, such as MEW’s Foot, had let it be known that they were
receptive to religious leaders discussing the relief issue with them. The committee also made a
pledge to publish “authentic information.” Bell believed that facts about conditions in the
occupied territories could be a “powerful instrument” for generating support.60
By the end of May 1942, high-ranking members of the Church of England, the Free
Churches, the Baptist Union, the Catholic Church, and the Jewish Congregation had joined the
Famine Relief Committee, along with a number of professors from Oxford. Bell agreed to serve
58 Maggie Black, Oxfam: The First 50 Years (Oxford: Oxfam and Oxford University Press, 1992) 10-13.
59 Letter, Bell to Aubrey, Bishop of Stepney, Pye, Bishop Myers, Murray, Elmslie, Bliss, Crawshay, 29 April 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
60 Letter, Bell to Gilbert Murray, 24 April 1942. Letter, Bell to Pye, 27 June 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 375
as its chairman and Pye became its secretary. The committee’s strategy led to its expanding base
of support. Willian Paton, the general secretary of the World Council of Churches, agreed to
serve on the committee, telling Bell that “I would have had nothing whatever to do with a
committee which was proposing to conduct a campaign throughout the country because that
would inevitably arouse such antagonism as to put the cause back.”61 Word of the committee’s
formation quickly spread, prompting requests for speakers and informational materials from
congregations and city leaders in Glasgow, Belfast, and Birmingham.62
The Famine Relief Committee made its first proposal to the Foreign Office and MEW at
the beginning of June. With the newly announced Swedish-Swiss Commission handling the
needs of Greece, the committee the decided to focus on Belgium, asking that “immediate medical
relief’ be sent to aid children, expectant and nursing mothers, and invalids. “The Committee
believes, from reports submitted to it, that any such measure of controlled relief would have
overwhelming support throughout the country.”63 The creation of the committee did not surprise
either the Foreign Office or MEW, but given the recent defeat in Cabinet, its lobbying served as
reminder of what they had failed to accomplish. After some discussion, MEW agreed to meet
first with the committee. Meanwhile, Foreign Office officials began making discreet suggestions
to the Anglican and Catholic leadership about the need for the committee to limit its agitation.64
61 Letter, William Paton (General Secretary, World Council of Churches) to Bell, 30 April 1942; Letter, Bell to Paton, 9 May 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58. Letter (Intercepted), Pye to Pickett, 14 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32463.
62 Letter, Bishop Edward Myers to Bell, 26 June 1942; Letter, Bell to Pye, 27 June 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
63 “Memorandum for the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Economic Warfare” by FRC, 1 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1224.
64 Pye wrote to Winant first, but he said that he thought that she should talk with the Foreign Office, recommending she contact Law. Letter, Pye to Winant, 21 May 1942. FDRL, Winant Papers, Friends Service Council, Box 197. Letter, Winant to Pye, 26 May 1942. FDRL, Winant Papers, Friends Service Council, Box 197. Letter, Pye to Law, 9 June 1942; Minute by Grey, 12 June 1942; Minute by Steel, 12 June 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32465.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 376
In mid-July 1942, Selbome, along with Drogheda and Foot, met with the committee’s
deputation, which included Bell, Pye, Murray, and Paton. The two-hour meeting consisted of a
friendly exchange of views. The committee based its appeal on logic and moral obligation. Bell
made it clear that there was “a considerable volume of opinion in Church, Free Church, and
Roman Catholic circles in favor of food relief.” 65 The committee then pressed its case for
Belgium to receive relief.
MEW used the meeting to convey two points: it wanted to work with the committee
rather than be its adversary and the blockade was a fact of the war. Selbome welcomed the
formation of the committee, stating he believed it to be a “healthy sign of Christian conscience in
this country.” He also appreciated its reasoned and thoughtful approach to the relief issue, an
approach the committee shared with MEW. He told the deputation that: “[OJur approach to this
problem is just the same as yours, but in handling it we have got to use our heads as well as our
hearts.” Aside from the moral considerations, the committee needed to consider the politics of
the relief issue:
The facts of this matter are that all this famine and misery have been caused by the Germans. They have been avoiding their obligations to feed the people in their power. If we once allow public opinion in this country or in America or in Europe to believe that the cause of it is not with the Germans but the British you have shifted the whole moral force that lies behind the blockade. . . Therefore, I am sure you will recongise that you have a great responsibility in this matter, just as the Government has. I suggest that the only way we can tackle it is as colleagues together. If you can suggest anything we can do, we shall be glad of your suggestions.
Bell was disappointed by the minister’s response. The need for relief was clear cut to the
committee— a need that should not be diluted by politics. “You say, quite rightly, that we are a
democracy, and we feel very strongly on this matter that it is not really democratic to maintain a
small portion of the blockade unless it is really necessary and can be so proved to the ordinary
65 Letter, Bell to Archbishop of York, 8 July 1942; Letter, Bishop of York (Cyril Foster Garbett) to Bell, 10 July 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 377
intelligence,” Bell told Selbome. “We do believe that the moral effect of this minute lifting of the
blockade will be very great not only for us but for the Belgians.” He hoped the Selbome would
“see whether there are not ways and means of overcoming your government’s objection to what
seems to us to be a duty.”66
MEW officials could not reveal that they had been fighting for the very program that the
committee advocated. It helped that Selbome genuinely respected the members of the committee,
which made it easier to strike a friendly rather than dismissive note. “I believe that we made
some impression: but we realise that it is a matter of Government policy rather than actual
administration of the particular Ministry,” wrote Bell after the meeting. Bell sensed that the
Ministry could be swayed to embrace the need for relief. He thought that Selbome was
particularly aware— and vulnerable— on the ethical issues involved.67
The Famine Relief Committee also met with the Foreign Office at the end of July.
Pleading a busy schedule, Eden asked Richard Law, the Foreign Office’s parliamentary secretary,
to take his place.68 Paton and Pye met with Law and Maclean, whom they judged to be
competent and thoughtful; but as with MEW, they found the Foreign Office to be firm advocates
for the blockade. “I urged that the ‘thin edge of the wedge’ is a bad argument and that one ought
to be willing to adopt a policy if it is sound even though it might be used by others as a pressure
point,” Paton reported.69 He pressed the Foreign Office to consider an experimental program,
while Pye emphasized the need not to let European children die needlessly. Pye apparently
66 Minutes of meeting between Selbome and Famine Relief Committee, 17 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32469.
67 Letter, Bell to Cammaerts, 24 July 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
68 Letter, Paton to Eden, 20 July 1942; Letter, Eden to Patton, 27 July 1942; “Note for Mr. Law’s meeting on July 30 with a delegation from the Famine Relief Committee” by Maclean, 30 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32469.
69 Letter, Paton to Pye, 31 July 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 378
wasn’t above a little extortion either. “During the discussion” Law told Eden, “Miss Pye
remarked that she and her friends had been exercising some restraint in the hope that HMG would
be able to do something to meet their wishes; if it became clear that nothing would be done they
would consider themselves free to bring as much public pressure to bear as they can manage. I
think that it is true that these good people have shown some discretion that it is in their power to
raise a considerable storm if they want to.” Law suggested that if there was a chance of the War
Cabinet reconsidering its position of relief, it would be better to do so before a mass campaign
became a reality.70 Eden agreed to go back to the Cabinet if circumstances changed, but as he
told Law, “I don’t like being blackmailed, even by the gentle Miss Pye.”71
The reception the Famine Relief Committee received by Foreign Office and MEW only
served to galvanize the committee. Not only did it decide to start accepting contributions to
finance its work, but it also established a fact-finding commission to study the feasibility of relief.
It also rented office space and formalized its governance.72 The committee printed up a new
pamphlet, “Food Conditions in Europe,” which featured an introduction by Bell appealing for
relief on the “grounds of Christian humanity.” It included facts about conditions in the occupied
territories. “It will be seen from the preceding pages that there is no grave objection to the
carrying out this obvious humanitarian duty,” concluded the pamphlet. “It is, however, essential
to avoid all public political controversy over what should be a purely humanitarian issue. . . .
70 Minute by Law (W 10580/62/49), 6 August 1942; Minute (10591/62/49) by Maclean, 4 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32469.
71 Minute by Eden, 8 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32469.
72 Letter, Pye to Correspondents of FRC, 17 July 1942; Letter, Bell to Selbome, 27 July 1942. Lambeth Palace Library, George Bell Papers, vol. 58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 379
What is really needed is a well informed opinion among those whose opinion carries weight in
the community.”73 The committee gave the pamphlets away as fast as it could print them.
The leadership of the Famine Relief Committee had a hard time keeping its campaign
separate from pacifist sentiment. It did not help matters that the Peace Pledge Union continued
its own relief campaign, naming its group the Food Relief Committee in a ploy to generate
attention and confusion. “To be perfectly frank, one of my troubles is to keep this business from
appearing just as a wing of the Friends’ activity or as something mainly pacifist in inspiration,”
Paton wrote Van Dusen. Paton wished the committee was more like that of Van Dusen’s, one
based on known supporters of the war.74
By the beginning of October 1942, the committee, with its low-key approach and
influential backers, had become a source of concern for the Foreign Office and MEW. The
Archbishop of Canterbury even asked to see Churchill to lobby on the committee’s behalf. The
committee’s proposals, which were often developed after consulting with the exile governments,
were just as problematic to reject as those done by the exiles.75 How much longer Britain could
continue to say “no” and not suffer any political fall out remained to be seen.
P andora’s B ox
Smaller concessions were vital to maintaining good relations with the exile governments.
One such example involved Portugal, where a flourishing trade in food parcels had developed in
since the outbreak of the war. For a fee, a sender could arrange to have package mailed directly
73 “Food Conditions in Europe,” Famine Relief Committee, July 1942. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Relief: Transblockade, May 1943, Box 40.
74 Intercepted Letter, Paton to Van Dusen, 28 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1224.
75 Letter, Bell to Eden, 23 October 1942; Minute (W14288/62/49) by Maclean, 27 October 1942; Minute (W 14288/62/49) by Steel, 28 October 1942; Letter, Maclean to Camps, 30 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32475. Letter, Cantaur to Churchill, 25 October 1942; Note to Eden, 28 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 380
to an address in one of the Nazi-occupied territories. Some firms offered standard packages,
while more enterprising ones offered a menu of items for selection. Because it took a long time
for the parcels to reach their intended recipients, the food had to have a long shelf life. Popular
items included coffee, chocolate, tea, cigarettes, oil and fats, hard cheese, cured meat and fish,
and dried vegetables and fruits. In addition to supplementing rations, scarce goods, such as
chocolate or cigarettes, fetched a high price on the black market. Despite Britain’s best efforts,
commercial food parcel companies did a booming business. Britain constantly worked to shut
them down, because they used goods imported through the blockade. Many of the companies
also had questionable ties to the Axis, with some firms even serving as front companies for
German agents looking to gather foreign currency.
While Britain did not like the commercial food parcel trade, it quickly recognized that
allowing exile governments to send food parcels from Portugal calmed their frustrations over
being denied large-scale relief programs. Britain granted the first food parcel concession in 1941
to Belgium, allowing it to send four tons of parcels each month. The Free French, Norway, and
the Netherlands also asked for parcel programs at the beginning of 1942.76 Britain had to limit
the size of the exile government parcel programs, because of financial constraints. The exile
governments, which were based in London, depended on Britain to facilitate financial
transactions, including transferring money. The problem, however, was that Britain was a
banker with very little left in the vault. The war drained its reserves, and Britain struggled to
obtain enough neutral currency to buy the goods it needed to for its war effort, let alone relief
supplies for the exile governments. But Treasury figured out how many escudos it could provide
each month for relief purchases.
76 Letter, Camps to Markbreiter, 20 January 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1223. Under of all these schemes, the parcels were sent on behalf of allied nationals living in the United Kingdom or in allied colonies or serving with allied forces overseas.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 381
In February 1942, MEW inadvertently drew attention to the food parcel issue when it
asked for American assistance in terminating the food parcel traffic from Latin and South
America. MEW wanted to put a stop to the growing stream of remittances flowing into neutral
and occupied territories, along with increased volume of food parcels originating from the region.
MEW wanted to put any firm or organization that refused to obey the rules on the Statutory List,
a register of firms that engaged in business practices benefiting the Axis powers, and hoped the
United States would agree to do the same.77 The United States was also concerned about the flow
of money from the Southern Hemisphere agreed to lend its support.78
In reviewing the money trail for Latin and South America, the State and Treasury
Departments also noticed what other trails had developed. “This is to give you advance
warning,” Hall told Drogheda in March 1942, “that I think the question of movements of supplies
for relief purposes inside the blockade area, where these have to be financed by dollars, is moving
into a new and very difficult phase.” State and Treasury officials were particularly struck by the
extent to which U.S. dollars financed intrablockade purchases. One transaction stood out in
particular: $250,000 had been transferred to Switzerland to buy milk for Greece in March 1942.
Worried about the grumbling he heard, Hall warned Drogheda not to approve anymore relief
purchases, parcels or otherwise. “[T]here is a real danger that we may create expectations which,
in practice, will be very embarrassing to have to carry out,” wrote Hall. He believed that the
Americans would refuse to release any additional dollars for relief.79
American support for intrablockade purchases was important, because Britain could not
provide the necessary currency. By mid-1942, Britain could no longer provide Swiss francs or
77 Memo by Hall, 9 February 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 9.
78 Memcon, “Problem of providing relief to enemy occupied and enemy countries,” 4 March 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 9.
79 Telegram 1701 Arfar, Hall to Drogheda, 9 March 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32461.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 382
Swedish kronor and could only provide limited sums of Portuguese escudos. One option was to
provide kronor or francs against repayment in U.S. dollars, but Britain would only do so with
American consent. If intrablockade purchases were to continue— and Britain believed they
should for political reasons— the Americans had to sign on.80
The State Department, however, challenged the logic of the food parcel programs. It
contended that intrablockade purchases used up valuable neutral currency, making them
antithetical to the goals of economic warfare. Meanwhile, the Norwegians lobbied Roosevelt to
allow a massive food parcel program for Norway, an idea the president found intriguing. Unlike
the programs operating out of Portugal, which generated 3,000 to 6,000 parcels per month, the
Norwegian scheme called for a parcel to be sent to every household in the country, amounting to
roughly 750,000 parcels.81
MEW found the American position on intrablockade purchases baffling, but the prospect
of a mass food parcel program for Norway was terrifying. “The White House plan would be
disastrous,” Selbome told his staff.82 Aside from the scale, MEW regarded the focus on Norway
as misplaced, given that conditions in Belgium were worse. The question of need, however, was
beside the point when presidential interest was piqued. “Whether or not something is done for
Norway must depend largely upon the President and the Prime Minister,” noted Camps. “What
seems certain however is that it is impossible to do something for Norway and not to do it for
Belgium, Northern France, Poland, and parts of Yugoslavia.” Aside from the problem of scope,
there was a possibility that Roosevelt might act unilaterally. “The choice of tactics is therefore
80 Letter, Camps to Fraser, 1 May 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1224.
81 Minute (W 14611/62/49) by Maclean, 2 November 1942; Minute (W 14611/62/49) by Maclean, 2 November 1942; Minute (W14611/62/49) by Steel, 2 November 1942; Minute (W 14611/62/49) by Steel, 11 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476. Memo by Camps, 2 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5. Minute by Drogheda, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
82 Minute by Selbome, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 383
important,” observed Camps, “since if our opposition is not conducted on the right lines it may be
that this particular specific proposal will be forced through by Presidential authority.”83
During the spring and summer of 1942, Hall politely schooled the State and Treasury
Departments about origins and evolution of the food parcel program. His efforts provided
stunning insight, at least for MEW, into American relief policy. Hall discovered that the State
and Treasury Departments rarely consulted with each other on relief issues and often withheld
useful information. Given the culture of consultation that existed among Britain’s ministries,
their behavior astounded MEW.
As Hall talked with the State and Treasury officials, he learned what troubled them about
the food parcels program. The Americans absolutely did not like its scale. As of mid-1942,
Britain approved and facilitated the following parcels programs out of Portugal:
Belgian bulk scheme £250,000 per month Belgian Parcel Scheme £3,000 per month Free French Parcel Scheme £3,000 per month Dutch Parcel Scheme £3,000 per month Norwegian Parcel Scheme £3,000 per month Jewish Parcel Scheme £3,000 per month
Using the £3,000 allowed, the governments could purchase up to 4000 tons of parcels each
month. In practice, the 4000 ton mark was rarely met since there was a shortage of suitable food.
The parcels were distributed in the occupied territories either by the local Red Cross or a local
welfare organization.84
There are two other interesting features about the list. First, the Belgian bulk program
stands out owing to its size. Unlike the other exile governments, Belgium realized very quickly
that a parcels program out of Portugal could be very useful. The Belgians also knew that if they
83 Minute by Camps, 27 April 1942; Minute by Drogheda, 27 April 1942; Minute by Selbome, 27 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
84 Memcon on Food Parcels for Civilians in Axis-occupied Europe (Long, Acheson, Reinstein, Kuppinger, Stopford and White), 24 September 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 10. Neither the Czechs nor the Yugoslavs had asked to have a parcels program, but if they had Britain would have given its consent.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 384
wanted to operate a large-scale parcels program, they would have to prove to Britain that they
could tightly control the purchasing, transport, storage, and distribution of the parcels. Their
solution was to establish an office in Lisbon, Office du Collis Alimentaire (Food Parcels for
Belgium), to handle all of the arrangements. After the Belgians proved themselves with the
mailed parcels, Britain agreed to let them send bulk shipments, which would be distributed by the
Belgian Red Cross. It also appears that the bulk parcel concession was obtained through
blackmail: the Belgians threatened to flood the European economy with gold from the Belgian
Congo unless Britain gave them the scheme. Second, Jews as a group received the same level of
support as the allied governments. The parcels were for Jews living in the General Government
and paid for by funds collected in Britain by a “responsible Jewish organisation.” Earlier in 1942,
MEW turned down a proposal to send parcels from Palestine. The idea of helping the Jews,
however, made an impression, resulting in MEW seeking out a British organization that could
provide the necessary financing. MEW officials did so, because they believed that the Jews in the
General Government endured the worst conditions in occupied Europe. The Polish government-
in-exile also preferred to devote their limited financial resources to financing the Polish Army.85
Aside from being unhappy with the scope of the parcels program, State and Treasury
officials believed that neutral currencies should be used to buy materials for the war effort, not
buy food parcels. It did not make sense to them from an economic warfare standpoint. Along the
same lines, the Americans did not like the fact that Switzerland was the only neutral country that
would not accept remittances for relief purposes against blocked dollars. From the State
Department’s perspective, such a transaction had substantial benefits, because funds remitted to
Switzerland would be spent within Switzerland and the money would help the Swiss merchants.
In cases where the money was intended to help refugees, the money prevented refugees from
85 Telegram 2895 Arfar, MEW to Washington, 18 April 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471. Note, Brandt to Long, 13 October 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 10. Note, Brandt to Long, 13 October 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 385
becoming charges of the state.86 The Americans were also concerned that any increase in the
foreign exchange resources of a neutral country might be put to use by the Axis for subversive
activities in South America.87
The Americans also had evidence of financial misdeeds. The Dutch funneled money
collected by the American-based Queen Wilhelmina Fund to Britain to finance their parcels
program in violation of U.S. regulations.88 The Treasury Department accused the Belgians of
doing the same thing, but on a larger scale. The Belgians had asked for permission to transfer the
money directly to Portugal, but had been refused, so they transferred it to Britain instead. The
Treasury Department believed that the Belgians were funneling almost £50,000 per month to
Portugal through Britain unbeknownst to MEW. Treasury Department officials were so angry
with the Belgians that they ordered all telegrams sent by the Belgian Embassy to Lisbon about
parcels stopped.89
While State and Treasury officials knew what they did not like, they could not agree on
what American policy should be. Treasury informed State that it believed food parcel programs
to be incompatible with economic warfare. “It is felt that such operations would affect the entire
relief problem and in particular, would make it difficult for this Government to object to similar
proposals by various organizations, including Allied governments, in the United States.”90
Treasury had, however, allowed the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee to transfer
money to neutral countries to aid the destitute Jewish refugees and allowed remittances against
86 Memo, “Remittances for Relief’ by Green and Hiss, 9 July 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 10.
87 Minute by Maclean, 21 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471.
88 Letter, Hall to Drogheda, 20 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32472.
89 Telegram 3792 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 5 August 1942; Telegram 4713, MEW to Washington, 10 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32470.
90 Letter, Foley to Hull, 2 July 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 386
blocked dollars be used to pay for the transportation of Jewish refugees. As for State, it opposed
all transfers for relief programs, except for Greece. It believed that conditions in Greece
warranted special treatment.91
Despite American concerns, the Foreign Office had no intention of changing the parcels
policy. It irked officials that the Americans, who had no coherent relief strategy of their own,
wanted Britain to abandon a policy that had worked well for more than two years. “[W]e have a
right to expect them to let us be consistent,” opined Steel.92 Given that relief agitation against
the blockade was growing on both sides of the Atlantic, the Foreign Office believed that the
parcels program provided an important counterpoint to charges that nothing was being done to
help the occupied territories. Rather than fixate on the economic warfare angles, the Americans
needed to see the policy’s political advantages.93
During August and September 1942, the State Department mulled over whether to
oppose, adopt, or expand Britain’s current policy. The Foreign Funds division under Dean
Acheson recommended that American policy stay the same. If the United States allowed
remittances for food parcels, it would be tantamount to “opening Pandora’s Box.” The division
feared that it would pave the way for similar arrangements in the other American Republics that
the United States would find difficult to control. Hull belatedly became attuned to the political
angles of the issue. Rather than leave parcels policy under Acheson’s purview, he bounced it to
Long. Unlike Acheson, who carefully studied the issue, Long plunged into a series of meetings
91 Memo, “Remittances for Relief’ by Green and Hiss, 9 July 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 10.
92 Telegram 4000 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 22 August 1942; Minute (W 11601/62/49) by Steel, 3 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471.
93 Minute (W 11601/62/49) by Maclean, 3 September 1942; Letter (W 11601/62/49), Maclean to Camps, 5 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 387
with the British Embassy, wherein he displayed his complete lack of knowledge while making
ominous statements about the need for Britain to change its policy.94
After months of dithering, State settled on a policy at the end of September. The United
States would permit each of the occupied countries to transfer of a maximum of $12,000 a month
Portugal to finance the shipment of food parcels on trial basis. Poland received two concessions:
one for the Jews in the Warsaw ghettos and one for Poles generally. The United States would
not, however, allow money to be transferred to finance bulk parcel programs. State hoped to
convince Britain to terminate the Belgian bulk parcel program or, if it refused, to induce it not to
allow other countries to operate such programs.95
State pushed the new policy as a political necessity, one that was “not only desirable but
necessary.” It argued that the United States needed to be in harmony with Britain on the parcels
issue; otherwise, the United States might find itself in an embarrassing position of political
inferiority vis-a-vis the exile governments. The location of the exile governments in London
made it easy for them to pressure Britain, but also for Britain to develop close relationships with
them. As things stood, only Britain could claim to be helping the exile governments.
The Treasury Department, which was more interested in economic warfare
considerations, was not initially impressed. It worried that the proposed policy would generate
more requests for money transfers, most of which would have to be refused because they were
incompatible with the blockade.96 After mulling it over for a week, Secretary Henry Morgenthau
decided that in light of the small number of groups involved and the small sums being transferred,
94 Memcon on Food Parcels for Civilians in Axis-occupied Europe (Long, Acheson, Reinstein, Kuppinger, Stopford and White), 24 September 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 10.
95 Memo, Long to Kuppinger, 28 September 1942. Memo, Kuppinger to Long, 29 September 1942; Memocon by Kuppinger, 1 October 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 10.
