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840.2 .U452 1988 C.2 CONTENTS a MESSAGE from the CHAIRMAN Ummit Meetings Between the United States and the Soviet Union

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840.2 .U452 1988 C.2 CONTENTS a MESSAGE from the CHAIRMAN Ummit Meetings Between the United States and the Soviet Union E 840.2 .U452 1988 c.2 CONTENTS A MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN ummit meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union. always headline news, have become media Summary of events on a grand scale. Both sides seek to influence Recommendatjons S and Findings ................ 2 the way the world views their leaders, the conduct of the meetings, the relationship bervveen the superpowers. and the policy Imroduction .. .... .. .......... 3 outcomes. Indeed, how summits are perceived fundamentally Preparing for shapes these outcomes and becomes a substantive pan of j the WashingtOn the process. Summit ... ........... 3 The members of this Commission believe that public [NF: The Public diplomacy should be treated as a st ralegic pan of summit sta tecraft. Affairs Challenge ......... .4 It is, after al l, the public component that makes summits unique and distinguishes them from other forms of diplomatic dialogue. Media Support In pre paring for summits, American policymakers pay a at the great deal of anention to protocol and policy issues. Despite Washington increased awareness of [he value of public diplomacy, it is still seen Summit .. .............. 6 too often only as press relations. Concern about public perceptions. Lessons for (he especially foreign public perceptions, becomes merely another Next Summit .... .7 routine planning item similar to budgets, logistics, and sec urity. Appendix .......... .. 8 Image is not more important than policy. But when image significantly affects the substance of policy, it must be given a higher priority than policymakers have given to it in the past. Public diplomacy supplements and reinforces tradi tional diplomacy through the explanation and advocacy of u.s. policies abroad. It provides foreign audiences with information about American society and culture, enables many to experience the diversity of our co untry through international educational eXChanges, and offers assessments of foreign public opinion (Q U. 5. policymakers. In this report. my colleagues and r have emphasized the st rategiC importance of public diplomacy to America's global interests, the essential role played by the United States In formation Agency in ca rrying out this nation's summit diplomacy, and the need to include its communications professionals early and regularly in the policy process. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. Chairman March, 1988 TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT - - ----OF THE UNITED STATES [n accordance with the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy submits herewith a report on "Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Washington Summit.'· Respectfully submitted, Edwin J. Feulner. Jr.. Chairman President. The Heritage Foundation Virginia (R) Tom C. KoroJogos Priscilla L Buckley Vice Chairman New York (R) Virginia (R) /~~~ Hershey Gold Richard M. Sca ife California (0) Pennsylvania (R) Herbert Schmertz New York (O) SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS --~ -~. ~------ ======RECOIIIIENDATIONS ,,' :-_-: • Public diplomacy should be treated as a primary slraleglC • The United States should insist that the Sovtets provide element in sum m il planning. II IS the public a1!enlion given press treatment and access at the Moscow summJl compara­ (0 summit meetings that makes them unique and distin­ ble 10 that extended by the U.S. at the WashlnglOn summit. guishes them from other forms of diplomatiC dialogue. This should be covered in a written understanding with the Soviets prior to the summit. • A comprehensive and coordinated public diplomacy sual­ egy for (he Moscow summit should be developed at (he • Equal access for foreign and domestic media should be highest levels of the White House. the Depanmem of Siale, pursued in pre-summil negotiations with the host country and the U.S. Informal ion Agency. The Special Planning for all summits taking place overseas. and combined press Group (SPG). escablished by President Reagan in National centers should be the norm in aJJ fmure summits In the Securi£}' Decision Directive (NSDD) 77. should be convened Umted States. at an early date by the ASSIstant to the President for National Security Affairs to consider such a strategy and its imple­ • U.S. spokespersons and senior officials should go to Mos­ mentation through the SPG's International Information cow before the principals arrive to provide background infor­ Commiltee (lIe). malion on the U.S. agenda and goals for the gathering world press. • Key elements in a summit p ublic diplomacy strategy should include early gUidance on U.S. policy goals; early • U.S. officials and other experts should participate in POSI­ decisions on summit themes; analysis of the anticipated summit briefings and other public diplomacy progra ms public opinion impact of proposed U.S. policies; assessment overseas. of potential publiC affairs strategies of other nations and responses to them: re ports on foreign public opinion