ANTOINE DE GUISCARD, 'ABBE DE LA BOURLIE', 'MARdUIS DE GUISCARD'

PETER JONES

SOME wars more than others offer scope to the hopeful military adventurer armed with plausible projects. The chevalier d'industrie flourished mightily in the War of the Spanish Succession, as the papers of the ist Duke of Marlborough reveal. The imagination of the military projector was admirably stimulated by the obstacles which long drawn-out sieges and skilful avoidance of battle threw in the way of a speedy end to the conflict. As a result, the Duke was the recipient of schemes which ranged in ambition from the surprise of a town to the raising of a national revolt in France. Many of these schemes were as fanciful as those of the financial projectors who proliferated after the Peace of Utrecht, but they were not ignored or rejected out of hand. The Duke was particularly responsive to anything which might contribute to the success of what he called *the great Design', the invasion of the French homeland. His hopes had been raised by the entry of Savoy and Portugal into the alliance, which seemed to expose France's southern flanks. Stalemate on the Meuse or in Flanders reinforced the desire to strike a decisive blow, and bring France to the conference table. There were potential allies within French borders, as well as without. The outbreak of the religious revolt of the Camisards of the Cevennes in 1702 held out the possibility of an invasion of Languedoc which could help the rebels in their war with French regular troops. The major stumbling-block was liaison with the rebels, and here the military projectors came into their own. From the three great centres of Huguenot exile—The Hague and Rotterdam, Lausanne and Berne, and London—came a discordant chorus of advice and innumerable schemes for invasion. Even after the first and most savage phase of the revolt in the Cevennes had been put down in 1704, and Savoy had proved itself a broken reed as an ally, military successes in Catalonia and the capture of Mediterranean sea bases at Gibraltar and Port Mahon kept the hopes of invasion alive. Discussions of military strategy at The Hague took place against a background of persistent lobbying by French exiles, although internal faction fighting was more evident than common purpose. In truth, the exiled Protestant ministers who had settled in the Netherlands after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes had little to offer when it came to liaison with the Camisards, who fought and worshipped in the 'Desert' (their name for the open-air congregations of the Cevennes) without the leadership of an educated ministry. The hunted Camisards who had fled to Switzerland or to London

94 seemed to offer the best intelligence and the hope that they would persuade their brethren to *lever le masque' once again. One of the competing projectors amongst the refugees stands out, not only by virtue of his being a Roman Catholic, and an abbS at that, but by virtue of his extraordinary capacity for dramatising his private compulsions on a European stage. Despite the ultimate failure of all his projects, Antoine de Guiscard achieved a final notoriety by his attempted assassination of Robert Harley at the Cockpit in Whitehall on 8 March 1711.^ From his first stage-managed entry into the limelight in 1703 to his appropriately tragical and macabre end, he demanded attention from the allied leaders by the vehemence and extravagant imagination displayed in a torrent of letters and memorials. He was given to denouncing his rivals, and hinted at plots with 'fer et poison' against his life by the agents of Louis XIV. He often reminded his correspondents of the vial of poison he carried on his person for use in the event of capture or betrayal. All this might have been hard to take seriously, but for his impressive connections, and his emergence from the Rouergue in 1703 in circumstances which gave him prestige as a leader of both Catholic and Protestant malcontents in Languedoc. At the time of the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession Guiscard was well into middle age, and apparently destined to play out a comfortable existence in possession of one of the richest benefices in the south of France. A description of his appearance in 1706 survives to complement the portrait of 1705 by Jan Hendrik Brandon (fig. i)? The Intendant of the Rouergue, Legendre, described Guiscard to the minister of war, Chamillart: C'est un grand homme bien fait qui a six pieds de haut, de visage blanc, un peu bazane, Le nes et la bouche grande, les dents belles. La jambe menue et fort longue. Les epaules larges et fort elevees. II a la main grande, forte et les doigts tres longs, II parle peu et a un air taciturne. II porte une perruque chatain clair et ses cheveux sont chatain brun.^ Born in 1658, he was the third son of Georges de Guiscard, Comte de la Bourlie, of a noble family of Quercy. His father had risen into favour as the under-governor of the King during the minority of Louis XIV. Subsequently he became a lieutenant-general and governor of Sedan; Saint-Simon remarked that the family fortunes were made by the draining of low-lying lands near Blaye in the Gironde, presented to Georges de Guiscard by Saint-Simon's father. As the third son, Antoine de Guiscard was destined for the Church, and in 1672 was appointed Abbe of Bonnecombe in the Rouergue.''^ This was a rich benefice with rents of more than £2,000 p.a.; to it was added the priory of Dieu-en-Souvienne. As he was given to pointing out, Guiscard had sacri- ficed 'une fortune considerable, une vie douce et delicieuse' to throw in his lot with the allies. According to an informant of Richard Hill, English envoy to Turin and Guiscard's first military sponsor, Guiscard had been educated at the French Protestant Academy of Sedan, where his father was governor. Whether the young abb^ was educated at this Protestant Academy, which before its dissolution in 1681 was the most famous in France, or, as is more likely, simply attended some classes there, his family certainly

95 ANTOINE •MAR9DE GVI5CARD • COMTE DELABOVRLIE ETD NEWI-STR LOIRE • UEVTEN^' GENC^-DES"

DE^ DRAGOJNI

TIRE-A LA HAfE LANNEE jyof PAR LE 5TEVR BRANDON REINS' UNDER EXAMINATiON BEFORE THE COUNCIL AT THE COCKPIT nAR^*" 9 J7fo STAB^U WTTH A PENKNIFE M'^HARLlTir THEN CHANCELLOllR OF THE EXCHEQUER NOW EARL OF COCFORD WHO HAD DISrOVER'D His' TRXAJONABLE CORRE5K)ND

