Dewey's 'Naturalized Hegelianism' in Operation: Experimental Inquiry As Self-Consciousness

Dewey's 'Naturalized Hegelianism' in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness

Scott Johnston

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Volume 46, Number 3, Summer 2010, pp. 453-476 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csp/summary/v046/46.3.johnston.html

Access Provided by Queen's University Library at 01/20/11 6:33PM GMT Abstract In this paper, I will press Dewey’s talk of the self, consciousness, and self- consciousness as it is developed in Experience and Nature together with some attention to Dewey’s other great experiential text, Art as Expe- rience. I will suggest that Hegel’s develop- Dewey’s mental and dialectical understanding of self- consciousness occurs in Dewey’s work, ‘Naturalized albeit in naturalized form. My claim is not that Dewey reproduces Hegel’s dialectic, or that Dewey’s notion of self- consciousness Hegelianism’ emerges as isomorphic with Hegel’s own. In fact, developing this understanding of in Operation: consciousness and self- consciousness leads me to conclude that for Dewey, these are Experimental roughly equivalent to experimental inquiry and science. To inquire, I claim, is Inquiry as Self- to be ‘conscious of.’ To inquire experimentally, deliberately, and methodically is to Consciousness conduct science. Consciousness and self- Scott Johnston consciousness emerge as activities, rather than as all- pervading states of the organism. In a claim similar to one Hegel makes in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Dewey maintains that intellectual activity—thought and re- fl ection—is the proper occasion for self and other- awareness. The moments of pause, doubt, and unsettlement that Dewey claims are the beginnings of experimental inquiry are also the proper beginnings of consciousness. Dewey’s particular take on consciousness is at one with his emergent, as opposed to absolutist, understanding of the self.

Keywords: Dewey, Hegel, Self- consciousness, Inquiry, Experience and Nature, Phenomenology of Spirit.

Introduction In this paper I claim that Hegel’s emergent and dialectical understanding of

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 46, No. 3 ©2010 453 454 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 duct science. Consciousness and self- and Consciousness science. duct of.’ To inquire experimentally, deliberately, and methodically is to con- inquireto claim I science. and ‘consciousbe to is inquiry experimental lead In fact, Dewey’s understanding of consciousness and self- self- of notion I do not argue that Dewey reproduces Hegel’s dialectic or that Dewey’s text Artexperiential claim. Experiencemy as for contexts the form will , great Dewey’sother to attention some with together Nature and ence Hegel’sform. ralized self-consciousness occurs in the thought of John Dewey, albeit in natu- self, consciousness, and self- and consciousness, self, consider his understanding of consciousness and self- and and consciousness course of understanding his middle consider a steer will I contradictory often and myriad are Hegel’sof interpretations the As Spirit. of nomenology on Dewey but that Dewey’sthat but physiological Dewey and on empirical neo- the and Hegel that only not shown convincingly Johnhas Shook ment of Hegel’s Absolute Idealism for naturalism and instrumentalism. Dewey’s story abandon- the is Dewey’sdevelopment. This intellectual this istheprovision ofanultimatelyscientificaccountingculture. these, of each Forinquiry. experimental of use subsequent and ment emergent of dialectic consciousness and self- the explicating through does Hegel what that self- and consciousness of understanding unified less or with together Nature and ofDewey’sof thepaperIwillexaminecertain statementsinExperience towardspensity non- recent philosophical- both self- and consciousness of understanding Hegelian the on Dewey’s use of Hegel. In the second section of the paper I will discuss on consciousness is at one with his emergent understanding of the self. are also the proper beginnings of consciousness. Dewey’s particular take inquiry experimental of beginnings the are claims Dewey that tlement for self and other- occasion proper the reflection—is and activity—thought intellectual the in Hegelmakes one rather than as all- y ihl Wnt hmef tikr h cmie empiricism combined idealism. with who psychology experimentalist thinker and a himself Wundt, Wilhelm by profoundly influenced Idealism—was Absolute to ‘rival’ supposed the H as This egelian scholars in Britain and America exercised a profound influence they emerge from these works. In the final section I will suggest Iwill section final the In works. these from emerge they Recently a number of key texts have challenged the typical story of story typical the challenged have texts key of number a Recently In paper, the of section first the summarize will I scholarship recent me to conclude that for Dewey these are roughly equivalent to equivalent roughly are these Dewey for that conclude to me material will be drawn from the first three chapters of the of chapters three first the from drawn be will material consciousness per awar r eligious and genetic- and eligious vading states of the organism. In a claim similar to and Dewey’s talk of the of Dewey’stalk and Spirit of Phenomenology eness. The moments of pause, doubt, and unset- consciousness Dewey maintains that maintains SpiritDewey of Phenomenology . I want to develop a more a develop to want I Experience. as Art metaphysical consciousness emerges as isomorphic with Hegel’swith own. isomorphic as emerges Dewey does through the develop- consciousness historical, readings. In the thirdsection Inthe readings. as it is developed in developed is it as 1 According to Shook, to According though with a pro-a with though emerge as emerge consciousness Phenomenology consciousness. consciousness consciousness psy chology— activities Experi- Phe- as Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 455 8 This may 9 Consciousness consciousness. James Good James has written a book 5 Good also sees ‘ideal’ in Hegel’s 7 For Dewey, though, experience is not 3 Good uses the term “experimental idealism” were were obviously central to thought. Hegel’s It 6 2 4 Consciousness Hegel’s role in Dewey’s thought include: the historical role in Dewey’s vis à vis Hegel’s As the reader can see, intellectual Dewey’s debt to Hegel is wholly Others Others have very recently followed Shook in examining the con- However, However, in opinion Dewey’s Absolute Idealism continued to di- remains remains an open question whether they were so for especially Dewey, understand- after his supposed ‘instrumentalist’ turn. Indeed, Dewey’s ing of his own scholarly development suggests otherwise. acknowledged acknowledged in this recent the literature. precise However, nature of the influence ofHegel specific on philosophicalDewey’s programs read- recently been have that influence of Areas question. open an mains dressed development of Dewey’s thinking; the construction and aims of the dialectic; the charges against dualistic thinking in metaphysics, ethics, education, and psychology; the tendency to organicism, holism, and reconciliation; the importance of investigated the be social to realm; yet and has the that priority area of One rules. moral over life’ ‘ethical the is the ‘theory’ of consciousness and self- and Self- nections between Dewey and Idealism. James Garrison, for example, Hegelian roots and has the noted ongoing Dewey’s influence ofHegel intellectual development. on Dewey’s minish real experience, because it contrasted it with an ideal of “maximally coherent experience.” detailing the “Hegelian bacillus” that runs the through by many inaugurated Hegel of reading Dewey’s of tradition the that argues He works. Vermont at years his during Dewey by up taken was Hegelians Louis St. notion of experience though naturalistic, Dewey’s Hopkins. and Johns vari- a as dialectic’ ‘natural Dewey’s investigated has Good dialectical. is ant of dialectic. Hegel’s impoverished. impoverished. This is the quintessential divergence between and Dewey the Absolute Idealists. Shook understands Absolute Idealism the (teleological) as quest for an Absolute experience that then serves as a model for a more impoverished and less coherent one. Ultimately, claims, Shook vestiges of idealism in Dewey have been fully integrated Ideal- emerging into from Absolute his experimentalist outlook. Upon ism, Dewey Shook’s is an instrumentalist, a naturalist, an empiricist, and an idealist. Dewey’s break with Absolute Idealism took with break Idealism place Absolute against the backdrop Dewey’s is Idealists theorya of Absolute the for as Dewey for that experience of active and dynamic. In mutual opposition to Kant, Absolute Idealists and Dewey repudiated the transcendentalist reduction of experiences states. to mental sense operating along the lines of ‘conscience’ in Dewey. Conscience for Conscience Dewey. in ‘conscience’ of lines the along operating sense estimation. in Good’s universal’ of the ‘concrete plays the role Dewey (1894)) to character- of Ethics himself used in his Study (a term Dewey ize Dewey’s experimental outlook. 456 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 egories. spaces, and historical, social, and cultural phenomena, to necessary cat- as linguistic conventions, the giving and taking of reasons in discursive necessity.”non- A “logical”) (or conceptual to claim lays that base categorical a on pends “de-system entire the that insistence the disavows also but Spirit) and self- and consciousness of nature emergent r non- A purposes. my for reading best the is this think I essarily to assert a thoroughly a assert to essarily embedded withinthesystemitself. are categories the and expunged, are Hegel in remain that dentalism transcen- Kantian of vestiges edifice; systematic his erects presumably r ters in his major works and few invocations of Hegel other than for purposes. than depreciatory other Hegel of invocations few and works major his in ters explain why there has historically been modest emphasis on these mat- reading of Hegel. This is the reading I employ in what follows. spirit if not in letter is what scholars distinguish as the non- question of ‘right;’ however, the reading that comes closest to Dewey in theanswercannot privileged? I be to reading oughtwhich and right is forceful and convincing. This leaves the novice with a conundrum; who arereadings these for arguments the of further,manyissue the plicate sciousness and self- is view mistaken. Dewey manifested a variant of Hegel’s model of con- behind Phenomenology Hegel’sis example,For abound. Hegel read to best how of Questions Which Reading ofHegel? Self- philosophicalworks: Experienceimportant andNature. that view Dewey left questions of consciousness and self- Whether this is the case with Hegel is debateable; many Hegel scholars, ducible to these. As existences are events they are (by nature) transitory. re- functions no and entities or objects timeless or essential no kinds, therewhich in areone fixedis no then metaphysics naturalistic oughly n te ieaue o ad gis tee edns abounds. readings these against and for literature the and earth?readingsontheseSpirit God Thereofproponentsare of each of the theologicaltreatiseof a Freedom? itandReason Is developmentof epistemologicaltreatise? Issocial-a it an it Is Knowing? Absolute on treatisemetaphysical a it Is logic? ner eading of Hegel is one that not only stresses the dynamic, evolving dynamic, the stresses only not that one is Hegel of eading eadings of Hegel reject the Kantian categorical base upon which Hegel To select the non- I need to explain further what I mean by non- C onsciousness asSpirit 12 when he abandoned the ‘baggage’ of Absolute Idealism. This Idealism. Absolute of ‘baggage’ the abandoned he when Another way to put the point is to say that non- a Bildungsroman metaphysical consciousness metaphysical 10 This in turn may have occasioned the typical the occasioned have may turn in This reading of Hegel. of reading naturalized readingalternativesjuxtapose such will , an educational novel with its own in- owneducationalits novel withan , and did so in (at least) one of his most reading of Hegel however is not nec- p olitical- consciousness h istoricalnarrative theof metaphysical consciousness metaphysical metaphysical m (and Reason (and 11 etaphysical 13 T com-To and why A thor- A Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 457 Ra- 15 regarding or the other. the This

