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CONNECTICUT UNSCATHED: AN EXAMINATION OF ’S SUCCESS DURING KING PHILIP’S 1675-1676

THESIS

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of Masters of Arts in the Graduate

School of The State University

By

Major Jason W. Warren, B.S. •••••

The Ohio State University 2009

Masters Thesis Committee: Approved by Professor Joe Guilmartin, Adviser

Professor Geoffrey Parker –––––––––––––––––––––––––– Professor Alan Gallay Adviser History Graduate Program

ABSTRACT

King Philip’s War (1675-1676) was one of the bloodiest in American history.

One New colony, however, emerged unscathed from the conflict. Connecticut maximized three important cultural-diplomatic and components that set it apart from its sister . Connecticut had a relatively humane policy towards the local, unaligned Native American tribes that dissuaded them from joining Philip’s hostile confederacy. The colony employed , Pequot, and Western Niantic in its military operations, giving it a decisive advantage. Finally, Connecticut effectively utilized European-new-style fortresses that had emerged from the Military Revolution of early modern . Connecticut’s native population also chose to remain neutral or to actively assist the colony’s English colonists, a point often obscured by the colonists’ successors. With historians focused on the terrifying events in Bay,

Plymouth and , Connecticut’s good news story has never been told before.

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VITA

February 20, 1977………………………...Born – Southbridge, Massachusetts

1999……………………………………….B.S. European History,

PUBLICATIONS

Research Publication

1. Captain Jason W. Warren, “Beyond Emotion: The Epidamnian Affair and Corinthian Policy, 480-421 BC” Ancient History Bulletin 17.3-4 (Fall 2003): 181-194.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………ii Vita……………………………………………………………………………………….iii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….v Explanation of terms, dates, and maps/diagrams…………………………………………vi

Chapters:

1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………...... 1

2. Background…………………………………………………………………...... 11

3. Historiography…………………………………………………………………...20

4. Forging an Alliance: The and the Interwar Years 1636-1674……...51

5. Philip’s Threat to Connecticut…………………………………………………...68

6. The ‘Military Revolution’ Continued: The European Way of War in the Colony of Connecticut and the Narragansett Country………………………………………85

7. The Impregnable Fortress: A Moderate Policy and an Active Defense………..119

8. Maintaining the Initiative: The Connecticut-Mohegan Alliance on the ……………………………………………………………………………...... 152

9. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...175

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………177

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1.1 Colonial Settlement and Native American Tribal Distribution…....7

1.2 “The Seat of King Philip’s War”……………………………….…………………9

2.1 “Connecticut in 1630” [Connecticut Indian Tribes in 1630]…………………….16

5.1 Avenues of Approach Topographical Map………………………………………74

6.1 Connecticut Towns and Forts……………………………………………………89

6.2 “Elements of Bastioned ”………………………………………….93

6.3-6 Glossary [ Terminology]……………………………………………94

6.7 Illustration of Landguard Fort 1625-1628……………………………………...100

6.8 Illustration of Landguard Fort in the Sixteenth Century………………………..101

6.9 ’s Fort at Charlestown………………………………………………….110

8.1 “The Valley in Massachusetts ca. 1675”…...………………163

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EXPLANATION OF TERMS, DATES, AND MAPS/DIAGRAMS

The English colonies of America used the Julian Calendar until 1752. I have adjusted these dates to correspond with the modern Gregorian Calendar and added notes where applicable to avoid confusion. The main historical difference between the calendars concerns the New Year. The Julian Calendar used 24-25 as the New

Year date.

I use the terms “English” and “colonist” interchangeably in the paper, attempting to reflect that fact that the colonists saw themselves as Englishmen first, even as the New

England colonies strove for limited autonomy during the seventeenth century. I also use the terms “Native American” and “Indian” interchangeably. Describing Native

Americans as “Amerindians” seems to be a new trend for colonial historians, but I do not believe that that term significantly alters “Indian,” a term which many historians still prefer.

Fortunately, the Records are almost entirely online thanks to a project from the University of Connecticut that scanned the typed version of the documents into a usable collection. For the online sources, I abbreviate the Council of

War’s Journal of the Connecticut Colony Records as CCR, and use the full name of the

General Court for the Court’s record in the Connecticut Colony Records. I refer to the original manuscript documents that I viewed in the Connecticut Archives by document

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number. I also viewed one set of documents on microfilm, which I also note. I compared the wording of the typed documents with the comparatively few manuscript documents that I viewed, and they were identical. I would not have finished this project in two years of graduate school (let alone 10 months) without the online documents.

I have used United States Military doctrinal terms to describe military action in this paper. I believe that a major problem in writing is the lack of clearly defined military terms, and this leads to confusion at best, and mistakes at worst. For early modern European fortification terminology, I have used the glossary from Robert B.

Roberts’ “Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States,” and attached a photocopy of this glossary and a diagram of a standard trace italienne fortress to the fortification discussion in my paper.

I have used a number of maps and diagrams to ease the understanding of the text, and elected to insert them into the corresponding sections instead of at the beginning or end of the paper. With the exception of the maps from Heritage Consultants LLC, I have not requested permission to publish the other maps and diagrams. I will do so for my dissertation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

What do a current military conflict, a children’s movie, and my thesis have in common? My thesis has at its peculiar origins these two dissimilar events. Far from the primordial forests of colonial New England, my focus in recent years has been, understandably given my career, the desert sands of . When the Iraq War was not going well for American forces, especially in Sunni dominated Anbar , the military held an essay contest concerning the conflict in the Middle East. Having many comrades in Iraq, and readying myself for deployment as well, I thought that it would be a worthwhile exercise to propose a solution to the then intractable problem of Anbar. As an amateur historian, I began to consider historical parallels to the American military problem in the province, and the central issue there appeared to be the region’s close-knit tribal organization and the inhabitants’ outlook that the were occupation forces. My native Connecticut provided an interesting historical parallel to this tribal situation, when the colony in 1675-1676, as part of the United Colonies of New England, faced the threat of hostile tribes that were in part fighting, to maintain some measure of autonomy. Connecticut Colony alone remained almost completely unscathed during this

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conflict that witnessed “a holocaust” on both sides.1 My hope was to uncover the reasons for Connecticut’s unique success in King Philip’s War, and apply them to the problem of

Anbar.

My wife Lisa would often baby-sit for a friend’s daughter, and the young girl’s favorite movie was “Finding Nemo,” a story about a fish father whose son has been captured and placed in a fish tank, and the trials and tribulations of their attempt to reunite. I would often work on my essay while the movie was playing, and it suddenly occurred to me that Connecticut, during King Philip’s War, had “found” , a friendly who greatly assisted in guiding the colony through its early development and the years of 1675-1676. If American forces in Iraq could find a or tribes to assist in effort, I reasoned that we would have similar success to that of

Connecticut Colony. Although my Iraq mission was ultimately canceled and my submission of “Finding Uncas” did not win the essay contest, the Americans in Anbar did eventually win an Iraqi “Uncas” and his tribe over, and then like dominoes, most of the

Sunni tribes in the region followed suit, and subsequently expelled (or incorporated) the insurgents and Al Qaeda.

The seeds of my interest in Connecticut during King Philip’s War, however, were sown much longer ago than the war in Iraq. As a boy growing up in central Connecticut,

I was always interested in the environment around me, particularly the vestiges of the

1 Alden T. Vaughan, New England Frontier: and Indians 1620-1675, 3rd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 309. 2

past such as colonial era houses, old graveyards, memorials, and place markers signifying past events. My grandparents lived nearby a slew of colonial houses, and would tell stories of an ancient tunnel connecting two of them so that the settlers could escape

Indian attacks. Although I never uncovered the tunnel after numerous attempts, the stories remained with me. In junior high school, the late Reverend James Burke gave me my first account of King Philip’s War. George W. Ellis’ and John E. Morris’ King

Philip’s War turned me on to the conflict, and I used this copy for my paper. If

Stonewall Jackson had two books by his bedside–the Bible and an account of Napoleon’s life–then the Ellis and Morris account is my Napoleon. I have had this book with me almost continuously for over 20 years.

Going beyond the original intent of “Finding Uncas” as an attempt to solve a problem on the modern battlefield, this paper endeavors to accomplish what has never been done before: a comprehensive account of why Connecticut was successful during

King Philip’s War. Just as in the world of journalism, success stories in history are sometimes ignored for the more gory details of disaster. This has been the case with

King Philip’s War and Connecticut. Historians have almost exclusively focused on the other and the significant destruction to both Indians and colonists there. No account exists primarily on the military and political experience of

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Connecticut’s colonial and native populations. Connecticut’s story during King Philip’s

War has been told in the margins, in the footnotes, and as part of larger studies on colonial Connecticut–until now.

It became evident early on in my research for Dr. John Brooke’s Early American writing seminar that Connecticut’s curious success was more complex than the beneficial alliance with Connecticut’s strongest tribe, Uncas’ . As critical as this alliance was to the colony’s success, and as little as it had been discussed in the context of King

Philip’s War (Connecticut’s earlier Pequot War garnered more “press”), what emerged from the historical record was a story of the Connecticut colonist’s deliberately moderate policy towards Connecticut’s native population, and the natives’ acceptance of this policy. In many ways this was the more fascinating story, both because of the numerous implications of this unique relationship between colonist and native and why historians had not previously examined these events. The larger story of the New England colonists’ relationship with the area’s Indians has been debated extensively, and many times acrimoniously, since the waning months of the war itself over 330 years ago. I do not wish to completely enter the debate because it is far beyond the scope of this paper, other than to highlight Connecticut’s policy as a tool to the hostile Indians at bay.

Historical coverage on this aspect of Connecticut’s early existence does not fit neatly into the two generally accepted theories of New England’s white-European-Indian relations: that either the Puritans/Pilgrims were trying to treat the natives fairly, but attempts were

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ultimately clouded by their belief in their religious and cultural superiority or that they were imperial conquerors bent on the utter oppression and destruction of the native population. Perhaps because it does not fit smoothly into either theory, Connecticut’s moderate policy during King Philip’s War has been largely ignored or briefly mentioned, but not thoroughly examined. Certainly Connecticut Colony’s conduct towards the local and allied Indians was not ethically perfect during 1675-1676, and for that matter, the

Indian allies and hostile tribes committed their own atrocities. But the relationship that occurred was, I believe, unique in New England history, and from my military history perspective, the military efficacy of such a policy is more important to my account than ethical judgments. Just the same, I attempt a balanced account of the relationship based on my findings in the record itself.

Another emergent theme for Connecticut’s experience was the similarities between the fighting in New England and what was occurring in the Old World during the seventeenth century. The military explanation for King Philip’s War had always been that the colonists had to adapt to the Indian “skulking way of war” and that in conjunction with friendly Indian forces, this tactical adjustment ultimately led to battlefield success against Philip’s forces. I have found this to be only part of the story. Dr. Geoffrey

Parker’s early modern Europe seminar made it readily apparent that warfare in the Old and New Worlds was very similar in many ways. Of particular similarity were defensive operations, especially fortifications. None of this should come as a surprise when one

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considers that many of early New England’s military leaders fought on the European continent, in Ireland, and during the English . European military texts were present in colonial Connecticut and there was numerous correspondence concerning military matters between the colonies and Europe. The threat of European military attack, particularly by Dutch and French forces on New England also made it a necessity to build fortifications that could withstand European and tactics.

Finally, humans, when presented with similar situations will sometimes act in predictable ways, such as the Native Americans building or utilizing European-like fortifications because it was most effective to do so.

Dr. Parker noted in class that one primary document usually emerges as central to a master’s thesis. My document was the ‘War Journal.’ This unique log of the

Connecticut Council of War’s minutes has never to my knowledge been analyzed as a separate historical document. Most often historians refer to it simply as part of the

Connecticut Colonial Records, which it was, technically. That methodology, however, partly buries the uniqueness of the document and blurs its importance in the retelling of

Connecticut’s experience during the war. Considered separately, the Journal tells the story of a select group of Connecticut leaders making incredibly measured and timely decisions about the colony’s war effort given the amount of uncertainty and their limited means of communication. Hammond J. Trumbull, a Connecticut historian of the mid-

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Figure 1.1: New England Colonial Settlement and Native American Tribal Distribution

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nineteenth century considerably strengthened the War Journal by adding the correspondence to and from the Council into his typed version of the Connecticut

Colonial Records. The University of Connecticut put the final, modern touch on the

Journal by scanning Trumbull’s documents on-line, which allowed me to examine the evidence at my leisure. When I examined various War Journal original manuscript documents at the Connecticut State Library, they were exactly the same as Trumbull’s typed version. The scope of this paper was made possible by the War Journal, opening up a window into the decision-making process and efficiency of Connecticut’s Council of

War.

This paper also enters into uncharted waters by examining the nature of Philip’s forces in Connecticut: how they invaded the colony and the extent of their military capabilities. This was made possible by the important finds in the War Journal of little known interrogations of two of Philip’s confederates at the end of the war. With the absence of a secondary historical record on these events, and a renewed scholarly and public interest in the handling of prisoners of war, this discovery in itself merits further examination as the focus of a separate study. The interrogations assisted in explaining the tribal make-up of Philip’s forces in Connecticut, as well as their modus operandi.

Deserving further examination, but also largely beyond the scope of this paper, is the apparent ‘defense-in-depth’ employed by the Narragansetts and eastern Niantics with a chain of European-like fortresses. The importance of this topic goes beyond the simple

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Figure 1.2: “The Seat of King Philip’s War” in George W. Ellis and John E. Morris, King Philip’s War, Henry R. Stiles ed., : The Grafton Press, 1906.

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fact that the Native Americans were utilizing European-like fortifications. Using Internet resources not available to the historians of an earlier era, I was able to calculate the distances and approximate locations of three, possibly four European-style fortresses all within a radius of 22 miles of each other. At least one of the forts commanded the trail to one of the other fortresses, and based on first hand accounts of colonial soldiers, Indians from the different forts were capable of reinforcing the other fortresses. Wayne Lee’s

“Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscorora and Defensive Warfare and Military Culture

Adaptation,”2 conclusively in my view, shows that southeastern American Indian tribes fought the colonists using European-style techniques or those similar to the Europeans derived from the Indians’ own fortification tradition. A similar study begs to be conducted for the Narragansetts and the closely related eastern Niantics.

This study is more than a narrative or operational military history. The historical record and my interpretation of the sources has led me to attempt a combination of diplomatic, military strategic and operational, and political history, both from the colonial and Native American perspectives. Cultural and social factors also come into play throughout my thesis, although these issues are not my focus. The process of finding

Uncas has taken me back to the beginning, allowing me to finally locate that Indian tunnel and glimpse back in time to tell Connecticut’s story during King Philip’s War.

2 Wayne E. Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscorora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation,” The Journal of Military History 68, no 3. ( 2004), under “Settings,” http://www.jstor.org/search/ (accessed 2008), 713-770. 10

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

It is not my intent to reexamine the complex roots of King Philip’s War. I offer here instead an abbreviated interpretation of the war’s causes. When the Pilgrims landed in 1620, the New England Indians had been decimated by disease, particularly those tribes on the coast from to , due to contact with European traders.

This altered the balance of power among the tribes, and caused the leader

Massasoit, Philip’s father, to seek an alliance with the newly arrived Pilgrims at

Plymouth. Peace in southern New England, with the exception of the Pequot War in

Connecticut and sporadic Indian against Indian warfare, lasted for the next 55 years.

After ’s death, his son Wamsutta, Alexander to the English, succeeded his father as sachem of the . In the early , Alexander died soon after visiting the English, and was succeeded by his brother or Philip, who suspected that the colonists had poisoned Alexander.3

3 There are many histories that cover the prologue to King Philip’s War, I prefer Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 59-67. Ian Steele, Warpaths: of (New York: , 1994), 80-99, also is a good description, although it is less balanced than Starkey, originating from the ‘Puritan-invader’ school of thought.

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Relations had at times been tense between the New England settlers and Native

Americans, over land disputes, the encroachment of Puritanism on traditional Indian religious beliefs, differing views on private property regarding trespassing, grazing, hunting and fishing rights, and the legal jurisdiction of the Indians. Adding to this underlying pressure was the demonetization of wampum in 1663 and the related collapse of the ,4 the system that was the basis for the joint colonial-Indian economy. The

Indians of coastal New England would string together shells known as wampum that were highly sought after by inland tribes. In return, the inland Indians would provide fur to the coastal tribes. The Europeans inserted themselves into this economic relationship, and ultimately the demand for furs and beads outstripped supply. Once the English demonetized wampum, land was the Indians’ remaining commodity to deal economically with the colonists, increasingly a point of tension with the expanding colonial population.5 The outside pressure of the Dutch and French also threatened New

England’s security. These pressures had existed for some time in New England prior to the outbreak of the war, so the question remains ‘why 1675?’

The best explanation for the war’s outbreak in 1675 was ’s suspicion that the Wampanoag had murdered , and the subsequent trial of the alleged perpetrators. Historians normally consider this episode as the proximate

4 Michael L. Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 158.

5 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 64. 12

cause of the war. Sassamon was a ‘,’ one who had accepted Puritan-

Christianity. He had served for a time as a chief advisor to Philip because he was literate in English and had experience living and dealing with the colonists. Philip have believed that Sassamon had cheated him financially in his dealing with the whites, but

Sassamon also reported to Plymouth Colony late in 1674 that Philip was planning an uprising. Sassamon was found dead soon thereafter. Although a joint Indian-English jury found three of Philip’s men guilty of the murder, the circumstances of the trial certainly were less than rigorous by modern standards. Reportedly, the colonists witnessed Sassamon’s body bleed anew, when the suspects approached it. Perhaps the handling of the trial further inflamed the Indians’ other grievances, but certainly the trial itself attacked Philip’s legitimacy as sachem of the Wampanoags.

This issue of legitimacy was arguably more important to Native Americans than

Europeans. European kings had the legal, if ‘divine,’ authority to command subordinates to action. Indian did not have the same authority over their warriors, and they did not take lightly affronts to their limited jurisdiction, such as Indian on Indian disputes which was Philip’ opinion of the Sassamon affair.6 The English on the other hand had

6 Philip stated during a conference with Rhode Island men prior to hostilities that he was angered over the Sassamon episode because the English were meddling in an Indian-Indian affair: “The English, they said, took them [Indians] out of the Jurisdiction of their Indian Kings…and that the Christian Indians wronged their Kings by lying about them…” Samuel G. Drake, ed., The Old Indian Chronicle; Being a Collection of Exceeding Rare Tracts, Written and Published in the Time of King Philip’s War, By Persons Residing in the Country (New York: AMS Press, reprint of the 1867 ed. published in by S. A. Drake, 1976), 229. This indicates that Philip accepted English jurisdiction in English-Indian disputes, but was angered about English meddling 13

legitimacy concerns of their own with the Sassamon murder because he had been a

Christian Indian, conferring on him a higher legal status than non-praying Indians. If the

English authorities left Sassamon’s murder unanswered, what effect would it have on their conversion efforts as well as those natives who were already converted? Thus the legitimacy of ‘converted Indians’ struck at the heart of English-Indian relationship in

New England, and there was no compromise solution to defuse the situation. Months after the execution of Philip’s men, Indian-colonial warfare convulsed New England.

King Philip may have decided to fight the English before the Sassamon trial, and probably it was only a matter of time before a similar incident triggered a conflict.

Certainly though, the Sassamon episode precipitated hostilities. Most of the Wampanoag tribe, the Nipmucks of central Massachusetts, the “River Indians” of the Massachusetts stretches of the Connecticut River, and eventually, the powerful Narragansetts of Rhode

Island (sympathetically neutral to Philip’s cause until attacked by a colonial army on 18

in Indian-Indian affairs. The English saw Sassamon as falling under their jurisdiction because of his religious conversion and English literacy. Jenny H. Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (: University of Press, 2005), 102-106, also concludes that the issue of Philip’s sovereignty over Native Americans was the primary factor in the onset of hostilities, but she characterizes it as a over rights instead of the more practical conclusion that Philip could not maintain authority as sachem without reacting to a major challenge to his power. Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougias, King Philip’s War: The History and Legacy of America’s Forgotten Conflict (Woodstock, : The Countryman Press, 1999), 25, illustrate an instance of one of Philip’s warriors turning on him when he concluded that Philip failed to counter a colonial challenge to his authority.

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December 1675) rallied to Philip’s cause. Vaughan estimates that all of these tribes totaled 6,000-8,000 people,7 with perhaps 2,000 warriors.8 Individual warriors from neutral or allied tribes also joined Philip as indicated in the Connecticut records, which was unsurprising given the prevalence of intermarriage between tribes and the limited political and military control of sachems.

These tribes faced approximately 50,000 English colonists with around 10,000

Englishmen capable of bearing arms.9 The 5-1 colonial military advantage has in part caused many historians to conclude that English victory was inevitable and the Indian fight suicidal. The war in fact proved that the English, without allied Indians, could not decisively defeat Philip, and at the outset of the conflict, it was not assured that any

Indians would rally to the English side. The war against the English certainly did not seem hopeless to the nearly 8,000 southern New England Indians that joined Philip’s

7 Vaughan, New England Frontier, 314.

8 Ellis and Morris argue that Philip’s confederates numbered 2,500, once the Narragansetts joined the war, not including the Abenaki of northern New England. I believe my number of 2,000 warriors is slightly more accurate than Ellis and Morris. For every one can assume that he had a wife, one or two children and one elderly adult and thus one warrior per 4-5 Indians. George W. Ellis and John E. Morris, King Philip’s War, Henry R. Stiles, ed. (New York: The Grafton Press, 1906), 17-18.

9 R. C. Simmons, The American Colonies: From Settlement to (New York, WW Norton, 1976), 100, argues that the white New England population was 46,188 in 1670 with a black population of fewer than 400. It is safe to estimate then that the English population by 1675 was 50,000. Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 10. Statisticians have calculated that the to total population ratio was 5-1. Evarts B. Greene and D. Harrington, American Population Before The Federal Census of 1790 (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1966, originally published Columbia University Press, 1932), “Note on Methods of Calculation.”

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Figure 2.1: “Connecticut in 1630” [Connecticut Indian Tribes in 1630] in John W. De Forest, History of the Indians of Connecticut From the Earliest Known Period to 1850, Edition with sanction and testimonial of the Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford: WM. Jas. Hamersley: 1851.

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rebellion. Philip would never have won over so many supporters without some specter of success. He sent entreaties to the powerful Mohawks, as well as to other tribes, and was probably successful in convincing the northern New England Abenaki to attack what is now and to draw off forces from his confederacy’s area of operations. Perhaps the possibility of winning over these powerful tribes was the decisive factor for the tribes that actually joined the war. There was also the more remote possibility of direct French support, and Philip did meet with a French agent prior to the war. Maybe Philip aimed at the prospect of a negotiated peace, similar to the one that English colonists granted Virginian tribes after a similar colonial-Indian conflict. In this scenario, Philip would have retained his honor and thus his leadership ability over his tribe and tributaries by successfully defending what he viewed as an

English intrusion upon his jurisdiction.10 Philip’s ultimate objectives are probably lost to history, but it does not appear that they were suicidal in nature.

10 Most historians conclude that Philip did not directly control most of his confederacy’s military activities or the hostile tribes’ objectives, once the war spread from Wampanoag territory. This was especially the case once the Narragansetts joined the conflict after Great Swamp. Narragansett goals, driven by the devastating English assault, seem to have been to inflict as much revenge on the colonists as possible. This can be seen by their rejection of the Connecticut peace overtures discussed below. Perhaps Philip would have accepted such an offer, but the Narragansetts were more powerful than the Wampanoags, and the other tribes were used to recognizing Narragansett dominance in Indian affairs for decades previous to the conflict. By mid-conflict, some of the hostile coalition’s objectives were seriously miscalculated or irrational (not necessarily suicidal) because Philip’s confederacy had limited means to inflict total damage on the English, and thus the ends of their strategy were impossible to achieve.

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The English, although having the advantage in size of population, logistics, and the possibility of reinforcement, certainly were not guaranteed a decisive victory.

Colonial objectives shifted to correspond with the expansion of Philip’s rising from a local affair to a regional conflict. Soon the decisive defeat of Philip’s confederation and the ultimate subversion of southern New England’s Indian power, in large part to prevent a similar uprising, became the goal of the United Colonies of New England.

Philip’s motives were not appealing to all of New England’s Indians. The tactically dominant of , along with remnants of the , and the closely related western Niantics provided critical military aid to the

English colonists. The Natick or praying Indians of Massachusetts Bay Colony rendered military aid to the Bay and Plymouth colonies.11 The tribes that determined to remain neutral were also important because they did not add to Philip’s number of warriors. The neutrality of Ninigret’s eastern Niantics was especially important because they were the most powerful of the neutral tribes. The remaining neutral tribes of Connecticut, and the

Indians of Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and , were smaller and of less military importance.

11 Vaughan, New England Frontier, 314. Vaughan overestimates that the colonies had the support of 5,000 allied (he does not count the neutral tribes here) Indians during the war. The combined Mohegan, Pequots and western Niantics never had more than 200 warriors take the field in any campaign (200 in the ‘Long March’ and 150 at Great Swamp), and the Natick Indians were also relatively small. In 1680, Connecticut reported that 500 Indians were capable of bearing arms in the colony, but that was probably counting the entire adult male Indian population at the time. See Greene and Harrington for the 1680 report, American Population Before The Federal Census of 1790, 48.

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The English colonists faced the possibility of economic ruin and high casualties, although complete annihilation at the hands of the Indians was by that time impossible.

The New England settlers, interestingly, did not believe that the war with Philip would result in a general uprising.12 The historical record makes clear that the colonists genuinely felt a sense of betrayal, especially by the local tribes who joined the rebellion and had been the colonists’ peaceful neighbors for decades. The colonists may have been in denial or simply misunderstood their situation vis-à-vis the Indians, and therefore were ignorant of the animosity they had stirred up against themselves since their arrival in the

New World. Whatever led the colonists to misunderstand their situation, the unguarded nature of their frontier, and their lack of preparation for war, clearly shows this mindset.

Most of colonial New England would pay the price for its lack of vigilance.

12 Vaughan, New England Frontier, 309, reaches the same conclusion.

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CHAPTER 3

HISTORIOGRAPHY

“The Matter of Fact therein related (being rather Massacres, barbarous inhumane

Outrages, than Acts of Hostility, or valiant Atchievements) no more deserve the Name of

War than the Report of them that Title of an History…”13 The Reverend William

Hubbard writing less than a year after the cessation of major hostilities, chose to emphasize the sheer brutality of King Philip’s War of 1675-1676. Much has been made about this conflict–certainly a ‘war’ by any standard–as one of the bloodiest per capita in

American history.14 Over 600 colonial fighting men were killed, not including allied

Indian casualties; 13 settlements were completely ruined and many more were partially damaged; 600 dwellings were destroyed, and Plymouth Colony alone spent over 100,000

13 William Hubbard, with notes by Samuel G. Drake, The History of the Indian in New England (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 15. Also see Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998). Lepore chooses to analyze the language in this excerpt from Hubbard. She goes on to propose a theory concerning identity in war.

14 Virginia’s Opechancanough’s Rebellion in 1622 cost the English at least one third of their population, more fatalities per capita than the English colonists suffered in King Philip’s War. Alfred A. Cave, “Anglo-Indian Relations” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763 An Encyclopedia, ed. Alan Gallay (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), 31.

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English pounds on a conflict that lasted little more than a year. 15 Native American power in southern New England, with the exception of the allied Mohegans, was completely broken. Connecticut Colony was the anomaly. Alone among the devastated New

England colonies, Connecticut stood, almost completely unscathed by the war. Philip’s confederates managed only to destroy the abandoned town of Simsbury in the north- central region of the colony.16 The colony’s joint English-native field forces remained undefeated in the field, suffering fewer casualties than those of the three other New

England colonies.17

All along Connecticut’s border, major settlements were devastated, but Philip’s forces and his confederates did not attack populated Connecticut itself. Philip’s confederacy devastated Longmeadow Massachusetts, a mere 15 miles from Windsor and

20 miles from Hartford respectively.18 There were reports that Hartford was under

15 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 288. Many women and children were also killed along with “innumerable” livestock, but reliable numbers are unavailable. Connecticut only spent 30,000 pounds on the conflict, Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 31.

16 For Connecticut’s losses see Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 288.

17 The one exception was that Connecticut sustained roughly half of the colonial casualties at the , but this had less to do with tactics than the unique situation of that one battle.

