ST/DPI ORAL HISTORY (02) G979

Yale-UN Oral History ProjectProject Theo-Ben GurirabGurirab Jean Krasno, InterviewerInterviewer November 3, 19991999 New YorkYork Yale-UN Oral History Project Theo-Ben Gurirab Jean Krasllo, Interviewer November 3,1999 New York

Index: Namibia

Angolan Independence 23 Apartheid 23,24 South Africa 17,20 Black Caucus 19 British Labor Paliy 19 Civil Police (CIVPOL) 35 Colonialism 2 Congress, United States 16 Coordinating Commission for Liberation of Africa 6-8 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 29 Frontline States 26-27 Law of the Sea Convention 14-15 Missionaries 2 Namibia Elections 9-10,35 Independence 1,10,14-16,19,24-25,33-34 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 6-9, 19 Organization of American States (OAS) 9 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 9 Permanent Members 9 Racism 1 Reagan Administration 20-21 Refugees 14 Resolution 2248 11 Resolution 385 10 Resolution 435 9-10,26-27,35 South African Defense Force 32 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 33 South West Afi-ica National Union (SW ANU) 3, 7 South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) 3,5-10, 14-22,24,26-35 South West African Territory Force 32,34 UN Council for Namibia 10-15,17 UN Development Programme (UNDP) 14 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ ization (UNESCO) 14 UN General Assembly 8,10-12,15,17-18 UN Security Council 9-11, 15, 18 UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 25,33,35 Western Contact Group on Namibia 10,27 World Court 11-12 I

I Yale-UN OralOral HistoryHistory ProjectProject I Theo-Theo-BenBen GuriraGurirabb NovemberNovember 3,3, 19919999 • NewNew YorYorkk • Interviewer:Interviewer: JeanJean KrasnKrasnoo • Jean Krasno: First, President Gurirab, forfor background purposespurposes couldcould youyou pleaseplease explainexplain • where you were born and educated andand whenwhen youyou werewere firstfirst involvedinvolved inin thethe independenceindependence • of Namibia?

• Theo-Ben Gurirab: My biographical datadata isis readilyreadily availableavailable andand I'llI'll givegive youyou aa foliofolio • on that, but I was born 23 January 1939, inin aa smallsmall railwayrailway towntown 142142 kilometerskilometers easteast fromfrom Swakopmund, our coastal town.town. Actually, inin mymy languagelanguage thethe namename ofof thethe placeplace isis •11 generally lmown as Usacos. At thethe timetime ofof mymy growinggrowing up,up, itit waswas thethe mainmain railwayrailway conjunction inin thethe whole ofthethe country. AsAs II waswas growinggrowing up,up, II feltfelt thatthat II waswas actuallyactually

11 living in a paradise. Little did II know thatthat II waswas livingliving inin thethe headquartersheadquarters ofof racism.racism. TheThe 11 communities were divided along racialracial lineslines notnot onlyonly betweenbetween thethe whiteswhites andand thethe blacksblacks , but also among thethe different black communities. ButBut itit waswas aa funfun placeplace atat thatthat toto havehave been growing up in.in. That isis where II startedstarted mymy schooling.schooling. UnlikeUnlike aa muchmuch largerlarger numbernumber 11 of my siblings and cousins, II was one ofof thethe fortunatefortunate onesones whowho diddid notnot gogo throughthrough thethe 11 rigors of looking after cattle and doing householdhousehold choreschores thatthat theythey werewere requiredrequired toto dodo inin ­ 11 2 the village and many settlements inin and around UUsacos.sacos. II waswas fortunatefortunate inin thethe sensesense thatthat II had early education at a missionary school where II hadhad mymy primary education.education.

I did my secondary education and teacher'steacher's trainingtraining atat OkahandjaOkahandja whichwhich isis aboutabout 7575 kilometers northwest ofofWindhoek, Windhoek, thethe capital city,city, atat aa placeplace calledcalled Agustinium.Agustinium. It'sIt's aa place that linkslinks inin so many different ways thethe historyhistory ofofNamibiaNamibia toto thethe reformationreformation ledled byby

Martin Luther inin Germany many centuries earlier. TheThe peoplepeople whowho werewere associatedassociated withwith setting up thatthat educational and trainingtraining facilityfacility inin NamibiaNamibia werewere LutheransLutherans toto beginbegin withwith and some money had been made available toto thosethose missionariesmissionaries toto setset thisthis school.school. ItsIts importance for me, more thanthan thethe cOlmection with thethe churchchurch isis thatthat itit waswas atat thatthat timetime thethe point of convergence of all thethe African students,students, thosethose whowho werewere eligibleeligible oror whowho hadhad anan opportunity one way or another toto attend schoolingschooling andand toto havehave comecome together.together. ItIt waswas notnot the intention of thethe colonial administration nor waswas itit thethe intentionintention ofof thethe schoolschool administration, for thatthat matter; itit was thethe economical situation.situation. ItIt waswas cheapercheaper toto bringbring all of us togethertogether at one place rather thanthan toto setset up schoolsschools andand trainingtraining facilitiesfacilities inin different parts of thethe country. What initiallyinitially we diddid notnot realizerealize ourselvesourselves waswas thatthat byby thisthis anangement, itit was possible toto bring togethertogether at oneone placeplace thethe futurefuture leadersleaders ofNofNanlibiaanlibia from all parts oftheofthe country. It was therethere thatthat mostmost ofofusus met.met. ItIt becamebecame thethe hubhub ofof thethe political consciousness raising inin thethe fullnessfullness of time.time. ItIt waswas thatthat schoolschool andand thethe oneone nextnext to it, not far from there,there, a catholic school at Dobra.

To come back toto my early education, itit was therethere thatthat II diddid mymy secondarysecondary educationeducation andand teacher's training.training. II qualified as a teacherteacher inin 19601960 but chosechose toto gogo toto WalvisWalvis Bay,Bay, ourour 11 3

harbor town, to work in fishing factories. They paid a little more than other job •11 oppOltunitiesoppOliunities that were open for blacks. My intention was, while I qualified as a teacher, that I wanted to fmtherfmiher my studies. I had not thought that it would have been possible for • me to have gone abroad, but I had plans that if I had enough money saved that I would 11 find a way to further my studies in South Africa. But politics came into being in the mid­ 50s as far as my own patticipationpatiicipation fromfro111 1957 onwards. Actually, the political • consciousness raising stmtedstmied while I was at Agustinium between the years 1958 and 1960. The African political resistance movements were being formed, including SWAPO • now the ruling pmty,patiy, as well as SWAND and others. From time to time, some of the • initial leaders of that process, that movement, would come discretely at night from Windhoek to the school at1d provide political education classes and gatherings for us.

• But that is where it stmted.stmied. • African teachers were not allowed by law to participate as, ifone is generous, as civil

• servants in any political activity. But pressure was mounting and we became responsive • to the demand because we were the educated lot among the people and we should also 11 take a lead in the political mobilization of the people, to talk to the people about the 11 problems there were m1d what they could do to demonstrate m1dat1d to protest and so on. That is how my political activities started. I had to be discrete; that was the requirement

11 by law while I was a teacher. But I nevertheless got myself involved in political activities 11 until 1962 when I decided to clandestinely leave the country and found my way newly 11 self-governing Tanganyika which I reached in October 1962. 11 11

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JK: When you talked about many ofthe leaders of Namibia started gathering at the

secondary school where you were, did that include Sam Nujoma and Hage Geingob and

some of these people?

TG: Not Sam Nujoma, but Hage Geingob and myself, Hidipo Hamutenya. We came

at different times. Hage Geingob and I came together. But there were others ahead of us.

Not necessarily in the previous generation but I am talking about when the political

activism started. There were people who were older than us but the same generation as we were. They were older than us significantly. They would be of Nuj oma's age group.

But he was a worker; he was not at that school. Our Deputy Prime Minister, HendrikWitbooi is older than us and was also a teacher there. He got his training there.

Eventually, my generation of Namibianleaders in the government and parliament,

even in the private sector, come from Agustinium, the majority of them.

JK: So, then you left in 1962. Where did you go from there? You went to

Tanganyika?

