The Birth of Indology As an Islamic Science Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science

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The Birth of Indology as an Islamic Science Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science

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Hans Daiber Anna Akasoy Emilie Savage-Smith

volume 97

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ipts The Birth of Indology as an Islamic Science

Al-Bīrūnī’s Treatise on Yoga Psychology

Mario Kozah

leiden | boston Front cover: Yogini. India, Uttar Pradesh or Madya Period, tenth to eleventh century. Buff sandstone, h. 34 in., w. 17.25 in., d. 9.75 in. San Antonio Museum of Art, purchased with the John and Karen McFarlin Fund and the Asian Art Challenge Fund, 90.92. Photography by Peggy Tenison. Courtesy of the San Antonio Museum of Art. Back cover: Bilingual Ghaznavid dirham struck in the name of Maḥmūd of Ghazna in 1028 with Arabic and Sanskrit on obverse and reverse respectively. See Kozah, 2004, p. 269. Photography by Prof. Ali A. Minai from his private collection and with his kind permission.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Kozah, Mario, 1976- Title: The birth of indology as an Islamic science : Al-Biruni's treatise on yoga psychology / by Mario Kozah. Description: Boston : Brill, 2015. | Series: Islamic philosophy, theology, and science: text and studies, ISSN 0169-8729 ; v. 97 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015032417| ISBN 9789004290297 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004305540 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Båiråunåi, Muòhammad ibn Aòhmad, 973?-1048. Kitåab Båatanjal al-Hindåi fåi al-khalåaòs min al-irtibåak. | Pataänjali. Yogasåutra. | Yoga–History. | India–Civilization–Study and teaching–Islamic Empire. | Indian philosophy. Classification: LCC B132.Y6 K655 2015 | DDC 181/.452–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015032417

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This book is printed on acid-free paper. To my parents

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Contents

Acknowledgements ix

Introduction 1 1 Al-Bīrūnī: A Brief Summary of His Life and Major Works 7

1 Al-Bīrūnī: Prologues and Method 11 1 Al-Asʾila waʾl-Ajwiba 11 2 Al-Āthār ʾl-bāqiya ʿan ʾl-qurūn ʾl-khāliya 12 3 Al-Qānūn al-masʿūdī fiʾl-hayʾa waʾl-nujūm 18 4 Kitāb taḥqīq mā liʾl-Hind 23 5 Al-Bīrūnī, Hindu Cosmology, and Atomism 32

2 Hindu Metaphysics According to the Hind 34 1 Mediaeval Arabic Texts on Hinduism and Their Sources 34 2 Al-Bīrūnī’s Sanskrit Sources: Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal 37 3 The Differentiation of Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal 41 4 Theology from Kitāb Bātanjal to the Hind 43 5 Passage 1: The Theological Interface between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali 45 6 Passage 2: The Theological Interface between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Citations from the Book Referred to as gītā 55 7 Passage 3: Kitāb Sānk and the Discussion of Human and Divine Action in the Hind 65 8 Kitāb Sānk as Conclusion to the Comparative Triptych 71

3 Al-Nafs: the Soul in Kitāb Bātanjal 73 1 Introduction 73 2 From Kitāb Bātanjal to the Hind 74 3 The Soul and Spiritual Liberation 75 4 Al-Bīrūnī and Western Scholarship 76 5 The Yoga-Sūtra and the Psychology of Kitāb Bātanjal 80

4 Kitāb Bātanjal: the Preface and Sections i–iii 85 1 The Tripartite Preface of Kitāb Bātanjal 85 2 Section i: Concentration of the Heart (Mind) 96 3 Section ii: Guidance towards Praxis 106 4 Section iii: The Manner of Recompense 118 5 Conclusion 120 viii contents

5 Section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal: Liberation and Unification, a Reading 125 1 Introduction 125 2 Section iv and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali: Liberation, the Soul and the Intellect 126 3 The Soul, Matter and Unification 132 4 Liberation: The Intellect, Intellected and Intellector 139 5 Ibn Sīnā’s Treatment of the Soul and Intellect in Aḥwāl al-Nafs and His De Anima 146 6 Conclusion: Kitāb Bātanjal, Knowledge and Language 149

6 Al-Nafs: the Soul in the Hind 151 1 Introduction 151 2 The Body/Soul Relationship in the Hind 153 3 Chapter Seven of the Hind: On the Manner of Liberation from the World and the Description of the Path That Leads to It 154 4 The Part of Worship 155 5 Islamic Characteristics Attributed to the Hindu “God” 157 6 Liberation, Divine Unification, and Knowledge 159 7 The Nature of Liberation According to Kitāb Bātanjal and Kitāb Sānk 167 8 Conclusion: Liberation, Metempsychosis and al-Bīrūnī’s Islamic Reading of Hinduism 184

Conclusion 189

Appendix. Translation of Section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal 195 Glossary of Terms 206 Bibliography 209 Index of Subjects 221 Index of Modern Authors 224 Index of Names 225 Index of Ancient and Mediaeval Sources 227 Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank James Montgomery for carefully guiding my early thinking and writing about al-Bīrūnī during my time at the University of Cambridge and Tarif Khalidi for his support throughout our many years together as colleagues at the American University of Beirut and his insistence that I should never give up on this project. While working on this book I was fortunate enough to meet the brilliant Bilal Orfali to whom I am deeply grateful for wisely suggesting that I publish with Brill. I would like to thank Adam Silverstein for his very valuable comments and steady stream of advice. The book’s title was formulated one balmy evening on the shores of the Indian Ocean with the masterful assistance of Abdulrahim Abu-Husayn to whom I am greatly appreciative. I wish to thank Tara Zend for so expertly helping me to see the wood despite the innumerable trees and for spurring me to strip down the text in order to make it more reader-friendly. Thanks are also due to Hans Daiber, Anna Akasoy and Emilie Savage-Smith for accepting this book in the Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science series, and for their important comments and corrections, especially by Anna Akasoy, and to Teddi Dols and Kathy van Vliet for supervising the production of the volume. A special thank you is due to John Moffatt sj for reading through the whole manuscript one last time at short notice. My biggest debt of thanks is owed to my beloved Rachelle, Karl, and Kristina, for their patience and love, and to my dear parents Nolvi and Khalil without whose unfaltering faith in me and fathomless support I would never have been able to reach this point.

Introduction

Abū Rayḥān Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bīrūnī (d. ca. 1048) is one of the most famous scientists and polymaths in the history of Islamic civilization. Although his works rival those of his illustrious contemporaries in their depth and sophistication, there has been little scholarly writing about him in the West relative to his importance. This trend is beginning to change with the appearance in recent years of monographs in which scholars have mostly presented all- encompassing readings of al-Bīrūnī’s writings following a pattern of interpretation established by earlier scholarship. A number of encyclopaedic entries have also been published recently in addition to the republication of most of al-Bīrūnī’s works. These monographs have either tended towards a “life and works” approach to the study of al-Bīrūnī in the search for holistic interpretations of his methodology or have focused on his substantial contributions to the scientific disciplines of astronomy, geography, mineralogy, pharmacology and mathematics. In contrast, this book investigates al-Bīrūnī’s unique contribution to the study of comparative religion in his major work on India, Kitāb taḥqīq mā lil- Hind min maqūla maqbūla fiʾl-ʿaql aw mardhūla1 (henceforth referred to as the Hind), by considering what will be explained in terms of an “Islamisation” of Hinduism. Written in Arabic, the Hind may very well be the very first systematisation of “Indian” beliefs into one “Indian religion”,2 as al-Bīrūnī calls it, preceding by almost 900 years the definitions of Hinduism by nineteenth-century European Orientalists. Al-Bīrūnī’s explanation of Hinduism or “the Indian religion”, draws principally on his interpretation of Yoga psychology articulated in Kitāb Bātanjal, his exceptional Arabic translation which interprets the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali.3 Al- Bīrūnī’s reading of Hinduism and the Yoga-Sūtra relies on common denomina-

1 Alberuni’s India: An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws, and Astrology of India. Edward Sachau (ed.) Arabic in 1 vol., English in 2 vols. London: Trübner & Co, 1887/1888. [Arabic edition reprinted in Hyderabad, 1958. Reprinted by F. Sezgin. Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic Science, 1993]. All consequent references and citations of the Arabic will be taken from the Hyderabad edition. 2 al-niḥlatu ʾl-hindiyyatu (Hind, p. 38, l. 5). 3 “Al-Bīrūnī’s Übersetzung des Yoga-Sūtra des Patañjali”, ed. H. Ritter, in Oriens 9 (2), Dec. 31, pp. 165–200; trans. S. Pines and T. Gelblum “Al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic Version of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra”, in bsoas 29 (2), 1966, pp. 302–325; 40 (3), 1977, pp. 522–549; 46 (2), 1983, pp. 258–304; 52 (2), 1989, pp. 265–305.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004305540_002 2 introduction tors he identifies as fundamental, most prominently the idea of a “shibboleth”4 or banner5 that unifies belief, and the concept of a “Holy Book” that represents a principal point of reference. In the case of Hinduism al-Bīrūnī identifies metempsychosis as its banner and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali as being its Holy Book. This comparative method was intended to make Hinduism more comprehensible to the Muslim reader:

Just as the declaration of the Article of Faith is the emblem of Muslim belief, Trinitarianism the sign of Christianity and the institution of the Sabbath that of Judaism, so is metempsychosis the banner of the Indian religion, such that he who does not profess it does not belong to it and is not considered to be a member.6

The book investigates al-Bīrūnī’s use of Yoga psychology, according to his Ara- bic translation of Patañjali’s work on the Yoga-Sūtra, to support his principal statement that transmigration of the souls is the banner of the Hinduism. Ulti- mately, we will identify the significance of al-Bīrūnī’s approach to Hinduism and the possible purpose that underlies this exceptionally early effort to define and systematize Hindu beliefs. With these considerations in mind this book conducts a close textual analysis of the methodology that underpins al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of Hindu beliefs and focuses on al-Bīrūnī’s contribution to comparative religion being one of the earliest Muslim scientific studies in the field of Indology. As such it fills a significant gap in scholarship on al-Bīrūnī and represents an important step forward in making one central aspect of this exceptional work on India from the Mediaeval Islamic period more accessible. The book begins by introducing al-Bīrūnī through an overview of his life and works to set the bio- bibliographical context for the Hind. Particular attention will be paid to the secondary literature analysing the period during which he travelled in India and interacted with Hindu pundits, or had indirect contact with Indian culture through its literature. The main thrust of the book will investigate al-Bīrūnī’s definition of Hindu beliefs as based on his premise that transmigration of the souls is the distinguishing sign of the “Indian religion”. Al-Bīrūnī’s posi-

4 “Shibboleth” is Edward Sachau’s translation of shiʿār (Hind, p. 38, l. 4). 5 ʿalam (Hind, p. 38, l. 5). 6 kamā anna ʾl-shahādata bikalimati ʾl-ikhlāṣi shiʿāru īmāni ʾl-muslimīna waʾl-tathlītha ʿalāmatu ʾl-naṣrāniyyati waʾl-isbāta ʿalāmatu ʾl-yahūdiyyati kadhālika ʾl-tanāsukha ʿalamu ʾl-niḥlati ʾl- hindiyyati faman lam yantaḥilhu lam yakun minhā wa lam yuʿadd min jumlatihā (Hind, p. 38, l. 4). introduction 3 tion relies principally on his interpretation of Yoga psychology as articulated in Kitāb Bātanjal. After analysing the psychology of Kitāb Bātanjal as a reading rather than a pure translation of the Yoga-Sūtra, al-Bīrūnī’s extensive use of Kitāb Bātanjal in the Hind will be explored. A comparative textual study will posit that al-Bīrūnī’s thesis depends upon his careful interpretation of Kitāb Bātanjal which he considers, at the outset of the Hind, to bear the fundamentals of Hindu beliefs. The comparative study will conclude with an illustrative investigation of al-Bīrūnī’s description of metempsychosis. The general conclusion highlights the importance of al-Bīrūnī’s unique contribution in the history of comparative religion. The conclusion also explores the reasoning that underlies al-Bīrūnī’s Indological systematisation of Hindu beliefs to produce his vision of a unified religion. Ultimately, the important research of the nineteenth century European Orientalist Edward Sachau is considered to try to discern whether his foundational and still unique English translation of the Hind may have inspired what he and other Europeans came to define as “Hinduism” in the light of al-Bīrūnī’s pioneering attempt at a comprehensive classification of Hindu beliefs. Chapter One, entitled “Al-Bīrūnī: Prologues and Method”, analyses the prologues to three of al-Bīrūnī’s works, the Hind, Qānūn,7 and Āthār,8 to arrive at a more accurate appreciation of his general methodology and philosophy. To achieve such an appreciation a number of points not previously addressed in the literature will be investigated throughout. Each prologue will be placed in a historical, political, and intellectual context to ensure the interpretation draws into consideration questions of patronage, dynastic rivalry, and personal advancement. The chief work to be used as a basis for the formation of the intellectual context is the Asʾila,9 which is a correspondence between al-Bīrūnī and his lifelong intellectual rival Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037). The Asʾila is crucial because of its formative influence on al-Bīrūnī’s career and, more importantly, its role as an index of the main issues in debate at the time, the nature of such debates, and their usefulness for delineating differing schools of thought. Finally, al-Bīrūnī’s methodology will be gleaned from an appreciation and, where necessary, a reinterpretation of his language. This will ensure that

7 Al-Qānūn al-Masʿūdī. Introduction by Syed Hasan Barani, 3 vols. Hyderabad: 1954–1956. 8 Al-Āthāral-Bāqiyaʿanal-Qurūn al-Khāliya. Eduard Sachau (ed.). Leipzig: 1878. TheChronology of Ancient Nations, trans. E. Sachau. London, 1879. Reprinted by F. Sezgin, Frankfurt, 1993. 9 Al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā, al-Asʾila waʾl-ajwiba, eds. S.H. Nasr and M. Mohaghegh. Tehran, 1973. Reprinted in Kuala Lumpur, 1995. “ibn Sina–Al-Biruni correspondence”, in Islam & Science, Trans. Rafik Berjak and Muzaffar Iqbal, Jun 2003; Dec 2003; Summer 2004; Winter 2004; Summer 2005; Winter 2005; Winter 2006; Summer 2007. 4 introduction our understanding of his methodology and its development derives directly from the immediate texts to be considered and their historic-intellectual context. Chapter Two, “Hindu Metaphysics According to the Hind”, introduces the reader to the Hind, and considers its sources, structure, and the methodological conclusions which may be drawn from it. The Hind epitomises al-Bīrūnī’s study of Hindu culture and civilisation. Based on a wide-ranging examination of San- skrit scientific and religious sources, many of which are no longer extant,10 as well as conversations with Indian physicians who were held captive at the court of his patron, Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna, and with Hindu pundits he met while accompanying Sultan Maḥmūd on military campaigns in northern India. The Hind was completed in 1030 shortly after Maḥmūd’s death. The twelve years al-Bīrūnī spent as court astrologer under Maḥmūd afforded him ample opportunity to gather information about India and acquire knowledge of Sanskrit and regional Indian dialects which he then used to understand and translate texts on Hindu philosophy and science. The preface and first ten chapters of the Hind centre almost exclusively on religious, psychological, and metaphysical subjects that present predominantly doctrinal discussions on Hindu (and other) beliefs in God, creation, metempsychosis, salvation and rituals of worship. However, the vast bulk of this work, thirty-seven of the eighty chapters, is a systematic appreciation and demonstration of Indian science that include: grammar, metrology, chrestomathy, astrology and astronomy, cosmology and cosmography, chronology and mathematics. The final fifteen chapters set out Hindu ritual practices, principally initiation and funerary ceremonies, obligatory sacrifices and dietary rules, together with fasting, pilgrimage and festival observances. Reference will be made to articles which use this structure to argue that al-Bīrūnī derived his information from a limited number of sources and that he wittingly shaped the organization and content of the Hind according to a preconceived view of Hindu culture and belief. The format of this chapter on the Hind incorporates three key points. First, by examining the sources and method which al-Bīrūnī draws on and employs in the Hind, a clearer understanding of his reflection of Hindu theology and psychology emerges. Second, the theology and psychology of the Hind are to be found in the first twelve chapters of the book and it is here and upon these chosen subjects that analysis will be concentrated. For one, the areas of theology and psychology

10 Cf. al-Bīrūnī’s Risāla fī fihrist kutub Muḥammad b. Zakariyyā al-Rāzī. P. Kraus (ed.). Paris, 1936. introduction 5 in the Hind present an informative case study detailing how al-Bīrūnī used primary Sanskrit and secondary Arabic sources in his critical and analytical explication of Hinduism. Thirdly, insight into al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic translations of Sanskrit texts,11 as they are manipulated in the first twelve chapters of the Hind, not only reveals a continuity of purpose and method, from the translations to an explication and further development of citations from them in the Hind, but also discloses a unified interpretation and vision by al-Bīrūnī of the subjects of Hindu psychology and theology. Thus, al-Bīrūnī presents a reading of Hinduism based on his belief that the transmigration of the soul is the characterising sign of the “Indian religion” as he calls it. Chapters Three, Four, and Five comprise in the main an analysis of the tripartite preface in Kitāb Bātanjal followed by its four sections with particular attention given to the nature and development of the presentation of the soul, al-nafs, as it is perceived in al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of the literary culture of Hindu metaphysical speculation and, specifically, as it is articulated in the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. Building on arguments made in earlier academic articles,12 this analysis suggests that there is a continuum of methodological perspective between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind and that Kitāb Bātanjal is not merely a bold effort to communicate the essentials of yogic ascesis to a Muslim readership, but marks the beginning of an interpretation and evaluation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali which finds its final form in the Hind. Thus, the initial ten chapters of the Hind offer far more than a distillation and an extension of an Arabic translation of the Yoga-Sūtra or a magisterial overview of Hindu notions whose subject matter is simply equivalent to that broached in Islamic speculative theology. These three chapters lead to the concluding argument that Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind seem not only to maintain a continuum of methodological perspective but also comprise a representation of the Yoga- Sūtra which closely reflects the Sūtras and fully engages with both unidentified and recognized commentaries. Such a representation also illuminates the cultural and intellectual Ghaznavid court context in which these works arose. The main argument of these three chapters, then, is that the purpose of such a representation is ultimately realized in the Hind where al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of Hindu psychology is used specifically to support his reading of Hinduism.

11 Mainly Kitāb Bātanjal but also the no longer extant Kitāb Sānk and gītā whose subject matter is psychological, metaphysical and theological. 12 For example, the excellent studies by Rosenthal, F., “Al-Biruni Between Greece and India”, and Lawrence, B.B., “Al-Bīrūnī’s Approach to the Comparative Study of Indian Culture”, in Biruni Symposium, (1976). 6 introduction

Chapter Six, “Al-Nafs: the Soul in the Hind”, has a twofold purpose: the first is to explore the final stage in the evolving continuum of methodological interpretation from the translation of Kitāb Bātanjal, to the distillation and summation of the “Indian religion” accomplished in the Hind. In parallel fashion, the case study on the nature of the soul, begun with the Arabic translation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali also finds its natural conclusion in the early chapters of the Hind. The basic issues argued in this case study will be tackled by focusing on the text of the Hind and on a number of points in particular. These are: establishing a continuity of argument, interpretation and analysis from Kitāb Bātanjal and the Sāmkhya text, or Kitāb Sānk as it is referred to by al-Bīrūnī, to those chapters which discuss the Hindu understanding of the soul in the Hind; then exploring the process by which particular concepts of the soul as described in Sanskrit sources referred to or quoted through translation and oral information, are incorporated in the text of the Hind. Next, corroborating certain terminological interpretations in Kitāb Bātanjal will be achieved by comparing the use of these terms and their connotations in the text of the Hind. Finally, those arguments relating to al-Bīrūnī’s definition of Hinduism which depend on an interpretation of specific passages found in Kitāb Bātanjal will be consolidated by comparing these passages as they are quoted in the more analytical context of the Hind. The second purpose in Chapter Six will be to investigate al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of Hindu belief in metempsychosis as he presents it in the fifth chapter of the Hind in the light of his defining statement that this is the characterizing feature of Hinduism. It will be argued that the concept of metempsychosis is not only represented as the chief distinguishing feature of the “Indian religion”, as al-Bīrūnī refers to it, but also forms the final refinement in the exploration of the content and nature of Hindu psychology begun with the translation of San- skrit texts and particularly Kitāb Bātanjal. Interestingly, the tripartite preface to Kitāb Bātanjal cites belief in metempsychosis as the banner religious doctrine and, by direct association, the framework for the psychology of the book suggesting this overarching theme from the outset:

This is a people whose discourse about their religion is never bare of topics concerning reincarnation and the misfortunes of incarnation and unification and generation not according to the principle of birth.13

13 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 15. introduction 7

Building on previous analyses, the discussion on the nature of the soul in the Hind in this chapter will identify the wider concept of metempsychosis as the common denominator in the various psychological details cited and as the theoretical mould within which the previously quoted passages from sources and the diverse technical and terminological descriptions were presented. This argument not only consolidates the notion of a continuity and synthesis of methodology and psychology in the process from Kitāb Bātan- jal to the Hind, but also establishes, by this proposed single unifying concept, far greater philosophical and religious significance within the intellectual contemporary context of the vibrant Muslim psychological debate. What is of primary interest is the approach towards the concept of metempsychosis among a number of Muslim authors that illustrate a surprising diversity of opinion. An objection may be raised regarding the rationale of comparing the discussion of metempsychosis in the Hind, being, overtly a description of a doctrine within the Hindu belief system, with the concept of metempsychosis in Muslim psychological writing such as in the De Anima of Ibn Sīnā’s Shifāʾ. This would be the case if the text of the Hind were composed purely of translations and direct quotations from Sanskrit with no analytical or explanatory input whatsoever. However, not only is the subject explained in a manner which facilitates understanding for a Muslim readership by means of, for example, illuminating comparisons with Sufism and the classical Greek tradition but also, and more significantly, the terminology of contemporary Arabic philosophical debate is consciously used throughout. This usage, as earlier argued, suggests a motivation beyond the simple presentation of a non-Islamic doctrine. The Hind engages with and expounds on the subject of metempsychosis within what may be viewed as an Islamising sphere of intellectual deliberation but without any self-imposed restrictions given its non-Islamic subject matter. By proceeding in this fashion, al-Bīrūnī renders the accusation of heresy an impossibility and grants himself a free hand to explore unscathed the Hind’s controversial concept, in all its facets, within the definition of Hinduism which al-Bīrūnī provides in reference to what he refers to as the “Indian religion”.

1 Al-Bīrūnī: A Brief Summary of His Life and Major Works

Al-Bīrūnī was born in 973, most probably in Kāth, which at that time was the capital of the city-state of Khwārazm located in the Transoxania region of Central Asia.14 Although his native language was Khwārazmian this region was

14 See Bosworth, C.E., “Bīrūnī: Life”, in EIran, p. 274; Boilot, D.J., “Bīrūnī”, in ei2. 8 introduction in no sense provincial given the long years of direct and indirect cultural and linguistic influence by Persia, India and even China. Thus, from the outset al- Bīrūnī was exposed to a spectrum of influences which shaped his lifelong passion for closely studying other civilizations and religions. By the tenth century the region of Transoxania had produced some of the most remarkable figures in the intellectual history of Islam and in the fields of mathematics, ḥadīth, kalām, and philosophy. The first scholar, Muḥammad b. Mūsā al-Khwārazmī (d. ca. 847) is often considered to be the inventor of algebra, although he in fact developed this and other mathematical operations based on older Indian and Greek sources which he was most likely first exposed to in Khwārazm. Shortly afterwards, Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī (d. 870), compiled what is considered the most authentic of ḥadīth collections, the Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī. No less eminently, Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī (d. ca. 944), a famous theologian and a scholar of Islamic jurisprudence and Qurʾanic exegesis, founded one of the two foremost schools of Sunnī theology, kalām, and became known as one of the pioneers of Islamic jurisprudence. Finally,two of the most prominent founding figures of the Arabic philosophical tradition, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī (d. 950) and Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), also hail from this region of Central Asia. Al-Fārābī was a renowned Muslim scientist and philosopher as well as an accomplished cosmologist, logician, and musician. Through his treatises he became known among medieval Muslim intellectuals as “The Second Teacher”, that is, the successor to Aristotle, “The First Teacher”. Al- Bīrūnī’s contemporary Ibn Sīnā is considered the most famous and influential polymath of the Islamic Golden Age. This is the intellectual milieu in which al-Bīrūnī was born and educated and where he spent the first 22 years of his life from 973–995 under the rule of the Āl-i ʿIrāq Khwārazm-shāhs. As for his name, much speculation has gone into explaining his nisba or ascription “al-Bīrūnī”.The most convincing explanations remain those provided by the Encyclopedia Iranica and Encyclopedia of Islam both of which explain the nisba as relating to the fact that al-Bīrūnī was born of an Iranian family on the outskirts (bīrūn) of Kāth.15 Very little biographical information can be verified from this early period of al-Bīrūnī’s life, however, it would seem that he received his early education under a teacher by the name of Abū Naṣr Manṣūr b. ʿAlī b. ʿIrāq whom he mentions in the Āthār,16 one of al-Bīrūnī’s earlier works. In 995 al-Bīrūnī fled his home city when his patrons,

15 Ibid. 16 Al-Bīrūnī, al-Āthār ʾl-bāqiya ʿan ʾl-qurūn ʾl-khāliya. E.C. Sachau (ed.). Leipzig, 1878, repr. Leipzig, 1923, p. 184: ustādhī Abī Naṣr Manṣūr ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿIrāq mawlā Amīr al-Muʾminīn. introduction 9 the ruling dynasty of Āl-i ʿIrāq were defeated at the hands of Āl-i Maʾmūn of Jurjāniyya, an independent Iranian family. A period of wandering ensued with al-Bīrūnī living at times in Khwārazm and at others in Jurjān, searching for patronage and permanent residence. At some point during these difficult years (995–998) he initiated a correspondence with his rival Ibn Sīnā who was most probably living in Jurjāniyya and in the service of the Āl-i Maʾmūn or the Maʾmūnids from ca. 997–1012. It is unclear whether an actual meeting between the two took place although such a hypothetical meeting would most probably have occurred in one of the Maʾmūnid courts. This correspondence, referred to as al-Asʾila waʾl-Ajwiba,17 is significant because it reveals the scientific and philosophical context in which al-Bīrūnī thought and worked, as will be discussed in the next chapter. It is in 998, most likely in Jurjān, that al-Bīrūnī found in the Ziyārid Shams al-Maʿālī Qābūs b. Wushmagīr (d. 1012/13) his next significant patron. Under the apparently generous patronage of this fourth ruler of the Ziyārid dynasty of Ṭabaristān and Jurjān, al-Bīrūnī wrote his Āthār, probably in 1000, which is dedicated to his new patron and remains one of his greatest scholarly achievements with its broad scope of subject matter, especially its sections on astronomy, history, and religions. In 1004 al-Bīrūnī returned to Jurjāniyya, the new capital of Khwārazm, to serve the Maʾmūnids whose favour he had gained under the patronage of the Khwārazm-shāhs Abū ʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī (997– 1008/9) and Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās al-Maʾmūn b. Maʾmūn (d. 1017). During this period al-Bīrūnī wrote a number of scientific works including his Taḥdīd18 and also served the Maʾmūnid court in diplomatic and political posts. Following the betrayal and death of al-Maʾmūn in 1017, Maḥmūd of Ghazna (971–1030), the ruler of the Ghaznavid Empire, invaded Khwārazm under the pretext of aveng- ing his brother-in-law’s murder. With this annexation and the effective demise of the Maʾmūnids, al-Bīrūnī found himself, along with other prominent scholars (including Ibn Sīnā), adjusting to a new dynastic sphere of influence. While Ibn Sīnā and other scholars went west, al-Bīrūnī hesitated and ultimately came under Maḥmūd’s patronage. Whether this was a decision which he took or was taken for him remains unclear and his relationship with his new patron has been the subject of much speculation. What is certainly the case, however, is that from 1017 to the date of his death in 1048 al-Bīrūnī found himself mostly in Ghazna, the capital of the Ghaznavid empire, in the courts and under

17 Al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā al-Asʾila waʾl-ajwiba. S.H. Nasr and M. Mohaghegh (eds.). Tehran, 1973. Reprinted in Kuala Lumpur, 1995. 18 Kitāb taḥdīd nihāyat ʾl-amākin li-taṣḥīḥ masāfāt ʾl-masākin. P.G. Bulgakov (ed.). Cairo, 1962. Reprinted by F. Sezgin, Frankfurt, 1992. 10 introduction the patronage of three Ghaznavid sultans: Maḥmūd (1017–1030), Masʿūd (1031– 1041), and Mawdūd (1041–1048), and that under their auspices he produced his greatest works. Under Maḥmūd he wrote his magnum opus on India, the Hind19 (ca. 1030), and his landmark astronomical work the Qānūn20 (ca. 1035) was written under Maḥmūd’s son and successor Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd. During the final years of his life under Masʿūd’s son Mawdūd b. Masʿūd he completed his two great mineralogical and pharmacological works: al-Jamāhir21 (after 1041) and al-Ṣaydana22 (ca. 1048), the last known work he wrote before his death. Despite the clear progress and increased sophistication of al-Bīrūnī scholarship on the Hind in recent years there still exists a common and inherited seam of a priori assumptions. Thus the sophistication does not necessarily reflect a greater sensitivity to the text of the Hind, the methodology that sustains it, or the historical and intellectual circumstances that shape it, but instead reflects a refinement of earlier assumptions. Indeed, at no stage in the chronology of al-Bīrūnī scholarship is a sustained attempt made to understand the Hind in the light of the frontier dynasty under which it was produced, the personal and philosophical motives for its conception, and the socio-cultural implications of a work on Hinduism whose methodology is openly dispassionate despite its seemingly controversial, even heretical, subject matter. Rather, al-Bīrūnī’s approach to Hindu thought is largely misconstrued in that it is either perceived to be imperfect or limited by the sources consulted. Such views ignore the real possibility of a deliberate reading of the Indian philosophical corpus and, by extension, the contributions of Indian science in order for it to be integrated as a comprehensible, if not compatible, cosmology into the worldview of the Muslim educated elite. It will be demonstrated that this process of integration by al-Bīrūnī is not so much an “Islamisation” of Hindu beliefs in the Hind but more a comparative methodology in which culturally specific categorization is not selective or constrictive of its subject matter.

19 Kitāb taḥqīq mā liʾl-Hind min maqūla maqbūla fiʾl-ʿaql aw mardhūla. E. Sachau (ed.). London, 1887. Reprinted in Hyderabad, 1958. Reprinted by F. Sezgin, Frankfurt, 1993. 20 al-Qānūn ʾl-masʿūdī fīʾl-hayʾa waʾl-nujūm. S.H. Barani (ed.). Hyderabad, 1954–1956. 21 Kitāb ʾl-jamāhir fī maʿrifat ʾl-jawāhir. F. Krenkow (ed.). Hyderabad, 1936. Reprinted by F. Sezgin, Frankfurt, 2001. 22 Kitāb ʾl-ṣaydana fiʾl-ṭibb. Hakim Muhammad Said (ed.). Karachi, 1973. chapter 1 Al-Bīrūnī: Prologues and Method

1 Al-Asʾila waʾl-Ajwiba

The Asʾila is the correspondence that al-Bīrūnī conducted with Ibn Sīnā during al-Bīrūnī’s stay in the Sāmānid capital of Bukhara after having secured the patronage of the Sāmānid emir, Manṣūr ii b. Nūḥ ii (997–999). The Asʾila consists of ten questions posed by al-Bīrūnī regarding the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s De Caelo, al-Samāʾ waʾl-ʿĀlam, plus eight other questions that relate to a range of contentions within the Peripatetic, mashshāʾī, School of natural philosophy and that present a critical challenge to Ibn Sīnā, then the most emi- nent representative of this school. Ibn Sīnā answers each of the questions posed with varying success. The Asʾila presents the scientific and philosophical context in which al-Bīrūnī thought and worked. It exposes, firstly, several of the most problematic scientific issues of the time and their metaphysical connotations, as well as the existence of an anti-Peripatetic current within the contemporary Islamic intellectual framework. The Peripatetic School dominated the philosophical tradition in Islamic civilisation and coloured much of the language of the great Muslim scientists, including al-Bīrūnī. The Asʾila, however, presents al-Bīrūnī’s logical criticism of Peripatetic natural philosophy by questioning the basis of its reasoning and its science in a rigorous exchange of mutually comprehensible terminology. Whether al-Bīrūnī’s logical criticism has an philosophical source derived, for example, from the Pythagorean-Hermetic heritage of Antiquity or from his introduction to Indian science, philosophy and cosmological doctrines can only be gleaned from examining the contents of his writings and the nuances in the comparisons he makes, an analysis that has thus far only been attempted to a limited extent in the secondary literature. The importance of the Asʾila lies not only in that it marks a key point in Islamic intellectual history, natural philosophy and the sciences but also in its foregrounding a defining moment at the outset of al-Bīrūnī’s career. By com- peting against the most famous intellectual rival of his time and choosing to differ on any number of a priori theories which form the basis of Aristotelian physics, al-Bīrūnī signalled his independence from the Peripatetic School and simultaneously established a tabula rasa from which to explore the empirical sciences and the development of ideas from new sources. The language used to express such ideas, though coloured by Aristotle’s dominant influence, belongs

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004305540_003 12 chapter 1 neither to al-Bīrūnī nor Ibn Sīnā,1 but rather derives from the lexicon of the Abbasid translators and the falāsifa written (specifically) to serve as a common language for philosophical dialectic. The same philosophical language is, therefore, used to give accounts of very different philosophies and this is, at times, markedly the case in each of al-Bīrūnī’s prefaces that we shall be examining. Interestingly, the intellectual rivalry between al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā is paralleled by the religio-dynastic rivalries of the courts to which they belonged. Both the Ziyārids and the Ghaznavids in whose rulers al-Bīrūnī found patronage were the implacable rivals of the Buyids in whose courts Ibn Sīnā found favour.

2 Al-Āthār ʾl-bāqiya ʿan ʾl-qurūn ʾl-khāliya

Al-Bīrūnī composed the Āthār in 1000 at the age of twenty-seven and dedicated it to his patron and master Shams al-Maʿālī Qābūs b. Wushmagīr, the Ziyārid ruler of Jurjān. Its wide-ranging subject matter includes astronomical, historical, and religious sections concerning the pre-Islamic Arabs, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, and Indians. The Āthār is based on a broad reading of Arabic and other sources as well as oral information gathered to detail the historical and scientific chronology of these civilisations. Al-Bīrūnī must have been aware of the dynastic struggles between the Ziyārids of Jurjān and Tabaristān, who were Sunnis and allies of the Ḥanafī Sāmānids, and the pow- erful Shiʿite Buyid dynasty in the West. Al-Bīrūnī demonstrates his loyalty to his patron, Qābūs b. Wushmagīr, by highlighting the rise of his dynasty in the fourth chapter of the Āthār, which contains a long criticism of the “false” claim of the Buyids to descent from the Sasanian emperor Bahrām Gūr alongside praise of the “true” descent of Qābūs b. Wushmagīr from the Sasanian royal house. The eventual outcome of the military struggle was that the Būyid ruler ʿAḍud al-Dawla was able to

1 Ibn Sīnā’s intellectual relationship with al-Bīrūnī can be initially gauged by comparing con- temporaneously written works. For instance, Ibn Sīnā’s encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences, al-ḥāṣil waʾl-maḥṣūl, was written in Bukhara at about the same time al-Bīrūnī was composing his first major work, the Āthār or Chronology, in 1000. Secondly, while Ibn Sīnā was busy completing his encyclopaedia of philosophy, Kitāb ʾl-Inṣāf, al-Bīrūnī was collating material for his Hind, a work, it is argued, of cultural philosophy. Finally, while Ibn Sīnā was conducting his astronomical research and observation at Isfahan, al-Bīrūnī was compiling his magnum opus on astronomy, the Qānūn. Cf. Barani, S.H., “Ibn Sīnā and Alberuni, a study in similarities and contrasts”. Avicenna Commemoration Volume. Calcutta, 1956, pp. 3–14. al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 13 wrest Kirmān from nominal Sāmānid overlordship and to prevail most of the time in Tabaristān and Jurjān against Qābūs b. Wushmagīr. After his death in 1011–1012 the Ziyārid dynasty became a virtual tributary to the Ghaznavids. This represents al-Bīrūnī’s first encounter with the dynasty in whose court he was to spend the final three decades of his life under Maḥmūd, Masʿūd, Mawdūd, and their successors, dying some time after 1050, perhaps during the sultanate of ʿAbd al-Rashīd. The preface to the Āthār may be divided into four parts: a doxology, a discussion of the Imām’s divinely ordained role in society perfectly exemplified in Muḥammad, the attribution of this role to Qābūs b. Wushmagīr or Shams al-Maʿālī, as he is referred to here, and a description of al-Bīrūnī’s methodology in this work. In this way al-Bīrūnī emphasises the interrelatedness of this hierarchy with the natural extension of his patron’s exalted position underscored through the author’s dependency on him. The doxology begins with a pious expression of monotheism that describes God as above things that are like and unlike each other.2 Muḥammad then follows as the “chosen one”,3 and the “perfect man”.4 This concept of the “perfect man” forms a divinely ordained standard at the outset of al-Bīrūnī’s preface against which all men are measured. The final section of the doxology asks for an invocation of blessings upon the family of the Prophet who are held to be “Imāms of right-guidance and truth”.5 The idea of the Truth, al-Ḥaqq, features very strongly in al-Bīrūnī’s thinking and varies in nuance according to the religious or scientific context of its use. By presenting this concept as an inherent quality of the Imām, al-Bīrūnī underlines the religious dimension of its meaning, but without making it exclusively religious or the sole property of the Imām, as later passages will reveal. An accurate description of al-Bīrūnī’s understanding of divine knowledge, providence, prophethood, the role of the Imām in society, and the political philosophy in the Āthār can only be successfully achieved if one is familiar with the formative intellectual rivalry of the Asʾila between al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīna. In the “Metaphysics” of his Shifāʾ Ibn Sīnā states that the world emanates from God as a consequence of His self-knowledge. In contrast, al-Bīrūnī conceives of God as transcendent,6 with the being of particular existents dependent on Him, even though they are not vessels of His Omniscience. For Ibn

2 al-mutaʿālī ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi waʾl-ashbāhi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 3). 3 al-muṣṭafā (ibid.). 4 khayru ʾl-khalqi (ibid.). 5 aʾimmatu ʾl-hudā waʾl-ḥaqqi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 4). 6 Āthār, p. 1, l. 3. 14 chapter 1

Sīnā political philosophy rests on the theory of prophethood and revelation, which means that the law revealed through prophets consists of the truths of theoretical and practical philosophy in a language that is understandable to the majority of humanity.7 The implication, therefore, is that, in the hierarchy of existents, the prophet is ranked below the philosopher just as revelation is a necessary simplification of the abstract universal concept. Al-Bīrūnī’s contrasting reference to an Imām rather than a prophet in the preface to the Āthār is not a promotion of an Imāmate per se which would be at variance with Ziyārid Sunnism.8 The emphasis that al-Bīrūnī places on the role of the Imām is not an attempt to undermine the supremacy of the law-revealing prophet; rather, it is to complement the prophet’s position and to demonstrate that God’s knowledge of the good order9 necessarily expresses itself in His providence,10 in this case, through the gift of an Imām. By positing the presence of an Imām in every age,11 al-Bīrūnī lessens the significance of Ibn Sīnā’s argument that prophets appear on the historical scene very infrequently. Instead, al-Bīrūnī contends that God sends a just Imām for every period.12 This counters the practical implications Ibn Sīnā proposes regarding the setting down of institutions and traditions to ensure the contin- uance of the good order once the prophet is gone. For Ibn Sīnā, the infrequent appearance of prophets has a metaphysical explanation that relates to the rare bodily reception of a prophetic soul. Never- theless, he argues for a still higher stage that is the direct reception of “intelligibles” from the Active Intellect. In contrast, in the preface to the Āthār al-Bīrūnī places Shams al-Maʿālī at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of existents,13 comparable in character to the Prophet14 being God’s chosen deputy15 and shadow on earth. Ibn Sīnā considers the perfect man to be one who combines speculative

7 Encyclopaedia Iranica, “Avicenna”: Section iv, “Metaphysics”. 8 This is not to deny the possibility of Ismāʿīlī influences, active in the tenth century, upon al-Bīrūnī’s thinking. It is significant that the only Arab author mentioned in the introduction to the Hind is Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī, the tenth century Ismāʿīlī author, despite the vast wealth of information about Greek philosophy and other relevant topics that inform the works of many of al-Bīrūnī’s contemporaries or predecessors. 9 niẓāmu ʾl-ʿālami (Āthār, p. 1, l. 7). 10 min laṭāʾifi tadbīri ʾllāhi taʿālā fī maṣāliḥi bariyyatihi wa jalāʾili niʿamihi ʿalā kāffati khalīqa- tihi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 4). 11 zamān (Āthār, p. 1, l. 5). 12 lā yukhallī fī ʿālamihi zamānan ʿan imāmin ʿādilin (Āthār, p. 1, l. 5). 13 faqāla subḥānuhu—wa innaka laʿalā khuluqin ʿaẓīmin (Āthār, p. 1, l. 13). 14 wa amaddahu bikhuluqin qad imtanna bimithlihi ʿalā nabiyyihi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 13). 15 al-muṣṭafā (Āthār, p. 1, l. 3). al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 15 wisdom with justice and, thus, attains his prophetic qualities. For al-Bīrūnī the Sufi concept of the perfect man16 is embodied in the person of the divinely sent and just Imām17 comparable in character and qualities to the Prophet Muḥam- mad. Moreover, such an Imām represents man as a microcosmos18 comprising more qualities than can possibly be imagined.19 The cosmology that underpins this vision has significant bearing on the metaphysical connotations of al-Bīrūnī’s use of medical terminology and diag- nostic empiricism in the prefaces to his later works, the Hind and the Qānūn. The continuity and mutual relevance of the three prefaces being analysed does not necessarily imply a lack of development in other areas of al-Bīrūnī’s thought. For instance, the differing dynastic polities and character of patronage, or lack of it, also need to be taken into consideration in each instance. The closing remarks of the preface to the Āthār discuss al-Bīrūnī’s purpose and methodology. His expressed purpose for writing the Āthār is threefold. The first may be described as a response to an intellectual incentive since he recounts that a learned man20 once asked him about the dating systems21 used by different nations and the differences22 between them. The adīb urges al- Bīrūnī to give the clearest possible explanation23 so it will be useful to the reader.24 The second purpose takes its impetus from patronage and service. Having contemplated the difficulty of the task al-Bīrūnī states that he drew support from his benefactor Shams al-Maʿālī.25 Moreover, he says, his position of service26 to Shams al-Maʿālī encouraged27 al-Bīrūnī to compose such a work and by doing so reaffirm his service to him.28 Although it remains politely unsaid that the Āthār is a commissioned work, perhaps out of deference for Shams al-Maʿālī’s generosity or to emphasise the impression that it was freely

16 khayru ʾl-khalqi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 3). 17 imāmun ʿādilun (Āthār, p. 1, l. 5). 18 wa laysa liʾllāhi bimustankarin an yajmaʿa ʾl-ʿālama fī wāḥidin (Āthār, p. 1, l. 18). 19 mimmā lā taḥṣuruhu ʾl-awhāmu (Āthār, p. 1, l. 17). 20 aḥadu ʾl-udabāʾi (Āthār, p. 2, l. 1). 21 al-tawārīkh (ibid.). 22 al-ikhtilāf (ibid.). 23 wa ʾqṭaraḥa ʿalayya ʾl-ibānata ʿan dhālika bi-awḍaḥi mā yumkinu ʾl-sabīlu ilayhi (Āthār, p. 2, l. 4). 24 ḥattā taqruba min fahmi ʾl-nāẓiri fīhi (ibid.). 25 taʾayyadtu bi-ʿuluwwi dawlati mawlānā … waliyyu ʾl-niʿami Shamsu ʾl-maʿālī (Āthār, p. 2, l. 7). 26 libāsu ʾl-khidmati (Āthār, p. 2, l. 9). 27 jarraʾanī (ibid.). 28 kay yatajaddada khidmatī lahu (Āthār, p. 2, l. 10). 16 chapter 1 and willingly written, it is quietly apparent that al-Bīrūnī’s position of service implicitly requires that he promote the Ziyārid dynasty and its ruler by composing a scientific work. The third purpose for writing the Āthār is a literary one expressing the writer’s desire for immortality through the legacy of his works. Al-Bīrūnī hopes that the memory and splendour of his service to Shams al-Maʿālī will remain through the ages.29 Al-Bīrūnī next approaches the subject of his methodology by arguing that the best way to explain the various dating systems is through knowledge of the traditions of former nations.30 This is because the akhbār mostly consist of information that comes from these nations themselves and bear the remnants of their customs and institutes.31 Al-Bīrūnī, therefore, upholds the principle of adopting the information of those who have a written tradition32 against that of seeking proof through inference and reason by analogy33 based on what is witnessed by the senses,34 whether as ear or eye-witness.35 It is this written tradition that is the basis upon which al-Bīrūnī will build his accurate description of former nations.36 Verification of this written tradition is to be achieved by comparing and contrasting the information received.37 Al-Bīrūnī believes this verification process to be the best method of achieving the task at hand38 despite the difficulties it presents and effort that it requires.39 This is not to say, however, that the akhbār are infallible, for he admits that numerous truths and untruths are to be found in them40 so that a compromise must be made in his method, namely, that that which is possible and not disproved by other evidence should be treated as true.41 The pragmatism of al-Bīrūnī’s methodology as exampled in this compromise is further qualified by a transparency that he promotes in his writing to guide those who

29 yabqā lī dhikruhā wa sharafuhā turāthan fiʾl-aʿqābi ʿalā marri ʾl-duhūri wa muḍīyyi ʾl-aḥqābi (Āthār, p. 2, l. 10). 30 maʿrifatu akhbāri ʾl-umami ʾl-sālifati (Āthār, p. 2, l. 13). 31 aktharuhā aḥwālun ʿanhum wa rusūmun bāqiyatun min rusūmihim wa nawāmīsihim (Āthār, p. 2, l. 14). 32 taqlīd (Āthār, p. 2, l. 15). 33 min jihati ʾl-istidlāli biʾl-maʿqūlāti waʾl-qiyāsi (ibid.). 34 bimā yushāhadu mina ʾl-maḥsūsāti (ibid.). 35 in bisamāʿin wa in biʿiyānin (Āthār, p. 2, l. 9). 36 taṣyīru mā hum fīhi ussan yubnā ʿalayhi baʿdahu (Āthār, p. 2, l. 16). 37 qiyāsu aqāwīlihim wa ārāʾihim fī ithbāti dhālika baʿḍihā bi-baʿḍin (Āthār, p. 2, l. 17). 38 naylu ʾl-maṭlūbi (Āthār, p. 2, l. 21). 39 al-juhdu ʾl-jahīdi (ibid.). 40 likathrati ʾl-abāṭīli ʾllatī tadkhulu jumala ʾl-akhbāri waʾl-aḥādīthi (Āthār, p. 3, l. 1). 41 al-khabaru ʾl-ḥaqqu (Āthār, p. 3, l. 3). al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 17 wish to develop the subject with knowledge that was previously unavailable to him.42 This aim is achieved in two ways, the first is to take from the most recent sources and proceed gradually to the former ones and to move from what is best known to that which is less known.43 Second, to gather the akhbār from those who have reported them, to correct them as much as possible, and to leave the rest as prima facie, or literal, so as to be of assistance to those who wish to further develop a given subject.44 In addition to elaborating on his methodology for the use of al-akhbār in constructing accurate descriptions, al-Bīrūnī also focuses on the motives that blind an individual from discerning the truth,45 that is, to distort the truth as a result of custom, partisanship, rivalry, passion and the desire for power.46 Fur- ther refining this list of factors that may influence a cultural historian, al-Bīrūnī presents the fundamentals for a dispassionate description of other nations and cultures despite the difficulties involved in achieving such dispassionate descriptions.47 The fourth chapter, which he states is devoted to legends concerning Dhūʾl-qarnayni, also presents a rather lengthy criticism of the “false” claim of the Buyids to descent from the Sasanian emperor Bahrām Gūr and praise for the “true” descent of his patron, Shams al-Maʿālī, and of the shahs of Khurasān and Shirvān from the Sasanian royal house. This subject is imposed on a chapter devoted to legends and, therefore, illustrates the disruptive harm that external or personal influences, such as partisanship or loyalty to a patron, can have on the content of a work. Choosing the chapter devoted to legends in order to introduce this concern may very well have been for the purpose of rendering the factual correctness of the “true” descent of al-Bīrūnī’s patron in a generally ambivalent light given al-Bīrūnī’s inability to overtly express such doubts. The client-patron relationship and patronage in general figure strongly in each of these prefaces, except in the preface to the Hind, and an underlying tension persists between al-Bīrūnī’s duty to demonstrate loyalty to his patron

42 muʿīnun li-ṭālibi ʾl-ḥaqqi … wa murshidun ilā nayli mā lam yatahayyaʾ lanā (Āthār, p. 3, l. 9). 43 ʿalaynā an naʾkhudha ʾl-aqraba min dhālika faʾl-aqraba waʾl-ashhara faʾl-ashhara (Āthār, p. 3, l. 7). 44 nuḥaṣṣiluhā min arbābihā wa nuṣliḥu minhā mā yumkinunā iṣlāḥuhā wa natruku sāʾirahā ʿalā wajhihā (Āthār, p. 3, l. 7). 45 al-asbābu ʾl-muʿmiyatu li-ṣāḥibihā ʿani ʾl-ḥaqqi (Āthār, p. 2, l. 18). 46 kaʾl-ʿādati ʾl-maʾlūfati waʾl-taʿaṣṣubi waʾl-taẓāfuri wa-ttibāʿi ʾl-hawā waʾl-taghālubi biʾl-riʾā- sati (Āthār, p. 2, l. 18). 47 ʿalāannaʾl-aṣlaʾlladhīaṣṣaltuhuwaʾl-ṭarīqaʾlladhīmahhadtuhulaysabiqarībiʾl-maʾkhadhi (Āthār, p. 2, l. 21). 18 chapter 1 and the need to maintain his intellectual integrity by dispassionately navigat- ing the (real and perceived) influences that he lists.