18 Distances were taken from Wikipedia contributors, “Longmeadow, Massachusetts,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Longmeadow%2C_Massachusetts&oldid=187812284 (accessed , 2007). Distances were calculated “as the crow flies.” Longmeadow is the ancient name of the area, but was part of Springfield township until more than a century after King Philip’s War. Traveling distances were longer when you consider the natural obstacles, such as hills and tributary rivers, which ground forces would have had to bypass. 21

imminent threat of an attack and that hostile Indians were sighted on both sides of the

Connecticut River near Windsor, Wethersfield and what is now Glastonbury (near

Hoccanum).19 Why did Philip’s forces not attack? Connecticut Colony’s eastern frontier was within easy striking distance of the Narragansett territory, once that largest of southern New England tribes joined with Philip. Once Connecticut’s forces began actively fighting against them, why did Philip and his allies not attack Connecticut?

This paper is a comprehensive assessment of the Connecticut Colony’s curious success during the war. Connecticut’s unprecedented policy of moderation towards the colony’s native population, influenced by a unique military alliance with a locally dominant tribe (and its tributaries), and the application of certain elements of the

“European way of war” then in vogue, coalesced to give Connecticut the upper hand in the war against Philip’s confederation. The effective use of military force–offensively and defensively–aided by the radical application of moderate policy, especially notable during a time of internecine conflict, drastically minimized the losses that the colony suffered vis-à-vis the other New England colonies. I question the assumption that military success in the demanded a complete departure from European military methods, then represented by tactics and techniques of the early modern

‘Military Revolution.’ Through the introduction of new evidence and the re-examination

19 Hubbard notes hostile Indians moving towards Windsor, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 132. Ellis and Morris identify hostile forces near the other two towns, King Philip’s War, 122-123.

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of old, a new paradigm becomes apparent for interpreting successful colonial warfare.

The allied Indian “cutting off way of war” worked in concert with English military skills, and both were complemented by Connecticut’s moderate policy towards the local

Indians.20

Inexplicably, Connecticut’s success story, including the relative success of

Connecticut’s Native American population, remains largely untold.21 Historians have ignored the colony’s success in favor of the juicier details of bloody and massacres that occurred in the other colonies. Historians also encounter a more difficult explanation for Connecticut’s success because it is more problematic to examine the effect of deterrence on Philip’s forces than the battles that actually occurred elsewhere, especially with the difficulty in identifying hostile war parties that operated in the colony.

Harold Selesky’s War and Society in Colonial Connecticut offers the best available

20 The term policy is more accurate than diplomacy when referring to the interaction of ethnic groups in colonial Connecticut. Diplomacy usually denotes state-to-state interaction versus the interaction of dissimilar groups within a state, which would better be described as policy. Admittedly the line is sometimes blurred in late-seventeenth century Connecticut as colonial-Indian interaction also occasionally resembled inter-state negotiation.

21 My observation concerning Connecticut’s Native Americans will inevitably draw criticism, but the fact remains that Connecticut’s tribes enjoyed relative success by not suffering destruction, slavery, or displacement as a result of the war. The Mohegan tribe actually increased not only its numbers with the integration of Indian refugees, but also its sphere of influence in terms of territory. Due to the complexity of the explanation for Connecticut’s success during King Philip’s war, I have divided the historiography into three sub-sections: the historiography of Connecticut for King Philip’s War, the theories concerning the tactics employed by colonial forces and Indians during conflict, and the debate over Puritan/Pilgrim policy towards New England’s Native American population.

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explanation for Connecticut’s success during King Philip’s War. He comes the closest to my point of view and makes the best use of the Connecticut Colonial Records compared to other historians. Selesky devotes only a handful of pages, however, to his examination of Connecticut during King Philip’s War because he focuses on the social-military ’s entire colonial period. Selesky offers only a cursory explanation for the colony’s relative success: “Connecticut survived the war in better physical, economic, and emotional shape than its neighbors because the Indians who lived among its towns were satisfied with the status quo and chose not to join Philip’s cause, and because the hostile Indians did not attack simultaneously along the eastern frontier and down the Connecticut valley.”22 Although it is true that Connecticut’s policy towards the local Indians was a key ingredient in its success, Selesky is constrained by his broader argument and thus does not present the array of evidence that I do in my examination of the colony’s moderate policy towards the Connecticut Indians. Selesky also omits two of the other critical factors for Connecticut’s success: the colony’s successful employment of the European Way of War in its active defense, which was complemented by the utilization of its allied Indians, and the success of Connecticut’s offensive operations. He overestimates the effect of Connecticut’s allied Indian on offensive success claiming that the result of the Pequot War “left Connecticut dependent on its Indian allies,” and that the

“Connecticut soldiers…[were] cautious and unskilled, and were never able to trap the

22 Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 31.

24

enemy.”23 The use of allied Indians in offensive operations was critical to Connecticut’s success, and a major difference between it and the other New England colonies,24 but

Connecticut’s colonists played an important role in the war as well. The hostile Indians in fact never defeated Connecticut forces, the colony’s expeditions scoring a number of successes in the field. Connecticut colonists played a vital role at Great Swamp, the most decisive battle of the war, and the colony’s joint forces defeated the Sunk Squaw in another important engagement. It is inaccurate to minimize the role of the colonists in these successes and to criticize the inability of Connecticut forces to bring about a single culminating battle, when the hostile tribes refused to accept a winner-takes-all confrontation. Even with these oversights, Selesky provides an adequate examination of

Connecticut’s War Council and certain defensive measures, and contributes more than any other author to Connecticut’s story during the war.25

23 Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 10, 20.

24 Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 20. The other New England colonies eventually adopted a similar military approach to Connecticut Colony, albeit with smaller numbers of allied Indians, but none exercised a coherent Indian when the war began. One small Plymouth force commanded by was a notable exception, utilizing ‘friendly Indians’ from the beginning of the conflict.

25 Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 17-32.

25

Douglas Leach’s Flintlock and Tomahawk remains the authoritative narrative account of King Philip’s War. He accurately argues that “Connecticut…throughout the war had shown the greatest skill of all the colonies in dealing with friendly Indians.”26

Leach highlights some of Connecticut’s defensive measures and a number of offensive operations, but Flintlock lacks detail because of Leach’s focus on all of the New England colonies. Robert Taylor’s Colonial Connecticut –A History, a volume of the series covering the original colonies, mostly defers to Leach for Connecticut’s role in King

Philip’s War.27 Taylor does offer an impressive political synopsis, including the colony’s confrontation with Andros of New York and similar episodes with the other

New England colonies. Michael Oberg in Uncas First of the Mohegans, correctly suggests that Connecticut Colony’s cooperation with the allied Indians spared it “the worst of the slaughter.”28 Oberg also is writing mainly a political history with military side notes, however, and does not sufficiently discuss the other key elements of

Connecticut’s success. The strength of his book is his excellent treatment of Uncas’ dealings with Connecticut. This paper attempts to fill the gap in scholarship concerning

Connecticut Colony’s experience during King Philip’s War.

26 Douglas E. Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), 227.

27 Robert J. Taylor, Colonial Connecticut–A History, A History of the American Colonies in Thirteen Volumes (Milton M. Klein & Jacob E. Cooke Gen. Eds. Millwood: KTO Press, 1979), 79.

28 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 180. 26

With few exceptions, the historians examining colonial New England, King

Philip’s War, and warfare in colonial America have been offering the same explanation for the past 330 years to describe the ultimate triumph of the New England colonists and their Indian allies over Philip’s confederacy. The traditional argument contends that the colonists’ European tactics were incompatible with the physical conditions of the New

World and the “skulking” methods of the Indians. Accordingly, it took devastating defeats on the battlefield and a degree of socio-political adjustment before the colonists were able to defeat Philip’s forces by adopting Native American tactics and employing allied Indians. Leach best summarizes this theory:

The real answer to the problem of how to deal with the skulking tactics of the enemy, as time was to show, lay in the intelligent adaptation of standard English tactics to forest conditions, and especially the systematic use of friendly Indians as scouts with every English force that moved through the woods. These natives were experts in the art of detecting the presence of other Indians, and whenever they were used ambushes became much less of a danger.29

The main point is that the English colonists eventually adapted to the New England battlefield conditions by co-opting and mimicking the Indians, and thus were finally able to conduct effective warfare.30 Historians often mention that the Connecticut Colony had

29 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 93.

30 In addition to Leach see Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991), 128; Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in New England,” Journal of American History 74, no. 4 (March 1988), under “Settings,” http://www.jstor.org/search/ (accessed December 2007), 1204; Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 55-56; James D. Drake, King Philip’s War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 2; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 32, 39; John M. 27

a successful military approach from the beginning of the conflict, but do not elaborate on the underlying factors for the colony’s success.31 Perhaps historians realized that they would have to replace the straightforward explanation for the ultimate colonial victory in order to deal adequately with the Connecticut Colony, giving rise to the more complex question ‘why Connecticut and not the other New England colonies?’

A few historians have taken this theory–that the colonists had adopted the

Indians’ “skulking way of war”–and developed it further. Patrick Malone in The

Skulking Way of War argues for the superiority of the Native American way of fighting that had resulted in a military “tactical and technological” revolution in the wilderness, supplanting the traditional European military system.32 The colonial forces had to adopt

Dederer, War in America to 1775: Before Doodle (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 19; Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 16. Richard, I. Melvoin, New England : War and Society in Colonial Deerfield (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 113. Melvoin argues that the colonists adopted the Indians’ tactics as the war progressed, but this transition in tactics did not ultimately defeat Philip.

31 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 109; Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans,180; Drake, King Philip’s War, 80; Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 9; Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America, 103; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 71; Nathaniel Philbrick, : A Story of Courage, Community, and War (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006), 319; Robert C. Black III, The Younger (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1966), 350. George M. Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War: Being a Critical Account of that War with a Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1967, originally published Boston, 1906), 136. Richard R. Johnson, “The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England,” The Journal of American History 64, no. 3 (December 1977), under “Settings,” http://www.jstor.org/search/ (accessed 2008), 627.

32 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 128.

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the tactics of the Native Americans in order to defeat them.33 The revolution saw the colonists ‘go native’ by dispersing from formation to use cover and concealment, and by taking aim at individual targets with flintlock muskets instead of firing massed volleys.

They also adopted Indian technology such as canoes and snowshoes, as well as ground maize for sustenance on the march.34

An alternate theory that still leans on Native American military skills as its explanation, attributes King Philip’s defeat primarily to Mohawk intervention on the northwestern New England frontier. This argument, quickly becoming the standard explanation for King Philip’s defeat, posits that the Mohawks defeated Philip in battle, denied sanctuary to his forces, and may have harassed Philip’s confederates near the

Massachusetts’ stretches of the Connecticut River. As John Grenier in The First Way of

War: American War Making on the Frontier contends, “Indeed, without participation on the side of the colonists, it is difficult to imagine an English victory over

King Philip.”35 The Native Americans thus ultimately decided their own fate, and it was

Mohawk interference in the war for their own strategic objectives that ultimately carried

33 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 117.

34 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 13, 128; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, agrees with Malone’s argument that a revolution in Indian tactics occurred with the adoption of the flintlock musket. Essentially, Indian tactics stayed the same but became more deadly.

35 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607- 1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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the day, largely without the knowledge of the New England colonists. 36 The Connecticut

Colony Records, however, indicate that the Connecticut Council remained skeptical of

Mohawk action against Philip as described in correspondence from New York Governor

Andros and his agents, although they acknowledge that something may have happened.37

The Colony was highly suspicious of Andros’ intentions, and this led them to be suspicious of the Mohawks, who were viewed as an arm of his colony’s military apparatus. Andros had invaded the lower Connecticut River at the outbreak of hostilities under the guise of military protection, and was only deterred from annexing all of

Connecticut west of the Connecticut River when Connecticut marshaled considerable militia forces at his landing place at Saybrook. In fact, fearing a revival of the Mohegan-

Pequot-Mohawk feud as well as Andros’ intentions, Connecticut repeatedly denied access for the Mohawks to operate against hostile Indians within the Connecticut

Colony’s borders. In the end, the ‘Mohawk argument’ fails to explain how Philip’s hostile tribes managed to launch an offensive in the spring against the New England

36 In addition to Grenier, see Melvoin, New England Outpost, 116-121; Philbrick, Mayflower, 332; Wayne Lee, “Subjects, Clients, Allies or ? The British Use of Irish and Indian Military Power, 1500-1815,” British and the British Atlantic, 1500-1820: Two Worlds or One? H.V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid, eds. *This article and the article cited below were both in the process of publication when Professor Lee graciously furnished me copies, and I therefore do not have complete citations or page numbers for either.

37 General Court Records, Connecticut (Colony), in The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, from 1636 to 1776 ... transcribed and published, (in accordance with a resolution of the General assembly), 15 vols. (Hartford: Brown & Parsons, 1850-1890), II: 334- 335; available at http://www.colonialct.uconn.edu/About.cfm (accessed 13-17 February 2008).

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colonies that was the most devastating of the war if the Mohawks had decisively weakened Philip at his winter quarters. One simply has to compare the devastation before the Mohawks’ alleged raid on Philip’s winter quarters with the destruction that the hostile tribes wrought in the spring to arrive at the conclusion that the Mohawk offensive did not defeat Philip, and may not have even significantly weakened his confederacy.

This theory concerning English adaptation to southern New England’s military conditions, with minor variations, has existed almost completely unchallenged for over three centuries because it goes a long way in helping to explain the circumstances of that time period. The problem with the theory, however, is its internal contradictions that become difficult to square with the existing evidence. Michael Oberg, who provides an excellent history of the Connecticut’s Colony’s relationship with Uncas in First of the

Mohegans, for instance, presents contradictory evidence over the military underpinnings of the Connecticut-Mohegan alliance. First, it was Uncas who “relied upon the English for protection,” against his native enemies whom continually sought to overthrow him in the years after he supplanted Pequot power in southern New England.38 During Philip’s uprising, however, Oberg argues that “the English could not counter the hostile

Algonquians’ “skulking way of war.”39 The English at first provided protection to the

Mohegans and then regressed militarily into incompetence three decades later. William

38 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 109, 130.

39 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 173.

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Shea’s “Militia” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763 complements Oberg’s theory by asserting that “the militia was ineffective as a static defense force against an enemy who could choose the time and place of attack.”40 Malone and others contend that

King Philip’s fight was “suicidal” and his defeat inevitable.41 Malone’s explanation is also problematic because the Indian way of war was supposedly superior to English tactics, yet the end result of Philip’s rising against the New England colonies was predictable defeat. Another contradiction of Malone’s theory is that the natives learned the concept of ‘’ from the English during the Pequot War, especially the use of fire as a against villages.42 King Philip’s warriors then employed the use of fire against the English towns four decades later.43 Again we have and method adopted from the English who had supposedly little to offer frontier warfare.

40 William L. Shea, “Militia,” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763: An Encyclopedia, 440.

41 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 120, 128; Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 56; Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth Century New England,” 1210.

42 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 1, 32; Steele, Warpaths, 92-93; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 60; Grenier, The First Way of War, 21, 29-32. I do not believe that the strategy of ‘total war,’ with the use of fire as its major tactic, was foreign to Native Americans pre-contact. Wayne Lee’s excellent description of the “cutting off way of war” in “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” is a good corrective to those historians who maintain that the American Indians were either ignorant of the concept of total war or somehow morally above it prior to European arrival.

43 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 100-106.

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The evidence that I have uncovered indicates that both the English and the Indians adopted successful tactics and technology from each other. My findings agree with other theories concerning the merging of Indian and colonial culture. James D. Drake in King

Philip’s War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 argues that King Philip’s War was in fact a civil war because the cultures of the New England colonists and Indians had effectively merged over the preceding 55 years.44 The colonists and natives had an intertwined economy, judicial system, and in some cases shared religious practices.

Native Americans and the Puritan/Pilgrims also shared technology, especially in the realm of agriculture. Most colonists also considered the war a rebellion indicating that they viewed the Indians as the King of England’s subjects. Sometimes the Indians saw themselves as subjects and used this status to directly petition the king over land disputes.45 As discussed, Philip believed that the English were sovereign in certain matters including legal jurisdiction over English-Indian disputes. Drake’s argument does not need bolstering with additional evidence. This paper merely contends that there was a process of intracultural sharing and borrowing in seventeenth century New England,

44 This is a major theme in Drake’s King Philip’s War.

45 The Mohegans, Narragansetts, and Wampanoags all appealed directly to the throne in certain instances in their land disputes with the colonists. For the Mohegan case see John W. De Forest, History of the Indians of Connecticut From the Earliest Known Period to 1850 (Hartford: WM. Jas. Hamersley: 1851), 323. After the Miantonomo episode described below, “the Narragansetts tried to free themselves from the [New England Confederation or United Colonies] domination by submitting themselves directly to King Charles I.” Richard C. Goode, “Narragansett” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 469. Pulsipher’s Subjects unto the Same King describes how Philip appealed to King Charles II.

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including things military.46 The colonial forces partial adoption of the “skulking way of war” can be attributed to numerous successes with “search and destroy” missions that tracked down Philip and his allies. The colonial utilization of allied Indians was the key to most of these successes. While it took the Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonies, and the Providence Plantations well into the war to adopt these tactics, the Connecticut

Colony, aided by its implacable Mohegan-Pequot allies, were implementing the

“skulking way” from the beginning. Some individual colonial soldiers were also able to master Indian tactics, but their skills would never fully equal the Native Americans, whose military techniques were honed by their every day lifestyle. The Indians too incorporated aspects of English warfare, primarily military technology such as the flintlock musket, and the Narragansetts utilized at least three European-new-style fortifications.

Even with this process of acculturation, both the English and Indian military cultures retained their respective strengths that were utilized in early New England warfare. English forces led the assaults on Indian villages and their Indian allies performed perimeter security duty. The attacks on the Pequot fort at Mystic during the

Pequot War, and the Narragansett fort at the Great Swamp and the Indian village at

46 Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth Century New England,” 1187, argues for a process of military acculturation that was occurring between the Indians and the English as a part and not a product of the overall acculturation process. He concludes that there was no significant change in New England’s military affairs between the Pequot War and King Philip’s War because of the general absence of warfare. He, like the other historians, ignores the effectiveness of certain English military methods. 34

Turner’s Falls during King Philip’s War were all critical if not decisive victories for the colonists. The English were also adept at defending fortified-garrison-houses and strong points such as at Northampton, Hadley and Hatfield, while inflicting significant casualties on Philip’s forces. In light of these successes, it is difficult to contend that the

English way of war was completely inadequate in the New England wilderness.

In Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast, Guy Chet argues that “European tactics were not outdated or ineffective in the American wilderness, as the Seven Year’s War in North America clearly demonstrated. Reliance on European defensive tactics–in both offensive and defensive operations–often enabled the English to overcome and overwhelm their opponents.”47 Arriving separately at our conclusion that the European way of war was not obsolete in the New World, Chet generally agrees that the English colonists were not ultimately successful by adopting the “skulking way of war.” Chet takes a long-view of

New England’s military history, attempting to refute the idea of the development of an

American Way of War beginning in the early colonial era.48 Thus his focus is not on

King Philip’s War alone, and my interpretation of events significantly differs from his for the conflict. A difference in methodology might explain some of our interpretive

47 Guy Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 2.

48 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, Preface.

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divergence. Chet does not utilize the New England colonial records for his chapter on

King Philip’s War, relying instead on contemporary history from the time period for his primary sources. In this way, he misses the success of Connecticut’s arms in the conflict as Hubbard, and Benjamin Church were less concerned with

Connecticut, concentrating instead on their own colonies. Chet inaccurately argues for the “ongoing degeneration of colonial armed forces” during King Philip’s War,49 ignoring Connecticut’s Colony’s undefeated military record. Chet does highlight the

English colonists’ ability to successfully defend town populations in garrison houses, if not town property, oddly arguing that the colonists’ garrison defenses were successful in this way, while at the same time asserting that the colonists’ defensive military skills were “degenerating.”50 Unfortunately, Chet gives us the ‘what’ and not the ‘why’ for successful garrison defense, missing that the real reason for this relative success was New

England’s importation of the technical aspects of the European Military Revolution, specifically the trace italienne fortification design applied in smaller scale to the

49 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 3. Chet also argues that “Colonial commanders, as a group, were simply remarkably inexperienced and unprofessional. Unlike Miles Standish, , and John Mason, most of the colonial commanders during King Philip’s War were not professional soldiers trained and seasoned on the battlefields of Europe” (39, 67). As I argue below, Connecticut did have experienced Indian fighters, such as Majors Treat and Talcott and the Pequot War veteran , and employed leaders with European military experience such as Winthrop Jr. and his son Fitz-John Winthrop.

50 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 58.

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garrisons.51 He also omits the Connecticut Colony Council of War’s decision to pursue fortification defense based on the new-style European design, once it became apparent that the garrison defense in the other colonies did not protect the colonists’ property.

Further, Chet largely ignores the success of combined Indian-English military operations, viewing the military skills of each group as distinct on the battlefield instead of as a complementary system of fighting. He erroneously down plays the Indians fighting capability, ironically echoing many colonists who deplored the Indians’ unwillingness to fight in a conventional European manner: “When Indian troops were successful against forces in the field, it was usually as the result of an ambush…rather than a battle that involved actual combat and required tactical skill.”52 Chet again ignores Connecticut’s story and the obvious battlefield success of its allied Indians. Even with these shortcomings, Chet deserves credit as the first modern historian to realize that the

European played a decisive role in the New World, and that the colonists actively pursued European military methods for implementation in the colonies.

51 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, viii, 15, 37-42, 81, uses the term “Military Revolution” to discuss European influence on colonial military thinking, but then argues these methods were ineffective in the New World.

52 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 54. Chet clearly misunderstands Indian tactics and their longevity in the history of warfare. Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 113, also downplays Indian tactics and blames the Bloody Brook disaster on what he saw as Lathrop’s abandonment of European standard tactics for Indian “skulking” tactics.

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The colonists never completely overcame their initial disadvantage in the Indian style of warfare during King Philip’s War, except in rare cases. There was marked improvement by the war’s conclusion, but English forces never defeated the natives at their own game without the assistance of allied Indians. The Indians thus retained their advantage in the “skulking way of war” and largely performed the scouting, navigation, and security duties for the English forces. The term “skulking way of war” itself is a misleading description of how the Native Americans fought. In “Fortify, Flight or Flee,”

Wayne Lee uses the phrase “cutting off way of war,” establishing how the Indians actually fought in colonial America, “Strategic and/or cultural motives for war might change, as might intensity, but the operational style of Indian offensives remained the same–and that was to “cut off” a select segment of the enemy, and do so with impunity.”53 ‘Skulking’ implies the unwillingness to fight pitched battles, which was not the case. The early colonists who coined the phrase mistook Indian selectivity of military targets and “the ability to exploit particular conditions” as the lack of ‘European’ courage and tactical wherewithal.54 In reality, the Indians were seeking to maximize their advantages in fighting in the wilderness, while minimizing the colonists’ advantage in firepower. To “cut off” was idiomatic, at times it meant literally to kill as the Indians were willing to execute deadly attacks against colonists and other Indians alike when the

53 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 719.

54 As quoted in Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 19.

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situation presented itself.55 Lee further explains, “At war, [the Indians] mobilized through persuasion and consensus, with the significant addition of young men who sought status through success in war. The combination of young men's enthusiasm with the cultural requirement of blood revenge meant that war was common, but for the most part conducted on a small scale.”56 In order to achieve increased social status, warriors sought war trophies and thus it was imperative to make it back alive in order to demonstrate military prowess. Becoming a casualty brought no increase in martial reputation, and generally Native American populations could not easily replace lost warriors. Dr. Guilmartin has pointed out that the Indians “cutting off way of war” probably originated, in part, from the Indians’ inability to replace casualties given their lower birth rates and smaller communities. The colonists perceived the Indians’ resulting unwillingness to sustain high casualties, which was not in accord with Native American cultural norms, as cowardice and inexperience.57 This attitude downplayed the devastating effect of Indian raids and ambushes, usually executed when Indian forces

55 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 719-720.

56 Wayne Lee, “Using the Natives Against the Natives: Indigenes as ‘Counterinsurgents’ in the British Atlantic, 1500-1800,” Defense Studies, the United Kingdom College Journal, to be published next year.

57 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 18, mentions that the Indians did not want to sustain unnecessary casualties, but does not explain why.

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maintained a relative advantage, and the occasional Indian decision for . It also inaccurately minimizes the role that Connecticut’s allied Indians played in the colony’s success during King Philip’s War.

Some modern historians repeat some of the colonists’ misunderstanding of Indian

“cutting off” tactics. Leach also derides Indian fighting ability, for example, as “not very far advanced in the science of organized warfare…Apparently little attention was given to formal tactics except for ambush.”58 Because the Indians usually would not stand and fight, although Philip’s confederates did at Great Swamp, Sudbury and Pierce’s Fight, this did not make their form of warfare any less effective than European tactics. The

Indians were fighting in a fashion that utilized their strengths and took advantage of colonial weaknesses. Besides social status requirements and the inability to easily replace casualties, Native Americans utilized their advantage in mobility and maneuverability. Chet gives the Indians credit for mobility, but ignores the importance of the Indians’ maneuverability–mobility is the ability to deploy forces around the of operations and maneuverability is the ability to position forces on the battlefield (or the larger theater of operations) in an advantageous way against the enemy. The Indians in

King Philip’s War continually positioned themselves in an advantageous way against colonial forces, certainly not a simple task, and no less ‘tactical’ than European methods.

58 Douglas E. Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), 2-3.

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Chet singles out the Indians inability to attack fortified positions, which is somewhat true given their lack of , but completely in accordance with the Indians “cutting off way of war.” Of course with the ease which the Indians incorporated flintlock muskets into the “cutting off way of war,” it was possible that they would have learned some form of artillery usage if they possessed , as the Susquehannock in fact employed at the old Piscataway Fort.59 The examples that Chet offers for Indian incompetence in attacking garrisons (Northampton, Hadley, and Hatfield),60 are misleading because the

Indians did not know, in at least two of the cases, that large colonial forces happened to be temporarily quartered in the towns.61 In accordance with the “cutting off way of war,” the Indians would not have assaulted the fortifications if they had intelligence concerning the size of the garrisons. The hostile tribes’ failed because of bad luck and poor intelligence, not tactical incompetence. The concept that the Europeans introduced ‘total war’ to Native Americans thus also demands reinterpretation, as native-on-native warfare witnessed the destruction and displacement of tribes if the political or strategic objectives warranted–in some cases pre-contact.62 Both the English and Indian forces applied their

59 Malone, makes the adoption of the flintlock a central theme in Skulking Way or War. See also Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 10. For artillery use see Steele, Warpaths, 53.

60 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 43.

61 Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 204, 227.

62 Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, “Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal,” The William and Mary Quarterly 61, no. 1 (August 2008), show that 41

traditional military tactics during the war, and although there was an acculturation process, it was how the allied Indians and English systems complemented each other that mattered during this era of colonial warfare.

The exceptional Connecticut-Mohegan alliance was not the only factor determining the colony’s success. Connecticut Colony’s moderate policy towards its native neighbors solidified the military aspects of the alliance. ‘Moderate policy’ here means that the Connecticut Colony charted a middle course between the lenient policy of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations that was not backed up by colonial military power and ultimately led to the loss of many lives and devastation of much of the colony’s property, and the stringent policy of Massachusetts Bay Colony that saw the harsh treatment and internment of Indians throughout King Philip’s War that alienated the very natives which its forces needed on the battlefield. Massachusetts Bay

Colony also suffered high casualties and loss of property during the war. Connecticut

Colony, in contrast, achieved a middle-ground Indian policy by largely avoiding unnecessary violence towards the natives within its boundaries; arbitrating, rewarding, and negotiating with Connecticut tribes when necessary; while retaining a lethal

European military capability complemented by allied Indians to solidify the ‘soft-power’ policy methods.

the Native Americans were capable of wielding strategic-level military and diplomatic power, even as non-state actors. While Baker and Reid focus on the northern New England Wabanakis (a.k.a Abenakis), Uncas’ Mohegans are a good example of a southern New England tribe that exercised similar power. 42

A historical debate on Pilgrim/Puritan policy towards the Native Americans of

New England rages still today. I am making a moral judgment by arguing that

Connecticut Colony’s Indian policy was ‘moderate,’ necessitating the juxtaposition of the predominant historical views on the subject. Without an analytical framework that defines harsh and lenient native policies, I would be hard-pressed to judge a policy moderate. The modern historical debate over New England Indian policy began with

Alden Vaughn’s New England Frontier written to challenge the pervading historical view that the New England colonists were land-hungry, brutal oppressors of Indians who swindled them out of their land. Vaughan sets the historical record straight in many ways by showing that the New England colonists were sometimes good neighbors and at other times misguided or ignorant in their treatment of the natives, rather than simply malicious

(although there was some of that as well), “To my surprise, the evidence suggested a more humane and equitable treatment of the natives–at least in diplomatic negotiations, land acquisition, and the administration of justice.”63 Vaughan, however, does not adequately portray the Indian perspective, “by necessity, as well as by inclination, I have concentrated on the acts and attitudes of the Puritans toward the Indians and have not, for

63 Vaughan, New England Frontier, xiii. Leach largely seconds Vaughan’s view, describing European intentions as “peaceful.” Leach, Arms for Empire, 1. Dederer, War in America to 1775, 127, is in Vaughan’s camp as well, claiming that “[t]he colonists came to the New World thinking that they could convert the Native Americans not only religiously but culturally.” Although it is not the focus of his study, Starkey seizes the middle ground, correctly asserting that when judging actions, historians should be sensitive to morality of the time period. Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 12-14.