Fig. I. Portrait of Guiscard by Jan Hendrik Brandon (1705), owned by Christopher Harley, Esq. (By courtesy of Lady Hamilton) befriended the Professor of Divinity Pierre Jurieu, and his protege Pierre Bayle, who taught philosophy there from 1675 to 1681. Louis de Guiscard, Antoine's eldest brother, tried as an act of friendship to persuade Bayle to return to Paris and abjure his faith when the Academy was dissolved. These contacts were vital to Guiscard later: in 1704, when Jurieu was operating an intelligence network for the allies, he introduced Guiscard to the Grand Pensionary Heinsius. After leaving Sedan, Guiscard's enemy David Flotard alleged that he was compelled to attend a Jesuit seminary in the parish of St. Lazare in Paris. Whatever the truth of this, Guiscard indulged his hankering for the military life by attending his brothers in the camps of Flanders during the Nine Years War. There he claimed later to have learnt the metier of a soldier. By the end of the century, however, Guiscard's reputation was that of one of the leading/)fn>5 maitres, or rakes of quality. Whatever his merits as soldier, which remained largely untested, Guiscard's exploits in this field did not pass without comment. La Musique du Diable^ ou le Mercure Galant devalise (Paris, 1711) imputed to Guiscard gluttony, the killing of a butcher after a bet on dog-fighting, a passion for little boys, and the seduction followed by abduction of a female minor. More realistically, he was often charged with keeping a string of mistresses, gambling heavily, living riotously, and ravishing nuns. His enemies tried later to exploit this reputation, which they certainly helped to inflate, but more importantly at the time, he made an extremely powerful enemy at the French court in the person of Madame de Maintenon. According to Abel Boyer, Antoine and his elder brother Georges de Guiscard had jointly abducted a hatter's wife, and the ensuing scandal had been hushed up. But they made the mistake soon after of laying violent hands on a near relation of Madame de Maintenon, and killing at least one of his retainers. She had already had occasion to resent their interference in a plan for the marriage of their niece to one of her connections, and now took the opportunity of disgracing the Guiscards. The hatter was encouraged in his suit against the two brothers, and the hatter's wife committed to prison. Antoine de Guiscard procured her escape and, according to Boyer, fled France in 1703 to avoid arrest.^ Certainly Georges de Guiscard was imprisoned and forced to sell his regiment, and Saint-Simon concurs with Boyer that this was on a charge of causing a sergeant in his Normandy regiment to be tortured. We can reasonably surmise on the basis of his own later testimony, that Antoine de Guiscard's retreat to the Rouergue was occasioned by his disgrace at court. In his Memoirs,^ Antoine de Guiscard called Madame de Maintenon 'A Woman formerly a strumpet, a Prostitute, and now a meer Hypocrite full of Pride and Ambition'; she reciprocated his hatred, referring to Guiscard in one ofher letters as 'monstre de siecle'."^ Guiscard's exile to the Rouergue, whether self-imposed or not, put him very close to the civil war in the Cevennes, precipitated by the murder of the Abbe du Chayla at Pont-de-Montvert on 24 July 1702. The Protestant rebels or Camisards were sustained by their faith, which in the absence of institutional religion, and goaded by persecution expressed itself in prophesyings and enthusiastic possession. Their religious and military gatherings in the 'assemblies du Desert' were protected by the mountainous terrain.

97 They were hunted at first by the local militia, and then by regular troops, but proved adept at tactics of evasion and ambush. The atrocities committed by both sides were of a savagery unmatched in European history since the Thirty Years War. The Marechal de Broglie, ignominiously defeated by Jean Cavalier and his band of Camisards, was replaced in February 1703 by the Marechal de Montrevel, a protege of Madame de Maintenon, who built up an army of over 20,000 men but still failed to put down the revolt. David Flotard, an agent of the Marquis de Miremont, the most prominent Protestant leader in exile, was paid by Queen Anne to make his way into the Cevennes and promise help to the Camisards. To their disgust, although two English frigates stood off the coast for several days in the summer of 1703, no attempt was made to land or to send reinforcements. Despite their rudimentary organization the Camisards had made attempts in 1703 to make contact, not only with the allied powers, but with Protestants in neighbouring provinces. The Rouergue lay to the north-east of the Cevennes proper, but was of similar terrain, and contained a substantial Protestant population. Three of Jean Cavalier's officers made contact in September 1703 with an ex-officer named Boeton, of Saint Affrique in the Rouergue, who worked to prepare a co-ordinated uprising there. The plot was prematurely revealed and forestalled by the burning of several Catholic churches; the authorities acted promptly and broke up the conspiracy. Around these events, Guiscard wove his own story of intrigue in the Rouergue, and advanced his claim to have master-minded operations in the Cevennes too. The Memoirs of the Marquis de Guiscard. Or, an Account of his Secret Transactions in the Southern Provinces of France., particularly in Rouergue and the Cevennes., to Rescue the Nation from Slavery, were first published in French at Delft in 1705, then translated and published in London in the same year. The Memoirs were dedicated to Queen Anne, and expressed the hope that with English help, Guiscard would complete the task he had begun in 1701. Guiscard claimed to have been working since 1701 to build up contacts amongst the malcontents in the Rouergue and the Cevennes, which would enable him to precipitate a rebellion of Catholics as well as Protestants, of men of substance as well as simple Camisards. They were to take up arms for the principles of liberty of conscience and an end to exorbitant and unlawful taxation. Like his old acquaintance Pierre Jurieu, Guiscard was aware that these were principles well calculated to appeal to English Revolution Whigs, and would allay fears of involvement in a fanatical war of religion. The Memoirs were a creative fantasy of conspiracy, much resented by genuine Camisard leaders in London. Guiscard told of elaborate plans for the capture of the provincial capital Rodez, taking hostage its bishop, raising a militia, and summoning the allies to the aid of the rebellion. As evidence for this, he included what purported to be original documents issued by himself, including The Roman Catholicks Advice to the Protestants of the Cevennes, printed at Paris, 8 March 1703; 'A Letter under the Name of a Protestant, to the Militia of Languedoc and Rouergue, Commanded to make War against the Protestants of those Provinces', dated Paris, 8 June 1703 (not printed); 'To the Soldiers of Louis XIV making War in the Cevennes against the Protestants there', dated Vareilles, 8 July 1703 (not printed); 'To the Officers of the Troops of France', dated Vareilles, 8 August 1703 (not printed); 'A Discourse to the Principal Inhabitants of Rhodes' (not delivered); and finally, 'An Ordinance. We, A. M. de G. the Chief of the Malecontents of this Province, and Protector of their Liberty' (never promulgated). There is no corroborating evidence that any of these documents were ever printed, or circulated in manuscript. The only firm evidence for Guiscard's role in the abortive revolt of the Rouergue in 1703 is the indubitable fact that he did fortify his house at Vareilles. One result of the publication of the Memoirs in 1705 was that the Intendant of the Rouergue, Legendre, gave instructions for the fortification to be pulled down. It is significant, perhaps, that this had not been done in 1703.^ Elie Marion, one of the Camisard leaders in London, was provoked by the publication of the Memoirs to state: je declare done et m'engage a le faire declarer d'une maniere authentique et incontestable, que ce que cet Abbe dit de lui-meme par rapport a nous est absolument faux et suppose, pure imposture. Nous n'avons jamais conneu tel homme ni eu aucune correspondance avec lui,^ Although the Parlement of Toulouse passed sentence of death on Guiscard in 1705, such men as Marion were not likely to forget that he had never run the risks of a captured Camisard—routine torture, followed by fever-ridden imprisonment in the Tour de Constance at Aigues-Mortes, the galleys at Marseilles, or the wheel and the stake at Nimes or Montpellier. But if Guiscard's role in the events of September 1703 in the Rouergue remains mysterious, it is clear that by mid-October 1703 he had fled to Lausanne, joining the large community of Protestant exiles from Languedoc there. Settled in Lausanne with no established source of income, Guiscard had to exploit his considerable powers of address to make contact with allied agents there. Two were particularly significant. Richard Hill, the English envoy to Turin, passed through Lausanne in early January 1704 on his way to this newly created post, with orders to help the Camisards in any way he could. He wrote to Nottingham, Secretary of State, about Guiscard: I met another man of a very different spirit and resolution: a Frenchman, a Roman Catholic, a white Camisard, who would engage to raise a revolt in Dauphine and Languedoc among the Catholics, if I would promise him such a protection and assurance as was absolutely necessary to begin the work. I liked the character of the man, and his temper so much, a man of figure, and family, very well known, that I promised him every thing. He promised to come to me here [Turin], and I hope to make something of it.^^ The other contact was Louis de Pesme, seigneur de Saint-Saphorin, who acted as the imperial representative in Switzerland, and was particularly close to Prince Eugene. He wrote rather more cautiously to the imperial councillor Auersberg on 27 January 1704: 'On pourra en tirer de l'usage, mais ce doit etre un de ces vehements personnages a regard desquels il faut toujours avoir bride en mains.'^^ Nevertheless Guiscard was given a commission from the Emperor as a Marshal de Camp, signed by Prince Eugene.