3 Al-Qānūn al-masʿūdī fiʾl-hayʾa waʾl-nujūm

The Qānūn was written under the patronage of Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd (r. 1030– 1040). He succeeded his father, Maḥmūd b. Sebüktigin, as sultan of the Ghaz- navid dynasty after a power struggle with his younger brother Muḥammad. Shortly before his death, Maḥmūd had changed his mind and made another son, Abū Aḥmad Muḥammad, his heir, despite Muḥammad’s lack of experience compared to Masʿūd. When Maḥmūd died in April 1030, Muḥammad became sultan in Ghazna but was deposed and succeeded that summer by Masʿūd who had marched eastwards to Ghazna with his army. Masʿūd was granted new alqāb or honorific titles from Baghdad. The work dedicated to this ris- ing star, the Qānūn, may be described as an astronomical handbook covering the same ground as Ptolemy’s Almagest but introducing new material. These include geographical tables giving the coordinates of six hundred cities, more than any other mediaeval Arabic source. For India and China al-Bīrūnī reports the coordinates of ninety cities given in no source antedating him. The Qānūn includes not only the numerical tables and accompanying rules for the solution of all standard astronomical problems, but also expounds the theoretical and observational bases from which the rules and tables have been derived. Like the Almagest, the Qānūn contains theoretical derivations of astronomical parameters, as well as tabular functions to facilitate the computation of planetary positions. It thus differs from the works of most of al-Bīrūnī’s predecessors and contemporaries who were concerned with constructing astronomical tables or zīj, suitable for computation of planetary positions, usually without discussing the derivation of the parameters upon which the tables were based. The methodological ethos of this fresh approach is set out in the preface. Although the preface to the Qānūn was written after the Hind, it has much more in common with the preface to the Āthār in terms of structure and content. Like it, the Qānūn also begins with a doxology in which an opening pun alludes to the work’s patron, Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd.48 This is immediately followed by a pious Muslim expression of God’s transcendence and oneness.49

48 al-masʿūdu man saʿida biʾllāhi ʿazza wa jalla (Qānūn, p. 1, l. 3). 49 wa tafarrada … ʿani ʾl-ashkāli waʾl-ashbāhi (ibid.). al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 19

Muḥammad is next described in the hierarchy of importance as the chief recipient of God’s magnificent grace,50 His religion,51 and His infallible Word, the Qurʾān.52 Although the Qurʾān is quoted in the preface to the Āthār its bestowal upon the Prophet is not specified as one of God’s acts of beneficence towards Humankind nor is its infallibility mentioned.53 The underplaying of the Qurʾān’s importance in the Āthār is in contrast to the perfection that is attributed to Muḥammad54 and the microcosmic qualities with which God endows both the Prophet and the Imāms.55 Whereas in the Āthār it is the Shiʿite vision of the divinely sent Perfect Man as microcosmos which is associated with the Prophet and his family of Imāms,56 in the Qānūn a more Sunni understanding prevails in which divine grace rather than God-given characteristics carries perfection. In the Āthār the Prophet and the Imām are described as perfect beings whereas in the Qānūn it is the Prophet’s all too human dependence on God’s scrupulous guidance and intervention that is described, thus emphasis- ing the important act of divine grace rather than its recipient.57 It is noteworthy that neither the family of the Prophet nor the Imāmate are mentioned in the Qānūn, rather, it is the awliyāʾ or “supporters” who succeed the Prophet and enjoy perspicacity and right guidance.58 Whereas in the Āthār Shams al-Maʿālī is an Imām and by implication a member of the Prophet’s family, al-Bīrūnī’s hierarchy in the Qānūn allows for only one distinction: that of believer and unbeliever. Thus the Prophet’s supporters, al-awliyāʾ, are the community of believers, al-muʾminīn, as a whole and what differentiates Masʿūd, being a walī, from his fellow believers is political rather than spiritual status. This is likely the reason why he is referred to as a king and an aid to God’s caliph.59 The distinction in the Qānūn between the spiritual leadership of the caliph and political leadership embodied in kingship60 is one which is not

50 iẓhāruhu taʿālā ʾl-ʿizzata lirasūlihi (Qānūn, p. 1, l. 6). 51 aẓhara bihi dīnahu (Qānūn, p. 1, l. 8). 52 thumma khallafa baʿdahu nūrahu ʾlladhī lā yanṭafiʾu biʾl-afwāhi (Qānūn, p. 1, l. 9). 53 wa lā yabṭula bitakdhībi ʾl-lisāni waʾl-shifāhi (ibid.). 54 Muḥammadu ʾl-muṣṭafā khayru ʾl-khalqi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 1). 55 wa amaddahu bikhuluqin qadi ʾmtanna bimithlihi ʿalā nabiyyihi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 13). 56 wa ʿalā ālihi aʾimmati ʾl-hudā waʾl-ḥaqqi (Āthār, p. 1, l. 1). 57 wajadahu yatīman fa-āwāhu wa ʿāʾilan fa-aghnāhu ḥattā sharaḥa ṣadrahu wa rafaʿa lahu dhikrahu (Qānūn, p. 1, l. 7). 58 wa awdaʿahu awliyāʾahu liʾl-tabṣīri waʾl-hidāyati (Qānūn, p. 1, l. 9). 59 kaʾl-maliki ʾl-ajalli ʾl-sayyidi ʾl-muʿaẓẓami nāṣiri dīni ʾllāhi wa ẓahīri khalīfati ʾllāhi (Qānūn, p. 1, l. 11). 60 al-mulk (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 8). 20 chapter 1 made in the Āthār where the very definition of the Perfect Man as microcosmos necessitates the inclusion of both these roles in the person of the Imām. It may be al-Bīrūnī’s awareness of such a distinction in the Ghaznavid understanding of dynastic order and their greater reliance upon the caliphate for legitima- tion that makes discussion of the Imāmate inappropriate in the preface to the Qānūn. Rather than an intellectual development, the change we encounter may very well be a reflection of rival dynastic structures and the necessary intellectual diplomacy of a scholar-servant in what most certainly were very different courts with distinct polities. Masʿūd’s role is further elaborated as the protector of the Community and the defender against its enemies.61 Moreover, as with the Prophet, it is Provi- dence which intervenes in Masʿūd’s favour62 returning to him what is rightfully his,63 namely, kingship and power.64 Masʿūd’s kingship is, therefore, granted a divine disposition65 and a spiritual acknowledgement.66 This religious dimension begins subtly to acquire caliphal qualities through a transferred epithet, namely, the “shadow (of God)”, and a suggestive form of panegyric whereby al- Bīrūnī describes Masʿūd as (God’s) shadow to whom the believers are naturally drawn67 and whose rule God has ordained in Umm al-Kitāb.68 By attributing Masʿūd with qualities particularly associated with the caliph, al-Bīrūnī raises his spiritual status to more than mere kingship but avoids the entanglement of actually calling him caliph or Imām which, given the history of the Ghaznavid dynasty, their reliance upon the caliphate in Baghdad for legitimacy, and their extended conflict with the Buyids, would have been inappropriate titles. The final stage in the hierarchy described cites al-Bīrūnī’s relationship with Masʿūd. The patron-client relationship, which necessitates an expression of gratitude,69 is built upon the basic requirement imposed on the subject, namely, to obey.70 Moreover, unlike the Āthār where patronage is implied and service71 is a duty,in

61 ḥāfiẓu ʿibādi ʾllāhi ʾl-muntaqimi min aʿdāʾi ʾllāhi (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 1). 62 khudhila fa-naṣarahu ʾllāhu wa rufiḍa fa-aʿlā lahu shaʾnahu (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 5). 63 rujūʿu ʾl-haqqi ilā ahlihi (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 4). 64 mulkahu wa sulṭānahu (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 6). 65 al-iṣṭifāʾu ʾl-ilāhī (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 10). 66 ḥabāhu ʾl-irtha ʿafwan (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 9). 67 istaʿjalat naḥwahu ʾl-arwāḥu litatafayyaʾa biafyāʾihi (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 11). 68 ḥukmuhu fī ummi ʾl-kitābi masṭūran (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 13). 69 yakhuṣṣunī minhu niʿmatan tuʿaqqibu ʾl-fakhra wa tūjibu idmāna ʾl-shukri (Qānūn, p. 2, l. 13). 70 lazimatnī ʾl-ṭāʿatu biʿāmmihā (Qānūn, p. 3, l. 1). 71 al-khidma. al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 21 the Qānūn patronage is clearly granted72 and service is expected73 although, as ever, abundant praise appears to be freely and gratefully given. It is clear, then, from the preface that al-Bīrūnī found favour with Masʿūd, that he had access to the court and received an income which enabled him to devote himself entirely to his scientific work. The primary reason described for crafting a work devoted to Masʿūd is given directly after the encomium to him and derives overtly from his influence rather than al-Bīrūnī’s interest in science. Finding that Masʿūd did not require his services at the court, realising that science stood in the highest favour with his patron,74 and aided by his personal interest in mathematics75 al-Bīrūnī expresses his desire to compose a book on astronomy76 and to adorn it with the name of his patron and master.77 In doing so, al-Bīrūnī mentions a further reason for writing the Qānūn, namely, to preserve Masʿūd’s memory, and the contents of the work through time. Given the prominence of the Qurʾān in the Qānūn, this is very evocative language:78 this aim is best achieved through the medium of the book given its mobility and permanence.79 Al-Bīrūnī devotes the final part of the preface detailing his methodology. Unlike the Āthār where the word al-taqlīd refers to the histories and is, therefore, synonymous with al-akhbār, in the Qānūn al-taqlīd refers to the blind imitation of al-akhbār which is one of al-Bīrūnī’s principle objections to the methodology of Ibn Sīnā. This refining of terminology does not affect al-Bīrūnī’s basic argument against erroneous attitudes towards received knowledge, namely the reiteration of falsehoods contained in khabar passed down uncorrected. Al-Bīrūnī writes at length in the Qānūn claiming that he did not follow those who preceded him in their approach to received science because blind imitation and repetition80 result in the perpetuation of uncorrected faults.81

72 makkananī fī ṣabābati ʿumrī mina ʾl-inbisāṭi li-khidmati ʾl-ʿilmi (Qānūn, p. 3, l. 2). 73 lazimatnī ʾl-khidmatu bikhāṣṣihā (Qānūn, p. 3, l. 1). 74 alfaytu rutbata ʾl-ʿilmi ʿindahu ashrafa ʾl-rutbati (Qānūn, p. 3, l. 16). 75 kuntu mutaʿalliqan bi-ṭarafin min aṭrāfi ʾl-ʿilmi ʾl-riyāḍī (Qānūn, p. 3, l. 17). 76 ṣināʿatu ʾl-tanjīmi (Qānūn, p. 4, l. 2). 77 ḥallaytuhu biakrami ḥilyatin hiyā ʾl-qānūnu ʾl-masʿūdī (Qānūn, p. 3, l. 3). 78 baqāʾi ʾl-dhikri fī ʾl-ʿālamīn (Qānūn, p. 4, l. 7). 79 faʾl-kitābu min bayni ʾl-āthāri ʾl-mudawwanati abqā ʿalā marri ʾl-azminati, wa athbatu ʿalā tabāduli ʾl-amkinati (Qānūn, p. 4, l. 8). 80 lam asluk fīhi maslaka man taqaddamanī … ʿalā maṭāyā ʾl-tardīdi ilā qaḍāyā ʾl-taqlīdi (Qānūn, p. 4, l. 9). 81 idh kāna khullida fīhā kullu sahwin badara minhum (Qānūn, p. 4, l. 14). 22 chapter 1

Al-Bīrūnī believed all facts should be tested and backed by proof,82 and that recipients of received knowledge should vigorously adhere to this method of testing.83 He is interested in correcting faults84 and flaws,85 especially where the perception of core truth is concerned.86 Al-Bīrūnī also claims to ensure transparency in his work in a manner that not only deters imitation87 but also promotes the possibility that his successors may attain greater accuracy, and even correct his mistakes.88 As in the Āthār this is achieved through the systematic comparison of akhbār on a specific subject and the clear identification of sources.89 The prevalent imagery of diagnosis and treatment of ailments is carried over to a logical parallel where proof with regard to a given subject is understood to be as integral as the soul in its relation to the body.90 This telling simile sums up the process and aim of al-taḥqīq, that is, verification by testing, whereby proof91 and explanation92 are essential for the improvement and complete appreciation of received knowledge just as the soul and body complement one another to produce a whole human form which is complete for scientific perception.93 The verification of khabar whereby perception94 of received knowledge95 is achieved through correction96 is not only given a biological and spiritual parallel through comparison of the soul with the body but is also put forth in al-Bīrūnī’s conclusion to the preface of the Qānūn as a divine ideal and a quality of God.97

82 al-ḥujja (Qānūn, p. 4, l. 15). 83 ihtidāʾi mustaʿmilīhā baʿdahum ilā ʾl-maḥajjati (ibid.). 84 taṣḥīḥu khalalin (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 1). 85 al-ʿilal (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 4). 86 ṣamīmu ʾl-ḥaqīqati (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 2). 87 al-taqlīd (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 5). 88 yaftatiḥu lahu bābu ʾl-istiṣwābi limā aṣabtu fīhi awi ʾl-iṣlāḥi (ibid.). 89 qarantu bikulli ʿamalin fī kulli bābin min ʿilalihi wa dhikri mā tawallaytu min ʿamalihi (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 4). 90 liannaʾl-burhānaminaʾl-qaḍiyyatiqāʾimunmaqāmaʾl-rūḥiminaʾl-jasadi (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 6). 91 al-burhān (ibid.). 92 al-tibyān (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 8). 93 kāmilan liʾl-ʿiyāni (ibid.). 94 al-ʿiyān. 95 al-akhbār. 96 al-iṣlāḥ (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 6). 97 innahu ʿalā mā yashāʾu qadīrun wa bimaṣāliḥi ʿibādihi khabīrun baṣīrun (Qānūn, p. 5, l. 13). al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 23

4 Kitāb taḥqīq mā liʾl-Hind

Al-Bīrūnī completed the Hind in 1030 shortly after Maḥmūd of Ghazna’s death. In the twelve years that he spent as court astrologer under Maḥmūd, al-Bīrūnī had great opportunity to gather information about India and acquire a knowledge of Sanskrit and regional Indian dialects, which he subsequently used to translate aspects of Hindu philosophy and science practised in the north western parts of India that were under Ghaznavid control. He also may have fur- thered his knowledge by accompanying Maḥmūd on plunder raids into the northern Indian heartland. The question as to the nature and purpose of the Hind, given that it is not dedicated to a patron, is one which al-Bīrūnī addresses in the preface. A key to understanding the content of the preface is the word al-taḥqīq, “verification”, which is to be found in the full explanatory title of the Hind.98 Unlike the prefaces of the Āthār and the Qānūn where the patron is the primary subject of prolonged attention, “verification” or the establishment of the truth, is the chief focus of scrutiny and elaboration in this preface. Given the philosophical texture of much of the language which al-Bīrūnī uses, particularly in the Hind, and the underlying intellectual rivalry with Ibn Sīnā throughout his professional life, as evidenced by their early correspondence in the Asʾila, it is useful to analyse al-Bīrūnī’s language in terms of this relationship and the mutual influences which would most likely have occurred. On this basis, an analysis of the word al-taḥqīq by A. Goichon in her Lex- ique99 is instructive given that in the Asʾila the same word is used to express different viewpoints. According to Goichon the meaning of al-taḥqīq is “the provision of proof, the establishment of the proof, its verification, and a deeper understanding of it”.100 Al-Bīrūnī’s concern is to achieve the truth, al-Ḥaqq, on the basis of empirical knowledge which is rational and which has its source in al-maqūla,101 or an explanation of the essence of a thing.102 Such an explanation

98 Kitāb Abī ʾl-Rayḥān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Bīrūnī fī taḥqīq mā liʾl-Hind min maqūla maqbūla fiʾl-ʿaql aw mardhūla. 99 Goichon, A., Léxique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sīnā. Paris, 1938. 100 “tahqīq, la preuve, l’établissment de la vérité; sa vérification; son approfondissement. Ce mot figure souvent dans les titres de chapitres, introduisant l’étude du subjet proposé, avec le sens d’éxaminer, creuser, déterminer exactement”. Goichon, A., (1938: 84). 101 “qawl, … Qawl est donné comme synonyme d’‘explication.’ Les traductions sont diverses.—La définition est elle-même définie comme ‘l’énoncé qui indique la quiddité de la chose’”. Goichon, A., (1938: 319). 102 Maqūla is also Arabic for an Aristotelian ‘Category,’ cf. ei2: “Al-Maḳūlāt (a.), “Categories”, 24 chapter 1 is to be found in khabar, or received knowledge, as opposed to ʿiyān, which is the derivation of knowledge through observation. The khabar/ʿiyān dichotomy is a fundamental distinction in Islamic scientific texts during al-Bīrūnī’s time. Indeed, in the Asʾila, he takes Ibn Sīnā to task for over-reliance on Aristotle, who in turn is overly dependent on the received wisdom of his predecessors.103 Despite al-Bīrūnī’s criticism in the Asʾila of Ibn Sīnā’s excessive dependence on akhbār, al-Bīrūnī is, nevertheless, forced to take recourse in khabar admit- ting that, if beyond reproach, it would be manifestly superior to ʿiyān.104 This difference and the preference of one over the other is crucial in understanding the nature of al-Bīrūnī’s methodology and in ascertaining his philosophical position in light of the Asʾila and the subject matter of the Hind. Unlike the Āthār and the Qānūn whose historical and religious content are determined by patronage and dynastic considerations, the Hind seems to be a far more personal work of philosophy, bent on determining Hindu cosmology in a manner that is strikingly similar to Ibn Sīnā’s use of the Greek tradition. In view of such a proposal the need to ascertain al-Bīrūnī’s philosophical position through the outline of his methodology in the preface becomes essential. Although not synonymous, the khabar/ʿiyān distinction bears parallels with the wider religio-philosophical dichotomy of reason, ʿaql, versus tradition, naql. Indeed, the greater scope of the term, ʿaql, which is the first principle of Avi- cennan philosophy, might be corroborated by ʿiyān but is not dependent on it for verification. Ibn Rushd, for example, attempts to unify what derives from reason and what derives from tradition105 with the aim of showing that philosophy and religion are compatible. Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, favoured the rational component of philosophy, falsafa, namely ʿaql, which has its roots in Aristotelianism, whilst viewing empiricism, naql, as being of secondary importance or even as ultimately deriving from reason. For al-Bīrūnī the inverse is true, namely, that the rational component represented in the more specific term ʿiyān, literally “eye-witness account”, is, for his present purposes, secondary to the more complete knowledge and universal

the translation of the title of the work of Aristotle on that subject, which is also referred to, by the transliteration of the Greek title as ḳāṭīghūriyā or ḳāṭīghūriyās. The singular is usually maḳūla, but maḳūl is also found. Al-Maḳūlāt is also found in the titles of works by Muslim authors on the same subject”. 103 For a discussion of this dichotomy see Montgomery, J., “Ibn Rusta’s Lack of ‘Eloquence’,the Rus, and Samanid Cosmography”, in Edebiyat, Vol. 12: 1, 2001, pp. 73–93. 104 lawlā lawāḥiqu āfātin biʾl-khabari lakānat faḍīlatuhu tabīnu ʿalā ʾl-ʿiyāni (Hind, p. 1, l. 3). 105 al-jamʿu bayna ʾl-maʿqūli waʾl-manqūli. Leaman, O., An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge, 1985. Chapter v, “Happiness, philosophy and society”. al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 25 empiricism to be found in khabar, through which the past, present and future may be ascertained as well as all that is material and immaterial.106 More limited than khabar, ʿiyān, in a sense, is also empirical and so could be argued to be distinct from ʿaql although in terms of Islamic science ʿaql includes ʿiyān.107 Despite the similarity of the language used by Ibn Sīnā and al-Bīrūnī, their positions could not be more different. The ramifications of this philosophical impasse are treated in the Asʾila in medical terms: al-Bīrūnī raises doubts concerning the power of perception of the human eye.108 The word used, idrāk, or vision, in the Hind has metaphysical and philosophical connotations; indeed, al-idrāk is used in the first line of the preface to mean intellectual perception. Both these definitions are cited by Goichon in her lexicon of philosophical vocabulary used by Ibn Sīnā which suggests a common dialectic with al-Bīrūnī: “idrak, saisie, perception, soit sen- sible, soit intellectuelle, …”109 Ibn Sīnā responds to the doubts raised by al-Bīrūnī by denying that a difference in the Platonic and Aristotelian positions exists, and then proceeds to explain the biology of al-ibṣār, the basic word for vision, according to Aristotle, a manoeuvre which al-Bīrūnī is quick to point out.110 The passage highlights the philosophical debate embodied in their medical and biological discussion and serves to add a further dimension of meaning to the philosophical and ethical resonances of the vocabulary used in the preface to the Hind. In preferring khabar to ʿiyān al-Bīrūnī not only places himself in opposition to the Aristotelian school of Ibn Sīnā but in the process also presents an alternative ethic. The preference is expressed in terms of al-faḍīla.111 This term not only relates to ethical excellence but also points to the Platonic definition of the four Cardinal Virtues: wisdom, valour, temperance and justice. The question as to the veracity of khabar and the means by which the truth, al-Ḥaqq, is ascertained takes the form of a medical diagnosis presented within the framework of empirical science similar in texture and language to al-Bīrūnī’s objections voiced in the Asʾila. It is important to note that the emphasis is placed on acquiring the truth rather than what is rational and it is for this reason that al-khabar is chosen over al-ʿiyān as a more accurate source in which the factual

106 tanāwulu ʾl-khabari iyyāhā wa mā qablahā min māḍī ʾl-azminati wa baʿdahā min muqta- balihā hattā yaʿumma ʾl-khabaru lidhālika ʾl-mawjūdi waʾl-maʿdūmi maʿan (Hind, p. 1, l. 4). 107 Leaman (1985: 104). 108 al-masʾalatu ʾl-thālithatu: kayfa ʾl-idrāku biʾl-baṣari (Asʾila, p. 40). 109 Goichon (1938: 122). 110 mā ḥaṣala min jawābika illā taḥdīdu ʾl-baṣari ʿinda Arisṭū …(Asʾila, p. 57). 111 Hind, p. 1, l. 3. 26 chapter 1 is distorted by degrees but not completely changed. Thus, ascertaining verac- ity112 and falseness113 is an empirical process involving the ethical diagnosis of the motivation of transmitters114 and only secondly an ontological one through which the content of al-khabar is scrutinized or an ideal Truth is sought. For al-Bīrūnī the issue is the ethical practice of the transmitter in conveying facts. Interestingly, the listed motives for lying are societal at their most sophisticated: al-jins or genus115 and al-ṭabaqa or class,116 and individual at their least sophisticated: danāʾatu ʾl-ṭabʿi117 or base nature118 and al-jahl or ignorance.119 The cause is humoral; for example, cupidity and animosity120 constitute the cause whilst the motive is the furtherance of personal or national interests.121 These motives for lying may also be understood in terms of a study of the negative influence of patronage and the dangerous distortion of facts which might result therefrom. Such a challenging analysis (though never overtly so) of the implications of patronage is only possible in the preface to the Hind given the lack of a dedication to any patron. It would, therefore, have been inconceivable in the Āthār or the Qānūn where such motives are barely alluded to122 and where it is the scientific methodology and the treatment of al-akhbār rather than the ethical diagnosis of the motivation of transmitters which is the focus of concern. Al-Bīrūnī stresses throughout the preface to the Hind the importance of speaking the truth even if it means risking one’s safety. He supports his stance by quoting from the Qurʾān and the New Testament where speaking out the truth, especially in the face of tyranny, is valued more than life.123 The moral dimension of his explanation seems best embodied in the term al-khulq,124

112 al-ṣidq (Hind, p. 2, l. 1). 113 al-kadhib (ibid.). 114 al-mukhbirīn (Hind, p. 2, l. 2). 115 Hind, p. 2, l. 4. 116 Hind, p. 2, l. 6. 117 “ṭabʿ, … Le ṭabʿ semble se rapprocher d’un habitus entitatif, tandis que tabiʿa se rap- procherait de l’habitus opératif”. Goichon, A., (1938: 199). 118 Hind, p. 2, l. 8. 119 Hind, p. 2, l. 10. 120 al-shahwatu waʾl-ghaḍabu (Hind, p. 2, l. 5). 121 yaqṣidu fīhī nafsahu fa-yuʿaẓẓimu bihi jinsahu (Hind, p. 2, l. 4). 122 wa hiya kaʾl-ʿādati ʾl-maʾlūfati waʾl-taʿaṣṣubi waʾl-taẓāfuri wa ittibāʿi ʾl-hawā waʾl-taghālubi biʾl-riʾāsati wa ashbāhi dhālika (Āthār, p. 2, l. 18). 123 lā tubālu biṣawlati ʾl-mulūki fiʾl-ifṣāḥi biʾl-ḥaqqi bayna aydīhim falaysa yamlukūna minkum ghayra ʾl-badani (Hind, p. 3, l. 1). 124 Hind, p. 3, l. 30. “khulq … Le pluriel akhlāq a toujours le sens de l’ensemble des habitudes al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 27 which is the singular of al-akhlāq, ethics, and, therefore, bears the strongest sense of morally correct action and habit.125 The derivation of an ethical vocabulary from medical works is an evident feature in al-Bīrūnī’s framework of ethics and in this context is meant to highlight the importance of relaying information truthfully. Just as justice126 in one’s nature127 is desirable for its own sake128 and sought after because of the ben- efit129 that it brings, so too is the case with truthfulness.130 Al-Bīrūnī’s consequent description of an individual suffering from a deprivation of justice in his nature131 is a telling one because of the characteristics of the deficiencies and the examples given of the crimes committed. Such an individual is not only a liar132 and a breaker of trust but also a plunderer of others’ wealth through subterfuge; he is a thief, and a propagator of vices that ruin the world and humankind.133 According to Sachau, it is not inconceivable, since the Hind does not seem to have a clear patron, that the description given is implicitly directed at the deceased Maḥmūd of Ghazna who kept al-Bīrūnī in his court, though he was not shown great favour nor encouraged in his study of India with the hope of royal reward.134 Moreover, al-Bīrūnī does not shy away from describing the destructive effect of Maḥmūd’s military campaigns on Indian civilisation and the well-being of its citizens, which is certainly not in line with the glorifica- tion of a Ghāzī. Al-Bīrūnī says: “He [Maḥmūd] utterly ruined the prosperity of the country (of India), and performed those [unheard-of things] (Sachau: won- derful exploits) by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions, and like a tale of old in the mouth of the people”.135 Later, al-Bīrūnī goes so far as to suggest that Hindu hostility engendered by Maḥmūd’s military strategies forms the chief barrier to communication. The moral encomia

morales … ‘par laquelle on sait comment doivent être les moeurs et les actions de l’homme …’” Goichon, A., (1938: 112). 125 sawāʾun kānat fī qawlin aw kānat fī fiʿlin (Hind, p. 3, l. 5). 126 al-ʿadl (Hind, p. 3, l. 6). 127 al-ṭibāʿ (ibid.). 128 lidhātih (ibid.). 129 al-ḥusn (ibid.). 130 al-ṣidq (Hind, p. 3, l. 7). 131 al-ʿādilu ʿani ʾl-ʿadli (Hind, p. 3, l. 9). 132 al-muʾaththiru liʾl-jawri wa shahādati ʾl-zūri (ibid.). 133 fasādu ʾl-ʿālami waʾl-khalīqati (Hind, p. 3, l. 11). 134 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: xvi). 135 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: 22). 28 chapter 1 of his patrons and their God-given authority, so prominently expressed in the prefaces to the Āthār and the Qānūn, are non-existent in the Hind. This work, given the above implications and its moral and didactic, rather than religious and eulogistic, introduction, is meant as an implicit critique of Maḥmūd’s reign and purports to set out in clear and dispassionate detail a true picture of Indian civilisation based on authentic primary sources. Revealing a pragmatism more than a moral idealism, al-Bīrūnī seizes upon a rare opportunity in the immediate wake of Maḥmūd’s death to freely express himself in the Hind without the weight of patronage bearing down upon his words and the consequent risks of voicing his true convictions, under the aegis of speaking the truth. Given the moral and ethically saturated content of the preface to the Hind it is quite conceivable that for al-Bīrūnī an accurate description of another culture or religion was a moral responsibility. The example cited of the Ḥākī136 who misrepresents the Muʿtazilite doctrine of God’s Omniscience highlights the way in which such accounts [sing. Ḥikāya,]137 are more often than not polemical works prone to the problem of misrepresentation.138 Al-Bīrūnī states that these studies comprise a twofold distinction. The first is between those which describe dogmas139 within the framework of one belief system and those which attempt an understanding of wholly different religions.140 Any unrepre- sentative and polemical content in the latter is less transparent141 because the subject is exotic142 and its comprehension difficult to achieve.143 The second distinction contrasts text-based pronouncements144 and those that derive from oral lore145 and legendary narratives.146 By adverting to the different origins of these pronouncements, al-Bīrūnī highlights the dangers of accepted fallacy

136 Hind, p. 3, l. 12. 137 Hind, p. 4, l. 1. ei2,“ḥikāya. The radical ḥ. k. y./w. is not represented in the Ḳuʾrān but it is found in ḥadīt̲h̲ with the primary meaning of “to resemble” or “to imitate” … to reproduce with the most exact fidelity the demeanour and bearing of various types of people”. 138 hādhihi ṭarīqatun qalla mā yakhlū minhā man yaqṣidu ʾl-ḥikāyata ʿani ʾl-mukhālifīna waʾl- khuṣūmi (Hind, p. 4, l. 1). 139 al-madhāhib (Hind, p. 4, l. 2). 140 al-milalu ʾl-muftariqatu (Hind, p. 4, l. 3). 141 akhfā. 142 libuʿdihā (Hind, p. 4, l. 4). 143 khafāʾi ʾl-sabīli ilā taʿarrufihā (ibid.). 144 kutubu ʾl-maqālāti (Hind, p. 4, l. 5). 145 al-asmār (Hind, p. 4, l. 9). ei2,“Samar. It seems that samar is used mainly of tales of the supernatural, but also of reports, since Ibn al-Nadim sometimes refers to authentic siyar and asmār”. 146 al-asāṭīr (Hind, p. 4, l. 9). al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 29 contained in received knowledge for those who are not alert to the true facts of a given subject.147 Throughout, the discernment of truth148 is underpinned by an ethical structure.149 This focuses primarily on deontology, namely, the duties and personal morality of al-Ḥākī150 to which al-Bīrūnī, the Ḥākī of this work, is by implication also morally subject, and only secondarily on the tele- ological validity of the source or, indeed, the truth that is inherent151 in a given subject. Al-Bīrūnī moves from an assessment of the nature of scientific exactitude to the specifics of “Indian religions”.152 He argues that studies already produced suffer from the uncritical acceptance of transmitted material,153 confused and ill-marshalled thinking,154 bias, and finally from a distinct lack of precision155 and dispassionate reporting.156 Even al-Īranshahrī (fl. second half of ninth century) of whom he makes an exception because of his imaginative thinking157 does not “hit the mark” when it comes to India and Buddhism.158 This is largely as a result of his blind reliance upon Zurqān, of whom al-Bīrūnī speaks slight-

147 man yaʿrifu ḥaqīqata ʾl-ḥāli fīhā (Hind, p. 4, l. 6). 148 al-taḥqīq. 149 ghayra ʾl-khajili in hazzat biʿiṭfihi ʾl-faḍīlatu awi ʾl-iṣrāri waʾl-lajāji in rakhkhat fīhi ʾl-radhī- latu (Hind, p. 4, l. 7). 150 Hind, p. 3, l. 12. 151 This does not correspond to ḥaqīqatu ʾl-ḥāli (Hind, p. 4, l. 6 and 8) which is al-Bīrūnī’s utilitarian understanding of factual truth based upon scientific observation. 152 al-kalāmu ʿalā adyāni ʾl-Hindi (Hind, p. 4, l. 10). 153 manḥūlun wa baʿḍuhā ʿan baʿḍin manqūlun (Hind, p. 4, l. 12). 154 ghayru muhadhdhabin ʿalā raʾyihim wa lā mushadhdhabin (ibid.). 155 mayl and mudāhana (Hind, p. 4, l. 14). 156 al-ḥikāyatu ʾl-mujarradatu (ibid.). “mujarrad, a deux sens principaux: 1ière abstrait, ce qui est obtenu par tajrīd, de là l’abstraction, la chose abstraite; 2ième séparé, libre de toute manière, ce qui est dans l’état de tajarrud, … Mujarrad peut aussi prendre le sens de seul, pur, en soi”. Goichon, A., (1938: 40). 157 munfaridun bimukhtaraʿin lahu (Hind, p. 4, l. 15). “ikhtaraʿa, a été traduit par abstrahit, mais il semble bien que c’est à tort et que ce verbe présente dans le vocabulaire avicennien son sens habituel de produire, imaginer … Cependant cette traduction est autorisée par la théorie avicennienne des quatre degrès d’abstraction réalisée par les sens, l’imagination, l’estimative et l’intelligence”. Goichon, A., (1938: 104). 158 In the mid-eighth century Buddhism was flourishing in eastern Iran, Afghanistan, and Transoxania with a series of prosperous trading communities located along the old cara- van routes to India and China. By the eleventh century, however, Buddhism had so thoroughly disappeared from eastern Iran and Afghanistan that al-Bīrūnī was able to pass on only very fragmentary information. See Āthār p. 206. 30 chapter 1 ingly, but also because al-Īranshahrī records common hearsay159 which ranks below eyewitness accounts160 in importance. It is for these reasons that al-Bīrūnī chooses not to reference the Islamic literature on Hindu belief. Instead he bases the Hind upon his personal translations of Hindu texts, studies of Indian literary materials, and, his research into Brahmin oral traditions. With a further disregard for Islamic literary tradition al-Bīrūnī disregards Abū Sahl al-Tiflīsī’s advice urging him to write a work combining the elements of a polemic161 and a cultural guide book162 typical of the Islamic heresiographical and geographical genres. Edward Sachau suspects that Abū Sahl was one of the high civil functionaries of the court of Maḥmūd.163 This would explain the character of the work which he encourages al-Bīrūnī to write, namely, a functional work,164 literally an arsenal of information, to assist in the administration of a subjugated population and a summary critique of its religion to support165 the preservation of a conqueror’s sense of cultural superiority. Al-Bīrūnī seeks an entirely different objective. His aim is not to produce a polemical work166 but to faithfully reproduce Indian beliefs, mainly Hindu, using their words.167 For al-Bīrūnī this is the definition of al-Ḥikāya. What better way to form a balanced picture of belief and custom than to quote Indian oral and written sources literally168 even if what is cited contradicts the (Islamic) Truth.169 It is significant that save for the tenth-century Ismāʿīlī author, Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī, no other author writing in Arabic is mentioned in the Hind, despite the vast wealth of information about Greek philosophy contained in the works of al-Bīrūnī’s contemporaries such as Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (d. 1000), Ibn Hindū (d. 1030), Miskawayh (d. 1030) and many others. Hindu popular beliefs and practices, in al-Bīrūnī’s view, were much like those of the ancient Greeks. Furthermore, he even related some aspects of Hinduism to ideas quoted from

159 [al-] masmūʿu mina [ʾl-] ʿawāmmi (Hind, p. 5, l. 4). 160 al-ʿiyān. 161 liman arāda munāqaḍatahum (Hind, p. 5, l. 7). 162 liman rāma mukhālaṭatahum (ibid.). 163 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: 250). 164 dhakhīra (Hind, p. 5, l. 7). 165 nuṣratan (ibid.). 166 kitābu ḥijājin wa jadalin (Hind, p. 5, l. 10). 167 ḥikāyatu kalāmihi (Hind, p. 5, l. 8). 168 ʿalā wajhihi (Hind, p. 5, l. 11). 169 wa in bāyana ʾl-ḥaqqa (Hind, p. 5, l. 8). al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 31 the traditions of the Eastern Christians, Jews, Manichaeans, and Sufis. How- ever, he also wanted to draw parallels between the Greek philosophy and Hindu thought of the intellectual elites within these two societies. It is clear from the tenor of the preface that al-Bīrūnī wishes to assert his independence from secondary sources and confine himself to the Greek primary sources which would have been available to him in Arabic translations.170 As a direct consequence, the Hind is highly unusual for its time because it draws on original sources, mainly Hindu religious and philosophical texts, translated by the author from the Sanskrit. Al-Bīrūnī states his reliance only on translations he has made of the Samkhya171 and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali172 and hopes that by doing so the Hind would enable his readers to dispense with other translations of these Sanskrit tracts, partly by transferring large portions of his translations into the Hind, and partly by focusing more on legal norms, al-furūʿ, and science in order to produce a truly encyclopaedic work. This does not, however, provide an obstacle to the integration of the Indian philosophical corpus and, by extension, the contributions of Indian science into the worldview of the Muslim educated élite. According to Sachau “Panthe- ism in Islam, the doctrine of the Sufis, is as near to the Neoplatonic and Neopy- thagorean schools of Greek philosophy as to the Vedanta173 school of Hindu philosophers”.174 Later scholars have expanded on this view to argue that al- Bīrūnī maintained a belief in a core truth and a proto-religion in which all civilisations share. This position is not borne out in the three prefaces examined here, rather, in accordance with al-Bīrūnī’s Ashʿarite disposition, one senses the incompatibility of his Islam, and the truth revealed to and transmitted by the prophets, with those schools or movements cited by Sachau above. By omitting Islam from comparison al-Bīrūnī implies its integrity and superiority despite

170 wa uḍīfu ilayhi mā liʾl-yūnāniyyīna min mithlihi litaʿrīfi ʾl-muqārabati baynahum (Hind, p. 5, l. 12). 171 The earliest surviving authoritative text on Samkhya philosophy is the Sāṃkhya-kārikā (c. 200ce) of Īśvara Kriṣna. There were probably other texts in the early centuries ce, however none of them are available today including the one which al-Bīrūnī used. 172 The Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali is the most significant text in the yoga tradition and represents the codification of yoga ideas and practices that had developed over many centuries. This text was composed sometime between 100bce and 500ce and contains 196 aphorisms or sūtras on yoga called the “eight-limbed”, aṣṭānga, or “the best”, rāja, yoga. In medieval times, aṣṭānga-yoga was cast as one of the six main schools of Hindu philosophy. 173 In the medieval period of Hinduism, the word Vedānta came to mean the school of philosophy that interpreted the Upanishads. 174 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: 254). 32 chapter 1 his employing any number of methods from observation to rationalisation to demonstrate the interrelatedness of the sciences and religion whether it be Islam or Hinduism.

5 Al-Bīrūnī, Hindu Cosmology, and Atomism

The cosmologies upheld by Ibn Sīnā and al-Bīrūnī are not only apparent in their unique understanding of the perfect man,175 a person according to Ibn Sīnā who has reached the highest position which corresponds to the acquired intellect, but also, at the other end of the scale, in their views concerning the nature of single metaphysical units. The rational component stressed in Ibn Sīnā’s perfect man translates into an attack on Democritus’ atomism as it is later upheld by Muslim theologians176 and defended by al-Bīrūnī in the Asʾila. Atomism permeates many of al-Bīrūnī’s works and is certainly sensed in the preface to the Āthār where he compares a day with the indivisible unit as the basis of all constructs.177 For Ibn Sīnā, as for Aristotle, the great weakness of the concept of indivisible atoms178 was that it postulated that atoms were not subject to change, which for them was the very essence of matter. Similarly, the essential component in the hierarchy of existents, according to Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology, is generation and corruption to which even his perfect man is subject. Al-Bīrūnī’s criticism of the Muslim Peripatetics whom he identifies with Aristotle179 does not blind him to the fact that there are also certain difficulties in the atomistic view. He, nevertheless, maintains that the view held by the Peripatetics is more open to criticism180 than the view of the atomists. Ibn Sīnā responds by pointing out that Aristotle considered matter to be divisible ad infinitum181 only potentially182 and not actually.183 Given al-Bīrūnī’s awareness of Hindu religious influence on the ancient Mediterranean world it is not surprising that the alternative that he proposes to Ibn Sīnā’s response, although

175 khayru ʾl-khalqi,(Āthār, p. 1, l. 3). 176 al-mutakallimūn. 177 idh humā [al-yawmu waʾl-laylatu] liʾl-shuhūri waʾl-sinīni waʾl-tawārīkhi kaʾl-wāḥidi liʾl- aʿdādi minhu tatarakkabu wa ilayhi tanḥallu,(Āthār, p. 5, l. 11). 178 juzʾun lā yatajazzaʾ (Asʾila, p. 17, l. 8). 179 Arisṭūṭālīs (Asʾila, p. 17, l. 7). 180 ashnaʿ (Asʾila, p. 18, l. 2). 181 an yujazzaʾa abadan (Asʾila, p. 19, l. 1). 182 biʾl-quwwa (Asʾila, p. 19, l. 3). 183 biʾl-fiʿl (ibid.). al-bīrūnī: prologues and method 33 similar in objective, differs entirely in its source which is Indian philosophy. In the preface to the Hind al-Bīrūnī notes the similarities between the Greek and Hindu traditions, in particular, their shared belief in metempsychosis184 and the unity of the Divine.185 Pythagoras may have obtained his doctrine of metempsychosis from India, mediated via Achaemenid Persia (sixth–fourth century bce), but similar ideas were known in Egypt and were present in Greece before his time. It is known, moreover, that Hindu ascetics occasion- ally visited Greece during Alexander’s empire. The most striking similarity of Greek and Indian thought is the resemblance between the system of mystical gnosis described in the Enneads of Plotinus (third century ce) and that of the Yoga-Sūtra attributed to Patañjali (c. second century ce) which was translated by al-Bīrūnī as, Tarjamatu kitābi Bātanjal fī ʾl-khalāṣi mina ʾl-irtibāki186 although it is unclear whether direct influence could have occurred in this case. Indian philosophy as expressed in al-Bīrūnī’s Hind suggests a qualitative atomism based upon the doctrine of the four elements of fire, air, earth and water. Further research may reveal al-Bīrūnī’s knowledge of certain Indian systems where the atoms are not absolutely indivisible but only relatively so, which is closer to the minima doctrine than to the atomism of Democritus. If this is indeed the case then the Hind reflects an outstanding episode in the long history of debate between the defenders of the view of continuity and the proponents of the discontinuity of physical bodies as well as an attempt to introduce a wholly different, Indian (mainly Hindu) cosmology into this debate and to present it to the worldview of the Muslim educated élite.

184 al-ḥulūl (Hind, p. 6, l. 1). 185 al-ittiḥād (ibid.). 186 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966: 302–325). chapter 2 Hindu Metaphysics According to the Hind

1 Mediaeval Arabic Texts on Hinduism and Their Sources

Previously we noted the priority given to the methodological discussion in the preface of the Hind in which Abū Sahl al-Tiflīsī urges al-Bīrūnī to write a work combining the elements of a polemic, typical of the Islamic heresiographical and geographical genres, “for those who wish to dispute with them [Hindus]”,1 and a cultural guide book “for those who wish to mix with them [ibid.]”, (Hind, p. 5, l. 7), even though significant information on India was already available through Arabic translations of Sanskrit works. These include a translation reputedly by Ibrāhīm Fazārī2 (d. 777) in 772 of Brāhmas- phuṭasiddhānta3 under the name of Sind Hind4 which Muslim mathematicians in later periods used as a source book and which was quoted widely by Mus- lim astronomers. Further, interest in Indian astronomy, mathematics and philosophy was spurred by significant interaction with Hindu civilisation during eighth-century Abbasid Baghdād.5 Such contact is indicated in, among other sources listed by Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 998),6 the Murūj ʾl-dhahab7 of al-Masʿūdī (d. 956) and the Rasāʾil8 of al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 869). Other relevant works translated

1 liman arāda munāqaḍatahum (Hind, p. 5, l. 7). 2 Ibrāhīm b. Ḥabīb al-Fazārī. Cf. Hind, p. 128, l. 12; p. 131, l. 6; p. 259, l. 7. Also in gas vi, pp. 122–124; gal s i, p. 391; Dodge, B., The Fihrist of al-Nadīm. New York and London, 1970, vol. ii, p. 649. 3 This is the main work of Brahmagupta, written c. 628. The text is notable for its mathematical content. 4 Hind, p. 118, l. 9. 5 The following overview of Indian sources draws from the article by Roy Choudhury, M.L., 1954: “Abū Raiḥān al Bīrūnī and his Indian studies”, in Indo-Iranica 7 (3), pp. 9–22. Cal- cutta. 6 Ibn al-Nadīm, Muḥammad b. Isḥāq. Kitāb ʾl-fihrist. G. Flugel (ed.). 2 vols. Leipzig 1871–1872. Trans. Dodge, B., (1970). 7 Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj ʾl-dhahab. ed. and trans. C.A. Barbier de Meynard and B.M.M. Pavet de Courteille. 9 vols. Paris 1861–1877 (Collections d’ouvrages orientaux, publ. par la Société Asiatique, 2). 8 Al-Jāḥiz, Rasāʾil. Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (ed.). 2 vols. Beirut 1996. wa qad taʿlamūna mā fī ʾl-hindi mina ʾl-ḥisābi wa ʿilmi ʾl-nujūmi wa asrāri ʾl-ṭibbi waʾl-kharṭi waʾl-najri

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004305540_004 hindu metaphysics according to the hind 35 in this earlier Abbasid period to which al-Bīrūnī refers include Brahmagupta’s Khanḍakhādyaka,9 a book on astronomy known in its Arabic translation as al- Arkand,10 Panchatantra of Vishnu Sarmā translated by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 756) under the Arabic title Kalīla wa Dimna,11 and Ganit of Ārya Bhatta, a work of arithmetic anonymously translated.12 The existence of many such anonymous translations of Sanskrit texts may be attributed to the appointment of Hindu physicians to the Abbasid court. The inspiration for the translation of medical works came from the school of medicine that was started by the Barmakids.13 Since it was compulsory for an Hindu student to study grammar and philosophy before he was allowed to pursue medicine, these medical scholars could easily impart knowledge of Indian philosophy to those who sought it, hence we find a variety of subjects introduced by the medical scholars to the court of Baghdād. It is highly unlikely that al-Bīrūnī was unaware of these translations from the Abbasid court,14 however, his generally negative view of the standard of what

waʾl-taṣāwīri waʾl-ṣināʿāti ʾl-kathīrati ʾl-ʿajībati, “for you are aware of what India has in mathematics, astronomy, medical secrets, turnery, carpentry, imagery, and many amazing crafts”, (Fakhru ʾl-sūdāni ʿalā ʾl-bīḍāni, vol. i, p. 212). 9 This is an astronomical work written by Brahmagupta in 665. 10 Hind, p. 346, l. 13. 11 Hind, p. 123, l. 11. 12 Roy Choudhury, M.L., (1954: 9–22) cites the Ganit in addition to other Sanskrit translations of this early Abbasid period in Baghdād including: Panjika by Khān Jain (almanac), Hitopadesh of Vishnu Sarmā by Abal, Kalīlā wa dimnā through Persian, Nakshatra Sāstra (science of the lunar state) by an unknown author, Karana Tilak by Brahmagupta, a synopsis by Abū Muḥammad Allah, and Josapha and Bārlām (Bodhisatwa and Purohit), a description of the Buddha and his preceptor in Persian. 13 The important presence of Hindu medics as court physicians in Abbasid Baghdād is evidenced by a large number of Sanskrit works which were translated by these physicians working in different fields during the eighth century. These include (cf. Roy Choudhury, M.L., 1954) works translated from Sanskrit by Mank on the science of medicine, the science of poison, veterinary science, treatment of pregnant women, and pharmacology. Dhan translated works on the science of eight parts (anatomy) and the science of joints. Moreover, there were many books translated by Ṣāliḥ (cf. Ṣāliḥ ʿAbd al-ḳuddūsā in ei2) but none of these manuscripts have been found. References to these translations by Ṣāliḥ mention astrology (drawing of horoscopes), agriculture, anatomy and palmistry as subjects. 14 Certainly by the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd (786–808) the following Sanskrit works had already been translated into Arabic, as recorded by Ibn al-Nadīm in his Kitāb ʾl-fihrist (Dodge, B., 1970: vol. ii, p. 710): Gynaecology by Roshena; Diseases of Gestation, author unknown; Treatment of Snake Bites (Rai Pandit) translator unknown; Veterinary Science of 36 chapter 2 had been analysed in the past may have dissuaded him from overreliance upon such sources:

An example was given on the explanation of the debate concerning the religions and doctrines of the Hindus. I then pointed out that the majority [of such debates on this subject] are recorded in books [i.e., are secondary], borrowed and copied from each other. They consist of snatches which are an unorganised and untidy mixture of their view[s].15

This attitude may have encouraged the more direct methodology employed in the Hind’s use of original sources, mainly Hindu religious and philosophical texts, which had not, up until his day, been made available or translated. In spite of this al-Bīrūnī refers to a number of Arabic sources in connection with his study on India and Indian subjects, these include Yaʿqūb b. Ṭāriq’s (d. c. 796) astronomical work entitled Tarkīb ʾl-aflāk;16 the Sufi works of Abū Bakr al-Shiblī (861–946) and Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī (804–874),17 specifically in connection with pantheism in Islam, as both drew extensively from Indian sources;18 references to al-Kindī’s (c. 801–873) use of the Karna;19 Carak Samhitā as quoted by ʿAlī

Kankāyan, translator unknown; Science of Necromancy of Rājā Kahn, translator unknown; Character of Women of Rājā Kosh or Ghosh, translator unknown; Drinkable of Atri, translator unknown; Science of Wine, author and translator unknown; Science of Music, author and translator unknown; Science of Mineralogy author and translator unknown. 15 wa kāna waqaʿa ʾl-mithālu fī faḥwa ʾl-kalāmi ʿalā adyāni ʾl-hindi wa madhāhibihim fa ashartu ilā anna aktharahā huwa masṭūrun fī ʾl-kutubi huwa manḥūlun wa baʿḍuhā ʿan baʿḍin manqūlun wa malqūṭun makhlūṭun ghayru muhadhdhabin ʿalā raʾyihim wa lā mushadhdhabin (Hind, p. 4, l. 10). 16 wa dhālika muqtabasun mina ʾl-raʾī ʾl-qadīmi ʾlladhī ḥakāhu Yaʿqūb bin Ṭāriq fī “Tarkībi ʾl-aflāki” ʿani ʾl-hindī,(Hind, p. 132, l. 7). “… this is derived from the old theory narrated by Yaʿqūb Ibn Ṭāriq in his book Tarkīb al-aflāk on the authority of his Hindu informant”. Cf. gas vi, pp. 124–127. 17 Cf. gal s i, p. 353. 18 wa kaqawli Abī Bakr al-Shiblī … wa kajawābi Abī Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī,(Hind, p. 66, l. 17). For an insightful analysis of the Upanishadic background of a number of al-Bisṭāmī’s analogies, cf. Zaehner, R.C., “Abū Yazīd of Bisṭām a Turning-Point in Islamic Mysticism”, in Indo-Iranian Journal i, 1955, pp. 286–301. Cf. also Pines, S., 1994. 19 fatantahī ilā ismi ʾl-karna … wa-in-aradta an udhakkiraka min amrihā mā rubbamā nasay- tahu faʿlam anna ʾl-Kindī wa amthālahu ʿatharū ʿalayhā ghayra mufaṣṣalatin,(Hind, p. 506, l. 5). “… you will arrive at the word Karna … and if you wanted me to remind you a little of what you might have forgotten about it, know that al-Kindī and his like came across it without it being explained”. hindu metaphysics according to the hind 37 b. Zain;20 al-Bīrūnī’s own astronomical work entitled Khayāl ʾl-kusūfayn;21 and, finally, al-Bīrūnī demonstrates a high regard for the account of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Īrānshahrī22 (b. ninth century) although less so of his partial reliance upon a work by Zurqān written in 863:

I did not find among those writers of treatises anyone who sought purely to narrate without bias or flattery except Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Īrānshahrī … when he came [in his book] to the Hindus and the Buddhists his arrow missed the mark, and in its latter part he strayed upon the book of Zurqān and copied its contents into his own book.23

2 Al-Bīrūnī’s Sanskrit Sources: Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal

It is quite clear from even a summary overview of al-Bīrūnī’s extant writings, that when it comes to the subjects of Hindu astronomy, philosophy and religion it is on his own wide readings in and translations of Sanskrit texts that he relies. Al-Bīrūnī refers to at least ten Hindu works24 in the Hind on which he had worked or with which he was familiar, and almost as many translations25

20 fa hādhihi aḥwālu ʾl-jūkāt dāʾiratun fī “Gatryuka”; wa fī kitābi “Jarak” ḥikāyatu ʿAlī bin Zain ʾl-Ṭabarī ʿanhu,(Hind, p. 321, l. 15). “This is the nature of the yugas [sic] as they circle round through the Caturyuga. The book Caraka, as quoted by ʿAli Ibn Zain of Ṭabaristān, says …”, Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: 382). 21 wa qad taqaṣṣaynā barāhīna hādhihi ʾl-aʿmāli fī kitābin wa sammaynāhu bikhayāli ʾl-kusū- fayni,(Hind, p. 512, l. 17). “… we have examined thoroughly the proofs of these methods in a book entitled Khayāl ʾl-kusūfayn”. 22 Cf. gas vi, pp. 172–173. 23 fa mā wajadtu min aṣḥābi kutubi ʾl-maqālāti aḥadan qaṣada ʾl-ḥikāyata ʾl-mujarradata min ghayri maylin wa lā mudāhanatin siwā Abī ʾl-ʿAbbās ʾl-Īrānshahrī … wa ḥīna balagha firqata ʾl-hindi waʾl-shamaniyyati ṣāfa sahmuhu ʿani ʾl-hadafi wa ṭāsha fī ākhirihi ilā kitābi Zarqāna wa naqala mā fīhi ilā kitābihi (Hind, p. 4, l. 13). 24 Important works include: Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta of Brahmagupta (astronomy and mathematics), Hind, p. 118, l. 17; Brhatsamhitā of Varāhamihira (astrology), Hind, p. 89, l. 14; Laghujātaka of Varāhamihira (astrology), Hind, p. 122, l. 5; Pañcasiddhāntikā of Varāhami- hira (astronomy), Hind, p. 119, l. 2; Paulisasiddhāntā by Paulisa (Indian astronomy), Hind, p. 118, l. 14; Romakasiddhānta by Srisena (astronomy), Hind, p. 118, l. 16; Khanḍakhādyaka of Brahmagupta (astronomy), Hind, p. 120, l. 16; Chhanda of Haribhatta (meter and prosody), Hind, p. 109, l. 1; Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali (philosophy), Hind, p. 42, l. 7; and the Gitā (religion), Hind, p. 21, l. 17. 25 Including Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta of Brahmagupta, Hind, p. 118, l. 17; Laghujātaka of 38 chapter 2 as well as works which he claims to have written in Sanskrit.26 This emphasis on self-reliance highlights the importance of the Hind in its role as a cosmological treatise drawing upon original sources, mainly Sanskrit scientific, religious and philosophical texts, rather than a further recapitulation of inherited materials and oral accounts or, indeed, a comparative study of religions based on contemporary Graeco-Arabic philosophy. In the preface to the Hind al-Bīrūnī refers to his reliance on the translations he has made of the Sāṃkhya of Kapila and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. He suggests that the Hind would replace these translations of Sanskrit works, which are religious and metaphysical rather than scientific in content, partly by transferring large portions of these translations into his latest work, and partly by focusing more on detail, al-furūʿ, and science:

And I had translated into Arabic two books, the first on beginnings and the description of existence called Sānk, and the other on the emancipation of the soul from the snares of the body called Bātanjal. These two contain the fundamentals of their [the Hindus] belief but without the details of their [religious] laws.27

An analysis of Arabic translations of Sanskrit texts available to al-Bīrūnī as well as a discussion of the sources which he refers to or directly quotes from in the Hind is as important as an analysis of his methodology. Indeed it is significant, given this received wealth of translated materials on many relevant topics, that the Hind draws primarily upon al-Bīrūnī’s direct personal study of Sanskrit original works as well as from contact with astronomers28 in Ghazna,

Varāhamihira, Hind, p. 122, l. 5; Brhatsamhitā of Varāhamihira, Hind, p. 272, l. 2; Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, Hind, p. 42, l. 7; Sāṃkhya of Kapila, Hind, p. 102, l. 2; Nyāya of Kapila, p. 102, l. 4. 26 References to the original books written in Sanskrit by al-Bīrūnī include al-Majisṭī (Greek astronomy) and Euclid’s works translated into Sanskrit, (cf. Boilot’s “L’oeuvre d’al-Bīrūnī”, mideo 2, 1955, which is the standard listing of al-Bīrūnī’s works, and includes the Sanskrit translations of Euclid’s Elements [rg 175], Ptolemy’s Almagest [rg 176], and a work on the astrolabe [rg 177]; the article notes that these books were made by others for al-Bīrūnī). 27 wa kuntu naqaltu ilā ʾl-ʿarabiyyi kitābayni aḥaduhumā fī ʾl-mabādiʾi wa ṣifati ʾl-mawjūdāti, wa ismuhu “Sānk” waʾl-ākharu fī takhlīṣi ʾl-nafsi min ribāṭi ʾl-badani wa yuʿrafu bi- “Bātan- jali” wa fīhimā aktharu ʾl-uṣūli ʾllatī ʿalayhā madāru iʿtiqādihim dūna furūʿi sharāʾiʿihim (Hind, p. 6, l. 1). 28 innī kuntu aqifu min munajjimīhim maqāma ʾl-tilmīdhi mina ʾl-ustādhi liʿujmatī fīmā baynahum wa quṣūrī ʿammā hum fīhī min muwāḍaʿātihim (Hind p. 17, l. 16). “I was, when it came to their astronomers, in the relation of pupil to teacher, because I was a foreigner among them and ignorant of their terminology”. hindu metaphysics according to the hind 39 in Indian cities, and in places of pilgrimage for Hindus, and only secondarily upon Sanskrit texts translated into Arabic during the earlier and later Abbasid period. It is significant in the light of al-Bīrūnī’s heavy reliance upon Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtra when outlining a Hindu perspective of the soul in the Hind, that he should define these two earlier works so sharply in its preface. Given that al-Bīrūnī’s Samkhya text has not survived it can only be concluded from the allusion to it in the preface and the ample quotations found from it in the first section of the Hind that al-Bīrūnī chose to limit his use of Classical Samkhya to certain aspects of metaphysical speculation, namely, its treatment of “beginnings and the description of existence”.29 This is despite the fact that Classical Samkhya, as it is generally defined, comprises its own dualistic theory regarding the soul/matter relationship.30 The numerous philosophical differences between Classical Yoga and Classi- cal Samkhya (henceforth referred to simply as Yoga and Samkhya) derive from the different methodologies adopted by the two schools of thought. Samkhya relies primarily on the exercise of the discernment of spirit, puruṣa, from matter, prakrti, on the basis of prefabricated categories of differentiation, stressing a theoretical and intellectual analysis in order to bring out the nature of final emancipation.31 Yoga, on the other hand, cannot be strictly described as a dualistic system since emancipation is achieved through a practical understanding and clearer realisation of one’s intrinsic identity as spirit, puruṣa, rather than through the intellectual discernment of puruṣa from matter, prakrti. The history of yoga is long and ancient. The term yoga, derived from the Sanskrit root yuj, “to control”, “to yoke”, or “to unite”, refers to these disciplines of asceticism and meditation which are thought to lead to spiritual awakening and profound insight into the nature of existence. Yoga is the means whereby the mind and senses can be restrained, the limited, empirical self or ego, ahamkāra, can be transcended and the self’s true identity eventually experienced. The actual term yoga first occurs in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad32 (2. 3. 10–11) where it is defined as the steady control of the senses, which, along with the cessation of mental activity, leads to the supreme state. The text most significant in the yoga tradition is the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. This text, composed some

29 fī ʾl-mabādiʾi wa ṣifati ʾl-mawjūdāti (Hind, p. 6, l. 2). 30 Larson, G., Classical Samkhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning. Delhi, 1969. 31 Whicher, I., The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana. New York, 1998. 32 The Kaṭha Upaniṣad is one of the primary Upanishads dating back to perhaps the sixth century bce. 40 chapter 2 time between 100bce and 500ce, contains pithy aphorisms on Yoga, called the “eight-limbed”, aṣṭānga, or “the best”, rāja, yoga. The Yoga-Sūtra codifies yoga ideas and practices which had been developing for many centuries. Patañjali succinctly defines yoga in the second Sūtra: “Yoga is the cessation of mental fluctuations”, (Yoga-Sūtra, i. 2)33 That is, yoga is a state of concentration in which the wandering mind, fed by sense impressions and memories, is controlled and made to be one-pointed, ekāgratā. This mental control occurs through developing eight aspects or limbs of the yogic path. These are: ethics; discipline; posture; breath-control; sense-withdrawal; concentration; meditation; and absorbed concentration, samādhi, which leads to the primary goal of liberation, kaivalya. Kaivalya, in Patañjali’s system, is liberation from the wheel of transmigration and the realisation of the self’s solitude and complete transcendence.34 The different methodologies adopted by these two Hindu philosophical schools (Yoga and Samkhya) and its reflection in their discussion of the nature of the soul/matter relationship is the reason why al-Bīrūnī sharply defines and separates the subject matter of his two translations, Kitāb Bātanjal and Kitāb Sānk. Thus, quotations from Kitāb Sānk cited in the Hind, seem to be mainly limited to the exposition of abstract metaphysical knowledge and attribute little significance to the dualistic psychology of Samkhyan doctrine. Kitāb Bātan- jal, on the other hand, as the quotation from the preface to the Hind indicates, has as its main subject Patañjali’s philosophy of the soul which conveys, in contradistinction to Samkhyan dualism, a pragmatic and experiential approach to achieve salvation. This is accomplished by dealing with the whole individual as both spirit and matter, an approach whose practical sophistication moves beyond the theoretical level of dualistic finality to the actual possibility of real liberation as described in al-Bīrūnī’s Kitāb Bātanjal. It is likely, then, given the general awareness of this conscious differentiation of subject matter within al- Bīrūnī’s two translations, that he actively chose to emphasise the methodology of Patañjali’s yoga when describing his view of the Hindu understanding of the soul over the dualistic metaphysics of Samkhya. In this context the psychology of the Hind may be understood in terms of a subtle comparison and exploration of the two systems of Samkhya and Yoga, based mainly upon quotations from al-Bīrūnī’s two translations, in order to dif-

33 Mukerji, P.N., Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali. Calcutta, 1963. All subsequent quotations from the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali are drawn from this edition. 34 This summary overview of yoga is taken from Flood, G., An Introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge, 1996, pp. 96–98. hindu metaphysics according to the hind 41 ferentiate between them in terms that complement his philosophical and cosmological narrative. This narrative is illustrated in psychological terms in the first section of the Hind that bases itself on and draws directly from KitābBātan- jal, al-Bīrūnī’s own non-dualistic translation of Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtra. Through- out this section, al-Bīrūnī contrasts these sources with a stricter metaphysical dualist interpretation of the Samkhyan text, as is clear from quotations he cites from his Kitāb Sānk translation.

3 The Differentiation of Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal35

A clear example of differentiation is found in the second chapter of the Hind entitled “A description of their [the Hindus] belief in God, may He be exalted”.36 This chapter begins with a general description of Hindu belief in a God who seems very similar, if not identical, to the Muslim God:

The belief of the Hindus in God, may He be exalted, is that He is the eternal one with neither beginning nor end, who is free in His actions, omnipotent, all wise, living and life giving, ruling and preserving, alone in His kingdom without likeness or unlikeness, resembling nothing and nothing resembling Him.37

Given the fact that many of the above epithets are typical Muslim terminology for describing God it is all the more interesting that the first important interpretative statement by al-Bīrūnī of Hindu doctrine in the Hind should reflect a strong monotheistic current. More importantly, it casts a non-dualist theme which sets the analytical tone and discursive drive in many other subject-areas of al-Bīrūnī’s treatise including the psychological and metaphysical discussion at the outset.