96 Minutes of meeting between State and Treasury, “Credits for Food Relief Purchases in Portugal,” 2 October 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 388
he would go along with State’s plan. He insisted, however, that groups wishing to transfer money
had to submit applications to Treasury’s Foreign Funds Control for approval. There would be no
carte blanche approvals.97
In mid-October 1942, the State Department decided to present its new policy to the
British Embassy. Given the sensitivity of topic they were to discuss, Hall was shocked to
discover Long alone in his office without a contingent to back him up. Norman Davis later joined
the meeting. “Speaking with unwonted geniality Mr. Long referred to the efforts made by State
Department to collaborate with us in blockade matters even before Pearl Harbor,” reported Hall.
“He said that Secretary of State attached the utmost importance particularly at this time to the
maintenance of the blockade in its full rigour.” After Long slyly acknowledged that he spoke at
Hull’s behest, he explained the new American parcels policy. State also wanted Britain to
confirm two points: first, Britain agreed with United States that blockade of enemy occupied
territories should be rigorously maintained; and second, Britain agreed to discuss with the United
States all blockade concessions that involve movement of supplies into occupied areas. “What
we [are] anxious for,” said Long, “was complete agreement on general policy which would be
adhered to completely and not deviated from except with the consent of the other party after a full
understanding.”98 Aside from any new parcel programs that might develop, the Americans also
wanted a unified policy on the Belgian bulk parcel scheme. State and Treasury were unhappy
with it, and Long hinted that they wanted it reduced. They were also displeased with the conduct
of the Belgians.99 Given the problems with the Americans over the previous eighteen months
and Long’s usually combative demeanor, Hall found the meeting a bit surreal. He admitted to
97 Memo, Brandt to Long, 7 October 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M 1284, Roll 10. Memo, White and Paul to Morgenthau, 7 October 1942. FDRL, Morgenthau Diaries, #576, Roll 169.
98 Minutes of meeting between Long, Davis, Hall, White, and Stopford, 13 October 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 10.
99 Telegram 5112, Washington to FO, 15 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 389
London that had it not been for Davis’ presence he might have thought Long was playing a trick
on him .100
Despite the odd turn of events, the Foreign Office and MEW welcomed the new
American policy. The food parcels program was safe, at least for the time being. Britain, of
course, agreed that the blockade should be maintained and that any new concessions would be
made only after consultation. They also had no objection to reviewing existing arrangements or
undertaking any new ones until the review had been completed.101 The Foreign Office and MEW
did, however, wonder what the United States was up to.102 The Foreign Office found the FIull
and Long’s “sudden irruption” on the food parcel issue disquieting. The Americans continued to
be very inconsistent on the relief issue, and that was a recipe for trouble.103
MEW favored conducting the review in Washington, believing it a more politic choice.104
The Foreign Office, on the other hand, preferred London. State did not appear to be capable of
coordinating American agencies involved in economic warfare policy, so having it coordinate the
review seemed like an exercise in futility. Britain was also more skilled in dealing with the exile
governments. “Not only is the whole machinery of the European blockade controlled from here,”
noted Steel, “but Mr. Long’s attitude in this interview betrays still deficient understanding of the
political issues which are naturally more obvious in London.” If it had to be in Washington, then
the Foreign Office wanted to send some “fresh blood.” While Hall handled the economic and
100 Telegram 5113, Washington to FO, 15 October 1942; Telegram 4511 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 16 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
101 Telegram 5624, MEW to Washington, 9 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32473.
102 Minute by Camps, 20 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
103 Minute (W14611/62/49) by Steel, 2 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476.
104 Minute (W 13855/62/49) by Steel, Strang, and Butler, 22 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 390
financial issues adeptly, the Foreign Office feared that he would be in over his head on political
issues. It also worried that he had been “Americanized to an overwhelming degree.”105
Winking at a Breach
The Foreign Office and MEW understood the need to let the State Department’s passions
on the relief issue simmer down, but they could only wait so long, because of a Norwegian
problem. Starting in August 1942, the Norwegians turned up the volume on their relief
overtures. Norwegian officials stated that they found it difficult to understand why Britain and
the United States would allow wheat to go to Greece on Swedish ships, but limit Sweden’s ability
to provide relief to Norway. They also argued that providing relief would aid Norwegian
resistance efforts against the Germans— people weak from hunger cannot practice guerrilla
warfare. Norwegian sailors, which crewed the Allied merchant marine fleet, also agitated for
assistance to their families.106 Aside from the arguments in favor of relief, the Norwegians
presented a number of proposals. First, they wanted to create a “dump” of relief supplies in
Sweden that could be rushed into Norway upon liberation and used to aid refugees in the interim.
The supply dump could be created by asking Sweden to allocate a small portion of the cargo
space on its ships to imports. Second, the Norwegians wanted to increase the amount of relief
they purchased in Sweden and distributed through relief organizations in Norway. Third, they
105 Halifax and his staff also favored London. “It is our view here,” he told London, “that your minds are a long way ahead of the State Department on the whole range of political and economic questions that need to be considered in discussing the policy. We think therefore that, providing you do not rush them but bring them slowly along to your point of view by a series of informal discussions, you can best influence policy by contacts with Mr. Winant, Mr. Riefler, and perhaps also with Mr. Biddle.” (Riefler handled economic issues for the U.S. Embassy.) Halifax suggested, however, that the Foreign Office and MEW temporarily hold off on starting the review. . . Mr. Long’s volte face on relief questions and Mr. Hull’s intervention will make State Department for the next three or four weeks very tough on all blockade matters, and that in consequence during this period any suggestions from the United States Embassy in London about further blockade concessions may, but not necessarily will, fall on deaf ears.” Minute (W13855/62/49) by Maclean, 17 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475. Minute (W 13855/62/49) by Steel, 19 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474. Telegram 5354, Washington to FO, 30 October 1942.
106 Letter, Mitcheson to Sporborg, 17 August 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 391
wanted to send 10,000 sets of baby clothing (two sets of clothing for 5,000 babies under the age
of one). Reports indicated that in devastated areas, babies were clothed in paper, which would
not be adequate for the forthcoming winter.
MEW turned down the first proposal, because agreeing to it would signal a wholesale
change in relief policy. While not opposed to the second proposal, MEW believed its prospects
were bleak. The Americans opposed such purchases, and Britain did not have the kronor to
facilitate them alone.107 As for the baby clothes, MEW decided to approve them. “[W]e are
privately,” noted Camps, “rather glad to wink at a breach of our rules in this present particular
case.” 108
In mid-October 1942, the Norwegians again pressed their plan to send a ten kilogram
food parcel to every household in Norway as a Christmas gift. The 750,000 parcels would be
assembled from food shipped to Sweden and consist of dried milk, flour, tinned butter or grease,
tinned meat, dried meat, dried eggs, cheese, dried fruits, chocolate, coffee, soap, and vitamins. In
a household of four, the contents of the parcel would provide each member with an extra 10,000
calories. If a Norwegian ate only the contents of the box, it would last four to six days.
Norwegian officials, however, regarded the parcel as a supplement to rations— a way to add an
extra few hundred calories each day. Used in such a way, the contents of the parcel could last
anywhere from twenty to thirty days. Families would be notified of the availability of the parcels
by radio. The parcels would be billed as a gift from a Norwegian-American relief organization or
friends of Norway in Sweden. “If the German authorities refused to carry out the plan,” noted the
Norwegian Government, “the whole question of the food blockade etc. would suddenly take a
107 Letter, Camps to Mitcheson, 1 September 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32471. Letter, Camps to Maclean, 20 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475.
108 Memo (C.C. 1161), Mitcheson to MEW, 17 September 1942; Letter, Collins to Mitcheson, 2 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475. Letter (W 13220/62/49), Eden to Collier, 1 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 392
new aspect. A propaganda offensive could then be launched in forms which would strengthen the
Norwegian fronts both at home and abroad.” If the Germans agreed and then plundered the
parcels, the theft would have tremendous propaganda value.109
In the past, the Norwegian government had emphasized the humanitarian aspects of their
relief proposals. This time, Norwegian officials focused on contribution of its sailors to the
Allied war effort and the importance of keeping them happy. “First of all the morale among the
many thousand Norwegian seamen whose active part in the war effort is sufficiently known and
appreciated by the British Government,” read the Norwegian aide-memoire. “They are all men
who have members of their nearest family in Norway, and the though of the welfare of those
relatives weigh very heavily on them.” Delegates from the Norwegian seamen had lobbied the
exile government to provide more assistance to their families. There were limits to the sacrifices
the sailors were willing to make for the Allied cause. “It was clearly pointed out,” noted Norway,
“that the seamen cannot in the long run be expected to transport food between other countries
while their own families face starvation.”110
MEW was not impressed.111 The Ministry of War Transport also failed to be intimidated
by the implicit blackmail. Previous relief proposals made by the sailors had been turned down
and they did not make trouble, nor was there any sign of unrest in their ranks.112 The Foreign
Office also did not like the proposal, particularly since a concession could not be made to Norway
109 Lettter, Camps to Maclean, 9 October 1942, plus Aide-memoire by Norway on parcels plan, 9 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
110 Lettter, Camps to Maclean, 9 October 1942, plus Aide-memoire by Norway on parcels plan, 9 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
111 Letter (W13607/62/49), Camps to Maclean, 13 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
112 Letter, Frazer to Camps, 19 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 393
without making one to Belgium. Steel thought that “we ought to consult the U.S.G. and make a
big effort to get them to share the odium with us.”113
The Special Operations Executive (SOE), however, found the plans intriguing. Churchill
had created SOE in July 1940 intent on setting Nazi-controlled Europe ablaze through sabotage
and espionage operations. Ministerial responsibility for SOE rested with MEW, which used
intelligence gathered by SOE agents and operatives to assess conditions in the occupied
territories. When SOE registered interest in relief, it caught Selbome’s attention.
SOE had been experimenting with the “Shetland Bus Service.” Based out of Shetland,
the closest point in Britain to Norway, the “service” used Norwegian fishing boats to send
supplies and agents into Norway. Bad weather, mines, and mechanical problems plagued the
operation. By mid-1942, SOE had smuggled into Norway less than one hundred tons of
supplies.114 SOE’s work with the Norwegian underground also made it aware of the conditions in
Norway. The latest intelligence reports suggested that “the public health in large parts of Norway
is seriously threatened by insufficient food” and that Norway suffered from “grave
undernourishment of the entire population.” 115 SOE believed that the establishment in August
1942 of the Swedish and Norwegian-American Donors’ Committee presented Britain with an
opportunity. The committee, which consisted of representatives from the influential Swedish
humanitarian organizations, including the Swedish Red Cross and Save the Children, along with
the American-based Norwegian Relief Fund, could serve as a reliable apolitical means of
113 Minute (W13607/62/40) by Steel, 15 October 1942; Minute (W13607/62/49) by Maclean, 15 October 1942; Minute (W130607/62/49) by Coote, 16 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474.
114 Charles Cruikshank,SOE in Scandinavia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 91-97.
115 Notes on the question of relief to Norway, 22 October 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 394
delivering relief. It could also serve as a cover for any subversive forms of relief that Britain
might want to deliver.116
SOE endorsed a more modest parcels plan, which consisted of sending a small parcel of
chocolate to 20,000 Norwegian children as a Christmas present. The mastermind of the scheme
was Madame Colban, the wife of the Norwegian ambassador. She had convinced the Norwegian
exile community in England and Norwegian sailors to donate their December ration coupons,
which would allow her to purchase two tons of chocolate. The chocolate would be sent by
diplomatic bag to Sweden, after which it would be made into parcels for delivery to verified
addresses in Norway. The Norwegian Prime Minister claimed that the program could be
implemented so as not to attract publicity. SOE also argued that the quantity of chocolate
involved was so minor that it would not dilute the blockade. “I would be willing to sanction the
proposal,” Selbome wrote Eden, “because S.O.E. consider that it would be good for morale from
their point of view, and also because it would give great satisfaction to the Norwegian community
here and also the Norwegian sailors.”117
While the Foreign Office found the Christmas chocolate plan appealing, it worried that it
could not be contained to just Norway alone. “I confess that I don’t like this,” Eden told his staff.
118 Eden also believed the plan required American agreement and Cabinet approval, both of
which would be difficult. “This would be hard to get,” Eden told Selbome, “and 1 incline to
think that we should do best to reserve our powder and shot for bigger game, i.e. if and when the
moment comes to ask again for authority to send more serious help.”119
116 Notes on the question of relief to Norway, 22 October 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
117 Letter (F/5630/130/17), Selbome to Eden, 28 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476.
118 Minute by Eden, 30 October 1942; Minute by Maclean, 29 October 1942; Minute by Law, 2 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476.
119 Letter, Eden to Selbome, 5 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F 0371/32476.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 395
Selbome, however, refused to give up on the idea of using SOE and its relationship with
the Norwegian underground to funnel relief into Norway. At the beginning of November 1942,
he broached the subject with Eden again. Norway wanted to import and store 7,000 tons of food
and baby clothes in Sweden. The public reason given for the request was that the clothes would
help the roughly five hundred Norwegian refugees who streamed into Sweden each week. The
private reason was that the supplies could be smuggled into Norway. Charles Hambro, the head
of SOE’s Scandinavian section, endorsed the plan and offered SOE’s assistance. He believed that
approximately one hundred tons of food and clothes per week could be sent in under the nose of
the Quisling government. “Knowing as I do,” Selbome wrote Eden, “that the Norwegian
underground organization is definitely the most perfect and elaborate of all the occupied
countries, I do not think that this claim is necessarily exaggerated.” If implemented, the program
would quell Norwegian complaints about the lack of relief and its secret nature would prevent it
from becoming a precedent. Selbome, however, acknowledged that the Americans might be a
problem.120
Selborne pushed for a concession, secret or otherwise, out of concern for the increasingly
testy relations developing between Britain and Norway and what it meant for SOE’s work in
Scandinavia. The Norwegian exile government wanted more resources to help its underground
resistance, including additional airplanes or flights to transport supplies between England and
Sweden. The Ministry of War Transport could not provide more aircraft— they simply didn’t
have any extra planes. Nevertheless, Trygve Lie, the Norwegian exile government’s foreign
minister, threatened to stop Norwegian merchant ships from sailing to Britain. Lie also told
Hambro that the Norwegian exile government believed that it had been treated “extremely badly”
by Britain during the previous year. “They have been promised a great many things by the Prime
120 Letter, Selbome to Eden, 4 November 1942; Letter, Mitcheson to Collins, 4 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Letter, Collier to Steel, 6 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476. Letter, Eden to Lie, 9 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 396
Minister,” Hambro told Selbome, “in return for which they had given many concessions but in a
large majority of cases these promises had not been forthcoming and now the Government were
placed in a critical position both with their sailors who were serving the Allies and with their
people in Norway over the refusal of the British Government to allow them to build up in Sweden
the where-with-all to give limited relief to the children of the sailors and patriots who were so
courageously obstructing German rule in their country.”
Given the stakes for SOE, Hambro recommended that Britain support either the chocolate
plan or the supply dump— or find another way of smuggling in food. While he believed it would
help mollify the Norwegians, he also wanted to protect SOE’s investment. “The Norwegians are
a gallant people but it will not be surprising if their morale begins to wane unless something is
done to give them hope,” Hambro told Selbome. “As you know the Special Operations
Executive have for the last year and a half been spending time, money and lives building up what
is now a far reaching and elaborate subterranean organization in Norway. If the morale of the
Norwegians is badly affected this winter the whole of this organization will be wasted and its
effectiveness reduced to nil. On this score alone I submit that it is a short-sighted policy not to
agree to the very limited Norwegian requests.”121 Eden agreed broach the Americans about the
chocolate plan and the food dump. O f the two, the Foreign Office was most intrigued by the food
dump, because of its clandestine approach. “It is, of course, an essential condition that the
scheme should be secret and its ostensible character unexceptional,” the Foreign Office told
Halifax.122
At the end of November 1942, the State Department countered with its own plan, a new
version of Norway’s mega-parcel program. It proposed that the Swedish Red Cross be
121 Memo (F/5706/13017), AD/S to SO, 9 November 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
122 Telegram 6984, FO to Halifax, 12 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32476.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 397
approached about conducting in limited areas an experimental civilian relief program, involving
the distribution of 750,000 parcels containing food and clothing. Parcels would be made for
different age groups and genders, ensuring the babies would get layettes and adults extra socks or
a sweater. After being assembled in the United States, the parcels would be transported to
Sweden using Swedish ships currently imprisoned in the Baltic. “Mr. Long supported his
proposal,” reported Halifax, “by saying that he thought that we were already doing a good deal
for Belgium and that more favourable turn in course of war seem to make it very important to do
something in Northern Europe.” When asked if the Norwegian exile government knew of the
plan, Long replied that “no one in State Department had said anything to Norwegians.”123 State
justified its Norwegian plan on basis of Belgium’s bulk food parcel concession.
The Foreign Office and MEW, however, made a different calculation: they believed it
would be impossible to agree to the mega-parcel plan for Norway, while refusing milk for
Belgium. It was also very clear from Long’s equivocation that Roosevelt had already provided
some form of reassurance to the Norwegians . Rather than say “no,” the Foreign Office and MEW
decided to hedge their bets. First, they proposed a joint review of the American plan. Second,
they informed the Norwegian exile government that Britain intended to go ahead with the plan to
smuggle relief into Norway via Sweden.124 More than anything, they wanted to prevent the
mega-parcel plan from being hashed out between Churchill and Roosevelt. “This is a most vital
business,” noted Steel, “and if the President insists on putting his idea through the efficacy of the
food blockade will be fundamentally impaired.”125
123 Telegram Unnumbered, Halifax to FO, 25 November 1942.. TNA/PRO, F0837/5. Telegram 4919 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 19 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/324377.
124 Minute (W 15926/62/49) by Maclean, 1 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Telegram 7544, FO to Washington, 2 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/5.
125 Minute (W15926/62/49) by Steel, 1 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 398
Given Long’s comment, the Foreign Office and MEW wanted to know what role the
Norwegians played in the new proposal. At the beginning of December, they received a
surprising answer. Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, the Norwegian ambassador to the United
States, informed Halifax that he had approached Roosevelt about supporting the mega-parcel
program. Roosevelt apparently not only liked the idea, but also suggested doing a small
experiment first to determine if it would benefit the Germans. “At worst no great harm would be
done and if scheme worked badly effective answer to Norwegian seamen and everybody else
would be forthcoming as to why it was impossible to extend it,” wrote Halifax describing
Roosevelt’s logic. “If on the other hand it worked well all the better.” Morgenstierne also
claimed not to have told his own government of Roosevelt’s interest in the program, believing it a
matter to be decided by Britain and the United States. “President has said nothing to me,”
reported Halifax.126
During the first week of December 1942, MEW and SOE hammered out the mechanics
of what became known as the “secret scheme.” It became clear that they could only send 100
tons of food into Norway per month, rather than per week. The distribution of supplies would be
limited at first to Oslo, which meant reducing the amount in order not to attract the attention of
the Nazis. MEW and SOE also dismissed the idea of a food dump in Stockholm, believing that it
would attract too much attention. Instead, the supplies would be smuggled in as part of the
“Gothenburg traffic.” Britain allowed ships— or traffic— between Gothenburg, a port on the
southwestern coast of Sweden, and South American ports, provided that all goods imported
through the blockade were consumed in Sweden. Germany sometimes interfered or stopped the
Gothenburg traffic when it believed the Allies might be benefiting from it. In order to evade
MEW’s navicert system— a requirement because the “secret scheme” was off the books— the
126 Telegram 5905, Halifax to FO, 4 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1213.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 399
supplies would be consigned to a Swedish front company or organization and then transferred to
SOE and the Norwegians.127
The clandestine nature of the “secret scheme” prompted MEW and SOE to take extra
precautions. They worried that the Norwegian exile government— excited about getting relief—
would unintentionally leak the plans. Competition among the exile governments over relief was
fierce. Lie agreed with Hambro that only the Norwegian Cabinet, key members of the Norwegian
Foreign Office, and the Swedish ambassador to Britain should be told, with the last two needed to
facilitate the plan. All arrangements for the shipments were to be made in Stockholm by the
Norwegians and the Swedes, in consultation with SOE. Since Britain officially knew nothing
about the scheme, MEW took steps to distance itself as well. Camps informed J.W. Mitcheson,
MEW’s man (and SOE’s man too) in Stockholm, that some shipments appearing irregular in
nature would be arriving. He should approve them, no questions asked. “The operation is
nothing to do with relief,” wrote Camps, “and its nature is officially unknown to the Ministry of
Economic Warfare.” If anyone mentioned it to him, Mitcheson should correct their
impressions.128 MEW would only learn about the progress of the scheme when Mitcheson
informed them that “certain applications made by the Swedes for navicerts or extra licenses were
quite in order.”129
MEW and SOE also decided to try Madame Kolban’s chocolate parcel plan.
Arrangements were made to send the chocolate by diplomatic bag to Sweden marked as “in
transit,” thereby avoiding the need to apply for any import or export paperwork either from
127 Note of a meeting held at MEW (Foot, Drogheda, Hambro, Sporborg), 2 December 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
128 Telegram 687, MEW to Stockholm, 8 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32479.
129 Memo, Hambro to Selbome etal, 3 December 1942; Aide Memoire, SOE to Norway, 3 December 1942; Letter, Lie to Hambro, 4 December 1942; Letter (CH/3888), Hambro to Lie, 5 December 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 400
Britain or Sweden. In reality, the chocolate would be claimed at the airport by the Donor’s Relief
Committee. Under the personal supervision of the committee’s head, Niels Christian Ditleff, the
Norwegian minister for relief, the chocolate would then be smuggled to Oslo, where it would be
made into parcels and distributed to individual families. Mitcheson assured London that any
problems could be handled discretely. He also trusted Ditleff, who he’d known since they were
both posted to their respective embassies in Warsaw in the late 1930s. “He has all sorts of
personal contacts with influential Swedes, who are prepared to go a long way and spend a lot of
money to help Norway,” Mitcheson informed SOE. Ditleff s underground contacts also had been
helpful for Mitcheson’s work for British intelligence.130
The first shipment, which consisted of one-and-half tons of chocolate, left Britain at the
end of November 1942. The scheme quickly became a nightmare.131 SOE and the Norwegians
found it difficult to evade all of the controls put in place to prevent precisely what they attempted.
More worrisome in the long run was the fact that sending large shipments, such as the twenty-five
cases of chocolate, by diplomatic bag constituted a breach of privilege. The Norwegians agreed
not to do it in the future, but Mitcheson and SOE worried that they had inadvertently shown both
Norway and Sweden a way to export goods to Norway without going through Britain. “Once the
door is opened for this sort of thing, even a crack,” observed Mitcheson, “then there may be no
end of abuses, or at least arguments with the Swedes.”132 After the chocolate finally arrived in
Sweden, Ditleff discovered that some of it could not be used, because it either had imprints or
wrappers that indicated it was of British origin. Ditleff swapped the British chocolate for
Swedish, but the exchange caused delays and attracted unwanted attention. Some of the
130 Letter (No. 42108), Mitcheson to Sporborg, 25 September 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
131 Letter (137/2A/42), Mitcheson to MEW, 19 November 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133. Memo, CD to SI, 28 November 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
132 Letter, Mitcheson to CD, 18 December 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 401
chocolate also disappeared from the warehouse. More transport problems followed when it came
time to smuggle the chocolate into Norway.1’3
While SOE and MEW proceed with their plans, the Foreign Office focused on how to
stamp out the mega-parcels plan. After some convincing from Whitehall, SOE agreed to let Lie
tell his Norwegian colleagues in Washington about the “secret scheme.” British officials hoped
that knowledge of it would discourage Morgenstierne from actively pushing the parcels plan with
Roosevelt. Lie was instructed to make two things very clear: first, the smallest indiscretion could
not only foil the plan, but also endanger the lives of those carrying it out; and second, Britain and
the United States had nothing to do with the scheme. “We know from experience that M. Lie can
hold his tongue,” observed an anxious Harry Sporborg, SOE’s second-in-command, “but can the
same be said for the Norwegians in the United States?”134 Halifax was also told to brief the State
Department.