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the most part, attempted to account for the actions and reactions of the natives.”64 In recent editions, Vaughan has mildly qualified his argument over protests from those arguing that the Indians were victims of colonial aggression. The leader of this school of thought, Francis Jennings, argues in The of America: Indians, , and the Cant of for a tradition of American underhanded policy. For Jennings, the

Pilgrim-Puritan brutality stretches back to a lineage of European feudalistic vassalage with the colonists forcing Native Americans into the role of vassals.65 Connecticut

Colony during King Philip’s War was just as “omnivorous” and its leaders expansionist as the other New England colonies.66 Jennings argues that the western European

“Atlantic coast countries” were especially prone to “conquest aristocracy,” and exported this aggressive mentality overseas.67 Jennings’ sweep through European medieval and early modern history in a mere fourteen pages leaves much to be desired and is at best, an extreme historical stretch. He is better later in his text, examining individual cases of

Puritan malfeasance towards the Indians. A methodological problem with Jennings’ point of view is that in his attempt to portray the Indians as victims of unstoppable

64 Vaughan, New England Frontier, lxix; Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina Press, 1975), 14, criticizes Vaughan for this “inclination.”

65 Jennings, The Invasion of America, Chapter 1.

66 Jennings, The Invasion of America, 308-309, 320-321.

67 Jennings, The Invasion of America, 1, 7.

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European aggression, he detracts from Indian agency, painting the natives as the

“mythical creatures” that he sets out in the first place to expose as “rational human beings.”68 The historical problem with his premise is that the Pilgrims and Puritans were not aggressive aristocrats, but largely Calvinist outcasts of a Protestant movement then under . The Counter Reformation was in fact at its strongest at the time of the founding of Massachusetts Bay Colony. France had largely destroyed Huguenot power

68 Jennings, The Invasion of America, 14. Steele, Warpaths, 1, 80, agrees with Jennings that the colonists were invaders, although he produces a less scathing account. A problem with the invasion argument was that in Plymouth’s case, as with other early European settlements in the New World, the Pilgrims were dependent on Wampanoag Indian patrons for food and military support, certainly an odd position for an ‘invading force.’ Wayne Lee, “Subjects, Clients, Allies or Mercenaries? The British Use of Irish and Indian Military Power, 1500-1815,” makes this same point, while noting that the treaty between the Pilgrims and Wampanoags ironically claimed that the Wampanoags were the clients, when the latter were more powerful. The Susquehanna (a.k.a Susquehannocks) were also the patrons of the colony of New as Cynthia Van Zandt recounts in “Nations Intertwined: Getting Beyond Regional Boundaries in Seventeenth- Century American History,” presented at Boston Area Early American History Seminar Massachusetts Historical Society 8 2001. Jennings’ and Steele’s theory detract from Indian agency by making the Indians victims when in fact they maintained the real power in the relationship with the original colonists, at least for the first few decades of European colonization. Grenier’s The First Way of War actually takes Jennings theory one-step further, arguing that the English colonists’ objective was “extirpative war, what today’s soldier’s term unlimited warfare, manifested by the destruction of enemy noncombatants and their agricultural resources” (21). Two of his prominent examples for New England are the often discussed “massacres” at the Pequot’s Mystic Fort and the Narragansetts’ Great Swamp fortification (27, 32). If this were truly the objective of English colonial forces, why did they bother capturing women and children on numerous expeditions? These are also misleading examples because the Pequot and Narragansett warriors were fighting from among the non-combatants in both of these cases. This made the non-combatants unfortunate but legitimate targets by not only the standards of seventeenth-century warfare, but today’s internationally recognized doctrine of self-defense. I do not doubt that the English, and their Indian allies for that matter, committed atrocities at Mystic and Great Swamp, but it is a stretch to say that it was colonial policy to kill all Native Americans. Interestingly, atrocities committed by Native Americans have been omitted from Grenier’s early New England account. Instead he measures the destruction wrought by Philip’s confederates in terms of houses burned and with the more sterile term “casualties” (31-32).

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by 1628, England was controlled by a Catholic-friendly monarchy, and the then formidable Habsburg Empire was on the march in and the to isolate, if not eliminate, Protestant strongholds.69 The Puritans were shunned from most places in Europe, and thus Europe itself was not a monolithic giant seeking to impose a supposed feudal will on distant lands with the devastating Thirty Years War and related conflicts raging on the continent.

The Connecticut Colony was certainly not without fault, however, in its dealing with the Indians. This was especially true during the inter-war years where fault lines between the colonists and the Indians over religion, legal status, economic resources and political power created disruptive conditions. Yet the Connecticut Colony resourcefully arbitrated disputes, and almost always backed its principle native client, Uncas, sachem of the Mohegans. During the war, there were atrocities committed against prisoners of war. As Lepore indicates, Connecticut soldiers witnessed the torture and killing of prisoners at the hands of their Indian allies.70 A group of colonists also conducted a revenge killing on two hostile Indians in Connecticut’s custody. Some town ordinances also attempted to restrict local Indian activities. But unlike Jennings’ claim, positive

69 The Huguenot’s fortress at fell to the French Catholic forces in 1628, and Wallenstein’s Imperial Army defeated Denmark’s Christian IV’s Protestant army at the Battle of Wolgast. Wikipedia contributors, “Battle of Wolgast” in Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wolgast (accessed 4 2008).

70 Lepore, The Name of War, 3-18.

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treatment and moderation outweighed negative incidents, as Connecticut’s actions towards the Indians within the colony’s borders were noteworthy even by our modern standards.

Connecticut Colony in 1675-1676 acted in a manner more in accord with

Vaughan’s description, seeking to co-opt its native population’s fighting ability, and treating both the allied and neutral Indians as humanely as possible, at least impart to keep them out of Philip’s camp. Without significant policy measures to keep the

Mohegans, Pequots, and western Niantic Indians militarily aligned, as well as tribes along the Connecticut, Farmington, and Housatonic Rivers neutral, the

Connecticut Colony’s military preparedness may not have been enough to prevent attacks by Philip’s forces. There was a pattern in the other New England colonies indicating that local Indians, who the colonists presumed were neutral, joined secretly with Philip’s forces and facilitated surprise attacks on the neighboring English towns. These tribes had the intelligence that Philip’s warriors needed concerning local conditions such as terrain and the routines, habits, and defensive posture of the neighboring colonists. This situation occurred at places like Brookfield, Springfield and Northfield with devastating consequences for the English. The colonists often precipitated these attacks with their heavy-handed measures, provoking the hostile attitude of their Indian neighbors. Their policy was markedly different than Connecticut, which repeatedly warned the other

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colonies to treat Indians fairly.71 Connecticut avoided devastation not because of the absence of hostile forces. War parties, which had slipped by the joint Connecticut-

Indians forces, operated within the colony’s borders throughout the war. Connecticut’s uniquely humane and farsighted policy kept the Connecticut natives loyal or neutral, preventing the hostile Indians from gaining the support that they needed to carry out large-scale attacks. Connecticut supplied its allied Indians with sufficient arms and ammunition to fight, and provided the Indians living within its borders with English coats in reward for good service and neutrality.72 Connecticut’s Council of War even advocated a unique joint-defense plan for two towns, which directed that the local Indians move inside the town’s fortifications for mutual defense. Connecticut also commissioned

Indian leaders to carry out their own operations against Philip’s hostile forces and to

71 Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 113, points this out as well. The Connecticut Colonial Records discussed below confirm this attitude. Pulsipher, however, goes on to claim that Connecticut could afford a more moderate policy because it was relatively more secure than the other New England colonies (117). Pulsipher has placed the cart before the horse here, as it was Connecticut’s policy that made the colony more secure by keeping the Indians living within its borders allied or neutral. Although Connecticut did not border Wampanoag country, the more powerful Narragansetts were geographically nearer to Connecticut than Plymouth or Massachusetts Bay Colony, and the Nipmuck and Connecticut River Indians to the north also bordered Connecticut. With three quarters of the tribes composing Philip’s confederacy bordering Connecticut, the colony was certainly not in a more secure position than the other New England colonies, and in fact faced the additional threat of Governor Andros on its western flank.

72 Some historians will argue that Connecticut Colony’s “gifts” to the Native Americans were another attempt at deception and deceit. The colonists distribution of material goods, however, conferred diplomatic recognition to the Indians, and the Indians acceptance of these signified a reciprocal relationship. This argument shows that the Indians were politically savvy rather than dupes, who would have been simply fooled by trinkets. 48

coordinate with other local tribes. Far from aristocratic expansionists importing a feudal system, the Connecticut colonists were practical farmers attempting to survive in the harsh New England wilderness.

The Connecticut Native Americans had a choice in the course of events. This seems obvious, but the lack of primary sources for Indians always lessens historian’s ability to more precisely define Indian motives and reconstruct their worldview.

Fragmentary evidence of the Indian voice has survived through the colonial records and other contemporary sources, but usually historians are left with only a fleeting glimpse of

Indian objectives. Thus historians largely guess at the Native American perspective based on the back-story of the colonists’ account. The lack of Indian primary documents now, however, cannot alter the fact of Indian agency during King Philip’s War. The

Connecticut natives chose the Connecticut Colony as allies, and in some cases protectors, as much as the colony opted for a policy of moderation. There was no doubt that shrewd political actors, like Uncas and Ninigret, understood that their best chance of survival was through cooperation with the English. Yet a far greater number of New England Indians opted to fight the colonists, and chance their survival on the field of battle. With so many

New England Native Americans deciding to fight against the colonists and their Indian allies, it is difficult to believe that their motivation was suicidal. Perhaps they knew that total victory was unlikely, but they had decided to fight for a compromise solution that would gain concessions in matters of jurisdiction and land disputes. Maybe they

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originally believed that more support from other powerful Indian tribes such as the

Mohegans and Mohawks would tip the military balance in their favor. Certainly the hope for French intervention against their English enemies was not beyond reason. Whatever the motivation of the hostile tribes, the Connecticut Indians chose a different course than

Philip and his confederates.

The Connecticut natives faced three courses of action: to join with the English as the Mohegans, Pequots, western Niantics did; to remain neutral as many of the river tribes opted; to take up arms against their colonial neighbors. Certainly all were influenced by Connecticut’s relatively moderate policies, especially evident after Philip’s rebellion spread throughout New England. The non-allied tribes probably faced a measure of coercion from the most powerful Connecticut tribes actively in the field against Philip’s forces. Still they could have chanced confrontation with the colonists for the same reasons as the hostile tribes. In terms of their immediate survival, they made the right choice by refusing to join with Philip.

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CHAPTER 4

FORGING AN ALLIANCE: THE PEQUOT WAR AND THE INTERWAR YEARS

1636-1674

“The Narragansetts will all leave you, but as for myself, I will never leave you,” promised Uncas, “chief sachem of the Moheags,”73 to Connecticut’s commander John

Mason during the Pequot War as they marched into Pequot territory. Most of the

Narragansetts abandoned the march, but Uncas, true to his promise, remained loyal to the

English not only throughout the war, but his lifetime. The Pequot War of 1636-1637 forged the Connecticut Colony-Mohegan alliance, which was further solidified during the interwar years. This alliance was mutually beneficial, allowing Uncas to achieve regional native hegemony, while the Connecticut colonists gained military flexibility because of the wilderness fighting skills of their native allies.

73 As quoted in Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 18, 66.

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Uncas had offered his tribe’s military assistance to the fledgling Connecticut

Colony for reasons of realpolitik. Uncas was of “royal” Indian blood and had asserted this hereditary right to the Pequot sachemship prior to the conflict.74 He claimed this position through his father, who was a son of the principle Pequot sachem.75 Uncas’ claim was rejected and his cousin assumed the chieftainship of the Pequots.

Uncas never forgave the decision, embarking upon years of subterfuge to overthrow his cousin and dominate both tribes. Uncas was even banished to the enemy Narragansetts for a time before pledging allegiance to Sassacus.76 When the Pequots ran afoul of the

English in the years that followed, Uncas recognized an opportunity to finally overthrow

Sassacus and to establish the Mohegans as the hegemonic native power between the

Pawcatuck and Quinnipiac Rivers, much of what is now Connecticut and western Rhode

Island.

74 Historians first argued that the Pequots and Mohegans were one tribe, and that Uncas had changed the name back to the old tribal name of Mohegan when he broke with Sassacus. Based on recent archaeology, however, historians think that the tribes were separate going back at least hundred of years based on different ceramic pottery samples. There is no evidence for a previous unity of the tribes, although they were closely related. For the pottery discussion see Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 18. Alfred A. Cave, The Pequot War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 66, also describes recent evidence indicating that the Mohegans were a separate tribe such as a Dutch map from 1614 ascribing different names and areas to both as well as known hunting disputes between the two tribes.

75 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 18.

76 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 48.

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Fortunately for the English, one of their primary military leaders was Major John

Mason. The savvy Thirty Years War veteran capitalized on the opportunity to co-opt

Uncas in the colonists’ war against the Pequots.77 The other New England colonies did not capitalize on the lessons learned during the Pequot War of 1636-1637, especially in the area of utilizing native troops. They would pay dearly for this oversight during King

Philip’s War.

At the crux of the Connecticut Colony’s Mohegan alliance was the military cooperation between the colonists and Indians. Survival was the obvious common interest of the two parties, especially during the internecine conflicts of seventeenth century southern New England. It is doubtful that the relationship would have been maintained peaceably with the colonists’ encroachment on the Mohegan’s native lands and religion as well as diverging economic and political objectives. But the alliance withstood these potential threats, due mainly to the relationships and mutual trust forged during times of war.

Uncas initiated his service to Connecticut Colony early in the Pequot War by warning the colonists that they had to respond militarily to a Pequot raid on Wethersfield.

Uncas advised the Connecticut leadership that if it appeared weak in fighting the Pequots,

77 Cave, The Pequot War, 137; Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 50-51; Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 7.

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they risked pushing the Mohegans and other unaligned Indians into the Pequot camp.78

The Pequots were the militarily dominant power in southern New England, and the

Mohawks were the only tribe in the greater New England region that retained such a military reputation. This reputation accounted for most of the Narragansetts deserting

Mason’s expedition as it neared the Pequot fort at Mystic. The colonists had to act decisively or risk appearing weak and ineffectual to the other Indians, which in turn would have bolstered Pequot strength. Uncas also stood to gain by a decisive Pequot defeat at the hands of the English because of his desire to take revenge on Sassacus and increase his own power. Even so, it is doubtful that he would have predicted just how devastating the Mystic attack actually would be for the Pequots.

Mason’s march from , after implementing an indirect approach into Pequot country in order to retain the element of surprise, was the first major operation in New England that included a significant friendly Indian force. This army consisted of Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay forces along with Mohegans and

Narragansetts, and probably some eastern Niantics. The native allies conducted scouting and flank security duties as well as navigating the expedition through the wilderness.

After the army arrived at Mystic, the Mohegans and remaining Narragansetts formed the perimeter around the Pequot fort, and the English forces executed the assault on the

78 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 52. Vaughan, New England Frontier, 141, makes the important point that Uncas “chose” Connecticut. As I argued in the last section, Indian agency and motives often get lost in the history due to a lack of evidence. 54

village. The Indians–friendly and enemy–did not expect the decisive victory that followed because of the Pequots’ military reputation.79 Few Pequots escaped the English assault, and Cave reports that even some friendly Indians on the outer perimeter were accidentally wounded.80 After the battle, the Massachusetts Bay forces departed by water, while Mason and the Connecticut troops, ably assisted by Uncas, fought their way back to Saybrook Fort, where they had initially departed.81 The fight at Mystic led

Malone to make his claim concerning the use of fire against villages that Philip’s forces later adopted, and Hirsch to argue that the Indians adopted the concept of total war from this conflict, and Steele to claim both. Malone, Hirsch, and Steele, whatever their assessments, at least realized that the attack at Mystic was a critical moment in early New

England colonial history. The most important outcome of this battle actually was that the friendly Native American forces utilized their military strengths–scouting, security,

79 Cave, The Pequot War, 152, argues that it was the devastation at Mystic that shocked the colonists’ Indian allies in accordance with the standard theory that the “skulking way of war” was not ‘total’ in nature. Besides the more realistic designation of the “cutting off way of war,” recent evidence suggests that when the remaining Narragansetts protested the slaughter of the Pequots, they were actually protesting the destruction of potential spoils of war, including prisoners. See Wayne Lee, “Subjects, Clients, Allies or Mercenaries? The British Use of Irish and Indian Military Power, 1500-1815.”

80 Cave, The Pequot War, 151.

81 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, describes Mohegan assistance during the Pequot War starting on page 72. Johnson, “The Search for a Usable Indian,” 646, briefly describes the Mohegans and Connecticut Colony relationship as “balanced and mutually profitable interdependence.”

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navigating–while the English utilized their ability in assaulting fortifications. This watershed event in colonial history established a system of that would prove devastatingly effective for those who realized the true lessons of Mystic.

Uncas and Mason certainly understood the importance of what had been accomplished, not only at the political level, with the extinguishing of Pequot hegemony in southern New England, but of the effectiveness of joint-force operations. Mystic set the tone for the rest of the Pequot War, which consisted primarily of hunting down the

Pequots who were desperately trying to flee the region. The military relationship continued along the lines established at Mystic, with both the English and the Mohegans conducting the operations that they did best. During the last major engagement at

Fairfield Swamp, the Mohegans tracked down the Pequots and formed the outer perimeter, while the English executed the assault.82 Events in the interwar years showed that the relationship between Uncas and Mason, and on a larger scale, the Mohegans and the Connecticut Colony, was not a transient relationship based only on the mutual Pequot threat. Both the Mohegans and the Connecticut colonists realized the efficacy of joint operations, and even when there were disagreements, the shared benefit and mutual respect of the military alliance prevented a severing of ties.

82 Cave, The Pequot War, 160. 56

As Uncas built the power of the Mohegan tribe on the remnants of the Pequot nation and colonists continued to immigrate to Connecticut, friendly ties with the

Narragansetts established during the Pequot War began to unravel. As a sister tribe and likely tributary, the Mohegans had closer ties to the Pequots than they did to the

Narragansetts, and inherited the Pequot’s feud with that tribe. A straining of Mohegan-

Narragansett relations occurred from memories of the Mohegans’ previous support to the

Pequots, competition over Pequot prisoners of war and the Pequot’s share of the wampum trade, and claims over Pequot hunting grounds. Uncas took advantage of the colonists’ good will towards his tribe for its support during the Pequot War, often at the expense of the Narragansetts and their grand sachem Miantonomi. Uncas desired to fill the underlying economic and power vacuum created by the collapse of southern New

England’s most powerful tribe by exacerbating the tense situation with the Narragansetts to the point of war. He accused Miantonomi of a conspiracy to ally various tribes, including the feared Mohawks against the English colonists. Although Miantonomi successfully cleared his name at Boston, he never forgave Uncas for approaching the

English authorities, and he invaded Mohegan country with a much larger force than

Uncas was able to muster. Miantonomi probably thought that he had persuaded the

English to remain neutral in the intra-Indian feud, and thus was confident in his chances of defeating the smaller Mohegan tribe. Tradition says that Uncas used a ruse by challenging Miantonomi to individual combat, and then dropped to the ground as his

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Mohegans showered the unsuspecting Narragansetts with a of arrows. Surprised, the Narragansetts fled in confusion and Miantonomi was captured because he was weighed down by chain that he had worn into battle.83 Presented as Uncas’ prisoner at Hartford, he was turned back over to Uncas for disposition in a show of neutrality, as the colonial authorities knew that this was in effect a death sentence. The Mohegans subsequently executed Miantonomi.84 The Narragansett tribe never forgot this episode, and through the intervening decades, variously invaded Mohegan territory or instigated against Uncas. Connecticut Colony did not contribute military support for Uncas on this occasion, but its decision to allow Uncas to adjudicate Miantonomi’s fate was clearly a vote in support of their Mohegan client.

Miantonomi’s brother Pessicus then inherited the Narragansett sachemship, and took the warpath against the Mohegans in order to revenge his brother’s death. He achieved more military success than his brother, raiding Mohegan country against the orders of the United Colonies, and even besieging Uncas’ main fort at Shantok in 1645.85

This time, the Connecticut colonists aided the Mohegans militarily, sending relief supplies up the Thames River and over the river’s bluffs into , where the

83 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 103.

84 For the Pequot War through death of Miantonomi see Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 72-111.

85 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 112-114. 58

Narragansetts had failed to place a guard.86 Thomas Peters, a Connecticut leader, wrote to Governor John Winthrop of Massachusetts Bay Colony in May 1645 that “I with your son [John Winthrop Jr.] were at Uncus Fort where I dressed 17 men and left plasters to dresse 17 more which were wounded…”87 Not only did the English re-supply Uncas, the colonial gentry dressed the wounds of their native allies. Understanding that the mutual relationship was too important for the security of the colony, Connecticut’s leaders prevented Uncas’ defeat. The other New England colonies also realized the advantages of maintaining Mohegan power, and prepared an invasion force for the Narragansett and eastern Niantic country, forcing both tribes to accept a humiliating peace.88

All alliances have weaknesses, and the limitations of the Connecticut Colony-

Mohegan Alliance became evident when colonial and Mohegan economic and political interests collided in the region of former Pequot dominance. After the Narragansett-

Niantic threat was temporarily blunted, both the English and Mohegans attempted to exploit the resources of the area. The main source of tension within the alliance occurred when John Winthrop Jr. developed economic interests on the lower Pequot River

(Thames River). John Winthrop Jr. figures prominently in Connecticut’s moderate policy towards Native Americans, especially once he became Governor of Connecticut Colony

86 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 113-114.

87 Letter from Thomas Peters to John Winthrop Sr., May 1645, in Winthrop Papers V (Boston: Merrymount Press, 1947), 19.

88 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 116. 59

intermittently throughout the interwar period.89 Even though he never resorted to force to protect his claims, his material interests were at odds with Connecticut’s most valuable

Indian ally. Winthrop also championed the cause of the Pequots in proximity of Pequot

Plantation further alienating the Mohegans. The symbolic nature of developing this plantation (also known as Nameag and by 1658 New London)90 literally on the site of the former main fortress of the Pequots, along with its economic implications for the wampum trade, was not lost on Uncas. Winthrop, writing to Thomas Peters on the 3rd

September 1646 from Boston, indicated the deterioration of his relationship with the

Mohegans from the previous year when both men were assisting Uncas in person at Fort

Shantock, “If the Pequotts be not taken under the English, If these Indians that we must live neere be still under Uncas command, there will be noe living for English there…”91

Uncas had argued that the remnants of the Pequots should act as a tributary tribe to his victorious Mohegans, while Winthrop advocated for the freedom of the Pequots in the vicinity of his new plantation. The underlying tensions undoubtedly centered on the potential use of Pequot labor for their own purposes, the disposition of Pequot territory for hunting and agricultural development, and the ability to dominate the former Pequot

89 Winthrop’s influence on Connecticut Colony’s policy of moderation is detailed below.

90 Winthrop, in a letter to Dutch New York Governor refers to a mandate of the Connecticut General Court to re-name Pequot New London. Winthrop Papers, VIII, Fifth Series, (Cambridge: University Press, John Wilson and Son, 1882), 49.

91 Winthrop Papers V, 100. 60

share of the wampum trade. Uncas had the added pressure of Indian legitimacy thrown into the economic mix because as a now powerful sachem, he had to wield power over the lesser Indian tribes in his sphere of influence, especially those he had conquered.

Winthrop’s interests posed a serious threat to this mandate.

The United Colonies were not prepared to cause friction with their erstwhile ally, now the most powerful tribe west of the , even if Uncas’ interests were at odds with the son of the Governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony. From Boston,

Samuel Symonds wrote to Winthrop Jr. in September 1646 advising, “Uncas may be kept a friend still to the English; but yet soe that he be not suffered…to insult, or wronge other

Indians.”92 Yet tensions boiled over in 1647, when Uncas backed up his demands by force. He led a party of Mohegans on a raid of the Pequot village adjacent to Winthrop’s settlement, roughing-up some of the Pequots and looting and destroying their property.

Although no one was killed, this event sparked colonial diplomatic action, further propelled by the lobbying of Winthrop, who had written to Boston protesting the raid.93

John Mason, still a supporter of Uncas, composed the treaty that established a formal tributary relationship between the Mohegans and Pequots. The agreement dated 24

February 1647 between Uncas and the Nameag Pequots’ sachem Cassasinamon ordered that the Pequots pay tribute and respect Uncas’ authority as well as “attend him in such

92 Winthrop Papers V, 100.

93 Winthrop Papers V, 124. 61

services of peace or warre as they shall be directed to by the Governor of Connecticott until the meeting of the Comissioners…”94 Uncas’ claims had temporarily triumphed over the protests of the colonists at Pequot.

The relationship between the Mason family and Uncas would continue to develop over the intervening decades, and the Masons remained the most vigorous supporters of

Mohegan land rights after King Philip’s War.95 The relationship between Mason and

Uncas often placed Mason at odds with Winthrop, as the latter continued to remonstrate for the freedom of the Nameag Pequots from Uncas’ authority.96 Winthrop may have written to Mason from Pequot Plantation on 19 September 1648, the letter appears unfinished and it remains uncertain if it was actually sent, concerning hunting disputes of various tribes and criticizing the Mohegans “Surmises and Jelousies.”97 Even if

Winthrop never sent the letter, it is a good indication of his continued distaste for Uncas.

94 Winthrop Papers V, 131.

95 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 155. Johnson, “The Search for a Usable Indian,” 649.

96 Mason and Winthrop Jr. were not always at odds as indicated by a letter from Mason at Saybrook to Winthrop at Nameag on 9 September 1648, advising that Wequashcook’s Pequots at Pawcatuck were “very desireous of frindship with the English.” Winthrop Papers V, 250.

97 Winthrop Papers V, 355.

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In July 1649, Winthrop wrote to the Commissioners of the United Colonies at

Boston, again making the case that the Pequots at Nameag should be free from the

Mohegans and the Narragansetts, and arguing for their autonomy because “Uncas hath sole militia of all the other Pequotts.”98 Winthrop sent another letter, this time to

Connecticut Colony Governor on 28 August 1649 asking him to prevent

Uncas from provoking the Narragansetts. A Mohegan war party had raided a

Narragansett village killing “an old woman,” and the Narragansetts had killed one

Mohegan warrior in the subsequent skirmish. Winthrop also mentioned Narragansett wampum as a central factor in his desire for keeping the peace: “so they (the

Naragansets) may the more securely goe on in the providing the wampam that is yet behind.”99 Although this letter was also unfinished, Winthrop followed it with another on the same day to Governor Haynes, which was sent.100 In 1650, Winthrop advised

Captain Atherton, leader of an expedition into Narragansett territory not to provoke the powerful tribe into fighting the English colonists, probably as much due to his adherence to a policy of moderation towards the native peoples as well as his economic interests at

Pequot that would be disrupted by hostilities.101 These exchanges make clear that a

98 Winthrop Papers V, 354.

99 Winthrop Papers V, 360.

100 Winthrop Papers V, n. 360.

101 Winthrop Papers VIII, Fifth Series (Cambridge: University Press, John Wilson and Son, 1882), 42. 63

complicated intersection of colonial and tribal politics, economic factors, and struggles for power emerged in the former Pequot territory more than a decade after that tribe’s collapse.102 The complexity of events showed that there was no clear line of demarcation between the interests of the Native Americans and the English, as Mason supported

Uncas and Winthrop supported Cassasinamon. The Narragansetts and eastern Niantics were the exception because they lacked powerful English patronage.103

Uncas then, did not always enjoy the full support of the English, especially those colonists whose interests were at odds with his own objectives. This was magnified when Winthrop became Connecticut Governor in the mid-late-, and Uncas’ prerogatives began to lose support, especially concerning his power over the Nameag

Pequots. Yet when push literally came to shove, when the Narragansetts, Niantics,

Pocumtucks, Mohawks and other tribes intermittently attempted to conquer Uncas by force of arms, the English colonists invariably came to his rescue as they had previously.