Indeed, there .

14 .

ertainty not a tree, but c tainty fails; beliefs are are beliefs fails; tainty self- Cer Phenomenology. From the ertainty to a world sceptical sceptical world a to ertainty C ertainty, Perception, Perception, ertainty, does not come to us fully us to come not does This C nowledge is itself unsatisfying. itself is nowledge k onsciousness as basic to his overall proj- overall his to basic as onsciousness ealized ealized conceptualization of sug- Spirit r c Phenomenology that demonstrate Hegel’s throughout throughout the and claim knowledge (or truth) is evident. is truth) (or knowledge claim and This 16 rue’. Any offer of Sense- of offer Any rue’. t tainty is, in truth, only what we have seen. s- a consciousness cer according to these. The these. to according This hings- ertainty, he does ertainty, not assume this as the point of departure for of truth the are things and world the about beliefs (“my ertainty , universal the very opposite of what that assertion affirmed to be t etaphysical readings of readings etaphysical Hegel take the dynamic evolving move- C C universal experience. universal as a house; and it similarly, immediately again supersedes the assertion which set aside the firstso far as it is also just such an assertion of a in experience from learn will consciousness what And This. sensuous all sense- The truth This for of consciousness sense of is a supposed to be uni- Every experience. universal is opposite very the but experience; versal tree, a is Here experience. truth a such supersedes itself consciousness or Now is noon, and proclaims the opposite: Here is m knowledge knowledge claims. As Hegel reminds, though philosophi- (the we sense one in true certainly is things”) and world the in role our see we this; than sophisticated more are public) literate cally ‘taking- Sense- of the possibility of a priori sense- priori a of possibility the of ect. Though Hegel begins the discussion of Consciousness proper with proper of the Consciousness begins discussion Hegel Though ect. Sense- irreducibly irreducibly perceptual as Hegel concludes (and we are led to see). We a “name” simply cannot We perceive features: characteristics, attributes, and the classify properties. We The attempt to ground truth claims in Sense- in claims truth ground to attempt The especially especially when considering Hegel’s logic, think not. are are many key passages in the sympathies with rationalism of various stripes (Plato, Spinoza, Leib- niz) and these sympathies discussion most obviously extend to Hegel’s of the Absolute through various of movements consciousness, Reason, claims empiricist to alternatives rationalist saw clearly Hegel Spirit. and in many ways superior and evidence of progress can only the provide briefest in sketch of a plausible rejoinder here. consciousness. I tionalist thought in general and Platonic, Spinozistic, and Leibnizean conscious- of movements various in sublated all are specifically thought ness and self- ra- and empiricist of unification the Knowledge Absolute of standpoint tionalist views in the fully self- and the Understanding Non- ment of consciousness and self- and consciousness of ment gests the impossibility of giving absolute credence to one The Emergence of Consciousness 1: Sense- The Emergence In In any event, there are interpretive limits to characterizing which I will respect. fully naturalized Hegel as 458 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 was initssensuousbeing.” overcomeis perceptualobject], surelyit [as as being just essential its constitute to supposed were which determinatenesses the in or nesses, ‘objectthe percept’as overcome: is “the puredeterminate- its in object ‘beings- its has each that realization consciousness’swith overcome only is and festers tension unresolved hand, the determinateness of perceptual being (or representation). This ( ness” “determinate- the calls Hegel what is there hand, one the On within. from up builds tension All itself. consciousness perceiving within up an is This begin. (Begriff) concept the towards development the can consciousness) perceptual mere (as itself of limitations the sees consciousness when Only purposeless. is we could talk reasonably only about the singular the about only reasonably talk could we is it formed; comes at the cost of tearing itself apart. Consciousness is ‘sundered’ is Consciousness apart. itself tearing of cost the at comes self- fully as emerges eventually Consciousness itself. of aware become to begins bound togetherinthisworld. elements various the and world natural the explaining in to turns ness individuals or manifolds of mere perceptions, than and it rather is these forces forces conscious- (scientific) of context the in perceptions and things sees consciousness now scientific; is Understanding presence. a is This time—This (the perceptual object) is a product of here, now, and then. and space of aspects as them understanding through standpoints these properly,moreForce. Force(or of Forces) unites concept (greater) the ness as Sense- blind. are cepts Con- without Percepts claimed, famously and earlier Kant As lung). many properties.” with thing the be to itself showing by does self.it own This its in ture na- its this express must object the universal, mediated a simplicity its reached. been has that result the from briefly developed be must definition the and . properties Hegel says, “This object must now be defined more precisely, in first not is that the senses’) and Classical Empiricism. intellect We know something through its the in is (‘nothing Realism of realm the Hereenter Consciousness. we movement of second this of context the about claims Our tion, however, we can talk of the many, the multiple, and the manifold. It is in the movement from Perception to Force that consciousness Forcethat Perceptionto from movement the in is It The unity, the bringing together of the two standpoints of conscious- (Vorstel- representation to limited itself is Perception However, B for- o snuu big (or being sensuous of estimmtheit) situated in space with geometrical rules conditioning its conditioning rules geometrical with space in situated This r aie truh hs mvmns u ti self- this but movements these through ealized another Cer in the act of perceiving. With perceiving. of act the in mediated

