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Improving Safety of the Platform-Train-Interface Through Operational and Technical Mitigation Strategies

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Improving Safety of the Platform-Train-Interface Through Operational and Technical Mitigation Strategies AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Dylan Anderson for the degree of Master of Science in Civil Engineering presented on April 22, 2015. Title: Improving Safety of the Platform-Train-Interface Through Operational and Technical Mitigation Strategies Abstract approved: ______________________________________________________ Katharine Hunter-Zaworski The purpose of this study is to provide background information and examples of best practices relating to platform-train-interface (PTI) safety. The research and information obtained for this manuscript has been in association with the A-40 project funded by the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) of the National Academies. The purpose of the TCRP A-40 project is to create a manual to improve platform safety for rail modes of public transportation at the interface between the edge of the platform and the vehicle. Information has been collected via an extensive literature review, phone interviews with stakeholders, basic incident data analysis, and site visits. Research has determined that the three main factors that affect platform safety are technical aspects, operational elements, and passenger characteristics. The focus of this document is to better understand the issues and potential mitigation strategies associated with the operational and technical aspects of platform-train-interface safety. ©Copyright by Dylan Anderson 22 April, 2015 All Rights Reserved Improving Safety of the Platform-Train-Interface Through Operational and Technical Mitigation Strategies by Dylan Anderson A THESIS submitted to Oregon State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Presented April 22, 2015 Commencement June 2015 Master of Science thesis of Dylan Anderson presented on April 22, 2015 APPROVED: Major Professor, representing Civil Engineering Head of the School of Civil and Construction Engineering Dean of the Graduate School I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request. Dylan Anderson, Author ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author expresses sincere appreciation to his advisor Katharine Hunter-Zaworski for all of her support and guidance throughout his educational and professional development at Oregon State University. The author would also like to thank his parents and brother for their support from afar. Without it, moving thousands of miles from home to complete his degree would have been far tougher. In addition, the author would like to thank the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) for providing support for the TCRP A-40 project. Furthermore, the author offers many thanks to the Transportation Research Board (TRB) for providing a Dwight D. Eisenhower fellowship to support his research and graduate studies. In addition, thanks must be given to the fellow graduate students in the transportation cohort. We were all in this together and it will be interesting to see what marks they leave on the transportation industry during their careers. Lastly, the author would like to thank the Oregon State Triathlon Club for providing a healthy work-life balance and long lasting friendships. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 1 2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................................................. 3 2.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 Technical and Engineering Factors ...................................................................................................... 3 Track Infrastructure and Geometry .................................................................................................... 4 Platform Design ........................................................................................................................................... 6 Platform Edge Doors .............................................................................................................................. 10 Intrusion Detection Technologies ..................................................................................................... 16 Between Car Barriers ............................................................................................................................. 19 Vehicles ........................................................................................................................................................ 21 Regulations and Standards .................................................................................................................. 23 2.2 Mode Specific Considerations ............................................................................................................. 25 Heavy Rapid Rail ...................................................................................................................................... 26 Light Rail and Streetcar ......................................................................................................................... 27 Commuter Rail .......................................................................................................................................... 28 2.3 Operational Aspects ................................................................................................................................ 29 Train Operations ...................................................................................................................................... 29 Railroad Track, Station, and Car Maintenance ............................................................................ 31 Public Relation Campaigns and Information Systems .............................................................. 31 Transit Agency Employee Training and Safety Culture ........................................................... 33 Railroad Hazard Analysis Process .................................................................................................... 35 2.4 Passenger Characteristics and Conditions ..................................................................................... 37 User Characteristics ................................................................................................................................ 37 User Conditions ........................................................................................................................................ 39 Incident Characteristics ........................................................................................................................ 42 2.5 Methodology Case Studies .................................................................................................................... 44 New Jersey .................................................................................................................................................. 44 Bangkok Mass Transit System ............................................................................................................ 45 Japan Study- Analytical Hierarchy Process ................................................................................... 45 2.6 Assessing Mitigation Approaches Implemented Worldwide ................................................. 47 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 47 Gauntlet Track ........................................................................................................................................... 47 Moving platform –Amtrak, United States ...................................................................................... 49 Page Platform Fixed Gap Boards .................................................................................................................. 50 Onboard Automatic and Manual Gap Fillers ................................................................................ 50 2.7 Identification of Operational Best Practices ................................................................................. 55 Platform Safety ......................................................................................................................................... 55 Public Relations ........................................................................................................................................ 57 2.8 Gaps in the Literature ............................................................................................................................. 59 Lighting ........................................................................................................................................................ 59 Acoustics...................................................................................................................................................... 59 Platform design......................................................................................................................................... 59 Passenger Behavior ...............................................................................................................................
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