Ralph L. Dietl Equal Security historische mitteilungen – beihefte

Im Auftrage der Ranke-Gesellschaft. Vereinigung für Geschichte im öffentlichen Leben e.V.herausgegeben von Jürgen Elvert

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat: Winfried Baumgart, Michael Kißener, Ulrich Lappenküper, Ursula Lehmkuhl, Bea Lundt, Christoph Marx, Jutta Nowosadtko, Johannes Paulmann, Wolfram Pyta, Wolfgang Schmale, Reinhard Zöllner

Band 85 Ralph L. Dietl

Equal Security

Europe and the SALT Process, 1969–1976

Franz Steiner Verlag Umschlagabbildung: Brezhnev-Nixon Summit (Washington-Camp David), 1973. Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Photographic Collection, Madison Building.

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Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2013 Druck: Laupp & Göbel, Nehren Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-10453-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface …..………………………………………………………………………… 7

I. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER? SALT I AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1969–1972

1. Introduction …..……………………………………………………………… 9 2. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: The Prehistory …………………………… 17 3. The Nixon Administration, Europe and Nuclear Arms Control …..………… 21 4. NATO, Europe and the Preparation for the Preliminary SAL Talks ………… 33 5. ‘Preliminary Talks’ and the Definition of Strategic Weapons .……………… 42 6. A Limited First Agreement ..………………………………………………… 54 7. The US Modified Approach: The Struggle for Adoption …………………… 60 8. The May 20 Joint Declaration: The Common Platform ...…………………… 73 9. The Path to Moscow: Europe and SALT I ...………………………………… 88

II. WHAT IS PARITY? EUROPE, SALT II & THE VLADIVOSTOK AGENDA IN THE ERA NIXON-FORD, 1972–1976

1. Introduction ..………………………………………………………………… 105 2. From SALT I to SALT II: The Congressional Approval .…………………… 109 3. A New Beginning: The Preparation of the Geneva Talks …………………… 115 4. Beyond the Preliminary Talks: The Matrix for Strategic Arms Control ..…… 127 5. SALT and the ‘Year of Europe’, 1973 .……………………………………… 132 6. SALT and the Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War ..………………………… 141 7. SALT II and MBFR .………………………………………………………… 156 8. Towards the Moscow Summit, June 1974 …………………………………… 172 9. President Ford and the Avenue to Vladivostok ……………………………… 182 10. Vladivostok: The SALT II Agreement Illusion ……………………………… 193 11. NATO, MBFR and US Nuclear Weapons in Europe ...……………………… 200 12. The SALT Track: Cruise Missiles, Backfire and NATO Europe …………… 206 13. SALT II: The Last Stand of the Ford Administration ..……………………… 216

III. CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………… 228

Abbreviations ...…………………………………………………………………… 239 Bibliography .……………………………………………………………………… 241 Index .……………………………………………………………………………… 246

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This monograph on Europe and SALT during the era Nixon-Ford is the product of a wider research project of the author on ‘Nuclear Order 1968–1980s’. The re- search focus of the author has shifted from transatlantic defense relations to global and regional nuclear order in 2011. A first manifestation of this new research fo- cus was a panel on ‘Nuclear Diplomacy – Nuclear Defense’ at the Alexandria Hilton SHAFR Conference 2011. The papers have been published in Historische Mitteilungen as a ‘Themenschwerpunkt’. The core focus of the wider project is on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The latter also forms the plat- form for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Art VI NPT imposed on the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) the obligation to seek ‘in good faith’ a limita- tion and reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals. The theme of the present vol- ume, SALT and Europe, naturally emerges out of the NATO deliberations on nu- clear sharing, the European Nuclear Option and the nuclear disarmament obliga- tion of the NPT. The monograph ‘Equal Security’ looks at the compatibility of the strategic arms control of the superpowers with European détente and European unity. This volume thus does not recount the classic US narrative of the SALT process but focuses almost exclusively on the impact of SALT on NATO and the European Communities. SALT forced NATO Europe to organize in order to have a voice opportunity. NATO Europe thus was able to defend European security interests and to shape or structure the US SALT negotiation position. The focus thus is on the compatibility of the institutionalization of bipolarity and Western regional security. What was to be prioritized: systemic stability or Alliance solida- rity? The narrative outlines the constant struggle of priorities, the clash of regional and national interests, the fight for equal security: the security of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also the security of NATO Europe. The difficult ad- justement processes to the emerging new superpower framework with its reper- cussions on European Security, Atlantic solidarity and European Unity are de- scribed and analyzed on the basis of recently declassified European archival re- sources and the wide array of recently edited archival resources from both sides of the Atlantic. The outcome is a study that rebalances our understanding of the SALT process and of European unity. The present study offers a perfect platform for an understanding of Europe’s role in global and regional arms control and of the Euro Missile Crisis of the 1980s. The present volume is the first of two volu- mes on Europe and the SALT process. The second volume – SALT II and Europe during the era Carter 1976–1979 – is scheduled for publication in 2015. Both vol- umes will be of major interest for scholars from various fields in Contemporary History, International History and International Politics. This study would never have been possible without the support of Queen’s University Belfast. The university kindly offered me a sabbatical in the autumn 8 Preface and Acknowledgements semester 2012 to write and complete the present monograph. I am indebted to numerous other institutions for their kind co-operation. The most important are the National Archives of the United Kingdom at Kew, and the Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin; the NATO Archive in Brussels, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington DC, the Archiv für Christlich- Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin, and the Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung. Per- sonally I am indebted to my family. My mother Marianne and my brother Peter always supported and encouraged my endeavour. My brother Peter furthermore commented on the final draft of my thesis with great dedication and skill. I am grateful for their constant and lasting warm support. My wife Ludmila created an environment that allowed my research project to progress and succeed. Her office for months turned into a ‘hub’ of my research. I thank Professor Dr. Jürgen Elvert for the kind inclusion of the current volume in the series of the Historische Mit- teilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft (HMRG). Last but not least, it is my pleasure to thank Dr Thomas Schaber and Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, who have been reli- able and professional partners in publishing for almost two decades.