. 18

. tainty and consciousness as Perception, is provided by Hegel concurs. A representation with no cognition no with representation A concurs. Hegel

17 Since the principle of the object, the universal, is in is universal, the object, the of principle the Since are grounded in our perceiving, which forms which perceiving, our in grounded are This .Yt oehr hy r oe ih hs realization this With one. are they together Yet ’. 19 n h ohr te ae both are they other; the in d’etre raison eso, n ta builds that one tension, internal ad o te other the on and, This) . With This. Sense- r C ealization , ertainty Percep- Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 459 of Yet, 22 This is a is This sundering This “Force 21 object. The self- The 20 Hegel claims, “We see that see “We claims, Hegel 24 for itself, the second [world] is first universal [world] as the Understand- , detached (and detachable) from the physical physical the from detachable) (and detached , priori a 23 understanding of Force; it is not yet actualized. Force, Force, actualized. yet not is it Force; of understanding Even here, with the realization of infinity as the totality the as infinity of realization the with here, Even 25 essence as it exhibits itself in and for itself.” sided ealizing Understanding can unity of appearance, of force, and r Ultimately Ultimately reconciliation occurs; the form reconciliation has taken The emerging consciousness of Understanding takes Force first to of scientific lawHegel occur. invokes the concept of infinity as ‘hous- ing’ or ‘containing’ all. The infinite is what contains all in its totality and the can Understanding for the first time see itself as infinite. Here we might think of Kant’s exhortation to see Reason as expanses of in the contemplation of vast of Understanding our Faculty transcending sublime. the of judgment the in as nature, is syllogistic. Aspects of appearance (as percept, as Substance) and con- and Substance) as percept, (as appearance of Aspects syllogistic. is cept (as Law, as Noumenon) become middle premises in Only this through the logic. absorption of all appearance and law in the world of self- world they explain. We might world say they that explain. We the first world (of appearances) is the world of Kant’s representations; the second world (of categories. or concepts Laws) pure is Kant’s of world the into multiple distinct and contradictory worlds—an understanding of the world of appearances and an understanding of the world of super- The sensible world law. of appearances is the physical world in which myriad world’s the of sense make and unify to operate forces (scientific) properties. The world of supersensible law is the noumenal world of as understood laws as Notion” corresponds roughly to the Kantian pure Concept. be Substance. Substance is merely an evolving thought- evolving an merely is Substance Substance. be these worlds is explication complex highly and controversial; I Hegel’s of some major movements. only the briefest sketch will provide one- purely Notion ing’s in which Force is not yet now Force’s however, continues however, to emerge and becomes scientific concept proper: “In so far as we regard the though this concept ‘houses’ the earlier understanding of it Substance is itself abstract and formal and the world of this supersensible notion is a This wholly conceptual conceptual world one. can (and does) become actual only by vanishing into its other—a process Hegel calls ex- Hegel’s in times several occurs term This ). (Verdöpplung “doubling” plication of the tensions and contradictions in the understanding as it wrestles consciousness with its alternative identities of and of Force the Supersensible. in which law and appearances combine, immanence rather than tran- scendence is the the supersensible conclusion draws. (con- Hegel Even that conclusion the resist cannot One immanent. fully is Kant) to trary metaphysics, Hegel’s even at vital points such as this, are thoroughly through infinity, law through completesinfinity, itself into an and immanent necessity, all of the moments of [the world of] appearance are taken up into the world.” inner 460 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 is in itself the negative [object], and must be for the other what it is.” itself,in itself of negation this out it for carry must it and itself; within tus to evolve comes from within. The impulsion, “effect[s] the negation ternal or outside ‘objects’ (persons) challenge the nascent self, the impe- essential being,butinthe other seesitsown self.” an as other the other,see the not superseded does has it it for so doing cance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as other being; secondly, in “Self- out. it draws which another towards self negates itself; it moves beyond itself. On the other hand, it is thrust emergence of the self from its self- itself by this other. The double thrust (within and without) leads to the self- These self- truly becomes Understanding Thus, . this momentpossessesfullself- this- sion from a judgment according to Reason. to according judgment a from sion use of a concept or notion, and a syllogism is the derivation of a conclu- the is judgment a barenotion, a is concept a syllogism: and judgment, self- of sion of the emerges self other- the is transformations self’s the in results that ‘object’ the as asmuch in- one social a is emergence self. This emergent the of accounting an I The Evolution ofConsciousness:Self- the object has its own independence. own its has object the that aware us makes however,experience satisfaction, this “In claims, gratification. Hegel ongoing for quest the in another to state one from regard.so not desire.is moveThis Desireto impetus the as manifests away does Kant that element importance—an inestimable of element another considers However,Hegel logic. general of elements rational experience, self- self- than social relations. This process by which self- which by process This relations. social for manifests variously at differing historical times. Desire emerges as a life- of sort a as emerges It changes. ny i] en acknowledged.” being [in] only itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists “Self- another. to but itself to wholly is. Negating itself, self- it what become to [object] negative the for possibility the is Negation t is in the chapter on self- on chapter the in is t ce—the essential impetus for (biological) love, caring, familial and familial caring, love, (biological) for impetus essential ce—the eie s h mmnu o itleta, oil ad historical and social, intellectual, of momentum the is Desire consciousness; worldly as- movements roughly accord with Kant’s treatment of concept, of treatment Kant’s with accord roughly movements consciousness, subject—that consciousness concept of self- tes Hgl eis i catr ih discus- a with chapter his begins Hegel others. through consciousness it has come out of itself. This has a twofold signifi- twofold a itself.has of This out come has it and then to the to then and consciousness is, person(s). Here Hegel makes it evident that evident it makes Hegel Here person(s). is, that is the essence of Desire; and through this through and Desire; of essence the is that consciousness, consciousness has itself realize this truth.” r ealization orself- 30 that is everywhere present and it and present everywhere is that Eros enclosed Self- Consciousness finds that it owes its existence not

consciousness . consciousness of self- of syllogism

then proceeds to the .

It is in fact something other something fact in is It that Hegel provides us with us provides Hegel that state. On the one hand, the 27 consciousness consciousness Together these form the Togetherform these consciousness. 31 xss n n for and in exists s rw ot of out drawn is identical consciousness. 28 Though ex- reflects into reflects s ae by faced is judgment 26 and at and 29

Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 461 is to We are led We 32 consciousness consciousness consciousness consciousness to the proper shape It is It here in the first 33 Ultimately each of the 36 in relation in to relation another self- conscious conscious battle for supremacy over one as- On the one hand, self- hand, one the On that we move from a purely individual purely a from move we that 34 to free itself. In so doing it quite prop- is the focus of the first movement of self- of movement first the of focus the is consciousness being that is also attempting to overcome process process that is fundamentally social (and in- consciousnesses which henceforth is social. Self- is simply the double movement of the two self-

consciousness. . Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does each does; it as same the do other the sees Each