TG: Yes, but it was a long, long journey. I left the country under a false pretense. I

cooked up a story, which succeeded and helped me to where I am today. The story being

that I and my friend who left with me, Jan Bamba Uirab who lives now in Sweden

and shuttles between Sweden and Namibia, was that we were actually natives, native

meaning nationals - our countries were not independent and we were not citizens - from

now Malawi, then Yasaland. The story was that we had been in South West Africa • 5 I O\Jamibia)O'!amibia) under contract, working in the local factories inin Walvis Bay andand thatthat wewe hadhad overstayed the terms of our contract. We were good people; we did not violateviolate anyany lawslaws • but we were advised that we should leave the country. We had a friendfriend inin thethe I magistrate's office who was very skillful and helpful, indeed,indeed, who issuedissued usus withwith twotwo setssets

of documents to that effect. One was a voluntary deportation order with allall thethe • appropriate quotations on it and one a traveling pass which blacks were reqlliredrequired toto bebe inin possession of. So, on that basis, we left Walvis Bay by traintrain and traveledtraveled throughthrough thethe restrest

of the country, tlu'ough South Africa, through Botswanaland -- Botswana waswas notnot • independent then-then - tlu'ough Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, throughthrough NOlihernNOlihern • Rhodesia which is now Zambia, up to Tanganyika which is now Tanzania. •11 JK: When did you become a member Of SWAPO? tI TG: SWAPOSWAPO was formed in 1960 and I officially became a member inin 1961. tI JK: When did you first become involved in the United Nations? 11 11 TG: In 1963, while I was in Tanganyika. I won a UN fellowship. ItIt was a UN fellowshipfellowship that brought me to the United States in June 1963 as a student at Temple

11 University in Philadelphia. English was not our official language nor was it spoken tI widely inin Namibia at that time. We were required, therefore, initially to do some brushing up of the language and science and math comses. Then I eventually became a tI student at Temple University where I did my undergraduate studies in political science IJ IJ I 66

I and graduate studiesstudies inin internationalinternational relations.relations. MyMy personalpersonal associationassociation withwith thethe countrycountry • startedstarted inin 1963 and continues, II shouldshould think.think. • JK: SWAPO achieved a very unusual status at thethe UN. ItIt became an official observer of thethe UN. How was that established and what were thethe forcesforces thatthat came togethertogether toto • actually establish thatthat status for SWAPO?SWAPO?

III TG: Yes, there were a number of forces. First was that when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded on the 25 th111 of May 1963, just shortly before I left Dar

es Salaam, Tanzania. Perhaps within a year of its founding, one of the committees set up 11 by the Organization of African Unity was called the Liberation Committee. The :fullfull title 11 is The Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, but it is briet1y calledcaUed the Liberation Committee, which was headqualiered in DarOar es Salaam. It called together the 11 leaders and representatives of all the existing national liberation movements of Africa, of 11 Mozambique, Angola, of Rhodesia, even Kenya and Uganda, that were not independent, Guinea Bissau, all the countries that were not independent. They were mostly from t1 eastern, central, and southern Africa. The question was for thesethese leaders to indicate to the t1 Liberation Committee thethe ways and means by which theythey as the people from the countries consent,consent, propose toto proceed toto findfind freedom, toto achieve freedom and independenceindependence for ­ theirtheir countries andand theirtheir people. TheyThey were, therefore,therefore, asked after thatthat initialinitial meeting toto 11 gogo backback andand prepareprepare so-calledso-called programsprograms of action,action, settingsetting out theirtheir objectives and goals. 11 ThisThis waswas donedone inin orderorder forfor thethe LiberationLiberation CommitteeCommittee toto notnot onlyonly recognizerecognize thosethose movementsmovements thatthat inin theirtheir judgmentjudgment deserveddeserved toto bebe recognizedrecognized andand supported,supported, butbut secondly,secondly, 11 11 I 7

11 and more importantly,importantly, toto go out throughoutthroughout the world, the independent African countries, P and other countries of the third world to mobilize support for those movements. We did so. SWANU, the party of our compatriot that you mentioned, Moses Katjiuongua, who

11 was one of the prominent members, were the two movements. Both ofus presented our I programs of action. In our case, SWAPO, we said in addition to the United Nations mobilizing the international community for supportive assistance, we would also organize

11 a militmy resistance body. We specifically asked the Liberation Committee and the OAU 11 member states to assist us to train our combatants to launch the armed struggle. SWANU felt that the objobjectiveective conditions in Namibia and the practicalities of how to get from

whatever to Namibia was such that they did not think the time was right for launching the 11 armed struggle. Others like Guinea Bissau opted for armed struggle in addition to political campaigns and diplomatic activities. But the long and the short of it is that both

11 SWAPO and SWANU were recognized as befitting support and were supported until 11 finally, the OAU decided that it was SWAPO that was doing most of the campaigning 11 and had gained recognition and suppOli beyond the OAU member states internationally, including by the UN. So, that was how the UN and the OAU worked together. So, that

11 was one thing. 11 , Secondly, on that basis, in 1972, at a summit held in Rabat, Morocco, the OAU decided to actually recognize those liberation movements that in their judgment (of the OAU 11 member states) and as recommended by the Liberation Committee, should be suppOlied. , Resources were scarce and therefore, it didn't want to waste money on organizations that did not have a chance to make a difference. In the case of Namibia, SWANU was not de­de- 11 11 I 8

I recognized, per se, but they somehow were not present and did not do what was expected 11 of them. After that exercise, the OAD, in 1972, recognized liberation movements as the sole and authentic representatives of their people. They campaigned for recognition and

11 suppOli and assistance in the international community. The OAD member states,

therefore, when they came to the UJ'J, in the resolutions in the General Assembly, inserted - the action taken by the OAD and initiated a similar action here within the UN and gained - support. So, it was on the basis that in 1972, SWAPOSWAPO was recognized as the sole and 11 authentic representative ofthe Namibian people. And step-by-step I was directly 11 involved from that point onwards. tI We reached a point where in the late 70s; SWAPO was recognized as the Permanent Observer, as opposed to an observer in 1972, a Permanent Observer. There is a

11 difference in quality between the two. I was eventually provided with a seat in the ,11 General Assembly. JK: So, you became the representative.

" TG: I became the representative here. ,fJ JK: About what year was that? fJ TG: The initial recognition came in 1972, but this recognition that elevated SWAPO at

11 the level similar to countries like Switzerland, the Holy See that represents the Vatican, r~ 11 9 intergovernmental organizations like the Organization of American States [OAS], the

Organization of African Unity [OAU] , and so on. It was only SWAPO and the PLO, for

Palestine, of the liberation movements who enjoyed that status.

JK: That's right; it was very unusual.

TG: Only the two of us. That was in 1978.

JK: That then coincides with the Resolution 435, so what is the connection because it is the same year?

TG: Not necessarily, there is no direct connection, a heavy coincidence, the two things.

Because the adoption of Resolution 435 started following the election of President Cmier in 1977, not so much the election, per se, but as a consequence of the election of

President Carter, Ambassador Andrew Young became the US. ambassador to the UN.

Cyrus Vance became the Secretary of State. Richard Moose became Assistant

Secretary of State for African Affairs. These people had a different approach to African issues than their predecessors. It was they who initiated consultations among the members of the Security Council, initially the Western members of the Security Council.

You have the Western Permanent Members the U.S., Britain, and France, but at that time between 1977 and 1978, you also had Germany and Canada as Non-Permanent members on the Security Council. The five of them together statted what is now known as the I 1100

11 Western Contact Group on Namibia. They started a long,long, drawn out negotiating process, I which eventually culminated inin thethe adoption of Resolution 435.

11 JK: Were you, as a representative of SWAPO, involvedinvolved inin thethe discussions thatthat 11 eventually formulated thethe languagelanguage thatthat went intointo thethe resolution?

11 TG: Yes, I was thethe principal contact person and spokesman for SWSWAPO,APO, The 11 groundbreaking resolution, thethe mother of resolution 435, was adopted inin January 1975. ItIt was inin thatthat resolution for thethe first timetime thatthat thethe United Nations specifically called for thethe

11 holding of free and fair elections inin Namibia under thethe supervision and control of thethe 11 United Nations toto give thethe Namibian people an opportunity toto exercise theirtheir right to selfself~~ 11 determination and freedom and independence.independence. But therethere was opposition toto itit until thethe election of President Cmier's Administration and thethe process thatthat I have explained. But TI tI was also involvedinvolved inin Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976, which was initiatedinitiated by t1 thenthen thethe UN Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. Sean MacBride, a f01111erf01111er Irish foreign minister who was at thatthat timetime inin 1975-76, thethe UN Commissioner for Namibia. 11

JK: About thatthat same time,time, thethe Council for Namibia was established. What was thethe ­ purpose of establishing thethe Council for Namibia and what did itit actually do? What were 11 itsits functions?