In mid-December, Halifax found himself attempting to calm an agitated Morgenstierne,
who had been told by Long that the parcel plan had been cancelled owing to British opposition.
British officials on both sides of the Atlantic were furious with what they regarded as Long’s
“disloyalty.” “This is very naughty of Long to put it like that,” remarked Camps, “especially as
in fact we did not close that door.”135 A few days later, Long informed Halifax that Roosevelt
still regarded the mega-parcel plan as an option.136 The Foreign Office had grown accustomed to
Long’s machinations, but the ongoing mystery remained as to why the Americans continued to
played games with relief policy. “Needless to say, particularly in view of recent establishment of
133 Memo by Barber, 17 December 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
134 Memo (F/6940/130/17), Sporborg to CD, 8 December 1942. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
135 Telegram 6057, Halifax to FO, 13 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1213. Minute (W 16883/62/49) by Steel, 16 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32479.
136 Telegram 6109, Halifax to FO, 16 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1213.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 402
Anglo-United Sates common front on the blockade,” London wrote Halifax, “we find it difficult
to understand why United States Government have felt free first of all to propose a concession to
the Norwegians without consulting us and then to withdraw it, telling the Norwegians that we do
not agree.”137
On 22 December 1942, Roosevelt sent a telegram to Churchill outlining the mega-parcel
program for Norway. “I have agreed to send certain relief into Norway,” wrote Roosevelt, “to be
furnished by the American Red Cross to the Swedish Red Cross and by that organization used in
Norway for the feeding and clothing of children.” A trial run would be conducted in one city to
determine the program’s feasibility before expanding it across Norway. Roosevelt noted,
however, that Britain did not agree with the program. “I hope that either this plan or an equally
good one can be put through as the internal situation in Norway is heartrending,” he told
Churchill. “A few extra calories for the children might save a lot of lives.”138
Roosevelt’s telegram— and the program he proposed— was exactly what the Foreign
Office and MEW wanted to avoid. “[T]he President’s present proposal would, in our opinion,
result in a general reversal of existing blockade policy,” wrote Maclean. “Belgium is far worse
off than Norway and it would be out of the question in our judgment to make a concession to
Norway while denying it to Belgium.” The president’s plan also lacked any safeguards to ensure
that the Germans did not reduce rations or imports.139 Roosevelt’s telegram also confirmed what
the Foreign Office and MEW had suspected: the State Department had not told him about the
“secret scheme.” Halifax believed that the State Department, annoyed at Roosevelt’s intervention
137 Telegram 8004, FO to Washington, 18 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32479.
138Telegram R-243, Roosevelt to Churchill, 23 December 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4.
139 Minute by Maclean, “Relief for Norway, 23 December 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32480.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 403
in the relief issue, had been pouting, which resulted in it withholding information.140 When
Halifax met with Hull on Christmas Eve, he intended to urge Hull to brief the president. Instead,
he discovered that Hull knew nothing about the scheme.141 Long had kept news of its existence
all to him self.142
In the days following Christmas, Eden and Churchill hashed out a response to Roosevelt,
hoping to convince him agree to the “secret scheme” and abandon the parcels plan.143 A meeting
between Halifax and Roosevelt on December 30 helped their cause. “It appeared that he did not
know about secret plan,” reported Halifax, “but was not much impressed with it and thought that
it was to be administrated by the Swedish Red Cross and therefore would not remain secret long.”
After Halifax explained the specifics of the “secret scheme” and dispelled the Swedish Red
Cross’ involvement, Roosevelt’s interest grew. “I suggested that we start with our secret plan and
examine the implications of his plan meanwhile,” wrote Halifax. “The President agreed that the
urgent thing was to get something going quickly and said he did not much mind what was done as
long as this was achieved.”144
On New Year’s Day 1943, Churchill sent his reply, which emphasized the importance of
continuing to make Germany responsible for the occupied territories. He began by reminding
140 Telegram 6204, Halifax to FO, 23 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0837/1213.
141 Telegram 6210, Halifax to FO, 23 December 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32480. Telegram 6255, Halifax to FO, 24 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32480.
142 Telegram 6255, Halifax to FO, 24 December 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32480.
143 Letter (PM/42/317), Eden to Churchill, 26 December 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4. Letter (W17619/62/49), Churchill to Eden, 27 December 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32480. Letter (PM/42/321), Eden to Churchill, 29 December 1942; Draft telegram by Churchill, 27 December 1942. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4. The Norwegians, however, did receive a Christmas delivery of sorts. The Norwegian exile government, with British assistance, dropped envelopes containing vitamins, cigarettes, chewing tobacco, and propaganda literature from the Norwegian prime minister over urban areas on the evening of December 23. Memo, SN/I to SN, 5 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
144 Telegram 6298, Halifax to FO, 30 December 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/36508.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 404
Roosevelt that Hull had asked for— and received— an assurance from Britain that it would
maintain the blockade. Then Churchill made his case for the “secret scheme”:
To abandon the principle that the enemy is responsible for territories he has conquered, will lead very quickly to our having the whole lot our backs, a burden far beyond our strength. Conditions in Belgium are worse than in Norway and in our judgment it would not be right to make a concession to Norway and to Belgium. It would be impossible, too, to dispute the claims of other Allied Governments who would certainly press violently for equal privileges. In our view the plan you propose might therefore have the eventual effect of reversing our whole joint food blockade policy, and this I am sure you will agree, we should not contemplate. As you are no doubt aware, we have already agreed with your authorities upon a secret scheme, which while distinct from ordinary relief, will help our Norwegian friends without dangerous repercussions. This scheme, which has been welcomed by the Norwegian Government, provides for the despatch in the Gothenburg traffic of limited quantities of supplies disguised as Swedish imports, to be distributed in Norway through secret channels. If it is put into operation it will bring material aid to our friends, although it is of course vital that none but the Norwegian officials directly concerned should know of it.145
Churchill did not offer Roosevelt a choice— the “secret scheme” or the parcels scheme— but
instead stated the facts as he saw them. The question remained as to whether the “secret scheme”
would placate Roosevelt’s desire to help Norway.
Usually the two leaders answered each other within a week, but Roosevelt did not
respond quickly. The Foreign Office suspected that Roosevelt was crafting a new version of the
mega-parcel plan, a supposition based on his close relationship to Crown Princess Martha of
Norway, who was known to be lobbying for relief for her country. (Princess Martha sought exile
in the United States in 1942 after the Swedes, her first hosts, grew increasingly anxious over how
the presence of her family affected their neutrality. Roosevelt not only extended and invitation to
come the United States, but also hosted her family at the White House when they first arrived.)
Martha was rumored to be the inspiration for Roosevelt’s speech championing Norway in
September 1942. "If there is anyone who still wonders why this war is being fought, let him look
145 Telegram 250, Churchill to Roosevelt, 1 January 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 405
to Norway,” proclaimed Roosevelt. “If there is anyone who has any delusions that this war could
have been averted, let him look to Norway; and if there is anyone who doubts the democratic will
to win, again 1 say, let him look to Norway."146
The arrival of a new player, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (OFFRA), also made Whitehall anxious. Roosevelt tapped Herbert Lehman, a
New Dealer and four-term governor of New York, to lead the agency. The president tasked
Lehman with devising post war plans, but it remained to be seen whether his agency would
dabble in wartime relief.147
Roosevelt’s silence stemmed not from making new relief plans, but from the preparations
and travel related to the Casablanca Conference. From 14-23 January 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt,
and de Gaulle met in Morocco to discuss the strategic direction of the war for 1943. Stalin
declined to attend on the grounds that the war on Eastern Front demanded his full attention. The
success of Operation TORCH in November 1942 allowed the Allies to control French North
Africa, which provide a springboard for attacking Europe and securing the Mediterranean. At
Casablanca, Britain and the United States decided to delay opening a second front in Western
Europe during 1943. Instead they resolved to clear the Axis out of North Africa, tackle Italy,
bomb Axis targets in Southeastern Europe, and take control of the Mediterranean.148 Although
British and American planners did not discuss relief, they reinforced Allied commitment to
economic warfare and the blockade as a means of strangling Germany’s war machine and
deflating the morale of German civilians. At the conference, Roosevelt and Churchill also
announced their intent to pursue Germany’s unconditional surrender. There would be no
146 Minute by Maclean, 6 January 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36508.
147 Minute (W808/4/49) by Maclean, 15 January 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36508.
148 Telegram, Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, 25 January 1943. FRUS,The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (1941-1943) 805-7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 406
negotiations, no deals. Roosevelt told reporters at the post-conference press briefing that: “It does
not mean the mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean
the destruction of the philosophies of in those countries which are based on conquest and the
subjugation of other people.”149
In mid-February, Eden decided to prod Churchill as to whether he had discussed the
Norwegian parcel plan with Roosevelt at Casablanca.150 “I did not discuss this with the President
at Casablanca and, since he has not replied to my original telegram, we may assume he has
cooled down,” Churchill told Eden. “I hope this is so. The less we have to do, the better.”151 A
few weeks later, Welles brought up with Roosevelt the need to reply to Churchill, but the
president shot him down. Roosevelt preferred that the issue be handled between the State
Department and the Foreign Office.152 The White Flouse and 10 Downing were done with relief
issue for the time being.
Meanwhile, SOE learned how hard it was to send relief into Norway clandestinely. As
January 1943 progressed, the chocolate scheme continued to generate one problem after another.
Two consignments made it to Stockholm, but use of Britain’s diplomatic bag to transport the
chocolate attracted the wrong kind of attention and too many questions.153 More leakage
problems developed in Stockholm, owing to the appeal of chocolate to both the taste buds and the
black market. “I am afraid, between ourselves, that some of these difficulties are perhaps due to
149 Press conference transcript, 24 January 1943. FRUS,The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 7943(1941-1943)727.
150 Letter (PM/43/17), Eden to Churchill, 10 February 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4. Telegram 173, FO to Halifax, 8 January 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
151 Letter, Churchill to Eden, 12 February 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4.
152 Note on Letter, Welles to Roosevelt, 2 March 1943; Letter, Roosevelt to Welles, 12 March 1943. FDRL, OF 123, Norway, Box 1, Norway 1933-45. 153 Memo, SI to CD, 8 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133. Memo, S.l to CD, 14 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 407
D itleff s over optimism about getting supplies clandestinely into Norway,” Hambro confided to
Mitcheson. “He gave us the impression here that this was all laid on and would present no
problems with the Swedes. If we had know better how exactly things are we would have insisted
on a little more preparatory work out in Stockholm before we undertook the shipment.”
Smuggling the chocolate into Norway also proved problematic. Ditleff s network was not as well
developed as he had led SOE to believe.154 Given all of the problems, Selbome decided to
cancel the pending third shipment. He told the Norwegians that if they wanted to send small
quantities in their diplomatic bag, Britain would look to the other way. Restraint, however, was
required. Selbome had no doubt that Madame Colban, unhappy with the cancellation of her “pet
project,” would soon be convincing any Norwegian traveling to Sweden “to stuff their bags full
of chocolate.”155
As Selbome predicted, Madame Colban continued her chocolate plan using the
Norwegian diplomatic bag. She also sent other supplies, including vitamins and baby clothing.
The scheme’s continuation came to MEW ’s attention in April 1943, because Ditleff asked
Mitcheson for permission to export the goods to Norway, this despite being repeatedly told that
he needed to make his own arrangements with Swedes. “Ditleff must accurately understand,”
Camps wrote Mitcheson, “that it is no use evading our own controls at this end if he then goes to
the Swedes for permission to pass through theirs, since the Swedes are obliged to refer to us
before giving their permission, and we are constrained to hold them to their obligation”156
Mitcheson made arrangements for the goods already in Sweden, but asked London to find a way
to get him off the hook for future ones. Continually bailing out Ditleff compromised his work for
154 Letter (CH/4149), Hambro to Mitcheson, 6 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
155 Memo, S.l to CD, 21 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133. Telegram 4910, Mitcheson to CD, 15 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
156 Letter (W6870/4/49), Camps to Mitcheson, 30 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36513.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 408
MEW and alerted people to his involvement with SOE. Regarding Ditleff as “the root of the
trouble,” Selbome decided that the best solution would be for Ditleff not to tell Mitcheson about
his plans. That way, MEW would have no official knowledge or involvement, leaving SOE to
deal with Ditleff however they wished.157
Having extricated Mitcheson, Selbome then had to tell Madame Colban that Britain did
not intend to provide any further assistance. “When Madame Colban asked about the prospects
for future deliveries I stated that they were bleak,” wrote Selbome. “I said that we must
regretfully wash our hands of the whole business and that the 4 tons of goods which had been sent
out so far represented the total help that we could give, as in the future we should be able to help
neither with the transport nor with any intervention in Stockholm.” Colban was very
disappointed, but understood that Britain had done what it could. “1 still have a feeling,
however,” noted Selbome, “that she may start off some new idea on her own.”158
The “secret scheme” also stumbled, foiled by the very checks and balances put in place to
ensure the blockade worked effectively. No cargo space could be found on the Swedish ships in
December, pushing the first deliveries to January 1943. The Norwegians then failed to follow
M EW ’s instructions on filing the navicerts, resulting in the supposedly clandestine shipments
coming to the attention of an array of American and Swedish officials.159 When confronted with
the problem, the Norwegians accused the Swedes of not being cooperative.160 In Washington,
Hall used his connections at the Board of Economic Warfare and the Swedish Embassy to smooth
157 Memo, S. 1 to CD, 20 April 1943. Letter (CH/4958), Hambro to Mitcheson, 22 April 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
158 Memo, S.l to CD, 1 May 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
159 Telegram 192, MEW to Washington, 16 January 1943. TNA/PRO, FOl 15/3952.
160 Letter, Lie to Hambro, 20 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 409
things out, keep the shipments off the books, and pave the way for future deliveries.161 Mitcheson
did the same in Stockholm, finding a way to process the necessary paperwork without inviting too
many questions.162 As a result of the paperwork problems, tidbits about the scheme began spread
through official Washington and Stockholm. Even those sworn to secrecy found it hard to
suppress the urge to talk about it. Morgenstriene’s wife indiscreetly mentioned it to Hall at a
cocktail party with a newspaper columnist within earshot.163
At the end of January 1943, Germany decided to suspend the Gothenburg traffic, putting
the scheme on hold. Rather than view it as a setback, Selbome seized upon it as a chance to
review procedure. “I am rather concerned,” he told Lie, “over problems which have arisen in
connection with the scheme for sending goods by clandestine means into Norway.” Selbome also
asked that Ditleff come to Britain to discuss future arrangements.164 Ditleff, however, did not
want to come, believing the meeting was the precursor to a cancellation notice. He urged the
Norwegian exile government to press forward with whatever supplies could be found— if the
scheme stopped, Britain would find a reason not to start it again.165 At the urging of his own
government, Ditleff made the trip to London in mid-February 1943. Despite SOE and MEW ’s
best efforts, they could not convince Ditleff of the need to keep arrangements secret or follow the
necessary procedures to evade blockade controls. He seemed to think that everything could be
accomplished with a wink here and a nod there. Given the circumstances, Selbome and Hambro
161 Minute (WT229/7/43) by CC staff, 23 January 1943; Telegram 323, Hall to MEW, 25 January 1943; Memo (WT220/7/43), Murray to Hall, 25 January 1943. TNA/PRO, FOl 15/3952.
162 Letter, Mitcheson to Hambro, 18 January 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
163 Telegram 6205, Halifax to FO, 23 December 1942. TNA/PRO, FO371/32480.
164 Letter, Selbome to Lie, 6 February 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
165 Letter (139/2A/43), Mitcheson to Hambro, 8 February 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133. Telegram 652, Washington to MEW, 19 February 1943. TNA/PRO, FOl 15/3952.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 410
contemplated scrapping scheme, but held off. The Gothenburg traffic remained suspended,
giving them more time to solve the supply problems— and work around Ditleff.166
In April 1943, Britain shut down the “secret scheme.” The Gothenburg traffic had not
resumed, making it impossible to smuggle in the necessary supplies. SOE also learned that had
Ditleff altered the plans for getting the relief into Norway without telling them. Rather than use
the Norwegian underground, he planned to distribute the goods through the Donor’s Committee,
which would have obliterated the “secret” part of the scheme.167
MEW decided to give Mitcheson more latitude in approving relief supplies for Norway
provided by Sweden. Public pressure in Sweden for the government to help Norway continued to
grow. Frustrated by British blockade controls, Swedish officials privately and publicly blamed
Britain for the lack of assistance, calling Britain’s policies “obstructive.”168 Swedish officials
also found it disingenuous that Britain refused, for example, to allow a small shipment of baby
clothes from South America, while asking them to let goods for the “secret scheme” in through
the back door.169 Despite Sweden’s unhappiness, MEW had no intention of changing its policies,
but it understood the need to make things easier. Under the new guidelines, Mitcheson could
approve food shipments to Norway, provided the food did not come through the blockade, was
paid for by Swedish funds, and distributed by a trusted relief organization. Given the scarcity of
cotton and wool, MEW wanted to keep an eye on clothing requests, so those requests still needed
166 Letter, Hambro to Mitcheson, 18 February 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
167 Telegram 2313, Eden to Halifax, 8 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/3952. Letter, Mitcheson to Hambro, 29 March 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133. Telegram 1508, Washington to FO, 30 March 1943. TNA/PRO, FOl 15/3952. Letter (W5499/220/G), Crowe to Collier, 27 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36511.
168 Telegram 24 Saving, Stockholm to FO, 26 February 1943; Telegram 189, Mallet to FO, 4 March 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36510.
169 Letter, MEW to Mitcheson, 9 January 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36508. Letter, Mitcheson to CD, 29 January 1943; Letter, Mitcheson to Hambo, 3 February 1943. TNA/PRO, HS/2/133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 411
London’s approval. The new policy, however, meant that food relief for Norway became a
question of Swedish generosity rather than blockade controls.170
Over the course of eighteen months, the Foreign Office and MEW went from devising a
mass milk program for children to experimenting with clandestine means of delivering relief.
The various schemes were an attempt to address the political and humanitarian issues created by
the advent of the Greek relief program and Britain’s ongoing adherence to the blockade. They
were also borne out of the frustration of working with an ally that not only lacked a clear policy
stance on the relief, but one that refused to grapple with the issue in a serious way. British
officials simply did not trust the Americans— whether it was the State Department or the White
House— to act rationally on the relief issue. The sooner the United States committed to a
consistent policy, the easier it would be control the exile governments and public opinion. Until
then, British officials felt that they had to continue to manage both the relief issue and the
Americans, crossing their fingers that they could keep the blockade intact.
Britain’s more liberal attitude toward food parcels also allowed it to facilitate modest
assistance to Jews suffering under Nazi rule in mid-1942. The concession was significant for two
reasons. First, it came months before the public became aware that something sinister was
happening to the Jews of Europe, meaning that it was based on knowledge of conditions rather
than public opinion. Second, by granting a special concession to the Jews, Britain acknowledged
that something sinister and extraordinary was happening to them. By agreeing to support British
food parcel policy— and also grant a concession to Jews in the Warsaw ghetto— the United
States’ made a small step towards helping the Jews in the fall of 1942, more than a year before
the creation of the War Refugee Board.
170 Letter (W3271/4/49), Camps to Mitcheson, 23 February 1943; Letter (W3693/4/49), Camps to Brodtkorb, 2 March 1943. Letter (W 4198/4/49), Quenell to Crowe, 12 March 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36510.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER NINE
TO TH E EN D
There was a time, Mr. Secretary, when the United States had considerable influence. There was also a President, and it is a coincidence that his name was the same as that of the present President, who would simply have put this food on the available ships and told England and Russia the dates on which those ships were leaving American harbors. There were no bad after effects on somewhat similar incidents of a generation ago and I am convinced there would be none n ow .1
So wrote John J. Phillips, the Republican representative from California, to Hull in June
1944. Phillips and many other Americans were puzzled as to why the United States continued to
go along with British blockade policy in the face of so much public support for relief to be
delivered to Nazi-occupied territories. What they didn’t know was that the Roosevelt
administration had been waging a fierce battle with Britain over relief since the beginning of
1943 and continued to do so until the end of the war. Bolstered by a new relief campaign in the
United States— and knowledge of the Holocaust— the White House and State Department
challenged the wisdom of allowing the blockade to trump humanitarian concerns.
Enter Lehman
Roosevelt’s creation of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations,
headed by Herbert Lehman, at the end of 1942 threw a new wrench into the relief issue. The
president created the office to begin laying plans for postwar relief. He wisely recognized that as
Allied armies began to liberate Nazi-occupied Europe, relief would have to follow in its wake.
Although technically part of the State Department, OFRRO functioned more like an adjunct.
1 Letter, Phillips to Hull, 19 June 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
412
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 413
Lehman informally reported to Hull, while also having direct access to Roosevelt. It did not help
Hull’s disposition toward Lehman that Roosevelt chose not to consult with him on the
appointment. (Hull would have preferred Acheson.) Lehman understood that many of his State
Department colleagues did not welcome his arrival, worrying about what it would mean for their
authority and influence. “While on the surface I had cooperation, actually I infrequently did not
have it; quite the opposite,” wrote Lehman. “This was partly due to the fact that everyone in
Washington was fighting for power.”2 OFFRO’s betwixt-and-between nature could have spelled
bureaucratic disaster for any other new office, but Lehman’s four terms as governor made him
bureaucratically savvy and adept.
The State Department and Britain carefully watched to see what Lehman would do with
regards to the current relief problem.3 Worrisome rumors circulated that he was under Hoover’s
spell.4 In mid-January 1943, Lehman and Hoover met for lunch, giving Hoover an opportunity to
pitch his plan for Greek-style relief programs across Europe.5 Although he was sympathetic to
Hoover’s relief views and respected his organizational ability, Lehman quickly became
uncomfortable with the pressure being exerted by the ex-president. Hoover used Lehman’s
appointment as a springboard for new relief campaign. In mid-February 1943, Hoover and
Gibson published an article in Collier’s stating their case, publicly urging Lehman to push the
2 Quoted in Allan Nevins, Herbert H. Lehman and His Era (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1963) 226.
3 Telegram 397, Hall to Troutbeck, 23 January 1943; Telegram 17 Relief, Washington to FO, 31 January 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214. Minute (W 1082/4/49) by Rougetel, 16 February 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36508.
4 Telegram 397, Hall to Troutbeck, 23 January 1943; Telegram 654 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 19 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F 0837/1214.