35 consciousness consciousness . conscious

consciousness consciousness emerging A child develops her identity in part through her par- of itself. This is the supersession of the first ambiguity, and is and ambiguity, first the of supersession the is This itself. of consciousness itself in the other. On the other hand, for it to ‘grow’ it must itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the brought be same. only can happen to is what Action because useless be would only by one side both. about by Now this movement of this self- movement Now consciousness consciousnesses. ness consciousness. This move to overcome the other (being) in order to become what it what become to order in (being) other the overcome to move This At this juncture, we move from the concept of self- of concept the from move we juncture, this At its own: a self- of is ultimately is a mutual affair. Each other is at once a self- a once at is other Each affair. mutual a is ultimately is itself by overcoming the other. This self- is the “double movement” of and subjective understanding of self- creasingly creasingly historical and political) though with its subjective in its totality. as central features remaining aspects movement of self- of movement of self- therefore therefore a self- We We are now at the point of locked made in famous mortalin many Presumably of exegeses Hegel. the “Lordship and Bondage” dialectic conflict, two rival self- another. As more than one interpreter of Hegel has pointed out this has not only historical corollaries such as the birth Ancient of Greece, the revolts, democracy Peasant’s and in the French Revolution but also social ones such as the parent vs. the and teacher, the establishment child, of friendships. the student vs. the itself itself and the discovers object it desires calls Hegel “Life.” ents who have alienated themselves for her sake. to think of the context for all human The life—the education family. self- of ) (Bildung consciousness. the judgment of self- of judgment the finds therefore therefore itself it a First, must second proceed ambiguity. to supersede itself of certain become to thereby order in being independent other the in so doing it to proceeds supersede its as the essential being; secondly, for this other is itself.” self, own overcome overcome the other and by doing so overcome itself, tied up as it is in its Hegelidentification calls with“am- this the phenomenon other. an might say there is We a contradiction that must be biguity.” overcome in order for self- erly becomes lord and master over the other. “It must supersede this other 462 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 each stoical response is countered by a sceptical one. be such an order. Such quarrels lead to a vicious circle—a trap in which by Carneades and Diogenes. These are sceptics of the idea that there can knife’s-at often and sakes own their for order andlaw, knowledge, of necessity the proclaiming Greece and Rome, typified by Epictetus, Cato the Younger, and Cicero, the historical- resultis crisis which breeds the ideas of stoicism and scepticism. Wesee here is nascent, it cannot yet instantiate itself socially and politically. The s uuly eonzn oe another.” one recognizing mutually as themselves recognize They mediation. this through same only the such is at time which account, own its on being immediate and other, the for and itself for is each and itself; with unites and itself with itself mediates each which through premise], minor a i.e., syllogism; a [of self- of syllogism the calls Hegel that phase the of commencement the is movementThis forward. genuine for basis the becomes recognition” “mutual and self- the Constitutions of the post-Constitutionsthethe of and ProtestantReformation the of consequence the in only manifests whichfreedom ofdevelopment full the to onlyprelude a is this tities, nize each other in the fundamental constitution of their respective iden- recog-slave andlord the both and mutualrecognitionone. isThough tion ofhisrole asconstitutive ofhisown identity. slave’sthe recogni-in also but himself lord’sof the recognition in role resolutely his. Freedom consists not only in the slave’s knowledge of his livelihood, the slave’s recognition of his own identity as being fully and conscious vis- self- a mind of his own.”his of mind a wherein heseemedtohave onlyanalienatedexistencethatheacquires himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work able to begin to become who he or she is. this “Through rediscovery of is effect in slave The located. is identity her or his that labour in is it that realizes slave the recognized is this once However, bondage. of his centre the at himself place to inability the is himself as himself of slave’srecognition the thwarting (negativity) thing very the that curs Crs] eiqihs isl fr te nomn o consciousness’, of say,to is that us.” for enjoyment ‘the for Himself relinquishes [Christ] of the Protestant Reformation through Martin Luther. Hegel says, “He dawn the at only Spirit as realized fully and Rome, of Empire gustan Au- the of height the at incarnate religion, Jewish ancient in presaged God- the of coming the in manifests Faith Though freedom is first realized at this moment, it remains a nascent Hegel claims that the only way through this circle is by way of faith. à- consciousnesses consciousnesses vis the other. One is lord; the other is slave. is other the lord; other.is the One freedom of the recognition of the slave’s role in the lord’s the in role slave’s the of recognition the of freedom p hilosophical beginnings of this with the Stoics of ancient consciousness. 39 realizes that its own being is bound up in the other to a fundamental conclusion regarding their status 42 It self- beyondtangible note, the to important is Christ and the manifestation of Christ as Holyas Christ of manifestation the and Christ e dge. These give way to the sceptics, typifiedsceptics, the to way givedge.These W “Each is for the other the middle term middle the other the for is “Each estphalianNation- 37 Ti rcgiin ed both leads recognition This man, 38 the figure of Christ of figure the S The realization oc- realization The 41 tates. 40 As freedomAs Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 463 then is the is states consciousness, entities. There are no Pla- 46 44 or any other natural event. Traits Traits event. natural other any or temporal events; they come and go as we have have we as go and come they events; are storms edicating beings lie; and there are no kinds and yet not be everlasting; it will crumble be- pr 45 , thunder- , The presence of the Holy Spirit that is Christ dwell- activity 43 was the impetus for the movement through to recogni- secula seculorum abstract ideal to a fully concretized and This universal is reality. A thing “absolutely” stable and unchangeable would be out of the range of the principle of action and reaction, of resistance and lever- po- no applicability, no have would it Here friction. of as well as age, designate tentiality of use as measure and To control of other events. rapid more and structure, events rhythmic regular the and slower the and irregular ones process, is sound practical sense. It expresses the to the other. function of one in respect A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a It latter. the of traits of because nature within occurring event natural precisely in thinking of traits empirical the from inference to bound is the same way as the sciences make inferences from the happening of radio- suns, of reflection are as truly indicative or evidential of the traits of other the traits of these events. things as are For For Dewey there are no supra- which do not transform as the situation requires. tonic realms where self- and undergo them. The transitory nature of an experience applies as well to the products of experiences—external objects: “A thing endure may fore the gnawing tooth of time, as it exceeds a certain measure. Every existence is an event.” Dewey’s Dewey’s metaphysics involves having ‘an experience’ of these events. experiences Dewey for Indeed, Spirit—first in the guise of theChurch, then in the guise of lay social life, and finally in the guiseof Reason itself—breaks through the in- cessant conflict and moves us beyond thevicious circle of“unhappy consciousness.” consciousness and Existence Events, Experiences, says, He events. metaphysics deals with natural Dewey For Experimental InquiryExperimental Naturalized as Consciousness sided manifests desire this Spirit, and Reason of shapes the taking When tion. to us as the movements through the history politics of Science the including of particular, in Science of developments Enlightenment. The moments in this movement. watershed and economics, are possibility possibility of the transformation of freedom from a nascent yet one- the Spirit beginning to manifest itself first as self- ing within us, within social institutions, and within nation- within and institutions, social within us, within ing as Reason, and finally as autonomous politicalSpirit. This is also the culmination of desire which at the beginning of the syllogism of self- 464 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 of experiencespsychology oftengives. thing about an event that goes beyond the usual functional accountings be characterized as ‘mental’. However, Dewey does admit there is some- Dewey nature is inclusive; it constitutes processes that would otherwise Forevents. of accounting functionalist admittedly this in invoked ter) further investigation. To begin with we have two kinds (mind and mat- their own rightandbehalf.” barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are such immediately and in tragic, beautiful, humorous, annoying, settled, disturbed, comfortable, use and enjoyment cannot be denied. Empirically, things are poignant, thetic’: “Empirically, ‘es-the existence of objects entertainment of direct or grasp, possession, enjoinment this calls Dewey objects. as objects entertain and enjoy do just events. We as qualified are they provided objects of ‘reality’ the deny to not immediacy.is its This beyond tion func- have does show)it shall I (as although equivalent functional a to out straightforwardly from the experience had and it cannot be reduced “something”This ‘had’‘found’ or qualitative.Itis separated be cannot matter are taken to be static structures instead of functional charac- ters.” functional of instead structures static be to taken are matter terious events that constitute nature.” constitute that events of complex the is belong matter and mind both which to “That says, (traits, qualities of experiences), and together these form nature. Dewey matter and inquiry), discuss, shall I as and reflections thoughts, ideas, for andofreflection, even astheyhave existentialimport. both tools are always ‘Things’ manipulation. and investigation of ucts areprod-they occurrences;rather brute just arenot maintains, Dewey are ideas and ideals; on the existential level they are objects. ‘Things’, as transformed into tools for and further desires. amassed, On the kept, intellectual level are these worthwhile deemed experiences those of ucts the development of objects from experiences. In simple terms the prod- Events for Dewey are constituted of both mind (we may think of think may (we mind both of constituted are Dewey for Events At this point, Dewey begins to build a genetic/historical account of account genetic/historical a build Deweyto Atpoint, begins this 48 not taken immediately but is referred to something that may come may that something to referred is but immediately taken not tend and give evidence of. An intellectual sign denotes that a thing is por- they what to subordinatedare immediacy their in things that is significance, intellectual meaning, cognitive of conception very The and athemeofdiscourse.Immediacy ofexistenceisineffable. to be, and in order to be capable of becoming the subject of relations definable and indescribable qualities which a thing must have in order but terminal and exclusive whole, relational a in element an nor relation a neither immediate, But in every event there is something obdurate, self- This meld of mind and matter in a complex of events requires events of complex a in matter and mind of meld This , incapable of designation, only when mind and mind when only designation, of incapable quid, tertium 50