99 By March 1704 he was in Turin, planning with Hill an expedition from Nice to land near Aigues-Mortes in the Golfe du Lion. In April, Tobie de Rocayrol, an agent recruited on behalf of Hill, set out to prepare the Camisards for the arrival of this expedition. The Camisards were by then hard pressed and the advent of Marechal de Villars in the same month signified Louis XIV's determination to crush the revoh at whatever cost in men and resources. The crushing blow of the surrender of Jean Cavalier and his band to Villars on 17 May nearly determined Hill to abandon his project, but he persevered in the hopes of stirring the embers once more. Three tartanes escorted by two English frigates, carrying some 450 men, food, ammunition, and 16,000 crowns, set sail from Villefranche near Nice on 15 June 1704. Guiscard had himself proclaimed publicly as the coming liberator, but a number of his officers refused to sail, and his army was made up of refugees and deserters rather than regular troops. The flotilla was scattered by a storm, and the two frigates returned ignominiously to Villefranche, one bearing Guiscard. One of the tartanes fell into French hands, the officers were executed and the men condemned to the galleys. One went ashore in Catalonia, and one escaped to Genoa. Guiscard blamed the debacle on the skimping of provisions, the poor quality of the troops, and the weather. Hill, who had called the Camisards 'the Queen's cheapest allies', ^-^ was inclined to resent Guiscard's subsequent demand for a pension. The Camisards, cheated once again of their promised relief, had almost all given up their arms by the end of 1704, when Villars felt he could return to Paris with his task completed. Within a few weeks of his return from the abortive Nice expedition, Guiscard was back in Switzerland, going under the name of M. de Meneville, and aiming at higher game. From Berne he wrote both to the Duke of Marlborough and to Heinsius. He declared quite frankly to the Duke that he was no longer willing to deal with underlings like Hill, and claimed, despite his recent setback, the honour of continuing the war in the Cevennes for the past three years by his work alone. ^^ To Heinsius he expressed resentment 'de se veoir donne son conge comme a un mauvais valet'.^""^ These first letters marked the opening of a sustained barrage of letters and memorials to the aUied leaders which was to last for another five years. One piece of luck came to his aid in this long-distance campaign. At the end of August 1704 Jean Cavalier broke his parole to Villars and with a number of his followers escaped to Lausanne. This gave Guiscard the chance to associate himself with the most famous and romantic of the Camisard leaders: in the words of a French agent they 'mangeant ensemble et sont inseperables'. The French minister of war, Chamillart, was sufficiently alarmed to send an open letter to Cavalier reproaching him with breaking his parole and associating with Guiscard, who 'apres avoir mene pendant plusieurs annees une vie desordonne, abandonne de Dieu et meprise des hommes, a pris le parti de se faire renegat et de travailler contre son roi, son devoir et son honneur'.^^ Guiscard seized the opportunity of this publicity and had a reply published in the Gazette d'Amsterdam, in which he indulged his rhetorical flair in turning the tables. He compared his gaming losses to those of Louis XIV, his youthful passions to those of the King

100 qui a croupi quinze ans dans une double adultere, qui a arrache les femmes d'entre les bras de leurs maris, et qui s'est servi de tous les artifices du monde, de toutes ses richesses et de sa puissance, pour seduire et pour debaucher tout ce qu'il y a eu dans sa cour de filles et dc femmes d'une jeunesse et d'une heaute tant soit peu distinguees. "^ Guiscard's own amatory career took a new turn in this year; he is supposed to have married secretly Prince Eugene's wayward younger sister, Marie Jeanne Baptiste de Savoie. Her last love affair with a Swiss colonel Fleckenstein had been interrupted by the French invasion of Savoy, and she left at the same time as did Guiscard for Switzerland, quite probably under his protection. A likely motive for this match was Guiscard's desire to ingratiate himself further with Prince Eugene. His bride died mysteriously in 1705,^"^ but he may already have sufficiently recommended himself to be invited to join Marlborough and Eugene at the allied camp at Landau in November 1704. Another guest was the agent Tobie de Rocayrol, Their advice was appreciated enough to win them a further invitation to The Hague, where strategy for 1705 would be determined. Eugene wrote to Marlborough from Vienna commending the prudence of Guiscard's latest plan for an invasion of the Dauphine to link up with the Cevennes from the east, and reheve pressure on the Duke of Savoy. ^^ But Guiscard's plan was not the only one competing for attention at The Hague; two other leading French exiles were in the field and had a head start. The Marquis de Miremont had been the recognized leader of militant Huguenots since the Nine Years War, and was well known and approved in London as well as The Hague. Pierre de Belcastel was an experienced commander in Dutch pay, whose military judgement was respected by Marlborough. Miremont had ambitious plans for raising an expeditionary force of Huguenot volunteers; Belcastel a plan for transferring Prussian troops to Savoy to relieve the Duke's own forces for an invasion of French soil. Guiscard had one big advantage over them both—in the words of Antoine Court, 'il avoit aussi la gloire d'etre le premier qui eut voulu rompre la glace'.^^ He did not neglect to remind them of his supposed network of contacts in the Cevennes, and his appeal to Catholics as well as Protestants. In-fighting between exile factions at The Hague continued through the winter of 1704 and early 1705, an embarrassment which Marlborough and Heinsius were eager to end by having them work in co-operation. Guiscard was willing to work with Belcastel but not with Miremont, and Miremont distrusted Guiscard as a Catholic and a turncoat. The allied leaders continued to hesitate over the options, while agreeing on the desirability of striking directly at France. Meanwhile Guiscard continued to lobby intensively; he wrote to the Duke of Ormonde in Dublin, who acknowledged an obligation to Guiscard's eldest brother. ^° He worked towards publication of his Memoirs, and had his portrait painted. Most important of all perhaps, he obtained a personal letter of recommendation to Heinsius from Pierre Jurieu, his former family friend and now the organizer of an intelligence network in France and the Low Countries. Jurieu reported on his knowledge of the family at Sedan; he claimed that Guiscard was trustworthy because he had burnt his boats with the French court; that he was responsible for the revolt in the Cevennes and expected 30,000 malcontents to flock to his standard there; that he was admirably