and • Analyses of fore ign elite, media, and public ani tudes on media lrends; close cooperation between policy-makers and summit issues should be fully considered in the National Ihe public diplomacy community: and a well<onceived plan Security Decision DireCtives that establish U.s. summit of p ublic affairs activi ties focused on foreign media and goals. opinion elites. • The Unlled States should undertake more systematic eval­ • Senior USIA officers should be assigned to rhe White ualion of the Soviet Un ion's publiC diplomacy to provide as House and all imeragency planning groups to participate in full a picture of its impact as we have of Soviet military, the summit planning process . economic, and diplomatic activities. • President Reagan's appearance on Sovie t television imme­ • Regional pre-summit meetings of senior policymakers diately prior to the next summir should be a major public and USIA's Public Affai rs Officers can contribute significantly diplomacy goal. to public diplomacy planning and programming. FINDINGS, • In addition to Presidem Reagan's skillful publiCdiplomacy • Effective summit public diplomacy involves effort over an al the U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington. the United States extended period of time and requires interagency coordina­ Information Agency contributed a greal deal to its success. tion well before the summit becomes a cenainty and its lessons from Ihe Washington summit can serve U.S. inter­ agenda is set. eSls well. • Briefings of USIA's Public Affairs Officers in Geneva by • Favorable disposition of overseas audiences towards U.S. principal U.S. arms control negotiators prior to the Washing­ poSi tions is important to Ihe success of a Moscow summit ton summit Significantly helped USIA's posts contnbute to a and may be more difficult to achieve with the summit laking favorable climate in Europe for the INF Treaty. place outside of the United States. • President Reagan's broadcasts on Ihe Voice of America • USIA began public diplomacy planning for an INF agree­ and World net pnor to {he Washmgton summit and Secretary ment and a possible summit In WashinglOn more than SIX Shultz's imerviews al USIA's Foreign Press Cemerwere nota­ months before Ihe event. Although USIA received positive ble examples of successful hIgh level participation m sum­ responses to its thematiC and public affairs proposals. their mit public dIplomacy. quality and authorilativeness would have been enhanced by earlier policy guidance from Ihe White House and the De­ • The combined foreign and domesuc press center, recom­ panment of State . mended by USIA and agreed 10 by the White House and the State Department. contributed 10 positive foreign press cov­ • The Washington summit would have benefited from an erage al the Washington summit. early public diplomacy planning meeting involving senior officials from the White House. the National Security Coun­ cil, [he Depanmem of State. USIA, the Department of De­ fense and other agenCies. 2 • Draw foreign media attention to other important sum­ m it agenda items such as Arghanistan and human rights. INTRODUCTION - --- - The public diplomacy challenge was heightened by the intense media focus that would be inevitable at a he proposal for a superpower summit in Washing­ Washington summit. ton first surfaced during the Geneva meeting be­ Because public perceptions significantly affect Ttween President Reagan and General Secretary pol icies, this Commission believes it is imperative that Gorbachev in Novembcc 1985. Preparations for their his­ public diplomacy be treated as a primary strategic ele­ toric December. 1987 summit in the nation's capital. ment in summit planning. however. were hampered until almost the last minute by In this report, we wil! focus on the strategiC impor­ uncertainty as to if and when it would take place. ' Despite tance of communicating U.s. summit objectives to for­ this. the Washington summit is widely perceived to have eign audiences. We will stress also the need early in the been a success for President Reagan and American for­ pla nning process to develop a comprehensive summit eign policy_ public diplomacy strategy at the highest levels in the Much of the credit for this success must go to White House, the Department of State. the U,S [nforma­ President Reagan himselF. Much. tOO, must go to the skill­ tion Agency. and other civilian and military agencies of ful planning of public diplomacy proFessionals in the U.S . the United States. We wiJl seek to draw lessons from the Information Agency and elsewhere. Early on, senior dip­ Washington summit and suggest ways they can serve lomats in USIA understood that acceptance of the INF U.s. interests and contribute to future summits. Treaty by the Western Alliance hinged nOt only on the terms of the agreement. bur on public perceptions of it. On the one hand, the world could perceive the INF PREPARI NG FOR THE agreement for what it is: a successful accomplishment by the President and NATO stemming from President Rea­ WASHINGTON SUMMIT gan's offer to the Soviets in 198 [ to cancel deployment of Pe rshing JJ and ground-launched cruise missiles in re­ ell before a White House team was created to turn for a Soviet commitment to dismantle its SS-20 mis­ deal with the December.
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