In 1648, a confederacy of tribes hostile to the Mohegans, consisting of the Mohawks,

102 The English did not always understand the complexities of Indian-European relations as Winthrop explains in a letter to his son-in-law about Dutch and overtures to Uncas in 1658. See Winthrop Papers VIII, 53. The Wappinger were an Algonquian people, a sub-group of or closely related to the Lenni or Indian cultural group, inhabiting the north of Manhattan northwards towards Mahican territory, and northwestwards towards Mohawk territory. See map http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lenape (accessed 10 July 2008).

103 of the Providence Plantations was the most vocal supporter of the Narragansetts, but because of the Puritan suspicions and distaste over his religious beliefs, he never held much sway with colonial authorities.

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Pocumtucks, Narragansetts, determined to attack Uncas and destroy his hegemony over southern New England. The colonists dissuaded the hostile tribes at Pocumtuck (now

Deerfield, Massachusetts) from molesting Uncas by threatening war. Soon after, the colonists resolved a dispute between Uncas and his brother Wawequa that witnessed the

English send forces to protect Uncas at Fort Shantock.104 Uncas also persuaded the colonial leaders that sachem Ninigret of the eastern Niantics, who had increased his power, was plotting to ally with the Dutch against the English in the early-1650s.105 The

Dutch and English both claimed Connecticut territory, and the Anglo-Dutch wars brought these tensions to the surface.106 A Dutch-Niantic alliance would have given the Dutch a powerful ally to reinforce these claims by force, and potentially open another theater in their global war against England. Thomas Stanton, who had been the colonial emissary at Pocumtuck, warned Ninigret not to conspire against the English.107 Whether there was an actual conspiracy is beside the point, Uncas had again succeeded in convincing the colonists to protect his interests.108 The English came to his assistance once more in the

104 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 130-135.

105 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 132-133.

106 The Dutch eventually gave way to the English at Hartford, but there were continual tensions between the Dutch traders and English colonists. The English even fired cannon at the Dutch on at least one occasion, and European style-fortifications were built in part because of the Dutch threat to the Connecticut Colony. Both are described in more detail below.

107 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 136.

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mid-late-1650s, when the Narragansetts drove Uncas from Shantock, and again when

Uncas was besieged by a confederacy of hostile tribes at the western Niantic fort.109 The western Niantics were tributaries of the Mohegans, and connected through intermarriage.

Uncas’ son Attawanhood, or Joshua to the English, was sachem of the western Niantics during King Philip’s War. Even during this period when Connecticut Colony did not always support Uncas’ economic and political objectives, it was unwilling to allow

Uncas’ power to diminish at the hands of the other tribes. Connecticut had learned during the Pequot War that it needed Native American support in order to effectively battle other Indians.

The interwar years demonstrated that the Indian way of war was not the only effective tactical method of fighting in colonial New England. The English successfully deterred hostile attacks on Uncas at Shantock and the Niantic fort. As Oberg asserts,

“Uncas...relied upon the English for protection” during this interwar period.110 The

English had also successfully assaulted the powerful Pequots at Mystic and Fairfield utilizing European style tactics. These battles illustrate that the European way of fighting

108 Uncas planted the seeds of discord between the colonists and the other Indian tribes throughout the interwar period, such as in Ninigret’s case and the earlier situation leading to Miantonomi’s execution. Mohegans also informed colonial authorities of an alleged plot to kidnap Winthrop Jr. in order to gain leverage for the release of Narragansett hostages taken in accordance with the colonial-Narragansett treaty of 1645. See 27 September 1646 letter from William Pynchon at Springfield to John Winthrop Sr. at Boston advising him about the Mohegan intelligence, Winthrop Papers V, 114-5 and n. 1 115 reference the treaty.

109 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 140-150.

110 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 130. 66

was not completely obsolete in the New World. The victories attributable to English tactics, primarily in garrison defense and assaults on fortified or easily defensible positions, foreshadowed similar English success during King Philip’s War.

The interwar years witnessed the overall strengthening of the Connecticut

Colony-Mohegan alliance. Sometimes at odds over economic interests and political objectives, the alliance proved resilient in times of danger. The colonial governments, not just Connecticut Colony, understood that Uncas’ continued friendship impacted colonial security, and they supported him, sometimes even over the interests of powerful colonial leaders like John Winthrop Jr. English military methods proved decisive in maintaining Uncas’ power, a favor that he returned when the Mohegans and their tributaries proved their military effectiveness in King Philip’s War.

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CHAPTER 5

PHILIP’S THREAT TO CONNECTICUT

Before coming to terms with the effectiveness of Connecticut’s defenses, it is necessary to thoroughly examine the type of hostile threat that Philip’s confederacy posed towards Connecticut Colony. If Philip’s forces did not actually enter the colony, then we would not be able to determine the efficacy of Connecticut’s defensive posture, other than to guess about its effectiveness as a deterrent. And if his forces did sally into

Connecticut, what were their objectives, how did they do so, and what real military threat did they pose? The secondary sources are strangely silent on the matter of hostile forces in Connecticut. Concentrating on the other colonies, the narrative histories only mention the burning of abandoned Simsbury in north-central Connecticut and the occasional colonists’ sighting of hostile Indians.

At the beginning of the conflict, Philip was likely uninterested in attacking

Connecticut. Connecticut posed no immediate threat to the Wampanoags, although the

Mohegans offered support to Massachusetts Bay Colony soon after the onset of hostilities.111 Philip’s Wampanoags were fighting alone in the beginning, with likely material support from the Narragansetts, and concentrated their efforts on Plymouth

111 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 88-89. 68

Colony. When Massachusetts Bay forces arrived to assist Plymouth, the Wampanoags likely expanded their objectives to include nearby Bay Colony towns, although Philip’s main priority soon became an escape to Nipmuck country. The nature of the conflict changed when Philip successfully evaded capture, fleeing to central Massachusetts with many of his warriors, having convinced the Nipmucks and eventually Connecticut River

Indians to join the rebellion. This was when the war initially spread from a local conflict to a regional war, and when Connecticut was directly threatened for the first time.

The Nipmuck tribes bordered northeastern Connecticut and were old enemies of the Mohegans/Pequots. Given the upper Connecticut River Indians history of animosity towards Connecticut’s most powerful tribe, when they joined with Philip, they threatened

Connecticut’s north-central and northeastern borders. Connecticut became an even greater target as soon as it sent forces to aid the Massachusetts Bay towns on the

Connecticut River. The likely immediate goal of Philip towards Connecticut then was to disrupt the colony’s offensive operations, isolating the Massachusetts Bay towns on the

Connecticut River, and forcing them to fight alone and especially without allied Indian assistance. Philip occasionally attained this objective by causing Connecticut to repeatedly withdraw its forces from the upper Connecticut valley to respond to threats within its own borders.112 This was very short lived success, however, as Connecticut’s

112 Massachusetts Bay Colony, throughout the conflict, urged Connecticut to play a greater offensive role and to supply it and Plymouth Colony with more material aid. In the western theater of operations along the upper Connecticut alone, there was a crisis in the colonial chain of command, overlapping territorial claims, and differing military strategies. This situation 69

forces always returned and conducted numerous offensive operations throughout the war.

Philip’s confederacy’s secondary goal would have been to invade Connecticut with numerous forces to destroy the more undefended portions of the colony, probably those areas that were relying only on garrison defense, and force Connecticut to come to terms.

Philip’s forces would have had to have driven back the frontiers of Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonies first, then the principle seats of the conflict, in order to concentrate exclusively on Connecticut without worrying about his rear area logistics.

This too nearly occurred in the spring of 1676. With Connecticut forces operating in the field and disrupting his confederacy’s operations and logistics, Philip had no choice but to confront Connecticut in some way in order to achieve his greater objectives.

Philip’s goals changed when the Narragansetts joined the conflict en masse after the colonies’ attack on the Great Swamp fort. The Narragansetts had considerably more clout than Philip, the tribe was more numerous and warlike, and likely dictated new objectives to Philip’s confederacy. The Narragansetts were also more disposed to attack

Connecticut. As we have seen, the tribe had repeatedly tried to annihilate the Mohegans, its ancient enemies, and grown to distrust and dislike the United Colonies, especially

was a microcosm for problems with the unity of the United Colonies, which suffered irreparable damage as a result of the conflict, due to the divergent goals of the three New England colonies (Providence Plantations were excluded). England eventually disbanded the United Colonies and attempted to impose a more centrally controlled system on New England in the decades that followed King Philip’s War.

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Connecticut Colony, after the ‘execution’ of Miantonomo.113 In the winter of 1675-1676, a joint colonial army aided by allied Indians had largely driven the tribe from its traditional home in southern and central Rhode Island, and the Narragansetts seem to have decided to risk the outcome of a total war, instead of what was probably Philip’s more modest goals. As indicated below, the Narragansetts were behind the rejection of two Connecticut peace proposals, and although groups of Nipmucks and Wampanoags eventually began to defect from the confederacy, no significant Narragansett group attempted to go over to the English.114 The Narragansetts certainly included

Connecticut’s destruction high on its list of objectives, the colony for which the

Narragansetts felt the most enmity. Connecticut had always feared that the Narragansetts would join with Philip, acting in the beginning of the war as we shall see, to secure its eastern border and sending a force to ensure Narragansett neutrality, while Governor

Winthrop in Boston argued against the Great Swamp expedition. Faced with Philip’s confederation on its northern flank during the late summer through early winter of the conflict, Connecticut after Great Swamp faced a two front war with the more powerful

Narragansetts still within striking distance of its eastern frontier.

113 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 39-40.

114 The Wabaquassets, a sub-tribe of the Nipmucks and tributary to Uncas placed themselves under Uncas’ protection during the war (CCR, 474), and various Wampanoag groups went over to Benjamin Church (Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 251). Other Nipmuck sub-groups went over to Massachusetts Bay Colony, Vaughan, New England Frontier, 315. 71

Although the secondary sources are silent about the threat to Connecticut, the primary documents illustrate that war parties operated within the colony despite the best efforts of the Connecticut forces. Connecticut launched numerous offensive expeditions to maintain the initiative and keep the war from Connecticut territory. The colony also maintained an active defense of patrolling and scouting integrated with garrison defense and eventually more advanced European-style fortifications. Still the hostile Indians infiltrated into Connecticut, which probably was not entirely preventable given the small nature of the war parties, their ability to avoid detection, and the sheer amount of territory that Connecticut forces had to patrol. Although rugged in many areas, Connecticut’s highest point in the war’s area of operations is only approximately 1800 ft. The rugged terrain and rivers served as obstacles, not impenetrable barriers. There were four main

‘avenues of approach’ for enemy forces into Connecticut.115 The northern approaches were from southwestern Massachusetts, where Philip’s forces were operating with impunity, into north-central Connecticut. The primary avenue of approach was the

Connecticut River Valley. A band of flat terrain, 5-10 miles in width, runs on either side

115 Avenues of approach are more than trails or pathways. These are better considered as corridors marked by accessible and traversable terrain that allows for rapid movement. Valleys and flat meadows are good examples of terrain that corresponds with avenues of approach. Also of note, the terrain surrounding the trail is sometimes more important than the trail itself. If forces can occupy terrain that allows forces to cover the trail with fire, then these forces effectively control the movement of forces along that route.

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of the Connecticut River. 116 This terrain is suitable for the movement of a modern mechanized division with large, modern vehicles, let alone small groups of lightly armed

Native Americans. The second avenue of approach was a north-south corridor on the western side of the river divided from the Connecticut River valley by a trap-rock ridgeline that runs from north of Holyoke, Massachusetts, south to the outskirts of New

Haven, Connecticut. This valley is 5 miles at its greatest width, and would have also been accessible to native war parties.117 Simsbury is located in this valley, and Philip’s warriors had obviously gained access to this area when they burned the town. The third approach, from Narragansett country in Rhode Island, into eastern-southeastern

Connecticut, is more rugged than the Connecticut River Valley. There is a nearly continuous ridge running in a north-south direction along the entire Rhode Island-

Connecticut border until the area of North Stonington close to the ocean’s shore.118

Where the ridgeline ends is in fact where route I-95 North now runs from Connecticut into Rhode Island because the area is much less rugged. The Narragansetts would have had the same freedom of movement as Philip’s other allies in ,

116 Google Maps, Connecticut, Google, http://maps.google.com/maps?q=Connecticut&f=s&utm_campaign=en&utm_source=en-ha-na- us-syn-gm&utm_medium=ha&utm_term=ct%20map (accessed December, 22, 2007).

117 The New England Trail, “West Branch: Connecticut,” Rye Press/The New England Trail 2001, http://www.netrail.org/tour/tour_ct6.html (accessed , 2007).

118 Google Maps, Connecticut, Google, http://maps.google.com/maps?q=Connecticut&f=s&utm_campaign=en&utm_source=en-ha-na- us-syn-gm&utm_medium=ha&utm_term=ct%20map (accessed December 23, 2007). 73

Figure 5.1: Avenues of Approach Topographical Map. Original map by William Keegan, Heritage Consultants LLC. 74

concerning their ability to travel light and fast. Still, it must have been relatively easy for a combined colonial-Indian force to guard the few approaches across the ridgeline into

Mohegan country, with the exception of the longer route near the shore. The evidence also indicates that few, if any, enemy forces were able to infiltrate the eastern portion of the colony during the war, as opposed to the much more open northern border, which facilitated easier enemy access into Connecticut Colony. The final avenue of approach into Connecticut was from Nipmuck country in the northwestern corner of the colony, moving southeast towards the Thames River and ultimately the Connecticut River. This was a narrow corridor of approach, and would have been easily observed by Connecticut

Indian forces. As indicated, the Wabbaquasetts traversed through this area when submitting to Uncas.

There were other obstacles in the way of invading war parties besides the large, natural terrain features of Connecticut’s small mountain ranges. Hostile war parties traveling along the Connecticut River would have had to negotiate water obstacles such as flooded areas and tributary rivers as well as the numerous bends along the river that would have increased the danger and the time that it took to infiltrate from southwestern

Massachusetts. The straight-line distances noted in the introduction would have been increased by such obstacles. From a defensive perspective, such obstacles were

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beneficial to the forces conducting an active defense because they would have channeled the enemy war parties into passable areas, especially fording sites on rivers and larger streams.

Philip’s warriors did gain access into Connecticut even with the defenses and natural obstacles because of the nature of their war parties. Even with natural impediments increasing the distance from Longmeadow in southwestern Massachusetts to Windsor or Hartford Connecticut by a few miles, an Indian war-party could have easily covered 18-23 miles in a half-day’s time. A modern combat infantryman carrying full combat gear is expected to miles in three hours; 119 an Indian patrol, carrying relatively little compared to the modern infantryman, and used to traveling long distances for hunting, would have quickly covered that distance.120 As Malone explains:

“Stealth, surprise, and high mobility were major assets in…the at which the Indians excelled.”121 This high degree of mobility, and the ability to move undetected through the wilderness, allowed Philip’s warriors to bypass obstacles and defenders alike to enter the Connecticut Colony.122

119 US Army Expert Infantrymen Badge Standards, ArmyStudyGuide.Com, http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/EIB/Task_Summary/perform-12mile-tactical-f.shtml (accessed 28 April 2008).

120 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 27, says that Native Americans covered long distances very quickly and most historians agree with this assessment.

121 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 128.

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The Indians were also not weighed down by excessive equipment, which not only made noise while traveling through the woods, but also required more energy to carry.

Besides a flintlock musket, a hatchet and a knife, a pouch for bullets, a horn for powder, and a purse for ground maize, the Indians carried little else. Native Americans simply added water to the ground maize for a high-energy ration,123 and game hunted on the warpath would occasionally supplement this crude mixture. L. Foxhall and H. A. Forbes in a groundbreaking article on ancient rations “Sitometria: The Role of Grain as a Staple

Food in Classical Antiquity,” show that “exceptionally active” men, such as conducting field operations, need 3382 calories daily.124 Donald Engels in

Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army estimates that

Macedonian warriors consumed 3600 calories a day during combat operations in arid conditions.125 The 200 calories difference between the two studies is negligible for our purposes, although Foxhall and Forbes completed the more reliable study. Foxhall goes on to prove errors in Engels’ additional calculations, such as Engels’ contention that

122 Eames, “Forts, Provincial” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 217, also argues that in the later “no defense could totally stop the small Indian raiding parties.” The same applies to Connecticut’s defenses during King Philip’s War.

123 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 13.

124 L. Foxhall and H. A. Forbes, “Sitometria: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity,” Chiron 12 (1982), 51.

125 Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 123.

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calories were lost during the processing of wheat flour into bread. Foxhall actually ground the wheat in his experiment and no calories were lost during the process of baking the ground flour into bread. He further argues that the Macedonians would have carried whole grain instead of ground wheat flour because it kept better and was easier to transport.126 I have found that whole grain also packs more calories with over 3,900 calories per kilogram.127 The Native Americans’ ground maize ration actually contains more calories than both wheat and whole grain, with over 4,000 calories per kilogram.128

Averaging the two studies’ estimates on the required caloric intake to 3,500 calories for soldiers in field operations, a Native American warrior would have had to carry slightly less than 2 lbs of rations per day to meet this caloric level.129 This total would obviously be further reduced if the Indians supplemented the maize with other food during operations such as fish and game that were eaten immediately, and not carried for future use.

126 Foxhall and Forbes, “Sitometria: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity,” 80-81.

127 IHerb.com, http://www.iherb.com/ProductDetails.aspx?c=1&pid=- 5235632845595937463 (accessed 3 September 2008).

128 Ground maize at the upper end of the caloric output is 4,100 calories per kg. Biotech Crop Database, AGBIOS, http://www.agbios.com/cstudies.php?book=FSA&ev=MON810&chapter=Nutrition&lang=, (accessed 28 April 2008).

129 Calculation: 3500 cal (needed by soldiers in field operations)/4100 cal/kg (of ground maize) X 2.2 (to convert to lbs)= 1.88 lbs of ground maize rations carried by Indian warriors.

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The main point here is that native war parties did not need a logistical tail of re- supply wagons that characterized most formations of their European counterparts. As

Lee argues, however, this was a short-term operational advantage because warriors, a link in the Indian food chain, could not remain away from their villages indefinitely, especially in winter when hunting was critical to the Native American diet. Allied

Indians, however, could take advantage of both this short-term logistical operational advantage as well as the long-term supply availability from their colonial allies.130

The absence of a supply train allowed Indians to negotiate difficult terrain because the only physical constraint on their mobility was the natural limitations of the human body–not the restriction of machines and beasts of burden that often determined the course of European-style operations. With that said, the natural animal and human tendency is to literally take the path of least resistance, which requires less energy and thus less caloric intake. This accounts for many trails traversing flat terrain and passing near waterways, which tend to be of lower elevation. The native war parties would have thus preferred to move along the flat valley bottoms, and only traversed the more difficult terrain if obstacles or Connecticut’s forces blocked their primary route of march.

The natives also wore very little in the warmer months, when much of the campaigning took place, usually only a loincloth. This was a natural advantage over their colonist contemporaries, who were heavily clothed and often wore helmets and sturdy

130 Lee discusses these issues in “Fortify, Fight or Flee.”

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leather or quilted jackets for protection.131 This was even an improvement over the equipment that was worn when the colonists first arrived in New England, which consisted of “a back and breast-plate (corselet), tasses for the thighs, thules for the groin, and a gorget for the neck.”132 The colonists had thus adapted their equipment to the local military situation, particularly after the lessons learned from the Pequot War, but they still carried more weight in equipment, and were more restricted than the native New

Englanders. Contrary to Peterson’s account of colonial during this era,133 the

131 Harold L. Peterson, “The Military Equipment of the Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620-1690,” The New England Quarterly 20, no. 2 (June 1947), under “Settings,” http://www.jstor.org/search/ (accessed 22 December 2007), 198.

132 Peterson, “The Military Equipment of the Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620-1690,” 198. Hirsch in “The Collision of Military Cultures” claims that the colonists stopped wearing steel armor once the Indians adopted muskets (1195), but this would not explain why some they still wore heavy leather or quilt during King Philip’s War. The change in body armor likely resulted in part from the English forces losing mobility during operations, not because of the Indian’s adoption of the musket. Quilted/leather vests also stopped arrows, which were the primary weapons of the Native Americans through mid-century. By King Philip’s War, however, the Indians almost exclusively used flintlocks, and the colonists’ vests would have been of little use. Wearing vests would thus indicate that the colonists had not completely transitioned their equipment to meet the new threat.

133 Peterson, “The Military Equipment of the Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620-1690,” 199. John F. Guilmartin Jr., “The Cutting Edge: An Analysis of the Spanish Invasion and Overthrow of the Inka Empire, 1532-39,” In Kenneth Andrien and Rolena Adorno, eds., Transatlantic Encounters: Europeans and Andeans in the Sixteenth Century, 40-64 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), describes the effectiveness of Spanish steel against the Incas. The New England Indians by mid-seventeenth century had adopted muskets, however, allowing them to engage the colonists at a distance, unlike the Incas who had to move within striking distance with their hand-held war clubs. In hand-to-hand combat, English swords would have still been of limited use in New England, and one could make the argument that swords would have been effective against hand-held Tomahawks (not thrown Tomahawks) in more open terrain because of the greater reach of a sword.

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Colonial Connecticut Records seem to imply that some of the soldiers still carried swords, which were not only of limited use in combat in colonial New England, but also were difficult to carry in the undergrowth of the forests. Before the Great Swamp Fight expedition, the Connecticut war council ordered that each county equip ten soldiers with hatchets, which were beginning to be recognized as a more effective all-purpose tool for fighting and hewing through the wilderness.134 Most of the were also mounted,135 which meant that they had to travel on trails and open land generally free of debris. Philip’s forces and Connecticut’s Indian allies were less encumbered than the

English troops.

Given the potential mobility of Philip’s forces, to what extent were these forces actually present in the colony and what threat did these forces pose? There is in fact substantial evidence concerning war parties exists in Connecticut that modern historians

134 CCR, 385.

135 CCR, 386. Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 20-32, argues that all of the Connecticut troops were mounted all of the time, but those assigned to garrison defense were usually not mounted unless scouting (General Court Records, CCR, 268-269 orders ranking town officers to distinguish between field and garrison forces), and during the march to Great Swamp three soldiers shared a horse (CCR, 386, Selesky attributes this instance to a lack of feed during the winter). I also question whether the small, joint-Indian-colonial forces that scoured the countryside late in the war were always mounted. ‘Dragoon’ of course implies that the soldier dismounted to fight, but how far away from the objective were these parties dismounting so as not to alert the hostile Indians to their presence? Guilmartin, “The Cutting Edge,” answered my illustrates how horses are more tactically effective and logistically efficient at shorter distances, while dismounted soldiers retain the locomotive and logistical advantage over longer distances. This factor explains how Connecticut’s dismounted allied Indians maintained the march with their mounted colonist comrades.

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have rarely, if ever, cited.136 In August 1676, with general military operations winding down throughout southern New England, a hostile Indian named Menowalett was captured in the wilderness near Farmington, Connecticut. He had been hiding in the woods with a very small band, and they had been captured, probably by the combined forces of colonists and allied Indians then scouring the woods for the remnants of Philip’s confederation. Upon interrogation by the colonial leaders, Menowalett confessed to belonging to the party that had burned Simsbury and killed a colonist between

Middletown and Wethersfield and another at Podunk.137 He had also taken part in battles against the English settlers on the Massachusetts stretches of the Connecticut River.

Menowalett claimed that his war party in Connecticut Colony had consisted of between seven and nine warriors from a number of different tribes including the Norwottocks, a tribe from Springfield (probably the Agawams), Narragansetts, and renegade Mohegans.

He himself was half Mohegan and half Narragansett.138 This evidence if uncorroborated, would have been difficult to rely on alone. Prisoners have not always told the truth, and

136 Hubbard, writing only a year after the war, mentions Menowalett briefly in The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 281-282.

137 Podunk now encompasses portions of South Windsor and East Hartford http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podunk (accessed 21 APR 2008). Winthrop described the area of Podunk as “a place between ys towne & Windsor,” meaning Hartford and Windsor. It should be noted that both towns extended over the Connecticut River at the time, accounting for Podunk’s location on the eastside of the river. Winthrop Papers VIII, 100.

138 The Connecticut Colonial Records, Connecticut State Library, State Archives, Hartford, Series, Series I, Vol. I, CSL #202, LDS #0003591, Document Numbers 108, 214, 217; CCR, 471-472.

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Menowalett undoubtedly knew that the English were executing Philip’s warriors who had killed Englishmen, and that others had been handed over to the allied Indians for torture and execution. Interestingly, Menowalett could have related events without incriminating himself, or only confessed to one event instead of three, or not have said anything about these attacks at all, but he seems to have told all that he knew. In early September, another renegade named Cohas, who was captured by allied Indians between New Haven and Milford, confessed to two of the murders and the burning of a farm that Menowalett had accused him of. The Council turned Cohas over to an allied Indian, who promptly executed him.139 Cohas confirmed three of the allegations that Menowalett had leveled against him, and this seems to confirm that much of Menowalett’s testimony was valid.

If Menowalett had not specifically given names, generally describing the attacks against

Connecticut colonists, and then Cohas had admitted to the attacks, we would be left with a lingering doubt that Cohas confessed under duress.

This previously unexamined evidence indicates that small war parties were still operating within the colony after most hostilities had ended, that a number of different tribes had been operating within the colony’s borders, and that what appears to have been small bands, acting independently was an effective way to enter Connecticut and remain undetected. Major Palmes, commander at New London, sent a letter to the War Council

139 State Archives, Colonial War Series, Series I, Vol. I, Document Numbers 108, 217; CCR, 479-480. Hubbard, History of the Indians Wars in New England, 281-282, recounts some of the Cohas episode, but focuses on the retreat of the hostile tribes to the Hudson River.

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at the end of 1676, with intelligence that Philip’s forces had in fact broken into small bands and were operating “downwards” from Nipmuck country, placing them inside Connecticut’s boundaries.140 A few weeks later, William Hill was killed at

Hoccanum by Cohas’ band.141 These events in light of the later testimony from the interrogations confirms that Philip’s allies were operating within Connecticut, but how did the colony avoid the devastation that similar marauders had caused the other New

England colonies?

140 CCR, 403.

141 CCR, 409.

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CHAPTER 6

THE ‘MILITARY REVOLUTION’ CONTINUED: THE EUROPEAN WAY OF

WAR IN THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT AND

NARRAGANSETT COUNTRY

The early modern era in Europe witnessed the development of fortifications based on geometrical design, generically termed trace italienne.142 The rise of these fortifications along with the renewal of dominance on the battlefield, in linear formation by late in the early modern era, was a historically significant time period.

Many historians argue that a ‘Military Revolution’ had taken place, while others prefer to view military developments during this era as evolutionary. Regardless of terminology, the rise of fortifications and the inability of attackers to easily overcome this kind of defense, often led to military stalemate in Europe. “As John Cruso, an English military writer, observed in 1632: ‘The actions of the modern warres consist chiefly in , assaults, sallies, skirmishes etc., and so affoard but few set battels.” Another military writer from this era, “Johann Behr stated that, in Germany, ‘Field battles are in comparison scarcely a topic of conversation. . . Indeed at the present time the whole art of

142 Geoffrey Parker, “The Artillery Fortress As An Engine of European Overseas Expansion, 1480-1750,” in Empire, War & Faith in Early Modern Europe (United Kingdom: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press, 2002), chapter 8.

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war seems to come down to shrewd attacks and artful fortification.” The great Vauban, the most famous military engineer of the epoch, described the importance of fortifications in Europe just prior to the outbreak of King Philip’s War, “its importance has increased to the point where one can say that today it alone offers the means of conquest and conservation.”143 Given the European reliance on fortifications and the general absence of set-piece battles, were military events in New England really that much different?