IOI equipped by boldness and discretion to operate in secret. Admittedly Guiscard's projects had failed up to now, through bad luck and the fallibility of underlings. Jurieu added a postscript to Heinsius: Un chef catholique romaine est plus propre pour l'execution du proiet qui vous sera propose et bien loin de faire quelque obstacle a nos veues, au contraire de ce que Ton vous fera voir, facilitera tres fort Texecution du premier et grand proiet qui a este con9eu en Angleterre. Vous comprendres aisement, monsieur, qu'il faut icy un grand secret pour empescher la ialousie des deux entreprenants.^^ Pierre Jurieu's facile appraisal may not have convinced the allied leaders entirely. In any case the States-General put off final approval of plans for an expedition. Instead Marlborough and Heinsius made secret arrangements to supply money and arms to a conspiracy which they hoped would prepare the way for an invasion rather than await its arrival. On 22 January 1705 the States-General authorized Clignet, postmaster at Leiden, to send money to the Marquis d'Arzeliers at Geneva, who was in turn to disburse it secretly to the ringleaders of the 'Complot des Enfants de Dieu' at Nimes and Montpellier. The plan was for simultaneous risings in Montpellier, Nimes, Uzes, Anduze, Ales, Saint Hippolyte, and Saunieres, triggered by the kidnap of the hated Intendant Baville and the Marechal de Berwick (who had replaced Villars). The ringleaders were assured that on the critical day of 25 April, 5,000 to 6,000 allied troops would land from the fleet near Sete in the Golfe du Lion (fig. 2). Elie Marion, one of the agents sent from England to co-ordinate the conspiracy, recorded bitterly that the conspirators received manifestos in the name of Miremont and letters of encouragement, but very little of the arms and money promised.^^ Miremont and Guiscard later blamed Clignet and d'Arzeliers for insisting on receipts signed by recognized Camisard leaders before handing over the money; it would have proved very difficult in any case to smuggle large quantities of arms to Nimes and Montpellier from Switzerland. As it happened, the whole elaborate plot crashed to the ground when, after a tip-off, a house in Nimes was raided on the night of 17 April. The next few days witnessed a fearful hunting down of the conspirators within the closed gates of Nimes and Montpellier, followed by torture, the wheel, and the stake. Many loyal Catholics were horrified by the cruelty of the executions. The allied fleet never sailed, nor would it have been ready to do so by 25 April. Evidence extracted by torture and passed on from Baville to Chamillart in Paris implicated both Guiscard and Miremont in the 'Complot des Enfants de Dieu'. As early as March 1705, a former Benedictine from Dole called Emmanuel (or Jean Baptiste) Toupelin had been arrested at Pontarlieu, and confessed to having been Guiscard's secretary and agent. Details of Guiscard's earlier plan to invade the Dauphine, march along the banks of the Rhone, and enter the Vivarais were discovered in April (though Marechal Julien, who commanded in the Vivarais, dismissed the idea as ridiculous). Boeton and Catinat, who had been closely involved with the September 1703 rising in the Rouergue were arrested and executed in April 1705; papers were found which indicated that they hoped to 'lever le masque' again in the Rouergue in June 1705, in

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the name of the Marquis de Guiscard. The Intendant of the Rouergue, Legendre, wrote of Guiscard 'sa folie est de croire qu'il le fera soulever quand il luy plaira', but took the threat seriously enough to dismantle Vareilles and institute a witch-hunt for conspirators.^^ If the plot was taken seriously enough by the French authorities, its collapse shook Miremont's credit with his allied paymasters, however unfairly. The States-General resolved to advance no more; the English cut back their subsidy. Guiscard had played second fiddle to Miremont in the conspiracy, and his reputation suffered less. In the summer of 1705 he was dispatched to Turin to discuss with the Duke of Savoy further prospects for an invasion of France. He met Prince Eugene in Italy in August, and from him procured a helpful introduction to the Emperor's brother, 'Charles III', Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne. He travelled via Genoa to Barcelona, and sufficiently impressed that King to move him to write to Marlborough on Guiscard's behalf on 24 September 1705.^ Better still, the King wrote formally to Queen Anne recommending Guiscard to her protection, and by dint of this assiduous cultivation of the powerful, Guiscard was invited to London. ^^ He arrived in February 1706, and was plunged immediately into conference with Marlborough, Godolphin, and Ormonde.

103 The early months of 1706 saw Guiscard's reputation and influence achieve their apogee. He quickly made himself a place in high political circles, becoming an intimate of St. John, then Secretary of War. He was closely linked too, in pleasure as in business, with the Comte de Briangon, the Savoyard envoy to London. The jaundiced eye of the resident French agent, the Abbe Gaultier, reflected with irony on the gullibility of the English leaders, allowing themselves to be taken in by 'un semi prestre apostat qui n'a jamais sceu le mestier de la guerre'. Nevertheless Gaultier was forced to conclude that the English intended a major military expedition against some place on the French coasts, although only Guiscard seemed to know exactly where. He reported that Guiscard was made colonel of a new regiment of dragoons ('si ses Dragons sont aussy braves soldats qu'il est grand fourbe et malhonneste homme, ils seront les premiers hommes du monde'). ^^ Once again, however, the military preparations were bedevilled by what St. John called 'impertinent cabals and partys' amongst the French refugees.^*^ Several high-ranking French officers laid down their commissions rather than serve under Guiscard, but more importantly the vital business of recruiting infantry went ahead too slowly, because military gentlemen were unwilling to serve except as cavalry, and the other ranks showed no great enthusiasm for the venture. Guiscard's plans had been unveiled to a select few in the meantime. As early as 23 February 1706, only days after his arrival from Catalonia, Guiscard sent a memoir to the Queen advocating a landing on the Atlantic seaboard at the mouth of the Gironde, followed by the capture of Blaye. There, he confidently expected, he would be joined by 'une infinite des mecontents des deux relligions'. Cavalier would be sent with a detachment to the Cevennes, but this was no more than 'une grande diversion'.^^ Significantly the paternal estates of the Guiscards were near Blaye, and the Gironde would permit the safe anchorage of a fleet during the winter. Guiscard disclaimed with rather belated modesty any intention of leading the expedition himself, but the Earl of Essex and Earl Rivers were soon to find that Guiscard had no intention of taking a back seat. He alarmed the Dutch by talking too readily of his plans, which he was accused of leaking to Isaac van Hoornebeck, pensionary of Amsterdam. Guiscard was stung by what he took to be the obstructiveness of Dutch politicians to his schemes, and wrote in very sharp tones to Heinsius, 'un peu trop vive', as he wrote in his next letter, apologetically.^^ Marlborough and Godolphin were more receptive, and soon he was assuring Marlborough that his agents reported 'qu'on y beuvoit hautement a ma sante, et qu'on m'y attandoit avec impatiance'.^*^ To complete the scheme, an elaborate deception was organized by St. John, which required a former employee of the French chancellor Pontchartrain to write to his patron with details of a plan for an attack on Normandy.^^ While St. John busied himself with the complex logistics of the operation, Guiscard drew up a printed 'Manifeste addresse aux Fran9ais par nous Antoine, Marquis de Guiscard, Comte de Labourlie et de Neuvi sur Loire, etc.. Colonel d'une Regiment de Dragons; Lieutenant-General des Armees de leurs Majestes Imperiales et Britan- ^^ This document rehearsed the miseries and economic hardships suffered by