Belfast – Esslingen – Samara May 2013

I. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER? SALT I & EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1969–1972

‘The summit agreements began the establishment of a pattern of inter-relationships and co- operation in a number of different areas. This was the first stage of détente: to involve Soviet interests in ways that would increase their stake in international stability and the status quo.’1 Richard Nixon

1. INTRODUCTION

The system configuration of the world during the Cold War was bipolarity. Bipo- lar orders are deemed stable in International Relations theory. The Cold War, ho- wever, led to constant frictions and confrontations. Marc Trachtenberg2 offers a clear and convincing explanation for the instability. The superpower control of the globe was not complete. The SU and the United States (US) had filled the vacuum that had emerged in Europe after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Spheres of influen- ces were established in line with Stalin’s predictions. The armies of the US and of the SU would export their social systems. Wherever the Red Army would be in control, communism would prevail. Whatever territory the US Army would ‘lib- erate’ would be integrated in the US orbit of capitalist market economies and Western democracy. One area, however, remained contested: Germany. Germany was occupied by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The Allied Powers had a common obligation to administer the territory of the former enemy. Frictions were the result. Thus the unsolved German question was responsible for the insta- bility of the Cold War – up to the Cold War settlement of the German question in the shadow of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This important inter- pretation remains contested. Another facet deserves attention: the factor Europe. A third tectonic plate existed during the Cold War: The ‘Old Continent’ in its in- stitutionalized form. The United Kingdom (UK) as the third victorious party emerging from World War II originally had embarked on the formation of a European power bloc. The Western Union concept, however, failed due to the ever growing East West tensions. But the European nucleus survived as a subsys-

1 Richard Nixon, cit in C.L. Sulzberger, The World of Richard Nixon, New York: Prentice Hall Press 1987, 196. 2 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. The Making of the European Settlement, 1945– 1963, Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press 1999. 10 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972 tem in the Western partial order. The process of European unity of the ‘Six’ and of the ‘Seven’ was a process to obtain autonomy in common as an independent entity or ‘billiard ball’ in the international system. Europe aimed at multi-polarity and thus contested the structures of the Cold War, the division of Europe and the specter of a superpower ‘condominium’. A condominium perpetuated the division of the Continent and the subordination of Europe to an institutionalized bipolarity. Thus the instability was due to a revisionist Germany and a revisionist Europe. Both intended to limit the parallel ‘hegemonies’ of the superpowers in order to regain an independent position in world affairs. The final outcome of the contest had to have systemic implications: a change from bi- to multi-polarity.3 This study deals with the core ‘battle’: the institutionalization of bipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. With the Partial or Limited Test Ban Treaty (PTBT/LTBT) of 1963 the superpowers had started to cooperate to preserve a stable – bipolar – world order. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was the breakthrough for superpower détente. The NPT was a blocking treaty, a static treaty, that aimed at the preservation of the status quo. The NPT aimed at the preservation of the system configuration of bipolarity: the common interest of the superpowers.4 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) – which emerged out of Article VI of the NPT – offered the superpowers an option to create a condominium.5 The super- powers could extend the non-transfer clause of the NPT to nuclear delivery sys- tems thus undermining the ‘European Option’ for a European deterrent preserved by the NPT. The superpower détente, however, was challenged by Europe. The Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) had embraced the NPT due to Article VI.

3 ‘By establishing more definitely the existing line of division in Europe, the Soviet Union would generally stabilize its European position. […] a further more specific objective of the Soviet European policy will be to protect its own interests which may be threatened by the movement for a united Europe. An enlarged and successful Community would present nume- rous real disadvantages to the Soviet Union. […] The European development which causes the Soviet Government even more concern is the possibility that a separate European nuclear force may emerge […]. It is of course possible that in the longer term the Soviet Union might take a different view at the whole European question. It would in theory be possible for the USSR to welcome the creation of a genuinely independent Europe, since this would pave the way for the ultimate separation of North America from the European states […].’ Sir D. Wil- son (Moscow)-Mr. Stewart, 14 Jul 1969, DBPO, Series 3, volume 1: Britain and Soviet Uni- on, 1968–1972, No 36, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ ver=Z39.88- 2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040910046 (access date: 15 March 2011). 4 ‘Sperrverträge […] sind ihrer Natur nach statisch. Sie begünstigen das Bestehende […]’, Dr. Schippenkötter, Fragen der Abrüstung, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 July 1969, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PA–AA), B 21, 743, 22. 5 Dr Ruete, Probleme der Ostpolitik und der europäischen Sicherheit, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743, 5f; Michael Meimeth, Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre: Zwischen Status Quo und friedlichem Wandel. Die Ära Georges Pompidou und Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 1990, 17. Introduction 11