- TG: The COlU1Cil was established earlier inin 1967. In 1966, thethe UN General Assembly 11.~"! after thethe World Court had failed toto give a clear ruling on thethe basis of which thethe UN would ,11 I 1111

11 have done something to force South Africa out of Namibia, outout ofof frustration,frustration, thethe GeneralGeneral 11 Assembly said, "Enough is enough." By an historic resolution,resolution, aa veryvery far-reachingfar-reaching resolution 2248 of the General Assembly of 1966 terminatedterminated South South Africa'sAfrica's mandatemandate

11 over Namibia. Following that, it set up thethe United Nations Council forfor NamibiaNamibia inin 19671967

and giving it a wide-ranging mandate. ItIt gave itit thethe responsibilityresponsibility toto proceedproceed forthwithforthwith toto - Namibia to establish itself inside the country and toto organize thethe peoplepeople andand toto assistassist them and organize elections and declare independence,independence, and comecome back.back. ThatThat didn'tdidn't

-11.--. III happen. South Africa said, "Ha ha ha." Smart people thatthat theythey were,were, theythey didn'tdidn't challenge South Africa. That situation existed until 1970. The mandatemandate hadhad beenbeen

11 terminated; there was no way to kick South Africa out of thethe UN;UN; andand inin thethe meantime,meantime, 11 South Africa was still in Namibia. The Security Council was asas aa bodybody skepticalskeptical aboutabout the action taken by the General Assembly. Some members feltfelt thatthat thethe GeneralGeneral AssemblyAssembly

11 had gone beyond its mandate in having takentaken such a far-reachingfar-reaching action.action. SomeSome peoplepeople 11 were more legally oriented.oriented. -~ ,-•.. On the basis of that, in 1970, the Security Council collectively askedasked thethe Court.Court. TheThe fJ situation had gone from bad to worse since 1966. South Africa hadhad itsits ownown reactionreaction andand ~ had stepped up repression and imposed bogus homeland policies similarsimilar toto whatwhat youyou hadhad in South Africa, in Namibia. Angered by that,that, thethe Security Council decideddecided toto seekseek anan fJ advisory opinion from the World Court, something toto thethe effect that,that, "given"given thethe factfact thatthat , the General Assembly had terminated South Africa's presence inin Nan1ibiaNan1ibia andand givengiven thethe , fact that South Africa, in spite of that decision, refusedrefused toto comply, whatwhat cancan wewe do?"do?" TheThe ,.11./,' , I 12

I Court said that what the General Assembly did was legal and "whatever youyou cancan dodo I within the competence of the UN Charter, you are free toto do."

I JK: Had there been changes in the ComiCourt that made thisthis reversal inin approach toto thethe I situation?

I TG: The International Court: we elected new members to today, this morning, inin fact,fact, 11 five additional members, some renewals of mandates and others as new members. There are 15 members of the COUlt. The Court is supposed to be apolitical, but we lmowlmow as a

11 practical matter that the Court has very often been influenced by those who wield power.

Certainly the ruling in 1966 surprised lawyers, frustrated the United Nations, and utterly " disappointed us, who had hoped that given the fact that our case was so just that the CourtCOUlt fI would rulerule inin our favor. We were happy that in 1971, the American president of the

Court, not thatthat he decided, provided leadership. The current president is also American,

- no connection between the two things. But, whatever, had been done in the Court, the -- outcome was far reaching.reaching. The judgment was given in June 1971. It was an advisory , opinion,opinion, whichwhich has really gone much farther than what the Court used to do, not only on , thethe NamibianNamibian question but generally. So, responsibility was given to the Council for , Namibia.Namibia. ItIt was a council of member states assisted by a Commission appointed by the GeneralGeneral AssemblyAssembly at thethe levellevel of Assistant Secretary-General. When the Council could 11 notnot proceedproceed toto Namibia, thethe Council stmted setting up machinery here at the UN and in , thethe neighboringneighboring countries, Zambia particularly,particulmly, in Africa, to begin to implement those thingsthings theythey could implementimplement without being inside the country. Among the things that the ,.11 r~ 11 13

IIII~ Council did was to provide the Namibians with traveltravel and identityidentity documents,documents, issuedissued byby I the Council and recognized by the member states. So, II waswas travelingtraveling allall overover thethe worldworld with the Council for Namibia document. The Council alsoalso setset upup soso manymany differentdifferent kindskinds 11 of scholarship and training programs for Namibians outside. TheThe CouncilCouncil alsoalso throughthrough the Office of the Commissioner forfm' Namibia stmted doing researchresearch intointo differentdifferent aspectsaspects ­ of Namibia's economy and the illegal activities of SouthSouth Africa.Africa. AfterAfter thethe advisoryadvisory 11 opinion of the Court, South Africa's presence inin NamibiaNamibia waswas declareddeclared illegal.illegal. SoSo anyany P action taken in Namibia by South Africa, anyany badbad actionaction ---- andand allall ofof themthem werewere badbad -­-­ p were deemed illegal. The Council was also researchingresearching intointo whatwhat specificspecific thingsthings SouthSouth Africa was doing following thethe rulingruling of thethe Court,Court, whilewhile submittingsubmitting annualannual repOltsrepOlts toto thethe 11 General Assembly for consideration and actionaction byby membermember states.states.

11 The Council, in 1975, set up thethe United Nations InstituteInstitute forfor NamibiaNamibia inin Lusaka,Lusaka, Zambia,Zambia,

of which our now Prime Minister was thethe director.director. ThatThat instituteinstitute adoptedadopted aa moremore focusedfocused ­ program of training inin selecting youngyOlUlg people thatthat wewe werewere trainingtraining asas mid-levelmid-level publicpublic 11 administrators in different fields.fields. ItIt was aa veryvery successfulsuccessful programprogram andand aa concreteconcrete 11 example, more than anything else,else, ofof whatwhat thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations diddid toto prepareprepare thethe t1 Namibian people for future responsibilities.responsibilities. II waswas aa UNUN fellow.fellow. SomeSome ofof usus gotgot In\JUN fellowships and scholarships andand obtainedobtained educationeducation inin differentdifferent countriescountries allall overover thethe

, world. In termsterms of education andand trainingtraining andand assistanceassistance toto thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations InstituteInstitute , for Namibia and some other facilitiesfacilities wewe setset upup forfor educationeducation andand healthhealth facilitiesfacilities inin ourour , camps, inin ZambiaZaIl1bia and Angola, thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations providedprovided notnot onlyonly thethe officeoffice oftheofthe Commissioner ofNamibia andand thethe UNUN CouncilCouncil forfor Namibia,Namibia, butbut alsoalso thethe UNUN specializedspecialized :

" ,0' :

,"';f..:,ip I 1144

agencies,agencies, WHO,WHO, U1\TESCO,U1\TESCO, UNDPUNDP providedprovided concreteconcrete materialmaterial assistanceassistance toto thethe

""'"~ NamibiansNamibians under thethe care ofof SWSWAPO.APG. 11J

P The resolution thatthat setset up thethe UNUN CouncilCouncil forfor NamibiaNamibia amongamong otherother thingsthings mandatedmandated thethe

Council toto proceed toto Namibia. InIn thethe absence ofof that,that, thethe CouncilCouncil was supposedsupposed toto havehave ­ proceeded toto Namibia and toto carry out itsits mandate with thethe fullestfullest possible, direct 11 participation of the Namibian people themselves. Because they could not proceed toto III Namibia, instead of that and because SWAPO had been recognized by thethe UN, thethe Council consulted the Namibians, who were outside as refugees in the neighboring

P countries, the largest concentration having been in Zambia and in Angola, to consult Ii them, to involve them. The Council also undertook some ofthe actions, which p independent Namibia virtually inherited, stock, lock, and barrel. For example, SWAPO :<;' was recognized as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people as a

~ Permanent Observer in the UN system, but there were some international conferences like p thethe Law of the Sea, for example, where as a liberation movement we could not represent p Namibia as a cOlUltry.CalUltry. The Council was set up by the UN to do that. The Council was virtually the government ofNamibia. We were freedom fighters to liberate the country. p So, thatthat enabled thethe Council forfor Namibia to sign certain treaties and conventions and p protocolsprotocols priorprior toto Namibia's independence,independence, of course, after consultations with me and the otherother SWAPOSWAPO leaders,leaders, on behalfbehalf of Namibia. When thethe Law of thethe Sea process started, , forfor example,example, thethe CouncilCouncil forfor Namibia representedrepresented us and II was includedincluded inin thethe delegation , ofofthe the CouncilCouncil forfor Namibia.Namibia. TheThe CouncilCouncil signedsigned a number of internationalinternational agreements, , I r'ji:' 11 1155 ~ I1III which at independence we inherited and accepted as valid international instruments that Ii Namibia had entered into.