When we consider that all of New England was under siege, with colonists crowded into garrison houses and other fortifications and very much afraid to harvest their crops, warfare in the New World was not much different from warfare in the Old

World. There were set-piece battles, but they were relatively rare. Captain ‘Peirse’s fight’ and the battle at Great Swamp somewhat resembled European a standard battle with two forces firing close order musketry. The majority of non-siege fighting consisted of “shrewd attacks” (ambushes in America) or the “sallies” that the European military writers lamented above. 144 In addition, King Philip’s War provides numerous examples

143 The three quotes are from Parker, “The Artillery Fortress As An Engine of European Overseas Expansion, 1480-1750.”

144 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 151, claims that the Narragansetts at Great Swamp fired a ‘volley’ that killed Captain Davenport and decimated his company of Massachusetts Bay Colony soldiers. In the ‘Peirse (or Pierce) fight,’ Philip’s confederates, “above 500 Indians, who in very good Order, attacqued [Peirse’s command]…the Indians were as thick as they could stand, thirty deep.” Once surrounded, Peirse arranged his men in either a circle or two lines back-to-back, presumably in the later case to maximize volley fire. Another contemporary account from The Old Indian Chronicle remarks that the Indians “upon [Peirse’s] Approach…drew into Order, and received his Onset with much Difficulty.” At Bloody Brook, Hubbard recounts that Captain Moseley kept his men together for a through the natives, 86

of large Indian detachments attacking colonial garrisons in all of the New England colonies besides Connecticut. The Great Swamp Fight in Narragansett country saw the colonists battling the Indians behind the Indians’ fortifications until successfully storming the breech. Both of these military situations resembled the conditions of warfare in

Europe. What can we now make of the historians’ assertion that “neither [the English nor the Indians] observed traditional European military conventions” because it was incompatible with American conditions, the Indian way of war having to be adopted for the ultimate success of the colonial effort during King Philip’s War?145 Did

Connecticut’s defensive posture also reflect conditions in the Old World?

With the combatants generally waging King Philip’s War with the methods then in vogue on the European continent, they faced similar problems, namely the inability to capture fortified positions. Philip’s warriors would normally burn the outlying and abandoned homes and farm-buildings, but were often unwilling to attack (in accord with the “cutting off way of war”) or unable to defeat the garrison houses. 146 Hubbard confirmed just that:

who were pillaging the dead from Lathrop’s command. Hubbard implies here that it was in standard English formation that the charge occurred because he was criticizing the colonists’ adoption of the “skulking way of war.” See Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 221, 307; Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 191; Hubbard as described in Ellis and Morris, 113.

145 Quote from Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 81.

146 Philip’s forces successfully assaulted at least four garrison houses: at Lancaster (Hubbard above), one of Groton’s garrison houses (but most of its inhabitants escaped, Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 252), William Clark’s garrison house outside of Plymouth, and Bulls’ 87

For [only] at Lancaster where they seemed to have had the greatest Cause of boasting for their Success in any Assault (although it were since known, that they had five hundred fighting Men when they assaulted that small Town of about fifty Families) yet were they able to surprise but one Garrison House, which neither was fenced round, nor were the Defendants able to ply their Shot behind it, but so as the Enemy came to the very Walls, and Roof on the back Side with their Fuel, or else they had never been able to have dispossessed the Inhabitants.147

The garrisons normally held, but usually at a high cost. Without artillery and military engineers, Indian forces did not normally have the capability to defeat garrisons, and especially full-scale fortifications in a direct manner, although victory through infiltration and surprise could never have been entirely ruled out.

Connecticut’s defensive success can be partly attributed to the deterrence factor of

European-style fortifications. The colony’s white population immediately following the conflict (October 1676) only numbered 2,303 landowning men.148 Probably less than two thousand additional males were capable of bearing arms in an emergency, essentially the old, the young, and the marginally incapacitated, while Philip massed 500-600 warriors at

Garrison near the shore of Narragansett Bay, the appointed rendezvous for colonial forces for the attack on Great Swamp (Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 147-148, 187).

147 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 260-261.

148 General Court Records, CCR, 290. I have estimated Connecticut’s total population at 11,000 colonists in 1675 based on the total population of 12,535 in 1679 (Greene and Harrington, American Population Before the Federal Census of 1790, 48). An estimate of 11,000 colonists also is consistent with the accepted 5-1 ratio of militia to total population discussed in the introduction’s notes.

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Figure 6.1: Map of Connecticut Towns and Forts by William Keegan, Heritage Consultants LLC.

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a time, if not more.149 The high proportion of fortifications to population made the colony a more difficult target for Philip’s warriors than the other New England colonies, which, with the exception of fortified Boston and Plymouth, relied on a garrison defense throughout the conflict. The Indian’s “cutting off way of war” did not normally include assaulting positions that would cause high casualties. Lee recounts the case of a Creek war party, lurking outside of a fortified Cherokee town waiting for an opportunity to attack, but ultimately it was deterred by the sound defenses.150 As in this instance, native war parties usually waited for easier targets or situations that they could exploit to their advantage. This was the case in Connecticut, with war parties ‘skulking’ around the colony’s towns, but never opting for an outright attack. Such an attack would have been too costly for Philip’s confederates without a colonial mishap or local intelligence that would have tipped the odds in their favor. Connecticut’s ability to retain the loyalty of the local Indians as discussed below, denied Philip’s warriors the local intelligence necessary to make an attack on Connecticut’s well-fortified positions. Philip was also at times able to achieve very transitory success without attacking Connecticut fortifications, isolating the Massachusetts towns on the Connecticut River through the execution of

149 There are many instances of large numbers of Philip’s forces massing for attacks on the colonists, such as the Beers’ defeat, Bloody Brook, the Sudbury Fight, Peirse’s Fight, and the assaults on the garrisons at Hadley, Northampton and Lancaster.

150 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 43.

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feints and demonstrations in the rear of Connecticut forces deployed up the river.151 This forced the temporary withdrawing of Connecticut forces, but was never a decisive operation as these forces always returned and conducted numerous offensive operations throughout the war. Ultimately, this was the hostile tribe’s dilemma. Philip’s confederacy needed to prevent the offensive operations of Connecticut forces, disrupting their operations in the other New England colonies, but Connecticut’s home European- style defense proved too strong. Thus Connecticut’s defensive posture, in part by maximizing European-style fortresses, deterred the hostile Indians lurking nearby.

The European fortresses during this time period were distinguished from earlier models by “thick [sloping] walls, broad , and geometrical .”152 The geometrical pattern was represented in Connecticut by the “flanker” design directed by the Council of War.153 Connecticut fortifications during King Philip’s War were designed with -like ditches sometimes filled with water; mutually supporting

“flankers” with interlocking fields of fire; wooden reinforced with earthen

151 A feint is a military maneuver that involves actual combat and distracts the enemy from the friendly forces’ main objective. A demonstration is a maneuver without fighting for the same purposes as a feint. Philip’s forces seem to have employed both techniques in Connecticut, killing lone colonists at times or making their presence known without actual combat in other instances.

152 Parker, “The Artillery Fortress As An Engine of European Overseas Expansion, 1480- 1750.”

153 The War Journal has at least two notations for “flankers” (CCR, 375, 413), and one for “forelorns” that served the same purpose for field forces on the march (CCR, 444).

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mounds; sally-ports; ramparts lined with platforms, where the garrisoning forces could fire down upon the enemy; and fields of fire cleared for observation around the entire work out to effective musket range. Artillery augmented key positions within the fortifications in major towns such as Hartford and New Haven, and at the strategic mouth of the Connecticut River at Saybrook. By the end of King Philip’s War, the forts at

Saybrook, Hartford, Windsor, and New Haven had extensive works similar to European artillery fortresses, and Wethersfield and other towns were at least partially palisaded.154

Fort Saybrook had bastions and Windsor’s fortifications boasted “an irregular parallelogram” and ditches,155 both forts thus featured components of early modern

Europe’s geometric military fortification design. The description of New Haven’s fort is based on an “outline” available in the Colonial Records of :

The fortifications consisted of a line of wooden posts of timber that would square twelve (12) inches set close together five (5) feet in the ground and several thicknesses and ten (10) feet above and at the top pointed; which were properly braced and filled in between with earth and clay excavated from the dug on the outside ten (10) feet deep and fifty (50) feet wide which was flooded with water from the harbor, and perhaps from the Beaver Ponds. This Palisade was built wide enough for a soldier to march on top and may have had also a platform on the inside low enough for a sentinel to walk, with body protected by the works, with loopholes for observation. On the sea side in fully

154 For the palisades see Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States (New York: McMillan Publishing Company, 1988), 125. Wethersfield voted for a palisade, a common defensive posture for Connecticut towns during the war, but it remains unclear if the project was completed. A Wethersfield town historian from the local historical society, with whom I discussed the issue, doubts that the colonists finished construction.

155 Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts, 122, 125.

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Figure 6.2: “Elements of Bastioned Fortification” in Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States, New York: McMillan Publishing Company, 1988.

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COHORN or COEHORN. Originally of Dutch deviation (coehoorn), it was a small short-barreled howitzer. COQUINA. A soft, whitish limestone made up of shell fragments, coral, and fossilized fish. Quarried, it is used as building stone, particularly in Florida. . A work made up of two faces forming a salient angle and located before bastions or , but separated from them, to protect their faces from artillery fire. . The outer wall or slope of a ditch or moat. COVERED WAY or COVERT. An open corridor in the outer wall of a ditch (counterscarp) for riflemen, who were thus protected by an earthen breastwork. CURTAIN. The wall of a fortification between bastions. DEFENSIVE BARRACKS. Fortified quarters usually designed to serve as a within a fort. DEFILADE. A natural or man-made shield to protect either troops or a gun position in face of the enemy. DEMIBASTION. A with only one face and one flank. DEMILUNE, HALF MOON, or LUNETE. In early Renaissance defenses, an consisting of two faces and a crescent-shaped , constructed to protect a bastion or the fort's curtain. French engineers termed it a demi-lune. Half moons were replaced by ravelins in later-built fortifications. DITCH. A wide, deep trench around a defensive work. The material from its excavation was used to form the ramparts. When filled with water, it was termed a moat or wet ditch, otherwise it was called a dry ditch or fosse. . A bridge across a ditch or moat at the fort's entrance, manually raised or lowered. . An opening or slot in a curtain or with its sides slanted outward to increase the angle of cannon fire. EN . An arrangement for in which they were mounted on high platforms or carriages so that they were fired over a parapet instead of through . . The enveloping works of a fortification consisting of the curtains, ramparts, and parapets. ENDICOTT-PERIOD BATTERIES. In 1885, a group of men known as the Endicott Board was established by President Grover under the chairmanship of Secretary of War William Endicott to cooperate with the Corps of Engineers in studying coastal defense needs and make recommendations for the development of a new system of defense. The board’s combined Army, Navy, and civilian membership undertook an extensive analysis of the coastal defense situation and in 1886 released its findings with proposals that ultimately led to the erection of numerous concrete batteries, including the heaviest artillery rifles mounted on disappearing carriages.

Figure 6.3: Glossary [Fortification Terminology] in Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States, New York: McMillan Publishing Company, 1988.

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ENFILADE. A sweeping fire from a line of troops or gun batteries. ENVELOPMENT. An assault directed against an enemy's flank; in the case of attack against two flanks, it is called a double envelopment. EPAULMENT. The immediate area where the curtain and a bastion meet. ESCARPMEMT. See Scarp. FACE. In some five-sided seacoast forts, the designation for the sides of the enceinte that form a salient directed toward the main passage; also, the wall between bastions or salients. FASCINE. A bound bundle of long branches or twigs, used in the construction of a rampart or an earthwork. FIELD FORTIFICATION. Impermanently constructed works intended for occupation only for a short time during a campaign. FIELD GUN. A cannon mounted on a mobile carriage for use in the field. FLANK. The wall of a bastion between the curtain and the face. FLANKED ANGLE. The angle formed by two faces of a or bastion. It is also called the "salient," the "point of the ravelin," or the "point of the bastion." FIANKER. A projecting work from which the ground in front of adjacent walls could be defended. FLECHE. A defensive outwork with two walls or faces forming a salient angle with an open ditch or gorge. Fleche is French for "arrow." FLINTLOCK or FIRELOCK. A gun with a mechanism for firing the priming charge by striking a piece of flint on steel to produce sparks. FORT. An enclosed land or seacoast defensive work, with walls or palisades and or bastions. Manned by soldiers, it was armed with artillery such as cannons and howitzers. FORTALICE. A small fort or its outwork. FORTRESS. Generally, a town or city enclosed by fortifications. FOSSE. See Ditch. FRAISE. Pointed stakes in the rampart or berm, either horizontal or inclined. FRONTAL ASSAULT. Equally distributed forces attacking along the whole Front. . Wickerwork filled with earth and stone, used to protect gun batteries; the equivalent of today's .

Figure 6.4: Glossary (cont.) [Fortification Terminology] in Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States, New York: McMillan Publishing Company, 1988.

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GLACIS. Sloping earthwork from either the covered way or counterscarp. RAPE or GRAPESHOT. The same as a canister, except that the balls were much smaller and more plentiful. GRASSHOPPER. The nickname for the small three-pounder field gun, mounted on legs instead of the normal wheeled carriage. The name was derived from the action of the gun when fired. The grasshopper was the artillery piece commonly carried during field operations. GUARDHOUSE. The headquarters for a fort's daily guard, it was also used as a structure to house prisoners. GUARDROOM. A small enclosed structure located at or near the entrance of a fort. HALF BASTION. See Demibastion. HALF MOON. See Demilune. . An outwork consisting of a pair of demibastions joined by a wall or curtain. HOT SHOT. Cannonballs heated red-hot in a hot-shot oven and utilized for setting fire to wooden fortifications or timbered enemy ships. HOWITZER. In use today, it is a short-barreled gun with the ability to fire shells at a high angle of elevation, particularly effective against targets within fortified enclosures or trenches. INTRENCHED CAMP. A fortified army encampment located outside a fort but within range of its armament. INTRENCHMENT. A fieldwork consisting of a ditch and an earthen parapet. LINSTOCK. A cannoneer's forked rod or stick that held the slow-burning match to be applied to the prime charge in the touchhole of muzzle-loading cannon. LOOPHOLES. Apertures or slots in defenses through which the fire of small arms or cannon could be directed at an attacking or besieging enemy. . See Demilune. MAGAZINE. A storage facility, usually bomb-proofed, for ammunition, armaments, goods, or provisions. MAHAM TOWER. Devised by Colonel Hezekiah Maham, it was first used during the successful siege of Fort Watson, , April 1781. Made of logs, the tower had a parapeted superstructure higher than the walls of the fort being besieged. MANTELET. A mobile bulletproof screen to protect gunners. . A free-standing masonry tower defense, usually erected along the coast to fight off invasion by sea.

Figure 6.5: Glossary (cont.) [Fortification Terminology] in Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States, New York: McMillan Publishing Company, 1988.

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MERLON. The section of fortification wall located between any two embrasures. MINE. A subterranean tunnel excavated by besiegers under a fortification for the purpose of destroying a section of the work by explosives or other means. MOAT. See Ditch. MORTAR. In use today, it is a short-barreled gun with a large-caliber bore, able to propel shells at high angles. MUSKET. The heavy smoothbore handgun of large caliber used throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. PALISADE. A wall or curtain constructed of logs or stakes set perpendicularly in the ground, forming a defensive enclosure. PARADE. A level area of the interior of a fortification where troops are assembled or reviewed while marching or drilling. PARRALEL. A trench in the ground, parallel to the lines of a besieged fortification, for covering an attacking force. PARAPET. An earthen or stone defensive platform on the wall of a fort. PICKET. A pointed pole planted vertically in the ground. . A reinforced grating, raised or lowered in vertical channels, to prevent entry through a fort's gateway. . A passage leading from the interior of a fortification to the ditch. POUNDAGE. Term applied to guns that fired solid balls of a certain weight (four-pounder, ten- pounder, etc.). RAMPART. A mass of earth formed with the material excavated from the ditch to protect the enclosed area from artillery fire and to elevate defenders to a commanding position overlooking the approaches to a fort. RAVELIN. A V-shaped outwork outside the main moat or ditch. . A V-shaped outwork, with its angle projected toward the enemy. . A defensive outwork, usually square or polygonal, minus defensive flanks. REENTERING or REENTRANT ANGLE. An angle pointing toward the interior of a fortification. REVERBERATORY FURNACE. A kiln in which the fuel is not in direct contact with the metal; used for the production of hot shot. . Support facing, masonry or earthen, of the rampart between the fort's wall and the ditch. ROYAL. A small mortar.

Figure 6.6: Glossary (cont.) [Fortification Terminology] in Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States, New York: McMillan Publishing Company, 1988.

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view were the king’s arms cut in wood and great guns mounted, also at the meeting house in the Market Place, which was protected by flankers and palisades (with a “watch tower” on top).156

As with Wethersfield and other towns, New Haven’s fortifications were “still incomplete when the war ended.”157 Even with unfinished defenses, Connecticut towns were still more defensible than they had been before the war, complete with the European design elements of flankers and ditches.

Military engineering capability from Europe crossed the Atlantic with veterans like John Mason and “Lion Gardener, [who] had fought as a youth against the Spaniards with an English volunteer force in the Netherlands...He stayed on in , winning appointment as a lieutenant of engineers on the staff of the prince of Orange. Having twelve years experience with the Dutch as a master of fortifications, Gardener was ideally suited to supervise the building of a refuge for Puritan noblemen in the American wilderness.”158 And it was Gardener at Saybrook in the , who “constructed a very respectable fort. The placement of the two cannons on “Fort Hill,” a ten-foot-high

156 Charles Hervey Townshend, “The Quinnipiack Indians And Their Reservation,” in Papers of the New Haven Colony Historical Society VI, 180-256 (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor CO., 1900), 189-190, http://books.google.com/books?id=jwQMAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA151&lpg=PA151&dq=The+Quin nipiack+Indians+And+Their+Reservation&source=web&ots=OVacj8JCJL&sig=dIJVdB_eA_dA cbbz31Io42-_7Bs&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result (6 March 2008).

157 Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 18.

158 Cave, The Pequot War, 91-92; Vaughan, New England Frontier, 117, n. 117, also discusses Gardiner’s European pedigree.

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mound within the palisade, enabled Gardener to command the treacherous, sand-clogged channel at the [Connecticut] river’s mouth.”159 Although Gardener, Mason, John

Underhill and most of the other military leaders of the Pequot War had died or were too old for service by the time of King Philip’s War,160 the knowledge that they brought from the Old World survived with the soldiers that they trained, and the fortifications that they designed. Even then, not all direct European combat experience was lost with that generation. Fitz-John Winthrop (son of the Connecticut Governor) and other leaders like him of the next generation, fought in the Parliamentary army during the English Civil

War, and Fitz-John led English militia against the Dutch in 1673.161

Richard S. Dunn in Puritans and claims that England’s Fort influenced John Winthrop Jr., once he was commissioned chief fortifications officer at

Boston, and later at the mouth of the Connecticut River at Saybrook.162 A letter survives from Winthrop to his father concerning the fortifications at “Langer Point” England,

159 Cave, The Pequot War, 92.

160 One exception was Thomas Bull, a Pequot War veteran who led Connecticut’s defenses at Saybrook against Governor Andros of New York. Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 16 n. 23.

161 Winthrop Papers VIII, n. 43.

162 Richard S. Dunn, Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 62; Pictures of Harwich Fort at Charles Taylor, Charles, Ecastles.co.uk 1997-2008, http://www.ecastles.co.uk/harwich.html (accessed May 2008). See also, Fortified-Places, http://www.fortified-places.com/landguard/ (accessed 3 September 2008).

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Figure 6.7: Illustration of Landguard Fort 1625-1628, from Fortified Places, http://www.fortified-places.com/landguard/image4.jpg, (accessed 9 September 2008).

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Figure 6.8: Illustration of Landguard Fort in the Sixteenth Century from Fortified Places, http://www.fortified-places.com/landguard/image2.jpg, (accessed 9 September 2008).

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which he visited with a “Kinges workman” and copied: “I have now a perfect plot thereof, wth the dementions of the whole & parts. I will have it read sgt you come downe.”163 The fort at Langer Point was “pentagonal structure with angle bastions and adry ditch,” and supposedly meant to compliment the Harwich fortification.164 Winthrop wrote from London to his father at Massachusetts Bay about happenings in the Thirty

Years War, and other military affairs as well: “The Spaniard hath a mighty fleete prepared to goe agt the Dutch at Parnambuco…The King of Sweden prvaileth in

Germany, he hath lately given Tilly an overthrow wth a small army agt his mighty army.”165

Winthrop also maintained correspondence with England and the European continent, once he arrived in the New World, as well as with John Samford, by 1634, the chief “cannoneer at the fort in Boston.”166 In 1636, Samford was the “surveyor of the ordinance and other ammunition,” seemingly a related duty to chief artillerist. Edward

Holmes wrote to Winthrop on 14 March 1632 to inform him of a number of books that he had sent to Samford, of which the following were related to military affairs: John

Smith (Smythe), Certain Discourses Concerning Divers Sorts of Weapons (London,

163 Winthrop Papers VIII, 23.

164 http://www.fortified-places.com/landguard/ (accessed 3 September 2008).

165 Winthrop Papers VIII, 30.

166 Winthrop Papers III (Boston: Merrymount Press, for the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1943), n. 58.

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1590) and Instructions, Observations, and Orders Militarie (London, 1595); Robert

Norton, The Gunner, Shewing the Whole Practise of Artillerie (London, 1628).167 The correspondence between the Old and New World indicates that the leading men of the day were, at least in some cases, discussing military affairs and sharing military tracts. It may be that Samford had succeeded Winthrop at Boston. We definitely know, however, that they maintained correspondence after Winthrop departed for Connecticut because he ordered supplies from Samford.168 Winthrop also maintained the largest personal library in the New World by the mid-seventeenth century, possibly consisting of over one thousand tracts, some of which concerned military affairs, such as Robert Ward’s

Animadversions of Warre; or a Militarie Magazine of the Truest Rules and Ablest

Instructions for the Managing of Warre (London, 1639).169 The complete title for

167 Winthrop Papers III, 110.

168 Winthrop Papers III, 2-5.

169 The New York State Library maintains Winthrop’s surviving library collection of 270 books and pamphlets. Here I used pdf. files of “A Catalogue of the Books Belonging to the New-York Society Library” (New York: C.S Van Winkle, 1813), which Professor John Brooke e- mailed to me in March 2008 along with the Greenberg and Browne documents immediately following. Ward’s book was the one specific military text in the remaining collection. There has been some debate over the authenticity of the library, some of which was originally and probably correctly attributed to Winthrop Sr. Also, as Herbert Greenberg argues in “The Authenticity of the Library of John Winthrop the Younger,” American Literature 8, no. 4 (January 1937), 448- 452, at least 20 volumes were printed after the date of Winthrop Jr.’s death (April 1676), proving these tracts were added to the collection at a later date, if they were even part of the original library. See also John Winthrop, Geo Starkey and C.A. Browne “Notes from the Books and Letters of John Winthrop, Jr., (1606-1676),” Isis 11, no. 2 (December 1928), 325-342. Ward’s book was published in 1639, and the copy in the collection was assuredly in New England, most likely Connecticut, during King Philip’s War.

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Ward’s text, still maintained on the Newton Library’s catalogue website, includes information of the Thirty Years Wars and specifically, fortifications:

Anima’dversions of vvarre; or, A militarie magazine of the truest rules, and ablest instructions, for the managing of warre: composed, of the most refined discipline, and choice experiments that these late Netherlandish, and Swedish warres have produced. With divers new inventions, both of fortifications and stratagems. As also sundry collections taken out of the most approved authors, ancient and moderne, either in Greeke, Latine, Italian, French, Spanish, Dutch, or English. In two bookes / By Robert Ward, gentleman and commander.170

European-style warfare had indeed made inroads in the New World, particularly in

Connecticut, through a variety of means such as imported texts, military experience abroad, and written communication with the Old World.

Connecticut’s War Council increased the defense of the colony based on its perception of the hostile Indian threat. Although incomplete in some instances,

European-style fortifications were the end result of this incremental increase, when it became apparent that Philip’s forces were able to devastate the other New England colonies, if not always the garrisons themselves. When the Narragansetts entered the conflict, the hostile threat became greater to Connecticut. Indeed the colony began to transition to a system of fortifications, while planning for the preventative attack on Great

Swamp. Thus the Connecticut colonists’ goal in transitioning from a strong-point garrison defense to full-scale fortifications was the protection of property; garrisons

170 Newton Library Online Catalog, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom, http://collpw-newton.lib.cam.ac.uk/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?DB=local&BBID=453919 (accessed 12 July 2008).

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normally protected lives but not property. Before Connecticut began constructing these end-of-the-line, state-of-the art fortifications, its towns relied on the same strong-point system of defense that utilized reinforced garrison houses as the other colonies.171 These served as “the first line of defense for frontier communities,”172 and the inhabitants were sometimes required to shelter there at night. A standing guard was required to defend them. The “history of Ancient Woodbury” Connecticut describes a typical garrison house as “palisaded…a deep ditch was dug all around the house; logs were then placed perpendicularly in the ditch all around it, leaving space for a . Logs sharpened at the top, placed close together, and about twelve (12) feet above the ground. The ditch filled in and the earth replaced and stamped down, and here part of the ditch open; this with the gate was a good defence against sudden attacks…”173 Garrison houses were sometimes similar to the European-style fortifications, but on a much smaller scale. The typical garrison house adopted at least two of the features of the early modern European fortifications. The “open ditch” from the Woodbury account, was a small-scale moat, and the Council of War’s order to fortify garrison houses with flankers was also standard

171 General Court Records, CCR, 268-269, the Court ordered each town to provide for its own defense, and at this stage of the war, it was almost always garrison defense. The records have instances of the War Council approving or requiring garrison houses in certain towns.

172 Eames, “Garrison Houses” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 259.

173 Quoted in Townshend, “The Quinnipiack Indians And Their Reservation,” 184.

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for the European geometric fortification design.174 As we have seen, garrison houses normally kept hostile Indians at bay, but they did not provide protection for the other buildings in the town. The garrison houses were especially vulnerable to fire attacks, which Malone claims the Indians adopted from the English during the Pequot War,175 because they normally consisted at least in part, of wood. Only a limited number of colonists, an “uncomfortable ‘heap’ of humanity,”176 could squeeze inside the garrison houses, slightly larger than normal dwellings for the time period converted for defense.

Connecticut mandated the fortification of its major towns because of these weaknesses of a garrison defense, the proven effectiveness of the hostile Indians in destroying towns in the other colonies, and the entry of the Narragansetts into the conflict.

Parker and Lee both explain that some Native Americans also adopted, or built separately, European new-style fortifications. In King Philip’s War, Connecticut Colony carried out attacks, sometimes in conjunction with the other New England colonies, against the Narragansett tribe that had sophisticated defenses. The Narragansett fort at

Great Swamp had characteristics of European-style fortifications. This elaborate fort, deep in the heart of a swamp outside of what is now West Kingston, Rhode Island, was

174 CCR, 375; Eames, “Garrison Houses” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 260, argues that “flankers…built at opposite corners of the palisade that could…cover the outer walls in case of attack” only occurred “as the French and Indian wars progressed,” when in fact Connecticut Colony, and likely the other New England colonies, utilized garrison flankers at least a decade before the French and Indians wars during King Philip’s War.

175 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 32.

176 Eames, “Garrison Houses” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 260. 106

equipped with a flanker and .177 Hubbard describes the European-like design as “a Kind of Block-house right over against the said Tree, from whence they sorely galled our Men that first entred…[the colonial soldiers] presently beat the Enemy out of a

Flanker on the left Hand.”178 Another contemporary account claims that “the Indians had built a Kind of Fort, being Palisado’d round, and within that a Clay Wall.”179 The clay wall was either a supporting structure for the palisades or an inner defensive structure common in European fortifications at the time. The fort was so well designed that a combined-colonial army sustained the worst colonial casualties of the war during the battle.180 Only after repeated sallies across a fallen piece of timber at an unfinished portion of the fortification were the colonists able to gain entry. The colonists had been fortunate during the battle. A renegade Indian had deserted his comrades and guided the

English army to the Great Swamp.181 The swamp was frozen and the colonists were able

177 Parker, “The Artillery Fortress As An Engine of European Overseas Expansion, 1480- 1750.”

178 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 146.

179 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 181.