104 the French under Louis XIV, and appealed to the people to throw off the chains of tyranny and enable the allies to restore France's ancient forms of government and institutions. He sought to reassure them that he came not as an agent of militant Protestantism but of reconciliation between the faiths: 'cette Affaire cy n'est nullement une affaire de Religion; et *** on n'y a en veiie que le Bonheur et la Liberte de la Nation en General'. In fact Guiscard did not hold a commission from the Queen, as a Catholic, but it was agreed that upon setting foot in France he could hold the rank of major-general de facto. This placed him, as the instigator of the project, in an awkward position once he had joined the troops and fleet at Torbay. On the journey from London, Guiscard had insisted on a guard of horse grenadiers to protect him from ambush by French agents; once at Torbay he was not going to allow others to steal the limelight. They discovered that he knew a lot less about the coast and hinterland of the landing-place than had been supposed. Soon Guiscard was complaining that Earl Rivers, Lieutenant-General Erie, and Admiral Shovell were disposing of the arrangements without him; Erie wrote in exasperation to St. John that the real difficulty was having to talk to the Admiral in English as he spoke no French, and Guiscard in French as he had no English. ^^ A sailing early in August turned back by contrary winds did not improve tempers. A council of war on 15 August determined on restricting the initial objective to the He d'Oleron, and though St. John was sympathetic to Guiscard's plea that this would invalidate the whole scheme, he was not willing to overturn the judgement of the professionals. However, the winds continued contrary right into September, and it was decided finally to send the whole flotilla to Lisbon instead. For the second time Guiscard was forced to conclude the weather had played him false. Guiscard had missed the boat both literally and metaphorically. He was no longer necessary to the fleet, though he wrote from Torbay to Marlborough saying that they should invade France from Catalonia.^ While the fleet made its way to the Bay of Biscay, Guiscard trailed back to London. The French agent noted gleefully that he had already set himself up with house, servants, and equipage, in expectation of pros- perity. But for the moment anyway, he had much to be thankful for: the Queen had made him a present of 600 guineas when he kissed hands at Windsor, he had his regi- ment, and a pension from the Dutch. His friends Brian^on and St. John were influ- ential figures in London, and there was plenty of time and scope for pleasure. But his plans for a second attempt in the following year, embodied in a 'Memoire secret' to Marlborough of 6 December 1706, were not so gratefully received.^^ Despite an interview with the Queen and Godolphin in March, it seemed that St. John on Marlborough's instructions was adamant that Guiscard should join his regiment in Spain. Guiscard procrastinated, but in April, as he was on the point of leaving, news arrived of the battle of Almanza, in which Guiscard's understrength regiment of dragoons was destroyed. Never lacking in readiness to turn all to account, Guiscard wrote immediately to Marlborough suggesting that the best thing that could be done now was to protect Catalonia by attempting a descent on the French coast. But to his dismay, Marlborough

105 did not respond to his offer to join him at The Hague to explain his project. This setback, together with the loss of his regiment, prompted Guiscard to reproach Marlborough directly with a failure of nerve, and indulge in an emotional outburst: 'Je suis accable de desespoir, la vie m'est insupportable, la crainte que j'ai des choses me rend plus clairvoyant a les prevoir, je voy qu'on deguise avec moi'.^^ An apology followed, but Marlborough's mind was focused on an expedition from Savoy against Toulon, not Guiscard's effusions. Guiscard's desperation grew out of a defensive awareness that his enemies intended to make the most of the fiasco of 1706. Guiscard's motives for coming over to the allies, and his ambitions to lead an expedition to France, had been impugned by critics in the Miremont group from the start. Against the insinuation that his Catholicism made him an unreliable leader of a Protestant revolt, Guiscard argued with success that his overriding concern was for religious toleration and political liberty, and that his Catholicism made him an ideal focus for a national rather than sectarian revolt. Charges that he maintained an extravagant establishment at The Hague and in London were met by the plea that he needed to keep a staff ready to put his plans into operation, and to retain the services of agents. He certainly tried to attract as many French refugees from diverse backgrounds into his orbit as possible. One, Michel de Bereau-Monsegur, formerly a lieutenant in the French navy, wrote to Sunderland with a plan for an attack on Placentia in Newfoundland, and told him how Guiscard had taken him under his wing in 1706: 'Cet seigneur me sert du Pere et dupuis six mois je lui suis a charge'.^"^ Personally Guiscard was accused of vaingloriousness, and of trying to pay off private scores rather than serve the allied cause. Guiscard boasted of his yearning for 'la gloire', while freely admitting that he 'n'a aucune sorte de passion que cela de retirer un frere qu'il aime d'un injuste prison':^^ a private grudge against the French court subsumed in the grievances of the public against the tyranny of Louis XIV. Guiscard's personal charm and flights of eloquence were deployed against his critics, but they did not cut so much ice with some of the Dutch politicians, as with the English. The failure of the 1706 expedition gave the Dutch an excuse to cut off Guiscard's pension. Marlborough could, or would, do nothing, although Guiscard wrote to say that the success of his enemies had precipitated 'une violante fievre, [qui] continue avec des redoublements et transports au cerveau'.^^ But more dangerous than the attacks on his character was the gradual accumulation of circumstantial evidence. Guiscard's mortification at the loss of his Dutch pension would have been still greater if he had known that Marlborough was the recipient of letters which showed all the French refugee factions in a poor light. A disappointed Huguenot officer named Jacques Barry revealed that he had reason to suspect that one Lacroix of Montpellier, whom Guiscard had employed in 1704-5 as a secretary, had been working for the French authorities. Furthermore, the Marquis de Miremont had seized on a letter Barry had written to Clignet at Leiden in January 1705 conveying his suspicions against Lacroix, and had tried to make use of it to discredit Guiscard.'**' Neither Guiscard nor Miremont emerged from Barry's story with much credit, but