The latter demanded that the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) would work towards general disarmament and not a mere freeze of the status quo by way of arms control. Disarmament, i.e. arms reductions, meant a relative gain for Europe’s position in the international system. European deterrence per se aimed not at sta- bilizing bipolarity, but at overcoming bipolarity. The focus of the West-Europeans was on universal principles on the one hand and regional action on the other. The West-Europeans focused on contacts beyond the ‘Iron Curtain’ in order to create an all-European entity and to undermine in common the bipolarity of the super- power structure. Thus European and superpower détente were not necessarily compatible. For Europeans there was no possibility of a settlement of the German question in bipolarity. ‘Finlandization’ was not an option. A policy of neutraliza- tion or neutrality would have discriminated Germany and destroyed ‘Europe’ as a player on the global scale. There was only one avenue worth pursuing: the unifi- cation of Germany in a unified Europe. The West-German Ostpolitik, the Europe- an détente, threatened the institutionalization of a bipolar order by drawing Po- land, Romania and other Warsaw Pact states closer into the European circle. Si- multaneously European détente would challenge US leadership if both remained uncoordinated. A failure to harmonize European security interests with the natio- nal security interests of the US would have undermined Western solidarity and strength. The Harmel Report sought a remedy: it enhanced NATO's role in collec- tive security beyond defense and deterrence to détente. European voice opportuni- ty was the outcome. The US was obliged to consult NATO in East-West affairs.6 Alliance interests mattered: only a common approach to the SU guaranteed Wes- tern solidarity and bloc stability. Two battle lines are thus discernible: (1) the struggle for a safe and stable world order among the superpowers and (2) the intra-Alliance struggle on a vision for the future of Europe. Which of the ‘games’ was to be prioritized? Was global and European security compatible? In case the US prioritized her national security interests over European security the ‘Alliance’ threatened to disintegrate. In case the US prioritized global security Europe's security was endangered – yet again. This monograph on Europe and the SALT process in the Era Nixon-Ford deals with the impact of the institutionalization of the global nuclear order on European security. This book does not deal with the fight for a ‘European Option’ during the NPT negotiations7, but will focus on the impact of the Strategic Arms Limita- tion Talks of 1969–1976 on European security and the European Nuclear Option. What did SALT mean for Europe?8 What was the impact of SALT on Europe? Did SALT threaten to undermine or bolster European security and autonomy?

6 Ruete an alle diplomatischen Vertretungen. Betr. Europäische Sicherheit, 26 Mar 1968, PA– AA, ZW 107296. 7 Ralph Dietl, ‘European Decision Making? The US, Nuclear Non Proliferation and the Euro- pean Option 1967–1972’, Historische Mitteilungen 24 (2011), 43–89. 8 Andrew Pierre, ‘Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America’, Foreign Affairs, 49 (1970–71), 283–301, 285. 12 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

What were the consequences for the European NWS and the European NNWS, and what were the consequences for Europe's place in the global nuclear order? The narrative will not focus on the US-Soviet SALT negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna or on the domestic decision-making on SALT in either the US or the So- viet Union. The diplomatic record of the negotiations is well captured in the ex- cellent studies of Raymond Garthoff9, Gerard Smith10, Henry Kissinger11, John Newhouse12, Morton A. Kaplan13 and Mason Willrich & John Rhinelander14 for the SALT I process. The early SALT II process left fewer traces in the literature. This is highlighted by Garthoff in Détente and Confrontation. Strobe Talbott is the Master of the Game on SALT II.15 Thomas Wolfe’s RAND study offers fur- ther valuable insights.16 The Congressional Hearings uncover the domestic debate. Wanting are studies on the intra-Alliance debate, the US-UK bilateral SALT ne- gotiations and ‘Europe's’ influence on and response to the SALT negotiations. This book offers the indispensable pre-history to the SALT II Treaty of 1979 and the emerging SALT III or START process; this book is a valuable addition to the literature on the Euro Missile Crisis, since it uncovers the European agenda in the formative period of strategic arms control. The fight about Intermediate-Range Ballistic/Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (IR/MRBM) starts in 1970 – not during the Carter Administration. To comprehend European security during the Euro Missile Crisis and the role of arms control for the future of Europe, to compre- hend the revival of the Western European Union and of European Arms coopera- tion in the 1980s it is indispensable to analyze the role of SALT I and the early SALT II process for both the European and the global nuclear order. This monograph is not a history of the SALT process. This is a study on the impact of nuclear arms control during SALT I and the early SALT II process on Euro-Atlantic relations. This is a study on shifts in the international system. It deals with a growing poly-centricity in the international relations of the 1970s, and a danger of dissolution of the Atlantic alliance. It thus deals with the challen- ge to connect political multi-polarity with the strategic bipolarity of the era.17 The

9 Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1994. 10 Gerard Smith, Double Talk. The Story of SALT, Lanham: University of America Press 1985. 11 Henry Kissinger, Memoiren, Band I, 1968–1973, Güthersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1979. 12 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn. The Story of SALT, New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston 1973. 13 Morton A. Kaplan (ed), SALT: Problems and Perspectives, Morristown N.J: General Lear- ning Press 1973. 14 Mason Willrich/John B. Rhinelander (eds), SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, London: The Free Press 1974. 15 Stobe Talbott, Endgame. The Inside Story of SALT II, New York: Harper & Row 1979; Id, The Master of the Game. Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, New York: Vintage Book 1988. 16 Thomas Wolfe, The SALT Experience, Cambridge/MA: Ballinger Publishers 1979. 17 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. America’s Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Introduction 13 growing parity between the superpowers undermined the ‘bloc’ architecture. Par- ity threatened to disaggregate the ‘West’ into two strategic theatres. The Atlantic bridge threatened to collapse due to (1) a growing ‘neo-isolationism’ in the US, that manifested itself in the demand for unilateral force reductions, and due to (2) an enlarging Europe with global interests and enhanced means. The preservation and modernization of long-range theatre nuclear weapons and nuclear strike forces mattered for NATO unity and European defense. SALT and the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks – that dealt with European theatre force reductions – touched on forward based systems (FBS). FBS are US systems stati- oned abroad with a capability to strike the SU proper. Any decision by the super- powers to remove US FBS from the European theatre would have had major re- percussion on Atlantic unity, European integration, and the international system at large. US disengagement as a result of a US-SU arms control agreement would have demanded a rebalancing of the Western partial system, a ‘Europeanization’ of NATO or the use of the ‘European Option’ by the member states of the Euro- pean Communities. Strategic arms control sets the framework. It freezes the rela- tive position of any given player in the international system and within any partial orders – to utilize a phrase utilized by Volker Rittberger. The SALT process ‘institutionalized’ systemic bipolarity and threatened to re- legate the ‘pentagonal structure’ of the NPT to a secondary position in a ‘multi- hierarchical system’ dominated in various degrees by the NWS.18 Nuclear defense questions thus followed a complex logic synthesizing mere survival with a status bias in a relative gains world. The relative position in the international system mattered – irrespective of regime formations. This study thus goes beyond Tho- mas Schelling and Morton Halperin in its ‘critique’ of arms control theory. Arms control was an important facet of normal politico-military relations. It followed the rules of international relations.19 Arms control is not beyond power politics but follows the logic of power politics. There is no contradiction between military strategy and strategic co-operation.20 Arms control is power-based regime forma- tion.21 Arms control seeks long term survival thru stability and predictability – at