180 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 152, states that more than 80 colonists were killed. Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 154, reports that 82 officers and soldiers died at the Great Swamp and immediately following the battle. I have encountered instances of wounded who died months later so the final tally then was probably closer to 100 ‘killed in action’ and ‘died of wounds.’

181 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 152. The Indian’s name was Peter. 107

to maneuver, where they normally would have been channeled onto a narrow trail.182 In addition, the portion of the fortification that they happened upon was unfinished.183

Finally, the Narragansetts at Great Swamp were unaware of the colonial army’s march through their country, most likely because the terrible winter weather afforded them a false sense of security and also made communication difficult. Even with good fortune, the colonial army achieved only a pyrrhic victory at Great Swamp because the

Narragansetts employed an effectively modern fortification.

The Narragansetts also utilized a European-style fortification known as ‘The

Queen’s Fort,’ named for a ‘squaw sachem’ of the tribe. This fort was so well hidden in the remote wilderness of Narragansett country that the complete works were not discovered until some time after the conflict. The exact specifications of the fort remain unknown and the debate surrounding its purpose continues.184 Nineteenth-century writers, however, concluded that “[t]he builders taking advantage of huge bowlders, laid rough stone walls between them, making a continuous line. ‘There is a round bastion or half moon on the northeast corner of the fort, and a salient or V-shaped point, or flanker,

182 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 181; Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 153.

183 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 146, 153.

184 For a recent account of the debate see Marilyn, Bellemore, Townnews.com 1995- 2008, Zwire.com, NKStandardTimes.com, http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=13684198&BRD=1715&PAG=461&dept_id=7397 4&rfi=6 (accessed 27 April 2008).

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on the west side.’ ”185 The Narragansetts briefly fired on colonial forces on their way to

Great Swamp from this fort.186 There is also a first hand account of the Narragansetts from Great Swamp regrouping “twenty Miles farther into the Country, to some Rocks where we could not get at them without much Danger,” although the English army eventually “beat the Indians from the foresaid rocks” some weeks later.187 This is undoubtedly the Queen’s Fort, which is in fact approximately 15 miles from Great

Swamp using straight-line distance.188 In the early colonial era, distances were measured by the windy trails without reliable maps, accounting here for the difference in distance.

A third European-style Indian fortress existed in Narragansett country during the war, only 7 miles from Great Swamp in what is now Charlestown.189 When compared to the other two forts, the design of this fortress was the most obviously geometric in

185 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War n. 2 146 continued from 145, and quote from Sidney S. Rider, The Lands of Rhode Island, 236, as cited in Stiles.

186 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, n. 1, 147.

187 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 194, 197.

188 The following website calculated the distance from Exeter to Kingston RI, the two forts were at a slightly greater distance as Queen’s Fort was north of Exeter and Great Swamp west of South Kingston, City Distance Tool, Geobytes, http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm?loadpage (accessed 31 May 2008).

189 http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm?loadpage (accessed 21 June 2008). 109

Figure 6.9: Ninigret’s Fort at Charlestown from Michael Luciano da Silva, M.D., “Portuguese Pilgrims and Dighton Rock,” http://www.dightonrock.com/pilgrim_chapter_10.htm (accessed 21 June 2008).

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construction, yet mystery shrouds its origins and utility during the war.190 Generally, historians have considered the fortress to be Ninigret’s main eastern Niantic fort at the time, and this was supposedly where Captain John Mason (the elder John Mason’s son) confirmed the sachem’s neutrality during King Philip’s War.191 The English gave approval for Ninigret’s men to bury the dead the day after the attack on Great Swamp,192 indicating that the eastern Niantics were located in force in the area, and may have come from this fortress. Although the Narragansetts did not control this fort, the eastern

Niantics have often been considered Narragansetts and were in any case, closely related.

Ninigret exercised power over certain elements of the Narragansetts during the interwar years, further clouding the tribal issue. It is likely that Ninigret’s Fort was part of an earlier chain of fortresses meant to protect both the Narragansetts and the eastern Niantics from attack.193

190 Historians debate if the Dutch, Portuguese, or English built this European-style fort, see Michael Luciano da Silva, M.D., “Portuguese Pilgrims and Dighton Rock,” http://www.dightonrock.com/pilgrim_chapter_10.htm (accessed 21 June 2008).

191 Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, And Trading Posts of the United States (New York: McMillan Publishing Company, 1988), 704.

192 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 193.

193 The implications of this chain of Indian forts are beyond the scope of this paper. Clearly something historically important was at play here with a developed defense of this magnitude, regardless of the origins of the fortresses’ original builders.

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The Narragansetts thus fortified their villages earlier than Connecticut Colony transitioned from garrison to full-scale fortification defense, and had more advanced defenses than the nearby Providence Plantations employed throughout the war. Recent research indicates that the case of the Narragansetts was not unprecedented in the New

World. Lee’s insightful relation of the Tuscarora’s and Cherokee’s use of fortifications, with or without knowledge of European military techniques, was an additional case of

Native Americans utilizing European-like fortresses: “the Tuscaroras…were using bastioned palisades and partially squared walls.”194 When the European threat increased, the Tuscarora increased their fortifications building “generally one per village…Some of these were more sophisticated than others…a larger [European] threat would require a more concentrated defense.”195 The Narragansetts and Tuscaroras seemed to have employed a ‘defense-in-depth’ concept, where there were alternate positions-or forts-to fall back on if others were captured. Meanwhile, the colonial invader was forced to move deeper and deeper into enemy territory, extending his forces’ supply lines and making them more vulnerable to attack. Similar to some of the Tuscarora fortifications, the fort at Great Swamp was incomplete when the English invaded Narragansett country.196

194 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 728-730; Steele reports that the Susquehannocks too employed European-style fortifications with an “earthen fort, complete with cannon, bastions, and ditch, to which they added a strong exterior .” Warpaths, 53. Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 24, discusses how the Indians “undermined the wall by tunneling” at Fort Presu’Isle in 1763.

195 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 734.

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Even with incomplete fortifications, the Narragansetts understood how to integrate modern defenses with the local terrain. When the Narragansetts from Queen’s Fort fired on the English during their march to Great Swamp, the fortification thus commanded the trail, and at Charlestown, the fortress was strategically situated to command the landing at the harbor there. The fortification at Great Swamp also utilized local terrain with its position inside a dense swamp. One wonders what additional fortifications were never found that were part of the Narragansett’s defensive posture. A contemporary report in fact claims that the Narragansetts from Great Swamp sheltered 5 miles away after the attack before reaching the Queen’s Fort.197 Another claims that “fresh” Narragansett warriors “out of an adjoining swamp” nearly turned the tide of the battle, when they arrived to reinforce Great Swamp.198 It remains unknown if the fortresses were built by the Narragansetts and Niantics themselves or with the assistance of Europeans, or whether the tribes occupied the forts once the Europeans abandoned them. What is clear is that the Native Americans in Narragansett country, as elsewhere in America, were utilizing European-style defenses.

196 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 734. The colonists in New England and the southeastern colonies similarly blamed fugitives for assisting the natives in building their fortresses, a further parallel between the two cases. In the Narragansett case, there was the additional story of ‘Stonewall John,’ an English-trained mason, who purportedly designed the Indians forts, Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 146 n. 1.

197 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 193.

198 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 300. Drake, 300, n. 367, agrees with Benjamin Church’s assertion that the reinforcements were from “Pumham’s town,” another Narragansett sachem. This also indicates that the forts were in mutually supporting positions of each other. 113

The evidence on fortifications in Connecticut’s colonial records and elsewhere enables an expansion of Geoffrey Parker assertion that “[i]n America as in Asia, however, isolated fortresses proved of limited use. They served to create a safe environment for trade and a defense against low-intensity threats, but they could not resist a major assault.”199 Although European forces did not attack the Connecticut

Colony’s defenses directly during the Seventeenth Century, the colony implemented

European-new-style artillery fortress to deter European forces and prepare for potential attacks. The colonial fort at Saybrook, at the strategic mouth of the Connecticut River deterred the higher-intensity threat of New York Governor Andros’ invading force,200 and the earliest garrison there, prior to the Pequot War, fired cannon at a Dutch ship to prevent a landing.201 The Dutch also threatened Connecticut in the eastern Niantic-Dutch conspiracy of the early-1650s, and the colony was in an especially precarious position because it bordered New Netherlands. In 1665, 1667 and 1673, Winthrop believed that the Dutch would raid the colony’s coast, and Connecticut leaders assisted the English

199 Parker, “The Artillery Fortress As An engine of European Overseas Expansion, 1480- 1750;” also Lee, “Using the Natives Against the Natives: Indigenes as ‘Counterinsurgents’ in the British Atlantic, 1500-1800.”

200 General Court Records, CCR, 334-335.

201 Cave, The Pequot War, 92.

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colonists on Long Island against an invading Dutch force from Manhattan in 1673.202

The Dutch force consisted of a “small vessel of six guns wth 300 men,”203 a considerable force of European infantry for the New World at the time, justifying Winthrop’s fears.

Militia forces led by Connecticut’s Fitz-Winthrop defeated the Dutch forces in battle,204 and England soon after regained Manhattan from the Dutch.

The French were also a threat to Connecticut Colony’s security as early as the mid-1660s, when the French and Dutch were temporarily allies.205 Governor Winthrop was suspicious of French interaction with the Algonquin tribes to the north of

Connecticut, considering that France’s Indian allies, with or without French forces, might use the war against the Mohawks as an excuse to attack the settlements of their English allies.206 Winthrop regarded this threat grave enough on one occasion to ready the

202 Governor Winthrop mentioned the threat of the Dutch fleet to Connecticut’s coastline in 1665 and 1667 (Winthrop Papers VIII, 97, 118). During the English-Dutch war of 1673, Winthrop sent intelligence to his son Fitz-John on Long Island when the Dutch fleet sailed from New York (Winthrop Papers VIII, 152). The fleet’s destination was unknown, and it easily could have raided the Connecticut coast.

203 Winthrop Papers VIII, 158.

204 Stevens, Sherrill H., LTC ret., “The Early History of County, Long Island, New York,” Rootsweb, an Ancestry.com Community. http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~nysuffol/history5.html (accessed 9 July 2008).

205 Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 14, mentions the temporary French-Dutch alliance.

206 Winthrop Papers VIII, 98, 100, 102, 118.

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Connecticut militia.207 He also sent Connecticut in a joint expedition with

Massachusetts forces “to discover the way toward Canada, whether passable for horse, as also to get good intelligence of the motion of the French Army…[which was] pretending against the Mohaques.”208 Winthrop also noted “the strange march of a French army in the very depth of winter fro Canad, wch alarmed all our inland plantations.”209 England too considered the French in Canada a serious enough threat to order its invasion, although Winthrop ultimately avoided committing New England troops in a Canadian expedition and a proposed attack on the French Caribbean islands.210 In 1669, Mason Sr., believed strongly enough that the French were attempting to ally with the southern New

England tribes, including the Mohegans, Pequots, Niantics and Narragansetts, that he ordered Owaneco to bring in some of his followers’ muskets.211 During King Philip’s

War, some colonists believed that the French were supplying Philip’s forces, and

207 Winthrop Papers VIII, 100.

208 Winthrop Papers VIII, 102. Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War, Appendix, 466- 467, cites that Major Mason “organized a troop of horse of thirty-seven members” in 1658 and that it had increased in size to sixty members by 1672. This unit of regular cavalry (not dragoons) was known as the First Connecticut Cavalry, and was most likely the one sent by Governor Winthrop to reconnoiter the route to Canada.

209 Winthrop Papers VIII, 104.

210 Winthrop Papers VIII, 103, 119.

211 Colonial Connecticut leadership rarely demanded the surrendering of firearms, an issue discussed at length below. That Mason, the patron of the Mohegans made some of the tribe weapons testifies to the colonists’ perception of the seriousness of the plot. Other Connecticut leaders believed strongly in the plot such as Thomas Stanton and Richard Allyn. State Archives, Indian Series, Series I, Vol. I, reel 69 microfilm, Document Numbers 1, 4, 10, 12- 22. 116

reportedly French agents at Pocumtuck (Deerfield) encouraged attacks during the conflict.212 Ellis and Morris relate that King Philip met with a Monsieur Normanville outside of Boston, and the Frenchmen told Philip not to burn the best English houses because a 300 man French army, with extra ammunition for the Indians, would arrive in the spring to reinforce the uprising.213 Although this attack never materialized, the colonists’ fears proved justified when Indian-French forces attacked New England a decade later, and repeatedly during the ‘French and Indian Wars.’

The Connecticut colonists effectively utilized the most prominent features of the

‘European way of war’ from the garrison defense to the full-scale fortifications at

Hartford, New Haven, and Windsor. The fort at Saybrook had always been a major fortification, and was improved over time. John Winthrop, writing in 1673 about New

Haven’s fortifications, described a “captaine Manig,” who “fell downe fro the wall of the

212 Hubbard ultimately concludes that the French were not actively aiding Philip, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 266, 203 for the French at Pocumtuck. Certainly Hubbard did not have all of the evidence in 1677, and the best place to discover possible French assistance to Philip is the French colonial records, if they still exist. The French did not send an army to aid Philip, but historians cannot conclusively rule out that the French did not provide material assistance such as weapons and ammunition.

213 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 187, from the testimony of a James Quanapohit, manuscript Document 355 in the Connecticut State Archives Colonial War Series. I believe that if the meeting took place at all, it was before the war’s outbreak because it would have been too dangerous for a white man to travel into Indian country, and too suspicious for a Frenchman to travel into the countryside to confer with the leader of an Indian uprising.

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there 16 foot high.”214 This indicates that New Haven also had fortifications prior to King Philip’s War, and the use of the term “castle” as opposed to “palisadoes” perhaps signifies that a more robust European-style fortress was already in place. By the end of hostilities in southern New England in 1676, Connecticut had at least four large European artillery fortresses, not including smaller versions and fortified garrison houses, while only populated by 11,000 colonists. Connecticut was thus very extensively fortified, virtually an armed camp, and the number of fortifications per density of population was certainly comparable to some of the most fortified places in Europe. The Narragansett tribe at Great Swamp, the Queen’s Fort, and the fort of the closely related eastern

Niantics at Charlestown, all employed methods of fortification analogous to the

Europeans. The Narragansetts, fighting from their Great Swamp fortification, inflicted the most casualties on the colonists of any battle during King Philip’s War. The evidence indicates that European methods of defensive warfare were widespread at least in

Connecticut and the Narragansett country from 1675-1676, and that adopting the

“skulking way of war” was thus not the only effective method for combating Philip’s warriors. These European-new-style fortresses employed in conjunction with an active defense, an adequate offense, and a moderate policy towards the local native population, proved very effective in deterring King Philip’s forces from devastating the Connecticut

Colony.

214 Winthrop Papers VIII, 149.

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CHAPTER 7

THE IMPREGNABLE FORTRESS: A MODERATE POLICY AND AN

ACTIVE DEFENSE

Fortifications alone are an ineffective defense. As Wayne Lee notes, almost all fortifications in Europe during the period succumbed to siege if no relief force was forthcoming, and the supplies of the offensive forces held out.215 Fortifications can be bypassed or reduced, or within the capabilities of Philip’s forces, waited out until the food supply inside the fort forced the colonists to take the field. This was in fact what happened at Fort Saybrook during the Pequot War, when Gardiner sent two separate parties to bring in corn and hay. The Pequots ambushed both parties, one of which was wiped out.216 Larry Ivers describes the bypassing of early English colonial fortifications:

“Initially, the colonial governments tried stationing small, immobile garrisons in forts situated on the major avenues of approach into the settled areas. However, the Indians quietly bypassed the forts and ambushed the surprised settlers.”217 There was something else at play, then, that made Connecticut’s fortifications effective. Connecticut Colony’s

215 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” n. 100.

216 Vaughan, New England Frontier, 130.

217 Larry E. Ivers, “Rangers” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 620-621.

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success in King Philip’s War hinged, in large part, on the good treatment of the local

Connecticut Indians–the culmination of a deliberate policy of moderation advocated by the Connecticut Colony’s leadership. In Connecticut, moderate policy towards the local

Indians and adequate defenses based on the European model were inseparable–one was not effective without the other. The Connecticut colonists themselves adopted the moderate policy advocated by their leaders, and resisted the anti-Indian hysteria that gripped the other New England colonies. Connecticut continually warned its colonial neighbors to treat their local Indians fairly, in order to keep them allied to the English or to ensure their neutrality. While adopting a moderate Indian policy, Connecticut took the precaution of adequately fortifying its towns and employing colonial forces jointly with allied Indians in an ‘active defense.’

Connecticut enacted a number of self-defense measures and incrementally increased them as it became apparent that Philip’s rising was spreading from a local conflict to a New England-wide war. One of the first measures that the Connecticut

General Court took was to ensure proper leadership for the colony with the creation of the War Council, which first convened on July 14th, 1675.218 Facing the hostile threats of

King Philip and New York Governor Andros, the Court granted the Council wide powers, authorizing all of the Council’s decisions consistent with the Colony’s Charter.

218 General Court Records, CCR, 331. Connecticut relied on a committee somewhat akin to the War Council during the Pequot War, and another very similar to it during the Third Anglo- Dutch War, Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 10, 17.

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The Council originally consisted of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and “Assistants,” as well as Captains Newbery and Wells and Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Lords, although various members were later added. The Council needed a quorum of at least five members to vote with the Governor or Deputy Governor always present to convene the

Council.219 The War Council’s ability to make effective and timely decisions, in part by remaining abreast of events, was especially impressive given the slow movement of information by messenger.

The General Court, prior to the formation of the War Council, acted decisively at the onset of hostilities by sending military reinforcements to the border nearest the conflict. This force consisted of 30 dragoons and 10 “troopers.”220 Both of these groups were mounted soldiers, but traditionally dragoons dismounted before fighting, while troopers fought as cavalry.221 Dragoons were armed with long muskets because they fought on foot, and thus did not need the shorter-barreled carbines that the cavalry carried in order to fire while on horse back. Given the terrain of New England, especially during the mid-seventeenth century when there were more forested areas, the cavalry had limited

219 General Court Records, CCR, 261. The “Assistants” were advisors to the Governor and Deputy Governor rather than clerical staff.

220 General Court Records, CCR, 331.

221 Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, ed. John R. Alden (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 1:27, explains the difference between dragoons and cavalry in the colonial era. 121

opportunities to maneuver, even in the very rare occasion that enemy Indians could be caught in the open. Based on these terrain considerations, cavalry normally fought as dragoons, dismounting to fight. In fact, the Connecticut General Court, meeting in lieu of the Council, ordered the troopers to arm themselves with long muskets,222 essentially turning them into dragoons.

In addition to bolstering the local militia in southeastern Connecticut, the Court sent warnings to Connecticut’s other towns to prepare for their own defense.223 The court again repositioned troops in the southern coastal towns, where suspicious Indians were thought to be marauding.224 On 16 July 1675, Uncas sent warning to Connecticut’s leaders that the Narragansetts would imminently join Philip.225 The War Council, now in session, reacted by dispatching Captain Bull to “secure the borders” along the southeastern frontier.226 After the threat of a Narragansett uprising dissipated for the time being, these forces were disbanded.227 By 5 August, however, an emergency meeting of

222 General Court Records, CCR, 270.

223 General Court Records, CCR, 331.

224 General Court Records, CCR, 333. This might have been in part a response to a report from Uncas that suspicious Indians were lurking in the woods, Winthrop Papers VIII, 402.

225 CCR, 336.

226 CCR, 337.

227 CCR, 337.

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the Council–it was annotated that they met close to one in the morning–determined to put the colony on full alert by calling up significant forces of dragoons in all of the counties.228 This decision was precipitated by recent intelligence from Major Pynchon, who was the militia leader at Springfield, Massachusetts Bay Colony. The conflict had spread to the western Massachusetts Bay Colony settlements, some of which bordered

Connecticut. The new dragoon forces could be termed ‘hourmen,’ having been ordered to muster in an hour’s time after an alarm, as opposed to the minutes required of the of American Revolutionary War lore. These troops were used both for the active defense of the colony and offensive operations in the other colonies. The soldiers from this call-up remained on duty through the Great Swamp Fight against the

Narragansetts, and various elements were called-up throughout the war.

The War Council, in addition to raising troops, determined to increase the security of Connecticut’s towns and highways as it became apparent that enemy forces were within the colony itself. There was now indisputable evidence of the enemy’s presence, more so than the initial warnings about local Indians acting suspiciously in early July, and a warning by Uncas that the Narragansetts living north and south of the Hockanum

228 CCR, 345; Robert Black and I separately arrived at the same conclusion that it was an emergency meeting because of the unusual time of the session–very early in the morning–noted in the War Journal. Robert C. Black III, The Younger John Winthrop (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1966), 350.

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River could not be trusted.229 On 31 August, four Indians out of a total party of eight shot at colonist Christover Crow, when he was traveling between Simsbury and Hartford.230

The following day John Coalt was shot at near the “North meadow” of Hartford.231

Major Treat, who had been dispatched with a large combined force to the settlements along the Connecticut River in Massachusetts Bay Colony, was ordered to counter- march. His dragoons were sent to reconnoiter along both sides of the river and from

Windsor to Hartford.232

Two days later, the Council ordered each plantation to maintain a night watch in addition to the quarter of each town’s militia on-guard during the day.233 The Council then dictated that parties working in the fields must consist of at least six armed men, and that ammunition was to be conserved for combat.234 On September 4th, the Council arranged a system of patrolling the main roads in Hartford County, where each major settlement sent out a two-man patrol to execute route-reconnaissance operations to the

229 General Court Records, CCR, 333; CCR, 336; “Hockanum River,” and “Podunk (people),” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hockanum_River and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podunk_%28people%29 (accessed 13 February 2008). The area is now East and South Windsor, Manchester, East Hartford, north of the Hockanum River and East Hartford south of the river.

230 CCR, 358.

231 CCR, 359.

232 CCR, 359-360.

233 CCR, 361.

234 CCR, 361.

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next major settlement. The towns would alternate each day and hence the patrols were sent out from opposite directions in turn; “[t]hese men to be taken out of the guard of each towne, and to be upon theire worke by sun an hower high in each day.”235

After Major Treat led the army back up the Connecticut River, and Springfield was nearly destroyed by the treachery of a local tribe, the Council ordered on 5 October that each town designate safe areas for the women and children, and to identify sufficiently fortified garrison houses. The inhabitants of central and north Hartford

County were also ordered to deposit their Indian corn on the east side of the Connecticut

River.236 Four days later, colonists sighted hostile Indians on the east side of the river, but it is unclear if the colonists had already transported their Indian corn as the Council had directed. On 11 October 1675, the Court ordered “Flankers placed in or neer the outside houses of the towne, so as they might be able to command from Flanker to

Flanker round the towne.”237 Flankers, specifically in terms of fortifications, were positions that could provide enfilading fire along the walls. Here, the War Council directed the colonists to utilize their English-European-militarily strengths.

By early November, with Philip’s forces ranging in all of the New England colonies, the War Council began to direct the establishment or improvement of

235 CCR, 362.

236 CCR, 372-373.

237 CCR, 375.

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fortifications. This essentially began the transition from strong-point garrison defense to standard European fortifications, except those fortifications that already existed at

Saybrook, New Haven and Windsor, which were improved. In combination with the more formidable land defenses, armed sloops patrolled the Connecticut River and the same probably held true for other rivers or bays large enough to maintain a fresh-water fleet.238 The War Council quickly and efficiently maintained the garrison-defense of

Connecticut by reacting to events in the other colonies as well as the incidents of hostiles within its own borders.

Apparently the pace of construction on the fortifications was not what the Council had anticipated, and by 22 November, the Council authorized the creation of town- fortification-committees to impress citizens, if volunteers were not forthcoming, along with beasts of burden.239 The Council’s failure to supervise the construction of fortifications until three months after Philip’s confederates were active on the northern frontier and harassing colonists in Connecticut proper can be contributed to the fact that the English were farmers first and soldiers second. During the months that the fortifications were largely ignored by the Council it was harvest season in southern New

England, and the harvested supplies were needed to maintain the colony during the long winter months as well as to supply the field forces during winter campaigning. Viewed

238 CCR.

239 CCR, 382.

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from this cultural perspective, the Council’s priorities seem reasonable. The Council can also be credited with not overreacting to the threat, and it had done something, namely ensuring that a strong point garrison defense was employed throughout the colony.

The threat to the Connecticut Colony increased as spring approached. Governor

Andros sent intelligence to Connecticut obtained from two freed English prisoners

“affirm[ing] that the said North Indians, at the said Rendezvous, in a vapouring Manner, declared, that their Intent was, first to destroy Connecticut this Spring…”240 These

Indians were not Philip’s immediate confederates or the Mahicans that may have supported Philip as well, but French Indians and other tribes from the north such as the

Abenaki. The Connecticut authorities also received intelligence that Philip was planning to strike the colony once the rebel Indians had broken their winter encampments. After

Major Treat led Connecticut’s forces into Narragansett country as part of the joint- colonial effort to subdue that tribe, the Council ordered on 28 December that the inhabitants of Hartford, Wethersfield and the Windsor plantations east of the River repair to their garrison houses, take in their provisions, maintain a vigorous guard, and scout the nearby woods.241 This was prescient advice because at the end of January, Major Palmes

240 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 226-227.

241 CCR, 389.

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then relayed that Philip’s forces had split into smaller groups and were laying in wait

“downwards” from Nipmuck country.242 On February 18th , one such band mortally wounded Hill at Hoccanum, and a few days later the Council ordered the inhabitants on the east side of the Connecticut River into their garrison houses with a guard of at least six men.243

Reacting to additional threats, especially against Hartford, the Council ordered

Hartford and New Haven and other towns “to compeat and lyne their and flanckers with a ditch and brast worke.”244 The Connecticut Colony was now facing the gravest danger to its existence since the Pequot War. On March 16th, the Council ordered an increase of guard around daybreak, and the scouting of the nearby woods on horseback.245 March 27th, 1676, brought the worst damage that Connecticut suffered during the entire war. The abandoned town of Simsbury was burned to the ground and a colonist was captured at Windsor.246 Four days later, the Council took the extraordinary step of disbanding some of its forces in the face of this extreme danger, when it sent the

242 CCR, 403.

243 CCR, 409-410.

244 CCR, 413.

245 CCR, 417.

246 CCR, 423.

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New Haven and Fairfield county soldiers back to their towns.247 The Council ordered that these troops conduct reconnaissance on the along the route of march back to their respective counties. The Council thus opted for a defense of fortifications, instead of maintaining a large to systematically hunt down the enemy war parties.

The next War Journal entry surprisingly was two months after the significant threat to the colony during the early spring. Philip’s threat seems to have climaxed by the first week of April, and dropped off quickly thereafter. The Council in June was advising the training of men and boys in the handling of firearms. Interestingly, the Council advocated training boys under the age of 16. If the men were away fighting–Connecticut forces were operating in western Massachusetts, Narragansett and Nipmuck countries– boys and old men were left to defend the garrisons and farming parties. The Council also advised that the training consist of marksmanship training.248 This was an important change of method from standard English tactical training. Through the American

Revolutionary War, British and colonial forces did not have a command for “take aim,” instead relying on “level.”249 After more than 50 years, the New England colonists were adapting to the new military environment, particularly one where opponents did not usually face each other in organized ranks. Without taking aim, it would have been

247 CCR, 426.

248 CCR, 451-452.

249 David H. Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

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difficult for the colonists to engage the hostile Indians. These were the final entries concerning the defense of Connecticut. The flurry of activity in late February and March died down to nothing until the one entry in June, and then on 19 August 1676, Hartford disbanded its forces all together after it became apparent that Philip’s confederacy had been defeated.250 Combined allied Indian and colonial- forces continued, however, to carry out mopping-up operations.251 Having surveyed Connecticut’s defensive posture, the question remains ‘why did the hostile Indians not attack the colony?’

Philip’s forced did attack Connecticut, just in the less noteworthy way of killing lone colonists and burning down an abandoned town, scarcely receiving recognition from contemporary authors, let alone historians. The colony avoided major devastation in part because it was well defended. The Council seemed to have had a sound system of receiving intelligence and translated this information into sound military preparations.