106 Guiscard in particular was the target of subsequent denunciations. In October 1707 Guiscard attempted to discipline another former secretary and officer in his regiment, Jean Molie, who retaliated by writing to Marlborough of Guiscard that 'je Ie crois suspect a V.A. en particulier et au Gouvernement en general par l'esprit qui a regne dans toute sa conduite depuis qu'il est en Angleterre'."^^ He accused Guiscard specifically of attempting to subvert French officers in English pay on the fleet in 1706; they were (according to Molie) to declare personal allegiance to Guiscard alone once they set foot on French soil. In support of his allegation, he referred Marlborough to Antoine de Laussac, chaplain to Earl Rivers. De Laussac, in his turn, brought forward a valet dismissed from Guiscard's service to bear witness to contacts with William Greg and the Comte de Brian9on's secretary, both implicated in a treasonable correspondence with France. Guiscard responded by countercharges against de Laussac, whom he described as an ex-monk who had debauched a woman in France, fled, changed his religion, then married her. He was addicted to gambling and singing bawdy songs; his wife loved drinking and gambling as much as he.''^^ What Marlborough made of all this is not known, but Guiscard's charges against de Laussac are uncomfortably reminiscent of the sort of things said of himself. These scandals broke in February 1708, and though Guiscard continued to be consulted in London over possible invasion plans, he sensed a certain cooling in the atmosphere. In May 1708 he complained to Marlborough that 'plus j'augmente en zele et plus je pers en confiance', and worse still 'on me cache la chose comme si je pouvois estre un partisan de la cour de France'."^^ The charge of acting as a double agent, and revealing allied secrets to France was absurd, as Guiscard impressed on Marlborough. Yet Marlborough might have had further reason to doubt the wisdom of taking Guiscard into his confidence if he had learnt that Tobie de Rocayrol, Guiscard's former associate and the agent who forwarned the Camisards of the Nice expedition of 1704, had turned double agent in 1707. Rocayrol had been party to discussions at the highest level at Landau, The Hague, and in London (as had Guiscard) about aiding the Camisards, and he approached the French with an offer to reveal the circumstances of his mission of 1704, and his dealings with Miremont and Guiscard. The French authorities did not value this information as he had hoped (did they know enough already?): for his pains he was sentenced to the galleys at Marseilles. The allies never knew of this betrayal; he was still trying to gain adequate recognition for his services to them in 1751."^ There is no reason to suppose that Guiscard was willing to try the same gambit as Rocayrol as early as 1707-8, but it was as well for him that Rocayrol's betrayal remained undiscovered. In his efforts to re-establish English confidence in him, and the continuing effectiveness of his contacts in Languedoc, Guiscard overreached himself in the summer of 1708. According to a deposition made in March 1709, and sent to Godolphin, one Etienne de la Font was asked by Guiscard to pose as a deputy of the people of the Cevennes, newly arrived to plead for an allied expeditionary force with Guiscard at its head.*^^ De la Font stated that he was presented by Guiscard to Prince George of Denmark

107 at Kensington, and delivered to the Prince a 'Placet' drawn up by Guiscard, but purporting to come from the Cevennes. Guiscard certainly referred to a 'sieur de la fons, depute des hautes Cevennes' in pressing his plans on Marlborough in a letter of 9 August 1708."^ But de la Font's deposition was enclosed in a letter of David Flotard, Miremont's agent, who fulminated against Guiscard as the villain who had sent others to their deaths or to the galleys, in his efforts to rescue a whore who had poisoned her husband from French justice. This wild accusation, and a suspicion of collusion between de la Font and Flotard, may well have lessened the impact of the deposition. De la Font's defection to the camp of Guiscard's enemies was probably the outcome of a fruitless journey to Brussels they made together in September 1708. Guiscard gambled on a personal appeal to Marlborough to restore his credit, but his projects had by now taken on an air of unreality. He proposed the surprise of Sedan, where the gates would be opened to the allies by Guiscard's old friends there, once Guiscard had smuggled himself in in disguise. Another associate, Louis de Riffier, was to raise a revolt in the Dauphine. Guiscard refused to work with the Marquis des Porcellets, who was soliciting Marlborough for an invasion through the Comte de Foix; instead he advocated a return to the Golfe du Lion. Dramatically he warned that if he was not in the meanwhile awarded a secure pension, 'je perdrai la vie du pure famine'."*^^ He was forced to return to London empty handed in early 1709, but de la Font stayed behind and looked for a better patron. The summer of 1709 saw a fresh Protestant rebellion in the Vivarais, but Guiscard seems to have been sufficiently discomfited by this time not to have offered a plan for allied support of the rising. His last letter to Marlborough, of October 1709, is a simple letter of congratulation to Marlborough on the battle of Malplaquet."^ Ironically the allied leaders followed his advice in rejecting invasion through Roussillon and the Comte de Foix in 1709, and choosing instead a landing at Sete on the coastline favoured by Guiscard in 1704. They even allowed themselves to be persuaded by de Riffier's exaggerated claims for a network of agents ready to raise a revolt throughout Languedoc. De Riffier's plot proved a will-o'-the-wisp, but a force under Major-General N. N. de Seissan did make a landing at Sete. The 'infinite des mecontents' failed to transpire, however, and after a few days de Seissan was forced to withdraw. There was some feeling that the lack of response, and the French army's swift appearance on the scene, was the result of secret intelligence of allied designs—feelings that were recalled when Guiscard's incriminating correspondence with France was discovered the following year. What Guiscard was up to in 1710 is unknown; probably, as Abel Boyer suggests, his comparative penury combined with his penchant for high living forced him to sponge off friends and acquaintances. According to Boyer, he had to dismiss his servants and pawn his plate. The death of the Comte de Brian9on in November 1709 had deprived him of a valuable supporter. Having lost his regiment and the Dutch pension, his only source of income was an ex gratia pension from the Queen, of which one payment of ;£2oo is recorded on 24 December 1709, and another on 3 August 1710. The change of ministry in 1710 gave Guiscard high hopes: St. John appears to have been instrumental

108 in securing him a permanent pension of £500 (£100 less than he petitioned for) m December 1710.^^ But the new Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, eager to introduce financial stringency as well as an early peace, were not willing to award Guiscard more than £400 p.a., and worse still, did not secure it on a proper establishment. It was very likely this final disappointment which precipitated Guiscard's downfall; the target of his wrath, Harley, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, may have been determined too. There are several differing accounts of that final tragedy: the most circumstantial and accurate is that in MS. Lansdowne 885, fols. 29-40. It was compiled by Auditor Edward Harley, who certainly relied on information supplied by his brother Robert. Robert Harley has also left some marginal comments in a copy of Abel Boyer's Political State of April 1711.^° Mrs. Delariviere Manley's version in her True Narrative of what pass'd in the Examination of the Marquis de Guiscard at the Cockpit; his Stabbing Mr Harley, and other precedent and subsequent Facts relating to the Life of the said Guiscard (London, 1711) was founded partly on information passed to her by Swift, and flattered St. John, but satisfied none of those in a position to know. To get beyond the 'Harley' and 'St. John' versions, it is necessary to bring in the letters of the Duke of Shrewsbury to Marlborough, which give an insider's view of what happened before and after the events at the Cockpit of 8 March 1711. Shrewsbury had less reason to distort the facts of the case than others who were parti pris, was kept fully informed of the charges against Guiscard which caused him to be arrested, and was present at Guiscard's subsequent statements in Newgate. The facts of the case, so far as they are known, are as follows. Guiscard had been trying for some weeks to procure from the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury an increase and a settlement of his pension (he had received £200 from the royal bounty on 26 January 1711). He had attempted to have the Duke of Ormonde present him to the Queen to deliver a new petition, but unsuccessfully. On the night of 5 March, Robert Harley enclosed a packet ofletters in Guiscard's hand to Shrewsbury, addressed to a certain Moreau 'autrefois marchand de drap, alors controleur de sceau' at Paris. These letters gave intelligence of plans in hand for de Seissan to make another expedition against France. The Marquis de Torcy, French Foreign Minister, recorded in his journal that he had received two letters from Guiscard via Moreau, offering to strike a great blow on behalf of Louis XIV. Guiscard wanted to 'expier ses crimes vers EUe et envers sa patrie'. Though this offer was made by a man 'reconnu pour etre egalement un fou et un scelerat', Torcy decided to send an agent to England to learn more. But the mission was forestalled by Guiscard's arrest. ^^ On receipt of the other letters forwarded by Harley, Shrewsbury advised that Marlborough should be warned immediately, and that Guiscard be seized 'without more delay', although he conceded that there would be some advantage in trying to secure more of Guiscard's correspondence and in allowing Marlborough to warn de Seissan before the story broke. ^^ Harley wrote to Marlborough with his find on 6 March, begging him to read the letters alone. ^^ Guiscard was not arrested until about three o'clock in the afternoon of 8 March, when walking in St. James's Park.