18 Richard A Falk, ‘Arms Control, Foreign Policy, and Gobal Reform’, Daedalus 104,3 (1974), 35–49; Heinrich Buch, ‘Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei SALT – Mitspieler oder Zuschauer’, in Helga Haftendorn/Wolf-Dieter Karl/Joachim Krause/Lothar Wilker (eds), Verwaltete Außenpolitik. Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn, Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1978, 115–134, 119. 19 Thomas Schelling/Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: Twentieth Cen- tury Fund 1961, 4ff. 20 Thomas C. Schelling, ‘The Thirtieth Year’, Daedalus 120,1 (1991), 21–32, 23; F.A. Long, ‘Arms Control From the Perspective of the Nineteen-Seventies’, Daedalus, 104,3 (1975), 1– 13, 1f. 21 Harald Müller/Niklas Schörning, Rüstungsdynamik und Rüstungskontrolle. Eine exemplari- sche Einführung in die Internationalen Beziehungen, Baden-Baden: NOMOS 2006, 123. 14 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972 its best and domination at its worst.22 It is a tool to be employed strategically to foster an environment in line with the core interests of the players involved. It serves a relative gains calculus. The logic of survival, security and domination applies. The Clausewitzian world remains untouched. Strategic arms control is the grand game of power politics. It is worth quoting in this context Schelling and Halperin: ‘Arms control can […] strengthen Alliances, collapse them, or make them unnecessary. It can create confidence and trust or can create suspicion and irritation. It can lead to greater world organization and the rule of law or discredit them. And it evidently lends itself to short term competition in propaganda.’23 This book focuses on the first game – the Alliance game. It looks at Alliance co- hesion and world order. It looks at Europe’s response to and impact on the nuclear arms control policy of the Nixon-Ford Administration. President Richard Nixon in 1973 outlined ‘five’ objectives for the US-SU bilateral arms control. The fifth objective was to keep the security of ‘third parties undiminished.’24 The other ob- jectives were the establishment of ‘essential equivalence’ between the superpo- wers; the maintenance of survivability of strategic forces; a modernization option that preserved strategic stability and verifiability. The four latter categories all had a major impact on the security of the European Allies. Essential equivalence or parity among the superpowers questioned the US nuclear guarantee; the survivabi- lity of US strategic forces had a direct impact on NATO strike force composition and development; the modernization question automatically involved transfer questions. Even verifiability mattered for European security.25 European security was always affected. Europe’s relative position in the in- ternational system depended on the outcome of the SALT process. All of the listed ‘objectives’ mattered for NATO’s future role in Western defense, for Euro- pe’s place in the world, and Europe’s security and survival. ‘Equal security’ should not be limited to the superpowers. Optimal outcomes mattered for Europe- an states as much as for the superpowers. This book focuses on the intra-Alliance dimension of the bilateral Strategic Arms Control Talks. It focuses on mecha- nisms, caucuses and fora utilized by Allies (1) to defend European theatre posi- tions, (2) to impact on the negotiation packages, and (3) to respond in common to challenges to European interests. The NATO SALT Experts meetings, the Euro- pean SALT Experts meetings, and the bilateral Anglo-American SAL Talks in Washington DC form the bone structure for an analysis of the European share in the SALT I and SALT II processes. Both the European SALT Experts meetings and the Anglo-American SAL Talks were kept secret. The heads of the Disarma-

22 Colin S. Gray, The House of Cards. Why Arms Control Must Fail, Ithaca/NY: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 1992, 8f. 23 Schelling/Halperin, 6. 24 Falk, 36. 25 Ibid, 36f; Stanley R. Sloan/Robert C. Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control. Challenges for US Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No 261. Introduction 15 ment Departments of the Foreign Ministries gathered for the European SALT Ex- perts meetings. The Anglo-American SAL talks involved staff of the UK Embassy in Washington and representatives from the Whitehall bureaucracy. Ministerial representation was omitted in order not to attract media attention. Thus the public was not informed about the consultation structures within the Atlantic framework. Even Allied governments were kept in the dark about the SALT network. A look at the main ‘theatre’ – the ‘back channel’ negotiations of Dr Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin – further underlines the secretive nature of SALT decision-making. Parts of the deliberations were unknown to the US SALT Dele- gation, to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State De- partment – withstanding the elaborate US SALT machinery in Washington DC dominated by the National Security Advisor (NSA): Dr Kissinger.26 The Russian structures of decision-making for the SALT process were largely unknown out- side of the SU and were first described in Aleksandr Savel’yev/Nikolay Detinov ‘The Big Five’.27 The SALT diplomatic process thus is to be distinguished from the ‘domestic’ game of public diplomacy and coalition formation beyond the core bureaucracies. The SALT Hearings – the domestic US debate, the public lobbying of interest groups, the information warfare within the Washington beltway and beyond on Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), Multiple Independently Targe- ted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) and SALT – are not the focus of this study. The study focuses entirely on the diplomatic front, on intra-Alliance negotiations, and official ‘European’ channels to impact on the SALT process. This is reflected in the source base for the present study in classic diplomacy, strategy and arms control during the Nixon-Ford era. Any arms control measures of a ‘technical’ importance: technical measures to forestall accidental war, technical definitions, verification questions and mecha- nisms for crisis consultation or confidence building measures are not part of the narrative. These are by and large ‘apolitical’ measures dealing with crisis stability. They serve no ‘specific’ political purpose. All these aspects of arms control are not – or rarely – impacting on the division of power in the international system. Aspects thereof feature only in case they impact on the ‘geopolitics’ of arms control, i.e. the nuclear world or regional order. The monograph is divided into two main parts: Part I deals with the SALT I process and ends with the Moscow Summit Agreement of May 1972. Part II ana- lyses the early SALT II process centered on the Vladivostok Accord of 1974. The study ends with the inconclusive debates on cruise missiles (CM), the ‘backfire bomber’ and European security. Offered is a history of Western Europe’s role in