Ii JK: That is very important history for the record because that is something I had not ~ known.

Ji TO: Exactly, and the Council also, as a part of its mandate, had power to legislate in III the form of adopting decrees. And one ofthe most important decrees that the Council adopted, prepared by the Commissioner for Namibia in consultations with myself and the

Ji other SWAPO leaders, was decree "number one for the protection of the natural resources

ofNamibia." It was passed and in the subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly

and even of the Security Council later, it was illegal and member states were prohibited

and advised not to engage in any legal relationships with South Africa which may lend

legitimacy to an illegal, occupying regime in Namibia. So that helped us to get tlu'ough

the General Assembly additional resolutions under which UN member states were

prevented from fishing illegally in Namibia's waters. Because when the Law of the Sea

Convention was passed, the Council for Namibia declared 200 miles exclusive economic

zone for Namibia. When we went there, it was our first law in independent Namibia, to

ratify what the Council had already done. The Council produced many, many documents

that proved very helpful to us at independence.

JK: This is a sort complex and analytical question. You were able to achieve a great

deal within the UN, a very lillusual accomplishment because there were other turmoilstunnoils 16

!I~ I I~ and other liberation movements in other parts of the world that never achieved what you II",II~,,· were able to do. What kind of leverage did you bring to bear to achieve this? In other IWll words, how did you understand how the power structures worked and how did you bring ~ 'l'i~ thatthat together to make this happen?

11"'l\i~I,': TG: That question really deals with me and if! answer it, I would really be talking

11 about myself. Because I was right inin the center and I don't necessarily want to do that.

But you touchtouch on it.it. It isis a question of understanding how the system operates. The III11"," d UnitedUnited Nations operates not unlike thethe U.S. Congress through networking. The United '11 Nations isis structuredstructured around regional groups. There isis an African Group; there is an Ii AsianAsian Group;Group; therethere isis a Latin American and Caribbean Group; therethere isis thethe Western EuropeanEuropean andand OthersOthers Group;Group; andand thethe EasternEastem European Group since thethe collapse of the ­ socialistsocialist systemsystem inin EasternEastem Europe.Europe. So,So, you get toto Imowlmow individuals.individuals. In order toto network, 11 youyou must know thethe key rolerole players. InIn each socialsocial setting, therethere are leadersleaders and therethere are 11 followers.followers. So,So, youyou getget toto knowknow thethe key ambassadors. The chairmanships of thethe regional groupsgroups rotaterotate onon aa monthlymonthly basis.basis. YouYou getget toto ImowImow individuals,individuals, notnot becausebecause theythey are

chairpersonschairpersons -- therethere isis moremore reasonreason whywhy youyou shouldshould knowknow thethe chairpersonschairpersons -- butbut you get " toto Imowlmow individualsindividuals andand theythey getget toto knowknow you.you. OnOn thatthat basis,basis, youyou provideprovide themthem withwith " informationinformation andand appealappeal toto them;them; requestrequest themthem toto assistassist thethe adoptionadoption ofof aa pmiicularpmiicular ,­ resolution.resolution. WhenWhen II becamebecame thethe representativerepresentative ofof SWAPOSWAPO here,here, II wrotewrote aa letterletter toto thethe OfficeOffice ofof thethe ,­ Commissioner,Commissioner, thethe newnew one,one, notnot thethe oneone thatthat waswas before,before, toto askask forfor aa ticket.ticket. BecauseBecause thethe , 17

!h !1~ I,,:, UN had recognized SWAPO and I was the formal representative and I felt it was logical

that they should pay for the ticket for me to fly to Lusaka where our headquarters was for

Ii consultations. And he wrote back politely and said that there was no provision in the -­ program of work of the Council for Namibia approved last year by the General Assembly. fi In other words, "The request that you have made has financial implications that were not provided for." I didn't know what this man was talking about. So, I started asking

, people and theythey said thatthat before money is spent, the General Assembly must specifically

approve a budget for thethe Council in which there would be a budget line for travel. So, I

asked, "How do you do that?"that?" They said, "When we consider the next report of the

Council submission toto thethe General Assembly, we must find a language included that

would provide forfor that." That is how you get to understand the system operates. It has a

lotlot toto do with thethe person and how you are perceived. This is a very protocol conscious

institution.institution. The mnbassadors are representativesrepresentatives of sovereign states. It was for an

AfricanAfrican liberationliberation movement, or m1Y liberationliberation movement, a hostile environment.

[interruption][interruption]

TheThe WesternWestern powerspowers werewere seenseen asas collaboratorscollaborators withwith Apartheid South Africa, with thethe

illegalillegal regime,regime, becausebecause theirtheir corporationscorporations werewere inin NamibiaNamibia or inin South Africa with

extensionsextensions intointo Namibia.Namibia. So,So, itit waswas toto usus aa questionquestion ofof howhow II managedmanaged it.it. II was not thethe

firstfirst one;one; II succeededsucceeded HageHage Geingob,Geingob, whowho waswas thethe SWAPOSWAPO representativerepresentative here. Before

him,him, therethere werewere others.others. ButBut itit waswas reallyreally duringduring thethe yearsyears thatthat II waswas herehere thatthat wewe

penetrated.penetrated. TheThe recognitionrecognition camecame actuallyactually thethe yearyear thatthat II startedstarted andand wewe continuedcontinued toto 1818

strengthenstrengthen notnot onlyonly SWAPO'sSWAPO's standingstanding inin thethe system,system, butbut wewe startedstarted gettinggetting thethe GeneralGeneral

AssemblyAssembly toto adoptadopt specificspecific resolutionsresolutions asas buildingbuilding blocks.blocks. Eventually,Eventually, II waswas acceptedaccepted asas l 1'HiiJi111 oneone ofof thethe keykey actorsactors inin thethe system.system. II thinkthink thethe achievementsachievements hadhad basicallybasically toto dodo withwith

wi1U1ingwinning overover thethe hearts andand mindsminds of thethe delegations.delegations.

1 1I'll111 .1 JK: It isis very interesting.interesting. II also wonder how thethe dynamics work. You personally

pursued thisthis and had a dedication toto this.this. You learnedlearned how toto get around the system and

use the bureaucracy in different ways. But you also had to be persuasive. Part of

leverage or part of power is whether you have benefits to offer or if you have some kind

of coercion to threaten. But if you have neither of those things, what do you bring to

bear? What I was wondering is, is there a kind of leveraging power in a kind of moral

authority? In other words, did you appeal to people the moral issues ofwhat was going

on in Namibia? Was that partpat1 of your strategy?

TG: It was a combination. The moral case was compelling and the political decisions

of the General Assembly, later political decisions through resolutions, declarations,

statements of thethe presidents of thethe Security Council, and also pmiicularly, thethe law behind

thethe moral appeal carried a lot. That was one. Politically, itit became clear with each

passing year thatthat thethe Namibians themselvesthemselves were thethe leadersleaders of theirtheir liberationliberation cause.