47 .

those irreducible, infinitely plural, un- He continues, “This becomes a mys- a becomes “This continues, He sufficient, 49 wholly Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 465

52 sensible called alled metaphysical c 55 We are attempting We to re- 54 By this he means that they are com- 53 51 conceptual order is recognized to be the proper called To follow the To clues of experience is to see that the so- relation- constant of scheme the constitutes it since science, of object bound are events causal and scattered spare, which of means by ships These emergent together immediate into events a connected history. remain the beginning and the end of knowledge; but since their oc- currence is one with their being affectionally sensibly, and apprecia- things known. not themselves had, they are tively world is a world of immediate beginnings and endings; not at all an affair of cases of knowledge but a succession of while qualitative the events; so- in consequence of it. Intellectual meanings may themselves be ap- intellectual of character the but appreciated; and enjoyed propriated, instrumental.meaning is Dewey Dewey must not be understood as saying that experiences have no Thus far what we have is an account of events composed of mind These traits are qualitative; that is to say, they which are we characteristics find by experiences moreor less satisfactory. Whenwe investigate an experience, we do so because we have found it to be highly satisfactory or Satisfaction dissatisfactory. consists in the quality of an experience had. Experiences, like all events, come into being and pass away; however, they do not do so without a qualitative effect on us. This immediate qualitative effect impels us to investigate further how we can augment our experiences. Elsewhere Dewey has existential called traits these “biological.” common characteristics about them. Indeed, there are traits of tence exis- found in every experience although in very different degrees. entities. and matter which are functions. Mind and matter are products of experience and in this sense tools that desirable are experiences. An then object or usedthing is an to event with formintellectual further significance; as all events come into being and pass on so doesobject, every every thing, and this is inclusive of so- solve a felt need, a problem, and an indeterminacy. We do so chiefly by chiefly so do We indeterminacy. an and problem, a need, felt a solve satisfying undergo to and have to conscious, necessarily not desire, our we experiences, our investigate we when this, do we When experiences. find that Self and Mind and Self of the Regardless context, we attempting are to transform an unsettled or problematic situation into a settled one. mon to other organisms and that they are natural (not mental) results of our transactions with the environment. The quest to for beings human for driver social and satisfactorybiological the both is experiences and themselves. transform their environments 466 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 with theenvironment. union our in together closer us bring events.linkages experi- and These ences between linkages note we that ‘inquiry’) this call now will (I investigation this in is Itinvestigation. in results experiences satisfying for quest the reciprocal; as these between relationship the see should latter.the enrich We to use to put be will what is former the and mer; of experience provides. The latter is of course the possibility of the for- that allow us to delineate what science does and what the sensible world than these being existential (or abstract- Here we have the return of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ in different guise. Rather with complexly organized interactions, organic and social.” and organic interactions, organized complexly with emerge that functions eventual are “Personality,subjectivity selfhood, the nature of our relationships with our environment and one another. into investigation an of product the is It world. and organism human between transaction the into inquiry of resultant or product the is self of Dewey’snotion born. is ‘self’ that traits its and experience of tion It is out of this union of organism and environment through investiga- an adventure.” of result unforeseeable the upon depend will takes finally it form the and forming, only is self new the and off put is self old another “The emerge. one and world our with transactions our of understandings with individuals comes into being and passes away as newer and better self- of root the at self fixed no all conceptions this self is dialectical and transitory. false. are claims traits. Dewey human understandings other These to respect with position privileged a accorded be to somehow is it that and able identifi- least very the at or static something is Mind that believe to us an eventual function. The past understandings of this term have misled ing understandings of Mind to the contrary, it too should be viewed as Much of what has been said of the self can be said of Mind. Prevail- f cetne ad eetos o epcace ad prias of appraisals, and expectancies of rejections, and acceptances ignorances, of and recognitions, belief, of system a itself in is former the that proves morals and mind. individual such as not is individuals in appears that mind The art, science, of history whole the But tions andinconvenient interruptions. frustra- of perception avert to and fruitions, of awareness possible, wherever perpetuate, to acts it up; set is modification organic in bias union summatory of environment and organism. Here in addition, a con- a in implicated been having by taught was what with so tions, interpreta- including reactions, subsequent influence which habit of way the in modifications organic produced have behavior, sequent sub- conditioned have earth and sun regarding teaching past as Just 59 hood. The conception of ‘self’ together ‘self’ of conception The 56 ideal) kinds, they are functions 58 There is obviously 57 As with As Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 467 dissimilar dissimilar accounting Art as Experi- as Art too- oducts—of sys- . The relation . pr

level, consciousness consciousness level, .

metaphysical In this not- 61 physical 63 interrelations of meanings, con- I believe we can conclude the follow- 64 .” Dewey distinguishes between Mind and

. 62

of these meanings. What counts as of these meanings. perception arsenal of skills, habits, and techniques (including techniques and habits, skills, of arsenal up 60 of David Hume’s of portrait David of Hume’s morals, Dewey closes off the of mind to consciousness may be partially suggested by saying that while mind as a system of meanings is subject disequilibrium, perturbation, to there is no disorganization, sense in referring to a particular state of in awareness its immediacy as organized or disturbed. An idea is just what it is when it occurs. There is thus an obvious difference between mind and consciousness; consciousness; and mind between difference obvious an thus is There as meanings of system whole the denotes Mind idea. an and meaning they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness of perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings, the having of actual ideas meanings meanings which have been instituted under the influence ofcustom and tradition. While Mind denotes the systematic sciousness consists in the old of fusion that of means by conscious rendered is “[E]xperience ence. meanings and new situations that transfigures both (a transformation that defines imagination). meaning, for Dewey? We have a clue in this passage from from passage this in clue a have We Dewey? for meaning, While not dismissing the importance of individual beliefs and attitudes, attitudes, and beliefs individual of importance the dismissing not While un- cultural and social contextualized of set a as Mind of thinks Dewey derstandings passed to us through our speech groups and taken up by us in the guise of customs and traditions. objects) we bring to bear on novel situations. Mind is historical and ing: Mind is the inclusive cluster of experiential by- tems of relations built up through active investigation into existential are that objects objects: and tools includes Mind situations. and events Mind is cognitive, the affective, and vast in- judgmental. this Put way, terconnected storehouse of tools by which we have and undergo more and better experiences. it However, is more than simply a storehouse. built- the is Mind consciousness: Mind, Consciousness, and Meaning Consciousness, and Mind, As Mind is a confluence of systems ings, consciousness—the of beliefs,of supposed mind—is ‘bedrock’ given a dual attitudes, and mean- psycho- the on “While Dewey. by function of Mind. denotes the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences, or it denotes, ‘feelings’, upon the level of mind, actualized apprehensions of meanings, that is, idea.” possibility that there can be a transcendental- accounting 468 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 attentive, caring,andexpressive. Moreover,categorizing. and trolling,discriminating, Mindaffective, is tools we build up are cognitive- communities, andcultures over time.Mind isintellectualinthatthese groups,social throughour and in up arebuilt tools these that in social physical meta naturalistic his for central is it that only note I here. inquiry of vestigation—that is,inquiry. IcannotdiscussatlengthDewey’s theory of traits or existence. qualities The way the we bring experiences of to consciousness is absence) through in- (or presence the through is this and experiences judge who ones the are We a realm. in outside mythical existing things or objects passive than rather undergo and have we that events are Dewey for experiences that remember to important consciousness that say might Wecentre. and front experiences renders consciousness hand other the other.On ceptions, propositions, mathematicaltools,andlogicalinference. inquiry,of habits con- objects, intellectual as well as reconstituted and internalized are that practices social norms, habits, customs, attitudes, and beliefs social past, the of inclusivity its in classification traditional one any than larger is Mind that is to building am I point larger The events. arbitrary of mercy the at being than rather positively experiences ing unsettled situations. unsettled these re- or reproducing and existence of traits favourable lating iso- of hopes in undertaken is experimentation active when conscious tence canbeisolated andre- activeor eventexis- the of into qualities experimentation the that such these qualities through an art object is paramount. Both require inquiry of expression the art of context the In case. the certainly is this science On the one hand, mind systematically relates meanings to one an- one to meanings relates systematically mind hand, one the On practical, actinginapurposive way. volitional, and liking, and caring as affectional, something; note to fully. thought- as well as emotionally action, of course our step, our we mind tended; be to need that things after looking active of as well as purely intellectual. mind to do this and that. Nor is mind in these operations something attention. signifies also It that. and this of memory. reminded signifies are It We situations. to respect with used always is but things, and persons of world the self- anything denotes never It emotional. and intellectual, for,practical, concern things: and in, interest of ety non- its in For in other experiences. Dewey elsewhere calls this the settling of settling the this calls elsewhere Dewey experiences. other in 66 Consciousness account of experience. Inquiry is the possibility of transform- of possibility the is Inquiry experience. of account