26 Buch, 130; Lawrence Weiler, ‘Secrecy in Arms Control Negotiations’, in Id/Alan Platt (eds), Congress and Arms Control, Boulder/CO: Westview 1978, 157–183. 27 Aleksandr G. Savel’yev/Nikolay N Detinov, The Big Five. Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union, Westport/CN: Praeger 1995. 16 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972 strategic arms control prior to the Carter Administration. Offered is a prehistory to the European security dimension of SALT II, the Euro missile crisis, and the dual track decision of NATO. 2. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS: THE PREHISTORY

The story of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks dates back to the Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) Administration. The idea emerged in line with the negotiations for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1964 the Johnson Administration proposed to freeze the characteristics and numbers of delivery vehicles, both offensive and defensive.28 The initiative was in line with the Johnson Administration’s policy of self-restraint in offensive strategic nuclear weapons procurement. Johnson hoped that the US example would ‘induce a reciprocal Soviet restraint.’29 The US ABM deployment agenda30 let to a first US invitation to its peer competitor to discuss the limitation of ABM deployments. The US-SU Glassboro Summit of 1967 de- serves to be mentioned in this context since Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense, deemed any ABM deployments as destabilizing. The deployment of ‘thick’ ABM systems would generate arms races in offensive systems. Thus both sides should seek to limit ABM systems.31 The final breakthrough for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks came with the signing of the NPT in 1968. Johnson an- nounced to start SALT negotiations in the ‘nearest future.’32 Simultaneously, the SU declared her willingness to embark on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in line with the NPT obligations.33 As mentioned in the introduction the Nuclear Non-

28 Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making, Cambridge/MA: Ballinger Publishing Company 1975, 108. 29 Richard Nixon, The Real War, New York: Warner Books 1980, 152. 30 Memo From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Special Assistant Rostow, 10 Dec 1966, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 171; Memo of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 19 January 1967, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 176. 31 Raymond Garthoff, ‘SALT I: An Evaluation’, World Politics 31,1 (Oct 1978), 1–25, 5; Id, A Journey Through the Cold War. A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence, Washington: Brookings Institution 2001, 206ff; Gerard C. Smith, Disarming Diplomat. The Memoirs of Gerard C. Smith. Arms Control Negotiator, Lanham: University of America Press 1996, 170; Statement by Dr John S Foster to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee: Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 6 February 1967, United States Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency ACDA (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1967, Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1968, 54–56; News Conference Remarks by Premier Kosy- gin on the Glassboro Meeting, 25 June 1967, ibid, 268–269; Statement by ACDA Director Smith to the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Antiballistic Missile Deployment, 6 March 1969, in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1969, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1970, 74–78; Memo from the Acting Di- rector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Foster to Secretary of State Rusk, Sec- retary of Defense McNamara and the President’s Special Advisor Rostow, 28 Aug 1967, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 202. 32 Smith, Double Talk, 20; Greenwood, 118. 33 J.C.W. Bushell, Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: First Re- port of the Working Party, 8 Jul 1969, The National Archive, Kew (TNA), FCO 46/295;

18 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

Proliferation Treaty contains an obligation in the Preamble and Art VI to stop the arms race and to seek general nuclear disarmament. The NPT thus sought to stop not just ‘horizontal’ but also ‘vertical’ proliferation. The arms race had to be con- tained and reductions started in order to pave the way to ‘general disarmament’. The NWS were obliged to pursue these negotiations in ‘good faith’, a fact that was highlighted in 1969 by US Secretary of State William Rogers and later con- firmed by the International Court of Justice.34 It was indispensable for the validity of the NPT that NWS and NNWS alike would honor the compromise of 1968. The NNWS would adhere and relinquish their right to build nuclear weapons only under the condition that the NWS disarmed their nuclear potential.35 The final aim then and now was ‘global zero’. Thus a 'natural' order of the international system with equal rights for all states would re-emerge in the nuclear weapons free world of the future. The NNWS were not offering the NWS an eternal place in a global nuclear directorate. In case the NWS would not honor their obligation, the NNWS had a right to withdraw from the treaty.36 Europe sought to forestall a status quo bias of the NPT by emphasizing the strategic compromise. The NPT was sup- ported only in case (1) peaceful use of nuclear energy was guaranteed; (2) Europe’s security was assured; (3) a commitment of the NWS to disarm was forthcoming, and (4) Europe’s process of unity remained unhindered.37 The path to re-establishing the equality of states in the international system had to be as- sured. The need to re-establish equality was highlighted during the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States convened on 29 August 1968.38 The historic compromise and its consequences were discussed in the US Hearings on the NPT. The compromise underlying the NPT then was an undisputed fact. The European powers had fought for the ‘European Nuclear Option’, for the ‘US interpretations’ to the NPT, and thus for NATO nuclear sharing and for a special status of EURATOM in verification. They intended to preserve Europe’s relative position in the world. They now refused to adhere to the NPT before a breakthrough in