SWAPO hadhad been accepted by thethe NamibianNamibian people andand whatwhat SWAPO was sayingsaying andand

doingdoing waswas assumedassumed toto enjoyenjoy thethe supportsupport ofof thethe Namibian people.people. ThatThat strengthenedstrengthened ourour

politicalpolitical hand.hand. ButBut also,also, wewe laterlater becamebecame aa factorfactor militarilymilitarily onon thethe ground.ground. WeWe couldcould notnot

matchmatch SouthSouth Africa'sAfrica's militarymilitary mightmight butbut asas aa guerrillaguerrilla force,force, wewe asseliedasselied ourselvesourselves onon thethe 19

ground in such a way that as Ambassador McHenry, my good friend who succeeded

Ambassador Andrew Young as U.S.US. ambassador to the UN, put it, that, "Whether we like

it or not," referring to SWAPO, "those are the guys with the guns."glillS." He was saying this in

the light of attempts made by South Africa inside the countly to find alternatives to

SWAPO. People were being depicted as democrats; people were being depicted as being

non-violent, people who had rejected the military option, people who were willing toto

carry on a dialogue, and people who were ready for an internal settlement, a bogus

independence. We could spoil anything on the ground ifit excluded us.

~ So, we had moral force behind us; we had political solidarity both on thethe part of thethe

Namibian people, the OAU, the Non-aligned movement, and thethe "peace-loving and

progressive forces" as we called themthem of thethe whole thirdthird world, includingincluding also amongamong thethe 'Ib i~l· , ir' ... Ji01';;; peace-loving forces individual senators and individualindividual congressmen. Later, thethe BlackBlack ~ Caucus came intointo being. We had progressive members of parliament inin thethe UnitedUnited , Kingdom, all Labor Party members. And particularly, inin EuropeEurope beyondbeyond thethe UnitedUnited Kingdom, the Nordic countries, thethe Scandinavian countriescountries emergedemerged asas EuropeanEuropean Ii countries thatthat saw thethe legitimacylegitimacy oftheofthe strugglestruggle ofof thethe NamibianNamibian peoplepeople ledled byby SWAPO,SWAPO, recognizedrecognized SWSWAPO,APO, allowed usus toto openopen officesoffices inin keykey EuropeanEuropean countries,countries, withwith officesoffices • inin London, inin Germany, inin Paris, inin Stocld10lm,Stocld10lm, Sweden,Sweden, Moscow.Moscow. AllAll thosethose thingsthings , helped. What waswas thethe lonelone voicevoice ofof thethe NamibianNamibian peoplepeople becamebecame thethe voicevoice ofof everybody.everybody. ,­

•LI 2020 1.~ I.li.t JK: ,1"1... JK: Fantastic,Fantastic, thatthat isis aa beautifulbeautiful pullingpulling togethertogether ofof allall ofofthose those forces.forces. AndAnd whatwhat isis

fantasticfantastic isis thatthat youyou understoodunderstood allall ofofthat that andand youyou orchestratedorchestrated thatthat here,here, aa veryvery impOliantimportant

factor,factor, veryvelY important.important.

TO:TO: BecauseBecause thisthis isis wherewhere wewe coordinatedcoordinated allall thatthat andand II waswas at thethe center of itit all.

JK:JK: DuringDuring 1988,1988, therethere waswas aa lotlot ofofnegotiationnegotiation going on outside ofNamibia to try to

bringbring aboutabout thethe agreement on thethe removalremoval of the Cuban troops which had been linked to

thethe wholewhole process under thethe Reagan Administration. While that was proceeding and

proceeding inin a very positive way, inside Namibia it seemed to be quite different. There

was a tremendoustremendous amount ofturmoil. The students had boycotted, starting in the north

and that had spread throughout the country, and not only students, but workers, and

everybody. What was the connection or discOlU1ection between what was going on on the

outside and what was going on on the inside?

TO: There was always a cOlli1ection between what was going on on the outside.

Freedom is one. The people had clearly come out not only as self-liberators by doing

some of the things that you were saying in spite of the repressionrepression and militarization ofof thethe

country by the Apm1heidApmiheid forces. In spite of all thethe attempts made by thethe ApartheidApartheid

regime and its apologists abroad to say thatthat Moscow controls SWSWAPOAPO andand SamSam NujomaNujoma

is outside. They are thethe bad guys.guys. ThereThere areare otherother SWSWAPOAPO peoplepeople insideinside thethe countrycountry andand

theythey are thethe good guys. InIn spitespite ofof that,that, SWAPOSWAPO waswas one.one. TheThe NamibianNamibian peoplepeople onon eacheach

occasion where publicpublic attemptsattempts werewere beingbeing mademade toto drivedrive aa wedgewedge betweenbetween thosethose ofofusus 21 outside and those inside, demonstrated that we were one people. Attempts included the installation of bogus internal governments. The last one was installed in 1985 during the period that you are talking about, from 1985 until 1989 when we started going back. That was the govenmlent in Namibia ostensibly nm by blacks, by Namibians, some of them who were former freedom fighters like the friend you mentioned and others who had become pmi of that govenmlent. It was a way to confront the international community and the UN with afaUafait a complit, i.e., the Namibian people internally have decided to opt for this. If SWSWAPOAPO and those who were outside wanted to come and join this thing that is accepted by the Namibian people, they are welcome to do so, but the days of armed struggle, a military solution, are over.

In a way, to lend some legitimacy to that bogus effort by South Africa, the Reagan

Administration in the 1980s through Chester Crocker tried to link Namibia's independence with the presence of Cubans in Angola, a dual policy of so-called constructive engagement. "You don't have to hit the South Africans over the head, you should talk to them," not a stick, but only a carrot, and a bigger carrot at that. In the meantime, to get the Cubans out, there would be a dialogue with South Africa, constructive engagement with South Africa. If the Cubans leave, it would expose the weakness of the Angolan government which is SUPPOliingSuppOliing SWAPO. It would also expose and weaken SWAPO. That was the strategy but it did not work.

There was never a division on the question of freedom, self-determination, and independence between the Namibians at home and the NamibiaJ.ls in exile. 22

JK: OK, letlet me see if!if! can understand thisthis correctly. There needed toto be shown thatthat insideinside Namibia therethere was solidarity with SWAPO and no110 matter what negotiations were going on on thethe outside. Because while theythey were going on, itit was not absolutely clear how theythey would get resolved.resolved. So, was therethere coordination by thethe SWSWAPOAPO leadershipleadership toto maintain thisthis pressure insideinside Namibia?

TO: Yes, but actually, itit was not only thethe SWSWAPOAPO leaders.leaders. The resistanceresistance at home, which we used toto call thethe firstfirst front,front, thethe natural resistanceresistance ofthethe Namibian people, we linkedlinked thatthat with thethe German occupation earlier. This was actually church leadersleaders who had publicly takentaken a stance against South Africa's illegalillegal occupation and condemned thethe

Western countries forfor aiding and abetting South Africa or turningturning theirtheir backs on us. ItIt involvedinvolved youth and students who were boycotting schools and others were confronting thethe army and thethe police. ItIt includedincluded women, women's organizations. We had different ways inin which women insideinside thethe country would assist. We had a SWAPO women's council outside. Those had leaders inside.inside. When theythey were victimizing thesethese people, we had ways inin which we were sending inin money forfor them.them. Particularly thethe church leadersleaders had opportunities toto come outside toto attend church meetings thatthat were held inin thethe United

States, Geneva, and elsewhere. And so we used toto arrange toto meet them.them.

JK: The Shejavalis. 23

TO: Before him also, Shejavali was one of them. Dumeni was another. There was the

Bishop, the old man who resembled in a curious way Dr. Martin Luther King's father.

JK: Was he the Bishop before Dumeni?

TO: Yes, Bishop Auala. His students used to come out and we would meet them,

Reverend Kamieta, who is now our Deputy Speaker. So these people were able to come

out. Occasionally, a student came out. There were various ways in which we were able

to communicate. We also we had our friends from outside in Europe and the U.S.,V.S.,

Canada, people who were not necessarily visible as leaders ofliberation support groups,

the anti-anti-ApartheidApartheid movement and so forth, people who were behind us. They would go in

as academics, say all the right things to reporters that the regime would want them to say.

They were able to go and stay two or tlu'ee weeks, go around and play ball with the army

and the police and bring out information and we would in turn send in information.

There are so many examples that I could site ofpeople that we used that way.

JK: The boycotts in 1988, if! am correct, started spontaneously with the rape of a

young girl in a school.

