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C2-26 Offensive Weapons

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C2-26 Offensive Weapons C2-26 Offensive Weapons 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 2 1.1 Scope of this guidance.................................................................................................... 2 1.2 Release of information: Freedom of Information Act ...................................................... 2 1.3 Background ..................................................................................................................... 2 1.4 Law and regulations ........................................................................................................ 3 1.5 Extent of prohibition......................................................................................................... 3 1.6 Roles and Responsibilities .............................................................................................. 3 2. Scope of offensive weapons controls......................................................................... 6 2.1 The Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959-1961 prohibit the possession and importation of:.................................................................................................................. 6 2.2 The Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Orders 1988, 2002 and 2004 prohibit the possession and importation of:..................................................................... 6 2.3 Seizure of offensive weapons ......................................................................................... 9 2.4 Antique weapons............................................................................................................. 9 2.5 Lock knives...................................................................................................................... 9 2.6 Crossbows....................................................................................................................... 9 2.7 Swords, bayonets, machetes, axes etc........................................................................... 9 2.8 Blowpipes and blow guns.............................................................................................. 10 3. HMRC Enforcement Policy......................................................................................... 11 3.1 General.......................................................................................................................... 11 3.2 Appeals and complaints ................................................................................................ 11 3.3 Non–prohibited offensive weapons ............................................................................... 11 3.4 Permitted importations .................................................................................................. 11 3.5 Offensive weapons in transit ......................................................................................... 15 3.6 Offensive weapons carried by passengers aboard aircraft or ships ............................. 15 3.7 Offensive weapons found on board a vessel ................................................................ 15 3.8 Offensive weapons which have been carried on an aircraft by a passenger................ 15 3.9 Carrying of knives in a public place............................................................................... 15 4. Health and Safety ........................................................................................................ 16 5. Operational Procedures.............................................................................................. 17 Page 1 of 17 C2-26 Offensive Weapons 1. Introduction 1.1 Scope of this guidance Our books of guidance are the main reference material for people in the Department. All HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) formal procedures and work systems are outlined in these books, which give managers and staff the Department’s rules, guidance and general advice on interpreting them. The guidance is aimed at HMRC staff and should not be relied upon by importers in their liability to obtain import licences and permits. This book of guidance covers guidance on the import prohibitions on offensive weapons, including knifes, and the procedures for dealing with detected importations and outlines the controls and explains the procedures to be followed The procedures should also be followed if you detect imported prohibited offensive weapons at outward bound controls. Please note: The use of ‘must’ in this guidance indicates mandatory checks or actions. 1.2 Release of information: Freedom of Information Act In this book of guidance the information detailed in section 5 or as detailed is exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act and must not be released to the public. It has been withheld because disclosure would prejudice operational procedures and assist in the avoidance of operational controls. All other information contained in this guidance may be released on request. This book of guidance should be read in conjunction with the Other reference and further reading section of the guidance. 1.3 Background HMRC plays a major role in the protection of society from the dangers posed by offensive weapons by enforcement of the UK prohibition on their importation. Prohibited offensive weapons are goods designed to kill or inflict serious injury for which there is no or very limited legitimate use to which they can be put by a member of the public. Our core objective is, through the detection of prohibited items, to prevent the illegal importation of prohibited weapons and to prosecute serious offenders. HMRC priorities are the: • detection and seizure of prohibited items carried on the person, in accompanied baggage and in postal/fast parcel imports; • targeting commercial importations of militaria, survival, camping, outward-bound type materials and similar goods which may include offensive weapons; and • passing of intelligence gained to other authorities for consideration of further action. Page 2 of 17 C2-26 Offensive Weapons 1.4 Law and regulations The prohibition on the importation of offensive weapons is established by the following legislation: z the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Acts 1959 to 1961; the importation of any such knife as described is hereby prohibited z the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, 2002 and 2004; Section 141(4) states: “The importation of a weapon to which this section applies is hereby prohibited.” Section 49(1)(b) of the of Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA) makes the goods liable to forfeiture for a breach of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Acts 1959 or Section 141(4) of the CJA “where –any goods are imported, landed or unloaded contrary to any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force with respect thereto under or by virtue of any enactment;” Section 139(1) of CEMA gives HM Revenue and Customs and UK Border Agency (UKBA) officers undertaking Customs functions the power of seizure as it states “Any thing liable to forfeiture under the customs and excise Acts may be seized…” Offence action can be taken under sections 50, 167 and 170(2) for those knowingly concerned in evading the import prohibition. 1.5 Extent of prohibition Prohibited offensive weapons may not be imported into the UK from either an EU or non-EU country. All prohibited offensive weapons are the subject to seizure. 1.6 Roles and Responsibilities HMRC Prohibitions and Restrictions Border Policy Group is responsible for: • formulating policy and procedures for administration of the controls on offensive weapons and issuing guidance therein; • consulting and liaison with inter departmental stakeholders on the above; • consulting and liaison with other government departments, and • providing assurance data as required on seizures. Page 3 of 17 C2-26 Offensive Weapons The Prohibitions and Restrictions Border Policy Group are located at: Room LG69 100, Parliament Street City of Westminster London SW1A 2BQ Tel: 0207 147 0583 Fax: 0207 147 0131. Responsibility of the Regions and Detection The Regions and Detection are responsible for enforcing the UK prohibition on the import of offensive weapons by operating selective, risk-based anti- smuggling checks on both intra-EU and third country movements of passengers and their baggage, crew members, freight, postal packages, and means of transport. They will: • allocate sufficient resources to administer the controls on licit importations of firearms; • operate controls in such a way as to maximize the detection of irregularities; • devise control procedures to detect illicit imports of firearms; • obtain relevant assurance and management information on seizures of offensive weapons; • influence policy, training and operational issues; and • ensuring appropriate training is available to anti- smuggling staff. Responsibility of the Home Office The Home Office is responsible for reflecting Government policy on offensive weapons by determining and tabling legislation creating powers of enforcement in consultation with HMRC who administer the import controls on its behalf. The Home Office Division referred to in this book is: Specialist Crime (SC1) (Public Order and Police Cooperation) 5th Floor Fry Building 2, Marsham Street London SW1P 4DF Page 4 of 17 C2-26 Offensive Weapons Role of the Intelligence Division (HMRC) Intelligence is responsible for co-ordinating all departmental intelligence activities and systems. Within Intelligence the NIU Customs provides
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