. In short “to mind” denotes an activity that is intellectual, is that activity an denotes mind” “to short In . technical 67

In the context of laboratory or physical/natural or laboratory of context the In .

. Mind is care in the sense of solicitude, anxiety, inquiry into events and situations. We are We situations. and events into inquiry is

use, “mind” denotes every mode and vari- and mode every denotes “mind” use, .

established. . Mind also signifies purpose; we have a we have purpose; signifies also Mind . instr umental and involve ordering, con- 65 experiences. It is It experiences. foregrounds contained, sltd from isolated establishing Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 469 onsciousness onsciousness c Experience Experience and onsciousness? Phenomenologyof C ided abstract ideal or or ideal abstract ided 69 s When we inquire, we are onsciousness as science) and and science) as onsciousness 68 c but more importantly to stress to stress importantly more but Phenomenology is worldly; it is as Logic, which in Hegel’s esti- Hegel’s in which Logic, as not olitical mechanisms for mutual recog- mutual for mechanisms olitical p oduction in 1949. tract. This is chiefly because it chronicles operates through the storyteller (Hegel) with with (Hegel) storyteller the through operates e a point I made earlier: the earlier: made I point a e Phenomenology onsciousness proceeds from concept to judgment judgment to concept from proceeds onsciousness c as the development of the one- the of development the as writing the intr emphasiz metaphysical onsciousness is onsciousness to give a account of circular the develop- merely c Phenomenology the development of social- of development the Without Without begging the question of the possibility of what constitutes We should see the development of consciousness and self- and consciousness of development the see should We From From here I depart from individual readings of both Dewey and an original idea, we must see Hegel as saying that an idea bryonic event is until something else an (inclusive of em- something within the person having an idea) comes along to push and prod it further. idea An is not complete until it is This concretized. is the fallacy vitiating not to provide a mere accounting of how it historically happened. historically it how of accounting mere a provide to not ment of the concretizing of an idea (of self- (of idea an of concretizing the of ment nition; we should see it as the emergence of an idea that in time concret- time in that idea an of emergence the as it see should we nition; opposing mutually choose to us helps This institution. an become to ized of Hegel’s interpretations tells Hegel When story. Hegel’s of aspect developmental and genetic the self- as freedom that us to to syllogism we may certainly this understand as an allusion to Kant’s similar for nomenclature general logic. we However, must also realize that and understanding Hegel’s use of logic is dynamic in a way that to are in an thought apply both that event The categories is not. Kant’s of the this, because Precisely politics). society, and deed (history, (logic) the of logic the story of the develop- in Telling already hand. material the requisite ment of self- Complementary Accounts of the Emergence of Self- of Complementary the Emergence of Accounts Dewey’s that it is How hand. at matter the of crux the to come we Here, various functional terms—Mind, Consciousness, and Inquiry—operate in a dialectical fashion to understand human freedom and culture in a manner similar to though not isomorphic with Hegel’s? Dewey does not reject the story Hegel tells of science and particularly the development of the science of consciousness. Hegel Hegel yet try to keep the spirit of each re- as to important I proceed. begin, To it is doing science. Science in turn helps us to more and greater satisfying experiences. in Hegel not not Hegel in merely the development of Spirit as Science as Spirit of development the terms practical in means this What Notion. abstract as Spirit is mation is that fully manifested Spirit in the terms in now are we where is Spirit guise, practical more a In concrete. of our understandings of culture. Culture here can be understood in world their to beings human of relations inclusive the as sense Dewey’s and to one Certainly another. this is where Dewey was heading when he lamented the misunderstandings of critics towards while re- Nature Spirit is a non- 470 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 s lsr o ee’ naturalistic- Dewey’s to closer us counting of Self- of counting Matter. of and favour in Mind practices ignores it roots; their concrete from applications sever technological to is ideas same downplay the or At ignore ideas. to other time counter to serves story develop. this they enough which Often of out context a story, a have that themselves forget to ideas is so To do ideals. abstract of set bare a to reduced be cannot is culture What concretized. ideas grasp to also but themselves in ideas understand to seek only not must it Hegel’s In terms well. as developments institutional and social, experiential, but development a through this genetic- carry To transactions. our of account individual the than rather humanity of inclusivity the emphasize to desire his with the from title the of story the of development Mind and Culture. His wish to change Self- of ence social contexts.Dewey callsthisunderstandingofMind “culture.” and intellectual across cut that practices and understandings, niques, tech- skills, habits, customs, of up build the is Mind of up build The thinking. short, inferring—in categorizing, sorting, ordering, of tools inquire into events by isolating qualities of an experience and using the to investigate; to attempt deliberate the is another.Consciousness one with and nature with transactions our in use and possess we that tions ally and socially. Mind is a functional term denoting the systems of rela- Mind constitutes these as well as other relations we build up intellectu- Mind. of realm the is elements of ‘fixing’ fixed. This least) at thought pur- the for though poses static of experimentation elements not of experience can be is isolated and (in Experience away. passes and be to ship we have with nature. Experience is furthermore an event. It comes relation- existential fundamental the is experience texts these In ence. in developed as particularly social- in institutions. presence concrete its through and in itself realizes freedomexample, only important, most the perhaps and one, but take Toinstitutionalized. fully become criterion this met have that those ideals only Indeed, ideal. existent an of application an or ideal other an- is this whether else, something to relation in placed are they until undeveloped and inert remain they valuable potentially arethemselves in Hegel’sideals in the philosophers While past. and philosophy most ously not the only accounts Hegel develops and in Hegel’sin and developsHegel accounts estimation, only the not ously conceptual- only not stress must required. story is ent This Hegel is the first philosopher to provide us with an emergent ac- emergent an with us provide to philosopher first the is Hegel of the Sci- of the development the with story Hegel What attempts S tressing the non- d evelopmental account of how we begin to think to the pres- the to think to begin we how of account evelopmental c Experience and NatureExperience onsciousness and Spirit Dewey attempts similarly with with similarly attempts Dewey Spirit and onsciousness consciousness, metaphysical and Nature and Experience science, and culture. These are obvi- are These culture. and science, metaphysical account of the to Nature and Culture con o experience of account Phenomenology brings Art as Experi- as Art is is of a piece i ntellectual ntellectual political Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 471