5 Nevins, p. 225. Telegram 397, Hall to Troutbeck, 23 January 1943. TNA/PRO, F 0837/1214.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relief issue.6
According to Allan Nevins, Lehman’s biographer, Lehman chose not to tackle wartime
relief.7 That isn’t that case at all. In fact, Lehman made a successful power play to control the
issue and spent the next five months trying to find some common ground with the British. In
mid-February 1943, Lehman suggested to Hull that responsibility for wartime relief be
transferred from Long’s purview to his office. He believed that it made sense to centralize the
relief issue; he was also aware that it had languished under Long, who had had problems dealing
with the British. Hull, however, refused to make a decision, telling Long and Lehman to work it
out. “The transblockade feeding of civilian populations,” Lehman told Long, “is clearly a relief
operation and as such should be part of the responsibility of OFR.” He requested not only the
transfer of authority, but also personnel. Long did not put up a much of a fight. By the end of
February 1943, Lehman had responsibility for wartime relief.8
Lehman and his staff made fast work of the relief issue. He immediately sent one of his
staff to discuss all pending relief issues with the British Embassy. “Quality of our discussions
has improved,” reported Hall, “and there is a very marked desire to improve our collaboration in
these particular matters.”9 He talked with the ambassadors of the exile governments about their
relief desires— and listened to their complaints about the British. Lehman also met with
Kershner, who pushed his own program for child relief in France. Kershner believed that the
6 Telegram 448, Washington to MEW, 5 February 1943; Telegram 562 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 12 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
7 Nevins, 225.
8 He asked, however, that they consult Norman Davis, given Amcross’ involvement in relief. Davis wisely stayed out of the turf battle, saying that he had no opinion on what division dealt with relief. Memo, Lehman to Long, 17 February 1943. NA, RG, 169, Entry 124, Box 140, Relief Transblockade.
9 Telegram 654 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 19 February 1943; Telegram 672, MEW to Washington, 18 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214. 412
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 413
relief program would help encourage the French to resist the German occupation.10 He requested
the Office of Strategic Services’ Research and Analysis branch to study the relief issue and make
recommendations.11 Last, but not least, Lehman set his staff to work devising a relief program for
children in Belgium and Norway.12 In two weeks, more work had been done the relief issue than
in one year.
Lehman also concentrated on developing a coherent approach to the relief issue. If the
United States wanted Britain to support a program for Norway, as Roosevelt had recently
suggested, then it had to support intrablockade purchases. Lehman believed that to do so
otherwise would be “illogical.” “We would be, in effect, asking the British to swallow what we
and they have regarded as a camel while we continue to strain at gnats,” he told Acheson.13 After
getting a tutorial from Hall on how intrablockade purchases worked, Lehman agreed to increase
the amount of money the Belgians, Dutch, and Yugoslavs could spend in neutral countries on
relief.14 He also agreed to try and convince Acheson— and the Treasury Department— to allow
the exile governments to use their frozen American assets to finance relief. The exile
governments had exhausted their financial resources in Britain. They needed to access to their
American assets in order to keep their parcel programs and intrablockade food purchases going.15
10 Memcon, Osbome and Kershner, 24 February 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 37, Relief France. Letter, Kershner to Roosevelt, 2 March 1943; Letter, Kershner to Hopkins, 5 March 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
11 Letter, Gulick to Langer, 8 March 1943. NA, RG 169, Entiy 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
12 Memo, Osbome to Lehman, 22 February 1943; Memo, Lehman to Osbome, 25 February 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
13 Letter, Lehman to Acheson, 16 March 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
14 Telegram 668 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 20 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214. Letter (WT208/32/43), Hall to Osbome, 23 February 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade, March 1943.
15 Telegram 875 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 8 March 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36511.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 414
Lehman succeeded in winning over a previously skeptical Acheson, giving him an ally in his
battle with the Treasury Department.16
Lehman’s arrival in Washington also prompted some candid discussions between
American and British officials about the relief issue. Halifax reported that Lehman’s staff had
confided that some elements of the State Department continued to believe that Britain had
politically “out-smarted” the United States with its policy of allowing food parcel concessions
and the intrablockade purchases. Gossip also circulated that Roosevelt remained interested in the
Norwegian mega-parcels scheme, prompting Halifax to warn that the plan could be sprung on
Britain again at any moment. This time, however, the State Department was not going to be able
to plead American public opinion as justification. Hoover’s new campaign was fizzling, being
kept alive only by the pro-Republican Chicago Tribune and other McCormick family
newspapers. “If we are shortly to be pressed by United States to change our basic position and
agree to schemes of controlled relief for children in occupied territories now,” wrote Halifax, “the
reason will be not pressure of public opinion, but partly because the President has committed
himself further than he should have done to the Norwegians and State Department fear that we
have acquired undue political credit with European Allies by what we have already done.”17
Although he demonstrated a willingness to work with Britain, Lehman made no secret of
his interest in providing relief before liberation, particularly for children. He believed that even
small quantities would help bolster the will of civilians to resist the Germans and instill good
feelings toward the Americans.18 Given that he had been recruiting his staff from the ranks of
professional humanitarians, any plans he devised would not be inconsequential. “He now has at
his disposal a staff of high pressure organizers who have literally no other duties than to examine
15 Letter, Acheson to Lehman, 27 March 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
17 Telegram 1120, Halifax to FO, 8 March 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4.
18 Memo, Osbome to Sayre, 4 February 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 415
possible schemes,” reported Hall.19 Despite his aspirations, Lehman pledged not to cut side deals
with the exile governments.20
The problem facing British officials was how to handle Lehman, a delicate task given
that he was Roosevelt’s man and Hull’s thorn. They worried that if word got out that Lehman
was studying and devising relief programs, it would raise expectations among the exile
governments that could not be met.21 Halifax and Hall believed that the quicker Lehman
received a lesson in the realities of the relief issue, the better. They recommended that MEW
invite him to London for a chat. “This may sound to you somewhat unreal,” wrote Hall, “but I
feel we shall be wise to make Lehman face in the near future all problems that may arise before
be commits himself to relief plans that may later break down because of increasing pressure upon
our limited resources.” By coming to London, Lehman would also have an opportunity to meet
with the exile governments, allowing him to experience them in their cacophonous glory. If
practical issues were not daunting enough, the exile governments certainly would be.22
Selbome wanted to cooperate with Lehman. “By maintaining a purely negative attitude,”
he told Eden, “we should not in any case have the smallest chance of preventing a breach of the
blockade, if the Americans set their hearts on making one.” Starting a dialogue about a general
feeding program would also divert attention away from giving relief to specific countries, as
19 Telegram 541 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 10 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
20 Telegram 445 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 5 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
21 Telegram 639 AFRAR, 17 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214. Telegram 1362, FO to Washington, 1 March 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4.
22 Britain also urgently needed American input on two outstanding requests from the Belgians and the Yugoslavs. Britain was also keen to discuss with Sweden and Switzerland the possibility of their caring for children evacuated from the occupied territories.Telegram 447 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 5 February 1943; Telegram 446 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 5 February 1943; Telegram 21 Relief, Halifax to FO, 10 February 1943; Memo by MEW (most likely Drogheda), 15 February 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36510. Telegram 552 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 11 February 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36509.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 416
Roosevelt had sought to do with Norway.23 The problem, however, was that Selbome technically
needed Cabinet approval to discuss relief. Deciding that Churchill’s blessing would be
sufficient, he asked the prime minister to give him some leeway on “that distasteful topic, Relief”
“[TJhere is a real danger,” he told Churchill, “of some capricious and ill-digested scheme being
adopted and published by the White House, and the most likely means of averting this danger is
to invite Lehman to discuss with us, while he is here, any proposals he may have in mind.”
Churchill agreed to let Selbome to discuss relief with Lehman, but he could not commit to any
policy changes— that remained the provenance of the Cabinet.24 In mid-March 1943, MEW
extended an invitation to Lehman, who immediately accepted.25
In the weeks leading up to the mid-April meeting in London, British officials were under
mounting pressure to change relief policy. They received a barrage of new proposals from the
exile governments for relief.26 Support for the Famine Relief Committee also continued to grow.
On 23 March 1943, the Archbishop of Canterbury addressed a meeting of both houses of
Parliament and endorsed the Famine Relief Committee’s plan for a milk program in Belgium.27
The archbishop’s support culminated a six month period in which the Famine Relief Committee
had evolved from being a coalition of church leaders making polite suggestions to being a
political force. “The strength of this movement,” read an MEW assessment, “lies in the fact that
it commands responsible and intelligent support and that it recognizes that relief action can take
23 Letter (W 3118/4/49), Selbome to Eden, 16February 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36510.
24 Letter, Selbome to Churchill, 15 March 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4.
25 Minute by Law, 19 February 1943; Minute by Le Rougetel, 25 February 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36510. Letter (PREM/43/60), Sargent to Churchill, 16 March 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/4. Telegram 1088, MEW to Washington, 18 March 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36511.
26 See for example Letter (W3967/4/49), Collier to Eden, 8 March 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36510. Note, Rougetel to Eden, 10 March 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36510.
27 “Famine Relief in Europe,” Statement by Archbishop of Canterbury, 3 March 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.Letter, Camps to Le Rougetel, 23 March 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 417
place only upon a limited scale and in a form least calculated to confer material benefit upon the
enemy.” More worrisome for the British government was the fact that the committee continued
to behave in a manner that did not invite criticism. Despite repeated overtures from the Peace
Pledge Union, it refused to merge forces. It stuck to its original philosophy of educating rather
than agitating. The Famine Relief Committee had become so integral to the relief issue, that no
policy review was complete without mentioning it.28
Asserting himself, Hull ordered Lehman not to initiate any discussions about relief with
the British— he could discuss it if the British brought it up, but otherwise he was to avoid the
topic. Hull’s motivations were twofold: first, he was taking out his frustrations with Roosevelt on
Lehman; and second, it reflected Hull’s belief that relief was a political issue that should be
decided by experienced State Department officials.29 While Lehman was enroute to Britain, Hull
had a change of heart, giving Lehman permission to negotiate. His about face came after a talk
with Lithgow Osborne, Lehman’s second-in-command. Osborne made Hull “face the realities of
the situation,” namely that it took months to implement relief programs. If the United States
wanted relief for Norway and Belgium, it had to win over Britain sooner rather than later.30
The newly-empowered Lehman arrived in London just after Easter. He was wined and
dined to the best of the ability of war-torn London. He lunched with the King and Queen, who
expressed an interest in the relief problem, dined with the leadership of the exile governments,
was feted at cocktail party at Claridge’s, and lunched with Churchill. He also participated in a
28 Note (W3225/4/49) on Blockade Policy respecting Relief by Ministry of Economic Warfare, 24 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
29 It didn’t help matters that Lehman and Hull were given different instructions about the relief issue by Roosevelt. Hull claimed that Roosevelt wanted a mass parcels scheme for Norway and milk program for Belgium, while Lehman had been told to pursue a limited feeding scheme.Telegram 1235, Washington to MEW, 5 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36512. Minute (W5621/4/49) by Crowe, 12 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F036512. Memcon, Lehman, Jackson, and Osborne, 3 April 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
30 Telegram 1689, Washington to FO, 10 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36512. Telegram, Halifax to MEW, 7 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 418
number of grueling meetings with MEW and the Foreign Office. Lehman made it clear that he
and Roosevelt believed in the psychological importance of providing relief to the occupied
territories and expressed their concern over growing public sentiment for some measure of
relief.31 The United States wanted a limited and experimental program of relief. MEW gave
Lehman a tutorial in relief politics, emphasizing that “those who squeal the loudest are frequently
not those who have the greatest need.” Selbome also delivered the standard lecture about the
importance of controlling transportation and distribution. For the first time, MEW spoke in a
forceful way about the need to be cognizant of Russian attitudes toward relief. The British
worried that the Russians might not look kindly on supplies going to help civilians in the
occupied territories.32 Supply convoys to the Soviet Union were also stalled because of shipping
needs for the invasion of Sicily and the presence of the German battle fleet in Norway.33
The meetings between Lehman and MEW and the Foreign Office yielded four results.
First, they decided to form a committee to study the feasibility of mounting a relief program in
the fall. Second, they agreed that relief was to be the subject of “continuous consultation.”
Third, they concurred that both governments should present a united front on the relief issue.
Finally, the United States also agreed to Britain’s request to explore the possibility of evacuating
children, including Jews, from the occupied territories to Sweden or Switzerland.34
31 Lehman and Roosevelt held fast to the idea of relief having psychological benefits despite OSS’s assessment that the Allies would derive no political or psychological advantage from the distribution of food in German-occupied areas. Since relief would not advance the war effort, the policy had to be based on humanitarian considerations alone. Letter, Langer to Gulick, 7 April 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 37, Relief Belgium.
32 Journal of a Mission to London by Lehman and Jackson, 8-23 April 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 41, Reports London. Record of the Meetings on the Question of Relief through the Blockade by MEW, 23 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
33 Kimball, Forged in War, 221.
34 Record of the Meetings on the Question of Relief through the Blockade by MEW, 23 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 419
The idea of child evacuation first arose in connection with Greece in early 1942 before
the Swedish-Swiss program came to fruition. Arrangements were made for 25,000 Greek
children to be sent to India, Kenya, and Tanganyika, but the plan collapsed after the Italians
withdrew their consent.35 Britain kept the idea of child evacuation alive and spent the next
sixteen months trying to get the United States to consider the idea. The Americans studiously
avoided it, believing the evacuation scheme a British ploy to divert attention away from large
scale relief. Hull regarded the plan as infeasible owing to the transportation issues.36
Lehman made it clear that he did not regard child evacuation as an alternative to relief,
but rather an adjunct. He also suggested that the plan be discussed at the Bermuda Conference,
35 Note (W3225/4/49) on Blockade Policy respecting Relief by Ministry of Economic Warfare, 24 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
36 While Britain continued to pursue child evacuation, a British program never materialized owing to Switzerland and Sweden’s reluctance to approach Germany on the issue. In the final year of the war, 21,000 Jewish children from concentration camps were evacuated to Sweden following the creation of the U.S. War Refugee Board. See Richard Breitman, “American Rescue Activities in Sweden,”Holocaust and Genocide Studies 7 (1993) 202-215. For Britain’s pursuit of child evacuation, see: Minute (W9389/62/49) by Steel, 9 July 1942; Minute (W9389/62/49) by Cadogan, 10 July 1942; Minute by Maclean, 11 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32468. Minute by Cadogan, 14 July 1942; Minute by Eden, 15 July 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32468. Memcon: “Relief for the Belgian civilian population, especially children,” Berle and Hall, 25 August 1942; Note by British Embassy, 25 August 1942; Letter, Davis to Berle, 29 August 1942. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 10. Minute (W 13607/62/49) by Maclean, 15 October 1942; Minute (W 13607/62/40) by Steel, 15 October 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32474. Letter, Maclean to Camps, 4 November 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32475. Minute (W15926/62/49) by Maclean, 1 December 1942. Minute (W15926/62/49) by Steel, 1 December 1942. TNA/PRO, F0371/32477. Telegram 539, DO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 11 December 1942; Telegram 6109, Halifax to FO, 16 December 1942; Telegram 6204, Halifax to FO, 23 December 1942; Telegram 6204, Halifax to FO, 23 December 1942; Telegram 6205, Halifax to FO, 23 December 1942; TNA/PRO, F0837/1213. Minute by Foot, 6 January 1943; Letter, Selbome to Eden, 11 January 1943; Minute (W808/4/49) by Maclean, 15, 21 & 22 January 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36508. Letter (WT239/2/43), Hall to Long, 18 January 1943; Memo, Long to Brandt, 20 January 1943. NA, RG 169, E124, Box 40, File Relief Transblockade Jan 43. Telegram 405 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 1 February 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36509. Telegram 672, MEW to Washington, 18 February 1943; Telegram 654 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 19 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214. Telegram 690 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 20 February 1943. TNA/PRO, FO371/36510. Telegram 668 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 20 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214. Memo, Osborne to Lehman, 22 February 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade, February 1943. Note (W3225/4/49) on Blockade Policy respecting Relief by Ministry of Economic Warfare, 24 February 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214. Letter (W5996/4/49), Camps to Walker, 16 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36512.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 420
which was meeting at that very moment.37 American and British officials were gathering on the
Caribbean island to devise solutions for managing the refugee situation in Nazi-occupied Europe.
Despite MEW and Foreign Office’s support, the conference closed before the scheme could be
put on the table.38 The late timing actually kept the child evacuation scheme alive, since it was
not considered and dismissed buy the delegates. It also escaped being associated with the odor of
failure that surrounded the conference. Despite twelve days of meetings, the conference
produced very little in the way of tangible plans to help European refugees, particularly Jews.39
Lehman left Britain optimistic about the prospects for the relief program. It seemed to
him that the British had turned the corner on the relief issue. The meetings in London also
demonstrated the importance of presenting a consistent policy stance. Before committee work
could began, the United States needed to nail down its own policy. Lehman and his staff
recognized that they were at an “obvious disadvantage” in negotiating with Britain. The British
had a simple direct policy based on a simple strong conviction, while the Americans had a “vague
feeling that ‘something ought be to done.’” As Osborne put it, “you can’t beat something with
nothing.” It quickly became clear, however, that the Lehman’s office, the Board of Economic
Warfare, and the Treasury Department could not agree on anything, whether it was which
countries needed relief or how to handle intrablockade purchases.40 Relief policy also suffered
from a lack of coordination and leadership at the highest levels. As Osborne aptly described the
37 Telegram 2723, FO to Washington, 24 April 1943; Minute by Law, 22 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36512.
38 Letter (W5996/4/49), Camps to Walker, 16 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36512. Telegram 2024, Washington to FO, 30 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36513.
39 Breitman and Kraut, 138-9.
40 Memo, Osborne to Sayre, 30 April 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade. Report by BEW, Recommended Policy on Civilian Relief in the Blockade Area, 3 May 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade. Memcon (Intra-blockade Relief Shipments), Fagen, Kiser, Gordon, Olsen, Osborne, Malin, and Kuppinger, 7 May 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade, May 1943. Memo, Paul and White to Morgenthau, 16 April 1943. FDRL, Morgenthau Diaries, Roll 183, F183. Memo, Osborne to Sayre, 30 April 1943; Memo, Osborne to Sayre, 8 May 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade, May 1943.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 421
situation: “The President told the Governor he was going to talk to Mr. Churchill about food for
the occupied countries at Casablanca. He didn’t. He told Mr. Welles that he would write to Mr.
Churchill as per our draft note. He didn’t. Instead he told Mr. Hull to talk to Eden. Instead of
doing so, Mr. Hull telephoned Lord Halifax. All of which indicates that in so far as it can be said
that we have any policy it is certainly not one which is being pursued with any singleness of
purpose.»41
Selbome also encountered difficulty. MEW agreed to the consultation process as a way
of keeping the Americans engaged and off balance. It had used the strategy with some success in
dealing with the Belgians. The consultation process also had a pragmatic value. The Americans
had yet to wrap their heads around the intricacies of mounting a relief program, so spending time
immersed in the details would do them some good. But when Selbome presented the outcome of
the meetings with Lehman to the Cabinet at the end of April 1943, he received a pasting.
Churchill argued that by participating in such a committee, Britain was giving its tacit approval to
a large scale relief program for fall. Once Churchill voiced his opposition, the rest of the Cabinet,
always a tough sell anyway, piled on. The Cabinet declared that Britain had no intention of
modifying its existing relief policy and all existing and future requests would be refused. There
would be no committee to study relief programs. Furthermore, the Cabinet expected that the
United States would consult with Britain about any requests, rather than arbitrarily approve
programs. It also expected the United States to present a united front with Britain on the relief
issue.42 “The present policy is “No relief, except for Greece,’” wrote Drogheda, “and the Prime
41 Note, Sayre to Flexner, 16 April 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade. Memo, Osbome to Sayre, 9 April 1943. NA, RG 169, Entry 124, Box 40, Relief Transblockade.
42 Telegram 3220, Eden to Halifax, 12 May 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/8. Letter (W6500/4/49), Lehman to Drogheda, 27 April 1943; Note by LeRougetel on “Relief Through the Blockade,” 29 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36512. War Cabinet Paper (WP(43)186), Relief for Occupied Europe by Selbome, 30 April 1943; War Cabinet Conclusions, WM(43)63 , 3 May 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 422
Minister has reminded us that we are the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and therefore, by
inference, not a relief organisation.”43
The Foreign Office and MEW officials dreaded delivering the news, but they knew it
was better to be frank and get it over with. They also had the perfect candidate for the job:
Churchill, who was in Washington for a conference with Roosevelt.44 “The essential thing now
seems to be to keep the President in line with the Cabinet policy,” Halifax explained to Churchill
when delivering the request.45
Churchill had traveled to Washington in mid-May 1943 in order to sell Roosevelt and the
Americans on an invasion of Italy. The British believed that the collapse and surrender of Italy
would rob Nazi Germany of an ally and cede dominance of the Mediterranean to the Allies. The
Americans, however, wanted to focus on the build up for a cross-channel attack and avoid getting
mired in the Mediterranean at expense of opening up Western Europe.46
Churchill, however, was a step ahead of his colleagues in London. Recognizing the
importance of keeping Roosevelt from proposing any more schemes, he had already pressed the
president on relief issue. According to Churchill, Roosevelt believed that Greece formed a
separate case, Germany alone was responsible for feeding the occupied territories, and once
Britain and the United States departed from this principle, it would be hard to control demand.
43 Comment by Drogheda on Foot’s Memo, 9 April 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1214.
44 The first casualty of the Cabinet’s intransigence was the joint statement. Britain wanted a forceful declaration reflecting Allied commitment to the blockade, while the Americans wanted something that implied the possibility of relief for the occupied territories. Telegram 2881, Lehman to Sayre, 26 April 1943; Telegram 2882, Winant to Hull, 26 April 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 11. Minute by Drogheda, 5 May 1943. Memcon, Drogheda and Steyne, 4 May 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36513. Memo, Lehman to Hull, 17 May 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 11. Letter, Hall to Drogheda, 17 May 1943; Minute by Le Rougetel, 11 May 1943; Minute by Butler, 12 May 1943; Minute by Eden, 6 May 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36513. Memo (WT238/78/43), Hall to Halifax, 11 May 1943. TNA/PRO, FOl 15/3953. Telegram 3220, Eden to Halifax, 12 May 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/8.
45 Telegram 3220, Eden to Halifax, 12 May 1943; Memo, Halifax to Churchill, 15 May 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/8.
46 Kimball, F orged in War, 214.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 423
Roosevelt also did not seem to think American public opinion had reached the point where
concessions needed to be made. “In fact I can safely say that there is no chance of President
taking any strong line against our policy and views,” Churchill wrote Eden. “To make absolutely
sure, I have read it over to the President, who concurs.”47
Once again Churchill had succeeded in reining in both the Foreign Office and MEW,
along with Roosevelt. There would be no relief large scale relief programs for the fall of 1943.
In mid-June, Hull grudgingly acknowledged to Halifax that he had been instructed by Roosevelt
to consider Britain as having “primary responsibility” for deciding relief.48 Britain could reject
requests for relief on behalf of both governments.49 While disappointed in the turn of events,
Lehman turned his attentions to delivering supplies to liberated areas. OFRRO delivered relief to
Allied-controlled North Africa, provided relief to refugees in Spain, and took over managing
refugee camps in North Africa. He also worked with Dean Acheson to lay plans for the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which came into being in November 1943.50
Go Ahead Mr. President, Put It Through
Although Roosevelt did not think that American public opinion was a concern, a new
powerful relief campaign began to percolate in the spring of 1943, producing the last significant
battle over relief for of the war. This time, the driving force was not Hoover, but Howard
Kershner, the administrator of the Quaker’s relief program in Vichy. In late April 1943, spurred
on by a letter from Kershner, the New York Times endorsed an experimental feeding program for
children and pregnant and nursing mothers. “There are few enough democratic people in the
47 Telegram (WT238/81/43), Churchill to Eden, 21 May 1943; Note, Hall to Halifax, 24 May 1943. TNA/PRO, FOl 15/3953.
48 Telegram 2734, Halifax to FO, 14 June 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1215.
49 Telegram 2783, Washington to FO, 17 June 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1215.
50 Nevins, 232-235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 424
world at best,” wrote Kershner. “How can we hope to bring about a satisfactory post-war
reconstruction if the democratic, freedom-loving people are decimated by starvation, while the
totalitarians are well fed? We will win the peace, but we shall lose the people if we allow these
people to die.” Kershner called for the establishment of relief programs in Belgium, France,
Norway, the Netherlands, and Poland, which would require 30,000 tons of grain and 21,000 tons
of fat, meat, and milk each month.51 Endorsements of Kershner and his organization, the
Temporary Council on Food for Europe’s Children, quickly followed from Hoover and the
Federal Council on Churches.52 In June,Washington Post also lent its support, arguing that
Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands would forgive the Allies for bombing their cities to oust
the Germans, but they would not forgive the Allies for letting them starve.53 That same month,
James Wood Johnson, philantrophist and cofounder of Johnson & Johnson, launched the Help the
Children Committee, an organization committed to providing relief to children. Johnson believed
that hunger in the occupied territories posed a threat to the family structure.54
Congress got into the act as well. At the beginning of May 1943, Hamilton Fish (R-NY)
submitted a resolution to the House of Representatives to calling for the extension of the Greek
relief program to other occupied territories.55 Senator Guy Gillette (D-IA) followed suit in June,
introducing a similar resolution to the Senate. Rumors circulated Washington that Gillette
intended to hold hearings in the fall and would call Hoover to testify.56
51 Letter to the Editor by Howard Kershner,NYT, 20 April 1943. “Europe’s Starving Children,”NYT, 20 April 1943.
52 “Feed Europe’s Children War Expert Pleads,”LAT, 25 June 1943.