President Nixon's Visit to London, February 1969, Nuclear Matters, Brief of the FCO, Febru- ary 1969, TNA, FCO 66/109. 34 Minute of the NSC Meeting, 19 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 5; Dr. Ruete, Prob- leme der Ostpolitik und der europäischen Sicherheit, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743. 35 Memo of Conversation, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Secretary of State-Vice Chancellor of FRG, 8 Feb 1967, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 180. 36 Dr Birrenbach, Die Auseinandersetzung um den Atomwaffensperrvertrag, Juni 1969, Archiv für Christlich Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin (ACDP), 01-226-406; Memo of Con- versation, Rusk–F.J. Strauß, 23 Jul 1968, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 259. 37 Dr Schippenkötter, Fragen der Abrüstung, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743, 23. 38 Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, September 1968, PA–AA, ZW 107296. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: The Prehistory 19 nuclear disarmament was discernible.39 The ‘Europeans’ intentionally slowed down the NPT ratification process to guarantee ‘Europe’ a more equal status. Pre- requisites for adherence applied: (1) the compatibility of the NPT with the Rome Treaties Establishing the European Community (EEC) had to be certified, and (2) the EURATOM-IAEA Agreement signed and implemented.40 More importantly – the NWS had to honor their obligation and to start the process of arms limitation with the aim of general disarmament. Arms reductions mattered: The UK repeat- edly warned the US that without a break- through in arms control the European Community (EC) countries might not adhere to the NPT.41 This would be the end of the NPT. It is thus not surprising that the outgoing Johnson Administration started the process of Strategic Arms Limitation deliberations. It referred the question to the Alliance in a last minute action.42 On the 15 January 1969 US NATO Ambassador Harlan Cleveland tabled a document in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on ‘ob- jectives and principles’ for future Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.43 The US ini- tiative would keep SALT on the North Atlantic Council agenda and thus safe- guard the core achievement of the Johnson Administration: the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty of 1968. The incoming Nixon Administration was now bound to discuss SALT with the European Allies.44 Johnson originally had intended to start the SALT track earlier but could not do so due to the crushing of the Prague Spring by Warsaw Pact forces in the summer of 1968. In a time of heightened tensions in Europe it was deemed inopportune to work on a common approach to arms control with the Soviet Union.45 Alliance solidarity mattered. It is rare that an outgoing Administration commits a successor Administration on such an important matter. The opposite is commonly the rule. Options for

39 Dr Birrenbach-Dr Barzel, 8 April 1968, ACDP I 142-017; Letter from the Undersecretary of State Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense Clifford, 10 April 1968, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 232. 40 Dr Schippenkötter, Fragen der Abrüstung, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743, 25. 41 See also: Botschafter Schippenkötter, Genf an das AA, 3 Oct 1969, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1969, Nr. 308. 42 Paper on the Interagency Working Group, 31 Jul 1973, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 264; Memo From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant Rostow, 12 Aug 1968, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 267. 43 E.E. Tomkins to Lord Hood, Limitation of Strategic Missiles, 25 Jan 1969, TNA FCO 66/109; Smith, Double Talk, 20; Garthoff, Journey, 213ff. 44 Cromer-Greenhill, 19 Jan 1973, Annex: Interrelationship of Issues Between the US and W Europe, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No 14, http//gateway.proquest.com/openurl?_ver= Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040950029 (access date 8 March 2011). 45 Roger P. Labrie, SALT Handbook. Key Documents and Issues, 1972–1979, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute 1979, 8. 20 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972 change should not be forestalled. The procedure nevertheless had its merits. The Nixon Administration could probe the NATO Allies on a program that was not theirs. 3. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, EUROPE AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

SALT offered new hopes and challenges. Nobody, however, could expect a quick initiative of the Nixon Administration due to the importance of arms control for national security. New foundations had to be found for the relations with the East, with Europe and with the ‘Third World’ including China. The Nixon Administra- tion faced three major challenges: the Vietnam War, the budgetary problem and the adjustment of Alliance relations to an emerging East-West regime. The US – so Kissinger – would follow a step-by-step pragmatism.46 The new Nixon Admi- nistration had first to devise her foreign policy approach and a new National Secu- rity Strategy (NSS) before initiatives in arms control could be devised. Arms control was an integral part of and subservient to strategic policy.47 Thus Presi- dent Nixon first established a Study Group chaired by Deputy Secretary of Defen- se David Packard to review the US military posture and the global balance of po- wer.48 Technical studies had to support the work of the Packard Group to evaluate the impact of arms control on the national defense policy. The US national secu- rity policy – as well as the US arms control policy – had to forestall the emer- gence of a ‘first strike’ capability. Any ‘first strike’ capability was destabilizing. No ‘first strike’ capability was allowed to undermine the global balance of power. The US aim was not strategic ‘superiority’ but ‘sufficiency’.49 President Nixon defined ‘sufficiency’ as a capability that is sufficient to fulfill all tasks and purpo- ses necessary for survival in the international system. The nuclear posture had to guarantee survivability, flexibility and penetrability. ‘Sufficiency’ was a form of parity that assured survival.50 Dr Kissinger once asked: ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, opera- tionally at these levels of numbers?’51 ‘Superiority is meaningless’ – so Kissinger.

46 Dr Birrenbach, Bericht über meine zweite Unterredung mit Professor Henry Kissinger am 7. Februar 1969, ACDP, I 433-143/1. 47 David S. Yost, NATO’s Strategic Options. Arms Control and Defense, New York: Pergamon Press 1981, 67; ‘I should like to make clear that I view arms limitation talks in the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union [...]’, Nixon-Smith, cit in: Smith, Disarming Dip- lomat, 160. 48 National Security Study Memorandum, 21 Jan 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 2; Paper Prepared by the NSA, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 3; Minute of the NSC Meet- ing, 19 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 5. 49 Leiter Militärattachéstab, Deutsche Botschaft Washington. Die Militärpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten und ihre Strategie der 70er Jahre, ACDP I 433-139/3; Foreign Policy Report by Pre- sident Nixon to the Congress [Extracts], 18 Feb 1970, US ACDA (ed), Documents on Disar- mament 1970, Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1971, 20–32. 50 Nixon, Real War, 154f.; Smith, Disarming Diplomat, 150. 51 Paul H. Nitze, ‘SALT I: The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism’, Foreign Pol- icy, 17 (Winter 1974–1975), 136–156, 136; Colin S. Gray, ‘The Strategic Forces Triad: The