TO: Yes, but actually, it was something that had been going 011on since the 1970s, a

whole generation of people. The first mass student uprising started in 1974-75, with the

collapse of the fascist regime in Portugal and the independence of Angola. That staltedstaIted a large wave; thousands of young people had gone out of the country, but that tradition had 1I 24

I remained. The more the country was being militarized, thethe moremore thethe studentsstudents werewere I refusing. Because schools were takentaken over across thethe countly;countly; alsoalso inin thethe northnorth theythey werewere taken over by the army. It was thethe soldiers who became teachersteachers andand werewere teachingteaching thethe

If' children armed with AK-47s and other machine guns wearingwearing uniforms,uniforms, militarymilitary fatigues.fatigues. I, They were teaching the children and thethe students refused.refused. SomeSome werewere killed.killed. ItIt waswas notnot spontaneous in the sense that it justjust happened. These werewere manifestationsmanifestations ofof politicalpolitical

·:,·.')1 I.. education and campaign that had been going on sincesince thethe formationformation ofof SWAPO.SWAPO. ItIt waswas

111 11 spontaneous in the sense that students expressed theirtheir oppositionopposition toto thethe SouthSouth AfricanAfrican f presence across the country.

I, JK: Did the students understand thethe negotiations thatthat werewere goinggoing onon outside?outside?

1-.,]~ i) TO: Very clearly, very clearly.

'r!!i JK: They knew that what they were doing put additional pressurepressure toto thethe outsideoutside I I~_. ( negotiations.

TO: They understood that we defined thethe struggle onon threethree fronts.fronts. WeWe calledcalled thethe firstfirst

front political resistance or national resistance as thethe firstfirst front.front. ThatThat isis thethe NamibianNamibian

people themselves rejecting colonialism and Apartheid andand demandingdemanding freedomfreedom andand

independence. We were a contingent of thosethose people outside.outside. Peoples'Peoples' resistanceresistance waswas

the first front. The second front was thethe diplomatic frol1t.frol1t. TheThe pursuitpursuit ofof thethe secondsecond frontfront

was making connections with the UN, with internationalinternational organizations,organizations, sympatheticsympathetic B: 25

I parliamentarians, church leaders, liberation support groups. That is the second front I, altogether is by explaining the aspirations of our people to our friends -- the ", internationalist forces we called them - that we were able to get assistance, including I... ,' .,1 weapons. With that we launched the third front, that is the armed struggle. The focus ~·' ··I'

" was always the people. However many were outside, we were a small fraction ofthose I".. , was always the people. However many were outside, we were a small fraction of those inside. The real resistance was inside the country. -.".':!i ,:l ,­ JK: Do you have more time or do you have an appointment now? TG:TQ: I have two more appointments if you have time to wait. ~.

~i JK: I could wait. So, we will just interrupt for a while and begin again. -.. 11 (.1' ....i ' , [interruption]

JK: Now we are going to pick up where we left off. There are three more areas that I I.-,.:~ r~ "", wanted to talk to you about. I will name the three now so that we can kind ofthink about

them. I would like your interpretation of what happened on April first in the north. 1'd I'jl•....:: lr!' also like to talk to you about security issues during 1989 within Namibia in general. And 'I the other part that I would like to talk to you about is that many people say that once ~i UNTAGAQ was established in Namibia, it was basically a piece of cake. Independence was ~ going to happen and it wasn't a difficult operation. I just wanted to get your

flf ~ ~" ft' 2626

I interpretationinterpretation of that,that, whether that is really a fair assessment. Let's start with your point I: of view on April first; what happened on April first? li TG: A combination of things,things, everybody isis inin one way or another responsible for thethe 1I tragedytragedy of April first.first. First, all throughoutthroughout thethe 435 negotiations which preceded thethe adoption of 435, but we call themthem 435 negotiations, therethere was thisthis one issueissue thatthat was

I controversial and could not be resolved and really touchedtouched thethe very core ofthe conflict

I, between thethe twotwo toto thethe conflict and thethe twotwo pmiies thatthat signed thethe cease-fire agreement at

thethe end, namely South Africa and SWAPO. The issueissue isis confinement offorces. The ­ languagelanguage isis "confinement"confinement of forces toto base." South Africa maintained thatthat thethe SWAPO terroriststerrorists dodo notnot havehave militarymilitary basesbases insideinside thethe country. TheyThey werewere doing thatthat

'i deliberately.deliberately. That isis what thatthat reallyreally meant.meant. "They"They do not have military bases and you '9:•...! peoplepeople shouldshould not saysay toto thethe negotiators, thethe Western Five, thethe Front-Line States and so , on, you shouldshould not trytry toto accordaccord SWAPOSWAPO an advantage toto erect military bases insideinside thethe cowltry which theythey dodo notnot havehave presently.presently. TheyThey comecome intointo NamibiaNamibia and cany out

terroristterrorist activities and theythey runrun back. They are not reallyreally present here." OK, thatthat was •: I ,:1,1' ' theirtheir contention.contention. Therefore, South AfricaAfrica waswas opposedopposed toto SWAPOSWAPO beingbeing givengiven militarymilitary , basesbases insideinside thethe country.country. ThatThat waswas SouthSouth Africa'sAfrica's contentioncontention.. • WeWe werewere saying,saying, "We"We areare aa guerrillaguerrilla army.army. WeWe areare notnot aa conventionalconventional army.army. WeWe do not ~ operateoperate outout ofof structures.structures. AA guerrillaguerrilla armyarmy operatesoperates inin smallsmall unitsunits andand wewe areare evelywhereevelywhere inin thethe country."country." TheThe SouthSouth AfricanAfrican governmentgovernment itselfitself virtuallyvirtually onon aa weekly basis, throughthrough &,.... i~Ji '1:,0 , , thethe signaturesignature ofofthethe ForeignForeign MinisterMinister ofof SouthSouth Africa,Africa, wouldwould writewrite -- andand thisthis isis somethingsomething , 11 iNf P'0'"' 11 2727

I thatthat isis onon thethe record;record; youyou cancan checkcheck asas aa partpart ofofthis this studystudy -- andand complainedcomplained aboutabout 11 activitiesactivities carriedcarried outout byby SWAPOSWAPO insideinside thethe country,country, aboutabout incidentsincidents carriedcarried outout insideinside thethe country.country. Therefore,Therefore, SouthSouth AfricaAfrica knewknew ourour presence.presence. GuerrillaGuerrilla armiesarmies dodo notnot operateoperate

I fromfrom bases.bases. ItIt waswas thereforetherefore necessarynecessary forfor thethe UnitedUnited Nations,Nations, thethe WesternWestern ContactContact 11 Group,Group, andand thethe Front-LineFront-Line StatesStates toto insureinsure thatthat thosethose SWAPOSWAPO militarymilitary unitsunits thatthat werewere insideinside thethe country,country, inin theirtheir country,country, inin Namibia,Namibia, onceonce thethe cease-firecease-fire isis made,made, hopefullyhopefully

I priorprior toto thethe datedate ofofthethe announcementannouncement ofofthethe cease-fire,cease-fire, shouldshould be informedinformed throughthrough I channels thatthat we knew toto gather at twotwo or three,three, depending on how many we had, 11 locations and be confined to base. That argument had not been resolved.

I. Now 435 was adopted in 1978. It wasn't implemented until 1989. So, during that , intervening period so many things had changed. Actually, we had more people inside the country than we had in 1978. The Westem cOlll1tries felt, and wrongly so, that they had

~ solved that problem. How? One was as part of the negotiations on linkage, the Angolans ~i and the Cubans and South Africans agreed toto sign a protocol, thethe Brazzaville Protocol, which was alter updated by the Geneva Protocol in August 1988, under which thethe

Ipill.... ·.. :. Angolan governmentgovemment with thethe compliance of thethe CubansCubans andand theirtheir friendsfriends thethe SovietsSoviets , undeliookundeliook toto clearclear anan areaarea atat thethe 1616thth parallel.parallel. SouthSouth ofofthatthat therethere wouldwould bebe nono militarymilitary , activitiesactivities ofof SWSWAPO.APO. ThatThat havinghaving beenbeen done,done, thethe UNlJN andand thethe WesternWestern countriescountries wronglywrongly interpretedinterpreted thatthat situationsituation toto meanmean thatthat AngolansAngolans andand thethe CubansCubans andand thethe SovietsSoviets ~ wouldwould taketake carecare ofof SWSWAPO.APO, TheyThey boughtbought thethe SouthSouth AfricanAfrican argumentargument thatthat wewe werewere notnot insideinside thethe conntly.country. FromFrom timetime toto time,time, wewe wouldwould gogo throughthrough therethere andand carrycarry outout activitiesactivities 1ri'...:..... 1 , andand comecome back.back. ~ r'! 28

JK: Were SWAPO representatives pmty to the agreement?