53 “Feed the Children,” Washington Post, 7 June 1943.
54 Letter, Johnson to Kuppinger, 14 June 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 12.
55 H.Res.221, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 3 May 1943.
56 Letter, Hall to Selbome, 21 June 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1215.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 425
Britain had its own problems. The Famine Relief Committee continued to gather support,
with more than 110 chapters operating across the United Kingdom by August 1943. The chapters
hosted informational meetings, often sponsored by mayors or members of parliament and
featuring representatives of the exile governments. The meetings not only drummed up more
support, but also passed resolutions that kept the committee in the press. The committee had also
been endorsed by a vast array of organizations, including the British Council of Churches,
Executive Committee of the War Organization of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of
St. John, with which were associated the National Red Cross Societies of Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa, and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Rejecting
MEW ’s claims that conditions in the occupied territories did not approach famine conditions, the
committee set up a Medical Council to study the statistics and make recommendations. People
were also willing to pay to learn about relief. The committee sold more than 105,000 pamphlets
and leaflets about the relief issue.57 A letter to the editor published by the Manchester Guardian
in October 1943, led to the paper endorsing the committee’s work and plans for relief. “The great
danger of the Government’s policy is that it concentrates too exclusively on the immediate
present and loses sight of the larger future,” wrote Bell and Murray.58 The committee’s campaign
led to the Foreign Office and MEW having to field questions about the government’s relief policy
in Parliament.59
57 Famine Relief Committee, “A Year’s Work: An account of efforts to obtain permission for controlled relief and limited food relief in German-occupied territories, August 1943. Lambeth Place Archives, George Bell Papers, vol 59. Letter, Pye to Kershner, 2 September 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1215. Notice of public meeting and resolution in Walthamstow, 7 October 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36517.
58 Letter to Editor, “Food for Occupied Countries” by Bell, Myers, Murray, and Lytton, 23 October 1943. “Relief for Europe” editorial, Manchester Guardian, 23 October 1943.
59 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 26 October 1943, Col. 114-115. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 27 October 1943, Col. 158.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 426
At the beginning of November 1943, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on the relief issue with Hoover and Kershner as the star attractions.60 Arguing that the
war was in its last stages, Hoover implored that relief would an “enoromous moral contribution”
to the fight, paving the way for a warm reception of Allied troops as they liberated Europe. “The
only difference between this war and the last,” said Hoover, “is that then we had the sympathetic
attitudes of the Governments; we have not got that now.”61 Kershner pitched his program for
child relief and took the British to task for blocking previous and current efforts. “We love
Britain,” said Kershner, “but we simply cannot longer tolerate being forced into a cruel and bad
diplomacy that will leave us with few friends in the future, after having sacrificed our long record
of always being ready to go to the help of the needy.” If the Germans were the only ones healthy
enough to reconstruct Europe after the war, Britain would bear the responsibility. He also
publicly challenged Roosevelt. “May we all say to our Chief, Go ahead, Mr. President, put it
through. You fellow citizens expect it and will back you to the limit.”62 The committee also
called Johnson and Maurice Pate, who had worked for Hoover’s National Committee on Food for
Small Democracies.63
In response to the hearings, Foot announced in the House of Commons that Britain had
no intention of changing its policy, a declaration that made it into American newspapers.64 The
Foreign Office and MEW feared that the Roosevelt administration might decide to sell out
60 Before the hearings, Robert Taft (R-OH), one of the sponsors of the resolution made his position clear: “We have the wheat and the Swedes have the ships.” “Calls Hoover on Relief,”New York Times, 1 October 1943. “Senators Ask Hoover’s Ideas on War Relief,Chicago Daily Tribune, 7 October 1943. Before the hearings, Robert Taft (R-OH), one of the sponsors of the resolution made his position clear: “We have the wheat and the Swedes have the ships.”
61 “Hoover Urges Aid to Hungry Europe,” NYT, 5 November 1943.
62 “Says British Block Food to Starving,”NYT, 12 November 1943. Address by Howard Kershner before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 11 November 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 12.
63 Statement of Maurice Pate before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 12.
64 “Plea to Feed Europe Rejected by British,”NYT, 11 November 1943.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 427
Britain, especially given the anti-British tone of the committee hearings and the daily attacks on
the blockade by the press. The Roosevelt administration, however, seemed content to weather the
hearings. But when asked about the hearings at a press conference, Roosevelt told reporters that
while American hearts were the right place, it was a question of ways and means.65 The State
Department also did not regard pressure as excessive. It rejected a British suggestion to publicize
the shortage of milk and other goods being touted for relief operations.66
Sensing that policy might be changing, the exile governments of Poland, Belgium, and
France all made new pitches for milk and vitamin programs for children and pregnant and nursing
mothers during December 1943. Belgium even claimed that it was experiencing a famine.67
The Famine Relief Committee used the increased attention being given the relief issue to
promote its plan for Belgium, which its experts believed was on the verge of famine. “It is pretty
ghastly,” Pye wrote Kershner, “the situation that our Government cannot be brought to see the
need for immediate help.” 68 At the beginning of January 1944, the committee sent a deputation
to meet with MEW. “Statistics are cold things,” Bishop of Wakefield told MEW officials, “but if
one uses a little imagination and tries to picture the sufferings of these young people, mothers and
children, then there is no doubt about the strength of the humanitarian appeal.” While the
committee understood the practical difficulties, its program was quite modest and would make a
65 “Roosevelt Seen in Favor of Relief Plan,”Washington Post, 6 November 1943, p. 3. “Roosevelt Cool to Program of Feeding Europe,”Chicago Daily Tribune, 6 November 1943. Minute by Long, 8 November 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 12.
66 Telegram 4129 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 17 November 1943; Telegram 34762 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 24 November 1943; Minute by Camps, 26 November 1943; Telegram 3334 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 6 November 1943; Telegram 3392 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 13 November 1943. TNA/PRO, F0837/1215.
67 Letter (W 16928/4/49), Polish Ambassador to Eden, 2 December 1943. TNA/PRO, F 0371/36518. Letter, Hoppenot to Stettinius, 4 December 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. Memo, French Committee ofNational Liberation to Macmillan, 8 December 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36518. Letter, Cammaerts to Eden, 20 December 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/42367. Telegram 38, Hull to Winant, 8 January 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
68 Letter, Pye to Kersher, 15 November 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36518.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 428
substantial difference in the lives of Belgians. As before, Selbome agreed with the committee
that a Christian moral imperative to help existed, but the British government also had an
obligation to fight the war in a manner that would bring a quick victory. “We have no more
desire to starve babies than you do,” Selbome told them. He also urged them to be careful with
their facts. Conditions in Poland were much worse than Belgium.69
The hearings had also served as a springboard for Howard Kershner. While he had
campaigned for relief since the summer of 1943 through speeches, radio addresses, and
publication of his book, One Humanity: A Plea for Our Friends and Allies in Europe, his
congressional testimony turned him into a relief superstar.70 Kershner came to his
humanitarianism through his Quaker background, but his plan attracted support from a wide array
of religious groups. All of the major Protestant religious groups, along with the Catholic bishops,
endorsed his plan. Isolationists and anti-Roosevelt forces also backed him as a way to criticize
the Roosevelt administration. Support also came from Robert LaFollette’s Progressive Party,
which believed that the villainous British had duped the Americans.71
Kershner kept the issue and his profile high by using the press. During the final week of
January 1944, full page ads advocating relief and touting the work of his Temporary Council on
Food for Europe’ Children appeared in the Washington Post, New York Herald Tribune, and the
Philadelphia Inquirer, with placement in smaller dailies as well. “Back the Commander-in-
Chief—back the unanimous decision of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate— Feed
the Children,” proclaimed the ad. The fact that the ad implied that the White House supported
69 Minutes from Deputation of the Famine Relief Committee received by Selbome and MEW, 3 January 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42367.
70 Howard Kershner,One Humanity: A Plea for Our Friends and Allies in Europe (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1943). The book was also published in England in early 1944. Kershner also published a pamphlet, “How to save the starving children of Europe without aiding the enemy” (New York: National Committee on Food for Small Democracies, 1943). Memcon, Hickerson and Kershner, 1 December 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
71 Letter (W 1152/33/75), Halifax to Eden, 16 January 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1216.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 429
Kershner did not sit well with the Roosevelt administration, particularly when the ads resulted in
the State Department and the White House being deluged with mail.72
Kershner also attempted to woo the exile governments into supporting his plan, but he
had better luck with the State Department.73 Long, who was back in charge of the relief issue,
found Kershner’s constant badgering tiresome. He told Kershner that he had a plan, then he
should submit it so that it could be studied.74 In mid-January 1944, Kershner did precisely that,
submitting a plan, “Strategy of Child Feeding in Nazi-Dominated Europe,” which called for
sending a minimum of 30,000 tons of grain, 9,000 tons of fat, 6,000 tons of milk, 6,000 tons of
meat per month to feed ten million children. The program would be limited to Norway, Belgium,
Holland, and France,with the food coming from South America and paid for by the exile
governments.75 Kershner also claimed that he had personally spoken with the owners of the idle
Swedish ships and they assured him that they could be used for relief. He believed that his plan
solved all of the technical details— the ships, the ports, and the distribution. It was now just a
question of wanting to help and standing up to Britain. “I know there is “will” in the State
Department to do it,” he told Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, “but in other quarters
here, and especially in London, the “will” is lacking and these technical matters are used as an
72 Brief report on the activities of the Temporary Council on Food for Europe’s Children, 25 January 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
73 Memo, Long to Hull, 13 January 1944; Memcon, Long and Norwegian Ambassador, 24 January 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
74 Letter, Kershner to Hull, 23 December 1943. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 12. Memcon, Raynor and Kershner, 13 January 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
75 Kershner did not believe that relief programs were possible in Poland or Czechoslovakia given conditions and location. The plan would provide a supplementary daily ration for ten million children and nursing and expectant mothers of 100 grams dried vegetables, 30 grams fats, 20 grams meat, and 20 grams milk. Food would be divided among the countries in the following way: Norway (6%), Belgium (20%), Holland (18%), and France (56%). The percentages were adjusted to address industrialization and urban populations. Letter, Kershner to Long, 20 January 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 430
excuse.» 7 6
A Gallup Poll taken in February 1944 indicated that American public opinion was behind
Kershner. Gallup asked “Should the United States send food by neutral Swedish ships to the
children of France, Belgium, Flolland, and other countries now occupied by German troops?”
Sixty-five percent of those polled answered “yes,” twenty-two percent answered “no,” and
thirteen percent had “no opinion.” The poll revealed a sharp change in attitudes toward relief,
since the last poll taken in September 1940. In that poll, a substantial majority opposed to
sending any food, with their chief objection being concern that either the children would not
receive it or German troops would receive it. In February 1944, those in favor of sending relief
emphasized the humanitarian reasons first, arguing that everything possible should be done to
help the children even with the risks involved. Many respondents also urged that an experimental
shipment be tried to see if the Germans would seize the food.77
The British found arguments used by Kershner and other relief advocates difficult to
combat. Relief advocates argued that with the Allied armies preparing for an assault on Europe,
the blockade was no longer a primary instrument of war. (It was not a secret that the Allies
intended to invade Western Europe in 1944— it was merely a question of when and where.) No
burden would be placed on the United States to provide relief, because the exile governments
would provide the money, Sweden would provide the ships, and South America would provide
the food. Britain could refute the specifics of the plan—-the exile governments were out of
money, Germany had to give permission to release the Swedish ships and allow relief, and the
food from South America wasn’t suitable for young children— but nitpicking lacked rhetorical
power. Relief proponents also continued to promote the idea that American officials supported
76 Letter, Kersherto Stettinius, 9 February 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
77 The vote by sex was: Women: 67% said “yes,” 18% said “no,” and 15% had “no opinion.” Men: 62% said “yes,” 26% said “no,” and 12% had “no opinion.” Gallup press release, “Sending Food to Children in German-Occupied Areas via Neutral Ships Favored in Poll,” 12 February 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 431
relief and “only the stubbornness of leaders of British Government stands in the way.” The
British Embassy began suggesting that American groups interested in supporting Kershner should
pour their efforts into post-war relief. Interestingly enough, the relief proponents were
noticeably lukewarm in their support of UNRRA, which led some more cynical observers to
suspect that Hoover believed the current relief campaign represented his last opportunity to get to
Europe before Lehman.78
To take some of the pressure off, MEW weighed the possibility of publicizing that
synthetic vitamin D had been moved to the medicine category, which would allow it to pass
freely through the blockade. Since the beginning of the war, vitamins had been classified as food,
which made them conditional contraband and subject to blockade controls. In the summer of
1943, synthetic vitamin D was reclassified, because it could be an important prophylaxis against
rickets in children and osteoporosis in adults. Germany also had ample stocks of it. Natural
vitamin D, however, remained in short supply. (It came from fish oil or a concentrate of oils,
which also included vitamin A.)79 MEW hesitated to promote the vitamin D concession, because
it feared trying to explain the complicated process of classifying vitamins. Before it could raise
the issue with the Americans, word came in mid-February that the supply of synthetic vitamin D
in the United States was tight due to high American consumption.80 “It would therefore seem a
reasonable challenge to ‘Humanitarians’ here,” wrote Halifax, “that they should supply occupied
78 Telegram 30 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 7 January 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1216.
79 Letter (W9669/4/49), Troutbeck to Le Rougetel, 30 June 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36514. Letter, Kennedy to Drogheda, 22 July 1943; Telegram 2766 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 2 September 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36515. Letter, Drogheda to Kennedy, 9 September 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36516. Telegram 3503 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 9 September 1943. TNA/PRO, F0371/36515. Telegram 30 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 7 January 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1216.
80 Memo by Camps, 10 January 1944; Telegram 68 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 12 January 1944; Telegram 112, Washington to MEW, 17 January 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1216.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 432
countries at some self-sacrifice to themselves.” When broached with the possibility of
publicizing the shortage, the State Department again rejected the idea.81
On 15 February 1944, the Senate passed Resolution 100 in which it expressed its
conviction that “immediate steps” be taken to extend relief and “thereby prevent this impending
tragedy of mass starvation.” The resolution called on the State Department to work out in
cooperation with Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden “the setting up of systematic and definite
relief for all stricken and hungry countries where the need is now the most acute.” Relief was to
be delivered with rigid safeguards and done in a manner as to not provide a military advantage to
occupying forces.82 When pressed about the resolution by the press, Under Secretary of State
Edward Stettinius observed that the decision to send relief was a military matter.83
Although the State Department and the White House publicly supported the existing
relief policy, they recognized that Kershner’s campaign and Congressional support presented
them with an opportunity. They also understood that public opinion— or a Senate resolution—
would not be enough to sway Britain, promoting them to tackle the relief issue on military
grounds. At the end of January 1944, Hull requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the
possibility of providing relief to children in Belgium, northern France, and Norway. Hull
believed that if the military leadership did not regard a relief program as detrimental to military
operations, then Britain could not object.84 Roosevelt also had a talk with William Leahy, the
head of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the issue.85 Leahy returned a response at the
81 Telegram 311 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 12 February 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1216.
82 Senate Resolution 100, 78th Congress, 2nd session, 15 February 1944.
83 Department of State Press and Radio News Conference, No. 21,16 February 1944; Letter, Crowley to Stettinius, 18 February 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
84 Letter, Hull to Roosevelt, 26 January 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13. Letter, Hull to Leahy, 27 January 1944. FDRL, PSF, Confidential File, State Dept., 1944-45, Box 9.
85 Memo, FDR to Leahy, 7 February 1944. FDRL, PSF, Confidential File, State Dept., 1944-45, Box 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 433
end of February. While they were aware of the “humanitarian aspects of the problem,” the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommended that no change be made to the current blockade policy. “It is the
view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the blockade has been and is an effective military'
instrument,” Leahy wrote Hull. There was, however, a caveat. If relief could be provided in such
a way that it provided no assistance to the enemy and its transportation would not deter the Allied
war effort, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not oppose it on military grounds.86
In mid-March 1944, the Americans put a proposal before the British to permit limited
shipments of food for children and nursing and expectant mothers in Belgium, France, the
Netherlands, and Norway. For the plan to go forward, Germany had to agree to maintain rations
and allow the program to be overseen by a neutral organization. If Britain agreed, then Sweden
would be approached about negotiating with the Germans. Hull acknowledged that the
conditions were drawn in such a manner to promote speedy acceptance by the Germans. “The
President is fully in accord with this proposal,” Hull told W inant.87 Roosevelt followed up with
a telegram to Churchill about the plan. “I bespeak your most earnest consideration of this
proposal,” he told Churchill. “I am convinced that the time has arrived when the continued
withholding of food from these categories of the populations of the occupied countries is likely to
hurt our friends more than our enemies and consequently to be injurious to the United Nations
cause.« 88
The proposal did not come as a surprise to the Foreign Office or MEW, who considered a
86 Letter, Leahy to Hull, 28 February 1944.FRUS, 1944, Vol. II, 254-5.
87 Telegram A-411, Hull to Winant, 16 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Letter, Stone to Berle, 14 March 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. Letter, Berle to Stone, 21 March 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
88 Telegram R-501, 15 March 1944. Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt, vol. Ill, 47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 434
new American overture inevitable.89 “The United States Government have repeatedly pledged
themselves not to change their blockade policy without prior consultation with us,” observed E.E.
Crowe, who now had charge of relief for the Foreign Office. “They would doubtless contend that
in their present approach they are fulfilling that pledge. A pistol held at our head in this manner
cannot, however, be held to fulfill the spirit of the pledge.” 90 They were also disappointed, but
not surprised by, the lack of specifics in the plan. Would milk be given in schools? Would there
be soup kitchens? Would they be giving out bread? How would they deal with the transportation
issues caused by the upcoming Allied invasion of northern France? The details mattered. Britain
would not agree to a plan without information about how it would work.91 Given the current
political climate and the sloppiness of the proposal, the Foreign Office and MEW could not
decide whether the Americans were serious about starting a relief program or simply attempting
to provoke a German refusal. “Can we count on rational discussion being welcomed, or do you
foresee an attempt to rush us?” MEW asked Washington.92 The answer from Washington was
“yes,” the Americans were serious— they genuinely wanted to start relief shipments. As for the
rational part, only time would tell.93
Britain needed time to study the proposal, prompting the Foreign Office to warn the State
Department that any publicity about the proposal would be detrimental. MEW and Foreign
Office officials feared that in the run up to the House of Representatives debate on relief,
scheduled for the beginning of April, State Department officials might be tempted to say more
89 Telegram 517 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 10 March 1944; Letter (WT399), Thorold to Foot, 17 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
90 Minute (W4962/33/75) by Crowe and Sargent, 31 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F 0371/42368.
91 Note, Selbome to Drogheda, 17 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Minute (W4931/33/75) by Crowe, 30 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42368.
92 Telegram 665 ARFAR, MEW to Washington, 22 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
93 Telegram 658 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 28 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 435
than they should.94 The State Department, however, tried to calm British anxieties, offering
assurances that information about the discussions would not leak. “In light of recent experience
however we can only keep our fingers crossed,” observed Halifax. State decided not to share
news of the proposal with the chairman of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees and
even attempted to quell the relief agitation while Britain considered the proposal.95 Britain caught
a break on timing, when the debate was rescheduled for after Easter.96
The Foreign Office and MEW decided that the sooner the Cabinet considered the
American proposal, the better. At the end of March, Selbome submitted a paper outlining the
scheme. In addition to the four countries proposed by the Americans— Belgium, France, the
Netherlands, and Norway— MEW added Poland to the list. MEW officials did not believe that
these countries could be provided with relief, while ignoring Poland, where conditions were
substantially worse. The proposed relief program would aid 7.5 million people and require
20,000 tons of dried milk and vitamins per month. Milk remained scarce, but some vitamins
were available. Aside from the supply issues, Selbome believed that Operation OVERLORD, the
impending invasion of western Europe, wou ld make distribution difficult. Despite passionately
championing similar programs before, he now argued against relief, believing that “the present
moment seems to be a singularly unfavorable one.” In addition to military concerns, he laid out
four reasons. First, it was a psychological mistake to embark upon a relief program with no
expectation of increasing its scope in the near future and with considerable doubt as to whether it
could be carried out. “It would be a great blunder to arouse expectations which we could not
hope to fulfill,” wrote Selbome. “This indeed might prove a political boomerang.” Second,
94 Telegram 2692, Eden to Halifax, 30 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42368. Telegram 1686 ARFAR, Washington to FO, 3 April 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Telegram 2546, Winant to Hull, 29 March 1944; Memo, JHK to Long, 3 April 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
95 Letter, Keeley to Long, 31 March 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
96 Telegram 1686 ARFAR, Washington to FO, 3 April 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 436
impending military events would temporarily depress the standard of living in the occupied
countries more than any relief program could raise it. Third, it would take four months to put the
program into operation, which would coincide with the harvest. Finally, it might backfire on the
Allies. “To agree to allow relief through the blockade at this eleventh hour before the battle for
the liberation of Western Europe begins might well be regarded by those awaiting freedom, either
with misgiving as to our military intentions, or with resentment as a meaningless gesture which
will cost us nothing since liberation will precede relief and because distribution will be
impossible whilst operations last.”
Selbome also urged that the Russians be consulted— not just notified— about the
program. Not doing so would give the Russians grounds for complaint, particularly given the
possible impact of the American relief program on operations in the western theater. He also
recommended that Britain offer to discuss the proposal with the United States rather than return
an outright rejection. Roosevelt supported the plan, which made summarily dismissing it
politically sticky. The plan also required further amplification, since the Americans had not
provided many details or given sufficient thought to distribution arrangements.97
The Cabinet did not need much convincing to reject the American proposal and did so on
3 April 1944.98 Following the Cabinet’s instructions, Selborne delivered Britain’s refusal to the
American Embassy in London, emphasizing the military considerations:
If we went to the Germans and offered to send food into Europe under conditions, and if they accepted the conditions, we would then be obliged to organise the entry of the food. This would involve not only the granting of safe conduct for ships to sail to designated ports within the operational zones, but also the preservation of routes of inland transport from those ports to the countries in which the food is to be distributed. No promise could possibly be given to keep any ports or the routes to them open, or to keep intact any railways between now
97 W.P. (44)177, Relief for Occupied Europe: Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare, 30 March 1944; Note by Selbome, 20 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Letter, Selbome to Eden, 27 March 1944. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/9.