35 Parts of this and the following section are drawn from my paper presented at the Con- ference of the School of Abbasid Studies held in Trinity Hall, Cambridge in July 2002 entitled: “The Epilogue of al-Bīrūnī’s Kitāb Bātanjal” in Montgomery, J.E. (ed.), ʿAbbasid Studies. Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Cambridge 6–10 July 2002. Leu- ven: Peeters, 2004. Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 135. 36 fī dhikri iʿtiqādihim fī ʾllāhi subḥānahu (Hind, p. 20, l. 1). 37 wa iʿtiqādu ʾl-hindi fī ʾllāhi subḥānahu annahu ʾl-wāḥidu ʾl-azalī min ghayri ibtidāʾin wa lā intihāʾin al-mukhtāru fī fiʿlihi al-qādiru ʾl-ḥakīmu ʾl-ḥayyu ʾl-muḥyī ʾl-mudabbiru ʾl-mubqī ʾl- fardu fī malakūtihi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi waʾl-andādi lā yushbihu shayʾan wa lā yushbihuhu shayʾun (Hind, p. 20, l. 5). 42 chapter 2

Al-Bīrūnī concedes that the Hindus’ belief in God as “one”,38 “eternal”,39 and “unique”,40 is not universally held because of the difference between the “educated elite”,41 whose nature “strives for reason and seeks to verify principles”,42 and the “masses”,43 whose “nature keeps them at the level of the senses, and who are satisfied with what is derived without bothering about accuracy especially in areas where there is a difference of views and opinions”.44 Accordingly, the principle keynote of non-dualism, reflected in unambiguous monotheistic language, is, nevertheless, set within the discursive context of other possible theological, metaphysical and psychological systems. As a result, the Hind becomes both an exploration of divergent Hindu doctrines and a non-dualistic interpretation based upon and drawing from a psychology gestated in his translation of Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtra. The combination of these activities discernible through a subtle comparison of a triptych of texts, the Arabic translations of Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtra, the Samkhya text and a version of the Bhagavadgītā,45 gives the Hind a rich versatility and comprehensiveness. Such an approach diminishes the flaws of bias, flattery or polemic outlined by al-Bīrūnī in the preface whilst maintaining an interpretative direction to what is a professedly text-based analytical treatise:

I did not find among those writers of heresiographies anyone who sought purely to narrate without bias or flattery … Let us quote extracts on this subject from their books to avoid the danger of our account being based solely upon hearsay.46

38 al-wāḥid (Hind, p. 20, l. 6). 39 al-azalī (Hind, ibid.). 40 al-fard (Hind, p. 20, l. 7). 41 al-khāṣṣa (Hind, ibid.). 42 yunāziʿu ʾl-maʿqūla wa yaqṣidu ʾl-taḥqīqa fī ʾl-uṣūli (Hind, p. 20, l. 3). 43 al-ʿāmma (Hind, p. 20, l. 2). 44 ṭibāʿu ʾl-ʿāmmati yaqifu ʿinda ʾl-maḥsūsi wa yaqtaniʿu biʾl-furūʿi wa lā yarūmu ʾl-tadqīqa wa khāṣṣatan fīmā iftannat fīhi ʾl-ārāʾu wa lam yattafiq ʿalayhi ʾl-ahwāʾu (Hind, p. 20, l. 3). 45 The famous Bhagavadgītā (Sanskrit: “Song of God”) in its present day form is one of the greatest and most beautiful of the Hindu scriptures. It forms part of Book vi of the Indian epic the Mahābhārata, “Great Epic of the Bhārata Dynasty”, and is written in the form of a dialogue between the warrior Prince Arjuna and his friend and charioteer, Krishna, who is also an earthly incarnation of the god Vishnu. The Bhagavadgītā is of a later date than the major parts of the Mahābhārata and was probably written in the first or second century ce. The poem consists of 700 Sanskrit verses divided into 18 chapters. 46 fa mā wajadtu min aṣḥābi kutubi ʾl-maqālāti aḥadan qaṣada ʾl-ḥikāyata ʾl-mujarradata min hindu metaphysics according to the hind 43

The interpretative direction of the Hind, therefore, based upon the psychology developed in al-Bīrūnī’s Kitāb Bātanjal, does not preclude an exploratory context in which the dualism to be found in the Samkhya text and the the- ism of the version of the Bhagavadgītā that he quotes enhance the scope of his analysis of Hindu theology, metaphysics and psychology. This is achieved without distorting the continuum of methodological perspective between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind. By analysing the full range of Hindu thinking within the parameters of these subject areas in the initial twelve chapters of the Hind, al-Bīrūnī classifies and evaluates the major categories of Hindu philosophy and religion without undermining the chief psychological context, itself a distillation and extension of what had been broached in Kitāb Bātanjal.

4 Theology from Kitāb Bātanjal to the Hind

It is significant, then, that the first important religious question to be broached in the Hind should be primarily explored on the basis of a quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal:

The questioner in Kitāb Bātanjal said: who is this who is worshipped, and by the worship of whom success is obtained? Patañjali answered: He is the one who through His uniqueness and oneness is in no need of action to reward it … He cannot be contemplated being above unlikeness which is detestable and likeness which is desirable and who in Himself is eternally knowing.47

Al-Bīrūnī’s desire for a comprehensive understanding of Hindu doctrine which is, of course, determined by the selection, translation and interpretation of certain texts, is not limited to those primary Sanskrit sources already mentioned. Indeed, his reliance upon these texts does not diminish his important use of other religions and sects in clarifying Indian philosophy and psychology. The ultimate aim is to permit a selected Indian corpus and, by extension, the contributions of Indian science to be integrated into the worldview of Mediaeval Ara-

ghayri maylin wa lā mudāhanatin (Hind, p. 4, l. 13) … wa li-nūrida fī dhālika shayʾan min kutubihim liʾallā takūna ḥikāyatunā kaʾl-shayʾi ʾl-masmūʿi faqaṭ (Hind, p. 20, l. 8). 47 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu fī kitābi “bātanjal”: man hādhā ʾl-maʿbūdu ʾlladhī yunālu ʾl-tawfīqu biʿibādatih? qāla ʾl-mujību: huwa ʾl-mustaghnī bi-awwaliyyatihi wa waḥdāniyyatihi ʿan fiʿlin limukāfāt ʿalayhi … waʾl-barīʾu ʿani ʾl-afkāri litaʿālīhi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi ʾl-makrūhati waʾl-andādi ʾl-maḥbū- bati waʾl-ʿālimi bidhātihi sarmadan (Hind, p. 20, l. 9). 44 chapter 2 bic philosophy. As has been suggested earlier, al-Bīrūnī relates certain aspects of Hinduism to ideas quoted from the traditions of the Greeks, Christians, Jews, Manichaeans, and Sufis. Some scholars have used this to argue that al-Bīrūnī maintained a belief in a core truth and a proto-religion in which all civilisations have a share. Such a position, however, is not necessarily borne out in the preface to the Hind where one senses the incomparability of Islam, and the truth revealed to and transmitted by the prophets, in contrast to non-Muslim schools and sects. By generally omitting Islam from the comparative process, al-Bīrūnī implies its integrity and superiority, despite his use of methods ranging from observation to rationalisation to demonstrate the interrelatedness of the Indian sciences and religion. However, given the seemingly conscious exclusion of Islam from the discussion it is intriguing that the first religious statement by al-Bīrūnī regarding Hindu belief in God should be so close in its monotheistic nature to the Islamic theological tenets. He justifies this statement based on Kitāb Bātanjal, his translation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali from which he derives a passage that supports and further qualifies his assertion. This strong relationship between al-Bīrūnī’s interpretative comments and argumentation in the Hind and such ancillary quotations from Kitāb Bātanjal is a key factor in determining the accuracy and the extent of a continuum of methodological perspective between these two texts. For not only, in this first example, does there exist a correspondence of conception between al-Bīrūnī’s statement and the Kitāb Bātanjal passage but, more convincingly, there is the parallel use of theological terminology. Thus al-Bīrūnī begins by describing God as, “… the eternal one with neither beginning nor end, who is free in His actions”,48 just as the Kitāb Bātanjal passage begins with, “… He is the one who through His uniqueness49 and oneness is in no need of (human) action”.50 The nature of al-Bīrūnī’s opening monotheistic statement on Hindu belief is further revealed in its latter portion describing God’s uniqueness, “… alone in His kingdom without likeness or unlikeness, resembling nothing and nothing resembling Him”,51 which relates closely to part of Patañjali’s characterisation of God, “… He cannot be contemplated being above unlikeness which

48 al-wāḥidu ʾl-azalī min ghayri ibtidāʾin wa lā intihāʾin al-mukhtāru fī fiʿlihi (Hind, p. 20, l. 6). 49 Cf. the editor’s footnote (Hind, p. 20, l. 19) for the alternative reading of bi-azaliyyatih for the given bi-awwaliyyatih (Hind, p. 20, l. 11), “in his primariness”. 50 huwa ʾl-mustaghnī bi-azaliyyatihi wa waḥdāniyyatihi ʿan fiʿlin (Hind, p. 20, l. 10). 51 al-fardu fī malakūtihi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi waʾl-andādi lā yushbihu shayʾan wa lā yushbihuhu shayʾun (Hind, p. 20, l. 7). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 45 is detestable and likeness which is desirable”.52 Finally, the quality of God as “omniscient”53 which al-Bīrūnī posits as a Hindu theological tenet is not only corroborated by the passage from Kitāb Bātanjal but also is explained further and in some detail, thus attesting to both a methodological continuum between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind and an interpretative one: “… who is in Himself eternally knowing since accidental knowledge exists about that which was not known before. Nor can ignorance be applicable to Him at any time or in any circumstance”.54

5 Passage 1: The Theological Interface between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali

The supporting passage from Kitāb Bātanjal continues with a detailed discussion of the attributes of God outlined by al-Bīrūnī’s statement at the outset of the chapter:

After this the questioner says: does He have any attributes other than the ones that you mentioned? Patañjali answers: He is perfectly sublime in power, not in place, for He transcends location. He is the pure and perfect good longed for by every existent, and He is knowledge which is pure from the contamination of negligence and ignorance.55

The presence of the Neoplatonic term “the absolute good”,56 reflects the more general use of expressions deriving from Greek philosophical texts translated

52 waʾl-barīʾu ʿani ʾl-afkāri litaʿālīhi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi ʾl-makrūhati waʾl-andādi ʾl-maḥbūbati (Hind, p. 20, l. 12). 53 al-ḥakīm (Hind, p. 20, l. 7). 54 waʾl-ʿālimu bidhātihi sarmadan idhi ʾl-ʿilmu ʾl-ṭāriʾu yakūnu limā lam yakun bimaʿlūmin wa laysa ʾl-jahlu bi-muttajihin ʿalayhi fī waqtin mā aw ḥālin (Hind, p. 20, l. 13). 55 thumma yaqūlu ʾl-sāʾilu baʿda dhālika: fahal lahu mina ʾl-ṣifāti ghayru mā dhakarta? wa yaqūlu ʾl-mujību: lahu ʾl-ʿulūwu ʾl-tāmmu fī ʾl-qadri lā ʾl-makāni faʾinnahu yajillu ʿani ʾl- tamakkuni, wa huwa ʾl-khayru ʾl-maḥḍu ʾl-tāmmu ʾlladhī yashtāquhu kullu mawjūdin, wa huwa ʾl-ʿilmu ʾl-khāliṣu ʿan danasi ʾl-sahwi waʾl-jahli (Hind, p. 20, l. 15). Cf. Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 174, l. 6: qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: fahal lahu mina ʾl-ṣifāti ghayru mā dhakarta? qāla ʾl-mujību: lahu ʾl-ʿulūwu ʾl-tāmmu fī ʾl-qadri lā ʾl-makāni faʾinnahu yajillu ʿanni ʾl-tamakkuni, wa huwa ʾl- khayru ʾl-maḥḍu ʾl-tāmmu ʾlladhī yashtāquhu kullu mawjūdin, wa huwa ʾl-ʿilmu ʾl-khāliṣu ʿan danasi ʾl-sahwi waʾl-jahli. The passage quoted in the Hind corresponds to questions 14–18 and the answers to them in Kitāb Bātanjal. 56 al-khayru ʾl-maḥḍu (Hind, p. 20, l. 17). 46 chapter 2 into Arabic but here, remarkably, employed to interpret the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. Thus the three Gunas57 of sattva (sentience and intelligence), rajas (mobility and activity), and tamas (inertia and darkness), are represented in Kitāb Bātanjal58 in the Neoplatonic terms of “the absolute good”,59 and “the absolute evil”,60 or the class that is a mixture of the two.61 Similarly, the Neoplatonic-sounding expression “He is perfectly sublime in power”,62 is primarily based on the commentary by Vyāsa63 of Sūtra i. 26, “As He was present with His full powers in the beginning of the present cycle of creation, so was He at the beginning of the past creations” [emphasis added].64 Finally, it may be argued that the Neoplatonism in the phrase “… He is knowledge which is pure from the contamination of negligence and ignorance”,65 derives from Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra i. 24.66 The provenance of the terminology is less significant than commentators such as S. Pines and T. Gelblum67 have insisted upon, given the Hindu philosophical context in which they appear and their practical function as an accessible means of expression for conveying broadly parallel concepts from the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali.

57 The three Gunas serve as the fundamental operating principles or “tendencies” of matter, prakrti. 58 wa maʿrifatuhu biʾl-kayfiyyati ahuwa min jinsi ʾl-khayri ʾl-maḥḍi aw min jinsi ʾl-sharri ʾl- maḥḍi aw mina ʾl-jinsi ʾl-mumtaziji baynahumā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 2), “and the cognition (of the known object) in terms of its nature, whether it belongs to the class of pure good or to the class of pure evil or to the class that is a mixture of the two”. This is an interpretation of the idea projected by Vyāsa of the three Gunas, described in his commentary to Yoga-Sūtra ii. 18, “Sentience is the characteristic of Sattva, mobility of Rajas and inertia of Tamas. These three Gunas are distinct though mutually related”. Mukerji, P.N., (1963: 176). 59 al-khayru ʾl-maḥḍu. 60 al-sharru ʾl-maḥḍu. 61 al-jinsu ʾl-mumtaziju baynahumā. 62 lahu ʾl-ʿulūwu ʾl-tāmmu fī ʾl-qadri (Hind, p. 20, l. 16). 63 The earliest of the classical commentaries on the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali is by Vyāsa, generally believed to be a historical figure who wrote his commentary within decades of the appearance of the Yoga-Sūtra. 64 Mukerji, P.N., (1963: 71). 65 huwa ʾl-ʿilmu ʾl-khāliṣu ʿan danasi ʾl-sahwi waʾl-jahli (Hind, p. 20, l. 17). 66 “The special Puruṣa, who on account of his eternal liberation, is uncontaminated even by the touch of enjoyment or suffering, is called Īśvara … For these reasons Īśvara is always Īśvara, i.e., Omniscient and always liberated. His pre-eminence is never equalled nor excelled”. 67 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., “Al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic Version of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra”, bsoas 29/2, 1966, pp. 302–325; 40/3, 1977, pp. 522–549; 46/2, 1983, pp. 258–304; 52/2, 1989, pp. 265–305. hindu metaphysics according to the hind 47

The second part of this expansive passage from Kitāb Bātanjal is essen- tially epistemological with a discussion of the nature of the difference between human and divine knowledge: “The questioner said: if He speaks as a result of his knowledge then what is the difference between Him and those wise teachers who spoke as a result of their own knowledge?”68 The comparison of divine knowledge with human knowledge is expressed in terms of the characteristic of “speech”,69 which, in the Islamic tradition at least, is attributable to both God and Human.70 Although the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali mentions only that God (Īśvara) is expressed by the sacred syllable “Om”,71 al-Bīrūnī in Kitāb Bātanjal understands Sūtra i. 27 as qualifying God with speech but without making any reference in his translation to this sacred syllable: “Do you describe him as having speech or not? Patañjali answered: if he is knowing then he undoubtedly has speech”.72 Nevertheless, the transference of divine knowledge through the device of human speech among sages and in the sacred texts which they receive does, in fact, correspond more closely to the commentary by Vyāsa in both Yoga-Sūtras i. 24 and i. 27: “To some of them [God] sent down a book, to others He opened a door for mediation with Him, others received revelation from Him and grasped through thought what he had granted them”.73 Indeed, the

68 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: fa in kāna mutakalliman liʾajli ʿilmihi fa mā ʾl-farqu baynahu wa bayna ʾl- ʿulamāʾi ʾl-ḥukamāʾi ʾlladhīna takallamū min ajli ʿulūmihim?(Hind, p. 21, l. 1). 69 al-kalām. 70 “kalām, parole, synonyme de qawl, mais laissant à ce dernier la signification technique, pour ne garder que la signification courante.—Le prophète a pour caractéristique ‘d’écou- ter la parole de Dieu’ [an yasmaʿa kalāma ʾllāhi] … L’un des sens vulgaires du mot ‘intelligence’ est celui-ci: ‘… une louable disposition qui appartient à l’homme dans ces mouve- ments, ses repos, sa parole, son choix,’ [hayʾatun maḥmūdatun liʾl-insāni fī ḥarakātihi wa sukunātihi wa kalāmihi wa ikhtiyārihi]”. Goichon, A., (1938: 352). 71 Cf. Sūtra i. 27, “The Sacred Word Designating Him Is Pranava Or The Mystic Syllable Om”. Also Vyāsa on this Sūtra, “Īśvara is indicated by the mystic syllable”. 72 afataṣifuhu biʾl-kalāmi am lā? qāla ʾl-mujību: idhā kāna ʿāliman fahuwa lā maḥālata mutakallimun (Hind, p. 20, l. 18). 73 faminhum man alqā ilayhi kitāban, wa minhum man fataḥa liwāsiṭatin ilayhi bāban, wa minhum man awḥā ilayhi fanāla biʾl-fikri mā afāḍa ʿalayhi (Hind, p. 21, l. 7). Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra i. 24, “The question, therefore, arises whether this perpetual superiority of Īśvara on account of the excellence of His self is something of which there is proof or is it something without any proof? The reply is ‘The Sacred books are its proof.’ What is the proof of the genuineness of the scriptures? Their genuineness is based on supreme wisdom. The Śāstras [Hindu scriptures] and their sublime wisdom which are present in the mind of the Īśvara and His pre-eminence are eternally related to each other. For these reasons Īśvara 48 chapter 2 clinching factor in this epistemological discussion which differentiates human from divine knowledge is clearly understood and reflected in Kitāb Bātanjal:

[Patañjali] answered: the difference between them is time, for they [the wise teachers] acquired learning in time and they spoke after having been ignorant and unable to speak, and they transmitted their science to others by speech, thus their speech and teaching took place in time. Since divine matters have no connection with time, God, may He be exalted, knows and speaks in pre-eternity.74

Here we find an epistemological discussion about the pre-eternity of certain knowledge: “God, may He be exalted, knows and speaks in pre-eternity”,75 over against the temporal acquisition of knowledge: “The difference between them is time, for they [the wise teachers] acquired learning in time”.76 Embedded in this passage is a methodological delineation of effective means for transmitting knowledge on the metaphysical and physical levels of divine to human,77 and human to human,78 as well as on the temporal level of transmitting knowledge through (textual) narration and teaching.79

is always Īśvara, i.e., Omniscient and always liberated”. Cf. also Vyāsa on Sūtra i. 27: “Sages, who know the Śāstras, say that on account of similarity of usage, the relationship between a word and the object indicated by it is eternal”. 74 qāla ʾl-mujību: al-farqu baynahum huwa ʾl-zamānu fa-innahum taʿallamū fīhi wa takallamū baʿda an lam yakūnū ʿālimīna wa lā mutakallimīna wa naqalū biʾl-kalāmi ʿulūmahum ilā ghayrihim fa-kalāmuhum wa ifādatuhum fī zamānin, wa idh laysa liʾl-umūri ʾl-ilāhiyyati biʾl-zamāni ittiṣālun faʾllāhu subḥānahu ʿālimun mutakallimun fī ʾl-azali (Hind, p. 21, l. 3). Cf. Sūtra i. 26: “[He is] The Teacher Of Former Teachers, Because With Him There Is No Limitation By Time (Of His Omnipotence)”. Also Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra i. 26: “The former teachers of knowledge and of piety are limited by time, but He to whom time as limiting factor is not applicable, was the teacher of the former teachers”. For the translation of the Arabic, fī ʾl-azali (Hind, p. 21, 6), as “in pre-eternity”,see Vyāsa on Sūtra i. 26: “As He was present with His full powers in the beginning of the present cycle of creation, so was He at the beginning of the past creations”, [emphasis added]. 75 faʾllāhu subḥānahu ʿālimun mutakallimun fī ʾl-azali (Hind, p. 21, l. 6). 76 al-farqu baynahum huwa ʾl-zamānu fa-innahum taʿallamū fīhi (Hind, p. 21, l. 3). 77 faminhum man alqā ilayhi kitāban, wa minhum man fataḥa liwāsiṭatin ilayhi bāban, wa minhum man awḥā ilayhi fanāla biʾl-fikri mā afāḍa ʿalayhi (Hind, p. 21, l. 7), “… to some of them [God] sent down a book, to others He opened a door for mediation with Him, others received revelation from Him and grasped through thought what he had granted them”. 78 wa naqalū biʾl-kalāmi ʿulūmahum ilā ghayrihim (Hind, p. 21, l. 4), “And they transmitted their science to others by speech”. 79 fakalāmuhum wa ifādatuhum fī zamānin (Hind, p. 21, l. 5), “Thus their speech and teaching took place in time”. hindu metaphysics according to the hind 49

This delineation, found in a quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal and based on the empirical differentiation between oral and written information, refers to al-Bīrūnī’s methodological purpose for quoting this passage. He states: “Let us quote extracts on this subject from their books to avoid the danger of our account being based solely upon hearsay”,80 thus revealing his insistence upon the importance of the written word, be it in the form of translated Sanskrit or Greek sources. The quoted passage, therefore, is an immediate manifestation of al-Bīrūnī’s methodological purpose of basing his “account”81 of Hindu religious doctrine on primary sources. More interestingly, it also seems to inform and corroborate his methodology so that what at first appears to be a clear distinction between quoter and quoted, theory and practice, blurs as the quotation seems actually to voice al-Bīrūnī’s declared theoretical approach rather than simply to affirm it. Thus al-Bīrūnī’s succinctly expressed desire to avoid complete reliance in his “account” on oral traditions, “that which is heard”,82 is in fact explained by the Kitāb Bātanjal quotation through a subtle definition of the metaphysical/physical, divine/human and temporal/pre-eternal possibilities of al-kalām83 which is the mechanism for the transference of knowledge from textual, oral, inspira- tional and revelatory sources:

And they transmitted their science to others by speech, thus their speech and teaching took place in time. Since divine matters have no connection with time, God, may He be exalted, knows and speaks in pre-eternity … to some of them [God] sent down a book, to others He opened a door for mediation with Him, others received revelation from Him and grasped through thought what he had granted them.84

The methods listed here may all be considered authentic accounts not only within the Hindu philosophical tradition from which they are derived and

80 wa li-nūrida fī dhālika shayʾan min kutubihim liʾallā takūna ḥikāyatunā kaʾl-shayʾi ʾl-mas- mūʿi faqaṭ (Hind, p. 20, l. 8). 81 al-ḥikāya. 82 al-shayʾu ʾl-masmūʿu (Hind, p. 20, l. 9). 83 “Speech”. 84 wa naqalū biʾl-kalāmi ʿulūmahum ilā ghayrihim fa-kalāmuhum wa ifādatuhum fī zamānin, waidhlaysaliʾl-umūriʾl-ilāhiyyatibiʾl-zamāniittiṣālunfaʾllāhusubḥānahuʿālimunmutakal- limun fī ʾl-azali … faminhum man alqā ilayhi kitāban, wa minhum man fataḥa liwāsiṭatin ilayhi bāban, wa minhum man awḥā ilayhi fanāla biʾl-fikri mā afāḍa ʿalayhi (Hind, p. 21, l. 4). 50 chapter 2 translated but also evidently for al-Bīrūnī. Of course, it is possible to argue that since the quoted passage is taken from al-Bīrūnī’s translation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali his theoretical and methodological interpretations would naturally be reflected in Kitāb Bātanjal. This is true but only to an extent given Kitāb Bātanjal’s strong connection in terms of subject matter with the equivalent Sūtras, the commentary on them by Vyāsa and many comparable passages.85 The fact that the Hind is a study of a non-monotheistic religion which is outside the sphere of heresy and heresiography gave al-Bīrūnī great room for intellectual and philosophical manoeuvre in his academic analysis of Hindu philosophy and his interaction with Hindu doctrines and Sanskrit texts. Given this context, that a text such as the Yoga-Sūtra or a commentator such as Vyāsa might influence al-Bīrūnī’s thinking is just as much a possibility, in an expository treatise such as the Hind, as the possibility of his influence governing the interpretative translation of KitābBātanjal. A refreshing view on this matter was proposed by Franz Rosenthal in his article, “On Some Epistemological and Methodological Presuppositions of al-Bīrūnī”,86 who argues “… that ideas to be found in the Yogasūtra entered Bīrūnī’s own epistemological thinking. Normally, it would seem prudent for us to see in Bīrūnī more the reporter of Indian philosophical speculation than the follower of it. However, his receptive mind was often deeply impressed by the foreign ideas he studied, and they were incorporated into his own thought patterns”. Furthermore, Divine knowledge is described in the quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal in terms that would be easily accessible to al-Bīrūnī’s Muslim readers without theological distortion to the relevant subject matter in the Yoga-Sūtra:

The questioner said: where does He have this knowledge from? Patañjali answered: His knowledge is eternally unchanged, and given that He is never ignorant then His Self knows and does not acquire knowledge which He did not have. As He says in the Veda which he revealed to Brahmā: ‘Praise and extol the One who spoke in the Veda and existed before the Veda.’87

85 The current passage under consideration in the Hind, as has already been shown, is the almost exact equivalent of questions 14–18 in Kitāb Bātanjal and reflects Sūtras i. 24–27 of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali in addition to a commentary on them by Vyāsa. 86 Rosenthal, F., “On Some Epistemological and Methodological Presuppositions of al-Bīrū- nī”, in A. Sayili, (ed.), Beyrunî’ye Armağan. Ankara, 1974, pp. 145–167. 87 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: fa min ayna lahu hādhā ʾl-ʿilmi? qāla ʾl-mujību: ʿilmuhu ʿalā ḥālihi fī ʾl-azali, wa idh lam yajhal qaṭṭ fadhātuhu ʿālimatun lam taktasib ʿilman lam yakun lahu, kamā qāla fī “bīdh” ʾlladhī anzalahu ʿalā brāham: aḥmidū wamdaḥū man takallama bi-bīdh wa kāna hindu metaphysics according to the hind 51

Thus, the reference here to the unchanging and eternal nature of God’s Self and knowledge and His imparting of this knowledge through revelation in scripture is not an “Islamisation” of Hindu theological doctrine. Rather, it is a contextualised translation which, nevertheless, reflects the core tenets described by Vyāsa in his commentary at this point. The eternally unchanged nature of God’s knowledge and, therefore, of His Self,88 may reflect Vyāsa’s idea of the “perpetual superiority of Īśvara on account of the excellence of His self”.89 That God reveals the “Veda”, which convey His divine knowledge through His own words, to Brahmā according to the Hind,90 is a close explanatory parallel of Vyāsa’s reference to “The Śāstras [Hindu scriptures] and their sublime wisdom which are present in the mind of the Īśvara and His pre-eminence are eternally related to each other”. Whereas Vyāsa seeks to explain the “sublime wisdom” and “genuineness” of sacred scriptures, Śāstras, through the subtle concept of their real presence as an eternal part of the Īśvara, for al-Bīrūnī the physical means by which this “sublime wisdom” and eternal “pre-eminence” is conveyed to humanity is explained in the more comprehensible and definite terms of the divine word revealed in sacred scripture.91 Al-Bīrūnī conceives of no scope for vacillation regarding the relationship between the pre-eternity of

qabla bīdh (Hind, p. 21, l. 9). Cf. also Kitāb Bātanjal p. 175, l. 1–4. With regard to Īśvara as the author of the Veda cf. Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra i. 24, “The question, therefore, arises whether this perpetual superiority of Īśvara on account of the excellence of His self is something of which there is proof or is it something without any proof? The reply is ‘The Sacred books are its proof’. What is the proof of the genuineness of the scriptures? Their genuineness is based on supreme wisdom. The Śāstras [Hindu scriptures] and their sublime wisdom which are present in the mind of the Īśvara and His pre-eminence are eternally related to each other”. 88 ʿilmuhu ʿalā ḥālihi fī ʾl-azali, wa idh lam yajhal qaṭṭ fadhātuhu ʿālimatun lam taktasib ʿilman lam yakun lahu (Hind, p. 21, l. 10), “His knowledge is eternally unchanged, and given that He is never ignorant then His Self knows and does not acquire knowledge which He did not have”. 89 Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra i. 24. 90 kamā qāla fī “bīdh” ʾlladhī anzalahu ʿalā brāham: aḥmidū wamdaḥū man takallama bibīdh wa kāna qabla bīdh (Hind, p. 21, l. 11), “As He says in the Veda which he revealed to Brahmā: ‘Praise and extol the One who spoke in the Veda and existed before the Veda’”. 91 Al-Bīrūnī’s version is more generally paralleled by Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra i. 27, “The Sacred Word Designating Him Is Pranava Or The Mystic Syllable Om”, which discusses the nature and implications of the divine words in sacred scripture: “In other creations too convention dependent on the relationship between the denoting words and the object denoted has been in use. Sages, who know the Śāstras, say that on account of similarity of usage, the relationship between a word and the object indicated by it is eternal”. 52 chapter 2

God and the eternal wisdom of His words as revealed in the “Veda”.92 In this way al-Bīrūnī ensures a doctrinal clarity in his exposition which is characteristic of the commentarial and elucidative subtext of the Hind. It is a subtext which even broaches or (more likely given their precedence to the Hind) is necessitated by the structure and terminology of exemplifying passages, such as the above from the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, quoted in his translation. The final portion of the corroborative quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal focuses on the existence and worship of God and his susceptibility to the human senses, all of which factors may have potentially been suggested in al-Bīrūnī’s opening statement on Hindu theological doctrine:93

The questioner said: how can you worship Him who cannot be sensed? Patañjali answered: calling Him establishes His existence because an object always refers to something and a name is always given to something which can be named. Even if He eludes the senses so that they cannot perceive Him, nevertheless the soul cognises Him and thought comprehends His attributes. This is how one worships Him in a pure manner and happiness is achieved by persevering in this.94

The source of the ontological argument described here by al-Bīrūnī mainly relies upon Yoga-Sūtra i. 27 and Vyāsa’s commentary on it which not only refers to the “mystic syllable” om as the sacred designation of God95 but also expands on the relationship of appellation with necessary existence in figurative and semantic terms. This is reflected here by al-Bīrūnī, and is reminiscent of those later formulations by St. Anselm in the mediaeval European Christian tradi-

92 aḥmidū wamdaḥū man takallama bibīdh wa kāna qabla bīdh (Hind, p. 21, l. 11), “Praise and extol the One who spoke in the Veda and existed before the Veda”. 93 al-fardu fī malakūtihi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi waʾl-andādi lā yushbihu shayʾan wa lā yushbihuhu shayʾun (Hind, p. 20, l. 7), “… alone in His kingdom without likeness or unlikeness, resembling nothing and nothing resembling Him”. 94 qālaʾl-sāʾilu:kayfataʿbudamanlamyulḥiqhuʾl-iḥsāsu?qālaʾl-mujību:tasmiyatuhututhbitu inniyyatahu faʾl-khabaru lā yakūnu illā ʿan shayʾin waʾl-ismu lā yakūnu illā li-musamman, wahuwa wa in ghāba ʿani ʾl-ḥawāssi fa-lam tudrikhu faqad ʿaqalathu ʾl-nafsu wa aḥāṭat biṣifātihi ʾl-fikratu wa hādhihi hiya ʿibādatuhu ʾl-khāliṣatu wa biʾl-muwāẓabati ʿalayhā yunālu ʾl-saʿādatu (Hind, p. 21, l. 12). Cf. Kitāb Bātanjal p. 175, l. 7, hādhihi hiya ʿibādatuhu ʾl-khāliṣatu wa bimuwāṣalatihā wa biʾl-muwāẓaba ʿalayhā yaḥṣulu mā yaḥṣulu biʾl-taʿwīdi ʾl-mutaqaddimi dhikruhu, “… this is how one worships Him in a pure manner and by diligently persevering in this the result of the aforementioned habituation is achieved”. 95 Again cf. Sūtra i. 27, “The Sacred Word Designating Him Is Pranava Or The Mystic Syllable Om”. hindu metaphysics according to the hind 53 tion.96 However, whereas al-Bīrūnī discusses the necessary existence of God in semantic terms only Vyāsa’s commentary includes an additional figurative element to further illustrate the point: “Īśvara is indicated by the mystic syllable. Is this relationship a matter of convention or is it always necessarily existing between the lamp and the light? The relationship between a word and its object is always there, and the convention in reference to Īśvara expresses what is inherent in Him”.97 The consequent illustration using a father/son analogy, “For example, the relationship between the father and son exists and is indicated by the language ‘this is that person’s father, that is this person’s son’”,is comparable in its subject matter and semantic argumentation with al-Bīrūnī’s theological discussion outlining the differences in denominating God in Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac as discussed in the third chapter of the Hind.98 In this further example of al-Bīrūnī’s reliance upon the Yoga-Sūtra, it is possible to reach beyond its use by him as a formative source for his interpretation of Hindu psychology. Indeed, one can also consider the methodological implications of the transformation of the analogical and semantic content of Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra i. 27 for a later and contextually different theological discussion about denominating God in the monotheistic and non-monotheistic religions and in their respective languages.

96 The ontological argument, which proceeds not from the world to its Creator but from the idea of God to the reality of God, was first clearly formulated in Christendom by St. Anselm (1033/34–1109) in his Proslogion (1077–1078). Anselm began with the concept of God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” (aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari possit). To think of such a being as existing only in thought and not also in reality involves a contradiction. For an x that lacks real existence is not that than which no greater can be conceived. A yet greater being would be x with the further attribute of existence. Thus the unsurpassably perfect being must exist, otherwise it would not be unsurpassably perfect. 97 Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra i. 27. 98 wa hākadhā ismu ʾl-ubūwwati waʾl-bunūwwati fa-inna ʾl-islāma lā yasmaḥu bihimā idhi ʾl-waladu waʾl-ibnu fī ʾl-ʿarabiyyati mutaqāribā ʾl-maʿnā wa mā warāʾa ʾl-waladi mina ʾl- wālidayni waʾl-wilādati manfīyyun ʿan maʿānī ʾl-rubūbiyyati … wa qad ʿulima mā ʿalayhi ʾl-naṣārā min dhālika ḥattā anna man lā yaqūlu biʾl-ābi waʾl-ibni fahuwa khārijun ʿan jum- lati millatihim … wa laysati ʾl-naṣārā ʿalā hādhā waḥduhā wa lākinna ʾl-yahūda tashrakuhā (Hind, p. 28, l. 11). “It is the same with the words ‘father’ and ‘son,’ for Islam does not permit their use since the words ‘child’ and ‘son’ in Arabic are close in meaning and the fact of parents and birth which the word ‘son’ implies negates concepts of divinity [for the word ‘son’] … and this [usage] is known among the Christians to the extent that he who does not speak of the ‘father’ and the ‘son’ is [considered] outside of their religious community … the Christians are not alone in this [usage] for the Jews share in it …”. 54 chapter 2

Thus what appears to be an unrelated and simple comparison of semantic differences and a discussion of the degree of anthropomorphism in their use takes on a more subtle complexion. This is the result of the Hindu background of the treatise and the use not only of Kitāb Bātanjal but also Vyāsa’s commentary of the Yoga-Sūtra as an influential source of information and imagery with which to frame similar arguments in the Hind. As a result, the possibility emerges that al-Bīrūnī’s comparative assessment of religions in the Hind is more than a demonstrative exercise with little bearing upon the Hindu background of the work. A small example such as this further suggests that the text and structure of the Hind may have been affected by the content and form of those seminal primary sources which al-Bīrūnī favours and to whose philosophy he most inclines. The second part of Patañjali’s answer in the above quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal, stresses the importance of the soul as a vehicle for the perception of God, who is understood to be super-sensory, and the essential function of human thought which conceives of His attributes, “… although He is inaccessible to the senses, so that they do not perceive Him, the soul cognizes Him and thought comprehends His attributes”.99 It is the soul’s perception of God with the mind’s comprehension of His attributes that combine as the purest form of worship and through the perseverance of which felicity is achieved, “… this is the pure manner of worshipping Him and by persevering in it happiness is achieved”.100 The importance of this passage taken from Kitāb Bātanjal lies in its definition of the soul’s theological function in relation to the mind, the engine of thought, and their necessary coexistence as the primary device for the worship of God and the attainment thereby, through repetition or perseverance, of true happiness (beatitude). The significance of what is being described here lies in the interdependence of the

99 wa huwa wa in ghāba ʿan ʾl-ḥawāssi falam tudrikhu faqad ʿaqalathu ʾl-nafsu wa aḥāṭat biṣifātihi ʾl-fikratu (Hind, p. 21, l. 14). 100 wa hādhihi ʿibādatuhu ʾl-khāliṣatu wa biʾl-muwāẓabati ʿalayhā yunālu ʾl-saʿādatu (Hind, p. 21, l. 15). Cf. Kitāb Bātanjal p. 175, l. 7, hādhihi hiya ʿibādatuhu ʾl-khāliṣatu wa bimuwāṣa- latihā wa biʾl-muwāẓaba ʿalayhā yaḥṣulu mā yaḥṣulu biʾl-taʿwīdi ʾl-mutaqaddimi dhikruhu, “This is how one worships Him in a pure manner and by diligently persevering in this the result of the aforementioned habituation is achieved”. For al-muwāẓaba/al-muwāṣala, cf. Sūtra i. 28 and Vyāsa’s commentary on it, “Yogins having understood the relationship between the verbal symbol and the thing expressed will ‘Repeat It And Contemplate Upon Its Meaning.’ Repetition of the symbol and contemplation on its subject-the Īśvara-bring one-pointedness to the mind of the Yogin who is engaged in repeating the symbol and contemplating on its meaning”. hindu metaphysics according to the hind 55 human soul and the human mind: both are not only necessary for the perception of God and the comprehension of His attributes but also as a modus for worshipping Him and attaining happiness. Since thought, the product of the human mind,101 is the highest form of bodily worship it follows that the soul’s dependence upon it for a fuller comprehension of God’s attributes and for the attainment of both bodily and spiritual happiness is an indication of its requirement of the body for its own true advancement and fulfilment. This quotation, then, holds within its theological statement insight into the integral relationship of the soul with the body which, as represented by thought, is the product of the human mind and the material body’s most refined state. It is a concept which al-Bīrūnī would almost certainly not have included unwittingly at the outset of the Hind since it comprises the first important integrated notion that describes Hindu psychology (the relationship between the mind and the soul) and theology (the relationship between God and man) set within the empirical and religious framework of perception, reflection and worship.

6 Passage 2: The Theological Interface between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Citations from the Book Referred to as gītā

The second passage that al-Bīrūnī quotes in elucidating his initial statement regarding the nature of Hindu theological belief is drawn from an as yet unidentified version of the Bhagavadgītā. According to al-Bīrūnī, the book gītā is part of the book bhārata, presumably the Mahābhārata102 which is never referred

101 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 92), “The citta [mind] itself is not sentient. Only puruṣa [soul] or pure consciousness is Self-luminous and ‘shines forth’ unalloyed and unabated. Its ‘light’ can be understood as being ‘reflected’ or ‘mirrored’ in insentient prakrti [matter] (i.e., in the human mind), creating various self-reflective stages of the mind … In the Yoga-Sūtra the term citta can refer to these three manifest principles (tattvas)[buddhi, ahamkāra, and manas] of prakrti, namely: the intellect, sense of self, and mind-organ respectively. Citta can be viewed as the aggregate of the cognitive, volitional, affective activities, processes, and functions of human consciousness, that is, it consists of a grasping, intentional, and volitional consciousness, and functions as the locus of empirical selfhood”. 102 The Mahābhārata is one of the two major Sanskrit epics of India, valued for its high literary merit and its religious inspiration. The Mahābhārata consists of a mass of legendary and didactic material surrounding a central heroic narrative that tells of the struggle for supremacy between two groups of cousins, the Kauravas and the Pandavas. Together with the second major epic, the Ramayana, “Romance of Rama”, it is an important source of information about the evolution of Hinduism during the period about 400bce–200ce. 56 chapter 2 to by this name in the Hind, and includes a conversation between Vāsudeva103 and Arjuna,104 “In the book gītā which is part of the book bhārata there is the conversation between bāsdiyū and ārjun”.105 In contrast to the differences between the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali and Kitāb Bātanjal which reflect an interpretative translation and commentarial infusion rather than basic structural incongruence in subject matter, a great many quotations from the gītā which al-Bīrūnī gives in the Hind could not have been derived or associated with the present Sanskrit text of the Bhagavadgītā. The possibility exists, of course, that whereas al-Bīrūnī combined in his KitābBātan- jal both an interpretative translation of the Yoga-Sūtra as well as a number of as yet unidentified Sanskrit commentaries upon it, in his translation of what he describes as the gītā there is a rendering of an unidentified commentary of the Bhagavadgītā instead of the original version with which we are familiar. The text of the extracts quoted in the Hind does not betray the expansive qualities of a commentary but, on the contrary, is terse, precise and direct without the liberal use of analogy characteristic of a commentary. These facts led Sachau to speculate that, “Alberuni seems to have used an edition of the Bhagavad-Gîtâ totally different from the one which we know, and which also

Authorship of the poem is traditionally ascribed to the sage Vyāsa, although it is more likely that he compiled existing material. The traditional date for the war that is the central event of the Mahābhārata is 1302bce, but most historians prefer a later date. The poem reached its present form about 400ce. 103 Vāsudeva in Hindu mythology is the patronymic of Krishna, who, according to one tradition, was a son of Vāsudeva. The worshipers of Vāsudeva, or Krishna, formed one of the earliest theistic devotional movements within Hinduism. When they merged with other groups, namely the Bhagavata, they represented the beginnings of modern Vaisnavism, or worship of Lord Vishnu. A significant second century bce inscription at Besnagar, near Vidisha (Bhilsa), Madhya Pradesh, refers to a column topped by a figure of Garuda (the emblem or mount of Lord Vishnu), erected in honour of Vāsudeva by the Indo-Greek ambassador Heliodorus, who termed himself a “Bhagavata”. Though, in the earliest parts of the Mahābhārata, the divinity of Krishna appears to be still open to doubt, by the time of the writing of the Bhagavadgītā (first or second century ce), Vāsudeva-Krishna was clearly identified with the Vedic god Vishnu. 104 Arjuna is one of the five Pandava brothers, who are the heroes of the Indian epic the Mahābhārata. Arjuna’s hesitation before a battle became the occasion for his friend and charioteer, the god Krishna, to deliver a discourse on duty, or the right course of human action. These verses, which are in the form of a quasi-dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna, are collectively known as the Bhagavadgītā. 105 wa fī kitābi “gītā” wa huwa juzʾun min kitābi “bhārata” fīmā jarā bayna “bāsdiyū” wa bayna “ārjun” (Hind, p. 21, l. 17). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 57 in India seems to be the only one known. It must have been more ancient, because the notorious Yoga elements are not found in it, and these have been recognised by modern interpreters as interpolations of a later time. Secondly, it must have been more complete, because it exhibits a number of sentences which are not found in the Bhagavad-Gîtâ”.106 Sachau, however, seems not to consider the possibility that al-Bīrūnī may have translated the text of the gītā in his possession according to his own understanding of it or based on the interpretation of those gurus who often aided him and would have been familiar with the primary religious texts as well as their commentaries. Al-Bīrūnī states:

The paths into this subject have wearied me because of my enthusiasm [for it] in which I am unique in my day and my unstinting effort concerning it [this subject] in collecting their [the Hindus’] books from suspected locations and in summoning those [scholars] who understood them [or: who could provide guidance about them] from their hiding holes.107

It is apparent from the insights provided in the Hind through al-Bīrūnī’s account of Hindu doctrine and the crucial relationship between the Sanskrit texts which he had acquired and the gurus on whom he had relied for their transcription, translation and explanation, that the gītā passages found in the Hind may be drawn directly from these sources. Such a likelihood is, perhaps, more feasible than al-Bīrūnī’s basing these passages on a “Bhagavad-Gîtâ totally different from the one which we know” as Sachau suggested. That the quotations in the Hind are “more complete” because they exhibit “a number of sentences which are not found in the Bhagavad-Gîtâ”, does not necessarily imply a “more ancient” version of the Bhagavadgītā. An earlier version may have been less verbose and less immediately comprehensible rather than more so. This completeness which is, nevertheless, terse and well worded is, possibly, more in keeping with a memorised version which al-Bīrūnī, consequently, distilled under his own auspices and recorded in words that reflected the context into which they were inserted. Sachau’s belief about the gītā passages in the Hind suggests that they are free from “Yoga elements” that constitute later “interpolations” and may be dif- ferentiated from the original fabric of the text. It is, indeed, the case that the

106 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. ii: 265). 107 wa laqad aʿyatnī ʾl-madākhilu fīhi maʿa ḥirṣī ʾlladhī tafarradtu bihi fī ayyāmī wa badhlī ʾl-mumkini ghayra shaḥīḥin ʿalayhi fī jamʿi kutubihim mina ʾl-maẓānni waʾstiḥḍāri man yahtadī lahā mina ʾl-makāmini (Hind, p. 18, l. 5). 58 chapter 2

Bhagavadgītā, a poem which consists of 700 Sanskrit verses divided into 18 chapters, is of a later date than the major parts of the Mahābhārata and was probably written in the first or second century ce, and that it seems skilfully to combine the philosophical systems of Kapila and Patañjali within a wider admixture of prevailing Brāhmanical doctrines.108 Yet Sachau’s conclusion that the gītā passages in the Hind lack “Yoga elements” seems to depend on his premise that these quotations derive from a more ancient version of the Bha- gavadgītā. This assumption becomes even more questionable in light of the Bhagavadgītā’s own description of yoga as already being ancient (purātana).109 Moreover, al-Bīrūnī’s elucidative quotation from his gītā comes in the wake of a passage taken from Kitāb Bātanjal based upon the same theme. According to al-Bīrūnī the theological conversation in his gītā about the nature of God and man and the relationship between them takes place between bāsdiyū and ārjun, Vāsudeva and Arjuna:

The conversation between Vāsudeva and Arjuna: I am everything, without a beginning through birth or an end through death. My action is not motivated by reward and I do not specifically belong to one class to the exclusion of another because of friendship or enmity. I have given to each of My creatures that which suffices for its function. He who knows this quality of Mine or emulates Me by removing desire from action, his bondage is loosened and his salvation and freedom is facilitated.110

In the Bhagavadgītā the dialogue takes place on the battlefield, just as the great war between the Pandavas and the Kauravas is about to begin. The two armies stand opposing each other, and, on seeing many of his friends and kinsmen among those lined up on the other side, Prince Arjuna hesitates. He considers whether it would be better to throw down his arms and allow himself to be slain by the enemy rather than to engage in a just, but cruel, war. He is recalled to his sense of duty as a warrior by Krishna, who points out to him that the higher way is the dispassionate discharge of his duty, performed with faith in God, and without selfish concern for personal triumph or gain.

108 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. ii: 264). 109 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 7). 110 fīmā jarā bayna “bāsdiyū” wa bayna “ārjun”: innī anā ʾl-kullu min ghayri mabdaʾin biwilā- datin aw muntahan biwafātin, lā aqṣidu bifiʿlī mukāfātin wa lā akhtaṣṣu biṭabaqatin dūna ukhrā liṣadāqatin awʿadāwatin, qad aʿṭaytukilā min khalqī ḥājatahu fī fiʿlihi, faman ʿarafanī bihādhihi ʾl-ṣifati wa tashabbaha bī fī ibʿādi ʾl-ṭamʿi ʿani ʾl-ʿamali inḥalla withāquhu wa sahula khalāṣuhu wa ʿitāquhu (Hind, p. 21, l. 18). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 59

The Bhagavadgītā goes far beyond the ethical question with which it begins, to consider the nature of God and the means by which man can know Him. The greatness of the scripture lies in its description of both the end and the means. It synopsises the religious thought and experience of India through the ages. Because it is a predominantly theistic work, it often describes the ultimate reality as a personal god, identified with Krishna. However, it frequently refers to the supreme as the immanent spirit, as the transcendent absolute, and, finally, as the state of one’s own awakened soul. The three paths of the Hindu religious tradition leading to mystic union with God are described as different aspects of a single approach. This broad theistic consideration of the nature of God is certainly borne out in the first quotation from the gītā which is given in the Hind when Vāsudeva states, “I am everything, without a beginning through birth or an end through death”.111 Just as interestingly, however, is the description of the gradual perception of God by an individual coupled with a parallel growth in his understanding and self-realisation. Indeed there appears to be a theological resemblance between this quotation and the Bhagavadgītā without there being direct reference to a particular verse or passage:112

You would find them very far from knowing Him because God is not apparent to everyone so that they might perceive Him with their senses, and for this reason they are ignorant of Him. Some do not pass beyond the senses, and some of them who do so stop at the knowledge of innate characteristics. They do not know that above these is He who does not

111 innī anā ʾl-kullu min ghayri mabdaʾin biwilādatin aw muntahan biwafātin (Hind, p. 21, l. 18). 112 Cf. Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. ii: 265), “The quotations from the Gîtâ (or Song) may be divided into three classes:—(1.) Such as exhibit a close relationship with certain passages in the Bhagavad-Gîtâ. Parts of sentences are here and there almost identical, but nowhere whole sentences (2.) Such as show a certain similarity, more in the ideas expressed than in the wording, with passages in the Bhagavad-Gîtâ (3.) Such as cannot be compared, either in idea or in wording, with any passage in the Bhagavad-Gîtâ”. A slightly different schematisation of the gītā passages to be found in the Hind and which broadly encompasses four classes, is offered by A. Sharma (1983: 4), “(1.) quotations which seem to display an identifiable degree of literal as well as ideological correspondence with the present text of the Bhagavadgītā; (2.) quotations which seem to display an ideological rather than a literal correspondence with the present text of the Bhagavadgītā; (3.) quotations which seem to display a literal rather than an ideological correspondence with the Bhagavadgītā as we know it; and (4.) quotations which seem to display neither a literal nor an ideological correspondence with the Bhagavadgītā as we know it”. 60 chapter 2

give birth nor is born, and that nobody’s knowledge is able to comprehend His true113 essence whilst His knowledge comprehends everything.114

According to A. Sharma115 the general tenor of this passage reflects several doctrines of the Bhagavadgītā reasonably well.116 This is not of course to ignore the equally detectable Qurʾanic undertones throughout in such phrases as for example “He who does not give birth nor is born”.117 Yet it does not seem possible to identify the relevant verse or verse parts for this particular quotation from the Bhagavadgītā. Al-Bīrūnī quotes Vāsudeva as saying “I am everything [the universe]”.118 This may be compared to Arjuna who states in the Bha- gavadgītā that “you”,meaning Krishna, are the universe when he addresses Him as viśṇamūrte. Krishna, however, never describes Himself directly as such in the Bhagavadgītā. Rather, he tells Arjuna that I have shown you the “universal, infinite, primal”119 form but not that he is that form. In an earlier passage Krishna says, “By Me is pervaded all this / Universe, by Me is the form of the unmanifest”.120 He further adds, “All things rest in Me, / And I do not rest in them”. It is apparent then that this first passage quoted by al-Bīrūnī from his version of the gītā is a case of theological rather than literal correspondence, for the nearest parallel to the statement by Vāsudeva saying “I am everything”, may be found in Bhagavadgītā vii. 19 in the statement, vāsudevaḥsarvamiti, “Vāsudeva is all”. Here, again, the statement stands alone, stripped of the elucidative phrase, “without a beginning through birth or an end through death”.121 It is possible, however, to tentatively suggest a theological parallel to the statement, “My action is not motivated by reward”,122 in the Bhagavadgītā iii. 22, “For Me, son of Prthā, there is nothing to be done / In the three worlds whatsoever, /

113 biʿayn as an alternative reading to bighayr, cf. Hind, p. 22, l. 20. 114 wajadtahum min maʿrifatihi fī makānin saḥīqin liʾanna ʾllāha laysa biẓāhirin likulli aḥadin yudrikuhu biḥawāsihi falidhālika jahalūhu; faminhum man lam yatajāwaz fīhi ʾl-maḥsūsāti, wa minhum man idhā tajāwazahā waqafa ʿinda ʾl-maṭbūʿāti, wa lam yaʿrifū anna fawqahā man lam yalid wa lam yūlad wa lam yuḥiṭ biʿayni inniyyatihi ʿilmu aḥadin wa huwa ʾl-muḥīṭu bikulli shayʾin ʿilman (Hind, p. 22, l. 5). 115 Sharma, A., (1983). 116 Cf. Edgerton, F., The Bhagavadgītā. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, Ch. vi, passim. Consequent references to the Bhagavadgītā refer to this version. 117 Qurʿān 112:3. 118 innī anā ʾl-kullu,(Hind, p. 21, l. 18). 119 Edgerton, F., (1964: 60). 120 Edgerton, F., (1964: 46). 121 min ghayri mabdaʾin biwilādatin aw muntahan biwafātin (Hind, p. 21, l. 18). 122 lā aqṣidu bifiʿlī mukāfātan (Hind, p. 21, l. 19). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 61

Nothing unattained to be attained; /And yet I still continue in action”. The gītā passage in the Hind continues with, “I do not specifically belong to one class to the exclusion of another because of friendship or enmity”,123 which may represent a paraphrase of Bhagavadgītā ix. 29:124 “All beings I regard alike; not one is hateful to me or beloved”.125 The following sentence, though, is difficult to identify even as a broad reflection of a passage in the Bhagavadgītā, “I have given to each of My creatures that which suffices for its function”.126 It is possible, nevertheless, to suggest Bha- gavadgītā iv. 13 in which Krishna declares, “The four-caste system was created by Me”,127 since it shares a common vision of the systematisation and regulated function of living things determined by God. The final line of the gītā passage quoted by al-Bīrūnī is even less identifiable: “He who knows this quality of Mine or emulates Me by removing desire from action, his bondage is loosened and his salvation and freedom is facilitated”.128 A. Sharma proposes Bhagavadgītā iv. 14 as its tentative source, “particularly because the initial remark ‘There- fore whoever knows me’129 resembles iti mām yoʾbhijānāti (iv. 14c) and the medial remark ‘his fetters will be loosened’130 resembles karmabhir na sa bad- hyate (iv. 14d)”.131 Sharma concludes that “The rest of the sentence looks like Albīrūnī’s extended comment on the same idea”, and that, furthermore, “The portion of the sentence ‘keeping desire apart from his action’132 closely follows na me karmaphale sprhā (iv. 14b). The rest of the content of the passage, again, seems to be Albīrūnī’s own exegetical interpolation-so to say”.133 A comparison of this sort is useful in that it outlines the nature of the relationship between the gītā passage quoted by al-Bīrūnī and the Bhagavadgītā as less than congruent but not completely divorced. What is, however, ignored by such a comparison is not only the possible influence of an earlier textual version of the Bhagavadgītā or an early composite commentary upon it but also