TG: No, we were not. I will come to that. We were not participating. We had

rejected linkage and we were not pmiicipating. Even though we were hanging around to

talk to our friends. It was part of a package and rising out of that was a specific aspect

that related to Namibia. It was a larger package that led to an agreement on the fate of the

Cubans and certain things the Angolans would do and South Africa would do, and so on.

That issue had remained suspended. We had discussions with the Angolans and the

Cubans asking, "What does this mean? You have signed this; you are a sovereign state,

but what do you mean? And you are saying that we should withdraw our troops that are

inside Namibia across this area which has now been accepted as a no-go area into Angola.

That we cannot do. We have forces as you know inside, in the country. What do we do with them? We cannot walk through with those forces." So, that thing remained unresolved. But once the agreement was signed by these countries, setting the date here for December 22nd in 1988, which unfortunately is linked with the tragic plane crash over

Lockerbie, Scotland. The Commissioner for Namibia, a Swedish fellow, Karlsson Bernt was also on that plane. He was on his way over here to attend that meeting.

Somehow, mysteriously, the South African foreign minister, defense minister, and delegation coming for that meeting who were supposed to be on that plane changed their plane. It is a mystery why they changed it. 2299

Anyway, there was a euphoria, a big ceremony, herehere justjust nextnext doordoor [to[to thethe presidentpresident oftheofthe

GA's office] in the ECOSOC chamber. The agreement waswas signedsigned andand thatthat fixedfixed thethe datedate of the first of April as the "D" day forfor thethe commencement ofof thethe implementation.implementation. InIn thatthat excitement ON people started sending inin theirtheir officialsofficials andand wewe signedsigned thethe cease-fire.cease-fire. WeWe had our troops inside in thethe COlIDtry. ItIt was thethe faultfault ofof thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations andand thosethose whowho were advising them that theythey should have made suresure thatthat eithereither SWSWAPOAPO andand SouthSouth AfricaAfrica had reached an agreement and had assumed thethe responsibilityresponsibility thatthat theythey werewere notnot goinggoing toto violate the terms of the cease-fire or whether theythey werewere goinggoing toto workwork outout somethingsomething thatthat even if SWAPO forces were not given a place wherewhere theythey couldcould go.go, TheyThey didn'tdidn't havehave toto call them bases, we were saying. InIn Zimbabwe theythey werewere calledcalled assemblyassembly points.points.

Someplace where we could call our fellowsfellows who werewere armedarmed people.people. YouYou don'tdon't wantwant toto have that situation when you are going toto have elections.elections, WeWe simplysimply saidsaid thatthat youyou shouldshould provide us with a place where we are going toto instructinstruct ourour fellowsfellows toto gathergather withoutwithout thethe fear of being attacked by thethe South Africans. ThatThat hadhad notnot beenbeen done.done. So,So, whenwhen peoplepeople assumed the problem had been solved, itit was notnot solved.solved.

We also stand to be blamed because we did not dodo enough,enough, SWAPOSWAPO thatthat is,is, inin informinginforming not only the people inside thethe country -- therethere werewere aa lotlot ofof peoplepeople insideinside thethe countrycountry andand they knew how to take care ofthemselvesofthemselves as theythey hadhad beenbeen doingdoing overover thethe yearsyears -- butbut those who were in the southern part of Angola, whowho hadhad retreatedretreated becausebecause ofof combatcombat whowho were on their way; the message did not reachreach themthem properly.properly. SomeSome ofof themthem endedended up,up, unfortunately, in that trag~dytrag~dy.. So, everyone hashas aa responsibility.responsibility. NothingNothing happenedhappened thatthat you could say it was this pmty or thethe other. Unfortunately, whenwhen thethe eventevent tooktook place,place, thethe 30

Prime Minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher, waswas inin Zimbabwe.Zimbabwe. SheShe wentwent overover toto

Namibia. I think it was arranged thatthat thethe South African foreignforeign ministerminister camecame upup toto

Windhoek and the two of them met with thethe now President ofof Finland,Finland, PresidentPresident

Ahtisaari, who in a way, some people felt,felt, panicked becausebecause thethe missionmission waswas goinggoing toto

collapse. He asked for advice, or authorization, whether hehe couldcould askask thethe SouthSouth Africans,Africans,

because the UN didn't have troops thenthen there,there, toto taketake carecare ofof thethe situation.situation. TheThe SecuritySecurity

Council said yes. 111eThe South Africans said, "Halaluya," andand unleashedunleashed theirtheir armory.armory. ThatThat

is the tragedy of April first.

JK: I understand that Manack Goulding had had aa meetingmeeting withwith SamSam NujomaNujoma aboutabout aa

couple of weeks before April first inin which theythey had hadhad aa discussiondiscussion onon thisthis issue.issue.

Marrack Goulding had explained toto Sam Nujoma thethe interpretationinterpretation thatthat thethe UNUN hadhad ofof thethe

agreement that assembly areas were not going toto be setset upup insideinside Namibia.Namibia.

TG: Yes, that's true. I know that Goulding isis a wonderful professional.professional. ButBut thatthat issueissue

was never resolved. It was never resolved. There isis notnot aa In.\)"In\J personperson thatthat cancan looklook youyou inin

the face and say that that issue had been resolved.resolved. ItIt waswas nevernever resolved.resolved. ItIt waswas simplysimply

lefi suspended. The commitment thatthat we had made whichwhich II hadhad neglectedneglected toto mentionmention isis

that after these countries had signed thethe agreement at Brazzaville,Brazzaville, andand thethe GenevaGeneva

Protocol, the Angolan government asked SWAPO, inin thethe lightlight ofof thatthat agreementagreement oror

protocol, that we would accept thatthat protocol and would thereforetherefore notnot undertakeundertake newnew

initiatives across that area that was announced, as II said,said, thethe no-gono-go area.area. ToTo thatthat extent,extent,

we had accepted the Brazzaville-Geneva Protocol. ItIt isis aa revisionistrevisionist explanation.explanation. II

11 III i!1

11 331] myself had a discussion with the first Commander Prem Chand inin thethe delegates loungelounge aa couple of days before he left. And I raised that issue, and thatthat thethe issueissue remainedremained umesolved. "How are you going to do it? You are going now toto Namibia; youyou areare goinggoing to start setting up your mission. That issue remains umesolved. How are youyou goinggoing toto dodo it?" He said, "Well, I was not here when negotiations were takingtaking place. II waswas toldtold thatthat the issue was resolved." I said, "I am telling you thatthat itit has not been resolved."resolved."

I think that the UN people misled themselves that thethe indirectindirect negotiations onon linkagelinkage andand our acceptance of the Brazzaville Protocol had somehow resolvedresolved thatthat issue.issue. ButBut asas farfar as the negotiations that I was involved with, that issueissue had never been resolved.resolved.

JK: That is an important point to clear up, a very importantimportant point. When diddid youyou arrive in Namibia?

TG: In June 1989.

JK: In June 1989, how did you find the security situation there?there? Was therethere violence?violence?

Were there tlu'eats against you or your SWSWAPOAPO members?

TG: We are talking about it now nearly ten years after and what II didn't knowknow then,then, II know now, It is almost, one can say, a miracle that some of us came out alive.alive. DuringDuring the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission trials,trials, so much informationinformation hadhad come in of what was in store for SWAPO, anything from shooting down thethe planeplane inin I1', i' 1" 32

which we arrived to some of us who were on the list to be killed, including those who

were killed, not only Anton Lubowski but others, as well. How dirty trick operators were

aiding and abetting not only financially but also in helping them with their election

campaigns, providing them with weapons. The amount of money that was spent, the

South Africans were forced later to admit that they had spent $100 million, and we think

that that is a ridiculous figure, on one of the internal parties to defeat SWAPO. One of

the things that I noticed in the disdisinformationinformation campaign style through the media that was

controlled by the enemy, was very sleek, celiainly not Namibian. Sleek ways in which

there was an extensive use of dirty tricks and disinformation campaign against SWAPO

and individualleaclers.