22 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

The US had to devise a national security strategy that would (1) protect US soil from attack; (2) free the US from the ‘Diktat’ of other players in the international system, and (3) protect US interests and wealth abroad. This was not a matter of numbers or parity or ‘superiority’ – but of requirements to match the aims.52 ‘Suf- ficiency’ assured a successful implementation of the national security strategy. The Interdepartmental Group for Europe in the meantime devised the first li- nes of a ‘Grand Design’ that highlighted the necessity in an ‘era of negotiations’ to cautiously combine deterrence and détente. Negotiations with the SU were not allowed to ‘jeopardize relations with our Allies who may be suspicious of our motives and [may] fear a US-SU condominium at their expense.’ The US had always to be aware that a failure to have the NATO Allies on board would make any promising looking superpower agreement ‘unstable’.53 Alliance affairs mat- tered. Alliance affairs had to be prioritized in national security affairs. Thus Presi- dent Nixon decided to travel to Europe soon in order to prepare a common ‘West- ern’ approach to strategic arms control. Dr Kurt Birrenbaсh – a prominent mem- ber of the ‘Bundestag’ Committee on Foreign Affairs – was informed by President Nixon that the US would concert their actions closely with the Allies throughout the forthcoming bilateral US-SU arms control negotiations. A direct participation of European partners was to be envisaged in a later phase of the arms control pro- cess.54 The Nixon Administration, however, did not necessarily embrace a Euro- pean preference. The President tried to de-emphasize the link with the NPT obli- gation that the Europeans cherished. The Strategic Arms Control Talks had to serve US national security. Stability and trust were the core principles for super- power détente. To pursue the NPT obligations might be counterproductive. The Secretary of State Rogers demurred. Stability was not enough: ‘we should proceed with good faith […] we are obliged to go ahead with talks, in good faith, language of treaty is clear.’55 Reductions had to be the aim. Thus differences concerning the approach to arms control persisted – within the Nixon Administration and surely within the Alliance. The selection of Gerard Smith as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) further widened ‘philosophical’ differences on the aims of SALT. What should be prioritized: global obligations, alliance affairs or bilateral superpower relations? President Nixon’s inaugural address was well received in Moscow. Ambassador Dobrynin confirmed ‘that his government had noted with interest President Nixon’s statement’ and ‘that his Administration looked forward to an era of nego-

End of the Road?, in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Arms Control and Security: Current Issues, Boulder: Westview 1979, 191–208, 193. 52 Earl C. Ravenal, ‘After Schlesinger: Something Has to Give’, Foreign Policy 22 (Spring 1976), 71–95, 73ff. 53 Paper Prepared for the NSC by the Interdepartmental Group for Europe, 18 February 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 18. 54 Dr Birrenbach, Gespräch Birrenbach-Nixon, 7 Feb 1969, ACDP I 433-143/1. 55 Minute of the NSC, 19 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 5. The Nixon Administration, Europe and Nuclear Arms Control 23 tiations’.56 What would it entail? The President’s European Tour in February 1969 served Nixon to familiarize the Allies with the new US national security policy and strategy. This was the platform for the future US approach to strategic arms control. The Anglo-American Summit at Chequers focused on the new concept of ‘sufficiency’ that was to replace the concept of ‘superiority’. ‘Sufficiency’ mainly stressed the need to maintain the possibility of a second-strike capability, or in other words, the survivability of the US strategic tripod: Inter-Continental Ballis- tic Missile (ICBM), Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Strategic Bomb- ers. Arms control – so President Nixon – surely had to be adjusted to the need to preserve the second-strike capability of the United States. The Nixon Administra- tion thus had started technical studies on the National Defense Posture, Strategy and Policy. HMG agreed with the Nixon approach. The need to preserve the US deterrent power was indispensable to maintain Alliance cohesion. Mere parity would undermine the credibility of the US deterrent for Europe. Parity raised the fear of a ‘limited war’ in Europe. Under parity the superpowers cancelled each other out. This made a conventional or ‘limited nuclear war’ in Europe imagi- nable. The British PM Harold Wilson therefore at Chequers clearly stressed the importance to maintain at least the credibility of the overall Western deterrent power. The ‘West’ had to be superior. The Europeans had to stay convinced that there would be no ‘decoupling’ of US and European security.57 The worst out- come of arms control negotiations would be a ‘decoupling’ of US and European security interests. To forestall a ‘decoupling’, to forestall the success of a Soviet wedge driving strategy the US had to constantly re-assure NATO partners that the US nuclear guarantee stayed unaffected and Alliance superiority remained unchal- lenged. President Nixon’s conversation with French President Charles de Gaulle at Versailles on 1 March 1969 allowed a glimpse at the position of the Nixon Admi- nistration on defensive weapons. Nixon stressed the need for a National Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The US would proceed with Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) deployment. ABMs were necessary to protect the deterrent, to avoid a gap in the ‘development of the art’ and to enhance the US bargaining position in Stra- tegic Arms Limitation Talks.58 The ABM decision followed suit. On 14 March

56 Memo of Conversation. Ambassador Dobrynin’s Initial Call on the President, 17 February 1969, The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Wilson Center: The Rise of Dé- tente. Compiled for the International Conference: NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Rise of Détente, 1965–1972, Dobbiaco/Toblach, 26–28 September 2002, edited by Mircea Muntea- nu/Hedwig Giusto/Christian Ostermann – Section1, No 1 (unlisted but included): Online Re- source: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-rise-detente. Memo from the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Toon to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 18 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 16. 57 Record of a Conversation Between the Prime Minister and the President of the US During and After Dinner at Chequers on Monday, 24 Feb 1969, TNA FCO 66/109. 58 Memo of Conversation. De Gaulle-Nixon at Versailles, 1 Mar 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 13. 24 SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