123 lā akhtaṣṣu biṭabaqatin dūna ukhrā liṣadāqatin aw ʿadāwatin (Hind, p. 21, l. 19). 124 Cf. Hill, D.P., The Bhagavadgītā. Oxford University Press, 1969. 125 samoʾham sarvabhūteṣu na me dveṣyoʾsti na priyaḥ. 126 qad aʿṭaytu kilā min khalqī ḥājatahu fī fiʿlihi (Hind, p. 22, l. 1). 127 Edgerton, F., (1964: 24). 128 faman ʿarafanī bihādhihi ʾl-ṣifati wa tashabbaha bī fī ibʿādi ʾl-ṭamʿi ʿani ʾl-ʿamali inḥalla withāquhu wa sahula khalāṣuhu wa ʿitāquhu (Hind, p. 22, l. 2). 129 For this translation cf. Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: 29). 130 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: 29). 131 Sharma, A., (1983: 59). 132 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. i: 29). 133 Sharma, A., (1983: 59). 62 chapter 2 the importance of the oral dimension and its role in al-Bīrūnī’s reception of a text as well as its explanation. More important, what is also not considered by such a focused comparison is the crucial interpretative influence of al-Bīrūnī as well as the epistemological drive of the religious context in which this now Arabic passage is quoted in the Hind. Thus, this gītā passage, which seems to derive from various sections of the Bhagavadgītā, is intended to be an elucidation and a further development of the Hindu belief in God and His perception by the soul broached by al- Bīrūnī’s initial statement as discussed in the second chapter of the Hind and first explored in the quotation from his Kitāb Bātanjal. This quotation134 is determinative in the sense that it is a representation of one continuous, integrated passage from the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. In contrast, the following passage from the gītā, intended to maintain thematic continuity and development, is drawn from a variety of locations in the present Bhagavadgītā. Not only, then, does Kitāb Bātanjal seem to shape al-Bīrūnī’s understanding of Hindu theological doctrines in this second chapter of the Hind but its influence is also sensed in the selection of passages from other textual sources marshalled to match its own methodological purpose. Thus, for example, the statement by Arjuna, “I am everything, without a beginning through birth or an end through death”,135 is a theological development in al-Bīrūnī’s depiction of the doctrinal framework he is constructing. It is a development borne out of the preceding Kitāb Bātanjal quotation in which God is described as, “… above unlikeness which is detestable and likeness which is desirable and who in Himself is eternally knowing”.136 The ultimate instigation for the development of the theological concepts explored in these two interlinked quotations lies in the common denominator to be found in al-Bīrūnī’s opening statement. This definition outlines Hindu theological tenets delineating the nature of God:

134 Hind, p. 22, l. 5, cited above. 135 innī anā ʾl-kullu min ghayri mabdaʾin biwilādatin aw muntahan biwafātin (Hind, p. 21, l. 18). 136 litaʿālīhi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi ʾl-makrūhati waʾl-andādi ʾl-maḥbūbati waʾl-ʿālimi bidhātihi sarmadan (Hind, p. 20, l. 11). 137 wa iʿtiqādu ʾl-hindi fī ʾllāhi subḥānahu annahu ʾl-wāḥidu ʾl-azalī min ghayri ibtidāʾin wa lā intihāʾin al-mukhtāru fī fiʿlihi ʾl-qādiru ʾl-ḥakīmu ʾl-ḥayyu ʾl-muḥyī ʾl-mudabbiru ʾl-mubqī (Hind, p. 20, l. 5). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 63

A second example which focuses upon the qualities of God initially indicated by al-Bīrūnī may be the gradual definition of the idea that He, “… is free in His actions”.138 This particular quality is given more specific detail in Patañ- jali’s initial response in the Kitāb Bātanjal excerpt, “He is the one who through His uniqueness and oneness is in no need of action in order to reward it …”.139 It is a thought that is further articulated through the opening words of Arjuna in the consequent gītā citation, “I am everything, without a beginning through birth or an end through death. My action is not motivated by reward”.140 A final example may be provided by the evolution of a subject connected to the one broached here regarding the nature of God’s action, namely, human perception and worship of God through practise or ascesis. The topic is once again concisely expressed at the outset by al-Bīrūnī who differentiates between an “educated elite”141 whose nature “strives for reason and seeks to verify principles”,142 and the “masses”143 whose “nature keeps them at the level of the senses, and who are satisfied with what is derived without bothering with accuracy especially in areas where there is a difference of views and opinions”.144 This differentiation functions as an epistemological backdrop for a gradually evolving evaluation of the nature and practice of humanity’s relationship with God, based upon the overlaying of similar subject matter drawn from those text- based sources which al-Bīrūnī principally relies upon for his methodology. It is in this light that the parallelisms to be found in the citations from Kitāb Bātanjal and al-Bīrūnī’s gītā may be best understood. Thus, for instance, the following gītā citation seems to qualify the subject matter with which al-Bīrūnī initiates the chapter,145 since it is affiliated with it both structurally and terminologically.146 The structural parallel lies in a fuller and more definite grada- tion of human perception from the senses to that knowledge which transcends

138 al-mukhtāru fī fiʿlihi (Hind, p. 20, l. 5). 139 huwa ʾl-mustaghnī bi-awwaliyyatihi wa waḥdāniyyatihi ʿan fiʿlin limukāfātin ʿalayhi …, (Hind, p. 20, l. 9). 140 innī anā ʾl-kullu min ghayri mabdaʾin biwilādatin aw muntahan biwafātin, lā aqṣudu bifiʿlī mukāfātan (Hind, p. 21, l. 18). 141 al-khāṣṣa (Hind, p. 20, l. 3). 142 yunāziʿu ʾl-maʿqūla wa yaqṣidu ʾl-taḥqīqa fī ʾl-uṣūli (Hind, p. 20, l. 3). 143 al-ʿāmma (Hind, p. 20, l. 2). 144 ṭibāʿu ʾl-ʿāmmati yaqifu ʿinda ʾl-maḥsūsi wa yaqtaniʿu biʾl-furūʿi wa lā yarūmu ʾl-tadqīqa wa khāṣṣatan fīmā ʾftannat fīhī ʾl-ārāʾu wa lam yattafiq ʿalayhi ʾl-ahwāʾu (Hind, p. 20, l. 3). 145 Cf. Hind, p. 20, l. 2, namely, the differentiation of the educated elite and the masses on the basis of a qualitative distinction between intellectual and sense perception. 146 Cf. Hind, p. 22, l. 6. 64 chapter 2 them, the most immediate of which is the knowledge of innate characteristics. The language used to express these ideas shares not only specific terminology such as al-maḥsūs/al-maḥsūsāt147 but also phraseology that articulates equivalent concepts, “… the nature of the masses keeps them at the level of the senses / … and some of them who do so stop at the knowledge of innate characteristics”.148 According to A. Sharma’s schematisation of the gītā passages in the Hind, the first half of this quotation is thought to be a case of ideological rather than literal correspondence, while the second half displays, “a minimal literal and ideological correspondence with the Bhagavadgītā as we know it; or none at all”.149 The section which Sharma refers to as “bearing no family relationship to the Bhagavadgītā as we know it”150 begins with “Further, Vāsudeva speaks in the same book”151 and concludes with the passage: “… they do not know that above these is He who does not give birth nor is born, and that nobody’s knowledge is able to comprehend His true essence whilst His knowledge comprehends everything”.152 In the course of this analysis it has become clear that the quotations are shaped as much by the structure and the dynamic of the chapter, driven by al-Bīrūnī’s illustrative intent, as by the primary sources themselves, whether identifiable or obscure. The interconnectedness of this excerpt with previously expressed theological ideas cited from different texts suggests an intellectual, synthetic process devised by al-Bīrūnī. It is one which supersedes any internal dynamic imported with these quotations but, one that, nevertheless, reproduces core Hindu tenets through an integrated medium that is primarily source-based. Thus the final line from the quoted gītā passage relates closely to the opening statement by al-Bīrūnī and to the consequent citation from Kitāb Bātanjal in which the nature of God’s Self and the subject of human intellectual recog-

147 Hind, p. 20, l. 3 / p. 22, l. 7. 148 wa ṭibāʿu ʾl-ʿāmmati yaqifu ʿinda ʾl-maḥsūsi / wa minhum man idhā tajāwazahā waqafa ʿinda ʾl-maṭbūʿāti (Hind, p. 20, l. 2 / p. 22, l. 7). 149 Sharma, A., (1983: 75). 150 Sharma, A., (1983: 75). 151 wa qāla fī hādhā ʾl-kitābi (Hind, p. 22, l. 4). 152 wa lam yaʿrifū anna fawqahā man lam yalid wa lam yūlad wa lam yuḥiṭ biʿayni inniyyatihi ʿilmu aḥadin wa huwa ʾl-muḥīṭu bikulli shayʾin ʿilman (Hind, p. 22, l. 8). Sharma comments on the basis of Sachau’s translation of this final line, “it is quite worthy of the Bhagavadgītā but is not found therein”,Sharma, A., (1983: 76). He does, however, tentatively suggest there may be, “The possibility that it can be connected with Krsna knowing his past births and Arjuna’s, and Arjuna not knowing them (Bhagavadgītā iv. 5)”, Sharma, A., (1983: 76). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 65 nition of it is first broached: “Calling Him establishes His existence because an object always refers to something and a name is always given to something which can be named. Even if He eludes the senses so that they cannot perceive Him, nevertheless the soul cognises Him and thought comprehends His attributes”.153

7 Passage 3: Kitāb Sānk and the Discussion of Human and Divine Action in the Hind

The final quotation in the comparative triptych which introduces the second chapter of the Hind on the nature of Hindu belief in God is tied to the context of the previous subject matter which centres on the essence of action and its final source:

The Hindus differ regarding the meaning of ‘action.’ Those who attribute it to God consider Him as the universal cause, since if the basis for those who act derives from Him then He is the cause of their action, indeed, they are the agents of His action. Those who attribute action to other than Him attribute it to the nearest in the chain.154

The importance of this statement lies in its crystallisation of the issues related to the core subject of the relationship between human and divine action. The exploration of this theme is initiated by al-Bīrūnī’s typification of the Hindu God as, “… free in His actions”,155 which finds several expansive echoes in the subsequent source citations including that of Kitāb Bātanjal.156 God then is both free to act and yet does not depend upon human action for His own activity. Such delineation brings to light, in consequence, the function of human worship as a form of intellectual perception which is described later in the same Kitāb Bātanjal abstract:

153 tasmiyatuhu tuthbitu inniyyatuhu faʾl-khabaru lā yakūnu illā ʿan shayʾin waʾl-ismu lā yakūnu illā limusamman, wa huwa wa in ghāba ʿani ʾl-ḥawāssi falam tudrikhu faqad ʿaqa- lathu ʾl-nafsu wa aḥāṭat biṣifātihi ʾl-fikratu (Hind, p. 21, l. 13). 154 wa yakhtalifu kalāmu ʾl-hindi fī maʿnā ʾl-fiʿli faman aḍāfahu ilayhi kāna min jihati ʾl-sababi ʾl-aʿammi liʾanna qiwāma ʾl-fāʿilīna idhā kāna bihi kāna huwa sababa fiʿlihim fahuwa fiʿluhu biwasāṭatihim, wa man aḍāfahu ilā ghayrihi famin jihati ʾl-wujūdi ʾl-adnā (Hind, p. 22, l. 9). 155 al-mukhtāru fī fiʿlihi (Hind, p. 20, l. 5). 156 Cf. Hind, p. 20, l. 9. 66 chapter 2

The questioner said: how can you worship Him who cannot be sensed? … Even if He eludes the senses so that they cannot perceive Him, nevertheless the soul cognises Him and thought comprehends His attributes. This is how one worships Him in a pure manner and happiness is achieved by persevering in this.157

Although the Kitāb Sānk translation by al-Bīrūnī is no longer extant, it is, nevertheless, apparent from what is cited of it in the Hind that like Kitāb Bātanjal the Samkhya text takes the form of a conversation between an anchorite and a sage. Samkhya, which may be translated as “Enumeration” or “Number”, is one of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. Samkhya adopts a consistent dualism of the orders of matter, prakrti, and soul, or self, puruṣa. The two are originally separate, but in the course of evolution puruṣa mistakenly identifies itself with aspects of prakrti. Right knowledge consists in the ability of puruṣa to distinguish itself from prakrti. Samkhya proposes belief in an infinite number of similar but separate puru- ṣas, “selves”, none superior to the other. Since puruṣa and prakrti are sufficient to explain the universe, the existence of a god is not hypothesised. The puruṣa is ubiquitous, pervasive, motionless, unchangeable, immaterial, and without desire. Prakrti is the universal and subtle (i.e., unmanifest) matter, or nature, and, as such, is determined by time and space. The chain of evolution begins when puruṣa impinges on prakrti. Now puruṣa, which formerly was pure consciousness without an object, focuses on prakrti, and out of this evolves mahat the “great one”, or buddhi, “spiritual awareness”. Next to evolve is the individualised ego consciousness ahamkāra, “I-maker”,which imposes upon the puruṣa the misapprehension that the ego is the basis of the puruṣa’s objective existence. The ahamkāra further divides into the five gross elements (space, air, fire, water, earth), the five fine elements (sound, touch, sight, taste, smell), the five organs of perception (with which to hear, touch, see, taste, smell), the five organs of activity (with which to speak, grasp, move, procreate, evacuate), and mind, manas.158 The universe is the result of the combinations and permu-

157 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: kayfa taʿbudu man lam yulḥiqhu ʾl-iḥsāsu? … wa in ghāba ʿani ʾl-ḥawāssi falam tudrikhu faqad ʿaqalathu ʾl-nafsu wa aḥāṭat biṣifātihi ʾl-fikratu wa hādhihi hiya ʿibādatuhu ʾl-khāliṣatu wa biʾl-muwāẓabati ʿalayhā yunālu ʾl-saʿādatu (Hind, p. 21, l. 12). 158 Compare this system with the following excerpt from the Yoga-Bhāṣya (ii.19) which shows Vyāsa’s correlation of Patañjali’s four-level model with the more familiar Samkhyan series of principles of existence, tattvas, described above: “Of these [four divisions], space, air, fire, water and earth are the gross elements which are the particularisations of the unpar- hindu metaphysics according to the hind 67 tations of these principles, to which the puruṣa is added. Largely outside the above system stands that of the three primal qualities of matter that are called gunas, “qualities”. They make up the prakrti but gain further importance as psycho-physiological factors. The highest prakrti is sattva, which is enlighten- ing knowledge, illumination, and lightness; the second is rajas, which is energy, passion, and expansiveness; the third is tamas, “darkness”, which is obscurity, ignorance, and inertia. To these correspond moral models: to tamas that of the ignorant and lazy man; to rajas that of the impulsive and passionate man; to sattva the enlightened and serene man. The Kitāb Sānk citation which concludes the opening triptych of texts provides valuable insight into what may have initially seemed an inappropriate relegation by al-Bīrūnī of the exploration of the subject of human and divine action from its natural place in the gītā quotation where the subject of God’s relationship with humanity is broached. The Kitāb Sānk citation, then, represents a discussion of various conceptions of the nature of human and divine action but within the Samkhyan context which establishes a fundamental connection between the nature of such action and what is perceived to be the precise function of the soul vis-à-vis the necessarily complementary role of matter. The first argument described by the sage is prompted by the anchorite’s inquiry as to the existence of differing opinions on the subject of action and its agent:

In the book of ‘Sānk’ the anchorite said: is there difference of opinion regarding action and its agent or not? The sage said: some people say that the soul is inactive and that matter is not alive. It is God who freely unites and separates them, therefore He is the agent. Action to motivate them proceeds from Him in the same way that that which is living and potent is able to move what is dead and limp.159

ticularised subtle elements (tanmātras): sound, touch, form-precept, taste and smell. Ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose are the sense-organs, and mouth, hands, feet, organs of evac- uation and generation are the five action organs. The eleventh organ, the mind-organ (manas), is multi-objective. These are the particularisations of the unparticularised I-am- ness”, in Whicher, I., (1998: 66). 159 wa fī Kitāb Sānk qāla ʾl-nāsiku: hal ukhtulifa fī ʾl-fiʿli waʾl-fāʿili am lā? Qāla ʾl-ḥakīmu: qad qāla qawmun inna ʾl-nafsa ghayru fāʿilatin waʾl-māddata ghayru ḥayyatin faʾllāhu ʾl- mustaghnī huwa ʾlladhī yajmaʿu baynahumā wa yufarriqu fahuwa ʾl-fāʿilu waʾl-fiʿlu wāqiʿun min jihatihi bitaḥrīkihimā kamā yuḥarriku ʾl-ḥayyu ʾl-qādiru ʾl-mawāta ʾl-ʿājiza (Hind, p. 22, l. 12). 68 chapter 2

The first “flawed” opinion outlined by the sage is the notion that action is in fact of divine provenance and is completely unrelated to the human soul and body, neither of which may be described as agents since action does not proceed from them. The instigation of human action as well as the union and separation of the soul and matter, prakrti/al-mādda,160 are entirely and freely derived from God. Thus the Samkhyan dualism which envisages puruṣa and prakrti as sufficient to explain the universe161 is abrogated by introducing the existence of God as free agent.162 The second “flawed” opinion described by the “sage”,163 seeks to establish its explanation by referring to the course of nature, “And others say that their union is brought about by nature for such is the normal course in everything which grows and deteriorates”.164 The ambiguity in the Arabic ijtimāʿahumā “their union” is significant since it can refer both to the main subject of inquiry, namely, the union of action and agent, as well as the immediately antecedent union and separation of the soul and matter by God, “… it is He who unites and separates them”.165 In this way nature166 is seen to underlie both unions so that the normal process of an agent-induced action is considered dependent upon the soul/matter dynamic or union effectuated by nature. This second “flawed” explanation sup- plants the Samkhyan vision of the puruṣa as ubiquitous, pervasive, motionless, unchangeable, immaterial, and without desire, and of the prakrti as the universal and subtle matter, or nature, and, as such, determined only by time and space. For the qualities of soul and matter, their union as well as the resultant synthesis of agent and action that proceeds from this state, are all encompassed by the normal process of growth and decay governed by nature. Nature, therefore, in this second explanation, seems to assume the overarching and superin- tending role that is attributed to God in the first: it consequently usurps those distinguishing Samkhyan qualities of puruṣa and prakrti for itself, and renders the prakrti subject to its process.

160 Hind, p. 22, l. 14. In the Hind as well as Kitāb Bātanjal the term al-mādda appears to be used regularly for rendering the Sanskrit term prakrti. 161 Where this duality is originally separate, with puruṣa in the course of evolution mistakenly identifying itself with aspects of prakrti, where right knowledge consists of the ability of puruṣa to distinguish itself from prakrti, and where, finally, the existence of a god is not hypothesised. 162 allāhu ʾl-mustaghnī (Hind, p. 22, l. 14). 163 al-ḥakīm (Hind, p. 22, l. 13). 164 waqālaākharūn:innaijtimāʿahumābiʾl-ṭibāʿifa-hākadhājaratiʾl-ʿādatufīkullināshinbālin (Hind, p. 22, l. 16). 165 huwa ʾlladhī yajmaʿu baynahumā wa yufarriqu (Hind, p. 22, l. 14). 166 al-ṭibāʿ (Hind, p. 22, l. 16). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 69

The third “flawed” answer presented by the sage identifies the soul as the agent, “… and others say: the agent is the soul because the Vedas say that every existing thing derives from puruṣa”.167 This particular form of emphasis upon the soul derives from the crucial Vedic idea that emerged from a period of intense questioning, namely, that of brahman, which tended to become a universal soul, with which the individual soul, or ātman, is merged. The equation of ātman, the self, with brahman, ultimate reality, became the basis of Hindu metaphysics. The spread in the sixth century bce of the interrelated concepts of the reincarnation of souls, of karma, and of the attainment of release from this cycle by meditation rather than through sacrifice marked the end of the Vedic period and the appearance of Hinduism. The primacy of puruṣa, which is in conflict with Samkhyan dualism that envisages puruṣa and prakrti as sufficient explanations of the universe, is illustrated, the Arabic suggests in the third “flawed” answer presented by the sage, in the Rg Veda where we are informed that the primordial Being, puruṣa, sacrificed ‘itself’ to generate the cosmos.168 The final two “flawed” answers are variously related to the same universal concept of time:

Others say that the agent is time, for the world is attached to time in the same way that a ewe is firmly tied to a rope so that its movement is determined by the rope’s tautness and slackness; and others say action is nothing more than recompense [karma] for something done in the past.169

Given the reference to the Vedas, it is not unreasonable to assume that it is the Vedic concept of time which is alluded to here. In this context time, like God and nature in the first and second explanations, assumes and abrogates the Samkhyan universal and dualistic roles of puruṣa and prakrti. Thus time appears personified as creator and ruler of everything. In the Brāhmanas and

167 wa qāla ākharūn: al-fāʿilu huwa ʾl-nafsu liʾanna fī ‘Bīdha’ anna kulla mawjūdin fahuwa min ‘purūsha’,(Hind, p. 22, l. 17). 168 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 9), “The transformative nature of cosmic existence, beginning with the creation and preservation of life in all its separate forms, inevitably leads to a dissolution of those forms. By analogy with the sacrifice of puruṣa, the dissolution of manifold existence is the way in which life continuously regenerates itself”. 169 wa qāla ākharūn: al-fāʿilu huwa ʾl-zamānu fa-inna ʾl-ʿālama marbūṭun bihi ribāṭa ʾl-shāti biḥabalin mashdūdin bihā ḥattā takūnu ḥarakatuhā biḥasabi injidhābihi wa istirkhāʾihi, wa qāla ākharūn: laysa ʾl-fiʿlu siwā ʾl-mukāfāti ʿalā ʾl-ʿamali ʾl-mutaqaddimi (Hind, p. 22, l. 18). 70 chapter 2 later Vedic texts there are repeated esoteric speculations concerning the year— the unit of creation associated with creative and regenerative sacrifice and with Prajāpati, “Lord of Creatures” and god of the sacrifice. Time is an endless repetition of the year, and thus of creation; this is the starting point of later notions of repeated creations and the subsequent and final explanation given of action being the result of “recompense”170 for past deeds. A more interpretative rendering of al-mukāfāt in the light of its relationship with temporal “action”,171 in both the Hind and Kitāb Bātanjal, would suggest that al-Bīrūnī relied upon the terms ʿamal or aʿmāl, “action” or “actions”,172 in order to convey the concept of karma.173 For, according to certain traditional Hindu doctrines, karma acting like clockwork always winds itself up while running down, binds the ātmans of beings to the world and compels them to go through an endless series of births and deaths. Having enumerated a series of “false” opinions in response to the anchorite’s inquiry about the relationship between action and its agent, the sage succinctly outlines the truth of the matter:

All of these views are incorrect. The truth with regard to this subject is that action belongs entirely to matter since it is matter which binds [the soul], causes it to be reborn in moulds, and frees it. It is matter, therefore, which is the agent and everything within its sphere of control assists it to accomplish action. The soul is not the agent of action because it lacks those various qualities [that exist within the sphere of matter].174

170 al-mukāfāt (Hind, p. 23, l. 2). 171 al-fiʿl (Hind, p. 23, l. 1). 172 Al-Bīrūnī provides the phrase al-aʿmālu ʾl-sābiqa, “past actions”, (Hind, p. 63, l. 10) as an equivalent term in Arabic for the concept of karma. Cf. also: “Others maintain that the disposer is karma, namely, action”: wa zaʿama ākharūn anna ʾl-mudabbir huwa Karma ayy al-ʿamal,(Hind, p. 272, l. 10). 173 Al-Bīrūnī understood the soul/body relationship expressed in the Yoga-Sūtra not in terms of an “utter distinctness” but in terms, first, of a removal of karma by means of recompense for past deeds and refraining from future ones, waʾl muntahī ilā darajati ʾl-khalāṣi qad istawfāhā fī qālibihi ʿalā māḍī ʾl-fiʿli thumma taʿaṭṭala ʿani ʾl-iktisābi liʾl-mustaʾnafi (Hind, p. 62, l. 14), “He who arrives at the stage of liberation has recompensed in his physical mould his past actions and he refrains from acquisition [of further karma] for the future”. 174 wa kullu hādhihi ʾl-ārāʾi munḥarifatun ʿani ʾl-ṣawābi wa innamā ʾl-ḥaqqa fīhī anna ʾl-fiʿla kullahu liʾl-māddati liʾannahā hiya ʾllatī tarbuṭu wa turaddidu fī ʾl-ṣuwari wa tukhallī fahiya ʾl-fāʿilatu wa sāʾiru mā taḥtahā aʿwānun lahā ʿalā ikmāli ʾl-fiʿli, wa likhulūi ʾl-nafsi ʿani ʾl-qiwā ʾl-mukhtalifati hiya ghayru fāʿilatin (Hind, p. 23, l. 2). hindu metaphysics according to the hind 71

8 Kitāb Sānk as Conclusion to the Comparative Triptych

This surprising conclusion to the citation from Kitāb Sānk, redressing the significance of prakrti/al-mādda in its interaction with puruṣa/al-nafs, is most convincingly explained in terms of a continuity of methodological perspective which centres upon Hindu psychology, initiated by al-Bīrūnī in Kitāb Bātanjal and concluded in the Hind. Without the manifestation of being, prakrti, liberation would not take place. It is through the conjunction of soul (spirit)175 and body/matter176 that the essential nature of the “observer”, ultimately synonymous with the soul, puruṣa, and the “observed” (prakrtic identity) can eventually be grasped. It is apparent in this statement that, just as in Kitāb Bātanjal, al-Bīrūnī does not equate the body or matter177 merely with “ensnarement”,178 but rather, outlines the epistemological causes by which the body179 becomes a snare. By doing so al-Bīrūnī seeks to rectify this association and achieve “liberation”180 either through yoga praxis (as portrayed in Kitāb Bātanjal) or through the removal of karma by means of non-egoistically motivated action, that is, action that has prakrti and not puruṣa as its agent. It is, ultimately, the methodological dynamic evident in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind which is also reflected in the selection, shape and content of those citations given in the Hind from Kitāb Sānk. Although many references to the system are given in earlier texts, Samkhya received its classical form and expression in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, the “Stanzas of Samkhya” by Īśvara Kriṣna (c. third century ce). Vijñānā Bhikṣu, furthermore, wrote an important treatise on the system in the sixteenth century. According to Sachau the Samkhya text which al-Bīrūnī reflects in the Arabic citations in the Hind may be most closely paralleled with Sāṃkhya-kārikā since “Both works teach moksha by means of knowledge, and contain here and there the same subject-matter”.181 Furthermore, Sachau suggests that “short indications” of the “illustrative tales” to be found in much fuller form in the Samkhya text quotations of the Hind also exist in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā. In addition, the Bhāṣya of Gaudapāda is found to be a “near relative” of al-Bīrūnī’s Samkhya since most of the quotations given by al-Bīrūnī, when not actually literal translations, are

175 al-nafs/puruṣa. 176 al-qālib/prakrti. 177 al-qālib/al-mādda. 178 al-ishtibāk/al-irtibāṭ. 179 al-badan/al-qālib. 180 al-khalāṣ. 181 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. ii: 267). 72 chapter 2 found to be only slightly differently phrased in Gaudapāda. Similarly, almost all the illustrative tales mentioned by al-Bīrūnī are found in Gaudapāda, an observation that led Sachau to surmise that both authors must have relied upon a work which was “near akin to, or identical with, that Sâmkhya book which was used by Alberuni”.182 The close relationship of al-Bīrūnī’s Samkhya text with that of Gaudapāda is hardly accidental if the framework of methodological continuity in the opening triptych of illustrative texts, of which Kitāb Sānk is the final instalment, is taken into consideration. Thus the significance of al-Bīrūnī’s Kitāb Sānk, an illustrative reflection of Gaudapāda’s Bhāṣya, which may have been based on an older version of the text, lies precisely in this active process of selection. What al-Bīrūnī projects in Kitāb Sānk is an involved and interpretative appreciation of Samkhya which draws upon the Hindu philosophical tradition with a critical and discerning eye. For al-Bīrūnī’s selective and interpretative use of source texts as part of an overarching methodology is as apparent in the very choice of a particular source and, by implication, the philosophy and intellectual system of its author, as it is in the content and persuasion of the Arabic citations themselves to be found in the Hind, whether from Kitāb Sānk, Kitāb Bātanjal, the gītā or others. They seem to accentuate those aspects of argumentation most appealing to al-Bīrūnī’s own system. Therefore, it is not incidental that Gau- dapāda is so closely reflected in al-Bīrūnī’s Samkhya, for the Gaudapāda argues that there is no duality,that the mind, awake or dreaming, moves through maya, “illusion”,and that only advaita, “nonduality”,is the final truth. According to the seventh-century Gaudapāda in his commentary on the Upaniṣads this truth is concealed by the ignorance of illusion. There is no becoming, either of a thing by itself or of a thing out of some other thing. There is ultimately no jīvā, “individual self” or “soul”, only the ātman, the “all-soul”,183 in which individuals may be temporarily delineated.

182 Sachau, E.C., (1910, vol. ii: 267). 183 Cf. Śāstri, K.S., (ed.), The Yogayājñavalkya. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 134. Trivandrum: Government Press, 1938. chapter 3 Al-Nafs: The Soul in Kitāb Bātanjal

1 Introduction

Al-Bīrūnī’s translation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali from Sanskrit into Arabic illustrates his deep understanding of the Sanskrit language and its literature. Entitled Kitāb Bātanjal al-Hindī1 (The Book of Patañjali, the Indian) it was written in the late 1020’s before the Hind and, most probably, during al-Bīrūnī’s travels in north-eastern India. Kitāb Bātanjal was first discovered by L. Massignon (1922) and later described by J.W. Hauer (1930). It was eventually published by H. Ritter with an introduction in German in 1956. It is divided into four sections2 that correspond to the four chapters of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali but also blends the views of Vyāsa, the great fifth-century commentator of the Yoga-Sūtra, drawing on his Yoga-Bhāsya to illuminate Patañjali’s thought. Each section has a different focus and will be considered separately in the following two chapters. The questions and answers of the first section focus on the complex interaction of the soul with the body, in particular the means of achieving the concentration of the heart (mind) that is a distinct concept in yoga philosophy.3 The second section of Kitāb Bātanjal draws attention to the discipline required to achieve liberation, al-khalāṣ: “The second section: on guidance towards the praxis of that which preceded it in the first section”.4 The third section focuses on recompense and the means by which it is achieved.5 The fourth section treats the subjects of liberation and unification (yoga).6

1 Ritter, H., (ed.), (1956: 165–200). 2 qiṭʿa (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 11), “part” or “section”. 3 fī iqrāri ʾl-qalbi ʿalā maqarrin wāḥidin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 10), “On fixing the heart [mind] in one place”. 4 al-qiṭʿatu ʾl-thāniyatu fī irshādin ilā ʿamalin mā kāna taqaddama fī ʾl-qiṭʿati ʾl-ūlā (Kitāb Bātan- jal, p. 183, l. 18). 5 al-qiṭʿatu ʾl-thālithatu ʾl-maqṣūratu ʿalā dhikri ʾl-jazāʾi wa kayfiyyati ʾl-mujāzāti (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 192, l. 22), “The third section which is confined to an account of recompense and the means by which it is achieved”. 6 al-qiṭʿatu ʾl-rābiʿatu fī ʾl-khalāṣi waʾl-ittiḥādi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 199, l. 1), “The fourth section on the subject of liberation and unification”. The Sanskrit word “yoga” is etymologically derived from from the verbal root yuj meaning “to yoke or join or fasten or harness” and

In addition to these four sections Kitāb Bātanjal includes a tripartite preface whose content is primarily explanatory and, finally, a tantalizing coda-like conclusion that raises more questions than it resolves and anticipates the comprehensive depth and detail of the Hind. The importance of studying Kitāb Bātanjal lies in the ways in which it assists in the understanding of the first twelve psychological and theological chapters of the Hind. The first is in terms of the contrast and comparison of detail from citations found in both for the purpose of clarifying the meaning but, second, and more significantly, in order to establish a continuity of method from the initial stage of translated (and interpreted) source material to a developed stage of synthesization and explanation. This material is then presented within an overall Islamic framework of meaning as will be illustrated in the chapter on the Hind.7 In this light Kitāb Bātanjal may be taken as a case study to establish and explore a continuity from the “translation” to the Islamic “synthesization” found in the opening chapters of the Hind. This procedure will further enable us to gauge the nature of al-Bīrūnī’s translation and manipulation of Sanskrit sources and their influence on the shaping of his interpretation of Hinduism based on Islamic principles in the Hind. For instance, by discovering what he extracted as useful from Kitāb Bātanjal when discussing the psychology of the early chapters of the Hind, a matrix may be set for the initial consideration of other Sanskrit sources he employed in it, whether translated by him or at his disposal.

2 From Kitāb Bātanjal to the Hind

The following chapters mainly analyse the tripartite preface and the four sections of Kitāb Bātanjal with particular concern given to the nature and development of the presentation of the soul, al-nafs, as it is perceived in al-Bīrūnī’s presentation of the literary culture of Hindu metaphysical speculation specifically in the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. Building on the work of earlier scholars8 this

can have several connotations including “union”. Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 7). It is, therefore, not inconceivable that al-Bīrūnī’s use of the Arabic term al-ittiḥād is at least partially intended to convey such an etymological connotation from the Sanskrit. However, the analysis of such terms in the Sanskrit is beyond the scope of this study and only tentative parallels between the English translation of Sanskrit terms and their possible Arabic equivalents in Kitāb Bātanjal will be made. 7 Al-Nafs: the Soul in the Hind. 8 For example, Rosenthal, F., “Al-Biruni Between Greece and India”, and Lawrence, B.B., “Al- Bīrūnī’s Approach to the Comparative Study of Indian Culture”, in Biruni Symposium, (1976). al-nafs: the soul in kitāb bātanjal 75 analysis forms the basis for the argument that a continuum of methodological perspective exists between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind. Kitāb Bātanjal is not only a “bold effort to communicate the essentials of yogic ascesis to an Arabic readership”,9 but marks the beginning of an interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali that finds its final Islamic form in the Hind. Thus, the initial ten chapters of the Hind offer significantly more than “a distillation and an extension”10 of an Arabic translation of the Yoga-Sūtra or a “magisterial overview of Hindu notions” whose subject matter is equivalent to that broached in the Kalām. First, Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind seem not only to maintain a continuum of methodological perspective but also comprise a representation of the Yoga- Sūtra that, closely, though not slavishly, reflects the Sūtras and fully engages with unidentified and recognised commentaries. Second, this representation illuminates both its immediate subject and the cultural and intellectual context in which these works arose. Thus a sense of Kitāb Bātanjal’s socio-intellectual environment is suggested in the choice and treatment of the subject matter. It informs the Arabic philosophical debate concerning the nature of the soul with a novel perspective by placing what would initially appear to be eccentric subject matter within an Islamic frame of discourse. The nature of the soul, of course, was a subject that was famously treated by al-Bīrūnī’s contemporary Ibn Sīnā, in the De Anima11 of the Shifāʾ. Third, we should not ignore the important role that Kitāb Bātanjal plays as an eleventh-century reflection of the Yoga-Sūtra that closely represents an earlier tradition of as yet unidentified commentaries.

3 The Soul and Spiritual Liberation

Both the continuum of methodological perspective between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind, and the socio-intellectual environment are best illustrated by their treatment of the Hindu concept of the soul12 and the means by which one achieves spiritual liberation.13 The schematisation of the three paths to liberation described in chapter seven of the Hind and the passages related to it are either quoted or paraphrased from Kitāb Bātanjal, as will be illustrated in our comparative analysis.

9 Lawrence, B.B., “Bīrūnī, Abū Rayhān, vii. Indology”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica, pp. 285–287. 10 Ibid. 11 Rahman, F., (1959). 12 Sanskrit: puruṣa. Arabic: al-nafs. Cf. Glossary. 13 Sanskrit: mokṣa. Arabic: al-khalāṣ. 76 chapter 3

These passages, then, are a reflection of the Yoga-Sūtra, in such a way that commentary, be it that of al-Bīrūnī or of others, and text are woven into an integrated whole, whilst, at the same time, maintaining a close approximation of the general structure and progress of the original. Al-Bīrūnī’s reliance on the teaching of Patañjali over those of Samkhya and the Bhagavadgīta, regarding the nature of the soul, does more than signal his preference for one Hindu philosopher over another. Rather it reflects a sensitive and considered intellectual evaluation and Islamic synthesis, an intentional process that was initiated in Kitāb Bātanjal and concludes in the first ten chapters of the Hind. Al-Bīrūnī stresses throughout the importance of the pursuit of knowledge14 not least in the opening paragraph of Kitāb Bātanjal where the achievement of knowledge15 necessitates a pedagogical obligation to impart it to others: “When they [Hindu books on wisdom] were read to me letter by letter and I had fully understood their content, my mind could not forego sharing them with those who wished to study them”.16 This sense of scholarly obligation was possibly inspired by the strong pedagogical current running through the Yoga-Sūtra and conveyed in the core structure of Kitāb Bātanjal by means of a dialogic format between Patañjali / bātanjal (pupil), and a renunciant, al-zāhid (teacher).

4 Al-Bīrūnī and Western Scholarship

Most scholars who have written or commented on Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind do not consider the possibility that al-Bīrūnī may have been influenced to any degree by the Hindu doctrines, philosophies and sciences that he imaginatively reflected. This pattern is grounded in a much adhered to tradition that stems from Edward Sachau’s Preface to his translation of the Hind first published in 1888. Al-Bīrūnī’s “strong inclination towards Indian philosophy”, (Alberuni’s India, p. xviii), can be nothing more than a reflection of his “professional zeal”, (ibid., p. xxi), for he was after all “a Muslim” and “he sometimes takes an occasion for pointing out to the reader the superiority of Islam over Brahmanic India”, (ibid., p. xix). This supposed contradiction between al-Bīrūnī’s eccentric “open-minded scholarship” and the desire to pigeonhole him into a “Muslim” mould of cultural superiority implicitly persists though is rarely addressed by later scholars. Such

14 jñāna-yoga/ṭalab ʾl-ʿilm. 15 al-istifāda/al-ʿilm (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 2, 9). 16 lammā quriʾat ʿalayya ḥarfan ḥarfan wa aḥaṭṭu bimā fīhā lam yujāwiz ḍamīrī fīhā ishrāka ʾl-rāghibīna fī muṭālaʿatihā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 8). al-nafs: the soul in kitāb bātanjal 77 an approach overlooks the possibility that the internal philosophical dynamics of a work like Kitāb Bātanjal allowed for a freedom to select, evaluate, create and translate within an Islamic frame what is manifestly a non-Islamic sphere of debate where questions of self-justification and personal faith were simply irrelevant. Thus the possibility of such freedom in the intellectual analysis of Hindu philosophy and of such a degree of fascination for Hindu doctrines was only possible because of al-Bīrunī’s success in setting this material within an Islamic interpretative and terminological frame. Al-Bīrūnī was conscious of the clear distinction between his Muslim beliefs and the Hindu doctrines he describes: “Even if it [the narration of their words] contradicted the Truth, and those who possess [the Truth] find hearing it revolting, the fact is that it is his [the Hindu’s] own belief and he understands it best … I will narrate the words of the Hindus literally”.17 The clarity of this distinction between an Islamic view of Hinduism and Islam may have actually spurred a sophisticated interest and constructive engagement in Hindu philosophy and psychology. Further, this engagement is a significant, if not subversive, contribution to the, at times, intense philosophical and psychological debates in the contemporary Arabic intellectual sphere that involved such luminaries as Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā. Such a distinction is best illustrated in the contrast between al-Bīrūnī’s generally positive treatment of Hindu doctrine within the Islamic frame he sets for it and a less apparent level of tolerance when he turns to Muslim “heresies”. His principal contribution to Muslim heresiography is the now lost, Akhbār ʾl-mubayyiḍawaʾl-qarāmiṭa (“A History of the Mubayyiḍa and the Qarmatians”), mentioned in his Āthār and whose clearly polemical nature is reflected in the unflattering and lurid accounts of Muqannaʿ18 and the Qarāmiṭa of Bahrain19 as narrated in the Āthār. Al-Bīrūnī’s contribution to contemporary Muslim discussions on the nature of the soul should not be ignored on the grounds that his treatment of this subject takes place within non-Islamic boundaries since it in fact takes place within Islamic ones. In addition, such a view does not take into consideration the role of Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind as rhetorical or cultural channels that offer al-Bīrūnī the necessary distance from his Muslim religious context for

17 wa in bāyana ʾl-ḥaqqa wa ʾstufẓiʿa samāʿuhu ʿinda ahlihi fa huwa iʿtiqāduhu wa huwa abṣaru bihi … fa ūridu kalāma ʾl-hindi ʿalā wajhihi,(Hind, p. 5, l. 8). 18 Āthār, pp. 213–214. 19 Āthār, pp. 213–214. 78 chapter 3 a novel and well synthesised contribution to the contemporary Arabic philosophical debate on the nature of the soul. It is the novel use of Hindu psychology from an Islamic viewpoint as a vehicle for philosophising inside his cultural milieu that is worth considering. A refreshing view on this matter was proposed by F. Rosenthal who argues in his article, “On Some Epistemological and Methodological Presuppositions of al-Bīrūnī”20 that ideas found in the Yoga-Sūtra entered al-Bīrūnī’s epistemological thinking: “Normally, it would seem prudent for us to see in Bīrūnī more the reporter of Indian philosophical speculation than the follower of it. However, his receptive mind was often deeply impressed by the foreign ideas he studied, and they were incorporated into his thought patterns”.21 As for the tentative argument that Kitāb Bātanjal betrays some attempt at “Islamisation” by al-Bīrūnī, Rosenthal suggests that this “may apply more to the translator’s skill as a translator than to his readiness to assimilate ideas of the work translated to his own thinking”.22 Rosenthal draws a clear distinction in his argument between, on the one hand, al-Bīrūnī’s “impression” by and “incorporation” of “foreign ideas … into his own thought patterns”, and on the other, his lack of readiness to “assimilate” these very same ideas into “his own thinking”.23 Such a distinction is resolved by thinking in terms of a process of “Islamisation” that allowed al-Bīrūnī to provide a culturally amenable philosophical and intellectual space. This afforded him, his readers, and discussants the freedom to engage with and even assimilate certain foreign ideas without them conflict- ing with their Islamic beliefs. The importance of the pursuit of knowledge24 is paramount in both Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind and reflects the yogic view that liberation25 is inseparable from self-cognition. In Kitāb Bātanjal liberation26 “is the return of the soul [in a state of knowing] to its nature”.27 In the Hind this concept is further sharpened:

20 Rosenthal, F., (1974: 145–167). 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 jñāna-yoga/ṭalabu ʾl-ʿilm. 25 mokṣa. 26 mokṣa/al-khalāṣ. 27 Ritter, (1956: 165–200): huwa rujūʿu ʾl-nafsi ʿālimatan ilā ṭibāʿihā,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 21). Ritter introduces the word ʿālima, “in a state of knowing”, from the parallel passage to be found in (Hind, p. 61, l. 19). al-nafs: the soul in kitāb bātanjal 79

The soul’s salvation, then, is through knowledge when it [the soul] understands things so as to define them comprehensively and specifically without the need for deduction and without doubt, because when it cate- gorises existents by means of definitions, it perceives its own entity and [grasps] that it possesses the nobility of permanent existence whereas matter possesses the ignominy of change and finitude in appearances.28

It is a concept that is reminiscent of the Greek-Arabic terminology of contemporary philosophical debate where the soul reasons its own existence. An example may be taken from Ibn Sīnā’s al-Shifāʾ, (“The Cure”): “We say, the soul reasons by taking into its own entity the appearance of intelligibles stripped of matter”.29 This leads to two important questions that need to be addressed alongside the investigation of the Islamic interpretative frame: Are we to see in this similarity the introduction of relevant Hindu material within the boundaries of the contemporary Arabic philosophical heritage? And if this is indeed the case then what is its possible place within the contemporary Arabic philosophy of al-Bīrūnī’s time? It has already been argued30 that the Hind is more than an exceptional eleventh century scientific study of Hindu civilisation. Rather, it is a philosophical presentation of a new cosmological alternative to that set out by Ibn Sīnā in the Metaphysics of his al-Shifāʾ31 which reflects the dominant heritage of Neo- Platonic Aristotelianism in Arabic philosophy. The apparent similarity of terminological usage between al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā in their parallel discussions on the nature of the soul further highlights the contrast in their approach to understanding the soul’s relationship with and role in matter. To trace these differences and, in so doing, answer our two

28 fa-khalāṣuhā idhan biʾl-ʿilmi idhā aḥāṭat biʾl-ashyāʾi iḥāṭata taḥdīdin kulliyyin mumayyazin mughnin ʿani ʾl-istiqrāʾi nāfin liʾl-shukūki liʾannahā idhā faṣṣalati ʾl-mawjūdāti biʾl-ḥudūdi ʿaqalatdhātahāwamālahāminsharafiʾl-daymūmatiwaliʾl-māddatiminkhissatiʾl-taghayyuri waʾl-fanāʾi fī ʾl-ṣuwari (Hind, p. 51, l. 18). 29 fa-naqūlu inna ʾl-nafsa yaʿqilu bi-ʾan taʾkhudha fī dhātihā ṣūrata ʾl-maʿqūlāti mujarradatan ʿani ʾl-māddati (al-Shifāʾ, i, 358), in Aš-Šifāʾ, La Guérison, lithographié à Téhéran, 1303/1886, 2 vol. in f˚. Quoted in Goichon, A., (1938: 225), “Nous disons que l’âme connaît, comprend, intellige, en prenant en soi la forme des intelligibles abstraite de la matière”. 30 In the earlier chapter “Al-Bīrūnī: Prologues and Method”. 31 Critical editions of the Arabic text of the Shifāʾ under the supervision of E. Madkur have been appearing in Cairo since 1952. Of these the most pertinent for our consideration of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical thought is al-Nafs (Psychology), 1975. Also Rahman, F., (1959). 80 chapter 3 questions, a study of al-Bīrūnī’s presentation of Hindu psychology allows us to assess its challenging vision in the light of the dominant Aristotelian heritage of contemporary Arabic philosophy, in particular, the Peripatetic School, whose greatest articulator was Ibn Sīnā. Thus al-Bīrūnī’s preference for the teachings of Patañjali may not have been incidental or circumstantial but, in fact, a conscious and sophisticated promotion of an integrated and challenging vision of the soul whose psychological development set within an Islamic frame of interpretation is a process that begins in Kitāb Bātanjal and culminates in the Hind.

5 The Yoga-Sūtra and the Psychology of Kitāb Bātanjal

The particular reading of Hindu psychology in Kitāb Bātanjal represents an accurate reflection of Patañjali’s yoga. The first systematisation of yoga took place in the Yoga-Sūtra attributed to Patañjali (possibly fourth or fifth century) and the philosophical implications of the Sūtras were discussed by Vyāsa (possibly in the year five hundred) in his commentary. Historically, little if anything is known about Patañjali, however, it is reasonable to assume that, as head of a school of yoga, Patañjali was an active preceptor or guru and, judging from the Yoga-Sūtra, a great authority on yoga whose approach was sympathetic toward philosophical inquiry and exposition. It is also reasonable to suppose that Patañjali taught a community of disciples, śisyas, devoted to the study and practice of yoga who carried on the tradition of this philosophical school. Adopting a classical format written in sūtra style, Patañjali composed the Yoga-Sūtra at a time of intense debate and philosophical speculation in India. As such, “he supplied Yoga with a reasonably homogenous framework that could stand up against the many rival traditions”, including Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhism.32 The sūtra style of writing is often employed in the writings of the so-called six orthodox systems of philosophy used within Hin- duism. Just as Patañjali employed the sūtra style to express yoga within the framework of rival traditions, so too the terminology of contemporary Arabic philosophy is employed in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind to facilitate its assessment within the framework of the dominant Peripatetic tradition to which Ibn Sīnā adhered.

32 Dasgupta, S., YogaPhilosophyin RelationtoOtherSystemsofIndianThought. Calcutta, 1930, pp. 39, 44. al-nafs: the soul in kitāb bātanjal 81

The essence of Patañjali’s yoga is the overtly practical and provisional dualistic metaphysics that does not, however, merely end up “in a radical dualistic closure in which puruṣa [soul] and prakrti [matter] are incapable of ‘cooper- ating,’ establishing a ‘harmony,’ and achieving a ‘balance’ together”.33 Rather, it is this wealth of sophistication that Kitāb Bātanjal brings from the Hindu traditions of yoga into the metaphysical and psychological debates within the sphere of Arabic philosophical culture and whose introduction into this sphere is made possible by means of an Islamic reading of these Hindu traditions. By introducing a yoga-derived monistic understanding to the debate on psychology, whose impact is further strengthened by a basically monotheistic reading of yoga philosophy, Kitāb Bātanjal presents a cosmological challenge to the more dualistic psychology of Ibn Sīnā whose hylomorphic enterprise is best reflected in the De Anima of his Shifāʾ:

The soul and the body are not one essence, rather, they are two essences … for we have proven and demonstrated that the soul is not in any way imprinted in the body, and, therefore, the body is not formed in the image of the soul, neither in simple nor in composite terms so that the body units are composed and blended in such a way that the soul is imprinted in them, and it is impossible for the body to be a causal form of the soul or a perfecting cause, for it is more appropriate that the opposite should be the case.34

In contrast, this study seeks to illustrate the way in which Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind seem consciously to reflect the monistic tendency in the psychology of the Yoga-Sūtra, that “seeks to ‘unite’ these two principles [puruṣa and prakrti] by correcting a misalignment between them, thereby properly aligning them, bringing them ‘together’ through a purification and illumination of consciousness leading to the permanent realisation of intrinsic being, that is, authentic identity”.35

33 Whicher, I., (1998: 4). 34 Rahman, F., (1959), wa laysa lā ʾl-nafsu wa lā ʾl-badanu bi-jawharin, lakinnahumā jawharān … fa-qad barhannā wa bayyannā anna ʾl-nafsa laysat munṭabiʿatan fī ʾl-badani bi-wajhin mina ʾl-wujūhi, fa-lā yakūnu ʾl-badanu idhan mutaṣawwiran bi-ṣūrati ʾl-nafsi lā bi-ḥasabi ʾl-basāṭati wa lā bi-ḥasabi ʾl-tarkībi biʾan takūna ajzāʾu ʾl-badani tatarakkabu wa tamtaziju tarkīban mā wa imtizājan mā fa-tanṭabiʿu fīhā ʾl-nafsu, wa maḥālun an yakūna ʾl-jismu ʿillatan ṣuwariyyatan liʾl-nafsi aw kamāliyyatan, fa-inna ʾl-awlā an yakūna biʾl-ʿaksi (De Anima, pp. 227–228). 35 Whicher, I., (1998: 4). 82 chapter 3

The preface to the Hind refers to two works from the Hindu philosophical tradition, Kitāb Bātanjal and Kitāb Sānk both of which were translated from Sanskrit into Arabic.36 In light of the heavy reliance on Patañjali’s yoga when outlining a considered Hindu perspective of the soul in the Hind, it is significant that these two earlier works should be so sharply defined. Given that the Samkhya text has not survived, it can only be concluded from the brief allusion to it in the preface of the Hind and the ample quotations to be found from it in the first section of the Hind37 that al-Bīrūnī chose to limit his use of classical Samkhya to certain aspects of metaphysical speculation, namely, its treatment of “principles and the description of existents”.38 This runs contrary to the fact that Samkhya comprises its own dualistic theory with regard to the soul/matter relationship. The numerous philosophical differences between Yoga and Samkhya derive from the different methodologies adopted by the two schools of thought. Samkhya relies primarily on the exercise of the discernment of puruṣa from prakrti on the basis of prefabricated categories of differentiation, stressing a theoretical/intellectual analysis to bring out the nature of final emancipation.39 Yoga, on the other hand, cannot be strictly described as a dualistic system since emancipation is achieved through a practical understanding and clearer realisation of one’s intrinsic identity as puruṣa rather than through the intellectual discernment of puruṣa from prakrti. The different methodologies adopted by these two Hindu philosophical schools and their reflection in the respective discussions of the nature of the soul/matter relationship are the reason why al-Bīrūnī sharply defines and separates the subject matter of his two translations, Kitāb Bātanjal and Kitāb Sānk. Thus Kitāb Sānk, to judge from the quotations cited in the Hind, seems to be mainly limited to the exposition of abstract metaphysical knowledge and attributes little significance to the dualistic psychology of Samkhyan doctrine. Kitāb Bātanjal, on the other hand, as the preface to the Hind indicates, has as its main subject Patañjali’s philosophy of the soul that conveys, in contradistinction to Samkhyan dualism, a pragmatic and experiential approach to attain salvation. This is accomplished by dealing with the whole individual as both spirit and matter, an approach whose practical degree of sophistication moves beyond the theoretical level of dualistic finality to the possibility of true liberation.

36 Cf. Hind, p. 6, l. 1. 37 Hind, p. 6, l. 1; p. 22, l. 12; p. 23, l. 2; p. 61, l. 19; p. 62, l. 1. For a full discussion of this Samkhya text in the Hind see chapter: “Al-Nafs: the Soul in the Hind”. 38 Hind, p. 6, l. 1. 39 Whicher, I., (1998: 50–58). al-nafs: the soul in kitāb bātanjal 83

Given this differentiation of subject matter within al-Bīrūnī’s two translations, as well as the dominant challenge presented by Peripatetic hylomor- phism within the Arabic philosophical tradition, al-Bīrūnī focuses on Patañ- jali’s yoga methodology as monistic and monotheistic when describing his view of the Hindu understanding of the soul over the dualistic metaphysics of Samkhya. Al-Bīrūnī’s apparent reliance, therefore, on Patañjali’s yoga on the subject of “the emancipation of the soul from the fetters of the body”,40 is a promotion of yoga’s more intricate and subtle vision of the soul. It is one that encompasses dualistic modes of description and explanation but is not held captive by Samkhya whose bifurcated metaphysical structure is not far removed from Ibn Sīnā’s explanations in the psychology of his Aḥwāl ʾl-Nafs41 and the Shifāʾ:

The soul has no connection in terms of existence to the body rather it is connected in terms of existence to those other principles that are unchanging and permanent … therefore, the human soul is not subject to corruption whatsoever.42

The yoga expressed in Kitāb Bātanjal is informed as much by mystical insight or yogic experience as it is by dualism for, unlike Samkhya, Patañjali’s philosophy is not based on mere theoretical knowledge, but rather, elicits a perceptual, not merely inferential approach. Such an approach is deemed essential to treat the whole human situation and provide real freedom and not just a theory of liberation or a metaphysical explanation of life.43 It is, then, in order to qualify an aspect of dualism in the Avicennian discussion of psychology, that, as the above quotations indicate, emphasis is placed on the primacy of the soul over the body rather than treating the whole human state. As such, the “eight-limbed” path of yoga (aṣṭānga-yoga) is expounded at length in Kitāb Bātanjal addressing the physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of the individual in the terminology of contemporary Ara- bic philosophical debate. The Hind continues and further refines the theme by advocating this experiential/perceptual approach against the dominance of

40 Hind, p. 6, l. 1. 41 Aḥwālu ʾl-Nafsi: risālatun fī ʾl-nafsi wa baqāʾihā wa maʿādihā. A.F. al-Ahwānī (ed.). Cairo?, 1952. 42 Rahman, F., (1959), lā taʿalluqa liʾl-nafsi fī ʾl-wujūdi biʾl-badani bal taʿalluquhā fī ʾl-wujūdi biʾl-mabādiʾi ʾl-ukhrā ʾllatī lā tastaḥīlu wa lā tubṭilu … idhan inna ʾl-nafsa ʾl-insāniyyata lā tufsidu ʾl-batta (De Anima, pp. 231–233). 43 Whicher, I., (1998: 1–4). 84 chapter 3 the theoretical/inferential one, and brings to light the importance of this major perceptual current at the outset of its preface fully discussed earlier:44

He who states that what is transmitted is not like what is seen is correct, for what is seen is the perception, in the eye of the observer, of the essence of that which is observed at the moment of its existence and in the place of its apprehension. Were it not for unavoidable concomitants that damage what is transmitted it would be clearly preferable to eyewitness.45

44 Chapter 1: “Al-Bīrūnī: Prologues and Methods”. 45 innamā ṣadaqa qawlu ʾl-qāʾili laysa ʾl-khabaru kaʾl-ʿiyāni liʾanna ʾl-ʿiyāna huwa idrāku ʿayni ʾl-nāẓiri ʿayna ʾl-manẓūri ilayhi fī zamāni wujūdihi wa fī makāni ḥuṣūlihi wa lawlā lawāḥiqu āfātin biʾl-khabari la-kānat faḍīlatuhu tabīnu ʿalā ʾl-ʿiyāni (Hind, p. 1, l. 1). chapter 4 Kitāb Bātanjal: The Preface and Sections i–iii

We are informed in the third part of the preface that “the text of Kitāb Bātanjal is interwoven with an explanation of it”.1 According to S. Pines and T. Gelblum,2 however, in addition to an early version of the Yoga-Bhāsya al-Bīrūnī seems to have also relied on commentators such as Vācaspati-miśra (ninth century ce) and others as yet unidentified.3 Yet what is of greatest significance is al-Bīrūnī’s considerable interpretative role in his consideration of the Yoga-Sūtra and its commentaries and their reflection in Kitāb Bātanjal. This role is more complex than what Pines and Gelblum have basically claimed—that Kitāb Bātanjal in its major as well as minor “characteristics” betrays “a good deal of ‘islamization’”.4 Rather, this translation represents a methodological project of interpreting and defining Hinduism along Islamic lines whose motives are conditioned in part by the challenge of the contemporary philosophical debate within al- Bīrūnī’s cultural sphere.

