The Ties That Bind? a History of NATO's Academic Adventure with the Middle East
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The Ties that Bind? A History of NATO’s Academic Adventure with the Middle East Jean-Loup Samaan and Roman de Stefanis1 On 6 December 2013, the NATO Defense matic aims and means. More than this, the College in Rome celebrated the graduation story of the NRCC illustrates the very dif- of the tenth NATO Regional Cooperation ficulties of building ties with new partners, Course (NRCC). Born five years ago from and shows how scholarship can contribute lengthy diplomatic negotiations in Brussels, substantially to such ties. This paper is this ten-week academic programme brings therefore of interest to both scholars and together officers and diplomats from NATO policy-makers. For scholars, it nurtures countries with their counterparts in Arab the ongoing debate over the challenges of States and in Israel. Meeting on a daily ba- education in a diplomatic and military en- sis for lectures and seminars, participants vironment.2 For practitioners, it provides include representatives of countries which, insights into what could become a primary in some cases, barely speak to each other instrument of NATO’s diplomatic appara- in normal international contacts. They ex- tus in the post-Afghanistan period. In other change views - and sometimes disagree, words, this story is a revealing case study or even argue – over critical issues such of interactions between academe, diplo- as the Israel-Palestine peace process, the macy, and the military world. Iranian nuclear programme, the Syrian Such is the subject matter that this re- conflict or Western policies in the Middle search paper explores. The initial question East. that drove our investigation was how an The introduction of the NRCC marked an academic course could fulfil a diplomatic unprecedented new departure for NATO, vision. In other words, how could classes an organization that scarcely looked out- in international relations help NATO reach side continental Europe a mere two dec- out to the Middle East, foster mutual un- ades ago. Looking back at the inception derstanding and, eventually, pave the way and development of the NRCC programme for practical cooperation? As the following thus means far more than an academic ex- sections show, the synergy of diplomatic ercise in institutional history, nor is the in- and academic efforts was, in the event, terest of this story confined to a relatively based less on a seamless interface be- restricted readership made up of NATO tween the two than on a constant dialectic. employees. The making of the NRCC In the end, the NRCC can be understood sheds light on an internal struggle within as a dynamic interface between NATO’s Eisenhower Paper Eisenhower Paper Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome Defense College, Rome Research Division - NATO the Atlantic Alliance regarding its diplo- evolving diplomatic agenda and an aca- 1 Jean-Loup Samaan is a researcher of the Middle East Faculty at the NATO Defense College. Roman de Stefanis is a research assistant in the same department. Both would like to thank all the people in Brussels, Paris and Rome who offered the benefit of their knowledge. Any remaining mistakes or imperfections are the authors’ responsibility. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2 See, among others, Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America’s Military, New York, Routledge, 2012 and the con- troversial article by Jeff Dyche, “The US Air Force Academy: Elite Undergraduate College?”, AAUP Journal of Academic Freedom, vol. 3, 2012. BRUARY 1 N° 1 E 2014 F demic environment. The diplomatic phase. In 2005, the US delegation came to the Northern Atlantic Our research is based on various sources. Council to submit the proposal of a “train- It relies on consultation of NATO Defense ing initiative” that would engage all NATO College archives, as well as on extensive member countries with Middle Eastern interviews with officials, both in Rome and partners through a tailored course. Spe- in Brussels, who have been involved in the cifically, the course would have to take NRCC since its inception. The first section place in the region. This initial proposal of the paper is a historical survey of how was met with fierce scepticism. Some the NRCC was born. We then look at the Allies argued that the build-up of mili- various challenges which accompanied tary and diplomatic ties with Arab coun- the venture, as witnessed by the people in- tries was outside NATO’s scope. In other volved all along. Finally, in a third section, words, NATO had neither the legitimacy we look at the possible future evolution of nor the experience for such an endeavour. the programme, and of NATO educational The biggest issue, however, was the ap- practices in general. parent lack of clarity on the exact content the Americans envisioned for this “train- NATO goes to the Middle ing” course. “For months, the US delega- East: the making of the NATO tion was unable to provide us with clear answers on this proposal because there Regional Cooperation Course was not even a consensus between the The idea of gathering soldiers and dip- State Department and the Pentagon on lomats from NATO and its Middle East what should and should not be included!” partners surfaced in the corridors of the explained an insider who took part in this Brussels Headquarters in early 2005. Fol- round of talks.5 lowing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, momen- To complicate matters even more, the US tum grew within the Alliance for an am- suggestion of locating the training facility bitious partnership with the Arab World. in the region itself encountered several There was nevertheless reluctance – not drawbacks. Jordan expressed its willing- only on the part of some Allies, but also ness to host the centre, under the aus- among potential Middle Eastern partners pices of its own Police Academy, but then who feared a NATO footprint in the region. Kuwait and Qatar also declared that they In 2004, NATO created the Istanbul Coop- would be ready to do so. At this stage, the eration Initiative (ICI), a partnership with question of where to locate the foreseen four Gulf monarchies (UAE, Kuwait, Qa- courses quickly turned into an unintended tar and Bahrain) which complemented the competition among the partners. The Jor- older Mediterranean Dialogue (MD).3 At danian option raised the issue of security, that time, with civil war escalating in Iraq as some NATO countries feared that the and regional angst over Iranian nucleariza- centre could become the target of anti- tion, NATO Allies saw a growing need for Western groups. On the other hand, locat- cooperation with local militaries. However, ing it in the Gulf states would have meant the forms of that cooperation still needed denying what was seen as an essential to be defined.4 factor: Israeli participation. Eventually, in the spring of 2006, ahead 3 The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 and includes Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Israel. 4 For a comprehensive account of NATO Middle East policies during this period, see Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Un viag- gio politico senza mappe: fra diversità e futuro nel grande Medio Oriente, Rome, Rubbettino, 2013; and Florence Gaub, Against All Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region, Carlisle, US Army War College, 2012. 5 Interview with the authors, October 2013. 2 of the scheduled Summit of Heads of nel Giuseppe Clemente, responsible for State and Government in Riga, the Allies the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul reached a consensus. First, confronted Cooperation Initiative, Cooperation and with the ambiguity of the “training” idea, Regional Security within the Military Com- International Staff suggested rebranding mittee. the whole project and making it an edu- The Riga Summit held in November 2006 cational initiative. This meant that diplo- was the very first time the idea of the course mats and officers from both sides would was officially mentioned. Paragraph 17 of convene to discuss international security the Summit Declaration states: issues, not operational or tactical con- siderations. In other words, the objective […]Through an evolutionary and would be more diplomatically and strate- phased approach building on exist- gically oriented. Second, as the search ing structures and programmes, we for a location proved to be much more dif- will set up to the benefit of our part- ficult than expected, a compromise was ners and NATO nations an expanding found: the programme would temporarily network of NATO training activities. An be run in Europe, with a possible subse- initial phase will include […] the estab- quent move to an unspecified location in lishment of a Middle East Faculty at the Middle East. Neither the timeframe for the NATO Defense College. As a sec- this process nor the future location were ond phase, NATO could consider sup- specified. Several places were suggest- porting the establishment of a Security ed: Brussels, where the course could be Cooperation Centre in the region, to close to decision-making circles; Ober- be owned by the MD and ICI coun- ammergau in Germany, where the NATO tries, with regional funding and NATO School had been operating since 1953; assistance.6 and, finally, the NATO Defense College in Rome. The academic phase. The next step was After another series of talks, Rome was se- to translate this diplomatic enterprise into lected as the venue. It is argued by some concrete guidelines. This is where strategic representatives in Brussels that the Italian matters met with bureaucratic constraints. influence, in particular through its handling The NATO Defense College certainly had of the Middle East partnership portfolio at considerable experience in military educa- NATO Headquarters, played a decisive tion, generations of NATO officers having role in this decision.