98 War Cabinet Conclusions, W.M, (44)43rd, 3 April 1944. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 437
and the end of this year; and if it were possible to make such a promise, we should by making it give the Germans valuable information as to our military intentions.
He also noted that Britain did not believe that it would be possible to devise a scheme that would
work under the existing rationing systems. Furthermore, the occupied countries were looking
forward to liberation, not relief."
Churchill also tackled Roosevelt. While expressing a shared desire to do everything
possible to help people in the occupied countries, Churchill observed that it had to be done in a
manner that did not impair the war effort. “The whole question seems to me to be governed by
the impending military operations for the invasion of Europe,” wrote Churchill. He argued that
undertaking a major relief program would “inevitably hamper” the execution of OVERLORD and
trusted that Roosevelt felt the same way.100 Roosevelt responded immediately, offering his
“complete agreement.”101
While Britain and the United States had agreed not to implement a relief program before
OVERLORD, there were still two months to go until D-Day.102 In the United States, pressure to
deliver relief did not let up. After a boisterous debate, the House of Representatives unanimously
passed a resolution in favor of relief on 17 April 1944.103 Congressional leaders increased the
pressure on the State Department to take action.104 Kershner continued his campaign as well,
lobbying the State Department and the White House— and even Halifax.105 While the State
99 Letter (W5476/33/75), Selbome to Riefler, 6 April 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42369.
100 Telegram C-641, Churchill to Roosevelt, 8 April 1944. Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt, vol. Ill, 85.
101 Telegram R-519, Roosevelt to Churchill, 8 April 1944. Kimball,Churchill and Roosevelt, vol. Ill, 86.
102 Letter, Kershner to Berle, 28 March 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
103 H.Res.221, 78th Congress, 2d Session, 17 April 1944.
104 Letter, Fish to Hull, 19 April 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 438
Department claimed that they did not tell Kershner about the American plan, Halifax suspected
otherwise. In May, Life published “Europe’s Children are Hungry,” an article about Kershner’s
plan accompanied by the type of poignant pictures that made the magazine famous, while
Colliers came out in favor sending relief.106 Kershner’s plan also got an airing in the House of
Lords at the end May.107 Some inventive relief advocates urged Americans to make a food
parcel and send it to “Starving Children of Europe c/o Winston Churchill, 10 Downing Street,
London, England.” (They were also urged to send them to Roosevelt and Halifax.). An irritated
Churchill demanded American customs authorities to stop the packages.108
Kershner also began making plans for a mass meeting at Cargenie Hall on 11 June 1944.
The British Embassy dreaded the meeting, fearing that it would devolve into a big anti-British
tirade. The meeting was to feature speeches by Hoover, Senators Robert Wagner, Guy Gillette,
and Francis Maloney, Under Secretary of Commerce Wayne Chatfield Taylor, Congresswoman
Winifred Stanley, and AFL President William Green. Prominent religious leaders, including
Norman Reverend Vincent Peale, Reverend Francis McQuade, S.J., Dr. Samuel Goldenson,
would endorse and second a resolution in favor of relief at the meeting. Kershner also urged his
supporters across the country to organize similar rallies in their communities.109
105 Note, Keeley to Morin, 11 April 1944; Letter, Kershner to Roosevelt, 22 April 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13. Telegram 1758, Halifax to FO, 9 April 1944; Telegram 2408, Washington to FO, 8 May 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
106 “Europe’s Children are Hungry,”Life, 8 May 1944. “Food for Occupied Europe,”C olliers, 13 May 1944.
107 Excerpt from debate on Kershner scheme in House of Lords, 23 May 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42371.
108 Letter, Taylor to Kuppinger, 29 May 1944. Memcon, McCahon and Weber, 31 May 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. U.S. Postal Service is reluctant to stop the parcels from going to England.
109 Letter, Kershner to supporters, 26 May 1944; Letter, Berle to Kershner, 14 April 1944; Letter, Kershner to Stettinius, 28 May 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 439
Although the president had agreed to no relief, the State Department continued to push
the relief issue. Until the invasion was judged a success, there was no reason to give up.110 Eden
found it odd that the United States insisted on pushing the relief issue, while the exile
governments were content to wait for liberation.111 The State Department, which needed to
demonstrate its responsiveness to Congress, pushed again. Would Britain agree to approach the
Swiss government about providing relief? The discussions would not result in a program being
implemented before OVERLORD, but their conduct would assuage relief critics. Again, Eden
refused. With Churchill’s consent, Eden offered up Britain as a sacrificial lamb. If need be the
State Department could tell congressional leaders that Britain declined to support relief for
“operational and security reasons.”112
Halifax, however, strongly counseled against this strategy, believing it would only
confirm the widespread suspicion that Britain prevented the United States from doing the right
thing. “This feeling is not confined to a few Congressmen or trouble makers,” he told Eden. “It
is constantly touched by a number of responsible newspapers and journals and is endorsed by all
Churches whom we are so anxious to influence in matters of peace with Germany.” Instead,
Halifax recommended that both governments emphasize that relief programs were not being
implemented on the advice of military authorities. Doing so would diffuse anti-British sentiment
and charges that Roosevelt administration caved into Britain.113 The problem with this
110 Memo, Keeley to Berle, 15 April 1944; Memo, Keeley to Berle, 27 April 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. Letter, Gillette and Taft to Hull, 7 April 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. Telegram 3194, Hull to Stettinius, 21 April 1944. FRUS, 1944, vol. II, 260-261.
111 Minute from meeting between Eden, Cadogan, Winant, and Stettinius, 25 April 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42369. Memcon, Camps and Kohler, 27 April 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Telegram 3387, Stettinius to Hull, 25 April 1944. FRUS, 1944, vol. II, 261.
112 Letter (PM/44/289), Eden to Churchill, 27 April 1944. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/9. Telegram 3804, FO to Washington, 2 May 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
113 Telegram 2398, Halifax to Eden, 7 May 1944; Telegram 4600, Eden to Halifax, 24 May 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 440
suggestion was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the supreme military command for the Allies,
had yet to study issue, only the Americans had.114
During a meeting with Stettinius, Kershner suggested that space for food might be
available on International Red Cross ships carrying POW parcels to Marseilles. Stettinius jumped
on the idea, since it would be an easy way to deliver food to France for a child feeding program.
Initial inquiries suggested that between 1,000 and 2,000 tons of food could be sent each month for
the next three months. The food could be distributed to children in southern France by a
reconstituted Secours Quaker, Kershner’s relief organization.115 In late May, Stettinius pitched
the idea to Halifax and Campbell, who found the idea intriguing. In addition to solving some of
the operational issues, Stettinius also believed that the plan would go along way to satisfying
American public opinion. Halifax urged London to give the plan favorable consideration,
particularly given the small amounts involved.116 MEW and the Foreign Office were initially
impressed with the idea as well, but the plan died following the successful invasion of northern
France in June 1944.117 Cargo space on the POW ships was not available until September and by
then France was in Allied hands, making assistance to the French people the job of UNRRA.
In the wake of D-Day, Kershner postponed his planned rally until the situation in Europe
clarified. If after a few weeks, it became evident that liberation and the relief provided by
UNRRA was not coming rapidly enough, then he pledged to renew the campaign “with increased
114 Letter (W7276/4450/G), Cadogan to Hollis, 13 May 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42369.
115 Memcon, Stettinius and Kershner, 18 May 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
116 Note, Stettinius to Berle, 24 May 1944; Telegram 4257, Hull to Winant and Riefler, 27 May 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. Telegram 2779, Halifax to Eden, 26 May 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
117 Letter, Winant to Selbome, 5 June 1944; Letter, Drogheda to Selbome, 7 June 1944; Letter, Selbome to Winant, 7 June 1944; Telegram 1148 ARFAR, Foot to Drogheda, 8 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Memcon, Stettinius, Foot, Thorold, Raynor, 8 June 1944.FRUS, 1944, vol. II, p. 263-4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 441
• 118 vigor.” “However, in the unfortunate event that the Nazis continue to occupy important areas
of Europe toward the end of the Summer,” he told his supporters, “we shall renew our insistent
demand that food be assured to these children. They cannot wait for long.”119
Throughout the summer of 1944, the State Department continued to push the relief issue.
The relief question went before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review in July, but it did not return
the answer the State Department wanted. The staff believed that Germany’s position had
deteriorated to such an extent that it “undoubtedly has destroyed their last remaining scruples as
regards diversion of relief supplies” Allied military demands for shipping also continued to
exceed Allied capabilities. “In view of this situation,” wrote George Marshall, “there seems
small prospect of finding a satisfactory and practicable means of solving this problem, desirable
as it would be to do so, on humanitarian and political grounds.”120
At the beginning of July 1944, Hull proposed that a special committee be established to
study the feasibility of providing relief. “Public opinion in the United States will not remain
satisfied with vague statements that military considerations preclude relief operations in all areas
under German domination (except Greece),” Hull wrote Winant. “Public opinion demands that an
attempt be made.” In the face of continued American demands and a joint overture by the exile
governments, Eden again took the relief issue before the Cabinet in mid-August 1943. “The
military situation is so satisfactory that it appears probable that we should never be called upon to
give effect to any scheme,” wrote Eden. “On the other hand, the fact that we and the Americans
had set up a committee to examine this question would go a long way to satisfy the humanitarians
118 Letter, Kershner to Stettinius, 9 June 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
119 Letter, Kershner to supporters, 8 June 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
120 Letter, Marshall to Hull, 26 July 1944.FRUS, 1944, vol. II, 279-80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 442
in both countries, and it is indeed all that Mr. Hull now asks us to do.”121 This time the Cabinet
agreed to the committee.122
The committee, which consisted of officials from MEW and the American Embassy,
drafted a set of recommendations which they offered at the beginning of October 1944. With the
Allies rolling through western Europe, the relief plans focused on Norway and Poland, which had
yet to be liberated. The committee recommended allowing Sweden to have additional imports to
compensate for providing relief to Norway. Relief supplies were also going to be allowed
through the blockade for distribution by D itleff s committee. As for Poland, the United States
and Britain were willing to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to distribute food
in select cities through schools, canteens, and other community centers. Food parcels could be
distributed in other areas.123 The proposals were endorsed by the Cabinet and British military
officials, who believed that the risks of any seized relief aiding the Germans were minimal.124 At
the beginning of November 1944, relief began trickling into Norway and Poland.
Relief and the Holocaust
As knowledge of Nazi Germany’s plans for exterminating the Jews became known, the
relief issue became entwined with the Allied response to the Holocaust. As with the relief issue,
public outcry to aid the Jews developed. Unlike with the relief issue, the Roosevelt
administration decided to act unilaterally and take steps to facilitate the rescue and relief of Jews.
121 Memo (WP(44)446), “Relief of Occupied Europe,” by Eden, 14 August 1944. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/9.
122 Extract from W.M. (44)109th Conclusions, 21 August 1944. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/9. Telegram 7886, FO to Washington, 5 September 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
123 Letter (W 14231/33/75), Wrightson to Law, 2 October 1944; Minute (W 14851/33/75) by Hayter, 7 October 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42373.
124 Memo W.P. (44)568 by Richard Law, 11 October 1944; War Cabinet Conclusions W.M.(44)137, 16 October 1944. TNA/PRO, PREM3/74/9. Note by Secretary (COS (44)212), “Relief for Occupied Europe,” 18 October 1944; COS Meeting (COS(44)212), 20 October 1944; COS Meeting (COS(44)354), “Relief for Occupied Europe,” 31 October 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42374.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 443
Publicity of the Holocaust and lobbying by private organizations for a response swelled
as knowledge about the Holocaust became available. While information about the fate of Jews
spurred calls to action, no unified campaign for Allied intervention emerged from within either
the British or American Jewish communities. Prior to November 1942, various Jewish groups
lobbied the Allies to expand or eliminate the immigration quotas that prevented Jews from
leaving Europe. Some Jewish groups also called on Britain to open Palestine to Jewish
immigration, an act Britain and the United States feared would provoke an Arab uprising and
destabilize the Middle East. While united in concern for European Jews, disagreements within
both the British and American Jewish communities over the Zionist movement made it
impossible for them to present a united front when lobbying the Allies. And because of the
Zionist movement’s activism, government officials frequently found it difficult to untangle
appeals made for Allied intervention to stop the Holocaust and appeals for the creation of a
Jewish state in Palestine. Unfortunately, the intimate link between the two issues provided Allied
officials with a formidable set of political and military reasons to discount Jewish appeals.
Competition between Jewish groups also frequently led one group to sabotage another group’s
efforts to publicize the Holocaust.
While disunity within the Jewish community hampered efforts to provoke the Allies to
action, information and publicity about the Final Solution created public awareness about the
killings and at various times forced Britain and the United States to address the issue. Newspaper
coverage of the German invasion of the Soviet Union included stories about the killing of Jews,
but the stories did not ascribe the killings to a coherent program of murder. Instead, the reports
portrayed the killings as part of a general Nazi program to eliminate all potential cells of
resistance.125 During the fall of 1942, reports from a variety of different sources began to filter to
the West proving a more comprehensive picture of the Final Solution. The information prompted
125 See for exampleThe New York Times from July to December 1941.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 444
Jewish organizations in Britain to step up their lobbying efforts, but proposals for relief were
refused because they would violate the blockade.126 The first major U.S. newspaper account of
the Final Solution appeared on 23 November 1942 in the New York Herald Tribune under the
headline “Wise Says Hitler Has Ordered 4,000,000 Jews Slain in 1942.” The story originated
from Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles informing Stephen Wise of the World Jewish
Congress about the contents of the Riegner telegram, which warned that the Nazis had made the
decision to begin exterminating the Jews. More concentrated press coverage of the Holocaust
appeared following Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s reading of the Allied declaration
condemning Nazi Germany’s “intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe” in the
House of Commons on 17 December 1942. The declaration offered little in the way of concrete
plans for action, except to say that “those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution,
and to press on with the practical measures to this end.”127
In Britain, the declaration was met with wide publicity in both press and radio, but it
seems to have had less of an impact on public opinion in the United States. British Jewish
groups, supported by the press, church groups, and interested members of Parliament, pushed for
Britain to follow up the declaration with concrete action. Ironically, the Foreign Office regarded
the declaration a failure at mitigating German treatment of Jews, while opening up the British
government to criticism about its policies.128 Public demand for action to aid the Jews remained
strong in Britain during 1943.129 Feeling the pressure, Britain moved to open talks on general
refugee problems, resulting in the Bermuda Conference in April 1943. The conference produced
little, if anything, substantial in the way of plans to help European refugees, but gave critics of
125 Breitman, Official Secrets, 140-41.
127 Hansard, House of Commons, 17 December 1942.
128 Wasserstein,Britain and the Jews o f Europe, 1939-45, 159, 163.
129 FO note to Cabinet Committee on Refugees, 18 Feburary 1943, TNA/PRO, CAB 95/15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 445
Allied policy plenty to complain about.130 In May 1943, the Committee for a Jewish Army of
Stateless and Palestinian Jews placed a full-page ad in the New York Times with the headline “To
5,000,000 Jews in The Nazi Death Trap— Bermuda Was a Cruel Mockery.” Unfortunately, the
critical sting of the ad abated when the committee was denounced on the Senate floor for printing
the names of thirty-three senators without their approval.131 Despite the slip-up, American rescue
and relief advocates continued to use confrontational ads and rhetoric to drum up popular support
for intervention, but with lukewarm results. They had to pay for publicity to keep a debate alive,
since the American press was largely disinterested in the issue.132
While disunity among the various Jewish groups played a large role in failing to generate
support for intervention, the idea of creating an U.S. agency specifically charged with aiding Jews
began to draw adversaries together.133 The creation of such an agency finally came in January
1944, when Roosevelt chartered the War Refugee Board. The Board’s creation was not a result
of pressure from the Jewish community, but rather sprang from the bureaucratic battles waged
between the State and Treasury Departments.134 The Treasury Department had grown
increasingly frustrated with State’s refusal to approve the use of blocked funds to pay for the
evacuation or support of European Jews. The creation of the Board, which seemed to disavow
Allied policy on both relief and rescue issues, initially outraged the British. Part of their anger
came from having learned about the Board, not from the United States government, but by
130 UK delegates to Eden, 28 June 1943. TNA/PRO, PREM 4/51/3.
131 US Congress, House, 78th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, 4044-47.
132 Wyman,Abandonment o f the Jews, 152.
133 Wyman,Abandonment o f the Jews, 146.
134 Breitman, O fficial Secrets, 192-201.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 446
reading about it in the Times.u5 The unilateral creation of the board was precisely the type of
action that Britain feared with regard to relief.
Ronald Zweig has argued that March 1944 debate over whether or not to allow a large-
scale relief program stemmed in part from proposals made by ICRC to help the Jews in the wake
of the creation of the War Refugee Board. The issue of aiding the Jews did not factor into that
decision, but the advent of the Board did result in a change in Allied relief policy.136
The Board, headed by John Pehle, was given a mandate of providing “rescue and relief’
of Jews. What the Board meant for relief policy was a renewed focus on the transfer of money to
facilitate purchases of relief supplies and parcels programs. In the first four months of its
existence, the Board, with the help of the Treasury Department, approved the transfer of more
than $2 million to neutral countries to finance rescue and relief operations conducted by private
organizations, including the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, American Friends
Service Committee, American Relief for Nom ay, Belgian War Relief, Polish War Relief, the
Queen Wilhelmina Fund, and the World Jewish Congress. These licenses were far above the
limits set for existing relief programs, which had been capped at $12,000 per month per country
or group.137 While MEW did not oppose the transfers, its officials were irritated that they had not
been consulted. They were also shocked that the Americans, after complaining and opposing
transfers of money for exile government-sponsored programs, had approved the transfer of so
much money in such a short amount of time.138
135 Telegram 644, Foreign Office to Washington, 24 January 1944; Telegram 413, Washington to Foreign Office, 26 January 1944. PRO, F0371/42727.
136 Ronald Zweig, “Feeding the Camps: Allied Blockade Policy and Relief of Concentration Camps in Germany, 1944-1945,”The Historical Journal, vol. 41, no. 3 (1998) 825-851.
137 Telegram 462 ARFAR, Washington to MEW, 1 March 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42727.
138 Telegram 4584, FO to Washington, 23 May 1944. TNA/PRO, FO371/42730. Letter, Pehle to Thorold, 29 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 447
At the beginning of August 1944, MEW learned that the Board had allowed more than
$269,000 to be sent into enemy territory from Switzerland to finance rescue and relief
operations.139 The Board believed that any danger that arose from allowing the Nazis to acquire
“relatively insubstantial” amounts of foreign exchange was outweighed by the prospect of saving
lives. “Experience has shown that the use of money,” wrote the Board, “is in many cases the only
means by which refugees can be assisted to escape or otherwise save their lives, and it is felt that
every effort should be made to see that adequate funds are available for this purpose.”140
MEW, on the other hand, regarded such transfers as less benign and wanted to be
consulted on them.141 The transfer of funds to neutral and enemy territory had been consistently
refused throughout the war on the grounds that they helped Germany acquire much needed
foreign currency. While the objections to allowing transfers had lessened, MEW believed that the
Board had been too liberal in approving licenses. There was still a need for restraint. MEW
worried that the funds might fall into the wrong hands. Intelligence reports suggested that enemy
officials, collaborators, and firms were taking steps to acquire and conceal funds in neutral
countries against the day when they may needed to seek refuge or for future use in restoring their
foreign trade. MEW feared that funds for rescue projects were particularly susceptible to this,
since the rescue projects depended on secrecy and bribery of German and occupation officials.142
139 Letter, Pehle to Thorold, 7 August 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
140 Telegram 3040, WRB, State, FEA to Berne, 2 September 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters, Clearance of Licenses with British, Box 30. Telegram 6512, McClelland to WRB, 30 September 1944; Telegram 3391, State to Bern, 2 October 1944. FDRL, WRB, Relief Projects through Switzerland, Box 38. Letter, Winant to Eden, 11 September 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
141 Letter, Thorold to Foot, 8 August 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
142 Telegram A-1213, Winant to Hull, 6 October 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 448
In September 1944, Britain formally raised the issue with the Americans.143 By
transferring the money to Britain, before sending it on to Switzerland, the Board had
unknowingly stumbled into MEW ’s purview and become entangled with British financial control
laws’44 Britain wanted to be consulted about any future transfers, just as it would be consulted
about any food or clothing being sent through the blockade. It did not make a distinction between
material relief and monetary relief.145 The Board agreed to allow all future licenses be reviewed
by Britain.146
The Board also wanted to send food parcels to concentration camps. Given the course of
the war, Pehle believed that sustaining the concentration camp internees until they could be
liberated by Allied forces was just as important as attempting to rescue them. MEW supported
sending parcels to the camps provided that an ICRC delegate could supervise distribution.147 It
also agreed to increase import quotas for neutral countries to aid ICRC in buying food to make
food parcels and care for Jewish refugees who had made it to neutral safe havens.148 ICRC
143 Telegram 7501, Winant to State, 12 September 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. Telegram 7637, Mann to Pehle, 16 September 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters, Clearance of Licenses with British, Box 30.
144 Telegram 7637, Mann to Pehle, 16 September 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters, Clearance of Licenses with British, Box 30. Minutes of meeting held to consider policy as to food relief for Allied countries occupied by the enemy, 20 September 1944. Agenda and memo for relief meeting prepared by Economic Warfare Division, 18 September 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Telegram 8414, Winant to Hull, 6 October 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
145 Telegram 8414, Winant to Hull, 6 October 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
146 Letter, Homer to Pehle, 12 October 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters, Clearance of Licenses with British, Box 30.
147 Memo, Keeley to Stettinius, 8 June 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13. Telegram 1148 ARFAR, Foot to Drogheda, 8 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Memcon, Stettinius, Foot, Thorold, Raynor, 8 June 1944.FRUS, 1944, vol. II, 263-4.
148 Memcon, Berle, Foot, Thorold, Reifler, Kuppinger, 10 June 1944; Memcon, Berle, Foot, Riefler, Kuppinger, Stone, Thorold, 12 June 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13. Letter (W 11989/33/75), de Watteville to Roberts, 1 August 1944; Telegram 2793 ARFAR, MEW to Berne, 1 September 1944; Telegram 2794 ARFAR, MEW to Beme, 1 September 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42372. Telegram 2835 ARFAR, MEW to Beme, 4 September 1944; Telegram 3557 ARFAR, Beme to MEW, 6 September 1944.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 449
suggested that the Board crate stockpiles of food and clothing parcels in Switzerland and other
neutral countries for eventual distribution to concentration camps. The stockpiles were necessary,
because the food supply in Europe remained tight and a program on the scale envisioned by the
Board required food from outside the blockade.149
By the mid-June 1944, the Board and MEW had agreed a program of 100,000 parcels per
month for three months. It would be impossible to send parcels to all of the camps at once, so in
consultation with ICRC, a few camps would be chosen for a trial run. The British had originally
wanted the program restricted to internment camps in France in order to test its feasibility, but
Pehle pushed hard to allow the parcel program to apply to any internment camp in Europe
selected by ICRC. If the parcel program was a success, then it would be expanded, with the
number of parcels limited only by available shipping and the course of the war. The next batch
would also include clothing.150
While MEW pushed the boundaries of British blockade policy— granting concessions far
beyond anything previously given— the Americans believed that more could and should be
done.151 “I am sure that you will be glad to know that the blockade has at last been broken as to
the feeding of civilians in internment camps in enemy Europe,” Pehle told Morgenthau. “These
developments are indeed significant and very encouraging, but it is hoped that they are only a
TNA/PRO, F0371/42373. Letter (W13064/33/75), Hayter to Wrightson, 20 September 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42372. Letter (W13852/33/75), Wrightson to Hayter, 22 September 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42373.