1 The Tripartite Preface of Kitāb Bātanjal

Al-Bīrūnī’s role in Kitāb Bātanjal is revealed in its short tripartite preface in which he describes the manner with which such texts were read to him letter by letter,5 and outlines the main issue of Kitāb Bātanjal as “liberation from likenesses”.6 This includes “topics concerning reincarnation, and the misfortunes

1 In Ritter, H., (1956: 165–200), wa hādhā huwa ibtidāʾu kitābi Bātanjal murakkabun naṣṣuhu bi-sharḥihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 5). 2 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966). 3 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966: 305). 4 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966: 305). 5 lammā quriʾat ʿalayya ḥarfan ḥarfan (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 10). 6 fiʾl-khalāṣi mina ʾl-amthāli (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 2). The term al-khalāṣ, “liberation”, is intimately related with that of al-ittiḥād, “unification”, in Kitāb Bātanjal. Unification is used to indicate the philosophically sophisticated and highly technical process of meditation, spiritual ascesis, and physical asceticism which, when systematically practised, is capable of steadying the mind, iqrāru ʾl-qalbi ʿalā maqarrin wāḥidin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 10), “On fixing the heart (mind) in one place”,bringing it under “control”,and thereby transcending the trammels of worldly existence including the human (egoic) barriers to (spiritual) freedom,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004305540_006 86 chapter 4 of incarnation, and unification, and generation not according to the principle of birth”.7 Al-Bīrūnī highlights the centrality and the process to liberation. This corresponds with the ultimate goal of the authentic yoga practitioner whose means of achieving both heaven and liberation can be seen as converging on basic yogic-orientated practices such as concentration, meditation, absorption, and unification.8 The attainment of liberation is intimately bound with the state of the individual soul:

Not one of them is free from the belief that souls are bound in the world and that they are snared by its hooks, and that only those souls which achieve the ultimate goal in their activity are freed from them and reach a state of permanent endurance. Those souls that fall short of this ultimate goal continue in the world and are in existents alternating between good and evil until they are cleansed and become pure and free.9

By highlighting the theme of the soul/matter relationship at the very outset of Kitāb Bātanjal in practical, experiential, and personal terms (terms which differ from the theoretical schematic of classical Samkhyan dualism), Kitāb Bātanjal, like the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, translates the “universal”, macrocosmic perspective, traditionally associated with the Samkhyan school of philosophy into subjective, microcosmic terms. Yoga philosophy as described in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind subtly addresses and attempts to resolve the tensions inherent in a dualistic perspective where puruṣa and prakrti are utterly separate and incapable of “uniting”.10 It develops an integration of being and positive (devotional) activity,11 that, as

al-khalāṣu mina ʾl-amthāli (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 2), “liberation from (states of) similarities”. It is the sense of these human (egoic) barriers described in yoga (cf. Whicher, I., 1998: 8) which is conveyed in the meaning of the Arabic al-amthāl, “(states of) similarities”, namely, a state of non-unification or an incomplete condition in the process towards “unification”, al-ittiḥād. 7 ʿan qaḍāyā ʾl-tanāsukhi wa balāyā ʾl-ḥulūli waʾl-ittiḥādi waʾl-tawalludi lā ʿalā ḥukmi ʾl- wilādati (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 15). 8 Whicher, I., (1998: 28–31). 9 wa mimmā lā yakhlū minhu aḥadun minhumu ʾl-iʿtiqāda biʾanna ʾl-anfusa fī ʾl-ʿālami mar- būṭatun wa bi-ʿalāʾiqihi mushtabikatun lā takhluṣu minhā ilā ʾl-baqāʾi ʾl-dāʾimi illā ʾllatī bal- aghati ʾl-ghāyata ʾl-quṣwā fī ʾl-ijtihādi thumma in qaṣurat ʿanhā baqiyat fī ʾl-ʿālami mutaraddidatan fī ʾl-mawjūdāti bayna khayrin wa sharrin ilā an tuhadhdhabu wa taṣfū fa-takhluṣu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 17). 10 al-ittiḥād (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 15). 11 al-ijtihād (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 19). kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 87 an embodied state of being reveals the essential difference between reincar- nation12 and “oscillation” in existents,13 with the latter possibly conveying the sense of metempsychosis. The concept of reincarnation conveyed in the Hind seems to reflect a stage by stage movement towards self-betterment within the bodily state:

He [an individual self] returns to the world and is prepared for a specific type of mould through ascesis. Sacred inspiration raises him in this latter mould by degrees to the level that he had willed in the first mould. His heart begins to obey him, and he continues to be purified in moulds until he attains liberation through a series of births.14

Al-taraddud,15 “oscillation” seems to play a dual role in both Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind. Thus, when it is associated with al-tanāsukh in the context of a general discussion of reincarnation, the two terms act in synthesis so that al- tanāsukh becomes the concept16 that represents the distinguishing feature of Hinduism. It is in this sense that al-taraddud is used as the central concept in al- Bīrūnī’s prerequisite Islamic identification of an “article of faith” in Hinduism. At other times, however, and particularly in Kitāb Bātanjal, al-taraddud seems to convey a negative sense of rebirth into a state of non-progressive sameness.17 This suggests an aspect of the soul’s ensnarement between good and evil, pleasure and pain relating to a wider definition of “oscillation” or “hesitation”,rather than a means for the soul’s liberation:

The postulant said: what is the state of the soul when it reaches [the stage] between rewards and sins, and thereupon becomes entrapped in the

12 al-tanāsukh (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 15). 13 mutaraddidatan fī ʾl-mawjūdāti (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 19). 14 yaʿūdu ilā ʾl-dunyā fa-yuʾahhalu li-qālibin min jinsin makhṣūṣin biʾl-zahādati wa yuwaf- fiquhu ʾl-ilhāmu ʾl-qudsī fī ʾl-qālibi ʾl-ākhiri biʾl-tadarruji ilā mā kāna irādatuhu fī ʾl-qālibi ʾl-awwali wa yaʾkhudhu qalbuhu fī muṭāwaʿatihi wa lā yazālu yataṣaffa fī ʾl-qawālibi ilā an yanāla ʾl-khalāṣa ʿalā tawālī ʾl-tawāludi (Hind, p. 40, l. 15). 15 This term literally means “constant repetition/alteration”,or “hesitation”,although the tentative and unsatisfactory choice of “oscillation” is a point of departure for an exploration of the wider context in which al-taraddud is used and its rather elusive application by al-Bīrūnī. 16 al-tanāsukhu ʿalamu ʾl-niḥlati ʾl-hindiyyati (Hind, p. 38, l. 5), “reincarnation is the distinguishing feature of the Hindu religion”. 17 This is the intended meaning of the subtitle of Kitābu Bātanjal, fī ʾl-khalāṣi mina ʾl-amthāli (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 2), “On liberation from [states of] similarities”. 88 chapter 4

prison of births for the purpose of [receiving] benefit and punishment? [Patañjali] answered: it is moved repeatedly according to what it has done before and perpetrated, between comfort and discomfort, and alternates between pain and pleasure.18

It is significant that both Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind focus at their outset on the distinction between the two major categories in yoga, namely the “observer” and the “observed” that is intimately related to the soul/matter dynamic and was possibly intended by Patañjali as a metaphysical theory of truth:19

It is known20 that complete certitude can only be obtained through the necessity of observation, and it does not encompass unseen things because that which is unseen can only be inferred from that which is seen, and that which can be attained through demonstrative arguments is not like that which is known through direct observation. In a similar manner the provision of decisive proof21 removes doubts as [effectively as] observation.

18 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: kayfa yakūnu ḥālu ʾl-nafsi idhā ḥaṣalat bayna ʾl-ujūri waʾl-āthāmi thumma ishtabakat bi-jinsi ʾl-mawālīdi liʾl-inʿāmi waʾl-intiqāmi? qāla ʾl-mujību: turaddadu bi-ḥasabi mā qaddamat wa ijtaraḥat fīmā bayna rāḥatin wa shiddatin wa tuṣarrafu bayna alamin wa ladhdhatin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 5). This passage in Kitāb Bātanjal reflects Sūtra ii. 14, “Because Of Virtue And Vice They (Birth, Span And Experience) Produce Pleasurable And Painful Experiences”. All quotations in English translation (including the capitalisation of all words) from the Yoga-Sūtra are taken from Mukerji, P.N., (1963). 19 Feuerstein, G., Encyclopedic Dictionary of Yoga. New York, 1990. 20 wa maʿlūmun anna tamāma ʾl-istīqāni lā yakūnu illā maʿa ḍarūrati ʾl-ʿiyāni wa hiya murta- fiʿatun ʿani ʾl-mughayyabāti liʾanna ʾl-ghāʾiba yustadallu ʿalayhi biʾl-shāhidi wa mā kāna ʾl-wuṣūlu ilayhi biʾl-dalāʾili fa-laysa kaʾl-maʿlūmi biʾl-ʿiyāni wa kadhālika ʾl-burhānu nāfin liʾl- shukūki mithla ʾl-ʿiyāni (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 21). 21 By relating the two terms of al-istidlāl/al-dalāʾil and al-burhān almost exclusively to each other in the third part of the preface to Kitāb Bātanjal, al-Bīrūnī consolidates the concept of al-burhān in order to justify the efficacy of intellectual process and textual analysis as cognitively equivalent to that which is directly observed. The translation of al-burhān as “decisive proof”, therefore, is an attempt to convey its intended meaning on the basis of the internal methodological dynamic established in this earlier quotation by al-Bīrūnī who renders the provision of al-burhān as authentically equivalent to actual observation whilst, at the same time, relegating al-istidlāl/al-dalāʾil whose results are compared to the level of certainty concerning that which is unseen but inferred. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 89

The discussion in the above quotation intimately relates to and qualifies the notion of “explanation/commentary”22 introduced at the outset of the third part of the preface to Kitāb Bātanjal. The distinction between sensibilia,23 the empirical knowledge attained through sense perception, and intelligibilia,24 the knowledge of rational argumentation,25 is made in terms of the “complete certitude” generated by al-ʿiyān,26 over against what is merely inferred through deduction.27 The inferiority attributed to deduction in this passage lies in the fact that it is a technical term of logic also used by Ibn Sīnā as a means to acquire “general knowledge”28 or what Goichon calls “demonstrative argumentation”,29 but is better translated as “correct inference”.30 Al-dalīl/al-istidlāl, in the view of Ibn Sīnā is a means to achieving al-maʿrifa but it is a means, according to Kitāb Bātanjal, that does not “remove all doubt”.31 Reference to observation32 and the relationship between the “observer” and the “observed” anticipates the discussion of the relationship between the “knower” and the “known”: “The knower comes to know that which is known only in the realm of ensnarement”.33 Knowledge, then, is produced by “obser-

22 al-sharḥ (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 5). 23 al-maḥsūsāt/al-maʿlūmāt. 24 al-maʿqūlāt. 25 For this distinction in al-Bīrūnī and the translations given see Rosenthal, F., (1974:145–167). 26 ḍarūratu ʾl-ʿiyāni (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 21). The primacy of the faculty of sight in the determination of certitude according to al-Bīrūnī’s methodology may be traceable as much to Hindu philosophical origins as to Neoplatonic ones given his awareness of the teachings of Âryabhaṭa articulated in the Hind: waqālaaṣḥābu‘ārjabhad’yakfīnāmaʿrifatu ʾl-mawdiʿi ʾlladhī yablughuhu ʾl-shuʿāʿu wa lā naḥtāju ilā mā lā yablughuhu wa in ʿaẓuma fī dhātihi famā lā yablughuhu ʾl-shuʿāʿu lā yudrikuhu ʾl-iḥsāsu wa mā lā yuḥassu bihi falaysa bimaʿlumin (Hind, p. 183, l. 13), “The disciples of ārjabhad say: the point which the ray of light reaches is sufficient for us and we do not require that which it does not reach even if this were in itself sizable. For that which the ray of light does not reach is not perceived by the sense [of sight] and that which is not sensed by it is not knowable”, (emphasis added). 27 al-dalīl/al-istidlāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 1). 28 al-maʿrifa. 29 Goichon, A., (1938: 125), “dalil, terme de logique désignant la démonstration et l’argumentation, soit d’une matière générale, soit avec un sens particulier”, p. 221, “maʿrifa, connaissance, d’une manière générale”. 30 “Knowledge … the truth of correct inference”, maʿrifatu … ḥaqīqata ʾl-dalīli ʾl-ṣaḥīḥi. Ibid., p. 125, “la connaissance … de l’essence de la vraie démonstration”. 31 nāfin liʾl-shukūki (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 2). 32 al-ʿiyān. 33 innamā ṣāra ʾl-ʿālimu biʾl-maʿlūmi ʿāliman fī maḥalli ʾl-irtibāki (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 14). 90 chapter 4 vation”, by means of which “complete certitude”34 is achieved. This is, most appropriately, defined by Ibn Sīnā: “Knowledge is the belief that something is the case and that it cannot be otherwise”.35 The methodological aim in Kitāb Bātanjal as in the Hind is the justification of a text-based analysis that is informed rather than superseded by empirical procedure. The central importance of both al-khabar and al-ʿiyān is set out in the preface of the Hind.36 This is the reason for the introduction in Kitāb Bātanjal of “decisive proof”37 as the framework of scientific epistemology and argumentation within which, according to Ibn Sīnā also, al-istidlāl/al-dalīl, reaches the level of “correct inference”.38 Whereas Ibn Sīnā is able to conceive of “correct inference”39 as the means to achieving both “general knowledge” and “decisive proof”, in Kitāb Bātanjal, however, deduction40 only functions within the epistemological framework of “decisive proof”, and the concept of al-maʿrifa does not carry the same epistemological implications as al-burhān. In Arabic philosophy qiyās, or reasoning by analogy—a term found in Muslim jurisprudence—was transformed into an Aristotelian syllogism and al-burhān came to designate syllogistic demonstration. Aristotle’s PosteriorAnalytics were translated as Kitāb al-Burhān, in the Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadīm, by al-Fārābī, and by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʿ. The adjective burhānī is applied frequently to

34 tamāmu ʾl-istīqāni (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 21). 35 waʾl-ʿilmu iʿtiqādun biʾanna ʾl-shayʾa kadhā wa annahu lā yumkinu an lā yakūna kadhā, in Goichon, A., (1938: 240). “La science est une croyance que la chose est ainsi, et qu’il n’est pas possible qu’elle ne soit pas ainsi”. 36 Cf. Hind, p. 1, l. 7. For a full discussion see Chapter 1: “Al-Bīrūnī: Prologues and Meth- ods”. This deliberation between the primacy of sense perception, particularly observation, al-ʿiyān, against a preponderant reliance on received knowledge or tradition, al-khabar, forms the basis for al-Bīrūnī’s particular choice of methodological approach. It is, furthermore, reflected in the summarised content of certain Hindu sources which al-Bīrūnī refers to in the Hind and which he was, therefore, certainly aware of: wa mithla ‘laukāyata’ ʿamalahu ‘al-Mashtarī’ fīʾl-akhdhi biʾl-ḥissi waḥdihi fī ʾl-mabāḥithi, wa mithla ‘āgastamata’ ʿamalahu ‘Sahīl’ fī ʾl-ʿamali fīhā biʾl-ḥissi waʾl-khabari maʿan (Hind, p. 102, l. 6), “An example is the book Laukāyata, composed by al-Mashtarī [Bṛihaspati?], which argues for the use of sense perception alone in [all] investigations, a [further] example is Agastyamata, composed by Sahīl [Agastya?], that one should conduct them [investigations] using both sense perception and received knowledge [tradition]”. 37 al-burhān. 38 ḥaqīqatu ʾl-dalīli ʾl-ṣaḥīḥi ʾlladhī huwa ʾl-burhānu, “The true reality of correct inference which itself is decisive proof”, in Goichon, A., (1938: 21). 39 al-dalīlu ʾl-ṣaḥīḥu. 40 al-istidlāl/al-dalīl. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 91 apodeictic demonstration, to the syllogism “composed of propositions which are certain” (yaqīniyyāt). The typical form of burhān—al-burhān al-muṭlaq—is a syllogism in which the obviousness of the premisses is either immediate or mediate.41 By relating the two terms al-istidlāl/al-dalīl and al-burhān almost exclusively to each other in the third part of the preface to Kitāb Bātanjal, al-Bīrūnī establishes the concept of al-burhān in order to justify the efficacy of intellectual process and textual analysis as cognitively equivalent to that which is directly observed: “In a similar manner the provision of decisive proof removes doubts as (effectively as) observation”.42 It is this methodological difference between al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā in the cognitive equation of al-burhān and al-ʿiyān in Kitāb Bātanjal that enhances the meaning and significance of the term “explanation/commentary”43 in the title of the third part of the preface. The preface, does not discuss an indubitable use of commentaries such as that of Vyāsa in Kitāb Bātanjal, but, more crucially, introduces a scientific epistemology and framework of logical argumentation that may be defined as the basis for this particular sharḥ of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. The religious dimension of the term al-burhān cannot be ignored given its primary role in the methodological framework constructed to “explain” the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. The term is Qurʾanic and signifies a “brilliant manifestation”, a “shining light” from God (iv, 174), a “manifest proof” (xii, 24), which may take the form of that supreme argument of authority that is the miracle (xxviii, 32).44 The first connotation of burhān, then, according to al-Bīrūnī, is not correct discursive reasoning; it is, rather, the manifest evidence of an irrefutable proof. It is, in some sense, akin to a spiritual realisation whose degree of certainty

41 Cf. Gardet, L., “Al-Burhān”, in ei2. 42 wa kadhālika ʾl-burhānu nāfin liʾl-shukūki mithla ʾl-ʿiyāni (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 1). The Hindu textual sources which al-Bīrūnī quotes in summary form in the Hind and with which he must, therefore, have had some degree of familiarity represent a significant body of influence, in terms both of his adoption or relegation of their teachings, on al-Bīrūnī’s own methodological conclusions and indeed, as in this instance, directly anticipate them: waammā‘Balabhadra’…yashuluʿalayhiīthāruʾl-khabariʿalāʾl-ʿiyānikamāyaṣʿubuʿalaynā taqdīmu ʾl-shubahi ʿalā ʾl-burhāni (Hind, p. 184, l. 17). “As for Balabhadra … his preference for received knowledge [tradition] over observation is as easy as it is difficult for us [me] to prefer causes of doubt to decisive proof”. 43 al-sharḥ (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 5). 44 Cf. Gardet, L., “Al-Burhān”, in ei2. 92 chapter 4 is closer, though not equivalent, to that which, for instance, is observed, via the sense faculties45 even though it is in fact attained through a method of argumentation, through al-maʿqūlāt. It is this range in the term burhān to be both a mode of argumentation and a “manifest proof”, to straddle the division between al-maḥsūsāt and al-maʿqūlāt by conveying characteristics of both but definitively grounded in al-maʿqūlāt, that makes it so useful as the basis of the methodological framework of al-sharḥ in Kitāb Bātanjal. The dual nature of the concept of al-burhān, according to the use of this term in Kitāb Bātanjal, may, therefore, be traced to the Yoga-Sūtra where knowledge, vidyā and particularly self-knowledge, is closely related to the notion of freedom from any compulsive attraction or enslavement, and is a spiritual state of clarity rather than the achievement of truths through logical argumentation. Yet Patañjali equally teaches the concept of a liberating knowledge attained through the purification of distorted perception. This refers not only to specific internal faculties, but also to the transformation rather than suppression or exclusion46 of the external senses. Patañjali’s teaching as reflected in the epistemological structure of Kitāb Bātanjal and its congruence with the promotion of a methodology based on the concept of al-burhān,47 leads not only to its equation with al-ʿiyān, the primary faculty of empirical method whose result lies in al-maʿlūmāt/al-maḥsūsāt, the objects or knowledge of sense perception, but, subsequently, to the assertion of the superiority of al-burhān over the sense faculties used by empirical method:

Sense perception is not truthful because of the occurrence of error in it, and that which is not truthful is not known for certain, and that which is not certain is inter-penetrated by ignorance … the objects of sense perception [sensibilia] do not have a true reality that is as fixed as that of the intelligibilia.48

45 al-maḥsūsāt. 46 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 247). 47 As we have seen, it is this methodology which ultimately governs the definition of the category of al-maʿqūlāt as the knowledge or objects of certain proof. 48 waʾl-ḥissu ghayru ḥaqīqī li-wuqūʿi ʾl-ghalaṭi fīhi, wa mā lā ḥaqīqata lahu fa-laysa bi-maʿlū- minyaqīnan,wamāzālaʿanhuʾl-yaqīnufa-qadlābasahuʾl-jahlu…walaysaliʾl-maʿlūmātiʾl- ḥissiyyatiḥaqīqatunthābitatunthabātaʾl-maʿqūlāti (KitābBātanjal, p. 181, l. 4). This quoted passage is developed out of Sūtra ii. 18, “The Object Or Knowable Is By Nature Sentient, Mutable And Inert. It Exists In The Form Of Elements And Sense-Organs, And Serves The Purpose Of Experience And Emancipation”. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 93

Given the emphasis on the relationship of “observer” with the “observed” in the preface to the Hind and the close association of this conjunction in the Yoga-Sūtra with that of puruṣa and prakrti, it is possible to argue that what is being presented in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind, is a fundamental teaching of Patañjali. Like Patañjali’s text, Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind develop from the metaphysical and impersonal dimensions of a macrocosmic philosophy that relate to al-nafs and al-qālib, and from discussions of Samkhya and the De Anima of the Shifāʾ, the microcosmic and practical terms of human life, the chief example of which in Kitāb Bātanjal is the concept of human perception.49 The implication of such an emphasis in practical terms is more directly expressed in the Yoga-Sūtra,50 namely, that without the manifestation of being, prakrti, liberation would not “take place” in yoga. It is through the conjunction of puruṣa with prakrti that the essential nature of the “observer”, that is ultimately synonymous with puruṣa, and the “observed” (prakrtic identity) can eventually be grasped.51 Kitāb Bātanjal subtly illustrates the line between the self or “observer”, through al-ʿiyān, and the “observed”,52 and in so doing echoes yoga that seeks to establish human identity as the “observer”, dismantling the error of mistaking material identity for spiritual identity thus leading one, ultimately, to liberation.53 As with the use of the term al-burhān, the dual conception in yoga of the “observer” being in fact also the soul54 seems to carry its own epistemology and is reflected in the language of Kitāb Bātanjal fusing in such technical terms as, maʿlūmun biʾl-ʿiyāni (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 1), empirical method with purified spiritual perception. Kitāb Bātanjal follows a dialogic format that may have been inspired by Socratic treatises with which al-Bīrūnī was familiar, although whether in their original Greek texts or in translation is a matter for debate. Al-Bīrūnī was certainly familiar with a version of Plato’s Phaedo that he quotes extensively in the Hind and that is structured in a dialogic format. Moreover, the very relevant Pythagorean/Platonic notion of sōma/sēma (body/prison) occurs in the Phaedo and is reflected in the quotations relating to the soul given in the Hind:

49 al-ʿīyān. 50 Ăgāśe, K.S., (ed.), The Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. Pune, 1904; ii.23 (p. 91). 51 Ibid. 52 al-maʿlūm,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 1). 53 al-khalāṣ (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 3). 54 puruṣa. 94 chapter 4

Socrates says in the Phaedo … the soul of every human rejoices in and grieves for an object and considers this object a part of itself, this respon- siveness ties it [the soul] and nails it to the body and makes it into a bodily form.55

This notion of sōma/sēma relates to the central discussion in Kitāb Bātanjal about the nature of the soul/body relationship that in some passages mirrors the Phaedo quotations in the Hind by describing the soul as being “trapped” or “imprisoned” in the body and seeking liberation from it.56 Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the possibility of other influences for the dialogic structure of Kitāb Bātanjal, not least the question/answer format that exists in some of the earliest Muslim legal, and theological texts as well as in Arabic philosophical correspondences.57 In addition, the pedagogical aspect in such a structure is reminiscent of the al-murshid/al-murīd58 dynamic in the Sufi oral and written traditions. Indeed, an awareness of such a dynamic is reflected in the quotations from the Sufi sources including those of both Abū Bakr al-Shiblī (861–945) and Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī (d. 877) in the Hind that hint at the possibility of a dialogic format in the original oral or written tradition from which they derive:

There exists in their statements that which indicates a belief in unification as in the answer of one of them regarding the Truth … and as in the answer of Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī when he was asked, how did you achieve [arrive at] what you have?59

This dialogic format makes Kitāb Bātanjal more accessible to its readership. More important than this format’s culturally pragmatic aspect, however, is its reflection, in structural terms, of the importance of an appropriate form of ped- agogy, a concept that is developed as much out of the guru/disciple relationship in yoga as out of the Socratic dialogue or Sufi oral and written tradition:

55 qāla Suqrāt fī kitābi “fādhin” … wa nafsu kulli insānin tafraḥu wa taḥzunu liʾl-shayʾi wa tarā dhālika ʾl-shayʾa lahā, wa hādhā ʾl-infiʿālu yarbiṭuhā biʾl-jasadi wa yusammiruhā bihi wa yuṣayyiruhā jasadiyyata ʾl-ṣūrati (Hind, p. 43, l. 9). 56 inna ʾl-abdāna shibāku ʾl-arwāḥi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 6), “Bodies are the nets of souls”. 57 For possible influences see Daiber, H., “Masāʿil Wa-Adjwiba”, in ei2 and Akasoy, A., “Philo- sophical Correspondence”, in ei3. 58 teacher/pupil. 59 wa yūjadu fī kalāmihim mā yadullu ʿalā ʾl-qawli biʾl-ittiḥādi kajawābi aḥadihim ʿani ʾl-ḥaqqi … wa kajawābi Abī Yazīd al-Bistāmī wa qad suʾila bimā nilta mā nilt (Hind, p. 66, l. 15). kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 95

The renunciant who roamed in barren lands and forests asked Patañjali, saying: I have studied the books of the ancients and their discourses about things hidden from the senses, and I have found them relying on weak inferences that are beset by doubts, and they do not seek the provision of those [certain] proofs that are equal to visual perception, giving the coolness of certainty and guiding towards the achievement of liberation from ties. Is it possible, then, for you to show me through the use of deductions and [certain] proofs what is sought for so that my understanding of it should be assisted against doubts and misgivings?60

The use of the dialogic format here highlights the priority given in yoga to the guidance of a spiritual preceptor who has direct experience of the insights as well as the obstacles that may arise on the path to liberation. However, unlike yoga where the ideal is of a guru as “true teacher”, having attained the ultimate realisation informing all yogic endeavour, in Kitāb Bātanjal the teacher is the vehicle for the attainment of definitive proofs61 through the provision of which the disciple’s “doubts and misgivings”62 are dispelled. Yoga entails a profound pedagogical commitment involving periods of study during which preceptors can communicate and transmit their wisdom to worthy disciples.63 Spiritual initiation, dīkṣā is a crucially important notion in yoga for it involves an essential transference of knowledge, jňāna, or spiritualised power, śakti, from the guru to the disciple. Through initiation, the disciple gains access to the guru’s state of consciousness and even mysteriously becomes a part of the guru’s transmission of spiritual energy and awareness through the guru’s “proximity”.64 In contrast, as the above quotation indicates, it is not so much the disciple’s “proximity” to the guru as it is the certain proof, al-burhān, that carries the efficacy and certainty equivalent to visual perception, al-ʿiyān, on which Kitāb Bātanjal places primary importance. In this understanding, therefore, the guru “guides” to spiritual knowledge as opposed to inspiring

60 saʾala ʾl-zāhidu ʾl-sāʾiḥu fī ʾl-ṣaḥārā waʾl-ghiyāḍi bātanjal wa qāla lahu, qad naẓartu fī kutubi ʾl-awāʾili wakalāmihimʿalāʾl-ashyāʾiʾl-ghāʾibatiʿaniʾl-ḥissi fa-wajadtuhumfīhā yaʿtahidūna ʾl-dalāʾila ʾl-ḍaʿīfata ʾllatī tatakhālajuhā ʾl-shukūku wa lā yaqṣidūna ʾl-barāhīna ʾl-qāʾimata maqāma ʾl-ʿiyāni ʾl-jālibata thalja ʾl-yaqīni waʾl-muṭarriqata ilā nayli ʾl-khalāṣi mina ʾl-wit- hāqi, fa-hal yumkinuka an tadullanī biʾl-dalāʾili waʾl-barāhīni ʿalā ʾl-maṭlūbi liyakūna wuqūfī ʿalayhi ʿawnan mina ʾl-shakki waʾl-irtiʾābi? (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 10). 61 al-barāhīn (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 12). 62 al-shakku waʾl-irtiʾābu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 14). 63 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 22–36). 64 Ibid. 96 chapter 4 it.65 Moreover, the emphasis is shifted in Kitāb Bātanjal so that it is the disciple’s ʿiyān and not the guru’s which provides the means for the postulant66 to achieve the essence of reality. Given the terminological equivalency of al- ʿiyān with inner consciousness, puruṣa, a term that signifies the dual notions of “observer”, and soul/inner consciousness,67 al-nafs, not only does this shift in Kitāb Bātanjal focus attention exclusively on the postulant’s visual perception but, more crucially, also focuses attention on the spiritual knowledge of the postulant’s inner consciousness.

2 Section i: Concentration of the Heart (Mind)

In the first section of Kitāb Bātanjal, which addresses the means to achieving the concentration of the heart (mind),68 three such methods of spiritual ascesis are described: habituated action,69 intellectual ascesis,70 and devotion.71 They correspond to the three stages of yoga elaborated in several Hindu works, including the Bhagavadgīta: karma-yoga, bhakti-yoga, and jñāna-yoga.72 Reliance on these treatises in Kitāb Bātanjal may have been intended to enhance the principle aim of describing the theoretical and practical process of self-realisation through yoga, al-ittiḥād,73 and the liberation of the soul. After

65 fa-hal yumkinuka an tadullanī (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 13), “Is it possible for you to show me”. 66 al-sāʾil (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 170, l. 5). 67 Feuerstein, G., (1990). 68 This is a possible interpretation of the Arabic, fī iqrāri ʾl-qalbi ʿalā maqarrin wāḥidin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 10), “On fixing the heart [mind] in one place”. 69 abhyāsa/al-taʿwīd. 70 vairāgya/al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī. 71 bhakti/al-ʿibāda. 72 The Bhagavadgīta, the “Song of the Lord”, written between the fifth and second centuries bce expounds the idea that there are various paths to liberation. The first is the path of action, karma-yoga. Above action is the path of devotion, bhakti-yoga, as a way of salvation. These paths of action and devotion contrast with the path of knowledge, jñāna-yoga, mentioned in the text. See Flood, G., (1996: 126–127). 73 The term al-ittiḥād in Kitāb Bātanjal is used to indicate the philosophically sophisticated and highly technical process of meditation, spiritual ascesis, and physical asceticism which, when systematically practised, is capable of steadying the mind, iqrāru ʾl-qalbi ʿalā maqarrin wāḥidin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 10), “Fixing the heart [mind] in one place”, bringing it under “control”, and thereby transcending the trammels of worldly existence including the human (egoic) barriers to (spiritual) freedom, fiʾl-khalāṣi mina ʾl-amthāli kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 97 a subtle analysis outlining the five faculties of the soul, the dialogue shifts to discuss the first method of spiritual ascesis, habituated action:

The postulant said:74 how can one suppress the soul and keep its faculties away from external things? [Patañjali] answered: this may be accomplished in two ways. One of them is practical, namely, habituation.75 For when a person targets a specific faculty of the soul and effortfully prevents it from fluctuation76 and entrusts it to that which is best for it through continuous perseverance … this faculty must ultimately become firmly rooted77 [istiqrār] in this habit, and will be diverted from the tendencies it had when it lacked this habit.78

The passage begins by outlining the method through which the soul achieves liberation in line with the principle current of approach in Kitāb Bātanjal that is practical, experiential, and personal against the theoretical and abstract trend of Samkhya and the Peripatetic tradition in their discussions of the complex interactions of the soul with the body. The intent of the first method

(KitābBātanjal, p. 167, l. 2), “On liberation from [states of] similarities”.(See footnote above for the relationship between al-ittiḥād and al-khalāṣ). In contrast, the term al-ittiḥād for Ibn Sīnā specifically denotes the unification of body and soul in one “self”: wa yuqālu ittiḥādun liʾijtimāʿi ʾl-mawdūʿi waʾl-maḥmūli fī dhātin wāḥidatin kaḥuṣūli ʾl-insāni mina ʾl-badani waʾl-nafsi. “On appelle union la réunion du sujet et de l’attribut dans une seule essence comme l’homme vient du corps et de l’âme”, Goichon, A., (1938: 428). 74 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: fa-kayfa yumkinu qamʿu ʾl-nafsi wa qabḍu quwāhā ʿani ʾl-khārijāti? qāla ʾl- mujību: yakūnu biṭarīqayni aḥaduhumā ʿamalī wa huwa ʾl-taʿwīdu fa-inna ʾl-insāna idhā aqbala ʿalā quwwatin min quwā ʾl-nafsi biʿaynihā fa-thanāhā ʿani ʾl-tamarrudi mujtahidan wawakkalahāilāʾl-aṣlaḥilahāmuwāẓibandāʾiban…lamyakunbuddunfīākhiriʾl-amrimin istiqrāri tilka ʾl-quwwati ʿalā tilka ʾl-ʿādati wa irʿiwāʾihā ʿammā kānat tajmaḥu ilayhi maʿa ʿadami ʾl-ʿādati,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 171, l. 14). 75 Cf. Sūtra i. 12 where abhyāsa/al-taʿwīd is referred to, “By Practice And Detachment They Can Be Stopped”. 76 The effortful prevention of fluctuation (al-tamarrud) of the soul derives, in the main, from Sūtra i. 13, “Exertion To Acquire Sthiti Or A Tranquil Flow Of Mind Devoid Of Fluctuations Is Called Practice”. 77 The notion of al-istiqrār through exertion and habituation is to be found in Sūtra i. 14, “That Practice When Continued Constantly For A Long Time Without Break And With Devotion Becomes Firm In Foundation”. 78 This reflects the state of desirelessness or detachment described in Sūtra i. 15, “When The Mind Loses All Passions For Objects Seen Or Described In Sacred Tradition It Acquires A State Of Utter Desirelessness Which Is Called Detachment”. 98 chapter 4 of habituation is to state that the effort toward al-taʿwīd, or meditational praxis denotes bringing the soul to stillness or self-restraint.79 This method implies the prevention of fluctuation in the soul’s faculties, al-tamarrud, so that each becomes firmly founded80 in meditational praxis which is what is meant by habituation in the above passage.81 This firm foundation of meditational praxis in the individual faculties of the soul, on its path toward a person’s true liberation, culminates in the firm concentration82 of the heart (mind)83 into one state,84 as described in the first section of Kitāb Bātanjal. The soul, through habituated action including “constancy and diligence in the worship of God”,85 achieves two things. The first is the soul’s cognition of God in spite of Him being inaccessible to the senses,86 whilst the second is the soul’s quelling of “hindrances” that prevent it from being “withdrawn” and from withdrawing its “faculties so as to prevent their spreading out and their attachment to what is not the Truth”.87 These “hindrances” that prevent the soul from its “specific and pure activity”,88 are listed as six:

79 qamʿu ʾl-nafsi wa qabḍu quwāhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 171, l. 14). 80 istiqrāru tilka ʾl-quwwa (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 171, l. 19). 81 al-ʿāda. 82 Samādhi/al-istiqrār. 83 Cf. Sūtra iii. 55: “Kaivalya (‘autonomy, independence, liberation’) comes about when sattva (i.e. citta ‘the mind’) and the self are equally purified”. Al-nafs ‘the soul’ corresponds to puruṣa in the Sūtra (cf. Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 170, l. 8; p. 177, l. 19; cf. Hind, p. 30: yusammūna ʾl-nafsa purusha, “They call the soul puruṣa”); and al-qalb, “the heart”—to sattva (i.e., citta, “the mind”, a synonym of buddhi and manas) in the Sūtra (cf. Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 10; p. 183, l. 20; and cf. Hind, p. 33, l. 12). Also cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iii. 55: “When the sattva of the mind has been cleansed of the defilment of rajas and tamas …”. 84 iqrāru ʾl-qalbi ʿalā maqarrin wāḥidin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 10). 85 ʿibādatuhu ʾl-khāliṣatu wa bimuwāṣalatihā wa biʾl-muwāẓabati ʿalayhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 8). This passage reflects Vyāsa on Sūtra i. 28 as well as the Sūtra, “Yogins having understood the relationship between the verbal symbol and the thing expressed will ‘Repeat It And Contemplate Upon Its Meaning.’ Repetition of the symbol and contemplation on its subject—the Īśvara—bring one-pointedness”. 86 wa huwa wa in ghāba ʿani ʾl-ḥawāssi fa lam tudrikhu fa qad ʿaqalathu ʾl-nafsu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 7). 87 wa yuqmaʿu ʾl-mawāniʿu liʾl-nafsi ʿani ʾl-inqibāḍi wa qabḍi ʾl-quwā ʿani ʾl-intishāri waʾl- taʿalluqibighayriʾl-ḥaqqi (KitābBātanjal, p. 175, l. 9). The quelling of “hindrances” or “obstacles” referred to here reflects Sūtra i. 29, “From That Comes Realisation Of The Individual Self And The Obstacles Are Prevented”. 88 ʿan khāṣṣi fiʿlihā ʾl-mukhliṣi iyyāhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 12). kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 99

They are blameworthy morals that arise in it [the soul] out of a neglect of responsibilities, sloth in activity, procrastination, doubting what is true, impotence through ignorance, and conjecturing that what is obligatory is not so.89

An additional “six types” of distraction are cited although only four are in fact given:90

It [the soul] is preoccupied by one of six types of concern including impulses that overwhelm it without them being sought by it, its concern with a [particular] created being whose reincarnation it anticipates, its concern with a failure to achieve a given goal and despairing as a result, its concern with change in the body which is its vehicle.91

Further, the (here corrupt text) seems to indicate that the body as a vehicle is the channel by which the soul is affected,92 “through its occurrence or its actions”.93 The description of the body as the “chariot” of the soul is not only Platonic94 in its provenance but may have also been derived from Hindu

89 hiya akhlāqun madhmūmatun tatakhallaqu bihā min ghaflatin mina ʾl-wājibi wa kasalin fī ʾl-ʿamali wa taswīfin ilā ʾl-ghadi wa shakkin fī ʾl-ḥaqqi wa ʿajzin mina ʾl-jahli wa ẓannin biʿl-wājibi annahu laysa biwājibin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 12). The listed “hindrances” correspond, in part, to Sūtra i. 30, “Sickness, Incompetence, Doubt, Delusion, Sloth, Non- Abstention, Erroneous Conception, Non-Attainment Of Any Yogic Stage, And Instability To Stay In A Yogic State, These Distractions Of The Mind Are The Impediments”. 90 According to Ritter (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, notes 5 and 6) certain words at the end of this passage in the manuscript are corrupt making the meaning of the final clause, (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 19), unclear. 91 yushghiluhāʾl-hammuʿalāaḥadisittatianwāʿinminhāihtimāmuhālikhawāṭirintaghshāhā min ghayri taʿammudin minhā lahā, wa minhā ihtimāmuhā limakhlūqin tatawaqqaʿu ḥulū- lahā, wa minhā ihtimāmuhā likhaybatin fī maṭlabin wa yaʾsin minhu, wa minhā ihtimā- muhā litaghāyurin fī ʾl-badani ʾlladhī huwa markabuhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 17). Cf. Sūtra i. 31, “Sorrow, Dejection, Restlessness, Inhalation And Exhalation Arise From (Pre- vious) Distractions”. Also Vyāsa on this Sūtra, “Sorrow is of three kinds—Ădhyātmika (arising within oneself), Ădhibhautika (inflicted by some other creature) or Ădhidaivika (through natural calamity) … Dejection is caused through non-fulfilment of desire or when wished-for things do not happen. The upsetting of bodily equilibrium or steadiness results in shakiness of the body”. 92 alladhī āthāruhā minhu: reading the corrupted word mbnh (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, 19) as minhu. 93 yakūnu ḥudūthuhā fīhā wa fī afāʿīlihā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 20). 94 Cf. Plato, Phaedo. Oxford, 2009. 100 chapter 4 texts.95 A simile given in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad says that the body is a chariot of which āṭman96 is the owner; buddhi97 is the charioteer, mind the reins and the senses the steeds (i. 3. 3–4). Since the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā is most closely related of all the Upaniṣads to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad it may be justified to extend this simile to the situation in the Gītā, a version of which is quoted extensively in the Hind.98 The emphasis on control of the body as the vehicle to spiritual progress is reflected in the subsequent question, in which the postulant asks concerning “the way towards quelling and warding off”,99 and the answer partly looks to control of the yogin’s breath so that it “will not go away and be lost in the two states of inhalation and exhalation”.100 Intellectual dispassion101 is the second method of spiritual ascesis. Although described as the “second path” in Kitāb Bātanjal, the structure of the text indicates that al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī functions in conjunction with the “first path” of al-taʿwīd and shares an identical goal. Al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī and al-taʿwīd seem to function in a similarly interdependent manner as the yogic equivalents that transform distracted states of the soul or fluctuations in its faculties, al- tamarrud, into concentrated states102 in the staged process towards liberation. Although not fully described in Kitāb Bātanjal, al-taʿwīd in yoga includes a wide range of techniques to stabilise the soul; there is, however, an indication that the cultivation of al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī prevents the disciple from misappro- priating the result of al-taʿwīd, that is, in an egoic,103 selfish, or irresponsible manner:

95 The soul is compared to a charioteer in Gauḍapāda. 96 “self”/al-dhāt. 97 “Intellect”. 98 Hind, p. 37, l. 16. 99 al-sabīlu ilā qamʿi dhālika wa dafʿihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 175, l. 21). Cf. Sūtra i. 32, “For Their Stoppage (i.e., Of Distractions) Practice Of (Concentration On) A Single Principle Should Be Made”. 100 lā yadhhabu yaḍīʿu nafsahu fī ḥālatay jadhbihi wa irsālihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 6). Cf. Sūtra i. 34, “By Throwing Out And Restraining The Breath Also (The Mind Is Calmed)”. Vyāsa on this Sūtra has, “Throwing out or expulsion is the ejection of the internal air through the apertures of the nose by a special kind of effort. Restraining or Prānāyāma is retention of the breath. The mind can also be calmed or set by these methods”. 101 vairāgya/al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī. 102 al-iqrār/al-istiqrār (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 171/177). 103 Cf. consequent discussion on al-ẓann, (p. 41). kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 101

The second method is intellectual,104 namely, mental ascesis, which consists in contemplating consequences with the eye of the heart, and in considering the evil of existents, that come into being and pass away. For nothing is worse than decay and passing away, these two being over- whelming in [the existents]. The result of this method is that when the person recognises evil and filth in all things, his heart flees from all the goals of this world and the next, and his innermost intellect becomes free to seek liberation from them, and he is relieved of questions and needs.105

This quotation refers to evil in existents as specific in their finiteness and their susceptibility to a decay that can “overwhelm” them, muʿtariyān bihā. Unlike the sharper dualistic tendency to regard body/matter as intrinsically evil and to be discarded by the soul, Kitāb Bātanjal closely parallels the sophisticated teachings of Patañjali, specifically the second method, vairāgya, to bring about concentration, samādhi, in the soul. Patañjali states: “Dispassion is the knowledge of mastery in one who does not thirst for any object either seen (i.e., of an

104 The intimate relationship between the “intellect”, al-ʿaql, and the “soul”, al-nafs, which is highlighted in the following description of the second method of spiritual ascesis in Kitāb Bātanjal is also reflected by Ibn Sīnā’s analysis of this relationship: nisbatu ʾl-maliki ilā ʾl-madīnati waʾl-ʿaqli ilā ʾl-nafsi wāḥidun. “Le rapport du roi à la cité et de l’intelligence à l’àme est le même”, Goichon, A., (1938: 226). Furthermore, the activity of the intellect is likewise, according to Ibn Sīnā’s analysis, intimately related to the function of the soul: faqāla mā maʿnāhu hādhā ʾl-ʿaqlu huwa ʾl-taṣawwurātu waʾl-taṣdīqātu ʾl-ḥāṣilatu liʾl-nafsi biʾl-fiṭrati. “Ce que signifie cette intelligence, dit-il, ce sont les concepts et les assentiments qui viennent à l’âme par l’esprit”, Goichon, A., (1938: 226). 105 waʾl-ṭarīqu ʾl-thānī ʿaqlī huwa ʾl-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī ʾlladhī huwa taʾammulu ʾl-ʿawāqibi bi-ʿayni ʾl-qalbi waʾl-naẓari fī sūʾati ʾl-mawjūdāti ʾl-kāʾinati ʾl-fāsidati fa-lā shayʾun aswaʾu mina ʾl- fanāʾi waʾl-fasādi wa humā muʿtariyāni bihā, wa maḥṣūlu hādhā ʾl-ṭarīqi anna ʾl-insāna idhā ʿarafa ʾl-sharra waʾl-radāʾata fī jamīʿi ʾl-ashyāʾi nafara qalbuhu ʿan kulli ʾl-maqāṣidi ʾl- dunyāwiyyati waʾl-ukhrāwiyyati wa khaluṣa ḍamīruhu li-ṭalabi ʾl-khalāṣi minhā wa irtafaʿati ʾl-asʾilatu waʾl-ḥājātu ʿanhu,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 1). Cf. Sūtra i. 16, “Indifference To The Gunas Or The Constituent Principles Achieved Through A Knowledge Of The Nature Of The Puruṣa Is Called Paravairāgya (Extreme Detachment)”. Also Vyāsa on this Sūtra: “Through the practice of the effort to realise the Puruṣa-principle, the Yogin having seen the faulty nature of all objects visible or described in the scriptures, gets a clarity of vision and steadiness in Sāttvika [of the sentient principle] qualities. Such a Yogin edified with a discriminative knowledge and with sharpened and chastened intellect becomes indifferent to all manifest and unmanifested states of the three Gunas or constituent principles [al-quwā ʾl-thalāth (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 7)] … Detachment is the highest form of knowledge [al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī?], and Kaivalya (or Isolation) and detachment are inseparable”. 102 chapter 4 earthly nature) or heard of (i.e., of the subtle worlds)”.106 There is not only a correspondence here in terms of the language used to describe al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī as deriving from “knowledge”,107 and relating to “any object either seen or heard of”,108 but also the implication that al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī does not imply a simple turning away from existents/[physical] things,109 becoming indifferent through intermittent withdrawal; rather, it means the pursuit of intellectual ascesis by means of the consideration110 of existents/[physical] things111 devoid of attachment.112 Al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī, then, is knowledge wherein the “eye” of the heart113 and the innermost intellect114 both of which, it could be argued, are faculties of the soul (given the nature of puruṣa as both “seer” and innermost self), become aware of and disengaged from misidentification with the “seeable” objects of body/matter.115 Thus in contrast to the dualism of Samkhya, Kitāb Bātanjal, like yoga, does not reduce the issue to a simple dichotomy with the soul triumphant over body/matter. Al-zuhduʾl-fikrī is not so much an act of dispassion or detachment as it is a state of understanding and insight.116 According to Patañjali dispassion is a knowledge of “mastery”117 resulting from a genuine persistence on the part of the individual to disengage the intellect from everything that is inimical118 to its steadiness in practice,119 thereby generating freedom120 from the affliction that results from attachment.121 Unlike the first two “paths” to liberation, al-taʿwīd and al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī, that seem to function in a similarly interdependent manner as their yogic equivalents, the promotion of devotion122 completes the triptych whose common

106 Ăgāśe, K.S., (1904: i. 15, p. 18). 107 al-taʾammul/al-naẓaru fī sūʾati ʾl-mawjūdāti (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 1). 108 al-maqāṣidi ʾl-dunyāwiyyati waʾl-ukhrāwiyyati (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 4). 109 al-mawjūdāt/al-ashyāʾ (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 2/4). 110 al-naẓar (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 2). 111 al-mawjūdāt/al-ashyāʾ (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 2/4). 112 al-khalāṣu minhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 4). 113 ʿaynu ʾl-qalbi. 114 al-ḍamīr. 115 khaluṣa ḍamīruhu li-ṭalabi ʾl-khalāṣi minhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 4). 116 al-taʾammul/al-naẓaru fī sūʾati ʾl-mawjūdāti/idhā ʿarafa (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172). 117 Whicher, I., (1998: 176–178). 118 al-sharru waʾl-radāʾatu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 3). 119 al-taʿwīd. 120 al-khalāṣ (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 4). 121 al-shadāʾidu fiʾl-withāqi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 6), “The afflictions in bondage”. 122 al-ʿibāda/bhakti. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 103 denominator is the soul’s attainment of liberation by spiritual praxis through the state of incarnate existence, rather than through a process of pure disen- gagement from body/matter:

The postulant said: is there a way to liberation other than the two ways of habituated action and intellectual ascesis? [Patañjali] answered: it is attained by devotion which spreads from the body on the basis of knowledge, certainty, and sincerity in the heart and on the basis of praise, exaltation, and laudation with the tongue, and on action with the limbs. God alone and nothing else is aimed at in all of these, so that success should come from Him in order to achieve eternal bliss.123

Significantly, the fundamental concept that drives the passage on devotion124 is expressed by the phrase, “by devotion which spreads from the body”.125 This phrase corresponds to the concept of “immanence” proceeding from devotion in the full translation of Sūtra i. 23 of the Yoga-Sūtra: “From Special Devotion To I’śvara Also Concentration Becomes Immanent”.126 Pines and Gelblum, who quote only part of the Sūtra regarding this passage,127 amend Ritter’s original reading of tatawazzaʿ128 into tunzaʿ129—a term reflecting neither the meaning of the Sūtra nor its commentary by Vyāsa. Pines and Gelblum, therefore, translate the phrase, tunzaʿu mina ʾl-badani (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9), as “withdrawal from the body” (Pines and Gelblum, p. 319). This allows compliance with the preconceived notions about the role of a theoretical, even Peripatetic dualism, in Kitāb Bātanjal as expressed in the intro-

123 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: fa-hal ilā ʾl-khalāṣi sabīlun ʿalā ghayri ṭarīqayi ʾl-taʿwīdi waʾl-zuhdi? qāla ʾl- mujību: yunālu biʾl-ʿibādati wa hiya tatawazzaʿu mina ʾl-badani ʿalā maʿrifatin wa yaqīnin wa ikhlāṣin biʾl-qalbi, wa ʿalā tamjīdin wa thanāʾin wa tasbīḥin biʾl-lisāni, wa ʿalā ʿamalin biʾl- jawāriḥi, yuqṣadu fī jamīʿihā allāhu waḥdahū dūna ghayrihi li-yakūna ʾl-tawfīqu min ʿindihi li-nayli ʾl-saʿādati ʾl-abadiyyati,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 8). Cf. Sūtra i. 23, “From Special Devotion [al-ʿibāda?] To I’śvara Also Concentration Becomes Imminent”. Also Vyāsa on this Sūtra, “Through a special kind of devotion called Īśvara Pranidhāna on the part of the devotee, Īśvara inclines towards him and favours him with grace for fulfilment of his wish”. 124 al-ʿibāda/bhakti (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9). 125 biʾl-ʿibādati wa hiya tatawazzaʿu mina ʾl-badani (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9). 126 Mukerji, P.N., (1963). 127 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966). “Cf. pranidhāna in sūtra 1.23: īśvara-pranidhānād vā ‘Or (the self near the goal) is attained by devotion to the Iśvara’.” Footnote 163. 128 This may correspond to the concept of “immanence” in Sūtra i. 23 that parallels question 11 of Kitāb Bātanjal as well as the commentary of this Sūtra by Vyāsa. 129 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966), footnote 164. 104 chapter 4 duction to their translation.130 These notions are driven by the assumption that “A Platonic-Aristotelian background is evident in this translation”.131 This assumption is based on translating philosophical notions into what is debatably referred to as “Aristotelian” terminology evincing al-Bīrūnī’s presumed sympathies so that Kitāb Bātanjal becomes, effectively, an “operative or functional” attempt to Aristotelianise Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtra “by means of paraphrasing”.132 They are also governed by “the fact that al-Bīrūnī was a Mus- lim, so that in this major characteristic of his translation as well as in its minor characteristics, that likewise exhibit a good deal of ‘islamization,’ his own interpretation, conditioned by his own cultural orientation, might have been at work”.133 Finally, further seeking to underscore al-Bīrūnī’s Aristotelianisation, Pines and Gelblum assert that “he relied to a considerable extent on his own intelligence and autodidactic capacity in studying the Sūtras and their commentary”.134 This, they argue, explains the “incorrect rendering” of terms and the “misunderstanding of a Sanskrit text”135 that often does not tally with their imposed Aristotelian template. The inclusion of the key concept of devotion as the third path to liberation underlines an Islamically-orientated methodology based on a monistic and monotheistic reading of Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtra, specifically on the soul/body dynamic in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind. The use of the Islamic term al-ʿibāda136 occurs, as touched on above, in a passage that reflects Sūtra i. 23, which includes the elusive but significant Sanskrit term īśvara-pranidhāna. The term is applicable to three types of action, all of which are central to the Islamic understanding of this term: (a) bodily activity,137 (b) verbal prayer,138 and (c) mental contemplation.139 In translating this Sanskrit term in Sūtra i. 23 the Islamic concept used is al-ʿibāda,140 “devotion”, and “God alone and nothing else is aimed at in all of these”.141

130 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966). 131 Pines and Gelblum, p. 306, l. 26. 132 Pines and Gelblum, p. 307, l. 33. 133 Pines and Gelblum, p. 305, l. 18. 134 Pines and Gelblum, p. 305, l. 27. 135 Pines and Gelblum, p. 307, l. 10. 136 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9. 137 ʿamalun biʾl-jawāriḥi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 10), “actions with the limbs”. 138 tasbīḥun biʾl-lisāni (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 10), “laudation with the tongue”. 139 ʿalā maʿrifatin wa yaqīnin wa ikhlāṣin biʾl-qalbi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9), “on the basis of knowledge, certainty, and sincerity in the heart”. Pines, and Gelblum, (1977: 522–549). 140 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9. 141 yuqṣadu fī jamīʿihā allāhu waḥdahū dūna ghayrihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 11). kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 105

This translation of the term īśvara-pranidhāna is consistently used in later passages of Kitāb Bātanjal such as that which reflects Sūtra ii. 1 where the words used are al-ʿibādāt142 and wa kullu mā yuqṣadu bihi dhātu ʾllāhi taʿāla yutaqarrabu bihi ilayhi,143 “and all that through which the essence of God, may He be exalted, is sought and by means of which one may come near Him”. This consistency in the translation of such an important term indicates an understanding of the subtle and interrelated nature of terminology used in these Sūtras and that the Islamic interpretative frame being applied is constantly and carefully maintained both in the choice of specific terms used as well as in the contextual and psychological progression from Kitāb Bātanjal to the Hind. The sensitive reflection of the meanings of terms described in these Sūtras demonstrates an awareness of tapas/asceticism,144 svādhyāya/self-study,145 and īśvara-pranidhāna/devotion, in a frame that betrays Islamic traits: “and all that through which the essence of God, may He be exalted, is sought and by means of which one may come near Him”.146 The specific terms are closely interconnected in the one, fully integrated, Islamic process of devotion. The third path described in Kitāb Bātanjal is bhakti-yoga. Bhakti is a major aspect of Krsna’s teaching, being the surest path by which the devotee approaches the supreme Person and thereby attains grace. Krsna declares: “Of all yogins, one who worships Me full of faith and whose inner self abides in Me- that one I consider to be nearest to my vision”.147 Bhakti-yoga became one of the central teachings on yoga in the Bhagavadgīta and in much of the Brāh- manic devotional literature that followed. This and the selective reliance on Hindu teachings from a variety of Sanskrit texts both in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind is a key indication of the non-dualistic tendency that underpins their presentation in the Hind. A noteworthy instance is the parallel between the three “paths” described in Kitāb Bātanjal and the three approaches of jñāna-yoga,

142 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 14. 143 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 15. 144 itʿābu ʾl-badani … mina ʾl-ṣawmi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 14), “tiring the body … through fasting”. Cf. Sūtra ii. 1, “Tapas (Austerity), Svādhyāya (Repetition Of Sacred Mantras Or Study Of Sacred Literature) And Īśvara Pranidhāna (Complete Surrender To God) Are Kriyā Yoga (Yoga In The Form Of Action)”. 145 The concept of this term is generally recapitulated in the Arabic phrase, ʿalā maʿrifatin wa yaqīnin wa ikhlāṣin biʾl-qalbi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9), “on the basis of knowledge, certainty, and sincerity in the heart”. 146 wa kullu mā yuqṣadu bihi dhātu ʾllāhi taʿālā yutaqarrabu bihi ilayhi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 15). 147 Whicher, I., (1998: 25). 106 chapter 4 karma-yoga, and bhakti-yoga detailed earlier. There is also the possible influence on Kitāb Bātanjal of Rāmānuja148 (eleventh century), the founder of the Viśistādvaita school of Vedānta and the leading theologian and philosopher of the medieval bhakti movement. For Rāmānuja, as in Kitāb Bātanjal, bhakti is firmly rooted in wisdom ( jñāna): “Through devotion that spreads from the body on the basis of knowledge”.149 The highest devotee is a knower ( jñānin), of the Lord. Similarly, just as Kitāb Bātanjal concludes its first section with a discussion of the nature of God that derives directly from an elaboration of bhakti, so too in his approach Rāmānuja sought to integrate jñāna-yoga, karma-yoga, and bhakti-yoga but also emphasised union with the Lord ultimately through bhakti:150 “God alone and nothing else is aimed at in all of these”.151 Al-Bīrūnī’s selective reliance on a number of Hindu teachings from a variety of Sanskrit texts both in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind reveals a non-dualistic tendency underpinned by the Islamic frame of interpretation that he adheres to throughout.