Regarding security, the policing of the transition and the South African security presence,

it was gradual withdrawal. The remaining bulk of South African troops and paramilitary

forces were withdrawn while we were there, physically. To that extent, we were

vulnerable. We are prominent people, so the fact that we were not attacked did not mean

that SWAPO members were not attacked, those who were not known. So, the security

,)11 I I~' situation was very tense. South Africa had trained killer units. We called them Koevoet.

The south had 20,000 strong South West Afi:ican Territory Force, an indigenous anny

that was created, not the South African Defense Force. It was an indigenous army that

was trained as a countervailing force against the SWAPO army. The security situation

was very tense. UN had something to do with mitigating it, but I think it was the large

contingents of international observers and just people of all kinds who satmated the

country that for fear that maybe they were being watched, they didn't do what they

- - 3333 intended to do. A lot came out in the South African Truth and Reconciliation

Commission.

Lastly, about UNTAG presence, if I had said what I said about the second point, security issues, then LlNTAG presence could not have been a piece of cake. UNTAG succeeded in Namibia, and this is a very important point for me to stress, because the Namibian people were ready to cooperate with UNTAG. What were its weaknesses? UNTAG, we saw was there to achieve freedom and the independence we had fought for and the UNU1\l has been a friend.friend. Not perhaps the individual officers, we did not lG10W them; they were facelessfaceless people. There were their thousands, but the United Nations blue flag and the blue helmets toto assist thethe Namibian people, not SWAPO, per se, to achieve freedom and independence.independence. The UN succeeded because thethe Namibian people cooperated with

UNTAG and made itsits tasktask possible. The political parties cooperated. We signed the

Code of Conduct and pledged toto abide by itit and by and largelarge observed the terms of the

Code of Conduct. We insuredinsured SWAPO thatthat our guerrillas who were now in civilian clothesclothes with theirtheir weapons tuckedtucked away elsewhere, didn't make use of them.them. We were havinghaving regularregular meetings with thethe UNUN people, with representativesrepresentatives of thethe Western cOlU1tries,cOlU1tries, toto ensureensure thatthat therethere was nono violence against thethe United Nations people. But thethe bottombottom lineline isis wherewhere thethe UNUN isis failing,failing, or was not as successful as inin Namibia, was becausebecause thethe peoplepeople werewere divided.divided. ThisThis isis thethe case inin Cambodia and inin Angola,Angola, also, or inin

Bosnia.Bosnia. TheThe forcesforces werewere notnot unitedunited inin supportsupport ofof thethe UN. We welcomed thethe United

NationsNations andand gavegave themthem support.support. WeWe mademade itit possiblepossible forfor thethe UnitedUnited Nations toto have scoredscored aa greatgreat victOlY.victOlY. 3344

JK: There were some groups within Namibia that did not necessarily support independenceindependence or if theythey did support independence,independence, for example thethe DTA, supported itit but theythey wanted itit under theirtheir terms.terms. It seems as thoughthough while everybody says theythey wanted independenceindependence for Namibia, itit isis an over simplification.

TG:TQ: I am talkingtalking about thethe majority ofthethe Namibian people. The DTA does not, as a political party, quite qualify inin thatthat context as thethe Namibia people. They are still suffering from thatthat stigma. At thethe timetime thatthat we came, theythey were defending thethe old order.

They were thethe right hand of thethe South African regime. They were thethe leaders,leaders, some of them,them, of thethe Koevoet and thethe South West African Territory Force thatthat I am talkingtalking about.

We are talkingtalking about a political party which was created by South Africa, which was funded by South Africa, and which was serving South Africa. They were opposed toto independence.independence. I don't necessarily count themthem among thethe Namibians thatthat I am talkingtalking about. There were thosethose who were my schoolmates at thethe Agustinium. Some ofthemofthem studied here. They leftleft and went home and were recruited and theythey survived as politicians before 1989 because theythey were protected by South Africa. These people were despised by theirtheir families. They did not see theirtheir families. These are people who were provided with houses and places toto stay under thethe protection by thethe South African army and police and thethe security units. In termsterms offreedom, self-determination, and thethe independenceindependence of Namibia, did not count among thethe Namibians I am talkingtalking about. I am talkingtalking about thethe largelarge number of patriots who wanted freedom and independenceindependence who had been part of thethe longlong and bitter struggle ledled by SWAPO. 3355

JK: That is a good explanation. ItIt isis justjust thatthat sometimessometimes peoplepeople whowho don'tdon't understandunderstand

what was going on inside Namibia simply saysay thatthat everybodyeverybody wantedwanted independenceindependence forfor

Namibia, therefore, it was an easy jobjob forfor UNTAG whilewhile theythey werewere there.there. ButBut ifif reallyreally

interview people and talk toto people who were therethere inin U1\ITAGU1\ITAG onon aa dailydaily basis,basis, theythey

really had to work hard to keep DTA and other elements, andand Koevoet,Koevoet, underunder control,control, soso

that they didn't disrupt the process. There were many crisescrises throughthrough thatthat periodperiod inin whichwhich

if the UN, the Special Representative and thethe Deputy SpecialSpecial Representative,Representative, thethe CivPolCivPol

and others had not worked on a constant basis, thethe processprocess couldcould havehave deteriorated.deteriorated.

TO: Let's just back track a littlelittle bit. The original resolutionresolution thatthat II hadhad talkedtalked aboutabout inin

January 1975, which for the first timetime with a program calledcalled forfor freefree andand fairfair electionselections

under UN supervision and control, thatthat ideaidea was weakened laterlater underunder 435435 negotiations.negotiations.

Initially, the UN had the idea of only sending monitors, onlyonly monitors.monitors. ThisThis isis onon record,record,

on paper. The fact that we had thatthat military forceforce inin NamibiaNamibia waswas solelysolely becausebecause ofof

SWAPO. We insisted. We knew thethe regimeregime thatthat wewe werewere fightingfighting against.against. ItIt waswas aa

fascist, military regime that isis killing and destroying propeliypropeliy andand we,we, therefore,therefore, wantedwanted

an effective UN military presence with battalions. ButBut also,also, wewe wantedwanted thethe SpecialSpecial

Representative of the United Nations which had assumed directdirect legallegal responsibilityresponsibility overover

Namibia to be the boss and toto have veto power. WeWe couldcould notnot preventprevent thethe SouthSouth AfricanAfrican representative from forming a teamteam with thethe UN SpecialSpecial Representative,Representative, butbut wewe wantedwanted the Special Representative toto have thethe overall authority asas aa UNUN territory.territory. 3636

JK:JK: Well,Well, wewe havehave runrun outout ofoftime,time, soso II wantwant toto thankthank youyou soso much.much.

TG:TG: MyMy pleasure.pleasure. Yale-UN Oral History Project Theo-Ben Gurirab Interviewer: Jean Kl'asno November 3, 1999 New York

Name Index: Namibia

Ahtisaari, Martti 30 Hamutenya, Hidipo 4 Auala, Leonard 23 Bernt, Karlsson 28 Witbooi, Hendrik 4 Carter, Jimmy 9-10 Chand, Prem 31 Crocker, Chester 21 Dumeni, Kleopas 23 Geingob, Rage 4, 17 Goulding, Marracle 30 Katjuongua, Moses 7 King, Martin Luther 23 Lubowski, Anton 32 Luther, Martin 2 MacBride, Sean 10 McHenry, Donald 19 Moose, Richard 9 Nujoma, Sam 4,20,30 Shejavali, Selma 23 Thatcher, Margaret 30 Uirab,Jan Bamba 4-5 Young, Andrew 9, 19 UNITEDUNITED NANATiONS,nONS, DAGOAG HAMMARSKJOLDHAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARYLIBRARY

11111111111111/111111111111111111111111111 \11111111111~11 1/11111111/111/1111111111111111111111II111/1/1/11111/11111illlllII11I1 1 119491949002094139 00209 4139