149 Telegram 279, WRB to Bern, 27 January 1944. War Refugee Board (WRB) History, Document 442. Letter, ICRC to Harrison, 29 February 1944. WRB History, Document 442. Telegram 3181 ARFAR, Beme to MEW, 1 August 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42372. The WRB History is an unpublished history and document collection. Is it available as part o f the War Refugee Board Records at the FDR Library.
150 Letter, Foot to Berle, 13 June 1944. TNA/PRO, FOl 15/4057. Telegram 2197 ARFAR, MEW to Beme, 25 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Telegram 2198 ARFAR, MEW to Beme, 24 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
151 Minutes of meeting, Berle, Foot, Thorold, Riefler, Stone, Pehle, etc., 13 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0371/42371. Telegram 1189 ARFAR, Foot to MEW, 14 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217. Letter, Berle to Foot, 14 June 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters: Food and Clothing Stockpiles in Neutral Countries. Letter, Thorold to Drogheda, 16 June 1944. TNA/PRO, F0837/1217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 450
beginning.”152 Pehle reminded Winfield Riefler, the American liaison with MEW in London, to
that humanitarian considerations trumped blockade concerns. He should do everything possible
to push through quickly any requests for relief.153
The Board, however, encountered a number of roadblocks in distributing the parcels. No
legal means of forcing Germany to allow the distribution of parcels existed. The 1929 Geneva
Convention set the pre-war standard for the treatment of POWs, giving ICRC the right to inquire
about the condition of POWs in Germany's care, make suggestions for improving internment
conditions, and to provide the POWs with food parcels. The convention, however, did not apply
to civilians or civilian internees. Consequently, Germany could ignore requests for information
about Jews and other internees and refuse to allow internees to receive food parcels. Unlike
POWs, who could claim certain legal rights from their captors, civilian internees had no legal
means of redress.154 The political incentives to motivate Germany to allow food parcels into
concentration camps were also minimal. Germany did not recognize any of the exile
governments and, since the exile governments did not have any Germans under their control,
there was little incentive for Germany to treat internees like POWs.
ICRC also balked at the Board’s request to facilitate the delivery of the parcels, believing
that it was beyond the scope of its m ission.1 >5 Because the internees of the concentration camps
were not covered by international law, ICRC could be charged with interfering with the internal
politics of the country hosting the camp. Since its work depended on goodwill of belligerents,
152 Letter, Pehle to Morgenthau, 16 June 1944. FDRL, Morgenthau Diaries, Roll 213, F744. Letter, Pehle to Hull, 22 June 1944; Memo, Pehle to Roosevelt, 22 June 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters: Food and Clothing Stockpiles in Neutral Countries.
153 Letter, Pehle to Riefler, 16 June 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters: Food and Clothing Stockpiles in Neutral Countries.
154 The texts of the Hague and Gevena Conventions can be found on the International Committee of the Red Cross’ website in the International Humanitarian Law database at http://www.icrc.org/eng/ihl.
155 Telegram 1498, WRB to Beme, 29 April 1944. WRB History, Document 435.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 451
ICRC did not want to cross that line.156 The Board asked Switzerland for assistance, but it
declined to serve as an intermediary on the grounds that doing so might jeopardize ICRC’s
w ork.157
In July 1944, ICRC made a counterproposal. Believing that Germany would not
welcome a formal request, it asked that the Board and MEW give its delegates discretion to do
what they could when the opportunity arose. ICRC delegates had been allowed to make
unofficial visits to a limited number of camps in the past and distribute parcels.158 If any abuse
occurred, then ICRC would suspend the parcel distribution. ICRC also explained that it was
impossible to distribute parcels individually in concentration camps, unlike in POWs camps, so
individual receipts could not be obtained. Given the constraints, ICRC suggested that the
program begin by distributing 30,000 parcels per month, with the option to increase the amount
as additional arrangements for distribution could be made. The committee was allowed to visit
Ravensbruck, Buchenwald, Dachau, Sachsenhausen Natzweiler, Jasenovac, Stara-Gradisca, and
Gredjani-Salas. It stressed, however, that German authorities refused distribution if the parcels
were intended for Jews alone. It also recommended that another 35,000 parcels be earmarked for
Theresienstadt, which was properly classified as a ghetto, rather than a camp. Pehle was
interested in sending parcels to Auschwitz and Birkeneau, but ICRC said that Germany would not
allow it.159
156 Telegram 3144, Beme to WRB, 17 May 1944; Telegram 3147, Bern to WRB, 17 May 1944. WRB History, Documents 436 and 437.
157 Telegram 2196, WRB to Beme, 28 June 1944; Telegram 4506, Bern to WRB, 14 July 1944. WRB History, Document 176.
158 Zweig, 830.
159 Pehle made his own list of camps that should be receive priority. Intelligence reports suggested that conditions in the camps were particularly acute. He wanted the ICRC to ask the Germans for access to Belsenbergen, Bergan, Birkenau, Servar, Theresienstadt, Drancy, Dost, Josenorac, Stars Gradiska, Gred Jani-Salis, Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg, Buechenwald, Dachau, Ravensbruck, and Auschwitz. Letter,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 452
Given the loose distribution controls, the Board worried that MEW might refuse to
approve the concentration camp program. The Board argued that the amount of food that might
fall into enemy hands should something go awry would not affect the outcome of the war or
prolong it. The desperate condition of the people in the camps demanded that some aid be
provided absent one-hundred percent ironclad guarantees of delivery.160 The Board need not
have worried. MEW willingly agreed to the plan at the beginning of August.161
The Board, however, still needed to provide the food parcels. It hoped to use POW food
parcels either bound for or already in Geneva for its concentration camp program. Unfortunately,
the U.S. Army owned the parcels, and the American Red Cross and ICRC did not have authority
to divert them.162 Instead, the American Red Cross offered to oversee the packing and shipping
of the 300,000 parcels.163 In order to take advantage of available shipping space before the
parcels were ready, the Board in cooperation with American Joint Distribution Committee
purchased 15,000 commercially prepared parcels in August 1944. These parcels were sent to
Sweden for distribution by ICRC delegates.154 After packing was completed by the American
Red Cross, 224,328 parcels were sent to Geneva via Gothenburg in early December 1944. The
remaining 60,672 parcels were sent later in the month to the French port of Toulon. ICRC
Pehle to Winant et al, 26 June 1944. FDRL, WRB, Policy Matters: Food and Clothing Stockpiles in Neutral Countries. Telegram 2865 ARFAR, Beme to MEW, 8 July 1944. TNA/PRO, F 0371/42845.
160 Telegram 6035, WRB to Winant, 31 July 1944. WRB History, Document 449.
161 Telegram 6279, Winant to WRB, 5 August 1944. WRB History, Document 450.
162 Memo, “Food Packages for Distribution by Intercross in European Concentration Camps,” by Kuppinger, 8 July 1944; Memcon, Kuppinger and Pate, 10 July 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M l284, Roll 13.
163 Letter, WRB to Amcross, 25 July 1944. WRB History, Document 454. Letter, Amcross to WRB, 28 July 1944. WRB History, Document 455.
164 Telegram 2897, WRB to Bern, 23 August 1944; Telegram 6263, Bern to WRB, 21 September 1944.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 453
suggested the change in order to make transportation to Geneva easier.165
The loosening up of restrictions on transferring money also allowed private organizations
to purchase parcels. In October 1944, ninety-three tons of food parcels from Sweden, made
available by the World Jewish Congress, were distributed to Bergen-Belsen, Theresienstadt, and
other concentration camps.166
In late December 1944, the Board learned that ICRC intended to give non-Jewish
internees priority in receiving parcels. The committee felt that it was necessary given that Jews
already received assistance through feeding programs operated by ICRC and Swedish Red Cross.
The Board, however, believed that ICRC’s intention to discriminate on the basis of racial and/or
religious grounds not only represented a departure from their agreement, but also the very type of
policies it was attempting to combat.167 The Board also wanted ICRC to expand its focus to
include not only camps, but also anywhere groups of Jews were forcibly segregated or detained.
In early 1945, Europe’s transportation infrastructure, already in shambles from six years
of war, began to fray even further as the Germans retreated and the Allies advanced. Germany
became less willing to make freight cars available to ICRC for transportation of relief goods,
resulting in long delays in delivery. Germany’s slow collapse and the fractured transportation
system did have an upside. It led to increased independence of action by the camp commanders,
increasing ICRC’s access. Delegates were given access to camps in around Vienna, while
another delegate was allowed into Landsberg-am-Lech, a previously unknown and unvisited
165 Telegram 4001, WRB to Bern, 25 November 1944. Distribution of parcels is described in detail in a report written by the Board’s representative in Stockholm, Iver Olsen. See Telegram 2071, Olsen to WRB, 8 June 1944.
166 Telegram 8097, London to WRB, 28 September 1944; Telegram 8244, WRB to London, 7 October 1944. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13. Telegram 284, Tangiers to WRB, 11 September 1944. FDRL, WRB, Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Comte. Licenses, Box 38.
167 Telegram 8044, Bern to WRB, 9 December 1944. WRB History, Document 458.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 454
camp in eastern Bavaria holding 15,000 prisoners. ICRC was also able to distribute parcels at
D achau.168
These new opportunities led the Board to try and obtain trucks to deliver food parcels.
Truck deliveries also had added advantages for control, since the delegates would see the parcels
to the gates of the camps, rather waiting for space on railways. Parcels had sat from weeks in
freight cars on side tracks in railroad yards without ICRC’s knowledge.169 After learning that
shipping the trucks would take months and the Swiss Government didn’t have any to spare,
Roswell McClelland, the Board’s representative in Switzerland, finally succeeded in renting a
few. More were available provided tires could be found.170 While finding the trucks was a stroke
of luck, the Board still needed gasoline, oil, and tires to keep them running. The problem was
presented to General Dwight Eisenhower, the head of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe,
who suggested that Board representatives travel to Paris to discuss the problem at his
headquarters. As a result of the meeting, SHAEF agreed to deliver to the Board 2,000 gallons of
gasoline per week, and sent the Board representatives back to Switzerland with tires and oil.
Unfortunately, the trucks burned diesel not gasoline, but with a little help from the British, the
necessary fuel was made available.171
In January 1945, another 300,000 food parcels were approved. The American Red Cross
couldn’t make the parcels this time, but it could provide shipping. The Board investigated having
them made by a commercial company, but quickly realized that it would take months to assemble
the parcels, since food had to be obtained from government agencies. The Board’s new executive
director, William O’Dwyer, approached the War Department for assistance. The department
168 WRB History, 341.
169 Telegram 455, Bern to WRB, 22 January 1945. WRB History, Document 459.
170 Telegram 998, WRB to Bern, 9 March 1944. WRB History, Document 464. Telegram 1740, Bern to WRB, 23 March 1945.
171 Telegram 1981 and 1982, Bern to WRB, 5 April 1945. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 455
agreed to sell the Board 206,000 POW food parcels in storage in Geneva. Before they could be
distributed, the parcels had to be repackaged to remove the Red Cross and Army stamps.172 The
war, however, ended before the Board could make the necessary arrangements.173
The rhythm of the war proved a challenge to the Board’s relief efforts. By the time
Germany collapsed, Board food parcels had been delivered to Dachau, Buchenwald,
Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg, Hamburg-Neuengamme, Mauthausen, Bergen-Belsen,
Ravensburck, Theresienstadt, Landsberg-am-Lech, and concentration camps in Wiirttemberg,
Bavaria, and the Vienna, and Bolanzo areas in Austria. Parcels were also handed out in convoys
of rescued detainees. In March 1945, the World Jewish Congress and the Swedish Red Cross
arranged for the distribution of 40,000 parcels to Bergen-Belsen, Ravensbruck, and other camps.
Some of the parcels were also used to help Danish Jews in Sweden and a large group of evacuees
from Ravensbruck who arrived in Denmark after having gone without food for a number of
d ay s.174
As the war dragged on, Britain was able to maintain control of relief policy by arguing
that a large-scale relief program would impair the Allies ability to withstand Germany. The
United States, however, increasingly took independent action on the relief issue. The creation of
the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations suggested that the White House was
not content to sit back and let plans for postwar relief develop organically. Lehman’s interest in
172 Letter, O’Dwyer to War Department, 30 March 1945. WRB History, Document 465. Letter, War Department to O’Dwyer, 4 April 1945. WRB History, Document 466. Telegram 1392, WRB to Bern, 9 April 1945. Telegram 1430, 12 April 1945. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
173 Arrangements were made to transfer them to UNRRA to help with its relief efforts. Letter, O’Dwyer to Surplus Property Board, 30 May 1945. WRB History, Document 474. Letter, Surplus Property Board to WRB, 30 May 1945. WRB History, Document 475.
174 Telegram 8044, Bern to WRB, 9 December 1944. WRB History, Document 458. Telegram 2189, Bern to WRB, 14 April 1945. WRB History, Document 471. Telegram 2823, Bern to WRB, 19 May 1945. WRB History, Document 472. Telegram 2071, Stockholm to WRB, 8 June 1945. WRB History, Document 473. Telegram 1756 Bern to WRB, 24 March 1945. Telegram 566, WRB to Stockholm, 28 March 1945. NA, RG 59, 840.48, M1284, Roll 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 456
wartime relief provided some much needed coherency to American relief policy. But even he
could not bring all of the departmental factions together to forge a policy that could be conveyed
with the sense of purpose in a manner akin to Britain.
The development of another relief campaign and the intervention of Congress provided
the White House and the State Department with the support they needed to push the British on
relief. The proposals, however, floundered owing to their amateur presentation and poor timing.
One wonders why the Americans seriously believed they could win British approval for a relief
program in the run-up to the launch of the Allied invasion of Western Europe. Despite being
rebuffed, the State Department persisted until the British decided that it was better to agree to a
committee than to fracture its relationship with the Americans. The resulting concessions for
Norway and Poland were small, but helped facilitate the delivery of relief in the waning days of
the war.
The decision by the Roosevelt to create the War Refugee Board turned the relief issue
inside out. Given a mandate to provide rescue and relief, the Board looked for options and
solutions. It tossed aside existing differences of opinion among American agencies in favor of
pursuing a policy that produced results. The biggest change in American policy came in the area
of monetary relief. The Board rejected five years of American angst over money transfers for
relief, embracing them as the most expeditious way to facilitate its delivery. The American volte-
face stunned the British, who still believed that some limits were necessary. MEW, however, was
amenable to the food parcel program for concentration camps, regarding it as an extension of
existing policy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONCLUSION
This study provides the first analysis of Allied relief policy for Nazi-occupied
territories— and by extension Allied humanitarian policy— during the Second World War.
Benefiting from unprecedented archival research in three countries, it has explored the critical
question of how Britain and the United States balanced strategic considerations with humanitarian
imperative. In doing so, this investigation brings to life a neglected chapter in history of the
Grand Alliance. This narrative sheds light on how the complex interplay of Roosevelt’s and
Churchill’s different styles of leadership, the strengths and weaknesses of their governments, and
democratic debates during wartime shaped their policies. It raises questions about some
interpretations of the Allied response to the Holocaust. More broadly, the strategic, political, and
moral complexities of American and British policies toward humanitarian relief helps us
comprehend a profound— and recurring— dilemma of statecraft in the modem age, namely, how
to ease the suffering of innocents while waging war. The choices made— and not made— reveal
the brutal calculus statesmen sometimes use when choosing among evils.
Given the complexity of the relief issue, it is helpful to review its evolution before making
some general observations. Beginning with the outbreak of war in September 1939, Britain
implemented a naval and economic blockade against Germany. It wanted to prevent Germany from
importing any food, goods, or raw materials considered to be of strategic value from non-European
sources. Under the terms of the blockade, food was declared “conditional” contraband, a commodity
with both humanitarian and military uses. Since total war blurred distinctions between enemy
armed forces and civilian populations, Britain believed that food destined for the occupied
457
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 458
territories could legitimately be included in the blockade. Over the course of the war, the Roosevelt
administration and American relief advocates pressed Britain to modify the blockade either to
accomplish a political objective or to address a moral imperative.
During the Phony War, the American Red Cross and Herbert Hoover’s Commission for
Relief in Poland sought to provide assistance to Poles living in the newly-formed General
Government. Sympathetic to the plight of the Poles, Britain agreed to allow supplies through the
blockade to facilitate the programs provided that the organizations could maintain control of the
relief and ensure that it reached the Poles. When the American Red Cross could no longer meet
that requirement, it withdrew from the General Government. Hoover, however, continued to
press for relief even though he could not guarantee control of the supplies. Unhappy with the
prospect of outsiders observing its brutal administration of the General Government, Germany
withdrew permission for Hoover’s program to operate.
The defeat of France in spring of 1940 left Britain standing alone against Germany. In
June 1940, the Cabinet voted to extend the contraband control system to include all countries
under Nazi occupation. Britain hoped to strangle Germany economically, while buying time to
improve its war footing. In a speech before the House of Commons in August 1940, Churchill
justified the British government’s decision not to allow food to pass through the blockade for the
relief of civilians on the grounds that food would “certainly be pillaged off them by their Nazi
conquerors.” Any future food shortages, noted Churchill, would be caused by “German exactions
or German failure to distribute the supplies which they command.” Churchill’s speech articulated
what became the basic British position throughout the war: Germany was responsible for feeding
civilians in territories under its control and shipping large quantities of food through the blockade
would absolve it of that responsibility and thereby aid the Nazi war effort.
Not everyone agreed with Britain. Believing that Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, and
Poland should receive aid, Hoover mounted the largest relief campaign of the war. He believed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 459
that all that was required to save the small democracies from impending starvation was the
support of the United States and Britain. Hoover’s longstanding conflict with President
Roosevelt, ongoing political aspirations, and his involvement in the isolationist movement made
the Roosevelt administration suspicious of his motives. Yet, the Roosevelt administration refused
to intervene and stop his campaign. Britain believed that the large-scale relief programs
advocated by Hoover would deal a fatal blow to the blockade. It also regarded the isolationist
movement as threat to its survival, making Hoover no friend of Britain. American entry into the
war following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor finally derailed Hoover’s crusade as
Americans turned their attention to fighting the war.
Despite Britain’s devotion to the blockade, it granted two major concessions for political
and strategic reasons, neither of them a result of Hoover’s campaign. Vichy France received the
first concession. By September 1940, Vichy France was hungry as German plundering, an
inadequate harvest, and the absence of imports led to a contraction of the food supply. The
presence of one million refugees within its borders also compounded the problem. Armed with
an American Red Cross plan, Roosevelt proposed to Churchill that Vichy France receive
shipments of milk for children. The president believed that the shipments would bolster internal
support for the Vichy government and encourage Vichy officials to resist collaborating with
Germany. While contrary to blockade policy, the milk shipments appealed to Britain owing to its
desire to improve relations with France and convince its former ally not to turn over her
Mediterranean fleet to the Germans. Roosevelt’s request also came at a key juncture in the
debate over Lend-Lease. Recognizing the political and strategic benefits, Britain agreed to allow
two shipments of milk in late 1940 and four shipments of wheat during the first four months of
1941. Britain later regretted the concession when Vichy agreed to turn over 800,000 tons of
wheat to the Germans.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 460
Smarting from Vichy’s deceit, Britain vowed not to allow further relief concessions, but
the plight of Greece soon made that position untenable. Beginning in the summer of 1941,
famine-like conditions developed in Axis-occupied Greece due to back-to-back crop failures, the
country's dependence on now-halted food imports, and German pillaging. By December 1941,
1,000 people a day died in both Athens and Pireaus from malnutrition. Recognizing that
Germany and Italy would not feed Greece because it possessed little economic value, the Foreign
Office and MEW pressed for aid to be sent to preserve Britain’s prestige in the region. After an
attempt to supply Greece with food from Turkey failed, the Cabinet reluctantly agreed to allow a
large-scale relief program for Greece. Britain and the United States created a neutral body, the
Swedish-Swiss Commission, to oversee the distribution of the imported food. Sweden’s
assistance— supplying ships to carry the relief supplies and administrating the relief program—
proved invaluable.
The concession to Greece brought substantial criticism from other occupied Allied
powers, such as Belgium and Norway, which pressed for similar relief programs. Britain resisted
their pleas, while allowing them to use foreign exchange to purchase food from neutral countries
within the blockade. The concession was granted on the grounds that the allied countries would
be buying food that was already available to the enemy within the blockade area. Along with
intrablockade purchases, exile governments also experimented with sending food parcels to
civilians. After relentless petitioning by Belgium and Norway, Britain agreed to expand the food
parcel programs in the fall of 1942. Significantly, the Jews as a group were granted the same food
parcel concession as the allied govemments-in-exile. The United States, however, remained
skeptical about allowing intrablockade purchases, believing they diluted the blockade. At the
same time, the State Department complained that Britain gained too much favor with the exile
governments through its support of the purchases.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 461
1943 was a rocky year for Anglo-American relief policy. Acting independently of the
State Department, Roosevelt increasingly showed sympathy for relief appeals made by the exile
governments, supporting a plan to send 750,000 food parcels to Norwegian families. Churchill
talked Roosevelt out of pursuing the scheme, urging instead that SOE be given a chance to
implement clandestine plans for delivering relief. While the covert programs placated Roosevelt,
they floundered owing to transportation and distribution issues. The creation of the Office of
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations by Roosevelt also provoked a series of painful
discussions in the spring of 1943 on the feasibility of a wide-scale European feeding program for
children. Once again, on strategic grounds, Churchill talked Roosevelt out of implementing any
relief programs.
In the fall of 1943, another relief campaign developed in the United States. The
campaign, which was led by Howard Kershner, received a boost when both the House and Senate
passed resolutions in early 1944 calling for relief to be delivered to Nazi-occupied territories.
Bowing to public opinion, Roosevelt appealed to Churchill in March 1944 to allow a limited
feeding program for expectant and nursing mothers and children in occupied areas. While
sympathetic to the demands of public opinion, Britain again resisted the program on strategic
grounds. D-Day was only months away. The impending invasion of northwest Europe would
disrupt railways and complicate distribution efforts. Because it took four months to implement a
relief program once the Germans agreed, the program would start in the middle of the campaign.
Convinced once again by the strategic arguments, Roosevelt declined to push the issue further.
Throughout the war, Britain feared that the United States would act unilaterally and
implement a relief program without its consent. Roosevelt did precisely that, but in a limited
fashion, when he created the War Refugee Board in January 1944. Given a mandate to provide
rescue and relief to Jews and other endangered groups in Europe, the Board dismissed previous
American concerns about transferring money for relief and implemented a food parcel program
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 462
for refugee and concentration camps. Britain whole-heartedly supported the food parcel program,
but remained leery of transferring large amounts of money into enemy territory. Another
relaxation of the blockade occurred in August 1944 after Britain finally relented in order to help
the Roosevelt administration placate American public opinion. Constraints on imports were
relaxed, allowing Sweden to export food to Norway and Switzerland to provide food to Poland.
Given that the story of Allied relief policy has not been part of the grand narrative of the
Second World War, how does it enhance our understanding of the conflict? It demonstrates the
humanitarian implications of one of the major weapons of the war. The tension between the
blockade and relief spawned an ongoing conversation throughout the war about the material and
moral repercussions of Allied strategy. Although the Allies did not have day-to-day control over
the occupied territories, the decisions they made affected the lives of civilians living under Nazi
rule. By implementing and maintaining a naval and economic blockade against Germany and
German-occupied territories, the Allies hoped to strangle the German war effort. This strategy
limited the amount of food available in Europe, making it harder for the Germans to feed civilians
and circumscribed any relief efforts. If the Allies allowed relief programs to operate, they
believed it would dilute the effectiveness of the blockade. It was a Catch-22: the blockade
limited the amount of food available in Europe, but allowing relief programs to operate could
impede the blockade.