3 Section ii: Guidance towards Praxis

Section ii of KitābBātanjal draws attention to the discipline required to achieve liberation, al-khalāṣ: “The second section on guidance towards the praxis of that which preceded it in the first section”.152 Al-Bīrūnī begins by describing those “afflictions that burden the heart” and keep the soul in a state of entanglement:

The postulant said: what are these afflictions that burden the heart? [Patañjali] answered: they are ignorance, conjecture, desire, hatred, and the attachments. The greatest of these is ignorance, which stands in relation to them as the root and basis. Man’s destruction is through them, or through most of them.153

148 See Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966). 149 biʾl-ʿibādati wa hiya tatawazzaʿu mina ʾl-badani ʿalā maʿrifatin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9). 150 Lipner, J., The Face of Truth: A Study of Meaning and Metaphysics in the Vedāntic Theology of Rāmānuja. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986; and Lester, R.C., Rāmānuja on the Yoga. Madras, 1976. 151 yuqṣadu fī jamīʿihā allāhu waḥdahu dūna ghayrihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 11). 152 al-qiṭʿatu ʾl-thāniyatu fī irshādin ilā ʿamalin mā kāna taqaddama fī ʾl-qiṭʿati ʾl-ʾūlā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 18). 153 qāla ʾl-sāʿilu: wa mā hādhihi ʾl-athqālu ʾllatī taʾūdu ʾl-qalba? qāla ʾl-mujību: hiya ʾl-jahlu waʾl- kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 107

The five opinions listed in Kitāb Bātanjal reflect, although problematically and inconclusively, the five afflictions, kleśas, listed at the outset of the second chapter of the Yoga-Sūtra, “Avidyā (Misapprehension about the real nature of things), Asmitā (Egoism), Rāga (Attachment), Dveṣa (Antipathy) and Abhini- veśa (Fear, of death), Are the five Kleśas (Afflictions)”.154 The great yoga authority Vyāsa (c.a. fifth/sixth century) explains the kleśas in his commentary on the Yoga-Sūtra, the Yoga-Bhāsya,155 which demonstrates the detailed sophistication of the understanding and interpretative undertak- ing reflected in the language of Kitāb Bātanjal. Vyāsa states in the Yoga-Bhāsya, “This ignorance is fivefold, namely the afflictions (Kleśas): ignorance,156 I-am- ness, attachment, aversion, desire for continuity”.157 A problematic example of the subtle commentarial nature of Kitāb Bātan- jal may be gleaned from the use of the term al-ẓann, “conjecture”, to reflect the Sanskrit asmitā Egoism/I-am-ness. The philosophy of Yoga, in contrast to that of Samkhya, recognises the citta: the “one mind” that impels the many individualised minds.158 The citta, becoming operative in a single personality, appears individual. Thus, as indicated in Yoga-Sūtra iv. 4, the numerous fabricated, individualised minds (nirmāna-cittas) are said to arise from asmitā- mātra—the ontological principle denoting the exclusive sense of I-am-ness.159 An awareness of this ontological principle is reflected in a parallel passage of Kitāb Bātanjal:

The postulant said:160 if the afore-mentioned renunciant is able to magnify that which is small and increase that which is scant and then is able to

ẓannu waʾl-raghbatu waʾl-ʿadāwātu waʾl-ʿalāʾiqu ʾllatī muʿẓamuhā ʾl-jahlu ʾl-qāʾimu lahā maqāma ʾl-aṣli waʾl-qāʿidati, wa bihā aw bi-aktharihā halāku ʾl-marʾi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 21). Cf. Sūtra ii. 2, “That Kriyā-Yoga (Should Be Practised) For Bringing About Samādhi [intense concentration] And Minimising The Kleśas [al-athqāl?]”. 154 Mukerji, P.N., (1963: Sūtra ii. 3, p. 129). 155 Ăgāśe, K.S., (ed.), The Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. Pune, 1904. 156 Possibly al-jahl, “ignorance”, in Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 1. 157 Yoga-Bhāsya, i. 8, p. 13. 158 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: chapter 3). 159 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: chapter 3). 160 qālaʾl-sāʾilu:innaʾl-zāhidaʾl-madhkūraidhāqadaraʿalātaʿẓīmiʾl-ṣaghīriwatakthīriʾl-qalīli thumma jaʿala badanahu abdānan liʾl-taʿāwuni ʿalā maqṣūdin wāḥidin fa-hal yakūnu tilka ʾl-abdānu bi-qulūbin aw bi-qalbin aw bilā qalbin … qāla ʾl-mujību: yakhtaṣṣu kullu wāḥidin minhā bi-qalbin wa lā yastabiddu aḥaduhā bi-shayʾin dūna ʾl-ākhari ḥattā takhtalifa wa innamā hiya abdānun wa qulūbun munbaʿithatun minhu faʾl-aṣlu huwa ʾl-awwalu waʾl- bāqiyatu tawābiʿuhu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 193, l. 20). 108 chapter 4

transform his body into many in order [for them] to assist [each other] in the pursuit of one aim, would these bodies exist with many hearts [minds] or with one or with none161 … [Patañjali] answered: each one of them [bodies] has its own exclusive heart [mind] and none of them possesses anything which the other [does not have] that would make them different from each other, rather, they are bodies and hearts [minds] that issue from him. The source, then, is the first [body] and the rest are consequent to it.162

According to Vyāsa, Yoga-Sūtra iv. 4 is alleged to have been composed in reply to the question, also reflected in the above quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal: “(Opponent:) Well, when a yogin projects several bodies, do they have one mind between them or a mind each?”163 The response appears in Yoga-Sūtra iv. 5: “One Mind Is The Director Of The Many Created Minds In Respect Of The Variety Of Their Activities”.164 According to Feuerstein’s understanding of this Sūtra, “the ‘one consciousness’ [mind ys iv. 5] is none other than the primary I-am-ness (asmitā-mātra) of aphorism iv. 4”.165 Thus the choice in Kitāb Bātanjal of the word al-ẓann, “conjecture”, to reflect or replace the Sanskrit asmitā indicates an awareness on al-Bīrūnī’s part of the problematic nature of the term asmitā in this particular context. It suggests an interpretive decision by him in expressing the Sanskrit asmitā with the Arabic al-ẓann to convey the implied sense of discernment that is not at its subtlest level in asmitā. Such a speculative argument about the choice of the word al-ẓann where a closer Arabic term for asmitā is perfectly conceivable can only remain speculation. Indeed, the unsettled reflection in Kitāb Bātanjal of the remaining four Kleśas is just as problematic and unresolvable. According to Whicher, under the influence of spiritual ignorance (avidyā) the reflected consciousness, misiden-

161 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 4, “When the Yoginconstructs many bodies, have they only one mind or many minds?” 162 Cf. Sūtra iv. 5, “One Mind Is The Director Of The Many Created Minds In Respect Of The Variety Of Their Activities”. Also Vyāsa on this Sūtra, “How is it that the intentions of one mind regulate the activities of many minds? The Yogin creates one mind as the director of the many created minds, and this accounts for the difference in activities”. 163 Yoga-Bhāsya, iv. 3, p. 178. 164 Mukerji, P.N., (1963: 385). 165 Feuerstein, G., The Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali: A New Translation and Commentary. Folkstone, 1979, p. 129. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 109 tified as puruṣa, appears as the affliction (kleśa) of ‘I-am-ness’ (asmitā).166 It is a similar sense of a “reflected consciousness”, meaning an imperfect and uncer- tain discernment that may or may not be implied in the choice of the term al-ẓann as it is defined, for instance, by Ibn Sīnā:167 “True conjecture is a view on a matter being the case, while it is possible that it is not the case”.168 For Patañjali and Kitāb Bātanjal the entanglement169 of the “observer” and the “observed”,170 the “knower” and the “known”,171 puruṣa and prakrti, “the bodily mould”,172 causes all afflictions and dissatisfaction173 because it gives rise to the incorrect understanding that one’s intellectual identity is defined within the limits of the individualised being:

Because of resemblance it appears to him that they [things/objects] are one existent/thing, just as when he conjectures that the corporeal subject which intellects and the simple intellect are, in the matter of existence, one thing.174

Both Patañjali and Kitāb Bātanjal understand this entanglement to be caused by the ignorance175 that is the primary affliction and origin of all afflictions:176

[Patañjali] answered: ignorance is in reality the hindrance to liberation. The other [afflictions] that come after it, even if they bring about bondage, go back to ignorance. Ignorance is their source and origin, and entanglement has no cause other than it.177

166 Whicher, I., (1998: 110). 167 Goichon, A., (1938: 209), “zann, opinion, connaissance présumée, mais non pas certaine”. 168 al-ẓannu ʾl-ḥaqqu huwa raʾyun fī shayʾin annahu kadhā wa yumkinu an lā yakūna kadhā, in Goichon, A., (1938: 209). 169 al-irtibāk (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 179, l. 19). 170 al-nāẓir/al-manẓūr (Hind, p. 1, l. 1). 171 al-ʿālim/al-maʿlūmāt (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 16). 172 al-qālibu ʾl-jasadānī (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 179, l. 15). 173 al-athqāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 20), “burdens”. 174 wa yukhayyalu ilayhi bi-sababi ʾl-mushābahati annahā shayʾun wāḥidun mithla ʾl-ʿāqili ʾl- mutajassimi waʾl-ʿaqli ʾl-basīṭi idhā ẓannahā fī ʾl-wujūdi shayʾan wāḥidan (Kitāb Bātan- jal, p. 178, l. 13). Cf. Sūtra ii. 6, “Asmit Or ‘Egoism’ Is The Appearance Of Identity Of The Puruṣa [al-ʿaqlu ʾl-basīṭu/ seeing-agent?] Or Consciousness And Buddhi [al-ʿāqilu ʾl- mutajassimu?]”. 175 avidyā/al-jahl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 1). 176 kleśas/al-athqāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 20). 177 qāla ʾl-mujību: al-jahlu huwa ʾl-māniʿu biʾl-ḥaqīqati ʿani ʾl-khalāṣi wa sāʾiri mā baʿdahū wa in 110 chapter 4

Ignorance is, therefore, also the root of the other afflictions or “burdens”,178 namely, egoism, in Kitāb Bātanjal reflected by “conjecture”,179 attachment,180 aversion,181 and the desire for continuity or the instinctive fear of death.182 Metaphorically speaking, the seeds, that represent impressions of pleasurable experiences, germinate and give rise to a state of attachment:

Has entanglement a cause other than this … the analogy of the soul with regard to these factors may be compared to a grain of rice within its husk.183

This state leads towards the attainment of the object of pleasure or desire. Yet in a seeming opposition to attachment, the emotive core of the phenomenon of aversion184 is provoked by the recollection of pain:185

kānat dawāʿī ʾl-withāqi fa-ilā ʾl-jahli marjaʿuhā wa huwa yunbūʿuhā wa maʿdanuhā wa laysa liʾl-irtibāki sababun ghayruhā,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 179, l. 20). 178 al-athqāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 20). 179 al-ẓann (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 13), wa ammā ʾl-ẓannu fa-ishtibāhu ʾl-ashyāʾi ḥattā lā yumayyazu baynahā, compare with Sūtra ii. 6, “Asmit Or ‘Egoism’ Is The Appearance Of Identity …”. 180 Possibly al-raghba (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 16), “desire”, although, given the apparent poor quality of the single extant manuscript and the abundance of alternative readings offered by Ritter at this point (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178), this word might be read al-rahba, “fear”, which would more closely reflect the fifth affliction, Abhiniveśa, “fear of death, desire for continuity”. 181 Possibly al-ʿadāwāt (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 19), “hatred”. 182 Problematic in the Arabic, possibly al-ʿalāʾiq (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 21) which may or may not convey the sense of an instinctive “attachment” to life or desire for continuity that is an additional connotation of the Sanskrit term Abhiniveśa, and, consequently, an instinctive fear of death. However, given the alternative reading of al-rahba, “fear”, for al-raghba, “desire”,the Arabic term al-rahba may suitably reflect Abhiniveśa, “fear of death, desire for continuity”, with al-ʿalāʾiq conveying the affliction of Rāga, “attachment”. 183 fa-hal yakūnu liʾl-irtibāki sababun ghayru dhālika … mithāla ʾl-nafsi fīmā baynahā kaʾl- aruzzi fī ḍimni ʾl-qishri (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 179, l. 19). Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra ii. 13, “Karmāśaya [latent impression of action which will eventually fructify] begins to fructify when there is Kleśa [pain/affliction] at its root; but it does not do so when Kleśa is uprooted. As rice when in the husk and not reduced to the burnt condition, can germinate but does not do so when the chaff is removed or reduced to a parched state, so Karmāśaya when based on Kleśa, is capable of producing consequences, but when Kleśa is removed or through acquisition of knowledge it is reduced to a burnt state, it does not produce any consequence”. 184 al-ʿadāwāt. 185 Feuerstein, G., (1990). kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 111

The postulant said: what is the state of the soul when it reaches [the stage] between reward and sin, and thereupon becomes entrapped in the prison of births for the purpose of [receiving] benefit and punishment? [Patañ- jali] answered: it oscillates according to what it has done previously and perpetrated, between comfort and discomfort, and alternates between pain and pleasure.186

Thus attachment and aversion dwell in the state187 of pleasure and pain.188 What Kitāb Bātanjal seems to illustrate here is that in general terms the soul exists in an ensnared state of constant “oscillation”189 between good and evil, pleasure and pain. The compulsive forces of egoism/opinion, attachment, aversion and desire, the causes of dissatisfaction or “burdens”,190 can only be uprooted through the removal of ignorance191 by means of yoga praxis192 that brings about the soul’s transcendence from all afflictions:

If the knower is not separated from the known objects (sensibilia) he is with them, and consequently, because of this conjunction between him and them, he is not liberated. For this conjunction only actually exists because of some form of ignorance.193

Thus, and against the dualistic approach that argues for the complete separation of soul from matter, an alternative approach is illustrated in Kitāb Bātanjal

186 qāla ʾl-sāʿilu: kayfa yakūnu ḥālu ʾl-nafsi idhā ḥaṣalat bayna ʾl-ujūri waʾl-āthāmi thumma ishtabakat bi-ḥabsi ʾl-mawālīdi liʾl-inʿāmi waʾl-intiqāmi? qāla ʾl-mujību: turaddadu bi-ḥasabi mā qaddamat wa ijtaraḥat fīmā bayna rāḥatin wa shiddatin wa tuṣarrafu bayna alamin wa ladhdhatin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 5). Cf. Sūtra ii. 14, “Because Of Virtue And Vice They (Birth, Span And Experience) Produce Pleasurable And Painful Experiences”. Also Vyāsa on this Sūtra, “They i.e., the species in which birth takes place, the span of life and the experience therein, produce happiness if caused by virtue, while they produce misery if caused by vice”. 187 al-ḥāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 5). 188 alamun wa ladhdhatun (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 8). 189 al-taraddud. 190 al-athqāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 20). 191 al-jahl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 18). 192 al-ittiḥād. 193 idhā lam yanfaṣili ʾl-ʿālimu mina ʾl-maʿlūmāti kāna maʿahā fa-lam yatakhallaṣ min ajli dhā- lika ʾl-ittiṣāli ʾlladhī baynahu wa baynahā, fa-inna hādhā ʾl-ittiṣāla lā yakūnu biʾl-ḥaqīqati illā ʿan jahlin mā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 16). Cf. Sūtra ii. 17, “Identification Of The Seer Or The Subject [al-ʿālim?] With The Seen Or The Object [al-maʿlūmāt?] Is The Cause Of The Avoidable”. 112 chapter 4 and the Hind that is the process of the soul’s liberation. Initially, this is achieved through progressive stages of removing any misidentification with intellected existents: “If the knower is not separated from the known objects (sensibilia) he is with them, and consequently, because of this conjunction between him and them, he is not liberated”.194 Secondly, this is achieved through eradi- cating ignorance, the primary affliction defined in both the Yoga-Sūtra and Kitāb Bātanjal: “Ignorance is in reality the hindrance to liberation. The other (afflictions) that come after it, even if they bring about bondage, go back to ignorance”.195 This process culminates in liberation which, far from resulting in the soul’s separation from matter, actually implies that one of the fruits in the praxis of the three methods of spiritual ascesis detailed in Kitāb Bātanjal may be thought of as a realignment of soul with matter by means of unification.196 Thus, the practical as well as philosophical discipline of yoga, as reflected in Kitāb Bātanjal, offers a sophistication and meaning to bodily existence that is noticeably lacking in the dualistic vision of both Samkhya and the Peripatetic tradition:

He is like a crystal in which that which surrounds it can be seen, so that things are in it, whereas it is external to them. In the same way he contains that which encompasses him, so that when knowledge and the known objects (sensibilia) are united in him, the knower, then the intellect, the intellector, and the intellected become a single whole in him.197

194 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 16. 195 al-jahlu huwa ʾl-māniʿu biʾl-ḥaqīqati ʿani ʾl-khalāṣi wa sāʾiri mā baʿdahū wa in kānat dawāʿī ʾl-withāqi fa-ilā ʾl-jahli marjaʿuhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 179, l. 20). 196 al-ittiḥād. 197 wa mathaluhu kaʾl-billawrati yurā fīhā mā ḥawlahā fa-takūnu ʾl-ashyāʾu fīhā wa-hiya khāri- jatun ʿanhā, kadhālika huwa yataḍammanu mā aḥāṭa bihi ḥattā idhā ʾttaḥada ʾl-ʿilmu waʾl- maʿlūmātu bihi wa-huwa ʾl-ʿālimu ṣāra ʾl-ʿaqlu waʾl-ʿāqilu waʾl-maʿqūlu fīhi shayʾan wāḥidan (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 10). Cf. i. 41, “When The Fluctuations Of The Mind Are Weakened The Mind Appears To Take On The Features Of The Object Fixed On—Whether It Be The Cogniser, The Instrument Of Cognition Or The Object Cognised—As Does A Transparent Jewel, And This Identification Is Called Samāpatti Or Engrossement”. Also Vyāsa on this Sūtra, “The case of a precious (flawless) gem has been taken as an example. As a crystal being influenced by the colour of an article adjacent to it appears to be tinged by it, so the mind resting on a subject, appears to be engrossed in it and appears to take on its nature”. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 113

Whereas the conjunction198 of the “knower” and the “known objects” (sensibilia) originates in “ignorance”,199 “unification”200 of the “intellector” and the “intellected”201 is achieved through the “unification of knowledge and that which is known in him”.202 This is the crucial factor involved in removing the “entanglement”,203 of the “knower” and the “known objects” (sensibilia), “the knower becomes knowing through the known in the site of entrapment”.204 That is, unification takes place through the discernment of the processes of knowing205 taking place within the “knower” on the basis of “knowledge”.206 Thus the nature of the “intellected”207 assumes an epistemological emphasis rather than an ontological one:

The sensed objects of knowledge do not exist with the fixed certainty of the intelligibilia. When this is established with certitude that is not open to any doubt, this conjunction has no further purpose. The knower is separated from the objects of knowledge and as a consequence becomes alone and isolated. This is the concept208 of ‘liberation’.209

198 al-ittiṣāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 17). 199 al-jahl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 180, l. 18). Cf. Vyāsa/ Sūtra ii. 24, “The alliance of the individual consciousness or Purusa [al-nafs] (Pratyak-Chetana) and the co-related Buddhi [al-qalb?], has ‘Avidyā Or Nescience As Its Cause.’ Nescience is the latent subconscious impression or Vāsanā of wrong knowledge”. 200 ittaḥada (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11). 201 ʿāqilun waʾl-maʿqūlu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11). 202 ittaḥada ʾl-ʿilmu waʾl-maʿlūmātu bihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11). 203 al-irtibāk (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 14). 204 innamā ṣāra ʾl-ʿālimu biʾl-maʿlūmi ʿāliman fī maḥalli ʾl-irtibāki (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 14). 205 ṣāra ʾl-ʿālimu biʾl-maʿlūmi ʿāliman (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 14). 206 al-ʿilm (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11). 207 al-maʿqūl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11). 208 For the translation of the term al-maʿnā as “concept”, cf. ei2 “Maʿnā”: “In philosophy. This term is used to translate a number of Greek expressions. Maʿnā is frequently used as a synonym of maʿḳūl corresponding to the Greek noéma, a concept, thought or idea. Sometimes maʿḳūl is used to translate the term “concept” (as in al-Fārābī’s commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione) and sometimes maʿnā (as in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Intellectu)”. An interesting comparison is made in the same article regarding Ibn Sīnā’s use of this term: “It is in a similar sense that Ibn Sīnā identifies a form in the soul with a maʿnā, a meaning or notion, which in mediaeval epistemology has the technical sense of ‘natural sign in the soul’ … The expressions maʿānī maʿḳūla, intelligible notions, or maʿānī, or just maʿḳūlāt, are often found in Ibn Sīnā, all frequently translated as intellecta”. On the definition of maʿnā cf. also Frank, R.M., (1967: 248–259; 1981: 259–319). 209 wa laysa liʾl-maʿlūmāti ʾl-ḥissiyyati ḥaqīqatun thābitatun thabāta ʾl-maʿqūlāti, fa matā ʾstay- 114 chapter 4

The “knower”,when in a state of “conjunction”,conforms to an identity that is contained within the “known” and is shaped by a process of discernment based on knowledge whilst still in matter. This state of “conjunction” terminates when certainty beyond doubt, through the intelligibilia, is attained. The specific vision of the “knowable” in Kitāb Bātanjal is a representation of Yoga-Sūtra ii. 18 and, possibly, its commentary by Vyāsa: “and the cognition (of the known object) in terms of its nature, whether it belongs to the class of pure good or to the class of pure evil or to the class that is a mixture of the two”.210 The term al-jins, “class/type”, seems to reflect the idea projected by Vyāsa of the three Gunas211 of matter, described in his commentary to Yoga-Sūtra ii. 18: “Sentience is the characteristic of Sattva, mobility of Rajas and inertia of Tamas. These three Gunas are distinct though mutually related”.212 Kitāb Bātanjal represents the three Gunas of sattva,213 rajas,214 and tamas,215 using the Neoplatonic terms of “the absolute good”, al-khayru ʾl-maḥḍu, and “the absolute evil”, al-sharru ʾl-maḥḍu, or a mixture of the two, al-jinsu ʾl-mumtaziju baynahumā. Here, mirroring Patañjali, the “known”216 expresses the nature of the elements and the senses and serves the dual purpose of experience and emancipation, “The Object Or Knowable Is By Nature Sentient, Mutable and Inert. It Exists In The Form Of Elements And Sense-Organs, And Serves The Purpose of Experience and Emancipation”:217

The intention with regard to each known [object] seen by him [the knower] is the cognition of its element, namely, that of the five [elements] it is. [By ‘the five’ elements] I mean earth, water, fire, wind and sky … This cognition comes about through the intermediary of sensory perception218

qana dhālika min ghayri shakkin yaʿtariḍu fīhi baṭula dhālika ʾl-ittiṣālu wa infaṣala ʾl-ʿālimu ʿani ʾl-maʿlūmāti fa-ʾnfarada wa tajarrada, wa dhālika maʿnā ʾl-khalāṣi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 20). Cf. Sūtra ii. 25, “The Absence Of Alliance That Arises From Want Of It Is The Escape And That Is The State Of Isolation Of The Seer”. 210 wa maʿrifatuhu biʾl-kayfiyyati ahuwa min jinsi ʾl-khayri ʾl-maḥḍi aw min jinsi ʾl-sharri ʾl- maḥḍi aw mina ʾl-jinsi ʾl-mumtaziji baynahumā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 2). 211 Qualities/constituents. 212 Mukerji, P.N., (1963: 176). 213 Sentience/intelligence. 214 Mobility/activity. 215 Inertia/darkness. 216 al-maʿlūm (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 1). 217 Mukerji, P.N., (1963: 176). 218 inna ʾl-maqṣūda min kulli maʿlūmin yarāhu huwa maʿrifatuhu biʾl-ʿunṣuri min ayyi ʾl-kham- kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 115

According to Pines and Gelblum, the differences between Patañjali and al- Bīrūnī regarding the Gunas, constituent elements, ultimately amounts to “a misunderstanding on his part of a definition of bhoga ‘experience’”,219 and “Al- Bīrūnī may have misinterpreted the difficult expression avibhāgāpannam (or a similar expression). He may have believed that in this context avibhāga, lit. ‘lack of separation,’ refers to a mixture of gunas”.220 Yet to approach Kitāb Bātan- jal uncompromisingly as a bald translation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali for a Muslim readership is to underplay its evaluative and creative role in the sophisticated and analytical continuum between it and the Hind. Indeed, it seems that the tripartite division in Kitāb Bātanjal of the “known” into particular man- ifestations is correlated with states of consciousness, discernment, and identity analogous to the soul: “The knower, without a known, is, in itself, a knower in potentia. The knower is actualised only through the known”.221 These manifes- tations, therefore, are to be understood with an epistemological emphasis— namely, that through the “known” the “knower” comes to realise his authentic identity and thus attains liberation. The process of “liberation” is given an additional dimension in this second section of Kitāb Bātanjal that involves the soul’s gradual disentanglement from sense perception through a seven-stage progression that includes four outer and three inner stages of preparation: “Seven things happen to him, three of them in the soul, namely immunity from committing sins … and four in the body”.222 Bodily withdrawal is now possible if one pursues the Classical Yoga system, often referred to as the eight-limbs, aṣṭānga, whilst in Kitāb Bātanjal the system is understood as “eight qualities”.223 Exposition of this system spans the second

sati huwa aʿnī bihā ʾl-arḍu waʾl-māʾu waʾl-nāru waʾl-rīḥu waʾl-samāʾu … wa hādhihi ʾl-maʿri- fatu ḥāṣilatun bi-wasāṭati ʾl-ḥissi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 1). Cf. Sūtra ii. 18, “The Object Or Knowable Is By Nature Sentient, Mutable And Inert. It Exists In The Form Of Elements And Sense-Organs, And Serves The Purpose Of Experience And Emancipation”. 219 Pines and Gelblum, p. 540, l. 37. 220 Pines and Gelblum, p. 540, l. 44. 221 inna ʾl-ʿālima bi-ghayri maʿlūmin yakūnu fī dhātihi ʿāliman biʾl-quwwati wa lā yakhruju ilā ʾl-fiʿli illā biʾl-maʿlūmi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 10). Cf. Sūtra ii. 20, “The Seer Is Absolute Knower. Although Pure, Modifications (Of Buddhi) Are Overseen By Him”. 222 sabʿatu ashyāʾin yaḥṣulu lahu minhā thalāthatun fī ʾl-nafsi hiya ʾl-amānu min iqtirāfi ʾl- āthāmi … wa arbaʿun fī ʾl-badani (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 1). Cf. Sūtra ii. 27, “Seven Kinds Of Ultimate Insight Come To Him (The Yogin Who Has Acquired Discriminative Discern- ment)”. 223 thamānī khiṣāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 8). 116 chapter 4 and third sections of Kitāb Bātanjal and constitutes the core of the argumentation that emphasises the necessity for a pragmatic continuum that enables the transformation, rather than transcendence (as in the dualism of Samkhya or the Peripatetic tradition), of the soul’s consciousness and identity that alone can bring about an end to its misidentification and ignorance.224 Within these eight qualities225 the empirical process is dealt with aspect by aspect in a manner that challenges a pure form of dualism with its bias for spiritual transcendence through separation from, rather than integration with, matter. This is the culminating and most prolonged stage of Kitāb Bātanjal, in which all actions, intentions, volitions and thoughts are subjected to spiritual ascesis by which the soul is purified, “By means of the qualities that render the knower pure and holy … mixing with (this) world”.226 One’s actions and interactions in the world are first harmonised through the application of ethical restraints. The first of the eight qualities227 in Kitāb Bātanjal is “restraint from evil”228 and includes five important moral obligations. These are: nonviolence,229 truthfulness, not plundering, sexual restraint,230 and finally, dispassion toward the worldly.231 Like their equivalents in the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, “restraint from evil”232 in Kitāb Bātanjal involves refraining from actions that limit the soul’s ability to discern whilst it exists in its incarnate state within the material world:

224 Whicher, I., (1998: 348–349). 225 al-khiṣāl. 226 biʾl-khiṣāli ʾllatī tuṣayyiru ʾl-ʿālima ṭāhiran muqaddasan … al-ikhtilāṭu biʾl-dunyā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 6). Cf. Sūtra ii. 28, “Through The Practice Of The Different Accessories To Yoga When Impurities Are Destroyed, Then There Arises Enlightenment Of Perception Culminating In Discriminative Discernment”. 227 Cf. Sūtra ii. 29, “Yama (Restraint), Niyama (Observance), Ăsana (Posture), Prānāyāma (Regulation Of Breath), Pratyāhāra (Withholding Of Senses), Dhāranā (Fixity), Dhyāna (Meditation) And Samādhi (Perfect Concentration) Are The Eight Means Of Attaining Yoga”. 228 al-kaff ʿani ʾl-sharri (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 8). 229 tarku ʾl-adhā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 9). Cf. Sūtra ii. 30, “Ahimsā (Harmlessness), Satya (Truth), Asteya (Abstention From Stealing), Brahmacharya (Continence) And Aparigraha (Non-Grasping, Abstinence From Avariciousness) Are The Five Yamas (Forms Of Restraint)”. 230 al-taḥarruju ʿani ʾl-kadhibi waʾl-ghaḍabi waʾl-zinā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 9). 231 mujānabatu ʾl-ikhtilāṭi biʾl-dunyā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 9). 232 al-kaff ʿani ʾl-sharri. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 117

Whoever sets himself apart from the world and does not merge with it sees his previous state before he entered this material mould.233

According to KitābBātanjal these moral obligations must be practised irrespec- tive of place234 or time,235 thus they are unconditionally valid and demonstrate the moral integrity that is at the heart of both yoga practice and the exposition in Kitāb Bātanjal of a “unification” rooted in praxis and devotion, al-ʿibāda. It consequently reflects the application of a recognisably monistic and Islamic interpretative filter. The second quality, purity, requires the observance of activities that are conducive to the quest for spiritual liberation. These include rules for self- regulation and consist in the observance of moral, physical, and mental purity.236 Through these regulatory activities the transformation of the soul’s consciousness, in its state of interaction in the world, is achieved. The point, therefore, made in Kitāb Bātanjal through the exposition of this particular aspect of yoga is that the liberation of the soul is not by means of escaping from the world, nor the neglect of personal and moral responsibilities in society, but quite the opposite. Once these two qualities237 have been sufficiently grasped and practised, the “postulant”238 can focus directly on the body, the most obvious aspect of one’s immediate sense of self, through its “quietude” which is the third quality.239 Moreover, its proper execution rewards the “postulant”, “by not being harmed by heat or cold, by not suffering pain from hunger and thirst, and by not feeling any need”.240

233 man tamayyaza mina ʾl-dunyā wa lam yukhāliṭhā aṭlaʿa ʿalā māḍī ḥālihi qabla ḥuṣūlihi fī hādhā ʾl-qālibi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 22). Cf. Sūtra ii. 39, “On Perfection In Non- Acceptance, Knowledge Of Past And Future Existences Arises”. 234 al-makān (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 10). 235 al-zamān (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 10). 236 wa ammā ʾl-khaṣlatu ʾl-thāniyatu wa hiya ʾl-qudsu ẓāhiran wa bāṭinan (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 3). Cf. Sūtra ii. 40, “From The Practice Of Purification, Aversion Towards One’s Own Body Is Developed And Thus Aversion Grows To Contact With Other Bodies”. 237 al-kaffu ʿani ʾl-sharri and al-quds. 238 al-sāʾil. 239 al-sukūn (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 9). 240 bi-an lā yataʾadhdhā min ḥarrin aw bardin wa lā yataʾallamu bi-jūʿin wa ʿaṭashin wa lā yaḥussubi-muḥwijin (KitābBātanjal, p. 183, l. 11). Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra ii. 48, “When perfection in Ăsana [seat/posture] is attained, the devotee is not affected by the opposite conditions like heat and cold etc”. 118 chapter 4

From this third quality the fourth, which is the regulation, literally quieten- ing, of the breath, is developed.241 This fourth quality transcends the internal and external conditions of the breath and progresses inwardly to deal with the more subtle phenomena of the heart (mind)242 leading to the removal of “turbidity” from within, enabling the individual to act according to his will.243 The fifth quality is the restraining of the senses.244 The individual is no longer distracted by external sources,245 allowing his attention to be focused internally246 and to tackle the more subtle aspects of the soul’s self- consciousness.

4 Section iii: The Manner of Recompense

The sixth quality, marking the beginning of the third section of Kitāb Bātan- jal, and embodying the fulfilment of the second section’s ultimate goal (discipline as a gradual and hierarchical progress), is concentration: the “postulant’s” consciousness as a purely mental process is focused on one thing.247 Meditation, the seventh quality, follows from concentration as its natural con- tinuation248 and is conceived of as an uninterrupted flow of attention from

241 taskīnu ʾl-tanaffusi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 13). Cf. Sūtra ii. 49, “That (Ăsana) Having Been Perfected, Regulation Of The Flow Of Inhalation And Exhalation Is Prānāyāma (Breath Control)”. Vyāsa’s commentary on this Sūtra has “suspension” of breath in the translation, [reflected in the Arabic by the word taskīn?] “Ăsana having been perfected, the suspension of both the processes of drawing in of external air and the exhalation of internal air constitutes a Prānāyāma”. 242 al-qalb. 243 zāla ʿan qalbihi mā kāna ʿalayhi mina ʾl-kudūrati fa-qadara ʿalā fiʿli mā arāda (Kitāb Bātan- jal, p. 183, l. 14). Cf. Sūtra ii. 52, “By That The Veil Over Manifestation Is Thinned”. 244 qabḍu ʾl-ḥawāssi ʿani ʾl-intishāri (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 16). Cf. Sūtra ii. 54, “When Separated From Their Corresponding Objects, The Senses Follow, As It Were, The Nature Of The Mind, That Is Called Pratyāhāra (Restraining Of The Sense-Organs)”. 245 lā yaḥussu bi-ghayri ʾl-dākhili (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 16). 246 lā yaʿrifu anna warāʾa ʾl-ḥāssi shayʾun ghayruhu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 16). Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra ii. 55, “Some say that Avyasana or indifference to objects like sights and sounds etc., is control of sense-organs”. 247 iqrāru ʾl-qalbi ʿalā shayʾin wāḥidin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 20). Cf. Sūtra iii. 1, “Dhāranā Or Attention Is The Mind’s (Chitta’s) Fixation On A Particular Point Of Space”. 248 idāmatu ʾl-fikrati fīmā ʾstaqarra ʾl-qalbu ʿalayhi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 20). Cf. Sūtra iii. 2, “In That Region The Continuous Flow Of The Same Knowledge Is Called Dhyāna Or Meditation”. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 119 the “heart” (mind) to the object of concentration.249 In these last two qualities the “heart” (mind) becomes the locus for a material sense of self by apprehending the object completely, increasing the soul’s relationship with the object. Thus the distinction between the subject, object and cognition persists.250 Through this practise the eighth quality evolves: the intellect of the individual becomes so completely absorbed251 in the object that it appears to become the object.252 Al-ittiḥād involves a complete transformation of the usual mode of knowing or perceiving: the intellect and mental consciousness transform from a state of dispersion into one of pure focus.253 Thus there is no distortion of the object and a pure knowing is attained.254 Through this process one quality builds on and complements the other leading ultimately to the soul’s “liberation” through a growing unification of mental consciousness or knowledge:

Knowledge regarding them is one,255 for it spreads out from the knower to the known [objects] so that it is characterised by multiplicity.256 When he quietens it and cuts off from it dispersal through matter, it becomes one and, through the third quality, whole. He has not, however, reached [at this point] the degree of abstract representation stripped of matter.257

249 lā yaqaʿu ʿalayhi ʿadadun fa-yanfaṣila (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 20). 250 Whicher, I., (1998: 235–238). 251 tattaḥid (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 184, l. 1). 252 ḥattā tattaḥida ʾl-fikratu biʾl-mutafakkiri fīhi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 184, l. 1). 253 al-ikhlāṣu fiʾl-daʾūbi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 184, l. 1). Cf. Sūtra iii. 3, “When The Object Of Meditation Only Shines Forth In The Mind, As If Devoid Of The Thought Of self Even, Then It Is Called Samādhi Or Concentration”. 254 Whicher, I., (1998: 29–31). 255 al-ʿilmu fīhā wāḥidun liʾannahu kāna yanbaththu mina ʾl-ʿālimi ilā ʾl-maʿlūmāti fa-tattasimu biʾl-kathrati, fa-lammāsakkanahuwaqaṭaʿaʿanhumawādduʾl-inbithāthiṣārawāḥidan, wa fī ʾl-thālithati kulliyyan lākinnahu baʿdu lam yablugh rutbata ʾl-taṣawwuri ʾl-mujarradi bilā māddatin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 184, l. 8). 256 Cf. Sūtra iii. 10, “Peaceful Flow Of The Mind (In A Closed State) Is Ensured By Its Latent Impressions”. 257 Cf. Sūtra iii. 11, “Repression Of Attention To All And Development Of One-Pointedness Is Called Samādhi-Parināma Or Concentrative Mutation Of The Mind”. 120 chapter 4

5 Conclusion

Each of the eight qualities, then, lessens the “burden” of afflictions on the mind and body and cuts away at the root cause—ignorance, that binds258 one to the cycle of egoic thoughts, actions, habits and their constant “oscillation”.259 Of the eight qualities, the last three are inner means and the first five are outer:

The latter three qualities that are referred to in the third section are, as it were, separate from the first five [qualities] because they are further removed from the senses and closer to the intellect.260

Advancement through these qualities accomplishes spiritual purification and progress and leads to the soul’s self-realisation beyond the individual, incarnate, personality. Kitāb Bātanjal describes this progression, in a manner that reflects the Yoga-Sūtra, as a growing unification of mental consciousness that is the means to self-transcendence and spiritual liberation. The evident textual interpretation of the eight qualities261 arises in part because of their sequential nature as a hierarchical and gradual discipline realised through spiritual progress. These qualities could, from a different perspective, be seen not only as complementary, but also as integral, sustaining each other and giving rise to a transformed sense of identity through an integrated state of being. Having purified and gathered together one’s physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual components, the individual can live in the world without being enslaved by worldly perspectives and involvement:

As long, therefore, as the heart [mind] has not yet achieved a purification similar to that of the soul so that they can be united in the unification of the attribute their mixture is of no benefit and liberation does not come about.262

258 al-ishtibāk. 259 al-taraddud. 260 wahādhihiʾl-khiṣāluʾl-thalāthuʾl-akhīratuʾl-wāqiʿatufīʾl-qiṭʿatiʾl-thālithatikaʾl-munfaṣilati ʿani ʾl-khamsi ʾl-ʾūlā min ajli annahā abʿadu ʿani ʾl-ḥissi wa aqrabu ilā ʿl-ʿaqli (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 184, l. 3). Cf. Sūtra iii. 4, “The Three Together On The Same Object Is Called Samyama [meditation or concentration on the same thing]”. Also Vyāsa here, “The three forms of practice when directed to the same object is called Samyama”. 261 al-khiṣāl. 262 fa-mā lam yuṭahharu ʾl-qalbu ṭahāratan ka-ṭahārati ʾl-nafsi ḥattā yattaḥidā bi-ittiḥādi ʾl- ṣifati lam yanfaʿ ikhtilāṭuhumā wa lam yakun khalāṣun (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 192, l. 20). Cf. kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 121

This means to spiritual liberation reflects the essential approach that underlies Kitāb Bātanjal, and challenges the stricter dualism of Samkhya and the Peripatetic tradition. “Liberation” is arrived at through a non-fragmented sense of being and a cognitive realignment of the relationship between soul and matter rather than their separation:

He who seeks knowledge263 should centre his thought in his heart [mind] which is its source and resting place.264 It would then give it [heart/mind] a form being united with the soul in such a way that they could not be separated because of the existence of the soul as knower and the heart [mind] as alive. This is not difficult for him given that he has totally freed it [heart/mind] from the world. When he does this he will truly know his own self and no object of the senses will be hidden from him, be it absent or distant.265

Pines and Gelblum argue that this passage illustrates that al-Bīrūnī, “does not seem to have understood the doctrine concerning the utter distinctness of puruṣa and prakrti, of which sattva (i.e., the buddhi) is a part, and the ultimate goal that is achieved by full awareness of this distinctness”.266 However, accounting for the inner dynamics and independent Islamic thematic drive of the work allows for a more considered evaluation of al-Bīrūnī’s commentarial and analytical role. Thus the crucial and sustained concept of “unification” of the soul with the body culminating in the above quotation, cannot simply be described in terms of mistranslation or misunderstanding. On the contrary,

Sūtra iii. 55, “Whether Discriminative Knowledge Is Acquired Or Not, When Equality Is Established Between The Buddhi-Sattwa And Purusa By Their Purity, Isolation Takes Place”. 263 wa man arāda ʾl-ʿilma fa-lyakun fikratuhu fī ʾl-qalbi ʾlladhī huwa yanbūʿuhu wa maskanuhu fa-yatasawwaruhu muttaḥidan biʾl-nafsi lā yufarriqu baynahumā li-kawni ʾl-nafsi ʿālimatan waʾl-qalbi ḥayyan, wa lā yaʿsiru dhālika ʿalayhi wa qad akhlāhu ʿani ʾl-dunyā ikhlāʾan wa matā faʿala dhālika ʿarafa dhātahu biʾl-ḥaqīqati wa lam yakhfā ʿalayhi maḥsūsun wa ghāʾi- bun wa buʿdun (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 19). 264 Cf. Sūtra iii. 34, “(By Practising Samyama) On The Heart, Knowledge Of The Mind Is Acquired”. 265 Cf. Sūtra iii. 35, “Experience (Of Pleasure Or Pain) Arises From A Conception Which Does Not Distinguish Between The Two Extremely Different Entities, viz. Buddhisattwa [al-qalb?] And Purusa [al-nafs]. Such Experience Exists For Another (i.e., Purusa). That Is Why Through Samyama On The Distinction Between Buddhi And Purusa, A Knowledge Regarding Purusa Is Acquired”. 266 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 286). 122 chapter 4

Kitāb Bātanjal exhibits an acute analytical understanding of yoga. Etymolog- ically it corresponds closely to the concept of “unification”267 as, arguably, a praxis and devotion (al-ʿibāda) reflecting the application of a recognisably monistic and Islamic interpretative filter leading to the true “unification” of the soul with the body on the epistemological basis of “knowledge”.268 Pines and Gelblum, on the basis of the parallel Sūtra iii. 35, make no distinction between al-dhāt and al-nafs in the above quoted passage claiming that: “ʿarafa dhātahu biʾl-ḥaqīqa ‘knows his own self in its true reality’ corresponds to puruṣa-jñānam ‘knowledge of the self’ in sūtra 3.35. In this sentence [Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 21] al-dhāt (and not al-nafs) corresponds to puruṣa”.269 The importance of the distinction between al-dhāt and al-nafs is only apparent when the concept of “unification”270 is taken into consideration. The sattva is that part of prakrti that when properly “united” with puruṣa, on the basis of knowledge, achieves the true knowledge of self,271 a “self”272 that is a product of the “unification” and not the “distinction” of the soul with the body and which, thereby, has achieved a real engagement with matter. Or as al-Bīrūnī aptly summarizes: “No object of the senses will be hidden from him be they absent or distant”.273 Kitāb Bātanjal moreover does not equate the body with “ensnarement”,274 rather, it outlines the epistemological causes by which the body becomes a snare in order, ultimately, to rectify this association through yoga praxis or “unification”275 and “liberation”.276 The soul/body relationship expressed in the Yoga-Sūtra is not understood in terms of an “utter distinctness”277 but in terms of a removal of karma by means of recompense for past deeds and refraining from future ones: “He who arrives at the stage of liberation has recompensed in his physical mould his past actions and divests himself of acting for future reward”.278 Second, in terms of a distinction where the soul exists in a liberated state of union with the body:

267 muttaḥad (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 19). 268 al-ʿilm (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 19). 269 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., ibid. 270 muttaḥad (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 19). 271 ʿarafa dhātahu biʾl-ḥaqīqati (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 21). 272 al-dhāt. 273 lam yukhfī ʿalayhi maḥsūsun wa ghāʾibun wa buʿdun (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 19). 274 al-ishtibāk. 275 al-ittiḥād. 276 al-khalāṣ. 277 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 286). 278 waʾl muntahī ilā darajati ʾl-khalāṣi qad istawfāhā fī qālibihi ʿalā māḍī ʾl-fiʿli thumma taʿaṭṭala ʿani ʾl-iktisābi liʾl-mustaʾnafi (Hind, p. 62, l. 14). kitāb bātanjal: the preface and sections i–iii 123

He knows where his soul has come from and where it is going and is thus able to transfer it [soul] and move it without being stuck to the body in which the soul [now] moves freely.279

The key word in this passage is muqalqala, which Pines and Gelblum translate as “harassed” so that the soul is understood as “harassed” in the body.280 Yet a more appropriate translation based on context is, “the body in which the soul [now] moves freely”. This suggestion does not depend on a dualistic reading of the text where the “utter distinctness” of the soul and the body forces an interpretation based on the Platonic sōma/sēma (body/prison) equation. Pines and Gelblum in fact refer to the fuller and more explanatory equivalent passage cited in the Hind in which taqalqala is convincingly defined by its immediate context in terms of my suggested translation here of “moves freely”: “He frees himself from the net and no longer needs his mould. He moves freely within it, without being ensnared”.281 Indeed, the parallel Sūtra iii. 38 also reflects, in translation, a similar context for the proposed meaning of taqalqala by echoing the Arabic, faʾnḥalla ʿani ʾl-shabakati, and, ghayru mushtabikin: “When The Cause Of Bondage Gets Relaxed And The Movements Of The Mind Are Known, The Mind Can Get Into Another Body”. The significance of translating taqalqala as “moving freely” goes to the fundamentals of the methodology of Kitāb Bātanjal. The soul’s movement within matter is the consequence of a true epistemological relationship between the soul and body in a state of “unification” rather than the “utter distinction” of the two. It is a state in which the body is a vessel282 and not a snare or “net”,283 thus allowing for the soul’s real engagement with the body rather than being constrained by it. In some sense this “unification” of the soul and the body,

279 wa qad ʿalima nafsahu min ayna jāʾat wa ilā ayna tadhhabu, fa-huwa qādirun ʿalayhā biʾl- naqliwaʾl-taḥrīkilāyatashabbathubiʾl-badanifa-innahāmuqalqalatunfīhi (KitābBātanjal, p. 189, l. 10). Cf. Sūtra iii. 38, “When The Cause Of Bondage Gets Relaxed And The Move- ments Of The Mind Are Known, The Mind Can Get Into Another Body”. Vyāsa on this Sūtra: “As the mind is naturally restless, on account of the latent impressions of previous actions, it gets tied up with the body … When the bonds of previous actions become weak and the movements of the mind over the nerves are known, the yogin can take out the mind from his own body and throw it into another body”. 280 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 258). 281 faʾnḥalla ʿani ʾl-shabakati wa ʾstaghnā ʿani ʾl-qālibi wa taqalqala fīhi ghayra mushtabikin (Hind, p. 62, l. 15). 282 al-qālib. 283 al-shabaka. 124 chapter 4 in addition to metempsychosis, is at the heart of the understanding of “liberation”284 in Kitāb Bātanjal. It is the transformation of consciousness that is being represented in Kitāb Bātanjal and interpreted in the Hind not its separation. This approach may be considered in terms of a challenge to the dominant understanding of the soul/matter relationship inherited and developed by the Peripatetic tradition within the Arabic philosophical heritage.

284 al-khalāṣ. chapter 5 Section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal: Liberation and Unification, a Reading

1 Introduction

The fourth section of KitābBātanjal is described as treating the subjects of liberation and unification.1 Such a brief summary, however, merely hints at the intellectual and philosophical challenge facing the reader when presented with the intricacy of composition, translation and allusion that permeates this final section. The level of subtle sophistication in this section accompanied by multiple layers of possible readings, tentative influences, and al-Bīrūnī’s use of sources, renders definitive explanation of the Arabic text’s multivalent permutations almost impossible. The fourth section of Kitāb Bātanjal evinces a perceptible development from the psychological to the intellectual: from a discussion of al-nafs in the preceding sections to a treatment of the role of al-ʿaql in the individual’s existential endeavour towards liberation. This is achieved through a process of unification of the intellect and intellected with and within the prioritised role of the intellector. Accounting for the reasoning behind such a development and the Arabic text’s capacity for multiple interpretations raises the challenge of a response that avoids the temptation for premature and unsub- stantiated closure to a wide interpretative range realized in Kitāb Bātanjal’s final section. A two-tier comparative approach will, therefore, be taken in this analysis. The first part of this chapter will begin by comparing the fourth section of Kitāb Bātanjal with the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. The aim is to highlight the background and significance of the Arabic text’s elaboration and development of certain subjects; in particular, the subtle shift of emphasis from a psychological to an intellectual discussion. The second, concluding, part of this chapter will compare Section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal with Ibn Sīnā’s treatment of the intellect in Aḥwāl al-Nafs and in his De Anima. The discussion will centre on the role of the intellect in its relationship with the soul as illustrated

1 al-qiṭʿatu ʾl-rābiʿatu fī ʾl-khalāṣi waʾl-ittiḥādi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 199, l. 1), “The fourth section on the subject of liberation and unification”. For the use in Kitāb Bātanjal of the Arabic term al-ittiḥād, “unification”, to denote yoga, see Chapter Four and Glossary of Terms.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004305540_007 126 chapter 5 by Ibn Sīnā and will reflect on significant and parallel issues salient in the concluding section of Kitāb Bātanjal. Before commencing such a two part analysis of Section iv, it is recom- mended that the reader refer to the full translation of this final section and the epilogue in the Appendix. No complete English translation of this section including its epilogue exists. The usefulness of this exercise is to begin to understand the way in which the Arabic text is a multi-layered translation and interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, the commentary on it by Vyāsa, and the comprehension of both by al-Bīrūnī. Kitāb Bātanjal material- izes through the medium of the particular Sanskrit text that al-Bīrūnī relied on (also a multivalent work combining text with commentary), and based on the nature of the human and textual exegesis that was at his disposal. The difficulty of such a contextualisation lies in the lack of information concerning the multiplicity of these layers. Given these difficulties, this translation will only be tentatively compared with current versions of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali and the commentary on it by Vyāsa, in English, where significant parallels may be drawn with Kitāb Bātanjal and where some degree of illumination of it may be achieved. Finally, those parallel passages to be found in the Hind will be noted in order to further clarify Section iv wherever the Hind passage is more expansive. The parallel passages will also be used to gauge the extent to which the first ten chapters of the Hind are interpenetrated with whole citations from Kitāb Bātanjal and, more importantly, to assess the epistemological continuity that this interpenetration seems to suggest.