70 of locus of locus experience of Phenomenol- consciousness metaphysical Phenomenology points science of the reading of Hegel. If we turn our at- our turn we If Hegel. of reading and immanent; it is complete only when metaphysical is exhausted by any one of these, particularly if we Phenomenology famously terminates in Absolute Knowing consciousness Dewey Dewey thought the naturalistic dialectic (or the dialectic of adjust- Hegel’s Hegel’s Certainly the terminus of the Science of Knowledge in the in Knowledge of Science the of terminus the Certainly its that in religious was this much However Knowing. Absolute ogywas was God, it was also very much worldly ‘nature’ and concrete with the history (intellectual, ethical, and political) of the past composing the vast ingredients of culture. The emergent accounting Hegel provides religious- the as science to vital as bit every is here at the end of the journey. the Absolute self- culture. It is the realization that what makes human beings human is culture; and science is the development of the means to this. understand We come full circle when we see with would our say philosophy with our (Dewey ‘inquiries’) how we became who we are. Regard- less of the tropes and metaphors that Hegel invests in (both Absolute Knowing and Spirit) the accomplishments the ment, adaptation, and growth) a was useful Dewey remedy think to I spurious absolutist prey. fall Idealism German saw he which to dialectics correct to emphasize the biological, genetic, and historical accounting of attribution his if mistaken but culture human of development the of coherent as a experience” an “maximally ideal to which all experiences in the Phenomenology. of Spirit ‘odyssey’ to look applies to Hegel’s are are following the non- the following are tention naturalistic to metaphysics Dewey’s wherein Mind constitutes not only Absolute Knowing but culture, we begin to of see Hegel’s characterization the of genius philosophy as its time in thought. For the development of science is the experience of self- has Hegel’s naturalistic, is metaphysics Dewey’s As human. are us to out moments both transcendent and turns back upon itself. it comes full circle wherein wherein Spirit ‘comes home to itself’. This has been Hegel scholars as the understood beginning of Absolute Logic, by the end of history, and the Kingdom of God on the Earth. completion Yet of philosophy, it would be wrong to conclude that his understanding of the completion of the development of metaphysics as a the emergent account is preliminary to a logical one in the sense that categories emerge out of our experience of is reality. Nevertheless where this Hegel thought philosophy begins—with the thought movement to action, of idea to application, abstraction to concrete thing. Only in these latter states can an idea, a thought, or an abstraction realize itself. Dewey would Any concur. idea including conceptions and propositions is an anticipation of some demonstrable change world. Those in ideas the holding currency are the ones that terminate in a positive state of affairs while those resulting in no transformation or discarded. an unsettled situation are unable to settle those that are 472 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 Self- Conclusion Good, Jim, 2006, 2006, Jim, Good, Garrison, Jim, 2006, “The ‘Permanent Deposit’ of Hegel in John Dewey’s Theory Dykhuizen, George, 1973, In Inquiry. of Theory The Logic: 1986, ———. In Experience. as Art 1987, ———. ———. 1985, “From Absolutism to Experimentalism.” In Nature:Experienceand 1981, ———. NewA Introduction. In In Nature. and Experience 1981, ———. In Conduct. NatureHumanand 1983, ———. Early The Dewey: John In Syllabus. A Ethics: of Study The 1971, Dewey,John, Beiser, Frederick, 2005,Hegel. New York: Routledge. REFERENCES is theoperationofthisactive experimentaltransformation. Consciousness relating. active this Mind—is of consciousness of—the speaks Dewey consciousness The social. or technical, practical, tual, intellec- whether relations meaningful building of method surest the and culture of transformation positive the of means and way the was Inquiry solving. problem and living everyday and fields specialized for inquiry of importance the on insisted Dewey Science, into science ing mak- Without experimentation. and investigation deliberate through situation unsettled an of settling the inquiry: was Dewey,ForScience is variously Freedom,ogy Knowledge, Science, and Absolute Knowing. of Inquiry.” Educational , Vol.Theory 56no. 1,pp1–37. ern Illinois University Press. Illinois University Press. 1925–1952. Vol. 12, 1938, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern versity Press. Vol. 10, 1934, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Uni- dale: Southern Illinois University Press. 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John Dewey: The Later Works1925– Later , The Dewey: John . Lanham, MI: Rowman and Little- and Rowman MI: Lanham, . Diversity: The “Permanent Hegelian Hegelian “Permanent The Diversity: [email protected] JohnMiddleDewey: The Works, John Dewey: The Later WorksLater , The Dewey: John Queen’s University John Dewey: The Later JohnDewey: The Phenomenol- Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 473 . Cam- . Hegel’s Phe- Hegel’s Transactions Transactions of the Consciousness The Cambridge Edition of the the Legacy of . Idealism Cam- . Werke Band I. Ed. E. Molde- Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Phenomenology Spirit: of Hegel’s 1860: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Works the of Edition Cambridge The The Cambridge Edition of the of Works Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Criti- A Spirit: Phenomenologyof Hegel’s : Surkhamp Verlag. : Surkhamp