109 The same afternoon at five he was brought before the committee of the Privy Council in the Cockpit, but while he was in a waiting-room procured a penknife from a messenger (Edward Shorter according to Robert Harley), which he put in his pocket. Charged directly with a treasonable correspondence with France, Guiscard denied it outright, but was then confronted with the letters, which by Edward Harley's account had been secreted under a hat. Guiscard requested a private word with St. John; when this was denied him, he drew the penknife and attacked Harley. His first blow struck Harley on the breastbone, which was padded by a fancy embroidered waistcoat; the blade broke, but Guiscard struck again with the broken blade, causing severe bruising. He was not given time for a further blow, as the Privy Councillors fell on him, and he was pierced by three sword thrusts at least. Nevertheless the coroner's inquest found that it was the struggle with messengers summoned from outside the room which caused the fatal injuries. The jury's verdict was very convenient to the government, as was Guiscard's death in Newgate before trial and the subsequent disappearance of the letters under the hat. St. John enclosed them in a letter to Marlborough of 20 March, but they are not extant in Marlborough's papers.^ After he was carried off to Newgate and physicians had been ordered to attend him, Guiscard seemed in no immediate danger. The first examination indicated that his wounds were not likely to be fatal, and his state of mind seems to have veered between confidence that he would be pardoned for revealing what he knew and a self-dramatizing wish to die, fulfil his tragic destiny, and frustrate the design of his enemies to have him tried. Shrewsbury is the best witness for his examination by the Lords of the Privy Council, which took place over several days. On 16 March Shrewsbury wrote to Marlborough: Having been yesterday with other Lords by Monsieur de Guiscards desire at Newgate, the onely thing he sayM which seem'd of the least importance was, that Sesan was a man of Proiects mais un grand Babillard, and had told him he had now proposed one in the Medeteranean was infallible; ##* that if his present proposals were hearkned to, and some Batalions given him to land where he proposed, one of the greatest blows would be given to France they had ever felt, this as near as I remember. Guiscard owned he had writt to Versailes; And being now on these subiects, I shall observe that it is plaine by the Intercepted Letters he was aquainted with the Proiect for forming Regiments of deserters, and among other advices given to prevent it, one is to encourage some men to desert they can rely on, and blow up the park of Artilirie and then he says we shall be weary of encouraging deserters." Given de Seissan's previous failure in 1710, it is unlikely that his project would have been further jeopardized by Guiscard's revelations. St. John's letter to Marlborough on 20 March suggests that Guiscard was receiving intelligence about the army in Flanders from one Chabanetti. Despite the efforts of the Lords Justices of Ireland, who wrote to the Duke of Ormonde on the same day with hearsay evidence of a conspiracy against the Queen's hfe, and made efforts to find a mistress of Guiscard with intimate knowledge of his plans, there seems to have been no evidence of a conspiracy, or even anything to substantiate Guiscard's supposed design to assassinate the Queen. ^^^

no Guiscard died in Newgate on 17 March 1711, having deliberately concealed the extent of his wounds and refused to follow the regimen prescribed by his physicians. He may have been mortified to find that his interrogators did not take his story as seriously as he had hoped, or make a firm offer of a pardon in return for further revelations. There was a macabre sequel to his death, for the jailer of Newgate put his corpse on display pickled in a barrel, and charged the public a penny for admission. By order of the Queen this was eventually stopped, and his remains were interred at Newgate on 27 March. On 25 July 1711, the jailer was awarded £5 'to repair the damages done to the floor and ceilings of 2 rooms by the salt water that ran out of his cofin'.^*^ One suspects that none rejoiced more at Guiscard's downfall than the Camisards in exile whose cause he had espoused. But despite allied interest in exploiting the military potential of further insurrection in the Cevennes, sustained even as late as 1711, the pleas of the Marquis de Rochegude and the Marquis de Miremont on their behalf fell on deaf ears, once the negotiations for the Peace of Utrecht were begun. The fact that Guiscard had cynically manipulated their plight, and played on their hopes of help from outside, was not enough to sustain interest in them, once their military usefulness was ended. In England the cause of the Camisards had also been damaged by the reception given to the French prophets in London. These 'inspires' had made converts amongst English millenarians who identified Louis XIV with the 'Great Beast', but had antagonized the existing Huguenot community in London, and suffered the sceptical attentions of a host of pamphleteers.^^ Moreover, they added a tithe to the influx of refugees which, with the advent of the 'poor Palatines' in 1709, had engendered popular resentment rather than sympathy. But it is doubtful in any case whether sympathy for the plight of Protestant refugees would have been allowed to influence the negotiations for peace, and the Treaty of Utrecht made no provision for the protection of the Protestant underground in France or the exiles abroad. The gap between Marlborough's 'great Design' and the aspirations of the Camisards was too great to be bridged in war or in peace. That Guiscard's spurious pretensions to lead 'une infinite des mecontents' against Louis XIV on a programme of political liberties and religious toleration were ever taken seriously is a measure of that gap. Between Marlborough and the Camisards there was room enough for Guiscard to intrigue and deceive, and to act out his personal fantasy of tyrannicide and revenge.