2 Section iv and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali: Liberation, the Soul and the Intellect

The content of Kitāb Bātanjal in this section is as interpretative of the Sanskrit original as the previous sections since it describes in sophisticated, elusive, and, at times, impenetrable terms, the psychological concepts encountered. This last section seems not only to reflect the content and format of its equivalent in the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali entitled “On Isolation”,2 but also recapit- ulates the structural and contextual fundamentals articulated in the earlier

2 The term kaivalya can be translated as “aloneness”, “perfect isolation”, “detachment of the soul from matter”, “final emancipation”, or “beatitude”, (Mukerji, P.N., 1963: 467). Hence it is possible that the use of the Arabic term al-khalāṣ, “liberation”, in the reference title to this fourth section may denote kaivalya given kaivalya’s range of meanings. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 127 sections. It comprises a coda-like precursor to the Hind and, in its conclusion, an anticipatory methodological backdrop for the religious and psychological points touched on in the Hind’s opening chapters. In the classical traditions of Samkhya and Yoga, kaivalya is generally understood to be the state of the unconditional existence of puruṣa. In the Yoga-Sūtra, kaivalya has been variously understood according to the context in which it appears. Kitāb Bātanjal, on the other hand, consistently associates this Sanskrit term with a liberated state in the individual or the soul, if not always directly equating kaivalya with the exact Arabic term, al-khalāṣ. For instance, in the Yoga-Sūtra kaivalya has been interpreted to refer to the “aloneness of seeing” (dṛśeḥ kaivalyam) that, as Patañjali states, follows from the disappearance of ignorance (avidyā) and its creation of samyoga—the conjunction of the seer and the seeable— explained by Vyāsa as a mental superimposition (Whicher, 1998: 276).3 Kitāb Bātanjal, however, describes the attainment of “aloneness of seeing” or “isolation of the seer” in terms of a state of “liberation” expressed by the Arabic al-khalāṣ that is achieved through the isolation of the intellector/seer resulting from a certain realisation of the difference between the objects of sense perception and the intelligibilia and the consequent severance of their conjunction:

The sensed objects of knowledge do not exist with the fixed certainty of the intelligibilia. When he knows this with the certitude that is not open to any doubt, this conjunction has no further purpose. The knower is separated from the objects of knowledge4 and as a consequence becomes alone and isolated. This is the concept of ‘liberation.’5

Kaivalya, in its sense of “isolation”, may also have been construed in the Yoga- Sūtra as puruṣa’s innate capacity for pure, unbroken, non-attached seeing/perceiving, observing or “knowing” of the content of the mind (citta) (Whicher,

3 Sūtra ii. 25 reads: “The Absence Of Alliance That Arises From Want Of It Is The Escape And That Is The State Of Isolation Of The Seer”. Vyāsa’s commentary on this Sūtra: “When Adarśana [non-awareness, failure to see] ceases, the alliance between the Buddhi and the Puruṣa ceases and there is complete cessation of bondage for all time, which is isolation of the Seer …”. 4 A distinction is made throughout in translation between the “known”, al-maʿlūm/al-maʿlū- māt, given its terminological basis in the Arabic al-ʿilm, “knowledge”, and the “intellected”, al-maʿqūl/al-maʿqūlāt, whose basis in Kitāb Bātanjal lies in the term al-ʿaql, “intellect”. 5 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 20. 128 chapter 5

1998: 276).6 Kitāb Bātanjal, on the other hand, remoulds this passage7 that centres on Sūtra ii. 20, within the context of the necessitated conjunction of knower with the known,8 the ultimate invalidity of this conjunction,9 and the consequent state of liberation that is precisely this absolute knowing Self:

In the state of liberation, however, the covers are drawn back, the curtains are lifted, the obstacles are removed, and, in this state, the Self is nothing other than simply knowing.10

The second passage (Sūtra iv. 18)11 that supports this particular interpretation of kaivalya is also finely adjusted in Kitāb Bātanjal through its Arabic wording and format. This process of transposed connotation distinguishes the dynamic of al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic text from its Sanskrit source in the Yoga-Sūtra. Thus the structure of the dialogue given at this point presents an interrogative proposal that reflects the commentary to Sūtra iv. 18 by Vyāsa12 but also includes an interpretative slant close to the suggested understanding of the meaning of kaivalya cited above. The response by Bātanjal to this inquisitive proposal may well be Kitāb Bātanjal’s refinement of the concept, although, one can never rule out the influence of as yet unidentified commentaries playing their part in this overall synthesis:

6 This understanding of kaivalya is based, firstly, on Sūtra ii. 20, “The Seer Is Absolute Knower. Although Pure, Modifications (Of Buddhi) Are Overseen By Him”, and Vyāsa’s commentary on it: “That is why it has been said by Pañchaśikha, ‘The Supreme entity to which experiences are due is not mutable nor transmissable, it appears to be transmitted to and follow the mutative modifications of Buddhi, which thereby seems to be endowed with consciousness, and thus pure Awareness appears to be identical with them’ …”. Sec- ondly, this understanding of kaivalya is based on Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra iv: 18, “But the quality of perpetual manifestation possessed by the mind indicates the immutability of its master, the Puruṣa”. 7 (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 20). 8 inna ʾl-ʿālima bi-ghayri maʿlūmin yakūnu fī dhātihi ʿāliman biʾl-quwwati wa lā yakhruju ilā ʾl-fiʿli illā biʾl-maʿlūmi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 10). “The knower, without a known, is, in himself, a knower in potentia. The knower is actualised only through the known”. 9 baṭula dhālika ʾl-ittiṣālu wa infaṣala ʾl-ʿālimu ʿani ʾl-maʿlūmāti (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 21). 10 wa ammā fī maqarri ʾl-khalāṣi faʾl-aghṭiyatu munkashifatun waʾl-sutūru marfūʿatun waʾl- mawāniʿu maqṭūʿatun, wa laysati ʾl-dhātu fīhi illā ʿālimatan faqaṭ (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 16). 11 See Appendix. 12 Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra iv: 18: “But the quality of perpetual manifestation possessed by the mind indicates the immutability of its master, the Puruṣa”. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 129

The postulant said: is the intellect like a lamp in that when it comes to making its self manifest it requires nothing other than itself? [Patañjali] answered: as the lamp is for someone who seeks light, so the intellect is for an intellector.13

It is clear from this passage and the consequent clarification that the intention in Kitāb Bātanjal is not to refute the possibility of a state of pure, unbroken, non-attached seeing/perceiving, observing or knowing as may be intimated from Sūtra iv. 18. Rather it is to distinguish between variety in intellection and unity in intellection. Thus there is the intellect that attains knowledge by means of external stimulus and collection, al-ijtimāʿ.14 Its activity, therefore, requires necessarily an object for its perception, namely, that which is intellected. Then, too, there is the intellector, al-ʿāqil, who achieves unification, al-ittiḥād,15 with the intellect and the intellected, rather than collection, and consequently it is implied attains that which was initially postulated for the intellect, namely, knowing itself purely for itself. The distinction made in Kitāb Bātanjal16 between variety in intellection and unity in intellection is, therefore, described in terms of the difference between the process of al-ijtimāʿ and that of al-ittiḥād, both of which take place within the function of the intellect/intellector but at divergent stages. Thus, at a lower stage al-ʿaql intellects through a variety of means and a process takes place of collection, al-ijtimāʿ, and acquisition, al-iktisāb,17 of the objects of sense perception by means of al-idrāk18 a word that is, in context, associated with the inferior activity of the intellect, al-ʿaql. Set against these actions is the higher activity of al-ʿaql when it is in a state of unification, al-ittiḥād, with the intellector and the intellected. In this state of unification where selfish acquisition for reward is not sought, the primacy of “the intellector”, al-ʿāqil, is emphasised over that of al-ʿaql against the Neoplatonic promotion of the Pure Intellect:

13 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: al-ʿaqlu kaʾl-sirāji fī iẓhāri nafsihi lā yaḥtāju ilā mā siwāhu? qāla ʾl-mujību: al-sirāju limustaḍīʾin mā, kadhālika ʾl-ʿaqlu liʿāqilin mā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 10). 14 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 15. 15 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 16. 16 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 12. 17 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 193, l. 15; p. 194, l. 15; p. 195, l. 7, etc. The terms al-iktisāb and al-kasb (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 194, l. 14) which are recurrent in the final section of Kitāb Bātanjal have no particular Ashʿari resonances in this context but are associated with the inferior function of the intellect when it lies extrinsic to a state of unification with the intellector and intellected, and is seeking acquisition and reward “for itself”, cf. Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 12. 18 “perception”, (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 13). 130 chapter 5

The postulant said: does the intellect perceive itself and for itself so that it, therefore, has no need for anything other than itself? [Patañjali] answered: on the contrary, its perception is not of itself since that which is collected does not collect itself, rather, something other than it collects it. The intellect only perceives after a stimulus to perception and it only perceives something that is intellected. Thus, the imprint of something other than itself and some form of collection takes place within it. The intellector differs from this for it is unification rather than collection that takes place within him.19

What is apparent, then, is that the differentiation in the above passage between intellect and intellector is derived from an explicatory elision of Sūtra iv. 18 and Sūtra iv. 19 and the distinction made therein between the pure, unbroken perception of the puruṣa and the relatively passive quality of the mind (citta).20 Further, the description of the mind in Sūtra iv. 19 as an object that is not self- illuminating21 and, in juxtaposition, the example proposed by Vyāsa of fire,22 that is self-illuminating as well as an illuminator, is reminiscent of the lamp imagery used in Kitāb Bātanjal to illustrate this same definition of Kaivalya. Kaivalya is alternatively defined, according to Patañjali’s explanation of it in Sūtra iv. 34, as the “return to the origin” (pratiprasava) of the gunas that have lost all soteriological purpose for the puruṣa that has recovered its transcendent autonomy.23 Additionally, kaivalya is classified as the establishment in its “own form/nature” (svarūpa), and the power of higher awareness (citiśakti),24

19 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: al-ʿaqlu yudriku nafsahu wa linafsihi falā hājata bihi ilā ghayrihi? qāla ʾl- mujību: bal laysa idrākuhu linafsihi min ajli anna ʾl-mujtamaʿa lam yajmaʿ nafsahu wa innamā jamaʿahu ghayruhu, waʾl-ʿaqlu lā yudriku illā baʿda inbiʿāthin liʾl-idrāki wa lā yudriku illā maʿqūlan, faqad ḥaṣala fīhi atharu ʾl-ghayri wa nawʿun mā mina ʾl-ijtimāʿi, waʾl- ʿāqilu laysa kadhālika fainnamā yaḥṣulu fīhi ʾl-ittiḥādu dūna ʾl-ijtimāʿi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 12). 20 “On Account Of The Immutability Of Puruṣa Who Is Lord Of The Mind, The Modifications Of The Mind Are Always Known Or Manifest”. (Sūtra iv: 18). 21 “It (Mind) Is Not Self-Illuminating Being An Object (Knowable)”. (Sūtra iv: 19). Cf. also Vyāsa here: “As the other sense-organs and things like light and sound, are not self- illuminating being knowables or objects, mind is also to be understood as such”. 22 Cf. Vyāsa: “Doubt may arise that the mind is self-illuminating and also an illuminator of objects like fire …” 23 “Isolation Is The Complete Disappearance Of The Gunas Which Have Ceased To Be Objectives (By Providing Experience Or Liberation Of Puruṣa), In Other Words, It Is Supreme Consciousness Established In Its Own Self”. (Sūtra iv: 34). 24 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 276), “Although the seer’s (puruṣa) capacity for ‘seeing’ is an un- section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 131 thus completing the definition of yoga in Sūtra i. 3 whereby the seer abides in a pure identity.25 The concept of al-khalāṣ is also broached at the equivalent point in Kitāb Bātanjal in this same two-pronged explanation:

The postulant said: how is liberation [brought about]? [Patañjali] answered: you can say that it [liberation] is the suspension of the three primary forces from their activity and their return to the source from which they had come. Or you can just as well say that it is the return of the soul [in a state of knowing] to its nature.26

This citation marking the conclusion of the fourth section of Kitāb Bātanjal, articulates the centrality of the concept of liberation and salvation, al-khalāṣ,27 in al-Bīrūnī’s Islamic systematisation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. The adoption in Kitāb Bātanjal of kaivalya as the backbone of an interpretative systematisation is not merely a mirror image of its signification in the Yoga-Sūtra. Rather, it reflects, by its careful translation and intimate integration throughout Kitāb Bātanjal, a transposed Islamic perspective that is sensitive to both the particular epistemological template that is being carefully constructed and the Arabic dialogic context that constitutes its framework. Al-Bīrūnī shapes this transposed Islamic perspective to fit the methodological purpose explained at the outset of Kitāb Bātanjal and, later, in the Hind, as will be illustrated in the following chapter. The obvious cases where concepts have been adopted should not blind us to the still more widespread cases where they have been adapted. For instance, the passage from Kitāb Bātanjal just cited is clearly concordant with the related Sūtra, but is so without being precisely congru-

changing yet dynamic power of consciousness that should not be truncated in any way, nevertheless our karmically distorted or skewed perceptions vitiate against the natural fullness of ‘seeing’. Having removed the ‘failure-to-see’ (adarśana), the soteriological purpose of the gunas in the samsāric condition of the mind is fulfilled; the mind is relieved of its earlier role of being a vehicle for avidyā, the locus of selfhood (egoity), and misidentification, and the realisation of pure seeing—the nature of the seer alone—takes place”. 25 “Then The Seer Abides In Itself”. (Sūtra i. 3). This corresponds to the proposition in Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 170, l. 5: qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: faidhā qabaḍa ʾl-insānu ilayhi quwā nafsihi wa manaʿahā ʿani ʾl-intishāri kayfa yakūnu ḥāluhu? “The postulant said: if a man gathers to himself his own faculties and prohibits their diffusion what kind of state is he in?” 26 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: kayfa ʾl-khalāṣu? qāla ʾl-mujību: in shiʾta faqul huwa taʿaṭṭulu ʾl-quwā ʾl-thalāthi ʾl-uwali ʿan fiʿlihā wa ʿawdihā ilā ʾl-maʿdini ʾlladhī wafadat minhu, wa in shiʾta faqul huwa rujūʿu ʾl-nafsi ʿālimatan ilā ṭibāʿihā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 19). 27 Both meanings are covered semantically by al-khalāṣ. 132 chapter 5 ent. It is the result of a confluent process of paraphrase, interpretation and integration expertly undertaken by al-Bīrūnī.

3 The Soul, Matter and Unification

According to Sūtra iii. 55 kaivalya is understood as ensuing when the sattva of consciousness has reached a state of purity analogous to that of puruṣa:28 “Whether Discriminative Knowledge Is Acquired Or Not, When Equality Is Established Between The Buddhi-Sattwa And Puruṣa By Their Purity, Isolation Takes Place”. (Sūtra iii. 55).29 Like Vyāsa the equivalent passage in Kitāb Bātan- jal employs an illustrative example to depict the state of purification that must take place in both the soul and the intellect. However, whereas Vyāsa’s imagery focuses on the purging of the Buddhi-Sattwa from all Rajas and Tamas impurities in order that it might become like puruṣa in its purity,30 the metaphor in Kitāb Bātanjal emphasises the purity of the soul and the need for the mind to achieve a similar state:

The postulant said: when does liberation take place? [Patañjali] answered: the soul in a man is a divine jewel that is pure and unadulterated; defilement of the heart [mind] is simply a result of its being tossed about often between the three mentioned primary forces. As long, therefore, as the heart [mind] has not yet achieved a purification similar to that of the soul so that they can be united in the unification of the attribute their mixture is of no benefit and liberation does not come about.31

28 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 276), “Through the process of sattivification—the subtilization or ‘return to the origin’ (pratiprasava) in the sattva—the transformation (parināma) of the mind (citta) takes place at the deepest level, bringing about a radical change in perspective: the former impure, fabricated states constituting a fractured identity of self are dissolved or discarded, resulting in the complete purification of mind”. 29 Cf. Vyāsa here: “The absence of any imputation of experience of pleasure or pain is purity of Puruṣa. In this condition, whether omnipotent or not, one endowed with discriminative knowledge or otherwise, everyone becomes isolated”. 30 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iii. 55: “When Buddhi-sattwa being freed of all Rajas and Tamas impurities, is occupied with only discriminative discernment of Puruṣa and thus comes to acquire the state where seeds of affliction become roasted, then it becomes like Puruṣa on account of its purity … When the seed of affliction is burnt out, there is no chance of knowledge sprouting from it”. 31 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: famatā yakūnu ʾl-khalāṣu? qāla ʾl-mujību: al-nafsu fiʾl-insāni jawharatun ilā- section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 133

The mind in this state of purity probably refers, in the Yoga-Sūtra, to the “one mind” in its most refined and subtle form of sattva (or buddhi), which being pure like puruṣa is associated with kaivalya:32 “One Mind Is The Director Of The Many Created Minds In Respect Of The Variety Of Their Activities”, (Sūtra iv. 5).33 Such a connection is more palpably expressed in the detailed elaboration allowed for this Sūtra in Kitāb Bātanjal. This connection in both the Yoga-Sūtra and in Kitāb Bātanjal may argue against the view that Patañjali calls for severing puruṣa from prakrti and the negative light cast over such concepts as liberation, cessation and dispassion.34 The absolute separation of puruṣa and prakrti can only imply a disembodied state through the death of the physical body. Yet the achievement of liberation, as expressed in the fourth section of Kitāb Bātanjal, regards the physical body as a fundamental tool in purging the mind so that it attains the purity of the soul. This physical process requires (devotional) activity that directly relates to the “eight-limbed” path,35 outlined in sections ii and iii of Kitāb Bātanjal. These two sections deal with the physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of asceticism and emphasise unification, continuity and balance of the physical with the spiritual as opposed to their separation. The product of such activity is a

hiyyatun ṭāhiratun ghayru mutadannisatin wa innamā ʾl-tadnīsu liʾl-qalbi min ajli taqallu- bihifīmābaynaʾl-quwāʾl-thalāthiʾl-ʾūlāʾl-madhkūratimirāran, famālamyuṭahharʾl-qalbu ṭahāratan kaṭahārati ʾl-nafsi ḥattā yattaḥidā biʾttiḥādi ʾl-ṣifati lam yanfaʿ ikhtilāṭuhumā wa lam yakun khalāṣun (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 192, l. 18). 32 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 277), “The mind, which previously functioned under the sway of ignorance coloring and blocking our awareness of authentic identity, has now become purified and no longer operates as a locus of misidentification, confusion, and dissatisfaction (duḥka). Sattva, the finest quality (guna) of the mind, has the capacity to be perfectly lucid/transparent, like a dust-free mirror in which the light of puruṣa is clearly reflected and the discriminative discernment (vivekakhyāti) between puruṣa and the sattva of the mind (as the nature of the ‘seeable’) can take place. The crucial (ontological) point to be made here is that prakrti ceases to perform an obstructing role in kaivalya”. 33 Cf. Vyāsa here: “How is it that the intentions of one mind regulate the activities of many minds? The Yogin creates one mind as the director of the many created minds, and this accounts for the difference in activities”. 34 Cf. Müller, M., The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. London, 1899. 35 Such an approach in Kitāb Bātanjal is to an extent consonant with some modern interpretations of yoga which regard it as a system that is not content with mere theoretical knowledge but represents a practical way of life. This implies “physical training, exertion of will power and acts of decision, because it wants to deal with the complete human situation and provide real freedom, not just a theory of liberation”. (Klostermaier, Klaus K., A Survey of Hinduism. 2nd ed. Albany, 1994). 134 chapter 5 willing and effortful material process of transformation from ignorance into an enlightened state of mind where the soul or the sense of self ascertains through a purified discernment the difference between the (devotional) activity of the body as its substantial, temporal tool and its non-temporal spirituality. What is achieved is not a separation of the soul from the body. Rather, through purified discernment, the self or the soul no longer misidentifies with any aspect of the body, a state of perception that paves the way for a unification between seer, seeing, and seeable:36

The postulant said: if a man acquires that by which recompense is necessitated while in a [bodily] vessel that is not the one in which the acquisition had taken place then the period of time between the two states would be far in the past and the matter would have been forgotten. [Patañjali] answered: activity is incumbent on the soul because it is its function and the body is an instrument for this [function]. There is no forgetfulness in matters relating to the soul for it [soul] lies outside time which [time] determines what is recent and distant in duration. This activity, being incumbent on the soul, transforms its nature and innate disposition so as to resemble that state to which it is being translated, for the soul in its purity knows by means of this, recognises it and does not forget it.37

The key feature of the Arabic rendition of Sūtra iv. 5 is the emphasis placed on the practical and physical process undertaken by the ascetic towards a goal driven by the “one mind”38 that is the source from which other minds and bodies emanate. It is precisely this goal, the highest expression of which is the attainment of liberation, whose singularity directs the activities of the one mind in addition to its consequent emanations. In contrast to such an understanding of the Sūtra as well as the commentary by Vyāsa implied at this point, it becomes clear that Kitāb Bātanjal does not in fact admit a variety of

36 Such a concept and state of unification is ancillary to true liberation as will be discussed. For instance, cf. Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 196, l. 14. 37 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: idhā ʾktasaba ʾl-insānu mā yūjibu ʾl-mukāfaʾata bihi fī qālibin ghayri qālibi ʾl-iktisābi faqad baʿuda ʾl-ʿahdu fīmā bayna ʾl-ḥālayni wa nusiya ʾl-amru. Qāla ʾl-mujību: al-ʿamalu mulāzimun liʾl-nafsi liʾannahu fiʿluhā waʾl-jasadu ʾālatun fīhi wa lā nisyāna fī ʾl- ashyāʾi ʾl-nafsāniyyati faʾinnahā khārijatun ʿani ʾl-zamāni ʾlladhī yaqtaḍī ʾl-qurba waʾl-buʿda fī ʾl-muddati, wa dhālika ʾl-ʿamalu bimulāzamatihi ʾl-nafsa yuḥīlu khulqahā wa ṭibāʿahā ilā mithli ʾl-ḥāli ʾllatī tantaqilu ilayhā, faʾl-nafsu biṣafāʾihā ʿālimatun bidhālika mutadhakkiratun lahu ghayru nāsiyatin (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 194, l. 14). 38 See Sūtra iv. 5. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 135 activities deriving from many created minds but directed by one mind. Against the Neoplatonic promotion of the primacy of the Pure Intellect from which all emanation issues, the emphasis is placed in Kitāb Bātanjal on the intellector, namely, the effective practice of the ascetic whose one mind unites and directs the many bodies he intentionally creates, as well as their respective minds, towards one particular goal of liberation:

The postulant said: if the afore-mentioned renunciant is able to magnify that which is small and increase that which is scant and transforms his body into many bodies in order [for them] to assist [each other] in the pursuit of one aim, would these bodies exist with many hearts [minds] or with one or with none? … [Patañjali] answered: each one of them [bodies] has its own exclusive heart [mind] and none of them possesses anything which the other [does not have] that would make them different from each other, rather, they are bodies and hearts [minds] that issue from him. The source, then, is the first [body] and the rest are consequent to it.39

The goal of yoga then is kaivalya, a goal that is amply demonstrated in section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal where the path to liberation is defined as purification through (devotional) activity and unification (yoga).40 Throughout the Yoga- Sūtra, Patañjali contends that puruṣa—pure, immortal consciousness—is the individual’s true nature and being and therefore the real foundation of authentic identity. However, due to spiritual ignorance (avidyā) human awareness mistakes the Self or “seer” (puruṣa) for the “seeable”. In this state of misplaced identity brought about by the conjunction (samyoga) of puruṣa and prakrti, and defined by Patañjali as misidentification with the modifications of the mind, the cognitive error of mistaking extrinsic (material) identity for intrinsic (spiritual) identity is continually reinforced:41 “Yoga Is The Suppression Of

39 qālaʾl-sāʾilu:innaʾl-zāhidaʾl-madhkūraidhāqadaraʿalātaʿẓīmiʾl-ṣaghīriwatakthīriʾl-qalīli thumma jaʿala badanahu abdānan liʾl-taʿāwuni ʿalā maqṣūdin wāḥidin fahal yakūnu tilka ʾl-abdānu biqulūbin aw biqalbin aw bilā qalbin … qāla ʾl-mujību: yakhtaṣṣu kullu wāḥidin minhā biqalbin wa lā yastabiddu aḥaduhā bishayʾin dūna ʾl-ākhari ḥattā takhtalifa wa innamā hiya abdānun wa qulūbun munbaʿithatun minhu faʾl-aṣlu huwa ʾl-awwalu waʾl- bāqiyatu tawābiʿuhu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 193, l. 20). 40 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 288): “Yoga, in its program of purification, goes beyond the position of classical Samkhya, which seems to rest content with a discriminatory knowledge (viveka) leading to a final isolation of puruṣa or absolute separation between puruṣa and prakrti”. 41 Whicher, I., (1998: 108): “Yoga seeks to establish our identity as the seer, and in the process 136 chapter 5

The Modifications Of The Mind / Then The Seer Abides In Itself / At Other Times The Seer Appears To Assume The Form Of The Modification Of The Mind”, (Sūtra, i. 2–4). In Kitāb Bātanjal these same Sūtras are approached in the Islamic terms of the proper discernment and appropriate administration of (devotional) activity so central to this tradition. The function of true knowledge and correct praxis are mutually related and return to their source in the agent with transforming effect. This contrasts with with their earlier description (section i of Kitāb Bātanjal) as an effluence from the agent that risks entangling the soul’s faculties in what is extrinsic and other than itself:

As for [devotional] activity, a part of it is like activity and another part is like desisting from activity. If you comprehend the matter you will find that it comprises knowledge, that is because it is the reining in of that which flows out from you towards externals back to you, so that you are purely occupied with yourself,42 and in the refraining of the faculties of the soul from becoming conjoined with what is other than you, and in the occupation of each of them [faculties] with that which is specific to them about you. This function, therefore, comprises both knowledge and [devotional] activity.43

Just as the process of purification that is central to the attainment of the ultimate goal of liberation is summarily yet indicatively treated at the outset of Kitāb Bātanjal in terms of (devotional) activity and the proper discernment of knowledge so too is this process definitively encountered at its conclusion after its thorough examination. This time, however, it is through the “eight-limbed” path outlined in sections ii and iii of Kitāb Bātanjal which deal with the physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of asceticism:

to ‘dismantle’ the mechanism of misidentification due to which we remain deluded, confused, and dissatisfied”. 42 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra i. 2, “Viveka-Khyāti or the realisation of the distinction between the pure Puruṣa and Buddhi, is of the nature of the Sattva principle and is thus opposed to Chiti- Śakti [supreme conscious power]. As there is still a touch of impurity in Viveka-Khyāti, a mind indifferent to it shuts out even that realisation. In such a state the mind retains the latent impressions alone. That is known as Nirvīja or objectless Samādhi”. 43 faʾammā ʾl-ʿamalu faqismun minhu kaʾl-fiʿli wa qismun minhu katarki ʾl-fiʿli, faidhā ḥaṣṣalta ʾl-amra wajadta ʾl-ʿilma fī ḍimnihi wa dhālika annahu qabḍu ʾl-mubtaththi ʿanka naḥwa ʾl- khārijāti ilayka liʾallā tashtaghila illā bika wa qamʿu quwā ʾl-nafsi ʿani ʾl-tashabbuthi bighay- rika wa shughlu kulli wāḥidatin minhā bishughlihā ʾlladhī yakhuṣṣuhā minka, faqadi ʾshta- mala hādhā ʾl-fiʿlu ʿalā ʾl-ʿilmi waʾl-ʿamali maʿan (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 19). section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 137

The postulant said: does there remain in him who reaches this sublime level remnants of worldly filth or is he purified from the stain of ignorance? [Patañjali] answered: ignorance with regard to man whilst in the world is as it were the natural state and knowledge is extraneous and foreign to him. Thus remnants of that which is innate and customary are inevitable during the onset of that which is uncustomary. The postulant said: how is he smelted so as to be completely purified of them? [Patañ- jali] answered: by means of habituation, meditational praxis and physical exercise … When he gradually becomes habituated to the necessary then that which is habitual becomes as it were natural, it contends with nature at that time and it overcomes nature, and the habitual becomes purified of those remnants. On reaching this level he becomes removed from the motives of both recompense and sin so that he becomes cleansed of impurities, and knowledge becomes established to such a measure that it cannot be increased by the abundance of things known and it is impossible for them to become distant or simple, for these are then annihilated through the unification of the three afore-mentioned [forces].44

The above conclusive passage mirrors that in Yoga-Sūtra iv. 28 and, more particularly, the commentary on it by Vyāsa45 who refers to objects as being, at their subtlest level, themselves the “seeds” of ignorance (avidyā) in the form

44 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: hal yakūnu fī ʾl-bālighi hādhihi ʾl-martabati ʾl-saniyyati baqiyyatun min darani ʾl-dunyā am yunaqqā ʿan danasi ʾl-jahālati? Qāla ʾl-mujību: al-jahlu liʾl-insāni fī ʾl-dunyā kaʾl-ṭabīʿī waʾl-ʿilmu ṭāriʾun ʿalayhi gharībun ʿindahu, falā budda min baqāyā mā huwa khu- luqun wa ʿādatun ʿinda hujūmi mā huwa mustaghrabun. Qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: fakayfa tasbīkuhu ḥattā yataṣaffā minhā kamālan? Qāla ʾl-mujību: biʾl-taʿwīdi waʾl-irtiyāḍi waʾl-tadrībi, wa qad taqaddamat kayfiyyatu dhālika, thumma idhā iʿtāda ʾl-wājibu qalīlan qalīlan ṣārati ʾl- ʿādatu kaʾl-ṭabīʿati wa ghālabati ʾl-ṭabīʿata ḥīnaʾidhin faghalabathā wa khalaṣa ʾl-muʿtādu ʿan tilka ʾl-baqāyā, wa ʿinda ʾl-ḥuṣūli fī hādhihi ʾl-martabati yatabāʿadu ʿan dawāʿī ʾl-ajari waʾl-ithmi maʿan, fayuṭahharu mina ʾl-adnāsi wa yastaqirru ʾl-ʿilmu ʿalā miqdārin ghayri mutakaththirin bikathrati ʾl-maʿlūmāti … faʾinnahā ḥīnaʾidhin fāniyatun biʾttiḥādi ʾl-tha- lāthati ʾl-madhkūrati (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 1). 45 “It Has Been Said That Their Removal (i.e. Of Indiscriminative Impressions) Follows The Same Process As The Removal Of Afflictions”. (Sūtra iv. 28). Cf. Vyāsa here: “As seeds (of affliction) when in a roasted state do not germinate, so previous latent impressions, when reduced to a roasted state in the fire of knowledge do not produce any modification, i.e. they do not emerge into a state of knowledge. The latent impressions of knowledge, however, wait for the termination of the function of the mind (i.e. they automatically die out when the mind ceases to act), and no special effort is necessary therefore”. 138 chapter 5 of samskāras—the karmic residue of affliction in the mind.46 These seeds of affliction are first broached by Vyāsa in his commentary to Sūtra iii. 50:

When after the dwindling of afflictive actions the yogin feels that the discriminative knowledge is but a characteristic of the Buddhi, and that Buddhi-sattwa has also been classed among the foresakables, while Puruṣa is immutable, pure and different from Sattwa Gunas then he begins to lose his desire for Buddhi-Sattwa, and the seeds of affliction die out with his mind as they become unproductive like roasted seeds. When they [the seeds] totally disappear the Puruṣa does not suffer from the threefold sorrow. Then the Gunas that develop within the mind as afflictive actions with their formations, having fulfilled their purpose, recede to unmanifest state and thus bring about their complete separation from the Puruṣa, which is isolation.47

Despite the absence of parallel imagery in the equivalent passage cited in Kitāb Bātanjal,48 the importance of discernment between puruṣa and the sattva that takes place in the sattva of the mind and especially as expressed by Vyāsa above is amply conveyed in the Arabic.49 In the above commentary Vyāsa seems to imply that the mind, comprising the three gunas, is in some sense active but in its subtlest state it is said to be like puruṣa, for at this finest degree of subtlety the mind has reached a state of purity analogous to that of the puruṣa. In this sense, therefore, kaivalya is associated in yoga with the coexistence of the purity of both puruṣa and prakrti (as the mind). In Kitāb Bātanjal the centre of the process of discriminating discernment is a true understanding of the nature and function of knowledge and its disassociation from the attainment of liberation. Accordingly, knowledge lies lower in rank to (devotional) actions and does not advance the individual to the same levels as actions. Indeed, liberation cannot be attained through what is mistakenly

46 Cf. Whicher, I., (1998: 233), “According to Vyāsa, an ecstatic state reaches both the supra- cogitative and suprareflective levels when the mind is, as it were, void of its own nature and is free to ‘become’ the object itself. Whereas the ‘unification’ (samāpatti) in nirvitarka- samādhi is a distinct perception limited to the gross object, in nirvicāra-samādhi the ‘unification’ is expanded to include subtle objects”. 47 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iii. 50. 48 Kitāb Bātanjal p. 191, l. 12–16. 49 Kitāb Bātanjal p. 191, l. 14–16. In this passage the discernment is made between, on the one hand, the limitations of “particular knowledge” whose domain is in the individual’s heart (mind) and, on the other hand, the true liberation of the individual’s soul. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 139 called “knowledge” which is in fact what is derived through the senses (and, therefore, beholden to worldly matter). True knowledge, by implication, is not derived through the senses and so can only reside in the subtle matter of the mind where it takes definition as the cognition of the finitude of known facts and its consequent rejection of them. Thus, liberation is facilitated through this correct discernment of knowledge:

The postulant said: does he attain by means of this knowledge the highest of echelons just as he attained them in [devotional] activity? [Patañjali] answered: no, for the possessor of this particular knowledge, even though it is designated by this word, falls short of liberation if he presumes it to be knowledge because it is acquired through the senses. For [true] knowledge is the cognition of the perishing and non-existence of these known objects and their consequent rejection. Just as what is presumed to be knowledge obstructs the attainment of liberation so boasting and bragging about it [knowledge] is a form of pride and insolence that also obstructs its attainment.50

4 Liberation: The Intellect, Intellected and Intellector

Liberation then, according to Kitāb Bātanjal, is the removal of ignorance and the realisation that knowledge is independent of worldly matter attained through the senses. Yet the realm of the intellect also consists of subtle matter for in yoga, as already mentioned, the mind comprises the three gunas or constituents of prakrti and is, consequently, in some sense active, having a real existence. This is also understood by the text of Kitāb Bātanjal whose concept of “unification” as a prerequisite to attaining liberation is introduced in this final section: by means of the unification of the three constituent “forces”, the obstacle to liberation is removed through a resultant cognition of the perishing of (known) facts, acquired by the senses, and their consequent non-existence.51

50 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: fahal yakūnu bihādhā ʾl-ʿilmi bālighan ʿulyā ʾl-marātibi kamā balaghahā fī ʾl-afʿāli? Qāla ʾl-mujību: lā, fainna hādhā ʾl-ʿilma wa ini ʾtasama bihādhā ʾl-ismi fainna ṣāḥibahu qāṣirun ʿani ʾl-khalāṣi in ẓannahu ʿilman min ajli annahu muqtanan mina ʾl-ḥissi, fainnamā ʾl-ʿilma maʿrifatu duthūri tilka ʾl-maʿlūmāti wa talāshīhā wa itbāʿihā birafḍihā. Wa kamā anna ʾl-maẓnūna bihi annahu ʿilmun yamnaʿu ʿani ʾl-khalāṣi fakadhālika ʾl-tabajjuḥu waʾl-iftikhāru bihi nawʿun mina ʾl-takabburi waʾl-jabarūti yamnaʿu ayḍan ʿanhu (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 191, l. 12). 51 Cf. Kitāb Bātanjal p. 191, l. 12, and p. 198, l. 1. 140 chapter 5

The corresponding discussions in the Yoga-Sūtra can be understood to demonstrate Patañjali’s acknowledgement of the existence of a multitude of individ- uated minds and personalities with the apparent rejection of the Buddhist school of Yogācāra. According to Vyāsa, Yogācāra maintains the idealist position that the objects of experience are merely products of the mind and have no existence in themselves, a perspective that negates the reality of the manifest world.52 Significantly, then, Patañjali, in Vyāsa’s understanding at least, seems to refute the idealist view that objects are merely projections or imag- inings of the mind and, as noetic, are thus deprived of any existence in themselves:

On Account Of The Co-Ordinated Mutation Of The Three Gunas, Objects Appear As One. (14). Inspite Of Sameness Of Object, On Account Of Sep- arateness Of Mind They (The Object And Its Knowledge) Follow Differ- ent Paths, That Is Why They Are Entirely Different. (15). Object Is Not Dependent On A Mind Because If That Were So, Then What Will Happen When It Is Not Cognised By A Mind? (16). External Objects Are Known Or Unknown To The Mind According As They Colour The Mind. (17).53

Kitāb Bātanjal likewise recognises the existence of the manifest world and the necessary part played by the three (constituent) forces in external objects as well as the intellect.54 For that which is actually existent even if too subtle to be felt by the senses is, nevertheless, not too subtle for the intellect which perceives it since both the existent and the intellect are formed by these

52 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 14, “An object prior or posterior to cognition is non-existent, as in dreams and similar forms of consciousness there is consciousness without any object. The thinkers who use such an argument and rule out the objective world, and hold that objects are consciousness-constructions and like dream-objects have no anoetic being, how can they who dispute the existence of objects that appear by virtue of their existence, and so put trust in illogical wild imagination, be believed?” Vyāsa would have been aware of the Buddhist school founded by Asanga. 53 Cf. (Sūtra iv. 14/15/16/17). Contra Whicher, I., (1998: 96) Chapple and Kelly argue that Patañjali need not be seen as explicitly polemicizing against this “idealist” view, but as “merely advancing the Samkhya perspective that all things stem from prakrti through parināma [transformation/serial change]”, (Chapple, C.K., and Kelly, E.P., The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali: An Analysis of the Sanskrit with Accompanying English Translation. Delhi, 1990, p. 7). 54 The empirical nature of the methodology as expressed in the preface to the Hind and those of Kitāb Bātanjal can only function on the basis of such a recognition. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 141 three (constituent) forces, in addition to forming the senses themselves.55 This common (material) constitution establishes in Kitāb Bātanjal the relative though distinct basis in time and space of the existent and the intellect and, by implication, their real and present existence. The proof is provided in terms of the reality of space and time: past and future time when in the present are subject to recompense56 generated by the three (constituent) forces. Therefore, both past and present time have a reality in the sense that by having an impact on this reality57 they are effective existents.58 An acceptance of the ontological status of both external existents and intellect based on the common denominator of the three (constituent) forces is not only significant as an interpretative comprehension of the equivalent Sūtras but it also defines the subsequent discussion in Kitāb Bātanjal concerning the unification of these forces and what this process implies. The initial question posed by the postulant is double edged. In its acknowledgement of the mutation of the three (constituent) forces and their resulting difference there is an apparent acceptance of external existents. Yet, as with Vyāsa,59 this immediately raises a contradiction regarding the corresponding co-ordinated unification of the three forces in what the text of Kitāb Bātanjal, in the response to this question, concludes to be the intellector:

55 lā yuʾaththirāni biʾl-fiʿli fiʾl-rāhini ʾl-mawjūdi biʾl-fiʿli … faʾin laṭafa ʿani ʾl-iḥsāsi biʾl-mashāʿiri lam yalṭuf ʿani ʾl-idrāki biʾl-ʿaqli, thumma yatakayyafāni biʾl-quwā ʾl-thalāthi ʾl-uwali (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 196, l. 4), “They have no actual effect on the actually existent present … even if it [existence] is too subtle to be felt by the senses it is not too subtle to be perceived by the intellect, furthermore both are formed by the three primary forces”. 56 al-mukāfaʾatu is the term used in Arabic to reflect the Sanskrit notion of karmic recompense. 57 This interpretation is based on Ritter’s reading of athyn as atharayn in Kitāb Bātanjal p. 196, l. 9 (cf. footnote 4, ibid.). The line may, therefore, be translated as: “Both (present and past), therefore, have an impact (on reality), for otherwise they would not have an effect on existence”. 58 bidalīlin anna ʾl-māḍī ḥīna kāna rāhinan lam yataʿarra ʿan mukāfaʾatin sababuhā tilka ʾl-quwā kamā lā yakhlū ʾl-mustaʾnafu minhā idhā ṣāra rāhinan, wa humā idhan dhawā atharayni wa illā lam yakun lahumā atharun fī ʾl-wujūdi (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 196, l. 7), “… the proof of which is that when the past was the present it was not deprived of recompense the cause of which was those forces just as the future, when it becomes present, will not be free of it. Both [present and past], therefore, have an impact [on reality], for otherwise they would not have an effect on existence”. 59 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 14, “But if all objects are products of the three Gunas, then how can there be a single perception as ‘one sound Tanmātra’ [the smallest particle of elemental knowables], ‘one sense-organ (as ear, eye etc.)’?” 142 chapter 5

The postulant said: if the three primary forces mutate and differ is it then possible for them to come together in a [state of] unification? [Patañjali] answered: why should this not be the case when the function of the oil, the wick and the fire differ from each other [yet] when their effects are combined and their actions are in unison the lamp, because of them, [burns] with a single illumination. For this reason when the heart [mind] is purified and the soul is disciplined so that they exist together then the intellected, the intellect, and the intellector become one and they all become an intellector.60

The purification of the mind leads to its co-existence with the soul and is reflected by the unification of the three primary forces within the former, consisting as it does of subtle matter, that leads to an equivalent tripartite unification of the intellect, intellector and intellected. More importantly, however, the latter process constitutes an immediate precursor to the possibility of an embodied freedom where the individual’s liberated state is described in terms of the soul’s integration with matter through purification. This tripartite unification alleviates the contradiction between the need to unify the three constituent forces in the mind and the reality of the differences in external existents resulting from the mutation of these same three forces in those external existents.61 By establishing the intellector as the product of this process of unification the text of Kitāb Bātanjal remedies the contradiction regarding the activity of the three forces in the mind and its relationship with intellected (external) material objects. For the unification of these forces in the mind does not com- pete against their mutation and differentiation in external existents since their independent function in each is embraced by the wider tripartite unification

60 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: idhā taghayyarati ʾl-quwā ʾl-thalāthu ʾl-uwalu waʾkhtalafat fahal yumkinu an yaqaʿa lahā ittifāqun ʿalā ittiḥādin? Qāla ʾl-mujību: lima lā yakūnu dhālika wa fiʿlu kulli wāḥidin mina ʾl-duhni waʾl-fatīlati waʾl-nāri ghayru fiʿli ʾl-ākhari wa idhā ʾjtamaʿat āthāruhā waʾttaḥadat afʿāluhā kāna minhā ʾl-sirāju dhū ʾl-iḍāʾati ʾl-wāḥidati, wa lihādhā idhāṣafāʾl-qalbuwatahadhdhabatiʾl-nafsuḥattākānāmaʿanittaḥadaʾl-maʿqūluwaʾl-ʿaqlu waʾl-ʿāqilu wa ṣārat kulluhā ʿāqilan (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 196, l. 10). 61 Hence Vyāsa who in his commentary on Sūtra iv. 15 describes a similar viewpoint on (external) matter in the philosophy of Samkhya: “According to the Sāmkhya philosophy all objects are made of the three Gunas which are constantly mutating, they come into contact with the mind through an exciting cause such as virtue, vice etc., when they produce corresponding impressions and thus become the cause of such impressions”. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 143 of the intellect, the intellected and the intellector. Thus, by establishing the intellector as the pivotal point in this process of unification and qualifying the relationship between the intellect and the intellected the text of Kitāb Bātanjal is able to reject the purely idealist view62 that the objects of experience, both sensual and other, are merely products of the mind and have no existence in themselves.63 Further, not only is the separate existence of external material objects and their relative difference argued for,64 but it is also established that the intellector is pivotal in the process of perception. Consequently the function of the intellect is relegated to an instrumental role of perceptual mediation between the intellector and the intellected:

For when intellect alone exists, it is a necessary consequence that knowledge and gnosis alone perpetuate. Yet we observe that known things may often become unknown, from which we can deduce that the difference of these two states is brought about by an intellector who intellects by means of an instrument belonging to it, namely the intellect … the cognition of two things subject to corruption is itself subject to corruption and there is a separation between them. If there was nothing other than the intellect then gnosis could only be one and of all things perpetually. How- ever, the intellect with regard to the intellector is like a gem concerning the relationship between sight and what is seen; when a light is shone on it, it conveys the colours and forms of what is seen to the seer.65

62 Reminiscent of the Buddhist school of Yogācāra. 63 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: mā maʿnā ʾl-maʿqūli idhā ʿaqala ʾl-ʿaqlu wa ʾttaḥada bimaʿqūlihi faʾinnahā lihādhā madhhabun ilā an laysa ghayru ʾl-ʿaqli faqaṭ? Qāla ʾl-mujību: kamā annakum lā tuthbitūna ghayra ʾl-ʿaqli fakadhālika lā nuthbitu naḥnu ghayra ʾl-ʿāqili wa laysa baynanā ʿinda ʾl-taḥṣīli khilāfun fī ʾl-maʿnā innamā ʾl-khilāfu fī ʾl-ʿibārati (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 196, l. 16). “The postulant said: what is the meaning of ‘the intellected’ when the intellect intellects and unites with what it has intellected, for this can only lead to the conclusion that nothing other than the intellect exists? [Patañjali] answered: just as you establish nothing other than the intellect so we establish nothing other than the intellector. Ultimately there is no difference concerning the meaning between us rather the difference lies in the expression”. 64 As a result of the mutation of the three primary forces of which they all consist. 65 famahmā kāna ʿaqlun faqaṭ lazima minhu an lā yakūna ghayra ʾl-ʿilmi waʾl-maʿrifati biʾl- daymūmati, wa naḥnu narā ʾl-ashyāʾa ʾl-maʿlūmata rubbamā takūnu majhūlatan fayuʿlamu mindhālikaannaʾkhtilāfahātayniʾl-ḥālatayniwaqaʿaminʿāqilinyaʿqilubiʾālatinlahuhuwa ʾl-ʿaqlu … waʾl maʿrifatu biʾl-shayʾayni ʾl-mutaghāyirayni mutaghāyiratun wa baynahumā farqun, wa law lam yakun ghayra ʾl-ʿaqli lam yakuni ʾl-maʿrifatu illā wāḥidatan wa fī jamīʿi 144 chapter 5

The introduction of the “intellector” at this precise point conveys an understanding of yoga in which there is no dichotomization between the cosmological and the psychological or the macrocosmic universe and the microcosmic human being. For it is, in the terminology of Kitāb Bātanjal, the conceptual contrast of intellect versus that which is intellected that leads to the false projection by the postulant of a psychological/subjective inner world that is, by implication, set against an outer corporeal/objective world creating, in effect, a subject-object duality. This implies a given, reified world set against a separate sense of intellectual self: “The postulant said: does the intellect perceive itself and for itself so that it, therefore, has no need for anything other than itself?”66 The reply in the Arabic expresses a response to this view of the intellect that is terminologically consistent with its immediate context in Kitāb Bātanjal although it reflects the philosophical position upheld in Yoga-Sūtra iv.19 and elaborated by Vyāsa.67 The passage by Vyāsa recalls the use in Kitāb Bātanjal of light imagery (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 196, l. 12) in which the three factors in the lamp, the oil, wick and fire, are found to be equally necessary for its single illuminative function. Thus, like Vyāsa, the text of Kitāb Bātanjal removes the element of fire from the illuminer/illuminated dichotomy and, in harmony with the lamp imagery, sets it within the tripartite and unified function of the illuminer/lamp. Doing so sets an important parallel between this tripartite combination and that comprising intellect, intellected and intellector whose unified function is as intellector. The aim of such a comparison is to remove the intellect from the intellector/intellected dichotomy and to set it within the tripartite unity of the

ʾl-ashyāʾi dāʾimatan, wa lākinna ʾl-ʿaqla liʾl-ʿāqili kaʾl-jawharati fīmā bayna ʾl-baṣari waʾl- mubṣari, faʾidhā uḍīʾat addat ilā ʾl-nāẓiri alwāna ʾl-mubṣarāti wa ashkālihā (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 197, l. 3). 66 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: al-ʿaqlu yudriku nafsahu wa linafsihi falā ḥājata bihi ilā ghayrihi?(Kitāb Bātanjal p. 197, l. 12). 67 “It (Mind) Is Not Self-Illuminating Being An Object (Knowable)”, (Sūtra iv. 19). Cf. Vyāsa here: “As the other sense-organs and things like light and sound, are not self-illuminating being knowables or objects, mind is also to be understood as such. In this case fire is not an appropriate example because fire does not illumine its true unilluminated self. The illumination caused by fire is the outcome of contact between the illuminer and the illuminated. That has no connection with the real nature of fire. Moreover, if it is said that mind is self-illuminating, it will mean that the mind is not knowable by anything else … But mind is a knowable because from a reflection of the action in one’s mind, persons are seen to experience tendencies such as ‘I am angry’, ‘I am afraid’, ‘I like it.’ This would not be possible unless there be cognition of what is happening in one’s own mind”. [Emphasis added]. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 145 intellector to effectively illustrate Vyāsa’s argument through a clear rejection of the analogy between fire and the mind.68 Thus, Kitāb Bātanjal describes the intellect, in tandem with the participa- tory role it gives to fire in the function of the lamp, as part of a unified tripartite function within the intellector and acting as such. It thereby produces a systematic explanation of Vyāsa’s conclusion that the “mind” is knowable because of its functional activity and that its self-illumination, if it can be described as such, is in fact the result of its “knowability” by the intellector. It is with reference to this earlier interpretation that the conclusion in Kitāb Bātanjal p. 197, l. 11 may be understood: “As the lamp is for someone who seeks light, so the intellect is for an intellector.”69 The response here underscores the introduction of a crucial element, the intellector, and envisioning the intellector as the comprehensive vessel of the unification of intellect, intellected and intellector whose consequence is liberation. In this way the material nature of the intellect can be allowed while it is set within the perimeters of the intellector where unification is in fact seen to take place. The material nature of the intellect is, therefore, not only reflected by analogy as similar to one of the three factors that equally constitute the lamp’s illuminative function, but also directly through its association with the objects of intellection within the tripartite framework that constitutes the function of the intellector. Such an association and its significance is expressed in the consequent response in the Arabic to the suggestion by the postulant that the intellect perceives itself for itself and that, therefore, it has no need for anything other than itself.70 More than simple inclusion within the unified function of the intellector, the response relates the intellected to the objects of its intellection on the basis of mutual interdependence. This not only replies to the postulant’s arguable and identifiable philosophical position of the hegemony of the intel- lect71 but also illustrates the “materiality” of the intellect. The illustration of this “materiality” is achieved by establishing the activity of the intellect as per-

68 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 19. 69 qāla ʾl-mujību: al-sirāju li-mustaḍīʾin mā, kadhālika ʾl-ʿaqlu liʿāqilin mā (Kitāb Bātanjal p. 197, l. 11), “[Patañjali] answered: as the lamp is for someone who seeks light, so the intellect is for an intellector”. 70 Cf. Kitāb Bātanjal p. 197, l. 12. 71 Cf. Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 14. Vyāsa would have been aware of the Buddhist school founded by Asanga which maintains the pure idealistic view that the objects of experience are merely products of the mind and have no existence in themselves, a perspective which negates the reality of the manifest world. 146 chapter 5 ceiving something other than itself by means of an “impetus/stimulus to perception” and the “collection” of what is perceived that tangibly imprints itself on the intellect. The reality of this process is exemplified by the formulaic argument: what is in a “collected state” did not collect itself but was rather collected by something other than itself. Thus, the intellect is “influenced” by that which it perceives and these perceptions are “collected” by it. The significance of the choice of terminology used to describe the intellect lies in the emphasis it gives of the intellect’s material nature, that is, its ability to be imprinted, its perception of externals, and its collection of that which it perceives. As such, an important distinction is set by means of terminology between the intellect in whose domain the collection of perceptibles takes place only and the intellector in whom unification rather than mere collection takes place. Such a clear distinction prioritises the intellector at the consciously studied expense of the intellect,72 and, therefore, prioritises the actions of the intellector in whom unification takes place. This highlights the significant differences that can be gleaned concerning the Islamic concept of the individual’s struggle for unification and liberation between Kitāb Bātanjal and Ibn Sīnā’s psychological writings, as will be illustrated in the following two sections.

5 Ibn Sīnā’s Treatment of the Soul and Intellect in Aḥwāl al-Nafs and His De Anima

According to Ibn Sīnā’s De Anima the potential intellect, al-ʿaqlu biʾl-quwwati,73 reaches the first stage of its actualisation when it acquires the axiomatic truths, called al-ʿaqlu biʾl-malakati,74 the second stage, al-ʿaqlu biʾl-fiʿli,75 when it acquires the secondary intelligibles from the primary intelligibles or axioms, and the final stage, al-ʿaqlu al-mustafādu,76 when it actually contemplates these intelligibles and becomes similar to the active intellect:

You find at the head the informed intellect that is served by all [lower intellects] and is the ultimate goal, then the actual intellect that is served

72 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 12. 73 De Anima, p. 50, l. 7. Intellectus potentialis. 74 De Anima, p. 50, l. 16. Intellectus in habitu. 75 De Anima, p. 50, l. 15. Intellectus in actu. 76 De Anima, p. 50, l. 14. Intellectus acquisitus. section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 147

by the possessive intellect, and the material intellect with what it contains by way of readiness serves the possessive intellect, then the active intellect serves all of this.77

The significance of this passage lies in its location at the heart of Ibn Sīnā’s most important psychological work: it expresses the intellect’s primary role in the De Anima’s description of the nature and function of the soul. The salient presence of the intellect in the De Anima provides a context for understanding the subtle development in section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal from its attention to the soul to an intricate detailing of the intellect’s various levels of state. According to many of the Mediaeval Muslim philosophers,78 including Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, the intellect is that part of the soul by which it “thinks” or “knows” and as such is the antithesis of perception. Mostly, however, al-ʿaql is not regarded as part of the soul at all,79 but as an incorporeal and incorruptible substance differing in kind from the soul.80 The above passage from the De Anima finds interesting parallels in differentiating the role of the intellect and knowledge in a psychological discussion in section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal that describes the means to attaining liberation:

On reaching this level he becomes removed from the motives of both recompense and sin so that he becomes cleansed of impurities, and knowledge becomes established to such a measure that it cannot be increased by the abundance of known things and it is impossible for them to become distant or simple, for these are then annihilated through the unification of the three afore-mentioned [forces].81

This differentiation of levels of knowledge is linked with the lower role of the intellect as a collector of known facts when outside of the tripartite unification of intellect, intellected and intellector, and its higher role when a part of this

77 fainnaka tajidu ʾl-ʿaqla ʾl-mustafāda raʾīsan, wa yakhdimuhu ʾl-kullu, wa huwa ʾl-ghāyatu ʾl-quṣwā, thumma ʾl-ʿaqlu biʾl-fiʿli yakhdimuhu ʾl-ʿaqlu biʾl-malakati, waʾl-ʿaqlu ʾl-hayūlānī bimā fīhi mina ʾl-istiʿdādi yakhdimu ʾl-ʿaqla biʾl-malakati, thumma ʾl-ʿaqlu ʾl-ʿamalī yakhdimu jamīʿa hādhā,(De Anima, p. 50, l. 14). 78 See article on al-ʿaql in ei2. 79 The soul is in fact restricted to the lower mental functions. 80 See article on al-ʿaql in ei2 for this ambiguity between the soul and the intellect which also pervades Aristotle’s psychology. 81 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 8. 148 chapter 5 unification where it transcends individual facts to achieve higher knowledge.82 Kitāb Bātanjal, therefore, sets up a hierarchy in contradistinction to what is found in the De Anima where a movement of descent is described from the higher “informed intellect” to the lower “possessive intellect”. Yet the crucial difference between the De Anima and Kitāb Bātanjal on this subject lies not in the intellect’s various levels of relationship with knowledge but in the definition of the nature and role of the intellect and in its connection with the soul. For one of the chief difficulties of the Graeco-Arabic doctrine of the intellect that the De Anima represents is that the intellect is affirmed to be incorporeal and therefore, according to the doctrine of individuation by matter, it is universal. Thus, although the intellect’s individuality is recognised, given that the subject of thought is the individual “I”, the basic principle of this theory of knowledge, namely that of the identity of subject and object, makes it imposssible to give an account of what makes an ego an individual. The difficulties in such a conclusion contrast with the exploration of the intellect in the final section of Kitāb Bātanjal. For not only is the intellector prioritised over the intellect,83 but also the individual is established in its principal role of achieving liberation. This betrays a recognisably Islamic interpretative frame that places on the individual the onus and responsibility of praxis and purification for the purpose of attaining unification that results in liberation. It becomes apparent from the above-mentioned passage of Kitāb Bātanjal that the chief purpose in the process of purification84 is epistemological and soteriological. The keynote question of liberation reiterated throughout Kitāb Bātanjal finds its ultimate response, as in the concluding section of the Yoga- Sūtra,85 in the relationship between the soul and knowledge. Yoga-Sūtra iv. 30 describes the way in which the binding influence of the gunas (in the form of the afflictions, past actions, and misguided relationships)

82 Kitāb Bātanjal p. 197, l. 3. 83 The intellect is no more than the instrument of intellection. 84 By means of the process of purification the unity of the three primary forces and their subsequent annihilation is achieved within the unified tripartite dimensions of the intellector. 85 The equivalent or relevant Sūtras: “On Losing Interest Even In Omniscience Acquired Through Discriminative Knowledge, The All-Round Discriminative Discernment That Ensues Brings About The Concentration Known As Dharmamegha (Cloud Pouring Virtue) / From That Afflictions And Actions Cease / Then On Account Of The Infinitude Of Knowledge, Which Has Been Bereft Of The Coating Of Impurities, The Knowables Appear As Few / From That (Cloud Pouring Virtue) The Gunas Having Fulfilled Their Purpose, The Sequence Of Their Mutation Ceases”. (Sūtra iv. 29–32). section iv of kitāb bātanjal: liberation and unification 149 is overcome. What remains is a “cloud of dharma” that includes an “eternality of knowledge” free from all impure covering (āvarana-mala, Sūtra iv. 31). This Kitāb Bātanjal passage also seeks to differentiate knowledge from known facts, by reducing the plurality of knowledge through purification and annihilating these facts by unifying the three primary forces. The passage describes an individual who has achieved this state as being beyond time and space because he has transcended these three primary forces whose very activity is necessarily dependent on time and space. Establishing knowledge within this state takes the form of that infinitude of knowledge referred to in Sūtra iv. 31. This endlessness of knowledge is better understood metaphorically rather than literally in the Yoga-Sūtra and only obliquely in Kitāb Bātanjal given that it is only discernible in Kitāb Bātanjal from its description in this passage. For in both instances it is not knowledge expanded to infinity. Rather it implies puruṣa-realization that transcends the limitations and particulars of knowl- edge86 (vritti) and, in the case of Kitāb Bātanjal, it signifies the final and most concise definition of what liberation is.87

6 Conclusion: Kitāb Bātanjal, Knowledge and Language

The notion that objects apprehended through the senses are subject to change is considered in Kitāb Bātanjal and reformulated in terms of an acceptance of the ontological status of both external existents and intellect. This is based on the common denominator of the three (constituent) forces and an acknowledgement of the mutation of these three forces and their resultant difference.88 Therefore, such a reformulation, comprehended within the philosophical system of Kitāb Bātanjal, does not simply question the status of knowledge acquired through sensation or perception but, in fact, sets such knowledge, as well as sensation and perception within a tripartite framework that is referred to in Neoplatonic terms as intellect, intellector and intellected. The makeup of all three must necessarily derive from the three (constituent) forces, whose ultimate end is unification through a stage-by-stage process of purification.89

86 “Isolation Is The Complete Disappearance Of The Gunas Which Have Ceased To Be Objectives (By Providing Experience Or Liberation Of Puruṣa), In Other Words, It Is Supreme Consciousness Established In Its Own Self”. (Sūtra iv. 34). 87 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 19. 88 Cf. Kitāb Bātanjal p. 196, l. 10. 89 Cf. Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 1–10. 150 chapter 5

Thus, given their identical constituent forces, the relationship between knowledge and perception in Kitāb Bātanjal is not a qualitative differentiation that raises questions regarding the nature of knowledge and definitions as to the extent to which humans have knowledge. Still, epistemology remains the pivotal issue in the concluding analysis of Kitāb Bātanjal yet in a radically transformed and surprising sense, if considered with a Neoplatonic context in mind. Whereas the Neoplatonic argument, for instance in Plotinus,90 is that true knowledge in an individual is attained by transcending the information provided by the senses in order to discover unchanging objects through the exercise of reason, in particular by the application of the dialectical method of inquiry inherited from Socrates, the argument in Kitāb Bātanjal centres on the very Islamic and, in many respects, Sufi concept of the transcending of knowledge in its entirety through perfect unification with the divine resulting in true liberation, al-khalāṣ. This chapter has laid the conceptual and philological foundations of the argument being presented asserting that al-Bīrūnī introduced an Islamic interpretative frame into his analysis of Indian, mainly Hindu, thought and that the structure of Hindu belief as it is depicted in the Hind begins with God as transcendent being. It then treats His relation to creation, and, after an excursus on the Greek/Indian notion of metempsychosis, concludes with the depiction of His saving power. The purpose of this representation is ultimately realised in the Hind, as will be discussed in the following chapter, where al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of Hindu psychology is overtly used in support of an Islamic reading of Hinduism. This process is initiated in Kitāb Bātanjal through a philological transformation of the relevant terminology, contextualised on the basis of the Hindu subject matter to which such terminology refers and applies, and reassessed on the basis of the proposed conclusion that the Hind took partial shape in al-Bīrūnī’s mind as an extension of his intensive interest in, and translation of, the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali.