Given the contradictions between blockade and relief, the Allies had three options:
strictly adhere to the blockade, allow any and all relief programs, or chart a middle course. The
Allies chose the middle course, making Allied humanitarian policy a product of the confluence of
political and strategic considerations. Blockade concessions were granted out of political
necessity or when conditions became so inhumane as to demand action. Relief was sent to
France in the hopes of staving off Vichy France’s collaboration with Germany. The Greek relief
program derived from an appreciation of Greek suffering, but also out of fear that Britain’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 463
prestige in the region would decline if it failed to take action after botching the 1940/41
campaign. Intrablockade purchases and food parcel programs were used to keep the exile
governments in check. Relief efforts for Jews were driven by knowledge of the Holocaust. All
other requests, such as the milk programs proposed in 1942 and 1944, were refused on strategic
grounds.
This decision-making rubric provides an important context for understanding the Allied
response to the Holocaust. At the very minimum it reinforces the need to see decisions made by
Britain and the United States in response to knowledge about the Final Solution as firmly
grounded in what they believed to be the most effective way to wage the war. After the fall of
1942, high-level Allied policymakers knew with great certainty that Jewish civilians trapped in
Nazi-occupied territories faced the prospect of death. But while the officials knew the Jews had
little time, they remained reluctant to alter policies engineered to produce the defeat of Germany.
Such clarity of purpose suggests the need to carefully reconsider the charge that anti-Semitism,
above all over factors, determined the Allied response to the Holocaust. While anti-Semitism was
a feature of British and American bureaucratic cultures, claims of it determining the Allied
response are overdrawn. Before the Allies had knowledge of the Final Solution, they established
a pattern of action in which strategic considerations outweighed moral concerns. Economic
warfare rather than anti-Semitism drove decisions about allowing money transfers and food
parcels.
How Allied humanitarian policy was made reveals the acrimonious and competitive
relationship between Britain and the United States. The number of times Churchill and Roosevelt
were called upon to decide the relief issue indicates that it was no minor consideration. The
programs being debated had the power to shape the lives of millions of Europeans and potentially
alter the course of the war. Just as Britain and the United States possessed different views on when
and where to launch an invasion of Europe, they also had different views on the relief issue. Some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 464
historians have portrayed Britain as the weaker partner in the Grand Alliance, but when it came to the
blockade, Britain retained the upper hand. Britain’s superior position sprang from the fact that it had
created the blockade policy. Even when disputes arose between ministries or between ministries and
the Cabinet, those disputes never reached the Americans. British officials always presented a unified
policy front. Decisions about relief also were not made in a reckless fashion, but with deliberation
and diligence. British officials constantly weighed individual concessions against larger political
and strategic considerations. Churchill, in particular, held fast to his belief in the blockade,
altering his calculations only when famine moved from rhetoric to reality.
The United States, on the other hand, never developed a coherent approach—the relief issue
was handled haphazardly. While the desire to help should be lauded, the ill-conceived manner in
which the Roosevelt administration went about it should not. Relief was serious business given
the strategic implications of allowing a large-scale program or granting blockade concessions and
as such it should have been handled in a logical manner. Depending upon the day, the White
House, the State Department, and the Treasury Department could hold different views— all of which
were conveyed to Britain. The lack of policy coherence derived in part from Roosevelt’s penchant
for personally handling foreign affairs. Roosevelt, in particular, was easily influenced by reports of
suffering and moral considerations. At the same time, when the relief issue was firmly the
provenance of the State Department, its officials did not take a rational or sophisticated approach to
the issue. When negotiating with a well-oiled machine like the Foreign Office or an obsessive
bureaucracy like the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the State Department’s laissez-faire approach
was never going to triumph. Had the United States behaved in a more logical fashion, Britain might
have been more willing to consider relief concessions.
The relief issue was also remarkable for its ability to draw civil society into issues
concerning the conduct of the war. Americans and Britons who supported relief did not
understand why civilians had to endure deprivation and malnutrition in order for the Allies to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 465
defeat Germany. Hoover’s crusade, Kershner’s campaign, and the Famine Relief Committee’s
program all constituted critiques— sometimes virulent— of Allied policy. They all disagreed with
the decision to prevent food from being allowed into the occupied territories and voiced that
decision publicly through petitions, letters to the editor, rallies, letter writing campaigns, and
protests. More importantly, they presented an alternate course of action for the British and
American governments to pursue. While the war had plenty of armchair strategists, they did not
come together in an organized fashion to lobby the government to change its policy. None of the
campaigns resulted in the Allies making blockade concessions, but they did inspire Congressional
hearings and resolutions, Parliamentary debates and questions, and intense media scrutiny of
Allied blockade policy. Every major newspaper in the United States endorsed Kershner’s relief
program in 1944. In Britain, the Manchester Guardian supported the Famine Relief Committee’s
proposal for Belgium. Americans and Britons were not content to sit back and let their leaders
conduct the war in manner they regarded as immoral.
Britain and the United States, however, proved willing to endure a substantial amount of
public and private criticism for their relief policy. While American and British officials grumbled
about the criticism and press coverage resulting from these campaigns, they rarely interfered with
their conduct. Relief leaders were not locked up, investigated by the Internal Revenue Service or
Inland Revenue, or barred from speaking publicly. The closest the public opinion came to
changing relief policy was in the spring of 1944, when Roosevelt lobbied Churchill for a milk
program. Roosevelt’s decision not to take unilateral action— as he had already done in creating
the War Refugee Board— suggested that the president did not believe public opinion or moral
imperative to outweigh strategic considerations in that instance.
A discussion of the relief issue is also not complete without considering the practical
challenges of running a relief program in the middle of the European theater. The plain fact is that
it was hard to do. First, the relief programs cost money and money was in short supply: every
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 466
penny Britain had went towards its war effort, the United States had its own financial concerns,
and the exile governments lived on loans. A bottomless vault of money did not exist. There were
no philanthropists waving open checkbooks. Second, supply problems limited the availability of
food for use in relief programs. In 1942, when the Foreign Office and MEW pushed for a milk
program, there wasn’t enough milk available to carry out it should the program have been
approved by the Cabinet. There was also a reluctance to push Americans and Britons to make
additional sacrifices. Not only were they providing troops to fight against Germany, but also
enduring rationing to facilitate the war effort. Third, transportation and distribution issues were a
constant concern. Ships had to be found, insurance paid, safe conducts obtained, and voyages
safely made— and that was just to get supplies to Europe. Once they arrived, relief agencies were
at the mercy of Germany, which controlled the rail lines. Even the War Refugee Board, which
had a mandate to provide relief any way it could, found it difficult to surmount logistical issues.
When all is said and done, we are left with the question: Why did concern for civilians
occupy such a small place in Allied sensibilities? War is a dirty business and the leaders who
wage it are constantly forced to weigh the value of one life against another. In the Second World
War, that calculation took on a new dimension in light of the unprecedented scope of the conflict.
During the First World War, the ratio between civilian and military deaths was 1:10; in the
Second World War it was dead even.1 Germany’s occupation policies and pursuit of the Final
Solution represented a conscious decision to blur the line between combatant and non-combatant.
The treatment of civilians was a minor consideration in pursuit of forging a new thousand-year
Reich. Were the Allies naive in assuming that they could place the burden of caring for civilians
on Germany? Yes. While they did not comprehend the sinister nature of Germany’s plans when
the war began, the Allies should not have assumed that Germany would fulfill its obligation to
1 The figure is cited in International Humanitarian Law, “Answers to your questions,” International Committee of the Red Cross website [http://www.icrc.org].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 467
care for conquered populations as required under international law. At the same time, placing the
onus on Germany made adhering to blockade policy that much easier. Britain— and later the
United States— understood that civilians might suffer deprivation as a result of privileging the
blockade over relief. They ultimately believed, however, that it was a small price to pay for the
larger goal of achieving victory sooner rather than later.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARCHIVAL SOURCES
The National Archives — Public Record Office (Britain) A IR20 F 0 1 1 5 CA B 16 F 0371 CA B 17 F 0 8 3 7 CA B 21 HS2 CAB 27 PREM 1 CA B 47 P R E M 3
Peace Pledge Union Archives (Britain)
Society of Friends Archives (Britain)
Lambeth Palace Library (Britain) Papers of George Bell
Quai D’Orsay Archives (France) Guerre, 1939-45, Serie Y Guerre, 1939-45, Vichy
National Archives and Records Administration (United States) RG 59, State Department 840.48 Refugees 740.00019EW RG 169, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations E ntry 124
Franklin D. Roosevelt President Library (United States) OF 14 OF 124 O F206 President’s Safe File Heniy Morgenthau Diaries Sumner Welles Papers John Winant Papers War Refugee Board Papers
468
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 469
Hoover Institution Archives (United States) Commission for Polish Relief National Committee for Food for Small Democracies Hugh Gibson Papers
PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS
Kimball, Warren (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 3 volumes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
World Peace Foundtion,Documents on American Foreign Relations Vol. Ill, July 1940 - June 1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941). Vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942).
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, 1937-1945.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1916 1940, Volume II 1941, Volume II The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (1941-1943). 1942, Volume II 1943 1944
Justus D. Doenecke, ed.,In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement o f 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford, 1990).
Walch, Timothy and Miller, Dwight M., Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Documentary History (Greenwood Press, 1998).
GOVERNMENT REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS
House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, United States Congress, Final Report on Foreign Aid (Washington: GPO, 1948).
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA: Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA (Washington: GPO, 1946).
United States Office of the President, Address of President Coolidge at the Observance of the 10'h Anniversary of the Armistice, Under the Auspices of the American Legion (Washington: GPO, 1928).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 470
BOOKS
A lexander, G. ML, The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Allen, H. C., The Anglo-American Predicament (London: Macmillan, 1960).
Auty, Phyllis and Richard Clogg, eds., British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece (London, 1975).
Bane, Suda and Ralph Lutz,Organization o f American Relief in Europe, 1918-1919 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943).
Elizabeth Barker, British Policy in South-Eastern Europe during the Second World (London: War St. Martin’s Press, 1976).
Barker, Elizabeth, F.W. Deakin and J. Chadwick, eds., British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in (London: 1944 St. Martin’s, 1988).
Bartov, Omer, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Baylis, John, Anglo-American Relations since 1939: The Enduring Alliance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).
Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, 1917-1918 (New York, 1956).
Bell, A. C., A History o f the Blockade of Germany, 1914-1918 (London, HMSO, 1961).
Bell, George, The Church and Humanity (London: Longmans, 1946).
Berry, Nicholas O., War and the Red Cross: The Unspoken Mission (New York, 1997).
Best, Gary Dean, Herbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933-1964, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford, 1988).
Best, Geoffrey, Churchill: A Study in Greatness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
Earl of Birkenhead, Earl of Halifax: the life ofLord Halifax (London: Hamilton, 1965).
Black, Maggie, Oxfam: The First 50 Years (Oxford: Oxfam and Oxford University Press, 1992).
Blake, Robert, and William Roger Louis (eds.), Churchill: A Major New Reassessment o f His Life in Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Bloch, Marc, A Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940, trans. Gerald Hopkins (New York: Norton, 1968).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 471
Bond, Brian, France and Belgium, 1939-1940 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975).
Breitman, Richard, Official Secrets (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).
Breitman, Richard and Alan M. Kraut,American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1987).
Burner, David,Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York: Antheneum, 1984).
Bums, James MacGregor,Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt, 1970).
Butler, J. R. M.,Grand Strategy, vol. II, September 1939-June 1941 (London: HMSO, 1957).
Cahill, Kevin M, ed., A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (New York: Basic Books/Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).
Campbell-Johnson, Alan, Viscount Halifax: A biography (London: R. Hale, 1941).
Cannadine, David, ed., Blood, Tears, and Sweat: The Speeches of Winston Churchill (B oston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).
Carlton, David, MacDonald versus Henderson: The Foreign Policy of the Second Labour GovernmentNew { York, 1970).
Chandler, Anderw, Brethren in Adversity. Bishop George Bell, The Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestants, 1933-1939.
Charmley, John, Churchill, the End of Glory: A Political Biography (New York: Harcort, 1993).
Coles, Harry and Albert K. Weinberg (ed.), United States Army in World War II: Civil Affairs— Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964).
Coogan, John W., The End o f Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899- 1915 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-1953).
Cruikshank, Charles, SOE in Scandinavia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Dallek, Robert, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: OUP, 1979).
Dallin, Alexander, German Rule in Russia, 1941-45: A Study in Occupation (London:Polices Macmillan, 1957).
Dalton, Hugh, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931-1945 (London: Frederik Muller, Ltd. 1957).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 472
Davis, Belinda J., Home Fires Buring: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War 1 Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
Davis, Kenneth S., FDR, the War President, 1940-1943: A History (New York: Random House, 2000).
Dilks, David, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: Cassell, 1971).
Divine, Robert, Roosevelt and World War (Baltimore:11 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).
Doenecke, Justus D.,Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Inventionism, 1939-1941 (London: Rowan and Littlefield, 2000).
Donnison, F. S. V., Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe, 1944-46, History o f the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1956).
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste,L ’Abime: Politique etrangere de la France, 1939-44 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1986).
Dutton, David,Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Favez, Jean-Claude, The Red Cross and the Holocaust (Cambridge: CUP, 1999).
Feingold, Henry, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust (N ew York: Holocaust Library, 1970).
Foot, M. D. R., S.O.E. in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944 (London: HMSO, 1966).
SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984).
Forsythe, David P., Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977).
Freidel, Frank, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Boston: Little Brown, 1990).
Garlinski, Josef, Poland, SOE, and the Allies (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969).
Gay, George I., Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (2 vols., Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1929).
Gibbs, N. H., Grand Strategy, vol. I, Rearmament Policy (LondonL HMSO, 1976).
Gilbert, Martin, Churchill: A Life (1971-1988).
Hagan, Kenneth, This People’s Navy, The Making of American Sea Power (New York, 1991).
Earl of Halifax, The Fullness o f Days (London: Dodd Mead, 1957).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 473
Hall, Christopher, Britain, American, and Arms Control, 1921-1937 (London, 1987).
Halleck, Henry Wegner Halleck, Halleck’s International Law (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1878).
Halpren, Paul G.,A Naval History of World War London:I ( Routledge, 1994).
Harris, C. R. S., Allied Military Administration o f Italy, 1943-45, History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1956).
Herwig, Holger H., The First World War: Germany, Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997).
Hinshaw, David, An Experiment in Friendship (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1947).
Herbert Hoover (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Co., 1950).
Hinsley, F. H., et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vols. 4 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979-1984).
Hondros, John Louis, Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941-1944 (New York: Pella, 1983).
Hull, Cordell,The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948).
Hutchison, John F., Champions of Charity: War and the Rise o f the Red (Boulder, Cross CO: Westview Press, 1996).
Imlay, Talbot, Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and France, 1938-40 (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 2003).
International Red Cross, Inter arma caritas: The Work of the Red Cross during the Second World War (Geneva: The Committee, 1973).
Jackson, Julian,France: The Dark Years, 1940-44 (Oxford: OUP, 2001).
Robert Rhodes James’s Churchill: A Study in Failure (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970).
(ed.,) Winston Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, vol. VII (London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974).
Jenkins, Roy, Churchill: A Biography (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001),
Jones, Matthew, Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1996).
Junod, Henri,Warrior without Weapons (Geneva: ICRC, 1982.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 474
Karalekas, Anne, Britain, the United States, and Greece (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988).
Kennedy, David, Freedom from Fear (New York: Oxford, 1999).
Kennedy, Greg and Keith Neilson, eds., Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour o f Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise of Anglo-German Naval Antagonism, 1890-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1980).
The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976).
Kershaw, Ian, Hitler 1899-1936: Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
Kershner, Howard, One Humanity: A Plea for Our Friends and Allies in Europe (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1943).
Kimball, Warren F., Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World (N War ew York: William Morrow, 1997).
A Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease 1939-1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1969).
The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as a Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
Klukowski, Zygmunt,Diary from the Years o f Occupation, 1939-1944 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993).
Lane, Anne and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).
Langer, William, Vichy Gamble (New York: Knopf, 1947).
Langhome, Richard, ed., Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World (Cambridge:War, Cambridge University Press).
London, Louise,Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Lukacs, John,Churchill: Visionary, Statesman, Historian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
Lukas, Richard, The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles Under German Occupation, 1939-1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986).
Maguire, G. E.,Anglo-American Policy towards the Free French (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 475
Marder, Arthur J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 5 vol. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961-70).
Marquand, David,Ramsay MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977).
Mazower, Mark, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
McKercher, B. J. C., The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-29 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
Transition o f Power: Britain’s Loss o f Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
(ed.), Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1990).
Medlicott, W.N., The Economic Blockade (London: HMSO, 1953-1959).
Moorehead, Caroline, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History o f the Red Cross (London: Harper Collins, 1998).
Nash, George, The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914-17 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988).
Nevins, Allan, Herbert H. Lehman and His Era (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1963).
Offer, Avner, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Orwell, Sonia, and lan Angus (eds.),The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters o f George Orwell: My Country Right or Left, 1940-1943 (London: Macmillan, 1958).
Papastratis, Procopis, British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (New York: Cambridge, 1984).
Paxton, Robert, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: Columbia University, 1982).
Penkower, Monty N., The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1983).
Porch, Douglas, The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World (NWar ew II York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004).
Pogue, Forrest C.,The United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command (Washington: GPO, 1954).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 476
Reynolds, David, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1981).
Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1995).
Warren Kimball, and A. O. Chubarian, eds., Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
Rieff, David, A Bedfor the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002)
Roberts, Adam, and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of (Oxford:War Oxford University Press, 2000).
Roberts, Andrew, The Holy Fox: The Life of Lord Halifax (London: Phoenix Press, 1991).
Roosevelt, Kermit, ed., The War Report of the OSS, 2 vol. (Washington: GPO, 1976-1979).
Roskill, Stephen, Naval Policy between the Wars. 1: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929, vol. I (London: Collins, 1968).
Rubinstein, William, The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis (New York: Routledge, 1997).
Schulte, Theo, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford: Berg, 1989);
Shipley, Dorothy White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, Free France, and the Allies (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964).
Siney, Marion C., The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-16 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957)3-4.
Smith, Bradley F., The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA(New York: Basic Books, 1983).
Smith, Kevin, Conflict over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War (New York: Cambridge, 1996).
Smith, Richard Norton, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph o f Herbert Hoover (Worland, Wyoming: High Plains Publishing Company, 1984).
Stafford, David, Britain and European Resistance: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).
Surface, Frank M. and Raymond L. Bland,American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period: Operations of the Organizations under the Direction o f Herbert Hoover, 1914 to 1924 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1931).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 477
Thorne, Christopher, Allies o f a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan (London: Hamilton, 1979).
Titmuss, R. M.,Problems of Social Policy, History of the Second World (London:War HMSO, 1950).
Tuchman, Barbara, The Zimmerman Telegram (New York: Viking, 1958).
Vidalenc, Jean., L ’Exode de mai-juin 1940 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957).
Viorst, Milton, Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
Wandycz, Piotr S., The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington, 1974).
Wark, Wesley R., The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
Wasserstein, Bernard, Britain and the Jews o f Europe, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy o f Hitler’s Germany, 1933-36: A Diplomatic Revolution in Europe (New York: Brill Academic Publishers, 1994).
A World at Arms (New York: Cambridge, 1994).
Woods, Randall Bennett, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
Wyman, David S., The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-45(N ew York: Pantheon, 1984).
ARTICLES AND ESSAYS
Babji, Orest, “The Royal Navy and the defense of the British Empire, 1928-1934,” in Greg Kennedy and Keith Nielson, eds., Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
Beaumont, Joan, “Starving for Democracy: Britain’s Blockade of and Relief for Occupied Europe, 1939-1945, " War and Society, vol. 8, no. 2 (1990) 57-82.
Biskupski, M.B., “The Diplomacy of Wartime Relief: The United States and Poland, 1914-1918,” Diplomatic History, vol. 19, no. 3 (1995) 434-5.
Breitman, Richard, “American Rescue Activities in Sweden,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 7(1993)202-215.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 478
Cairns, John, “Great Britain and the Fall of France: A Study in Allied Disunity,”Journal o f Military History, vol. 27 (1955) 365 -409.
Cole, Wayne S., “American Entry into World War II: A Flistoriographical Appraisal,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 43 (1957) 595-617.
Doenecke, Justus D., "U.S. Flistoriography and the European War, 1939-1941"Diplomatic History 19 (1995) 669-98.
Ferris, J. R., “The Symbol and Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States, and the One-Power Standard, 1919-1921,” in B.J.C McKercher, Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1990).
“The Symbol and Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States, and the One- Power Standard, 1919-1921,” in B. J. C. McKercher, Transition of Power: Britain’s Loss o f Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-45 (Cambridge, 1999).
“The last decade of British maritime naval supremacy, 1919-1929,” in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson, eds., Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Frank Cass, 1996) 124-169.
George, Jr., James H., “Another Chance: Herbert Hoover and World War II Relief,” Diplomatic History, vol. 16, no. 3 (1992) 389-407.
Gottschalk, Louis, “Our Vichy Fumble,”Journal of Modern History, vol. 20 (1948) 45-56.
John B. Hattendorf, “Martime Conflict,” The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, eds. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) 98-105.
Hindley, Meredith, “The Strategy of Rescue and Relief: The Use of OSS Intelligence by the War Refugee Board in Sweden, 1944-45,”Intelligence and National Security, vol. 12, no. 3 (1997)145-165.
Kyrou, Alexandros K., “Operation Blockade: Greek-American Humanitarianism during World W ar II,” in Eugene T. Rossides (ed.),Greece’s Pivotal Role in World War II and Its Importance to the U.S. Today (Washington, D.C.: American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 2001.
“Ethnicity as Humanitarianism: The Greek American Relief Campaign for Occupied Greece, 1941-1944, in Dan Georgakas and Charles C. Moskos, eds., New Directions in Greek American Studies (New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 1991).
McEnaney, Laura, "He-men and Christian Mothers: The America First Movement and the Gendered Meanings of Patriotism and Isolationism," Diplomatic History, vol. 8 (1994) 47-58.
Moore, Bob, “The Western Allies and Food Relief to the Occupied Netherlands, 1944-1945,” War and Society, vol. 10, no. 2 (October 1992) 91-118.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 479
Rempel, Richard, “The Dilemmas of British Pacifists during World War II,” Journal of Modern History, vol 50, no. 4 (December 1978).
Reynolds, David, “Churchill and the British “Decision” to fight on in 1940: right policy, wrong reasons,” in Richard Langhome, ed., Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 147-67.
“A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain, and the international order since the Second W orld W ar f International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 1, (Winter 1985/86) 1-20.
Thompson, Dean K. "World War II, Interventionism, and Henry Pitney Van Dusen," Journal o f Presbyterian History, vol. 55 (1977) 32-45.
Tuttle, William M., "Aid to the Allies Short-of-War versus American Intervention, 1940: A Reappraisal of William Allen White's Leadership," Journal o f American History, vol. 56 (1970).
Young, Robert J., "'La Guerre de longue duree’: Some Reflections on French Strategy and Diplomacy" in Adrian Preston, ed., General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second World War (London: Rowan and Littlefield, 1978) 41-64.
“Spokesmen for Economic Warfare: The Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s,” European Studies Review, vol. 6 (1976) 473-89.
Zweig, Ronald, “Feeding the Camps: Allied Blockade Policy and Relief of Concentration Camps in Germany, 1944-1945,” The Historical Journal, vol. 41, no. 3 (1998) 825-851.
NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINES
Chicago Tribune Colliers Magazine Life Los Angeles Times Manchester Guardian New York Times New York World Richmond Times-Dispatch St. Louis Post-Dispatch The Times (of London) Washington Post The Watchman Examiner
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.