Unconventional forces, such as Philip’s confederates, normally attack less well-defended areas to inflict maximum damage without a corresponding risk to their own men. These tactics in fact corresponded with the Indian’s “cutting off way of war.” Connecticut’s

250 CCR, 469.

251 CCR, 420. I term the colonists ‘mercenaries’ because they were allowed to keep the booty that they captured, including a monetary reward for hostile Indian captives. This policy attempted to alleviate a shortage of soldiers, when the Indian threat was greatest in the early spring of 1676. It did not always work as it was intended though, as the policy seems to have attracted some unsavory colonial volunteers. Leaders have a much more difficult time maintaining discipline and preventing atrocities when policy allows troops to plunder at will. 130

leaders ordered measures for self-defense after learning of the outbreak of hostilities in

Plymouth colony, and took measured steps thereafter to ensure the colony’s safety. Once the enemy disbanded into smaller war parties after breaking winter quarters, it would have been difficult for them to attack at the time Connecticut transitioned from a garrison-strong-point defense to a defensive posture based on European-style fortifications. Bands of seven to nine Indians harassed lone or small groups of settlers, but could not carryout large-scale attacks on the well-fortified towns. We cannot be sure that larger war parties did not operate in Connecticut, there was simply nothing recorded to indicate their presence. Certainly bands could have joined together for major attacks, a tactic employed by guerilla forces throughout history. Combined war parties of hundreds of warriors would have devastated Connecticut towns, largely unfortified until well into the conflict. Based on the other colonies’ experience, most of the garrison strong points would have survived, but the non-garrisoned portions of the towns would have been destroyed. The threat of major attacks on Connecticut were very real because of the geographic proximity of the Massachusetts Bay towns on the Connecticut River, which large numbers of Philip’s confederates devastated. Philip or his allied leaders may have easily maneuvered forces into Connecticut to deliver a significant blow. Although the

Connecticut War Council seems to have acted more quickly than the other colonies’ leadership, and the Connecticut Colony’s defensive operations were probably better during the stage of garrison defense, there were two more influential factors that

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combined with these relative advantages that accounted for Connecticut’s success.

Connecticut Colony possessed two ‘super weapons’ that the other New England colonies lacked: a radical policy of moderation towards the local Indians that neutralized them; and the utilization of Mohegan-Pequot-western Niantic warriors for both defensive and offensive operations.

“But its advised that all due care be taken to treat the Indians amicably in all parts, and not to put them upon any unrighteous or intollerable tearmes to be obserued.”252 This proclamation from the Connecticut General Court (meeting in lieu of the War Council), especially noteworthy because it came at the pinnacle of Philip’s threat to the Colony in the spring of 1676, indicated a critical difference between Connecticut and the other New

England colonies. The policy of moderation advocated by the Colony’s leadership was a vital component of the new frontier-fighting system employed by Connecticut, which established the good-treatment of local Indians as a centerpiece of its war policy.

There was a trend in the other New England colonies of local Indian-settler disputes that turned into armed violence and paved the way for King Philip’s forces entry into an area. Philip and his confederates adeptly took advantage of local disputes. An expedition led by Captain Wheeler aimed at determining the Nipmuck’s position towards

Philip, turned into a disaster when local Brookfield men, insisting on the tribe’s loyalty to

252 General Court Records, CCR, 272.

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the English, led the force into an ambush. The Indians then besieged Brookfield itself.253

On September 2nd 1675 at Northfield, the northernmost settlement along the

Massachusetts Bay Colony’s stretches of the Connecticut River, a band of River Indians surprised the colonists even though hostilities had been ongoing in New England for almost two months.254 The colonists’ lack of military preparations indicated that they trusted the local Indians. The Indians along the Massachusetts’ stretches of the

Connecticut River may have been incited to violence when the colonists suddenly disarmed them contrary to the advice of Connecticut’s War Council. The situation replayed itself at Springfield, when inhabitants refused to believe that the local Agawam tribe would turn against them. Rejecting Major Pynchon’s developing suspicion of the

Agawams, constable Lieutenant Cooper, was ambushed on his way to the tribe’s village.255 Members of Philip’s confederacy, joined by the Agawams who had clandestinely sheltered them in their nearby fort, then turned on the town, destroying most of it.256 Winthrop had recorded early in the war that the Indians “up the river (as

253 Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 149. Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 104-105, indicates that the colonists felt betrayed by the Nipmucks, especially after sending several expeditions to secure their neutrality.

254 Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 163.

255 Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 178-9.

256 CCR, 372-373; Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 119-123, describes the events at Springfield and the colonists’ strong feelings of betrayal.

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those have to us) have assured Maior Pynchen of their fidelity to the English.”257 The

English trusting behavior towards the local natives is manifested in passages such as this as well as in the general lack of colonial military mobilization in Nipmuck country and along the upper Connecticut River. The colonists’ trusting posture explains their sense of outrage at the perceived disloyalty of the Indians once the tribes joined with Philip.

Undoubtedly from the hostile Indian perspective, there was also a sense of betrayal, causing them to join with Philip. Most of this record has been lost, and we are left to piece together remnants, such as disillusionment over the colonist’s confiscation of their firearms, and the more general land and hunting/fishing disputes.

The situation was markedly different in Connecticut. Not only did the colonists there allow the Indians to maintain their firearms, they did little to incite the ill will of their native neighbors. By 1675, the Indians of southern New England had fully adopted the flintlock musket as their primary means of fighting as well as hunting, and their disarmament would have thus spelled disaster for native families: “They had become quite dependent on those Arms to procure the Means of living, and hence it is not strange that they should consider the Seizure of them an Act of great Injustice.”258 Connecticut’s

257 Winthrop Papers VIII, 170.

258 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 74. Hubbard also highlights that the Indians had adopted firearms: “Not making Allowance for the Difference of Times, when they before engaged us, only with Bows and Arrows; but now came to fight us with our own Weapons,” The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 260. See also Malone, The Skulking Way of War 45, 87.

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colonists also arranged local peace-agreements with the tribes after Philip’s rising in exchange for English clothing.259 The English clothing was more than a practical offering to protect the natives from the elements. The Indians acceptance of the colonists’ gifts indicated that a friendly relationship existed between the parties and the wearing of English clothing identified the Native Americans as allied or neutral in regard to the neighboring colonists. There were also several occasions when the Council authorized the allied Mohegans to deal with the local tribes. One such example was when the Council sanctioned that Uncas’ son Owaneco establish a fort with local Indians near Hoccanum for their joint safety as well as to undoubtedly watch them.260 Allowing natives to deal with natives ensured that the colonists would not break native taboos, and showed that the tribes that were in good standing with the English would be empowered to act as leaders within Indian communities.

The Council reminded the colonists through proclamations to treat the local

Indians fairly as in a letter to the town of Milford: “we must desire that you would cause all your people to carry so tenderly towards the Indians that they may not receiue any just provocation to stir them up against us. We have enemies eno, and let us not by any harsh dealing stir up more yet.”261 The General Court ordered the towns to establish methods

259 CCR, 369. For the agreement with the Middletown Indians () see State Archives, Colonial War Series, Series I, Vol. I, Document Number 176.

260 CCR, 379.

261 CCR, 419. 135

for identifying local Indians to keep them from becoming confused with Philip’s confederates, attempting to prevent friendly-fire incidents.262 The most significant and notable element of the policy, however, was when the War Council “desired”

Wethersfield and Middletown to allow the local tribes into their towns along with their corn, for mutual protection from the hostile tribes.263 This was truly a remarkable event as Massachusetts Bay Colony forcibly drove off peaceful local tribes or imprisoned them on Deer Island in Massachusetts Bay.264

Lee has theorized that a “resident alien” concept existed in combined colonial and

Native American villages or those Indian towns adjacent to colonial settlements. The

Native Americans desired the symbol of colonial protection if not actual joint-defense in return for providing intelligence to the colonists. The intermingling of colonists and natives was in accord with Indian cultural ideas of diplomacy, with those Native

Americans living with the colonists serving as “diplomatic ‘entry points,’ go-betweens, and early warning mechanisms.”265 The Indians also at times invited colonists to live

262 General Court Records, CCR, 272.

263 State Archives, Colonial War Series, Series I, Vol. I, Document Numbers 178-179; CCR, 374-375.

264 For the driving off of friendly tribes see Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 98. For the Deer Island captivity see Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 107 and Vaughan, New England Frontier, 318-319.

265 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 46. Lee further develops Native American cultural norms for warfare and diplomacy in “Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of in 136

with them for many of the same reasons and especially to demonstrate their loyalty to the

English. The Natick ‘praying Indian’ community of Massachusetts Bay Colony, after the onset of King Philip’s War convinced two Englishmen to live with them, but the positive experience of the these men did not convince the other colonists or prevent the internment of the community on Deer Island.266 In recent times of extreme crisis, people have sometimes resorted to an insular tribal instinct like that of Massachusetts Bay

Colony in King Philip’s War.267 That tendency makes Connecticut Colony’s actions, and the behavior of the Connecticut Indians (and the Natick community), that much more extraordinary given the relative religious and political intolerance of that era as well as the colonists’ lack of security in an untamed land. The policy was thus practical in addition to ethical, denying critical local intelligence to Philip’s forces. Without this intelligence, the hostile Indians were unable to carryout the attacks that they had managed in the other New England colonies in conjunction with the local tribes. Connecticut

Colony avoided the hostility of the local tribes through its unprecedented moderate policy and this was a major contributing factor for Philip’s forces’ lack of success in the colony.

Native American Warfare, 1500-1800,” The Journal of Military History 71, no. 3 (2007) 701- 741.

266 Vaughan, New England Frontier, 317-318.

267 Vaughan, New England Frontier, 316, agrees with me, pointing out American behavior towards German and in 1917 and 1941.

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The Connecticut Colony’s policy towards the local natives was extended to the hostile Indians as well. Almost unbelievably, the War Council sent a letter by way of a

Narragansett messenger named Tiawakesson (aka Watawaikeson) to Philip’s forces requesting a prisoner exchange and proposing a peace conference, the day after the burning of Simsbury!268 Certainly the Council could have been motivated by a sense of weakness after such an attack, but this seems unlikely because Simsbury had been abandoned and no inhabited Connecticut towns had been attacked.269 Connecticut’s field forces, heavily aided and guided by Indian allies, also had been the most effective of any colonial military units during the war. It seems then that the Connecticut Colony was offering conciliation out of a position of strength rather than out of perceived weakness, and hence continuing its moderate policy. When there was no definitive reply to this peace entreaty,270 another more active proposal was approved on April 18th 1676, and a force was sent to Hadley to affect this meeting on the first of May.271 Philip and his allies

268 CCR, 425.

269 Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 274-275, describes the attack on Simsbury.

270 Josiah H. Temple, George Sheldon, Mary T. Stratton, A History of the Town of Northfield Massachusetts (Albany: J. Munsell, 1875), 89, http://books.google.com/books?id=yjdcfw5Q2cC&pg=PR5&dq=A+History+of+the+Town+of+N orthfield+Massachusetts (accessed 4 September 2008), claims that the hostile Indians offered a counter-proposal for the bounty of English captives in their possession. The colonists, probably correctly, saw it as a ruse to buy time to regroup.

271 CCR, 435, 439.

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never decisively acted on the Connecticut Colony’s peace proposals. Connecticut forces in Narragansett country later killed Tiawakesson the messenger, and the “Ticket for his free passage” from the English was found folded in his pocket.272

Compared to Massachusetts and Plymouth, Connecticut had the most lenient surrender and reintegration policy: “Connecticut was alone in forbidding the sale of other

Indians into foreign slavery. Instead, the colony sentenced captives to ten years of domestic servitude if they were sixteen or over at the end of that term; those under sixteen served until age twenty-six.”273 As with all of the New England colonies,

Connecticut enacted the death sentence for Indians that killed colonists. This was not in breaking with the standard English law practice at the time for citizens who had committed murder or , and this was how the colonists viewed Philip’s “rebellion.”

Many Native Americans viewed slavery, especially far from their native land, as a fate worse than death, however, and Connecticut’s move to outlaw this form of punishment for those hostile natives who had not kill colonists was therefore moderate in comparison to the other colonies policies. The case over the disposition of Philip’s captured wife and son also showed that Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies were in no mood to offer quarter, when a number of influential ministers sanctioned the pair’s execution. Samuel

Arnold, , Increase Mather, and James Keith all used Old Testament biblical

272 CCR, 458-459; Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 249-250.

273 Taylor, Colonial Connecticut, 84.

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passages to formulate a ‘legal opinion’ on the disposition of Philip’s family.274 Only

Keith argued against a death sentence. The colonists eventually sentenced the family to slavery,275 tradition says in the West Indies. Connecticut’s opinion on the matter was not recorded, but it is difficult to imagine the Colony supporting slavery for non-combatants, even Philip’s family, let alone a sentence of death.

Connecticut Colony did not always maintain the perfect moral high ground in its dealings with the local Indians. In Hartford for instance, the Indians were required to register and were not allowed to leave the vicinity of the town without a special permit.276

In Farmington, the tribe was told where it had to establish its village.277 The motivation for these rules, however, was partly for the Indians own protection so they would not become victims of circumstance. The Connecticut colonists’ worst example of mistreatment of Indians in King Philip’s War was the murder of two captured

Narragansetts in a New London prison. This ugly episode was a revenge murder for the

Narragansetts’ killing of an English colonist and the capturing of his son on the

Connecticut frontier with Narragansett country. The local military authority Major

274 Mather Papers VIII, Series IV, Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, “Appendix-Indian Captives” (Boston: Wiggin and Lunt for the Society, 1868), Document Numbers 2-4.

275 Schultz and Tougias, King Philip’s War, 128.

276 CCR, 376.

277 CCR, 376.

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Palmes, attempted to bring the perpetrators to justice, but was frustrated by local civilian leadership.278 In late August 1676, when Philip’s threat had significantly diminished, the

Council told Uncas in direct terms that the victory over Philip’s confederacy was ultimately the colonists, and therefore so were the prisoners of war.279 Connecticut

Colony apparently waited until the services of the Mohegans were no longer a matter of survival to reassert authority over the most powerful sachem in southern New England.

This incident was not indicative of a complete realignment of policy as the Colony, only a week later, allowed Uncas to maintain jurisdiction over the Wabaquasset Nipmuck tributaries that had surrendered to him.280 A year later, the Council also sent representatives asking Governor Andros to intercede with the Mohawks to release Uncas’ son Owaneco, who had been captured by a Mohawk raiding party.281

What caused the overall decent conduct of the Connecticut colonists towards their native neighbors when the Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies, whose colonists shared the same cultural background as the Connecticut colonists, treated their neighboring

Indians relatively poorly? The brutal experience of the Pequot War forty years prior to

Philip’s Rebellion was the vital experience that the other New England colonies did not

278 CCR, 403.

279 CCR, 472-473.

280 CCR, 474.

281 CCR, 499-500. 141

share with Connecticut. The other colonies were never in danger from Pequot war parties, although the Massachusetts Bay troops participated in the attack on the Pequot

Fort at Mystic, the other New England colonists never knew the fear of large-scale Indian attack on their frontier during an Indian war. The Connecticut colonists, on the other hand, quickly learned that war in the New World could not be effectively waged without the support of Indian allies. The alliance with the Mohegans helped generate the

Connecticut’s respect for their Native American neighbors. The Connecticut colonists captured the correct lessons from the conflict instead of drawing erroneous conclusions, as has often been the tragedy of history.

The Connecticut Colony’s policy of moderation was, in part, a reflection of its

Governor’s leadership. John Winthrop was a man of integrity, who had long-experience in matters of governance and war. Winthrop began his professional career as an executive officer to Captain Best on the Man of War Due Repulse, as part of Admiral

Lord Buckingham’s armada sailing in relief of Huguenot forces at the besieged fortress of La Rochelle.282 He experienced the ugliness of war, particularly at the battle of the Ile de Re, where he witnessed the royal French Catholic army slaughter poorly marshaled

English forces.283 Robert Black in The Younger John Winthrop claims that this experience colored Winthrop’s view of war, and that he thereafter sought diplomatic

282 Letter from Winthrop Sr. to Winthrop Jr. on 6 June 1627, in Winthrop Papers I, (Plimpton Press, for the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1929), 352.

283 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 32.

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solutions to solve disputes, and that “from war itself he would shrink as from an evil beyond calculation.”284 Although the primary documents do not specifically note

Winthrop’s feelings concerning his first military expedition, he was waiting anxiously to sail back to England: “I hope we shall not stay here long after [relief from England arrives] I thinke soone after Michaelmas.”285 Throughout the course of his public service, Winthrop tried to resolve crises through diplomacy. His actions in Connecticut during the interwar years indicate his preference for negotiation over force. During the crisis leading up to the Pequot War, Massachusetts Bay appointed Winthrop as chief negotiator for that colony’s diplomatic mission to the Pequots.286 In the events prior to

King Philip’s War almost 40 years later, Winthrop was again an active force in policymaking concerning Indian affairs.

284 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 33.

285 Letter from Winthrop Jr. to Winthrop Sr. in September, 1627, in Winthrop Papers I, 359; Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 62, does not specify how the La Rochelle expedition shaped Winthrop Jr.’s feelings about war; Neil Kamil, Fortress of the Soul: Violence, Metaphysics, and Material Life in the Huguenots’ New World, 1517-1751 (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 630-631, 863, claims that his experience there developed an aggressive mindset that sprung from militant international of the era. Jennings, The Invasion of America, 308 argues that Winthrop was an expansionist, a term corresponding to his characterization of the Europeans as “invaders.” Steele, Warpaths, 91, often agreeing with Jennings, implies that Winthrop was heavy-handed in his negotiations with the Pequots as chief negotiator for Massachusetts Bay Colony during the Pequot War. The historical record does not support the characterization of Winthrop as a warlike expansionist.

286 Letter from Sir Henry Vane to Winthrop Jr. the 5th month (August) of 1636, in Winthrop Papers III, 282.

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By the outbreak of war in 1675, Winthrop was an old man suffering from chronic illness.287 He was in a state of semi-retirement, and had at least twice attempted to resign

Connecticut’s Governorship so that he could return to England,288 presumably to die in the land of his birth. The Colony’s General Court simply would not accept his resignation, especially after the eruption of hostilities. Winthrop returned to work and resumed leadership of the colony, presiding over a number of meetings during the crisis of July 1675.289 Connecticut’s policy of moderation to the natives was undoubtedly a hallmark of Winthrop’s predilection for the diplomatic solution. Even during the early days of hysteria fostered by the uncertainty of the scope of the Indian rebellion, Winthrop maintained his composure and on 9 July 1675 argued that the Wampanoags, who had fled to Ninigret, should have “hopes of good quarter if delivered to us, &c.”290 Three days later Winthrop penned guidance to New England field commanders then in Narragansett country reminding them of Narragansett assistance during the Pequot War, and “to

287 Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 185.

288 Two of Winthrop’s letters of resignation still exist, one to the Connecticut General Court and one sent a month later “To the Deputy-Governor and Assistants of Connecticut;” both were written prior to the onset of major hostilities, Winthrop Papers VIII, 168-170. See also Winthrop Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 185. Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 346, cites the later resignation attempt was on 1 July 1675.

289 Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 185, the crisis in early July 1675 was not only due to the hostile Indian threat, but also from Royal Governor Andros of the Colony of New York, whom tried to use the confusion from Philip’s rebellion as cover for using force to make his claim to all of Connecticut west of the Connecticut River.

290 Winthrop Papers VIII, 171.

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cosider whether it be not far better to take up wth such ingagements of amity as can be attained freely & willingly [from the Narragansetts], then that the potetest of all our neighboring heathen should be made open, professed enemies.” Winthrop also argued against a “so absolute” position regarding the Narragansetts surrendering hostages, pointing out that European nations did not require hostages from “newtralls.” Underlying

Winthrop’s argument for treating the Narragansetts like fellow Europeans was also his usual practical view of diplomacy: “I believe there is difficulty ynough wth that one enemy, & why to stir up an other before an issue wth ye first [is settled].”291

Connecticut Colony did take appropriate measures for its defense, but the colony’s leadership did not allow xenophobia to carry the day. Winthrop left his mark on the colony’s Indian policy before he was summoned to Boston on 19 August 1675, as a senior representative to the assembly of the United Colonies that would last throughout

King Philip’s War.292 The Governor’s sons Majors Fitz-John and Wait Winthrop continued their father’s service to the colony. Fitz-John furthered his father’s policy of moderation by distributing cloth to loyal Indians,293 while Wait led a mission to trade

291 Winthrop Papers VIII, 173.

292 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 350.

293 Winthrop Papers VIII, 279-280; Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 208.

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coats to the friendly Mohegan, Pequots and western Niantics in exchange for those tribes handing over hostile Indians.294 Wait also participated in the expedition at the war’s outbreak to exact assurances of neutrality from the Narragansetts.295

Governor Winthrop would never see Connecticut nor England again. He died in service at Boston, succumbing to an illness apparently exacerbated by his other health problems.296 While in Boston before his death, Winthrop enraged the other colonial leaders by not restraining Connecticut’s Deputy Governor Leete’s and the War Council’s decision to withdraw Connecticut forces from Massachusetts Bay.297 He was later ignored by the other United Colony assembly delegates when he argued against the

December 1675 Narragansett expedition that he believed was “unnecessary,”298 preferring another negotiated settlement with southern New England’s largest tribe.

Winthrop also advised acting Connecticut Governor Leete to allow Uncas and Ninigret to

“draw of fro the enemy all yt will come ine & live quietly,” implying good treatment of those who surrendered. He considered that such treatment would be “an expedient towards peace” and would open the possibility of a treaty with Philip, perhaps setting the

294 CCR, 408.

295 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 348.

296 Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, 185.

297 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 351-352.

298 Quoted in Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 353.

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stage for Connecticut’s peace entreaties later in the spring.299 Regardless of the other

New England commissioners’ animosity, Winthrop was given an extravagant (by Puritan standards) public ‘state’ funeral after he died on 5 April 1676 to pay tribute to his long public service.300 One of his last major acts at the United Colonies assembly was to urge a policy of moderation for captured or surrendered Indians instead of a policy of slavery advocated by some of his peers.301 Winthrop influenced Connecticut Colony’s policy of moderation towards Indians, and his leadership was a critical factor in the colony remaining unscathed during Philip’s rising.

“Likewise the Pequods and Mohegins…proved a good Guard to New London,

Norwich, and the River’s Mouth,” relates a contemporary writer of the conflict.302 What unique military skills did the Mohegans-Pequots contribute to the active defense of

Connecticut? The best-laid defensive plans can be thwarted without an active defense that maintains the initiative and the enemy off balance, especially the “skulking” kind of enemy that can strike virtually anywhere at any moment. The mainstay of the

Connecticut war effort was the alliance with the Mohegans and Pequots. These tribes had the best military skills of any of the tribes in southern New England. Before the

299 Winthrop Papers VIII, 177.

300 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 355.

301 Black, The Younger John Winthrop, 354.

302 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 229.

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English colonists attacked Mystic during the Pequot War, the Pequots were the most feared tribe in New England. The Mohegans proved that they could not only fight at the same tactical level as the Pequots when they assisted the English during the Pequot War, but that they could survive even the neighboring larger Narragansetts lingering animosity.

Connecticut’s utilization of friendly natives from the beginning of King Philip’s

War gave the Connecticut colonists a military advantage over their New England counterparts. On the defensive, the Mohegans, Pequots, and western Niantics provided the colony with reconnaissance and search and attack capability. Allied Indians operated inside Connecticut in this way against the hostile Indians, scouring large areas, attempting to locate hostile war parties. These forces operated in much the same way as the following description of colonial scouts during the French and Indian Wars.

According to Steven Eames, “defensive scouts operated ‘on the backs of the towns’…first, they had to look for signs of enemy raiding parties, usually revealed by their tracks or campsites, and warn the towns; second, they protected the inhabitants while they performed their labors; third they pursued the enemy after they had struck; and finally, they ambushed known trails and fords used by enemy raiding parties and Indian fishing sites.”303 Allied Indians would have concentrated on scouting the passes through difficult terrain, where the enemy Indians would have been channeled, such as passes through ridges and the fords over Connecticut’s numerous rivers and creeks. The allied

303 Stephen C. Eames, “Scout” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 679.

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Indians would have also reconnoitered places that would have offered enemy bands protection from the elements, such as the leeward side of hills and ridges. Attacking forces usually consolidate for an assault near their objective. The allied Indians of

Connecticut would have been able to prevent the consolidation of enemy forces or at least alert the colonists to the enemy’s presence. The Mohegans, Pequots and western Niantics would have conducted these active-defensive operations in the same ways that they conducted offensive operations in Narragansett country and in western Massachusetts.

The allied Indians, as discussed below, proved adept in offense operations in locating enemy war parties, even on the enemy’s home turf, although, this was partially due to the women, children, and the elderly impeding the mobility of the hostile Indian parties.

Locating small bands of warriors unimpeded by non-combatants would have proved more difficult even with the allied Indians’ tactical ability.

On 16 July 1675, the Council ordered Captain Bull to secure the colony’s eastern border with Narragansett country in the event that the Narragansetts joined in Philip’s nascent rebellion. Unsurprisingly given Connecticut’s tradition of cooperation with the

Mohegans, he was directed to enlist that tribe to support his mission.304 On 24 August, the Council fearful of Philip’s rumored advance on Norwich, commissioned sachem

Joshua (Attawamhood) of the western Niantics to intercept them.305 In early October,

304 CCR, 337.

305 CCR, 353. 149

Joshua and a Tomsquash, were sent “beyond the mountaines” in eastern Connecticut to search for “strange” Indians that had been spotted.306 The Council ordered friendly

Indians to scout the eastern side of the Connecticut River from Hartford to Springfield, along with two Englishmen on 10 February 1676.307 This was the Council’s probably reaction to intelligence that hostile tribes would attempt large-scale attacks on

Connecticut in the spring, and indeed colonist Hill from Menowalett’s account was mortally wounded at Hoccanum eight days later.308 Shortly thereafter, an unknown number of friendly Indians with 100 colonial soldiers were enlisted to “clear” the eastern side of the Connecticut River.309 In mid-March, the Council advised Mr. Fitch to convince the Mohegans and Pequots to “draw off as many of the enemie as may be” near

Norwich.310 After the burning of Simsbury at the end of March, the leaders at Norwich were again ordered to “endeauour to send our the Mowheags and Pequots in a sculking manner to suppress the enemie.”311 By using the term “skulking,” the Council believed that the allied Indians would be able to defeat the enemy war parties operating in

306 CCR, 374.

307 CCR, 408.

308 CCR, 409.

309 CCR, 411.

310 CCR, 417.

311 CCR, 423.

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Connecticut with the enemy’s same tactics. The records do not indicate if the leaders at

Norwich succeeded in convincing the allied Indians to attack Philip’s forces, and if they did, whether the Mohegans and Pequots were successful. As we know from the interrogations of Menowalett and Cohas after the war, the hostile Indians were operating in small bands during this time, so it was entirely possible that they avoided detection even from the allied Indians. This was the extent of entries in the Connecticut Colonial

Records concerning the use of allied Indians in the active defense of Connecticut. While difficult to judge the precise effectiveness of the allied Indians operating inside

Connecticut, we can conclude that they were mostly successful based on their achievements in offensive operations, the fact that the colony remained free from major attack, and that contemporary colonial commentators willingly attributed some success to them. “[W]ith their simultaneous objectives of warning, protection, pursuit and ambush,”312 allied Indians were very useful in the active defense, augmenting

Connecticut’s advanced fortifications and dynamic policy of moderation.

312 Stephen C. Eames, “Scout” in Colonial Wars of North America 1512-1763, 679. 151

CHAPTER 8

MAINTAINING THE INTIATIVE: THE CONNECTICUT-MOHEGAN ALLIANCE

ON THE OFFENSIVE

Sound dictates that wars are not won on the defensive. This certainly held true for the case of Connecticut Colony in King Philip’s War. As successful as

Connecticut’s active defense was when complemented with the moderate Indian policy,

Philip and his confederates would never have been ultimately defeated without campaigns outside of the colony’s borders. If the hostile tribes remained unmolested in their staging areas and logistics bases, then it would have been only a matter of time before Connecticut Colony suffered a military setback. No defense is completely impenetrable, and it is a matter of fact that Philip’s confederation would have ultimately found a weak point to exploit in the colony, in accord with the Indian’s “cutting off way of war.” Based on Philip’s success in the other colonies, the weak point would have been a Connecticut town that did not transition to modern European defenses, relying still on garrison-only defense.