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Press, bridge: Cambridge University bridge: Cambridge University Press. bridge: Cambridge University bridge: Cambridge University Press. bridge: Cambridge University Critical . Guide Ed. D. Moyar and M. Quante. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- pp 112–129. Press, versity ———. 1977, ———. 1971, ———. 1991, science of justification the system: subject, “Substance, 2008, Dieter, Heidemann, Hance, Allen, 1995, “Pragmatism as Naturalized Hegelianism: Overcoming Tran- Overcoming Hegelianism: Naturalized as “Pragmatism 1995, Allen, Hance, 1971, G.W.F. Hegel, ———. 1971, Phänomenologie des Geistes. in Harris, Harris, H.S.1997, Johnston, Johnston, James Scott, 2006, “Dewey’s Critique of Kant.” Horstmann, Rolf- Horstmann, Logic. on Lectures 1992, Immanuel, Kant, ———. of 2000, Judgment. Critique of the Power 1996, Terry, Pinkard, ———. 2002, ———. 1998, Critique of Pure Reason. Rockmore, Tom, 1997, Tom, Rockmore, ———. 2008, “The “logic of experience” as “absolute knowledge.” In In knowledge.” “absolute as experience” of “logic “The 2008, ———. ———. 2008, “What is a “shape of spirit””? In In spirit””? of “shape a “Whatis 2008, ———. 1989, Robert, Pippin, 474 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 in suchworks asGerman Philosophy andPolitics andTheQuest. forCertainty Dewey’s Empirical ofKnowledge andRealityTheory , p. 259. pp. 243–246. Syllabus”.A JohnSeeShook, claiming “experimentalterm, the used Deweyonly and idealism” “Study1894 his in Ethics:of realist” “naïve a Dewey calling point, this on demurs also Shook cizes the use of the term ‘idealist’ in reference to Dewey’s criti- experience. Westbrook work of features after moral/ethical the to late confined 1890’s.only as saying 2003, ———. metaphysical, epistemological, social, and historical and social, epistemological, metaphysical, Dewey’spost- Deweyterminology.p.the , consider , 70 referencein term the to Dykhuizenuses Dykhuizen, George and 62, p. Democracy, American ness asDewey discussesinExperience andNature. conscious- particularly and experience of realms the into conclusion his push to posit’ in the Thought of John Dewey, p. 186. I agree with Good, and this paper seeks Inquiry,”; James ScottJohnston, “Dewey’s Critique ofKant.” in mind.Dewey’s relationship toHegel isnotaddressed. NOTES 1991, Westbrook,Robert, Shook,John, 2000, In Darwin.” and Hegel between “Dewey 1998, Rorty,Richard, abandoned neo- Dewey Good, for idealism; not but Hegel), (meaning Idealism Absolute doned aban- Dewey Shook, Dewey’sfor ‘break’;interpret to how of one as Good and Deposit in the Thought of John Dewey, 137ff. I see the central issue between Shook Good. James See alism. with the ‘absolute’ of Idealism commits Dewey to a form of epistemic foundation- 71–120. 11. While there is widespread agreement that the 10. I am thinking of the criticisms of German Idealism Dewey brings forward John9. Dewey, “From Absolutism Experimentalism,”to p. John150; Shook, 8. Ibid., p. 301. neo- has Shook 18. p. 113; p. Ibid., 4. 3. Ibid., p. 152;p. 265. 7. This term is not invented by Good. Robert Westbrook, Robert Good. by invented not is term This 7. Good, James 6. Dewey’s‘Permanentin Hegel Deposit’of “The James Garrison, 5. of Theory Shook, John 1. University Press. Vanderbilt University Press. 290–306. pp Press, University Cambridge Cambridge: PapersVol.3. Philosophical ress: versity Press. 2. Ibid., p. 266. James Good has questioned this “break”;this Jamesquestioned p.breakingIbid.,266. Good,has Good2. for 1890s . New Haven: Yale Uni-Yale Haven: New Philosophy. Analytic and Idealism, Hegel, H egelian idealism(e.g.,Green, Caird, Bradley) butnotHegel. A Search for Unity in Diversity: in Unity for Search A Dewey’s ep pp esp. Reality, and knowledge of Theory Dewey’s Empirical works. Unfortunately Westbrook interprets what Dewey is Dewey what interprets WestbrookUnfortunately works. A Search for Unity in Diversity: the Permanent Hegelian Permanent the Diversity: in Unity for Search A . Ithaca: Cornell Ithaca:Democracy American. and DeweyJohn Empirical KnowledgeRealityof andNashville: . Theory Dewey’sReality,, and Knowledge Empiricalof Theory I dealism rather than Hegel specifically Hegel than rather dealism The ‘Permanent Hegelian De- Hegelian‘Permanent The , there is less consensus less is there topoi, ranges Phenomenology across The Life and Mind of John of Mind and Life The John Dewey and Dewey John Truth and Prog-Truthand Dewey’s ‘Naturalized Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness • Scott Johnston 475 , German German Consciousness Hegel, Idealism, Idealism, Hegel, , A69, A321–322. A69, , Phenomenology of ,; Spirit ,; Terry ,; Pinkard Terry eter Horstmann, “Substance, Sub- “Substance, Horstmann, eter P Hegel’s Hegel’s Phenomenology: the Sociality Consciousness , pp. 264–276. pp. , Reason of Pilgrimage The Critique of Pure Reason, Reason, Pure of Critique eter Horstmann, “Substance, Subject, and P Idealism: Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self- or epistemological an For overall view that uses Hegel’s reading, see the following: Robert Pippin’s Introduction, reading, see the following: Robert Pippin’s esp. p. 55; Rolf- 55; p. esp. Hegel Vol. 1: Vol. Ladder Hegel’s metaphysical, readings readings of Hegel. Horstmann is unconvinced by these read- , and Logic, on Lectures eter Horstmann, “Substance, Subject and Infinity: A Case Study of Aand Infinity: Case Subject “Substance, eter Horstmann, P metaphysical metaphysical .. (But see Pippin’s .. retort Hegel (But in see “The Pippin’s ‘Logic of Experience’ as ‘Absolute metaphysical 12. Rolf- 15. See Robert Pippin. 16. G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology 109. Hegel. , p. Spirit of F. W. 16. G. p.112. 17. Ibid., , , A51. Reason of Pure 18. Kant, Critique 19. Ibid. Harris, S. H. 20. 13. Almost no one recommends a fully naturalized Hegel except perhaps Rich- perhaps except Hegel naturalized fully a recommends one no Almost 13. Beiser, Frederick 14. 21. Hegel, Phenomenology 143. 21. Hegel, , p. Spirit of 22. Ibid. 141. , p. 23. Ibid. 5. p. , esp. of Judgment of the Power 24. Kant, Critique Phenomenology 161. 25. Hegel, , p. Spirit of 162–163. pp. 26. Ibid., Kant, See 27. 28. Hegel, Phenomenology 175. 28. Hegel, , p. of Spirit 29. Ibid. 178 p. 30. Ibid., 179 p. 31. Ibid., 180. p. 32. Ibid., 321–328. , pp. of Reason 1: The Pilgrimage Vol. Ladder Hegel’s 33. Harris, Phenomenology 180 34. Hegel, , p. of Spirit Hegel’s Hegel’s Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self- Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology. of Spirit to Hegel’s Introduction ; and An Philosophy and Analytic p. 83. System,” Hegel’s Role of Logic in Study of the A Case ject, and Infinity: Knowledge’,”). For epistemological readings, see Tom Rockmore’s Rockmore’s Tom see readings, epistemological For Knowledge’,”). Infinity: A Case Study of the Role of Logic in Hegel’s System”; see also Frederick Frederick see also System”; Infinity: AStudy Case of theRole of LogicHegel’s in Beiser, Phenomenology:,. the Sociality of Reason Hegel’s Pinkard. Terry the Role of Logic in Hegel’s System,” p. 83. This is how Horstmann understands This Horstmann is how 83. p. System,” the of Role Logic in Hegel’s non- ings because he sees an unwavering categorical substrate laying claims for logical system. necessity within the ard Rorty in “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin.” See also Allen Hance, “Prag- matism as Naturalized Hegelianism: Overcoming Transcendental Philosophy?” renders Dewey as inasmuch Hegel, of “naturalization” Dewey’s of talks also Good in late nineteenth century themes and tropes biological tropes. Hegelian Kant is also invoked at pp. 279–281. at pp. Kant is also invoked Philosophy Philosophy from 1760–1860 ; Terry Pinkard of ; Reason Robert Pippin, “The ‘Logic of Knowledge’,”. Experience’ as ‘Absolute For a metaphysical reading, see Rolf- on which reading should predominate. I Unfortunately, cannot delve into this. However, a number of recent authors have argued for readings preponderantly metaphysical, non- these categories to discuss variant readings see Dietmar Heidemann, “Substance, Subject, System: the Justification of Science inHegel’s a For non- in 476 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 3 The attributionisShook’s. rience andNature. Phenomenology ofSpirit, isReligion.which forHegel, inthecontext ofthePhenomenology Reason or Spirit Absolute precedes This Spirit.” “Objective terms Hegel which . passagesHarris discussesarepertinent atpp. 229–231ofthePhenomenology Biological Matrix ofInquiry.” 70. John Shook, John 70. 69. See John Dewey, “Experience 68. Harris, Hegel’s LadderVol. 1: The Pilgrimage ofReason , pp. 8–18. 67. John Dewey, Logic: The ofInquiry, p.Theory 108. 66. Ibid., pp. 30–31. 65. Ibid., p. 277. 64. John Dewey, Art asExperience, p. 279. 63. Ibid., p. 230. 62. John Dewey, Experience andNature, p. 229. 61. John Dewey, Human Nature andConduct,esp. p. 43. 53. John Dewey, 52. Ibid., p. 82. 51. Ibid., p. 105. 50. Ibid., p. 82. 49. Ibid., p. 74. 48. Ibid., p. 66. 47. Ibid., p. 66. 46. Ibid., p. 64. 45. Ibid., p. 63. 44. John Dewey, Experience andNature, p. 62. 43. Ibid., p. 228. 42. Ibid., p. 220. 41. Ibid., p. 209. Reason, on section the of chapter final the in clearly most this see We 40. 39. Ibid., p. 196. 38. Ibid., p. 192. ofSpirit, p.37. Hegel, 181. Phenomenology Harris,36. 35. Ibid. 60. I 59. Ibid., pp. 188- 58. Ibid. 57. Ibid., p. 162. 56. Ibid., pp. 258–259. 55. John Dewey, Experience andNature, p. 113. 54. Ibid., p. 108. bid., p. 170. Hegel’sLadder Logic: the Theory of Inquiry,. See especially Chapter 2—“The Dewey’s 189. , p. 152. p. Reality, and Knowledge of Theory Empirical Vol.1: The Pilgrimage of ReasonPilgrimageof The pp., 429–431. The and Nature: A New Introduction,” in Expe-