President Nixon approved the ‘Safeguard’ concept to succeed ‘Sentinel’ – the ABM concept of his predecessor. ‘Safeguard’ was necessary (1) to protect US Minutemen Silos from the Soviet SS-9; (2) to offer protection against ‘Third Par- ty’ nuclear forces and (3) against accidental firing of nuclear weapons.59 Simulta- neously, Nixon approved a continuation of the testing of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRV). The MIRV revolution – that multiplied war- heads per delivery system by up to 12 – was giving the US an edge of 4:1 in warhead count over the SU in case the number of delivery system were equal. The US hoped for appropriations for both dynamic weapons systems – ABM and MIRV – in order to strengthen her negotiating position and to create the option for a zero deployment in case the SU reciprocated.60 NATO’s 20th Anniversary Washington Summit in April 1969 offered the US the right opportunity to inform the Alliance as a whole about the US approach to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The 11 April was a date to remember. It was the date of a specially restricted North Atlantic Council (NAC) session attended by NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers and the NATO Ambassadors.61 President Nixon started the debate to reassure the partners about the role of NATO. NATO seemed to be an ‘old fashioned’ concept, but was needed to negotiate from strength. Thus NATO communality was indispensable for any successful arms control negotiation with the SU. The Nixon Administration had inherited a com- mitment to ABM. The ‘Sentinel’ Program of the Johnson Administration, however, had a wrong focus: ‘area defense’ of US cities against a Chinese threat. The major threat the US faced was the vulnerability of her deterrent. The SS-9 with her high throw weight could pose a threat to the US Minutemen silos. The SS-9 was a Soviet ‘first strike’ counter force weapon. Thus the US had to protect the viability of her deterrent in addition to or in replacement of her cities. The focus had to move from ‘area’ to ‘terminal defense’. The new US ABM system ‘Safeguard’ thus focused on the protection of the deterrent – not on the protection of the US per se or the National Command Authority (NCA). This was in the na- tional interest of the US and in the interest of Europe. Without a secure US deter- rent force Europe's security guarantee would be infringed. The presentation of US President Nixon was well received. One ‘statement’ by the US President, however, shook the Alliance partners. Nixon had discarded the advice of PM Wilson and flatly told the NATO Allies that a

59 Memo from the President’s Special Assistant to the President Buchanan, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 24; Statement by President Nixon on Ballistic Missile Defense, 14 Mar 1969, in US ACDA (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1969, 102–105. 60 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 27 Mar 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 6; Memo from Director of the ACDA Smith and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs John- son to Secretary of State Rogers, 9 Mar 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 20; C.B., Notes on Visit to the United States, Jun 1969, TNA, FCO 46/297. 61 Record of a Meeting between President Nixon and NATO Ministers on April 11, TNA, FCO 66/110. The Nixon Administration, Europe and Nuclear Arms Control 25 strategic parity was emerging. The Dutch in particular were alarmed.62 Nixon in- stantly tried to allay emerging fears: the US ‘tripod’ was not in danger. Only the ICBM leg might suffer in case of a SS-9 first strike. The SLBM and Strategic Bomber Force would guarantee an effective second strike in any case. Furthermo- re, ‘Safeguard’ would enhance the survivability of the Minuteman III ICBM force. Italy’s Foreign Minister Pietro Nenni agreed with the need to preserve the deterrent but stressed the obligation arising out of the NPT. The public had to be assured that arms reductions would be ‘one of the essential preoccupations of the US policy.’63 The deployment of any new weapon system would just enhance the arms race. The US decision to proceed with an ABM defense system was not well re- ceived in London – either. HMG feared any ABM deployment: it would enhance the arms race and invalidate the penetration capability of the British nuclear forces. Both currents could invalidate the ‘European theatre’ deterrent forces.64 The UK reaction to the ‘Sentinel system’ deployment decision of 1967 had been ‘particularly sharp’. The UK had not been consulted by the Johnson Administrati- on prior to the decision. The reaction to the ‘Safeguard’ announcement was more guarded – but critical. HMG sent the former Private Secretary to the British Mi- nister of Defence Ivor S. Richard to Washington to explain the concern of HMG about the ‘Safeguard’ decision of President Nixon. ABM deployment would sim- ply have the effect of encouraging improvements of offensive and defensive sys- tems on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A new arms race was to be expected. The threat posed by the Chinese deterrent forces was not deemed serious in the UK and thus an argument based on a ‘China threat’ was unconvincing.65 A ‘light’ ABM could already invalidate the deterrent forces of ‘Third Parties’. A ‘thick’ ABM system would be destabilizing to the extreme. It would enable the protected party to knock out the retaliatory forces of a peer competitor by a ‘first strike’. However, there was one positive aspect of the new US approach: ‘Safeguard’ would leave cities unprotected thus offering the SU a ‘second strike’ counter city capability. Thus ‘mutually assured destruction’ might be guaranteed – a stabili- zing factor. ABM deployment, however, was not the only Western European concern. The UK started to analyze the possible implication of a SALT agreement on offensive and defensive weaponry in Europe – so did the Germans, French and Italians. The possible implications for European security were far-flung and diverse. The ‘Eu-

62 Ibid – see also: Gedächtnisprotokoll über das Gespräch zwischen Bundesminister Dr Schrö- der und Mr Dean Acheson in dessen Wohnung in Washington am 12.4.1969 von 10 bis 11 Uhr, 12 Apr 1969, ACDP, I 483-283/3. 63 Record of a Meeting between President Nixon and NATO Ministers on April 11, TNA, FCO 66/110. 64 Christopher Irwin, ‘Nuclear Aspects of West European Defence Integration’, International Affairs 47, 4 (1971), 679–691. 65 A.E.D. Chamier-Sir E. Peck, Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, April 1969, TNA, FCO 66/110.