1 Events in England, and letters from England, are Bosc, 'La guerre des Cevennes (1705-1710)', dated Old Style; Continental events and letters dissertation (Paris, 9 June 1973), vol. i, p. 586. from the Continent are dated New Style (r i days 4 Antoine de Guiscard is confused with his brother in advance of England). In either case the year Louis in Henry L. Snyder (ed.). The Marl- begins on i January, borough-Godolphin Correspondence (Oxford, 2 The right side of the portrait was repainted at a ^975); and in B. van 't HofF (ed.). The Cor- later date to include the penknife and caption. respondence of Marlborough and Heinsius (The 3 Paris, Archives historiques du Ministere de la Hague, 1951). Antoine de Guiscard was known Guerre, vol. 1986, fol. 134, quoted by Henri as the Marquis de Guiscard, or Abbe de la

III Bourlie, but neither of these titles was properly Heinsius 1702-1720 (The Hague, 1980), vol. iii, his. PP- 451-2- 5 A. Boyer (ed.). The Political State of Great 22 C. Bost, ed, cit., pp. 114-15, A specimen of Britain (London, March 1711), pp. 276-8, Miremont's manifesto can be found in E. 6 Memoirs of the Marquis de Guiscard (London, Roschach, Histoire ginirale de Languedoc 1705), p. 12. (Toulouse, 1876), vol. 14, cols. 2013-15. 7 Lettres inedites de Mme de Maintenon et de Mme 23 H, Bosc, op. cit., vol. i, p, 404, and chapter xii, la princesse des Ursins., 4 vols. (Paris, 1826), passim. vol. i, p. 22 (i August 1706). 24 Add, MS. 61212, fol. 15, 8 P. A. Verlaguet (ed.), Cartulaire de PAbbaye de 25 A. Boyer, ed, cit., pp. 287-9. Bonnecombe, Archives Historiques du Rouergue 26 'Le Vasseur' (Gaultier) to Marquis de Torcy, (Rodez, 1918-25), vol, i, pp. 714-15- 28 May 1706, P,R,O. 31/3/193, fol. 37 (Baschet 9 Charles Bost (ed.), Memoires inidites d"*Abraham transcripts). Guiscard's name occurs between Mazel et d'Elie Marion sur la Guerre des Cevennes, that of the Comte de Brian9on and the Dutch I-J0I-IJ08, Publications of the Huguenot Society envoy in London under 1706 in The Signatures of London, vol. xxxiv (Paris, 1931), p. 75. in the First Journal-Book and the Charter-Book of 10 W. Blackley (ed.). The Diplomatic Correspondence the Royal Society, 4th edn. (London, 1980). of the Right Hon. Richard Hill (London, 1845), 27 St, John to Marlborough, 21 May 1706, Add. vol. i, p. 305. MS. 61131, fol. 160. 11 Archives de Mestral, c. 11, quoted by S. Stelhng- 28 'Extrait d'un memoire presante a S.M.B. par le Michaud, Saint Saphorin et la politique de la Marquis de Guiscard', Add. MS. 61257, fol- 24. Suisse pendant la Guerre de Succession d'Espagne 29 Guiscard to Heinsius, 9, 11 March 1706, The {1700-1J10) (Villette-les-Cully, 1935), p. 170, Hague, Archief Heinsius, no. 1094. 12 W. Blackley, ed. cit., vol. i, p. 338. Hill's accompt 30 Guiscard to Marlborough, 24 May 1706, Add. in Add. MS. 61330, fol. 119, records an outlay of MS. 61257, fol. 44. £20,726. 165. on the Guiscard expedition, one- 31 St. John to Marlborough, 28 June 1706, Add. third of which was repaid by the Dutch envoy, MS. 61131, fol. 173. Albert van der Meer, 32 Add. MS. 61257, fol. 71. 13 Guiscard to Marlborough, 10 August 1704, Add. 33 Erie to St. John, 5 August 1706, printed by MS. 61257, fol. I. H. T. Dickinson, 'The Correspondence of Henry 14 Guiscard to Heinsius, i September 1704, Archief St. John and Thomas Erie, i'jo$-S\ Journal of Heinsius (Rijksarchief, The Hague), no. 917. the Society for Army Historical Research, xlviii 15 Printed in Jean Cavalier's Memoires sur la Guerre (1970), p. 218. des Cevennes (ed. Frank Puaux, Paris, 1918), 34 Guiscard to Marlborough, 27 August 1706, Add. p. 281. Note 2 cites the report of the French MS. 61257, fol. 53. agent. 35 Idem, 6 December 1706, Add, MS. 61257, fol. 16 'Lettre du Marquis de Guiscard a Monsieur de 63- Chamillard', F. Danjou (ed.). Archives Curieuses 36 Idem, 16 May 1707, Add. MS. 61257, fol. 92, de rHistoire de France (Paris, 1839), 2nd ser., 37 Add. MS. 61648, fol. I. vol. X, pp. 293-4. 38 Guiscard to Heinsius, 19 December 1704, The 17 This episode is investigated by S. Stelling- Hague, Archief Heinsius, no. 917. Michaud, op. cit., pp. 170-2. 39 Guiscard to Marlborough, 25 July 1707, Add. 18 Add. MS, 61221, fol. 27. Printed in FeldzUge des MS. 61257, fol. 108. Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen (Vienna, 1881), ist 40 Barry to Marlborough, 8 April 1707, Add. MS. sen, vol. 7S, pp. 26-7. 61257, fol. 78. 19 Antoine Court, Histoire des troubles des Cevennes 41 Molie to Marlborough, 16 January 1708, Add, ou de la guerre des Camisards, 2nd edn. (Alais, MS. 61257, fol. 124. 1819), bk. xiv, p. 78. 42 Guiscard to Marlborough, 27 February 1708; 20 Guiscard to Ormonde, 26 December 1704, de Laussac to Marlborough, 28 February 1708; H.M.C. Ormonde, vol. viii, pp. 127-8. Add. MS. 61257, fols. 134-9. 21 Jurieu to Heinsius, 2 December 1704, A. J. 43 Guiscard to Marlborough, 11 May, i June 1708, Veenendaal (ed.), De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Add. MS. 61257, fols. 144, 156.

112 44 H. Bosc, op. cit., chapter xv; Add. MS. 32815, 50 B.L., Portland MSS. Loan 29/166/2. fol. 229. 51 F. Masson (ed.), Journal inMit de Jean-Baptiste 45 Flotard to Godolphin, 2 April 1709, Add. MS. Colbert Marquis de Torcy (Paris, 1884), pp. 399, 61258, fol. 106. 400, 413. 46 Add. MS. 61257, fol- 164. 52 Shrewsbury to Harley, 6 March 1711, B.L., Port- 47 Guiscard to Marlborough, 18 December 1708, land MSS. Loan 2glii)j, fol. 164. Add, MS. 61257, fol, 174. 53 Add. MS. 61125, fol. 84. 48 Add. MS. 61257, fol. 208. 54 Henry St. John, Works (ed. Gilbert Parke, 49 Calendar of Treasury Books . . . preserved in the London, 1798), vol. 6, p. 70, Public Record Office, vol. xxiii, pt. 2 (1709, 55 Add. MS. 61131, fol. 78- London, 1949), p. 468; vol. xxiv, pt. 2 (1710, 56 Add. MS, 34079, fol. 54. London, 1950), p. 392; vol. xxv, pt. 2 (1711, 57 Calendar of Treasury Papers, 1708-14, p. 293. London, 1961), p. 150. Calendar of Treasury 58 See Hillel Schwartz, The French Prophets: The Papers, 1708-14 preserved in . . . Puhlic Record History of a Millenarian Group in Eighteenth- Office (London, 1879), p. 231, Century England (Berkeley, 1980).