Connecticut Colony was ultimately able to avoid attack by maintaining the initiative against Philip’s confederates through offensive operations in western

Massachusetts Bay Colony, and Nipmuck and Narragansett country. ‘Maintaining the

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initiative through offensive operations’ meant that Connecticut Colony forced Philip’s allies to react to its operations instead of the reverse. Connecticut’s field forces, ably assisted and in many times led by its Indian allies, disrupted Philip’s operations and forced the confederated tribes to guard against Connecticut’s search and destroy missions in order to protect their non-combatant population and logistics base. William Shea cites the Great Swamp expedition as an example of such a mission, explaining the importance of offensive operations against the hostile tribes: “Again and again, the militia seized the initiative and relieved the pressure on beleaguered colonial farms and villages along the frontier.”313 Eames indicates the objectives of offensive operations against hostile Indian tribes as “threefold: to disrupt the economy of the Indians, to intimidate Indian raiding parties with the presence of provincial soldiers on their invasion routes, and to destroy warriors through ambush and battle.”314

The other New England colonies also understood the necessity of offensive operations. Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonies sent numerous expeditions into the wilderness against the hostile tribes. The result was often terrible defeat inflicted by

Philip’s forces. At Beers’ defeat, Bloody Brook, Peirse’s Fight, the Sudbury Fight and the return march from Turner’s Falls, the colonial forces were all but wiped out. At

313 William L. Shea “Militia” in Colonial Wars of North America, 440.

314 Stephen C. Eames “Scout” in Colonial Wars of North America, 679. Eames here is discussing the French and Indian wars, but the same held true during King Philip’s War.

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Peirse’s Fight, Cape Cod Indians aided the colonists,315 but even then a force of

Narragansetts ambushed and destroyed the column. These one-sided affairs shook the already unsteady confidence of the New England settlers by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of its field forces. Chet argues that Wadsworth’s and Pierce’s defeats and the costly colonial victory at Great Swamp occurred when the colonists abandoned the

“tactical defensive.”316 The tactical defensive–maneuvering to engage the enemy and then assuming a defensive posture–still required a decision on the part of the hostile tribes to stand and fight, however, for they simply could refuse battle as they often did when confronted in this manner, in accordance with their “cutting off way of war.”

Wadsworth’s command kept the Indians at bay by utilizing European tactics, and it was not until the Indians fired the woods that his soldiers broke formation. In Pierce’s case, it was the somewhat understandable poor decision under the pressure of combat that caused him to misinterpret the local terrain. Both cases resulted from superior Indian tactical

315 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, n. 275 173, 175-178; Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 307-308. Towards the end of the war, Philip’s men ambushed one of Church’s expeditions in another case of Plymouth’s allied Indians not discovering the hostile Indians, although only one colonist was killed. Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 264. Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 77, indicates that Pierce was ambushed even with friendly Indian support, but does not compare this with the Mohegan-Pequot success. Perhaps the Praying Indians’ “cutting off way of war” military skills had degenerated from living among the English.

316 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness 40, 46, 47, 52. Chet’s theory of the superiority of the tactical defensive rests on the assumption that the colonists won the war through the disruption of the Indians supply base alone (63). This disruption was a decisive factor in Philip’s defeat, but it was offensive operations that caused this situation, as well as offensive operations that killed and captured key hostile Indian leaders, throwing the hostile tribes into disarray and making their supply base vulnerable.

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performance and other factors, not the abandonment of the tactical defensive, incompetence, or the inability of Wadsworth or Pierce to utilize traditional European tactical methods.317 Chet also inappropriately argues that “one has to condemn General

Winslow and his officers for criminal optimism” in their decision to abandon the defensive and attack the Narragansetts at Great Swamp, with a less than desirable logistics base, potentially outnumbered “deep in enemy territory,” and in the dead of winter.318 Winslow should conversely be praised for maintaining the initiative, utilizing the element of surprise (poor weather can be an advantage as well as a disadvantage), taking advantage of a renegade that knew the way to Great Swamp, and understanding the strategic necessity of employing the combined colonial army before it disintegrated due to political pressure. That the colonists did their best under the circumstances must have been little solace to the colonist on the New England frontier. The hostile warriors must have appeared larger than life, driving the settlers into garrison houses and besting their militia in the field.

Connecticut Colony’s military experience was markedly different. Not only did the colony avoid devastation at home, its field forces incredibly did not suffer a single defeat in the field! This is certainly a negative way to measure success, but because the other colonies’ forces were so often and easily defeated, in some instances even with

317 See Hubbard and Drake citation above.

318 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 52; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, also argues that the Great Swamp fight was “a failure,” 77.

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allied Indian support, it is worth noting Connecticut’s undefeated record. Even with a shared English-Protestant culture and military background, there was a significant qualitative difference between Connecticut’s forces and the other New England colony’s contingents that proved a critical factor in the colony’s curious success during King

Philip’s War.

“The Pequot & Monhegen Indians may be of very good use if securely managed,

& will be useful to send out in partyes or march at a distance from ye body to clere up any suspitious places.”319 Fitz-Winthrop, the veteran of the English Civil Wars and the leader of English militia against the Dutch on Long Island, gave this advice to his younger brother Wait at the outbreak of King Philip’s War. Leaders like Fitz-Winthrop and his father, the colony’s governor, placed Connecticut on a more advanced war footing than the other New England colonies by utilizing the Mohegans and closely related tribes in significant numbers. Connecticut’s leaders employed allied Indian forces to avoid or nullify the hostile Indian advantage in “suspitious places,” difficult terrain where the enemy could ambush the less experienced colonists: “& if you desire & must speke with the Naroganset sachems, it will, I beleiue, be best to appoint them a place in some open ground, to preuent yt treachery & surprise wch they use in dark & mountaynous places, & is alwayes to be auoyded, for ye security of yor men, who may

319 Winthrop Papers VIII, 280.

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easely be cut off by such disadvantages.”320 A product of Connecticut’s experience during the Pequot War as well as the moderate disposition of the colony’s leadership towards the local natives, the policy of employing allied Indians proved incredibly effective for offensive operations. While many historians have noted that Connecticut utilized allied Indians from the beginning of the conflict (noted in historiography), there is little examination concerning how they were employed, and why the Mohegan-Pequot- western Niantics proved effective when non-Connecticut allied Indians did not always prevent the ambush of colonial forces.

Historians and anthropologists have a much easier time simply acknowledging qualitative differences in military effectiveness between Indian tribes than interpreting the scarce evidence to answer the question ‘why.’ The Pequots for instance, were the most feared tribe in New England, prior to the tribe’s defeat at the hands of the combined colonial-Mohegan army. The more numerous Narragansetts, who were also allied to the colonists during the Pequot War, ran away before the attack on Mystic because of the

Pequot’s military reputation. The Mohegans, closely related to the Pequots and for a long time considered by historians to be the same tribe before Uncas’ schism, seemed to have inherited the same military skills and reputation as the Pequots. The fact that Uncas survived the inter-war years with a much smaller tribe than his hostile Indian neighbors

320 Letter from Fitz-John to Wait Winthrop before the expedition into Narragansett territory, 8 July 1675, Winthrop Papers VIII, 279. 157

was testimony to Mohegan fighting skill as much as the sachem’s political acumen. The

Pequot and Mohegan qualitative advantage over the other New England tribes remains a mystery.

Certainly the Pequots and Mohegans had a reputation for being ‘fiercer’ than the other New England tribes, and ‘Pequot’ or variations of it were thought to mean

‘destroyer.’ But fierce does not necessarily translate into tactically sound on the field of battle. Morale certainly is a factor in success, but the ‘spirit of the bayonet’ has been proven repeatedly throughout history to be less important than sound tactics and superior leadership. The Mohegans and Pequots also shared the same general New England

Algonquin culture as the other tribes in the region, and there were no significant differences for example, in a typical Pequot village versus the Narragansetts bordering them immediately to the east. Leadership always plays a role in success, but the Pequots appear to have been dominant over long stretches of time. Without a codified system to develop leaders or a significant difference in cultural norms, it seems difficult to point to superior Pequot military leadership alone as the means for the tribe’s success. A factor that remains hard to examine, yet a possible explanation for the Pequot military reputation, was the tribe’s interaction with the Mohawks. The Pequots were geographically closer to this eastern-most Iroquois nation, also known as the ‘man- eaters,’ than southern New England’s other powerful tribes such as the Narragansetts and

Wampanoags. In fact, the territory of the Pequots and the closely related Mohegans

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virtually formed a barrier, albeit mostly uninhabited, between Narragansett country and

Mohawk raiding parties. The Pequots relative proximity to the Mohawks might also coincide with ’s inexplicable vacancy.

Between the Farmington and Quinnipiac Rivers, with the Quinnipiac River only inhabited in significant numbers near New Haven, there was a complete absence of tribes west to the territory of the in what is now New York State. The Naugatucks were the closest tribe to this uninhabited area, situated on the banks of the Housatonic to the southwest. Although I have never encountered a viable explanation for this peculiarity in tribal distribution, it seems as if there were something unusual at play.

Indians inhabited the remainder of Connecticut much more densely, particularly around rivers and on . There was no geographic or environmental hindrance preventing tribes from settling west of the Farmington and Quinnipiac Rivers, and a renaissance of tribes in fact occurred in the northwestern portion of the state in the following century.321 De Forest argues that the Mohawks ensured Connecticut’s western regions remained uninhabited, but offers no evidence to support this claim.322 During the

Beaver Wars, the Mohawk’s Five Nations, rendered vacant huge swaths of territory east of the Mississippi River by destroying or displacing numerous Indian tribes. The same may have occurred in western Connecticut. A military explanation is just as plausible as

321 De Forest, History of the Indians of Connecticut, devotes Chapter X to the temporary resurgence of combined tribes in northwestern Connecticut in the eighteenth century.

322 De Forest, History of the Indians of Connecticut, 65.

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any other for the absence of tribes in this region. Perhaps it was a kind of buffer zone or even demilitarized zone, where neither the Pequots nor their Mohawk adversaries sought to oppose or antagonize each other. Anthropologist Steven LeBlanc in Constant Battles proposes just such a buffer zone theory, “Farmers, or similarly organized tribal people, develop buffer zones between their territories…Since crops are vulnerable to destruction by an enemy, and since egalitarian farmers have limited ability to organize boundary defenses, tribes tend to leave areas of unfarmed land between competing groups…these buffer zones are essentially fallow fields.”323 Citing the example of the conflict between the Yumans and Maricopas of the American southwest, LeBlanc argues that Native

Americans among other tribal peoples utilized buffer zones “as a means of survival” by allowing “societies to avoid being constantly in conflict.”324 This is a plausible theory for the de facto buffer zone between the Mohawks’ and Pequots’ spheres of influence, and in part accounts for the Pequots fighting superiority inherited by Uncas’ Mohegans as a frontier people bordering a tribe known as dominant fighters.

There were also other significant tribes in the area to the northwest of

Connecticut, such as the Wappinger confederation–closely related to the Delaware nation of tribes–and the Mahicans (not the be confused with the Mohegans) further to the north

323 Steven A. LeBlanc, Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2003), 140.

324 LeBlanc, Constant Battles, 210.

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of the Wappingers, but on the opposite bank of the Hudson River from Mohawk territory.

Perhaps the Pequots engaged in military confrontation with these tribes as well, but it is almost certain that the Mohawks influenced certain areas of Connecticut, where two elder

Mohawk statesman reportedly made rounds each year, exacting tribute from many

Connecticut tribes.325 Applying the lesson of the Mohawks to the Pequots and

Mohegans, the latter tribes may have developed more advanced fighting skills than other

New England tribes because of their position on the periphery of the region, just as the

Mohawks had as “the keepers of the eastern door” for Iroquois country. The Pequots also faced the possibility of a two-front war that the other New England tribes did not, at least not to the extent of facing the dangerous Mohawks and heavily populated Narragansetts.

The Pequot nation would not be the first in history to develop potent military tactical skills, when faced with two potent enemies on its flanks. The Mohegan-Pequots were in an unenviable geographic position, forcing them to become the capable warriors that their reputation reflected.

Whatever the reasons for the Mohegan-Pequot-western Niantic tactical superiority, Connecticut Colony employed large numbers of allied Indians in field operations–a significant difference compared to the other colonies. At Great Swamp, 150

Mohegan and Pequots accompanied Major Treat’s Connecticut expeditionary force.326 In

325 De Forest, History of the Indians of Connecticut, 66. I have also previously encountered the story of the two Mohawk tribute collectors.

326 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 148. 161

the early summer of 1676, some 200 allied Connecticut natives joined Major Talcott’s

‘Long March’ into Nipmuck country.327 In August 1676, 80 Mohegan-Pequots were searching for Philip’s forces in western Massachusetts Bay Colony, and the War Council soon sent another 30 allied Indians under Joshua to join the allied Indians already in the field.328 On the 5th of September after the Council learned of Beers’ defeat, it sent 100

Mohegan-Pequots to attack Philip’s forces.329 An additional combined force of colonists and allied Indians were sent up the Connecticut River commanded by Captain John

Mason Jr. a day later, to link-up with Major Treat, Connecticut’s overall Commander.330

Major Treat with 60 Mohegans saved Moseley’s command at the Battle of Bloody Brook after the latter attempted unsuccessfully to relieve Lathrop’s command, which was almost completely wiped-out.331 Moseley would have faced a similar fate had Treat and the

Mohegans not been operating within range to relieve his force. After returning around 24

September, the Mohegan-Pequots were called back to duty on 28 September.332 In

327 CCR, 450.

328 CCR, 348.

329 CCR, 363.

330 CCR, 363.

331 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 113.

332 CCR, 369, 371. 162

Figure 8.1: “The Connecticut River Valley in Massachusetts ca. 1675” in Richard Melvoin, New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989.

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January 1676, the Council wrote to Major Treat, who was regrouping in Connecticut following the Great Swamp Fight, to ensure that the allied Indians were properly identified with markings in future operations.333 This was to prevent ‘friendly fire’ incidents, and the Council was concerned about this possibility throughout the war. The

Mohegans and other allied Indians continued to assist Connecticut Colony, especially in multiple expeditions in Narragansett country, although their exact numbers were not recorded in the War Journal.

This evidence indicates that allied Indian numbers influenced Connecticut

Colony’s offensive success during King Philip’s War. Although the allied Indians did not outnumber Philip’s forces by themselves, when combined with Connecticut colonial forces the number of Indian forces made a difference. In the case of Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth, smaller numbers of allied Indians were employed, with only twenty at

Peirse’s defeat.334 The Connecticut forces were never defeated in the field, even if their operations did not bring about a decisive victory. Selesky inaccurately argues,

“Connecticut soldiers were cautious and unskilled, and were never able to trap the enemy.”335 Even without a culminating victory to end the war, the combined

Connecticut-allied Indian forces did have notable successes outside of Connecticut

333 CCR, 400.

334 Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 173.

335 Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 20.

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Colony, such as the rescue of Moseley’s command, the successful defense of

Northampton and Hadley, the victory at Great Swamp, the capture of Canonchet, the principle Narragansett sachem and war leader, and the defeat of the Sunk Squaw in July

1676.336 The English soldiers were not as poor fighters as Selesky claimed, particularly in the traditional European methods of warfare and when operating in unison with their allied Indians. When opposing forces generally refuse to give battle, it is very difficult to bring one about, and Connecticut forces did repeatedly attack the hostile tribes in

Narragansett country. By employing larger numbers of allied Indians, Connecticut forces achieved notable successes in the field, and avoided the military disasters that plagued the other colonies’ forces.

With the most tactically proficient Indian force in New England, and deployed in relatively large numbers, how did Connecticut Colony actually employ the allied Indians on the battlefield? As Oberg and other historians have indicated, the Mohegans and their tributaries were implemented for navigation and as scouts and flankers.337 As the term suggests, flankers ranged on the flanks of the colonists when enemy contact was expected during tactical movement. Flankers prevented ambushing forces from closing in on the main column, and at a minimum, flankers would have given the alarm to the main body

336 Many historians consider the colonial attack on the Sunk Squaw’s band a massacre because over one hundred non-combatants were killed, Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 249- 250.

337 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 183.

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of troops so that they could deploy into fighting formation as the enemy approached.

Flankers also served to drive the ambushing forces out of position as well as to deny them the necessary element of surprise. Scouts moved further afield of the main body of troops than flankers, searching for the trail of the enemy and the best route of march. It was essential for scouts to move well ahead of the main force so there would be enough time to adjust the route of march if the scouts encountered obstacles on the original line of advance. If scouts were too close to the main body, the column would have to halt and wait for the scouts to find an alternate route, which was always a dangerous proposition in enemy territory. Moving bodies are much more difficult to locate and attack then those that are stationary in unfamiliar terrain. Even with the usual employment of Native

Americans in the role of scouts, flankers, and navigators, the Connecticut’s Indian allies seem to have brought something more significant to bear on offensive operations.

Wayne Lee offers the best description of the use of indigenous forces in the New

England, arguing for the allied Indians use as more significant than the sideshow of flankers and scouts.

The real value of indigenous aid was a kind of strategic intelligence that informed the English of who the enemy was, where they were, how to get there, what their probable intentions were, and keeping that kind of information up-to-date over time. Despite difficulties in achieving set- piece battles, English military leaders nevertheless often focused on finding and destroying their enemy's military forces, and to do so they sought surprise--while avoiding themselves being surprised. Since the native inhabitants knew the landscape more thoroughly, and also usually had

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more intimate connections among other locals, it was they who were most able to provide the up-to-date information necessary to achieve surprise.338

This description is more nuanced than the normal explanation of allied Indian assistance, focusing on the critical use of Indians at the operational level of war. The Mohegan-

Pequot-western Niantic tribes provided just this type of service to Connecticut Colony throughout King Philip’s War. The natives’ identification of enemy forces was especially critical given the high-level of intermarriage between southern New England tribes, and the splintering of sub-tribal groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the colonists.

Connecticut’s area of offensive operations essentially covered three ‘theaters’ outside of the colony’s borders–Narragansett Country, the upper Connecticut River valley, and

Nipmuck country in central Massachusetts–and the Mohegans were integral in directing operations by identifying the ‘theater’ location of enemy groups, and guiding the implementation of Connecticut’s limited military resources. They also had the ability to target and eliminate key enemy leaders, such as Canonchet, severely hampering the enemy forces ability to conduct operations.

The record is more vague concerning the role of the allied Indians once battle was actually joined with enemy forces. When Major Treat’s column relieved Moseley at

Bloody Brook, there is no indication of the role that the 60 Mohegans played in driving

338 Lee, “Using the Natives Against the Natives: Indigenes as ‘Counterinsurgents’ in the British Atlantic, 1500-1800.” 167

off Philip’s forces. The surprise and destruction of the Sunk Squaw’s Narragansetts saw the implementation of the allied Indians as the ‘hammer’ to flush out the Narragansetts from difficult terrain onto the waiting ‘anvil’ of the colonists.339 Besides the scattered reference to this type of implementation, not much was recorded for the offensive use of

Indians, excepting their typical role as flankers and scouts. The best employment for the

Indians would have been to employ them in a fashion that coincided with their “cutting off way of war.” In battle, this would have been to send them circling around the hostile forces’ flanks, while the main colonial body moved forward in a standard European assault. Lee describes that the “cutting off way of war” often “took the form familiar to us as the ‘Indian way of war’…after the first exchange of fire individual warriors ‘took to the trees,’ firing and moving, while each group tried to surround the other in the classic half-moon style that would negate the cover of a single tree.”340 Ellis and Morris also cite that hostile forces attempted to circle around the colonial forces’ flanks, and it would make sense if Connecticut’s colonial leadership employed allied Indians in the same way.

339 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 249-250.

340 Lee, “Fortify, Fight, or Flee,” 722. Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 22, describes this tactic as envelopment with a “horseshoe formation.”

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Another employment would have been to use the natives as ‘skirmishers’ in front and on the flanks of the English colonists’ main body, playing to the Indian strength of aiming at individual targets.341 In typical “cutting off way of war” fashion, set-piece battles were rare between the hostile tribes and Connecticut forces, indicating perhaps that Philip’s confederates knew that the Connecticut forces, employing larger numbers of allied Indians than other colonial forces, would be too powerful to confront in open battle. If we assume the reason why the records do not indicate the use of friendly

Connecticut Indians in pitched-battle was the absence of actual battles, then it follows that the allied Indians greatest strength in the field was deterring enemy forces from ambushing and otherwise confronting the Connecticut forces. This would correspond with one of the goals of search and destroy missions–the disruption of the hostile Indians’ economic patterns and logistics base. Numerous pitched battles in fact proved unnecessary to win the war.

The record is clear that the allied Indians were not relied upon to assault fortified positions such as at Great Swamp, drawing perhaps on the experience of combined operations in the Pequot War. Oberg claims that the Indians were “unfamiliar with attacking fortified positions,”342 but there was a more accurate explanation. It was far

341 The term “skirmishing” had not been recognized in European warfare in the seventeenth century. Military history, however, is replete with instances of military formations employing skirmishing techniques before this time, and skirmishing tactics were utilized during King Philip’s War.

342 Oberg, Uncas First of the Mohegans, 180. 169

more likely that the Indians chose not to attack fortified positions than they were unfamiliar with how to do so. After all, the allied Indians had accompanied the English at Mystic and Fairfield Swamp during the Pequot War, and Great Swamp during King

Philip’s War, and clearly would have observed English tactics and techniques, which in all of these cases were not very advanced. As Lee points out in the Tuscarora case, the

Tuscarora easily adapted to English fortification building and counter-engineering, and the drew their own lessons from accompanying the colonists during the

Tuscarora campaign. Oberg it seems, has fallen into the trap here of reading the evidence through a European lens instead of the Indian’s perspective. The Indians chose not to attack fortified positions as portrayed in the example of the Creek war party that gave up after observing a well-fortified and vigilantly guarded Cherokee village. It was not a matter of skill or courage; it was a matter of tribal survival that dissuaded Indians from undertaking military operations that risked high casualties. The Indians did play a role, however, in combined operations where the colonial forces attacked fortified or difficult positions. The allied Indians normally led the English forces to the enemy, and then served as an outer perimeter as the English conducted the assault. Allied Indians also helped defend fortifications by using their marksmanship skills, firing from the parapet of the palisades as at Northampton and Hadley.343

343 Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 184, 243.

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Besides assaulting enemy positions, the English forces also somewhat adjusted to the “skulking way of war” as note by many historians.344 A handful of colonists, such as

Plymouth’s Benjamin Church and Connecticut’s Captains Dennison and Avery operating with small joint-Indian and colonial forces adopted the cutting off way of war, with

Dennison’s group capturing Canonchet and Church’s force killing Philip himself.345

Connecticut’s alliance with the loyal tribes, however, did not rest on the English skill in adapting to the Indian methods of fighting. The allied Indians did not need the colonists fighting like themselves anymore than the colonists needed the Indians defending garrisons. Connecticut’s military alliance rested on an effective division of labor. Both the allied Indians and the English each performed military functions according their own battlefield strengths. The Indians conducted scouting, flanking, sharp shooting, and pursuit, while the English colonists provided disciplined firepower and the willingness to assault fortifications. Leaders like Connecticut’s Majors Treat and Talcott understood that the key to ultimate success was to employ allied Indians and colonial soldiers to complement each other. If the colonists could fight in the same fashion as their native allies, and the allied Indians had the same willingness to storm fortifications and conduct standard European battle, it is hard to imagine why a Connecticut-Mohegan alliance would have been sustained. This was especially true given differences over land,

344 See historiography.

345 Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle, 310; Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England, 182; Ellis and Morris, King Philip’s War, 222-223; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815, 32, 79; Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 53, 63. 171

religion, and power politics that irritated relations during the inter-war years. Mutual respect for what each other’s military skills on the battlefield, generated from the hard reality of early-colonial New England frontier warfare, cemented the mutually beneficial alliance.

Leadership always plays a role in military success, and Connecticut Colony’s offensive success in King Philip’s War reflected the martial skill of its field leaders. The colony’s primary war leader was Major , a long-service colonial veteran.

Treat began his military leadership experience as the commanding officer for the Milford

Train Band; “the chiefe military officer there for the present to order ye military affaires of that towne.”346 He then was instrumental in settling Newark, , where his statue still stands today, and he was respected both as a military and political figure. He eventually returned to Connecticut, serving as commander of New Haven County’s war levy and second in overall command of Connecticut forces in 1672-1673 during the Third

Anglo-Dutch War.347 During King Philip’s War, Treat served as commander in chief and led successful expeditions into the more western reaches of the Massachusetts Bay

Colony along the Connecticut River, rescuing Moseley’s command, and successfully defending Northampton and Hadley. He also led Connecticut’s expeditionary force at

346 The New Haven Colony Records as quoted in John Harvey A.M. Treat, The Treat Family: A Genealogy of Trott, Tratt, and Treat (Salem: Salem Press Publishing & Printing Company, 1893), 132.

347 Treat, The Treat Family, 136.

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Great Swamp, where he was nearly killed when a bullet passed through the rim of his hat, and was reportedly the last Englishman to leave the Narragansett Fort as the commander of the rear guard.348 Treat was sought after as a leader because he purportedly “knew how to fight the Indians.”349 Again there is a dearth of evidence concerning how Treat employed the allied Indians, but he used them in large numbers and never suffered from ambush as the other colony’s forces did repeatedly. Connecticut’s Major Talcott, who replaced Treat towards the end of the conflict, enjoyed success in his operations, especially in Narragansett country. Talcott also employed large numbers of allied

Indians, and his operations finished off the Narragansett tribe as an effective fighting force by mid-July, 1676.

Connecticut Colony successfully utilized allied Indians during offensive operations in King Philip’s War. Connecticut realized early in the conflict that its forces would never defeat Philip and his confederates with defensive operations alone, deciding to also maintain the initiative in the field outside of the colony itself. Capitalizing on the superior tactical ability of the closely related Mohegans, Pequots, and western Niantics, and employing the natives sooner and in greater numbers than the other New England colonies, Connecticut enjoyed successes and avoided defeat in the field. Although a

348 Treat, The Treat Family, 152; George Hare Ford, Robert Treat, founder, farmer, soldier, statesman, governor (New Haven, Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1914), 171, electronic copy.

349 C. Alison Scully, Robert Treat 1622-1710 (Philadelphia, no publisher listed, 1959), 177. 173

culminating battle against Philip never occurred, Connecticut forces disrupted the hostile

Indian tribes’ logistics base, keeping the enemy on the run, and defeating them in battle when battle was joined. Led by experienced officers, Connecticut contributed to the significant colonial victory at Great Swamp, captured Canonchet, and soundly defeated the remnants of the Narragansetts under the Sunk Squaw. The colony’s combined

English-Indian forces also assisted in protecting the Massachusetts Bay Colony towns on the upper stretches of the Connecticut River. Connecticut Colony emerged unscathed from New England’s bloodiest war, in large measure due to the effectiveness of its offensive operations.

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CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

Historians have largely ignored and never adequately explained the story of

Connecticut Colony’s singular success during King Philip’s War. This paper fills the gap in scholarship and sheds light on the historical record from both the colonial and Native

American experience. The Connecticut Colony and the Mohegans (and tributaries), drawing on experience from the Pequot War and conflicts in the intervening decades, successfully merged their two dissimilar fighting styles into a formidable frontier military system. The natives did what they did best–reconnaissance, flank protection, security and exploitation–while the colonial troops focused on garrison and fortification defense, disciplined volleys, and assaults on fortified Indian villages and encampments. This system worked because this ‘division of labor’ focused on the strengths of the respective military cultures. While there is no debating that the colonists developed better wilderness tactics as King Philip’s War progressed, both sides retained their natural advantage in their traditional fighting fashions. Employing the techniques of the

European ‘Military Revolution,’ Connecticut Colony utilized European-style fortifications in a widespread fashion, combining an effective active defense with its moderate policy towards the natives. By taking into account not only what the colonists

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and allied Indians contributed militarily as well as Connecticut’s moderate policy towards the natives, an explanation becomes possible for why the colony remained unscathed at home, and suffered less than the other New England colonies on the battlefield. The cooperation between the Connecticut Colony and its Mohegan allies and mutual respect in military affairs did not exist in the other colonies, especially at the outbreak of King

Philip’s War, and this unique relationship was cemented by the colony’s moderate policy towards allied and unaligned Indians alike. This thesis also questions prevailing assumptions concerning the utility of the ‘European way of war’ during this era, introducing new concepts concerning Indian warfare, and examining historical evidence that has been largely ignored for 330 years. Viewing old and new evidence through the lens of effective policy and joint-military capability, anticipates a new methodology for examining warfare during the early colonial era. Forged during the Pequot War and the inter-war years, the synergy of the native “cutting off way of war” with traditional

European tactics into an effective military system, complimented by moderate policy, became the critical factor in the colony’s success, and the enduring nature of the

Connecticut-Mohegan alliance.

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