90 Cf. Blumenthal, H., “On Soul and Intellect”, in Gerson, L., (ed.), (1996: 82). chapter 6 Al-Nafs: The Soul in the Hind

1 Introduction

The principal passage from Kitāb Bātanjal for comparative consideration in this chapter will be that which was briefly discussed at the end of the fourth chapter:

He knows where his soul has come from and where it is going and is thus able to transfer it [soul] and move it without being stuck to the body in which the soul [now] moves freely.1

The critical context of this passage as it is found in chapter seven of the Hind will be used to argue for a continuity of method from Kitāb Bātanjal to a comprehensive assimilation in the Hind. It will also be employed to validate the suggested interpretation given earlier concerning the word taqalqala as “moves freely” rather than “harassed” as translated by Pines and Gelblum.2 The significance of translating taqalqala as “moving freely” goes to the fundamentals of the methodology of Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind. The soul’s movement within matter is the consequence of a true epistemological relationship between the soul and body in a state of “unification” rather than the “utter distinction” of the two. It is a state in which the body is a “vessel”3 and not a snare or “net”,4 thus allowing for the soul’s real engagement with the body rather than being constrained by it. The “unification” of the soul and the body, in addition to metempsychosis (see the second purpose below), is at the heart of al-Bīrūnī’s

1 wa qad ʿalima nafsahu min ayna jāʾat wa ilā ayna tadhhabu, fa-huwa qādirun ʿalayhā biʾl-naqli waʾl-taḥrīki lā yatashabbathu biʾl-badani fa-innahā muqalqalatun fīhi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 10). Cf. Sūtra iii. 38, “When The Cause Of Bondage Gets Relaxed And The Movements Of The Mind Are Known, The Mind Can Get Into Another Body”. Vyāsa on this Sūtra: “As the mind is naturally restless, on account of the latent impressions of previous actions, it gets tied up with the body … When the bonds of previous actions become weak and the movements of the mind over the nerves are known, the yogin can take out the mind from his own body and throw it into another body”. 2 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 258). 3 al-qālib. 4 al-shabaka.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004305540_008 152 chapter 6 understanding of “liberation”.5 It is the transformation of consciousness that is being represented in Kitāb Bātanjal and interpreted in the Hind, not its separation from the body. Importantly, this approach may be considered to be a challenge to the dominant understanding of the soul/matter relationship developed by the Peripatetic tradition within the Arabic philosophical heritage. The second purpose of this chapter is to establish the grounds for the proposal that there is a conscious promotion of an underlying and unifying Islamic theme common to the psychological chapters of the Hind that seems to syn- thesize information from the variously quoted Sanskrit sources under one religious banner. This argument takes its lead from the well-known passage in the introduction of the fifth chapter of the Hind entitled: “On the State of Souls and their Rebirth in the World through Metempsychosis”,6 in which metempsychosis is stated to be the “banner” of the “Indian religion” in an associative comparison with those articles of faith that characterize Islam, Christianity and Judaism:

It will be argued here that the concept of metempsychosis is not only represented as the chief distinguishing feature of the “Indian religion” as a whole, but also forms the final stage in the Islamic interpretation that al-Bīrūnī undertakes through the exploration of the content of Hindu psychology begun with the translation of Sanskrit texts on the subject including Kitāb Bātanjal.

5 al-khalāṣ. 6 fī ḥāli ʾl-arwāḥi wa taraddudihā biʾl-tanāsukhi fī ʾl-ʿālam (Hind, p. 38, l. 3). 7 kamā anna ʾl-shahādata bikalimati ʾl-ikhlāṣi shiʿāru īmāni ʾl-muslimīna waʾl-tathlītha ʿalāmatu ʾl-naṣrāniyyati waʾl-isbāta ʿalāmatu ʾl-yahūdiyyati kadhālika ʾl-tanāsukha ʿalamu ʾl-niḥlati ʾl- hindiyyati faman lam yantaḥilhu lam yakun minhā wa lam yuʿadd min jumlatihā (Hind, p. 38, l. 4). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 153

2 The Body/Soul Relationship in the Hind

It was argued earlier8 that the nature of the body/soul relationship as it is described in Kitāb Bātanjal is one in which the ultimate aim of bodily existence through a progressive process of metempsychosis is to arrive at a stage in which the soul exists in a liberated state of union with the body. To this end the interpretation of the word taqalqala in the cited passage9 as “moving freely” within the body, against the dualistic Aristotelian offering of its being “harassed”,10 seeks to support this interpretation of an existential rather than a metaphysical state of liberation. However, the argument of a non-dualistic reading of this passage as a template for an overall thematic structure that promotes a relationship between the soul and body in a state of “unification” rather than the “utter distinction” of the two based, in this instance, on the nuance placed on the translation of one word, taqalqala, is speculative to the say the least. In order for this monistic interpretation, namely, the “unification” rather than total separation of the soul and the body, to be established at the heart of the understanding of “liberation”11 both in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind in terms of a conscious continuity of method and interpretative drive, this very same passage must be used elsewhere within a context that directly supports such an interpretation and with, preferably, a substantiating comment by al-Bīrūnī himself. Usefully, this is the case with the passage under consideration which is also cited in the Hind:

He who arrives at the stage of liberation has recompensed in his physical mould his past actions and he suspends acquisition in the future. [As a result] he frees himself from the net and no longer needs his mould. He moves freely within it, without being ensnared. He is able to go wherever and whenever he wishes not in the manner that [this movement] takes place after death.12

8 See chapter five: Section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal: Liberation and Unification, a Reading. 9 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 10. 10 Suggested by Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 258). 11 al-khalāṣ. 12 waʾl muntahī ilā darajati ʾl-khalāṣi qad istawfāhā fī qālibihi ʿalā māḍī ʾl-fiʿli thumma taʿaṭṭala ʿani ʾl-iktisābi liʾl-mustaʾnafi faʾnḥalla ʿani ʾl-shabakati wa ʾstaghnā ʿani ʾl-qālibi wa taqalqala fīhi ghayra mushtabakin fahuwa qādirun ʿalā ʾl-intiqāli ilā ḥaythu aḥabba wa matā arāda lā ʿalā wajhi ʾl-mawti (Hind, p. 62, l. 14). 154 chapter 6

As will be discussed shortly, the citation is embedded in a more elucidative context that contrasts with Kitāb Bātanjal’s more deliberate interpretation of what is an already nuanced Arabic translation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali.

3 Chapter Seven of the Hind: On the Manner of Liberation from the World and the Description of the Path That Leads to It

The context of the above citation comes at the heart of the seventh chapter of the Hind as part of a long discussion on the nature of liberation as it is perceived by Hinduism, in the widest sense of the word. Following a brief introduction13 in which ignorance is cited as the chief fetter and knowledge as the only means to liberation through a process of the soul’s true perception of its infinity against the finiteness of formed matter and true discernment by its recognition of evil and suffering in what it used to consider good and pleasurable,14 a corroborative quotation cited from Kitāb Bātanjal15 lists the eight gifts that result from the individual’s achieving mokṣa.16 A Sufi parallel is next explained where an individual’s eternal soul is able to know that which is hidden in the transcendental world and to perform wonders. This is followed by a translation of Patañjali’s listing of the four degrees of knowledge17 and its association with

13 Hind, p. 51, l. 16–p. 52, l. 4. 14 liʾannahā idhā faṣṣalat ʾl-mawjūdāti biʾl-ḥudūdi ʿaqalat dhātahā wa mā lahā min sharafi ʾl-daymūmati wa li-ʾl-māddati min khissati ʾl-taghayyuri wa-ʾl-fanāʾi fiʾl-ṣuwari fastaghnat ʿanhā wa taḥaqqaqat anna mā kānat taẓunnuhu khayran wa ladhdhatan huwa sharrun wa shiddatun faḥaṣalat ʿalā ḥaqīqati ʾl-maʿrifati, “Because when it differentiates between existing things definitively it intellects itself, the dignity of its own infinity and the ignoble changeability and finitude of matter in form. It then does away with matter and verifies that what it thought was good and pleasurable is bad and painful and, thereby, arrives at the truth of knowledge”, (Hind, p. 52, l. 1). 15 Hind, p. 52, l. 5–p. 53, l. 8. 16 These eight gifts are: 1. The faculty of making one’s body so thin that it becomes invisible to the eyes. 2. The faculty of making one’s body so light that it is indifferent when it treads on thorns or mud or sand. 3. The faculty of making one’s body so big that it appears in a terrifying miraculous shape. 4. The faculty of realising every wish. 5. The faculty of knowing whatever one wishes. 6. The faculty of becoming the ruler of whatever religious community one desires. 7. That those over whom one rules are humble and obedient. 8. That all distances between a man and any far away place vanish. 17 These four degrees are: 1. The knowledge of things as to their names and qualities and distinctions. 2. Such a knowledge of things as proceeds as far as the definitions by which particulars are classed under the category of universals, but regarding which a man must al-nafs: the soul in the hind 155 mokṣa. A similar comparison ensues where knowledge according to the “book of gītā”18 is summarized through a citation that is compared with a quotation from Plato’s Phaedo.19 Just as the previous comparison with a Sufi parallel reverts to the Patañjali quotation, so too the conclusion of the same quotation from the gītā on the process of knowledge follows the Phaedo.20 A discussion of the obstacles to mokṣa is then developed using quotations from the gītā and Kitāb Sānk as well as general descriptions of Hindu doctrine, including the nine commandments of the Hindu religion that are an unmistakable echo of the ten commandments in Judaism and Christianity.21 Next, the path of liberation is initially divided into three “parts”, aqsām, using Kitāb Bātanjal as a general framework,22 though by no means the only source for explanation. The first “part”, qism, is described as the “practical”23 and includes citations translated from the Vishnu-Dharma24 and the gītā. The second part is defined as “renunciation”25 relying primarily on the gītā for explanation. The third part is worship.

4 The Part of Worship

It is the third part to the path of liberation that is of primary interest since it is in the seventh chapter of the Hind, where the taqalqala passage occurs along with the two above-mentioned corroborating stipulations. This part of worship is described as an instrument for the previous two, provided by God as the means to a graduated process towards felicity acquired whilst in a material mould and as the component of practice that causes us to grow towards perfection within the larger cycle of reincarnation:

still practise distinction. 3. This distinction disappears, and man comprehends things at once as a whole, but within time. 4. This kind of knowledge is raised above time … In this stage the intellectus and the intelligens unite with the intellectum, so as to be one and the same thing. 18 Kitāb gītā (Hind, p. 53, l. 14). 19 Hind, p. 53, l. 20. 20 Hind, p. 54, l. 7. 21 Hind, p. 56, l. 13. 22 Hind, p. 58, l. 5. 23 al-ʿamalī,(Hind, p. 58, l. 6). 24 Kitāb Bishnu Dahrm,(Hind, p. 58, l. 8). 25 al-qismu ʾl-thānī ʾl-ghufliyyu,(Hind, p. 60, l. 7). 156 chapter 6

It is known from this that the first part is an instrument of the second part. Furthermore, the third part, namely worship, follows as the instrument of both by means of which God renders liberation suitable and enables, within a bodily mould, a cumulative graduation towards felicity.26

The analysis of this third part of worship begins with a brief summary of the subject as it is described by the “author of the gītā” who, it is claimed, divided devotion into body, voice and heart.27 Incumbent on the body is fasting, prayer, fulfilment of the obligations of religious law, service to the angels and the learned among the Brahmans, bodily cleanliness, refraining from killing in all cases, and from staring at the chattels of another man be they women or otherwise.28 Incumbent on the voice is recitation, praise, adhering to the truth, soft spokenness with people, their right guidance and instruction to do good.29 Incumbent on the heart is to have upright intentions, abandon pride, adhere to patience, and to joyously marshal the senses.30 The explanation then reverts, almost unnoticeably, back to the general thematic framework provided by the Kitāb Bātanjal text where a fourth part to the path of liberation is suggested by its author, which we must assume is a reference to Patañjali:

He then adds a fourth superstitious part to it called rasāyana31 that refers to medical concoctions that have the same aim as alchemy in that they [seek to] achieve impossible things.32

26 wamaʿlūmunmindhālikaannaʾl-qismaʾl-awwalaālatunliʾl-qismiʾl-thānīthummaʾl-qismu ʾl-thālithu awlā an yakūna ālatan likilayhimā wa huwa ʾl-ʿibādatu liyuwaffiqa ʾllāhu linayli ʾl-khalāṣi wa yuʾahhilu liqālibin yunālu fīhi ʾl-tadarruju ilā ʾl-saʿādati,(Hind, p. 60, l. 15). 27 waqadqassamaʾl-ʿibādataṣāḥibugītāʿalāʾl-badaniwaʾl-ṣawtiwaʾl-qalbi,(Hind, p. 60, l. 18). 28 fa-ʿalā ʾl-badani ʾl-ṣawmu waʾl-ṣalātu wa mūjibātu ʾl-sharīʿati wa khidmatu ʾl-malāʾikati wa ʿulamāʾi ʾl-barāhimati wa tanẓīfu ʾl-badani waʾl-tabarruʾu mina ʾl-qatli aṣlan wa min mulāḥaẓati mā liʾl-ghayri mina ʾl-nisāʾi wa ghayrihinna,(Hind, p. 60, l. 19). 29 wa ʿalā ʾl-ṣawti ʾl-qirāʾatu waʾl-tasbīḥu wa luzūmu ʾl-ṣidqi wa mulāyanatu ʾl-nāsi wa irshādi- him wa amrihim biʾl-maʿrūfi,(Hind, p. 61, l. 1). 30 wa ʿalā ʾl-qalbi taqwīmu ʾl-niyyati wa tarku ʾl-taʿaẓẓumi wa luzūmu ʾl-taʾannī wa jamʿu ʾl-ḥawāssi maʿa inshirāḥi ʾl-ṣadri,(Hind, p. 61, l. 3). 31 thumma ʾttabaʿahā biqismin rābiʿin kharāfiyyin yusammā “rasāyana” wa hiya tadābīrun biʾadwiyatin tajrī majrā ʾl-kīmīyāʾi fī taḥṣīli ʾl-mumtanaʿāti bihā. wa sayajīʾu lahā dhikrun wa laysa lahā bihādha ʾl-fanni ittiṣālun illā min jihati ʾl-ʿazīmati wa taṣḥīḥi ʾl-niyyati biʾl-taṣdīqi lahā waʾl-saʿī fī taḥṣīlihā,(Hind, p. 61, l. 4). 32 Compare with the fourth section of KitābBātanjal where rasāyana is described as the third means to achieving zahāda or asceticism: waʾl-thālithu an yanālahā bitanāwuli “rasāyana” wa hiya ʾl-adwiyatu waʾl-ʿilājātu ʾl-mawṣūfatu lidhālika, “The third [way] is for him to al-nafs: the soul in the hind 157

5 Islamic Characteristics Attributed to the Hindu “God”

The framework of comparison and analysis becomes more obviously reliant on Kitāb Bātanjal in the lead up to the taqalqala passage in question cited in the Hind. Indeed, the statement that is now made and supported by a citation from Kitāb Bātanjal strikes a key theme by directly relating liberation with unification and thus sets the conceptual tone for the previous and consequent psychological analysis in clear monistic terms. Furthermore, it is noteworthy within the Islamic frame of interpretation that al-Bīrūnī maintains throughout, that an unambiguous association is drawn between the Hindu notion of a psychological holism and the theological self-sufficiency or incomparability of God, an Islamic and distinctly Muslim tenet, though not exclusively so. This statement that “their belief that liberation is unification” including a direct reference to “Allāh’s” attributes raises many questions about the moti- vations of the text of the Hind and the nature of the debate being undertaken given such conscious mergers of general and specific Muslim doctrines with Hindu beliefs through the filter of translated sources and inferential statements:

Indeed33 they [the Hindus] believe that liberation is achieved through unification since Allāh is beyond hope of reward or fear of punishment. He is past thoughts because He lies above abhorrent dissimilarities and desirable likenesses. He is knowing in Himself, not through accidental knowledge that He was once ignorant of. This too, according to them [the Hindus], is the description of the one who is liberated and whose only difference from Him lies in [his] origin.34

acquire it by ingesting rasāyana which are medicines and treatments prescribed for this [purpose]”, (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 193, l. 9). 33 wainnamādhahabūfīʾl-khalāṣiilāʾl-ittiḥādiliʾannaʾllāhamustaghninʿantaʾmīlimukāfātin aw khashiyati munāwātin, barīʾun ʿani ʾl-afkāri litaʿālīhi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi ʾl-makrūhati waʾl- andādi ʾl-maḥbūbati, ʿālimun bidhātihi lā biʿilmin ṭāriʾin limā lam yakun lahu bimaʿlūmin fī ḥālin mā, wa hādhā ayḍan ṣifatu ʾl-mutakhalliṣi ʿindahum fa-lā yanfaṣilu ʿanhu fīhā illā biʾl-mabdaʾi,(Hind, p. 61, l. 7). 34 Compare with the Kitāb Bātanjal source passage: qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: man hādha ʾl-maʿbūdu ʾl- muwaffiqu? Qāla ʾl-mujību: huwa ʾllāhu ʾl-mustaghnī biazaliyyatihi wa waḥdāniyyatihi ʿan fiʿlin al-mukāfaʾatu ʿalayhi birāḥatin tuʾammalu wa turtajā aw shiddatin tukhāfu wa tuttaqā, waʾl barīʾu ʿani ʾl-afkāri litaʿālīhi ʿani ʾl-aḍdādi ʾl-makrūhati waʾl-andādi ʾl-maḥbūbati waʾl- ʿālimu bidhātihi sarmadan idhi ʾl-ʿilmu ʾl-ṭāriʾu yakūnu limā lam yakun bimaʿlūmin wa laysa ʾl-jahlu bimuttajahin ʿalayhi fī waqtin mā aw ḥāl. Qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: idhā kāna ʾl-mutakhalliṣu 158 chapter 6

It is difficult to ignore that the underlying argument in this favourable description of the Hindus’ belief in characteristically Islamic terms and, in certain respects, through reference to a Muslim God is their concept of a non- dualistic psychology that leads to liberation. This concept becomes a valid idea all the more worthy of serious consideration within the then Muslim debate on the subject. Having proposed the debatable principle that the Hindus maintain belief in the concept of unification as the means to liberation, the profile of Kitāb Bātanjal as the supporting source and framework for this argument is vis- ibly raised by means of lengthy citations. Furthermore, this choice has a striking interpretative significance given the clearly non-dualistic tendency of the context. This supports the view that Kitāb Bātanjal, as an analytical translation, betrays a monistic philosophical colour that may have been drawn as much from the relied-on Sanskrit original text as it is imposed by the monotheistic structure and Islamic frame of the Arabic rendition. Finally, and as a further corroboration of the non-dualistic trend within the context of this section of the Hind, there is the conspicuous absence at this point of any reference to Kitāb Sānk, the Arabic translation of the samkhya text. Although not extant, Kitāb Sānk, on the basis of citations to be found in the Hind, seems to have generally reflected a more abstract metaphysical form of the samkhya system. Its overtly dualistic theory regarding the differentiation and separation of soul from matter appears to have been generally downplayed, as is evidenced here, for example, by the preference for Kitāb Bātanjal as the supporting psychological primary source.

muttaṣafan bihādhihi ʾl-awṣāfi famā ʾl-farqu baynahu wa bayna ʾllāhi subḥānahu? Qāla ʾl- mujību: al-farqu baynahumā anna ʾl-mutakhalliṣa yakūnu kadhālika fī ʾl-zamāni ʾl-rāhini wa fī ʾl-zamāni ʾl-mustaʾnafi dūna ʾl-māḍī ʾl-mutaqaddimi likhalāṣihi, “The questioner said: who is this worshipped one who provides succour? Patañjali answered: He is Allāh who in His Eternity and Oneness is beyond action whose reward is hoped and longed-for rest or dreaded and feared hardship. He is past thoughts because He lies above abhorrent dissimilarities and desirable likenesses, and is eternally knowing in Himself since accidental knowledge is for that which was not known, nor is ignorance applicable to Him in any given time or place. The questioner said: if the one who is liberated is thus characterised then what is the difference between himself and Allāh who is exalted? Patañ- jali answered: the difference between them is that the liberated one is so in the present and the future but not in the past which preceded his liberation”, (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 12). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 159

6 Liberation, Divine Unification, and Knowledge

Subsequent to this above discussion is a development in which a psychological description of the soul’s liberation is imbedded within the metaphysical implications of the immediately preceding citation from Kitāb Bātanjal with its theological Islamic doctrine of the indivisibility and inimitability of the Divine. Liberation is thus understood to be derived from the divine characteristic of unification that is also psychologically attainable in the form of the existential freedom of the soul within matter through proper discernment and right knowledge:

For he was not in this state [of liberation] in pre-eternity since he was before it [this state of liberation] in a state of entanglement, knowing that which is knowable as a shadow acquired by [intellectual] exertion, while that which he knows [remains] shrouded. As for when he is in the state of liberation the shrouds are raised, the covers removed, the hindrances are severed, and the Self [becomes] knowing without a desire to recognize anything that is hidden, and [becomes] separated from the oblivion of what is sensed whilst united with the eternity of what is intellected.35

Perhaps more important than the role of knowledge in the process towards this state of liberation is the nature of the knowledge that is required. The distinction is immediately noticeable in the above citation through the contrast of a knowledge that is achieved through ijtihād, or intellectual exertion, and an uninhibited, disinterested yogic knowledge within the Self that is united with the eternal intelligibilia and unhindered by the finitude of sensibilia. Although the nature of knowledge is all-important in the process towards achieving true liberation, the fact that this process takes place and is attainable in time and whilst in matter is the significant yogic contribution to the Arabic psychological discourse of the time. The yogic view that liberation is inseparable from self cognition is finely conveyed here in the psychology of the Hind where the interrelatedness of theology, metaphysics and the individual is described in terms of

35 fainnahu lam yakun fī ʾl-azali ʾl-mutaqaddimi kadhālika min ajli annahu kāna qablahu fī maḥalli ʾl-irtibāki ʿāliman biʾl-maʿlūmi wa ʿilmuhu kaʾl-khayāli muktasabun biʾl-ijtihādi wa maʿlūmuhu fī ḍamāni ʾl-sitri, wa ammā fī maḥalli ʾl-khalāṣi faʾl-sutūru marfūʿatun waʾl- aghṭiyatu makshūfatun waʾl-mawāniʿu maqṭūʿatun waʾl-dhātu ʿālimatun ghayru ḥarīṣatin ʿalā taʿarrufi shayʾin khafiyyin munfaṣilatun ʿani ʾl-maḥsūsāti ʾl-dāthirati muttaḥidatun biʾl- maʿqūlāti ʾl-dāʾimati,(Hind, p. 61, l. 11). 160 chapter 6 various levels of equivalence between unification and liberation and their connection with a particular state of knowledge. It is Patañjali’s philosophy of the soul that is here preferred and represented, in contradistinction to samkhyan dualism and those dualistic trends within contemporary Arabic discourse. As a pragmatic and experiential approach to achieve liberation by dealing with the whole individual as both spirit and matter, it is one whose practical degree of sophistication moves beyond the abstraction of a dualistic finality to the actual possibility of liberation for an individual in real time, matter and space. Having described the process by which liberation is attained, the focus of attention subsequently shifts to the nature of the state of liberation. The intro- ductory corroborative citation, in line with the general conceptual approach of the text, is taken, with one minor (though still significant) omission and one addition, from the concluding question and response in Kitāb Bātan- jal:

For this reason the postulant asked at the conclusion of Kitāb Bātanjal about how liberation is brought about. [Patañjali] answered: you can say that it [liberation] is the cessation of the three forces and their return to the source from which they had issued. Or you can just as well say that it is the return of the soul in a state of knowing to its nature.36

The original passage in Kitāb Bātanjal, from which the above citation in the Hind derives, reveals that the nature of the state of liberation is directly related to the suspension of action in the three primary forces:37

q. 78. The postulant said: how is liberation [brought about]?

[Patañjali] answered: you can say that it [liberation] is the suspension of the three primary forces from their activity and their return to the source from which they had come. Or you can just as well say that it is the return of the soul to its nature.38

36 wa lidhālika saʾala ʾl-sāʾilu fī khātimati Kitāb Bātanjal ʿan kayfiyyati ʾl-khalāṣi? Qāla ʾl- mujību: in shiʾta faqul huwa taʿaṭṭulu ʾl-quwā ʾl-thalāthi wa ʿawduhā ilā ʾl-maʿdini ʾlladhī ṣadarat ʿanhu, wa in shiʾta faqul huwa rujūʿu ʾl-nafsi ʿālimatan ilā ṭibāʿihā,(Hind, p. 61, l. 16). 37 taʿaṭṭulu ʾl-quwā ʾl- thalāthi ʾl-uwali ʿan fiʿlihā,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 20). 38 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: kayfa ʾl-khalāṣi? Qāla ʾl-mujību: in shiʾta faqul huwa taʿaṭṭulu ʾl-quwā ʾl- thalāthi ʾl-uwali ʿan fiʿlihā wa ʿawduhā ilā ʾl-maʿdini ʾlladhī wafadat minhu, wa in shiʾta faqul huwa rujūʿu ʾl-nafsi ilā ṭibāʿihā,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 19). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 161

This concept of the suspension of action in the three primary forces as one of the two ways39 by which liberation is brought about is omitted in the Hind citation that modifies the original phrase by omitting the words “action” and “primary” reducing it to the “cessation of the three forces”.40 Surprisingly, Sachau’s translation of taʿaṭṭulu as “cessation”41 is given despite his being unaware of the additional details of the original passage in Kitāb Bātanjal because he did not have access to the original manuscript of this text.42 Nevertheless, Sachau’s sensitivity to the implied nuance of the word taʿaṭṭulu leads him to an interpretative elaboration of the Arabic phrase taʿaṭṭulu ʾl-quwā ʾl-thalāthi in the Hind citation43 that he renders as: “the cessation of the functions of thethreeforces”.44 Clearly “functions” is not a direct translation of any Arabic word in the Hind citation. It would seem that Sachau’s expertise in the Arabic language and sensitivity to the nuance in the choice of the word taʿaṭṭulu led him to sense the presence of a hiatus in this phrase that he sought to fill by adding the apparently required word “functions”. The presence of the missing phrase ʿan fiʿlihā45 in Kitāb Bātanjal exactly reflects the word “functions” that Sachau supplies in his translation of this citation in the Hind. In this light Sachau’s translation of the word taʿaṭṭulu by “cessation” seems to offer a compromise meaning between the sense of utter “annulment” that the Arabic taʿaṭṭulu does not carry46 and “suspension” that is not justified in the Hind version of the citation even though

39 The in shiʾta faqul … in shiʾta faqul construction seems to suggest either that there are two ways of thinking or “speaking” about liberation or that there are two ways by which liberation is achieved. 40 “Suspension” for the Kitāb Bātanjal passage and “cessation” for the modified version of the same citation in the Hind is a more accurate translation of taʿaṭṭulu in the two texts that reflects the change in nuance due to the discussed omissions in the Hind citation. Pines and Gelblum render taʿaṭṭulu as “annulment” for both the Kitāb Bātanjal passage (1989: 271) and the equivalent Hind citation which they quote and translate in footnote 153 of their translation of the fourth chapter of Kitāb Bātanjal (1989: 303). 41 Sachau, 1910, vol. i: 81. 42 The original manuscript of this text was in fact only discovered twelve years after Sachau’s translation by Louis Massignon in 1922 and only later prepared and published by H. Ritter in 1956. See Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966: 302–303). 43 Hind, p. 61, l. 18. 44 “Functions” is not italicized in Sachau’s translation, however, the following phrase “the three forces” is (1910, vol. i: 81). 45 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 20. 46 See for example: Hava, J.G., Al-Farāʾid Arabic-English Dictionary. Beirut, Dar el-Mashreq, 1982, p. 481, where taʿaṭṭala is given the sense “to be unemployed” or “impaired” or “ne- glected” rather than “annulment” which is given by Pines and Gelblum. 162 chapter 6

Sachau seems to lean towards this second sense. This tendency evidenced by his insertion of the supplementary word “functions” reshapes the meaning of the phrase “cessation of the functions of the three forces” and implies the possibility that this cessation is not necessarily a permanent one. Such a tempering in the meaning of the Hind citation is, strictly speaking, inaccurate if one were to simply consider the passage prima facie without taking into consideration the original passage in Kitāb Bātanjal since it is the “cessation of the three forces”47 themselves that the grammatical structure of the Arabic citation, as it stands in the Hind, must denote. An accurate translation of taʿaṭṭulu in Kitāb Bātanjal is “the suspension of the three primary forces from their activity”, and the change in nuance in the Hind, the result of the omitted phrase, al-uwalu ʿan fiʿlihā, discussed above, is best translated as “the cessation of the three forces”. This change in meaning, achieved through the omission of the above phrase, reflects an interpretative development from the original passage to the citation in which the “three primary forces” whose “activity” is suspended in Kitāb Bātanjal now “cease” in themselves—that is, from suspending their function in the first passage the three forces themselves now no longer function at all in the Hind citation. This interpretative development reinforces the importance of the second definition of liberation relating to the soul and expressed in the latter half of the construction beginning with the second in shiʾta faqul. Here we witness a second interpretative development that reinforces the second definition of liberation, this time through an addition of a word rather than an omission. The second definition of liberation as found in the Kitāb Bātanjal passage states that “it [liberation] is the return of the soul to its nature” that is in close concordance with the second half of Sūtra iv.34: “Or When the Absolute Consciousness is Established in its Own Nature”48 and like its Sanskrit source makes no mention of knowledge let alone knowledge attributed to the soul. More emphatically still is Vyāsa’s commentary on Sūtra iv. 34 in which he clearly stresses the intellect’s absence: “In other words, when the supreme Consciousness is established in His own self, i.e. the absolute consciousness is unrelated to or unconcerned with the intellect”.49 It is interesting that both in Ritter’s Arabic edition of Kitāb Bātanjal and in the translation by Pines and Gelblum the word ʿālimatan50 rendered “endowed with knowledge”51 is

47 taʿaṭṭulu ʾl-quwā ʾl-thalāthi,(Hind, p. 61, l. 18). 48 Sadakhas, Patanjali’s Yoga Sutras. Bombay, 1995, p. 202. 49 Ibid. 50 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 21. 51 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1989: 271). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 163 introduced from the equivalent but chronologically later citation in the Hind. This addition does not take into account the development in epistemological interpretation that has taken place from the former passage in Kitāb Bātanjal to the latter citation in the Hind.52 Furthermore, Pines and Gelblum support their insertion of “endowed with knowledge” in the Kitāb Bātanjal passage by citing an earlier passage that they argue carries the same “view”, namely, that “al-Bīrūnī appears to attribute knowledge to the soul (puruṣa) in the state of kaivalya (‘wholeness, perfection’ i.e. liberation)”.53 This earlier corroborative passage, however, does not in fact refer to the “soul”, al-nafs, but rather to the “self”, al-dhāt, nor does it refer to “liberation”, al-khalāṣ, but rather the “locus of liberation”, maqarri ʾl-khalāṣi:

However, in the locus of liberation the covers are removed, the veils lifted, and the impediments undone, and in this locus the self is in a [state of] knowing, nothing but.54

Secondly, Pines and Gelblum seek proof that ʿālimatan should indeed be inserted into the Kitāb Bātanjal passage by relying on a quotation taken from “Śankara Bhagavatpāda in his Pātañjalayo-gasūtrabhāṣyavivarana”, who, they argue, is referring “to the doctrine of the school of Yoga when he says (on ys, sutra 4.33(34)): ‘Some (people) consider that kaivalya consists in the attainment of the attribute of being equal to God in the matter of omniscience and so forth’”.55 Elsewhere, Pines and Gelblum expressly note the influence of the commentary by Vyāsa on al-Bīrūnī’s Kitāb Bātanjal,56 in addition to the influence of a later ancillary sub-commentary by Śankara Bhagavatpāda on Vyāsa (by their admission and use).57 Thus, despite their arguments against both

52 Pines and Gelblum expressly defend Ritter’s insertion of ʿālimatan as well as their inclusion of its English rendition which they give as “endowed with knowledge” in footnote 152 of their translation, (1989: 302). 53 Ibid., (1989: 265). 54 wa ammā fī maqarri ʾl-khalāṣi faʾl-aghṭiyatu munkashifatun waʾl-sutūru marfūʿatun waʾl- mawāniʿu maqṭūʿatun, wa-laysati ʾl-dhātu fīhi illā ʿālimatun faqaṭ.(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 16). 55 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1989: 266). 56 Cf. for example: “In fact al-Bīrūnī’s text has more in common with Veda-vyāsa’s commentary than with that of Bhoja Rāja”. Ibid., (1966: 304). 57 Cf. for example ibid., (1989: 298), footnote 108: “For the simile of the ‘lamp’ here cf. Śankara Bhagavatpāda on Vy. loc. cit. [Vy. introducing ys, sutra 4.18 (19)]”. Cf. also ibid. (1989: 276), where Śankara Bhagavatpāda’s Pātañjalayo-gasūtrabhāṣyavivarana is listed under ‘Subcommentaries.’ 164 chapter 6

Garbe and Ritter who attribute the unidentified commentary used by al-Bīrūnī to an early non-extant version of Vyāsa’s,58 they, nevertheless, admit to unmistakable resemblances in certain passages. However, they explain this as repetition and borrowing from a common tradition:

Thus al-Bīrūnī’s translation of certain passages has an unmistakable resemblance to Veda-vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya … But these similarities can be explained as normal repetition due to borrowing from a common tradition.59

And yet the fact remains that Pines and Gelblum rely heavily on Vyāsa’s commentary in the greater portion of their elucidatory footnotes precisely because the extant version of this commentary is clearly the closest to that text or the oral tradition that al-Bīrūnī was relying on when composing his Kitāb Bātanjal and explaining its intricacies. Thus in the case of the passage in question from Kitāb Bātanjal there is a clear logical inconsistency in introducing the word ʿālimatan from the equivalent but later citation to be found in the Hind and then proceeding to defend this insertion with a supporting sub-commentary, especially since Vyāsa’s explanation of Sūtra iv. 34 so emphatically stresses the intellect’s irrelevance in this Sūtra (as was discussed above). What is more, to overlook the absence of the word ʿālimatan in the Kitāb Bātanjal passage that is unmistakably in harmony with Vyāsa’s commentary on the corresponding Sūtra, and whose absence is further underlined by contrast with its insertion in the equivalent Hind citation, is to discount the continuum of contextual, methodological and interpretative development from Kitāb Bātanjal to the Hind. This is the result of a process by al-Bīrūnī of contemplation, understanding and translation of the Yoga-Sūtra from his earlier Arabic explanatory text to his later expository and exploratory Hind. Thirdly, Pines and Gelblum seek to support the insertion of ʿālimatan in their translation of the Kitāb Bātanjal passage by once again referring to the Hind, in this case the context that precedes the citation, where they state that: “The idea that the liberated one is equal to God and endowed with knowledge also occurs in al-Bīrūnī’s India (Hyd., p. 61 11. 7–16; transl. Suchau [sic.] i, 81)”.Closer scrutiny of this reference reveals not only that the passage immediately preceding the citation is taken from Kitāb Bātanjal but that it is also an undeclared citation with alterations:

58 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1966: 303–304). 59 Ibid., (1966: 303). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 165

Before liberation he existed in the world of entanglement, knowing the objects of knowledge only by a phantasmagoric kind of knowing that he had acquired by absolute exertion, whilst the object of his knowing is still covered, as it were, by a veil. On the contrary, in the world of liberation all veils are lifted, all covers taken off, and obstacles removed. There the being is absolutely knowing, not desirous of learning anything unknown, separated from the soiled perceptions of the senses, united with the everlasting ideas.60

Sachau’s translation is largely accurate, however it also reveals that a number of words are cursorily translated partly due to the fact that he did not know the Kitāb Bātanjal manuscript. His translation, for example, of maḥall61 as “world” on the two occasions that it occurs in the passage would certainly have been amended had he known that in the Kitāb Bātanjal text on the same two occasions the words maḥall,62 “place”, and maqarr,63 “locus”, are given and thus identify the intended meaning more precisely. Further, his translation of al-dhāt64 as “the being” does not reflect the close association in the use of this Arabic word in Kitāb Bātanjal with the Sanskrit puruṣa (“self/seer”) that is demonstrated on a number of other instances.65 It is the case, in fact, that the original passage in Kitāb Bātanjal has already been used by Pines and Gelblum as part of their argument (see above) to support their insertion of the word ʿālimatan. Indeed, we find once again that the continuum of interpretation and conceptual development in al-Bīrūnī’s writings, from the earlier to the later, seems not to have been taken into consideration. This undeclared citation in the Hind, bearing significant differences from the original passage, should not be used in support of the inclusion of the word ʿālimatan in Kitāb Bātanjal, which is only found in the later text of the Hind as illustrated above. The citations from the later Hind that are derived from the earlier Kitāb Bātanjal text are not interchangeable since the differences to be found between them result from a development of epistemological, philosophical and argumenta-

60 Sachau, 1910, vol. i: 81. 61 Hind, p. 61, l. 12/13. 62 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 14. 63 Ibid., p. 181, l. 16. 64 Hind, p. 61, l. 14. 65 For example, cf. Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 286), footnote 182: “ʿarifa dhātahu biʾl- ḥaqīqati ‘knows his own self in its true reality’ corresponds to puruṣa-jñānam: ‘knowledge of the self’ in Sūtra 3.35. In this sentence dhāt (and not nafs) corresponds to puruṣa”. 166 chapter 6 tive reasoning. They are not purely philological variations that may be treated as entirely transposable allowing the possibility of reading “back” from the later text to the earlier. Finally, Pines and Gelblum, in support of their insertion of the word ʿāli- matan in the Kitāb Bātanjal text, quote from Īśvarakrṣna’s Sānkhyakārikā, kā- rikā 65:

Thereby (i.e., by means of kevalam iñānam, “the perfect, complete, total knowledge” mentioned in the preceding kārikā; cf. Guaḍapāda’s Bhāṣya ad loc.) the puruṣa, retaining its own nature, abiding in itself. (v. 1: well- composed, confident) standing as spectator, looks at the prakrti that, having divested itself of the seven forms (cf. sk, kārikā 63), has ceased to evolve, its purpose (having been achieved).66

The purpose of this quotation, and those that are provided from other commentaries as well as from Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind, is to show that “some Yoga and Sāmkhya authors maintained that the puruṣa in the state of kaivalya was endowed with knowledge that was not unconscious”.67 Although this is not in doubt with regard to some of the commentaries on the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañ- jali, such an interpretation cannot then be automatically ascribed to al-Bīrūnī nor comprehensively applied to the texts of Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind simply on the basis of the word ʿālimatan inserted into the amended citation found in the Hind. As will be presently illustrated, the insertion of ʿālimatan has the exact opposite purpose, namely, to differentiate between the positions regarding the subject of liberation discussed in the Sāmkhya of Kapila and the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali as interpreted by al-Bīrūnī who translated both works into Arabic. Further, the analysis of this difference between the two works, that is partly due to the insertion of ʿālimatan, will also reveal that this particular change in the citation taken from Kitāb Bātanjal, as with many others, is an epistemological rather than a merely philological variation.

66 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1989: 3). 67 Ibid. al-nafs: the soul in the hind 167

7 The Nature of Liberation According to Kitāb Bātanjal and Kitāb Sānk

After the amended citation from KitābBātanjal in which the nature of the soul’s state of liberation is described in two possible ways, an interesting development in the explanation ensues in which the authors of Kitāb Bātanjal and KitābSānk are shown by al-Bīrūnī to differ in opinion regarding the definition of the individual who has attained such a level of liberation.68 Thus the phrase wa qadikhtalafaʾl-rajulānifīmanḥaṣalatlahurutbatuʾl-khalāṣi clearly emphasizes at the outset of a series of citations from the two texts a difference of opinion between the author of Kitāb Sānk and that of Kitāb Bātanjal on liberation according to al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of his two translated texts. Indeed, the following quotations from Kitāb Bātanjal and Kitāb Sānk reveal that a differentiation is being carefully set out by al-Bīrūnī between these two authors’ interpretation of the subject of liberation and its attainment based on the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the soul. This argument contrasts with Pines and Gelblum’s opinion which seems to suggest that al-Bīrūnī does not differentiate between yoga and samkhya on this subject and it is for this reason that they support Ritter’s insertion of ʿālimatan in the Kitāb Bātanjal passage analysed above. That is, they seem to assume that al-Bīrūnī’s translations exactly reflect his personal position or interpretation as they understand it to be. Yet it would be more accurate to argue that al-Bīrūnī first translates the relevant Sanskrit texts of Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal then uses these translations to elucidate his interpretative reading of Hindu psychology as developed in the Hind. The first contrary opinion given for the purpose of illustrative contrast is what al-Bīrūnī cites from his Kitāb Sānk:

The two men differ regarding the one who has attained the level of liberation. The hermit in Kitāb Sānk asked: “Why does death not occur with the cessation of action?” The sage answered: “This is because separation requires a certain spiritual state whilst the soul is in the body. Their separation only takes place through a natural state that divides their union. It

68 This reading differs from that of Sachau who suggests for: wa qad ikhtalafa ʾl-rajulānifīman ḥaṣalat lahu rutbatu ʾl-khalāṣi,(Hind, p. 61, l. 19), “The two men, pupil and master, disagree regarding him who has arrived at the stage of liberation”. However, it is clear from the subsequent citations that the two men are the authors of Kitāb Sānk and of Kitāb Bātanjal and not the questioner and sage of the quotation from Kitāb Sānk who do not in fact display a sustained difference of opinion, but rather a negative question is posited in order to induce a detailed explanatory response. 168 chapter 6

is possible that the effect remains for a period after the disappearance of the cause during which time it grows colder, receding to the point when it disappears. This is similar to a silk-weaver who rotates his wheel with a stick until it is spinning then leaves it. It does not come to a rest when the rotating stick is withdrawn rather its movement begins to decrease little by little until it stops. In similar fashion the effect [of action] remains in the body after action has stopped until natural force comes to an end through [a process of] tensing and slackening and the effect of previous [action] disappears leading to complete liberation upon the casting away of the body”.69

What is immediately noticeable in this citation is the absence of any discussion of the relationship between liberation and the soul’s attainment of knowledge. Indeed, a lexical review of the citation reveals no mention of the word liberation, al-khalāṣ, in relation to a soul’s state of knowledge, ʿālimatan; what is more, references to knowledge are entirely absent. The discussion of the soul’s attainment of liberation and how this may be brought about according to Kitāb Sānk is clearly not given as an epistemological process but rather as a physiological one. In this regard a clear differentiation is being set out between “the two men”, namely, the authors of Kitāb Bātanjal and Kitāb Sānk. Thus, liberation according to Kitāb Sānk is the result of both a spiritual and a natural state in which the “spiritual state” (of liberation), ḥālatun nafsāniyyatun, is directly dependent on the attainment of a certain “natural state”, ḥālun ṭabīʿiyyun, and not at all related to the soul’s attainment of a state of knowledge. This natural state that leads to the spiritual state of liberation is described in physiological terms, in which liberation is understood uniquely to be the result of the soul’s physical separation from the body. The salient difference of view between what is expressed in this citation and that which is later given from Kitāb Bātanjal may be presently anticipated when one considers that in the latter liberation is

69 wa qadi ʾkhtalafa ʾl-rajulāni fīman haṣalat lahu rutbatu ʾl-khalāṣi, fasaʾala ʾl-nāsiku fī Kitābi Sānk lima lā yakūna ʾl-mawtu ʿinda ʾnqiṭāʿi ʾl-fiʿli? Qāla ʾl-ḥakīmu: min ajli anna ʾl-mūjiba liʾl-infiṣāli ḥālatun nafsāniyyatun waʾl-rūḥu baʿdu fī ʾl-badani wa lā yufarraq baynahumā illā ḥālun ṭabīʿiyyun mufarriqun liʾl-iltiʾāmi wa rubbamā baqiyā ʾl-taʾthīru baʿda zawāli ʾl- muʾaththiri muddatan yafturu fīhā wa yatarājaʿu ilā an yafniyā mithla ʾl-ḥarrāri ʾlladhī yudīru dawwāratahu bikhashabatin ḥattā yaḥtadda dawarānuhā thumma yatrikuhā wa laysat taskunu maʿa izālati ʾl-khashabati ʾl-mudīrati ʿanhā wa innamā yafturu ḥarakatuhā qalīlan qalīlan ilā an tabṭula fakadhālika ʾl-badanu baʿda ʾrtifāʿi ʾl-fiʿli yabqā fīhi ʾl-atharu ḥattā yanṣarifa fīʾl-shiddati waʾl-rāḥati ilā ʾnqiṭāʿi ʾl-quwwati ʾl-ṭabīʿīyyati wa fanāʾi ʾl-athari ʾl-mutaqaddimi fayakūnu kamālu ʾl-khalāṣi ʿinda ʾnjidāli ʾl-badani.(Hind, p. 61, l. 19). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 169 described in terms of the soul’s state of knowing whether or not physical separation has taken place. Hence, the “natural state” referred to in Kitāb Sānk, that is the prerequisite necessary for the soul’s “spiritual state” of liberation through its physical separation from the body or “casting the body away [or earthward]”, injidālu ʾl-badani, is described as being the cessation of the “effect”, al-atharu of “action”, al-fiʿlu in the body and the consequent ending of “natural force”, al- quwwatu ʾl-ṭabīʿīyyatu. It is only when this natural force comes to an end that the “complete liberation” of the soul, kamālu ʾl-khalāṣi, is attained not through any intellectual or epistemological process but rather through a purely physical one where it finally casts the body away. The conclusion to be drawn from this citation is that it represents a passage taken by al-Bīrūnī from his Kitāb Sānk in order to reveal two different points of view each of which he initially identifies as maintained by one of “the two men”, Sānk and Bātanjal, on the subject of the attainment of liberation, although this initial dichotomy is quickly nuanced by al-Bīrūnī. Indeed, these two points of view are anticipated in the passage quoted above from Kitāb Bātanjal where two possible answers to this question are given. The first answer, which might now be understood as the physiological answer, is that liberation is the result of a cessation of the three (primary) forces (from their activity) and their return to the source from which they had issued. It closely relates to this Kitāb Sānk citation where it is the effect of action that must disappear in the body before “complete liberation” can be attained. What is implied by such a citation is that complete liberation, according to al-Bīrūnī’s reading of samkhya in his Kitāb Sānk, is impossible without actual separation between the body and the soul once action has ceased and the effects of action have completely disappeared. In this regard it would appear that al-Bīrūnī’s desire to differentiate between the “two men” results from his understanding that numerous philosophical differences exist between yoga and samkhya. Samkhya, as has been argued in earlier chapters, relies primarily on the exercise of the discernment of puruṣa/spirit from prakrti/matter on the basis of categories of differentiation and is, in harmony with this interpretation, presented to us by al-Bīrūnī, through the citation given from Kitāb Sānk, in strictly dualistic terms. The second answer, on the other hand, where liberation is understood in terms of “the return of the soul in a state of knowing to its nature”, is clearly epistemological and, as was discussed above, is consciously intended to be so given al-Bīrūnī’s emphatic insertion of the word ʿālimatan, “knowing”, into the original Kitāb Bātanjal phrase. Thus, the quotation, analysed below, cited from his Kitāb Bātanjal has the purpose of reflecting and elaborating on this second epistemological understanding of liberation suggesting on the face of it that al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal establishes a 170 chapter 6 bipolar differentiation. Al-Bīrūnī’s reading of yoga through the citation that he consequently gives from his Kitāb Bātanjal reveals a level of sophistication that takes the reader beyond the theoretical level of dualistic finality to be found in his presentation of samkhya to the actual possibility of real liberation by suggesting that the soul may attain complete liberation whilst still in the body. Thus, by illustrating this conscious and interpretative differentiation between the translated texts of “the two men” through the analysis of these two contrasting citations given in the Hind as an example of such, it will be argued that al-Bīrūnī actively chose to emphasise the methodology of Patañjali’s yoga, as he deduces it, when describing his view of the Hindu understanding of the soul, over the dualistic metaphysics of samkhya. As a consequent conclusion, we surmise that al-Bīrūnī was actively engaged in a process of creatively reading and interpreting these Sanskrit texts rather than merely translating and citing from them. Before the second citation from Kitāb Bātanjal is given, however, al-Bīrūnī seems intent on nuancing the dichotomy described by highlighting the fact that both opinions concerning the attainment of liberation are addressed in Kitāb Bātanjal. This is revealed in his citation where the response to the question regarding how liberation is brought about suggests the two possible answers: one physiological, the other epistemological.70 Yet, we suggest that according to al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation, as set out in his Hind, although both opinions are considered only the second71 is in fact maintained and developed further in Kitāb Bātanjal whereas the first72 remains an unfulfilled option. Al- Bīrūnī explains:

Moreover, in Kitāb Bātanjal that which bears supporting witness in semblance of what has been cited above [from Kitāb Sānk] is his [Bātanjal’s] reference to a man who has restrained his feelings and [five] senses in the manner that a tortoise withdraws its limbs when it is afraid. Such a man is not bound because the bond has been loosened nor is he liberated because he still has his body with him.73

70 Hind, p. 61, l. 16. 71 Liberation through the return of the soul in a state of knowing to its nature. 72 Liberation through the cessation of the three forces and their return to the source from which they had issued. 73 wa amma fī Kitābi Bātanjal faʾlladhi yashhadu limithli mā taqaddama qawluhu fīman qabaḍa ḥawāssahu wa mashāʿirahu qabḍa ʾl-sulaḥfāti aʿḍāʾahā ʿinda ʾl-khawfi. Innahu laysa bimawthūqin liʾannahu ḥalla ʾl-ribāṭa wa lā mutakhalliṣin liʾanna badanahu maʿahu.(Hind, p. 62, l. 10). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 171

What is immediately noticeable in Sachau’s translation of this passage is that he mistakenly considers the latter part of it to be a direct quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal.74 The most obvious reason for this would seem that he had earlier interpreted the difference between the “two men” referred to in the text as being one between “pupil and master” introducing the latter explicatory phrase in his translation where no Arabic equivalent is to be found. Thus, the logical consequence according to this reading is that an internal difference must exist in the dialogue between the “pupil and master” in each of the two texts, Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal, that al-Bīrūnī then cites from. This, however, cannot be the case in the Kitāb Sānk citation where the question of the hermit and answer of the sage do not reflect a difference of opinion. On the contrary, an elaboration is requested by the hermit from the sage regarding what is a shared position.75 Sachau does not attempt to force a difference of opinion within the Kitāb Sānk citation between “pupil and master” as he sees it but tries to establish the difference in this bridging text (hereafter referred to as “bridging text”)76 between the two authentic citations in which al-Bīrūnī begins to discuss the attainment of liberation according to his interpretation of Kitāb Bātanjal. In it Sachau attempts to introduce a quotation where none exists with the phrases “there is a passage which expresses” and “he says that” that are not to be found in the Arabic. Indeed, the absence in the Arabic of either qāla or qawluhu, that are used throughout the Hind to indicate the opening of a quotation, supports the argument that there is no direct citation and that Sachau’s reading of a difference of opinion in the dialogue between “pupil and master” is, therefore, doubtful. In his “Annotations” Sachau admits that he has neither been able to locate this nor the subsequent citation in “The Yoga Aphorisms” of Patañjali.77 He may be forgiven for such an inaccuracy

74 “In the book of Patañjali there is a passage which expresses similar ideas. Speaking of a man who restrains his senses and organs of perception, as the turtle draws in its limbs when it is afraid, he says that ‘he is not fettered, because the fetter has been loosened, and he is not liberated, because his body is still with him’”. (Sachau, 1910, vol. i: 82). 75 The sage’s elaboration develops from the hermit’s question rather than contradicting it with a different position: “The hermit in the book of Sānk asked: ‘Why does death not occur with the cessation of action?’ The sage answered: ‘This is because separation requires a certain spiritual state whilst the soul is in the body’”. (Hind, p. 62, l. 1). 76 This passage (Hind, p. 62, l. 10–12) which is to be found between the two direct citations, the first from Kitāb Sānk and the second from Kitāb Bātanjal, will henceforth be referred to as the “bridging text”. 77 “I have not found these two passages anywhere else. As to the faculties of the perfect Yogin, cf. “Yoga Aphorims”, iii. 42, 44, 45” (Sachau, 1910, vol. ii: 287). 172 chapter 6 given the fact that he did not have access to Kitāb Bātanjal in order to verify these citations to be found in the Hind. Upon consulting Kitāb Bātanjal it becomes apparent that what Sachau had considered to be a direct quotation is in fact an interpretative development by al-Bīrūnī based on an amalgamation of two separate passages. The first of these passages is to be found at the outset of Kitāb Bātanjal and is an answer to the second question posed by the “postulant”, al-sāʾil, who is identified in the very first question as being an “ascetic”, al-zāhid. In it Patañjali answers in a manner that closely resembles what Sachau had considered to be a direct citation but had failed to locate even among the “Yoga Aphorisms” that he refers to:78

The postulant said: what would the state of a man be were he to withdraw his soul’s faculties [in]to himself and restrict them from spreading out? [Patañjali] answered: he would not be completely bound having severed the corporeal ties between himself and what is other and abandoned attachment to what is external to him, and he would not qualify for liberation because his soul is with his body.79

This question along with its answer in Kitāb Bātanjal appears to be a much fuller and more detailed version of its sibling passage in the Hind and is certainly not a direct quotation. Indeed, it would seem that al-Bīrūnī is paraphrasing and interpreting his original translation in order to shape the original question and answer into the bridging text that he intends it to be between the first citation taken from Kitāb Sānk and the second taken directly from Kitāb Bātan- jal. In addition, the collapsing of the question-and-answer dialogic format in the sibling passage in the Hind reveals that the purpose of the text has changed

78 Pines and Gelblum suggest that this second question by the postulant in Kitāb Bātanjal resembles Veda-vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya commentary “introducing Sūtra 1.3: tad-avasthe cetasi viṣayābhāvād, buddhi-bodhātmā puruṣaḥ kiṃsvabhāvaḥ ‘Since there is no object when the mind is in this state, what will be the character of the self which consists of intellected and intellection?’”. (1966: 314) Yet the relationship between these two passages seems not to be one of direct resemblance but rather that the commentary which Pines and Gelblum cite is the direct epistemological consequence of what the postulant is more materially or physiologically describing in Kitāb Bātanjal. 79 Qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: faʾidhā qabaḍa ʾl-insānu ilayhi quwā nafsihi wa manaʿahā ʿani ʾl-intishāri kayfa yakūnu ḥāluhu? Qāla ʾl-mujību: lā yakūnu ʿalā kamāli ʾl-withāqi wa qad qaṭaʿa ʿalāʾiqa ʾl-jismiyyati ʿammā baynahu wa bayna mā siwāhu wa taraka ʾl-tashabbutha biʾl-khārijāti ʿanhu wa lā yakūnu mustaʾhilan liʾl-khalāṣi liʾanna nafsahu maʿa ʾl-badani.(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 170, l. 5). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 173 from one of explanation through translation to one of analysis through interpretation. Thus the sibling passage is now synthesized into the interpretative argument that is being formulated by al-Bīrūnī, whose purpose is to differentiate between a physiological understanding of liberation to be found in Kitāb Sānk80 and an epistemological one that he considers to be dominant in Kitāb Bātanjal. Hence, the purpose of the bridging text is not to illustrate that an analogous opinion of a physiological understanding of liberation also exists in Kitāb Bātanjal, as Sachau proposes, but rather that which inexactly “resembles what was cited” from KitābSānk, limithlimātaqaddamaqawluhu,81 is echoed in Kitāb Bātanjal but in fact stops short of resulting in complete liberation. This is revealed in the meaning of the bridging text and the original question and answer on which it is based, both of which opine that the state of liberation that results through the physiological process of withdrawing or restraining the senses is incomplete. A difference is clearly set out, therefore, between the preceding citation from Kitāb Sānk in which the physiological process of restraint leads to perfect liberation, kamālu ʾl-khalāṣi,82 and a similar passage from Kitāb Bātanjal, that al-Bīrūnī relies on for this bridging text, in which a similar physiological process leads, in this case, to an imperfect state of liberation. Further evidence for the interpretative development that takes place in this bridging text is that it consists in both an elision and a development of two completely separate and textually distant passages, both from Kitāb Bātanjal. The first dialogic source passage, that comes at the very outset of KitābBātanjal, has already been identified and analysed. The second source passage, that is elided into this bridging text under discussion, however, bears much less resemblance to

80 The association of a physiological or material understanding of liberation with Kitāb Sānk is emphasized by al-Bīrūnī from the very outset of his Hind (at the conclusion of the second chapter) and in the very first citation that he provides from his Kitāb Sānk translation: “And the hermit in the book of Sānk asked: has there been disagreement concerning action and the agent or not? The sage answered: […] and all of these opinions are incorrect for the truth in this is that action is entirely material because it is matter which binds [the soul], which [causes it to] oscillate from form to form, and which sets [it] free. It is matter, therefore, which is the agent and all that it subsumes aids it to accomplish action. The soul is not the agent because it does not possess the different [necessary] faculties”. Wa fī Kitāb Sānk qāla ʾl-nāsiku: hal ikhtulifa fī ʾl-fiʿli waʾl-fāʿili am lā? Qālaʾl-ḥakīmu:[…] wakulluhādhihiʾl-ārāʾimunḥarifatunʿaniʾl-ṣawābiwainnamāʾl-ḥaqqa fīhī anna ʾl-fiʿla kullahu liʾl-māddati liʾannahā hiya ʾllatī tarbuṭu wa turaddidu fī ʾl-ṣuwari wa tukhallī fahiya ʾl-fāʿilatu wa sāʾiru mā taḥtahā aʿwānun lahā ʿalā ikmāli ʾl-fiʿli, wa li-khulūwi ʾl-nafsi ʿani ʾl-quwā ʾl-mukhtalifati hiya ghayru fāʿilatin.(Hind, p. 22, l. 12 / p. 23, l. 2). 81 Hind, p. 62, l. 10. 82 Ibid, p. 62, l. 9. 174 chapter 6 the interpretation that it inspires in the Hind but is, nevertheless, its direct and unmistakeable source for reasons that will be set out below. The source passage in question is to be found in the “third section” of Kitāb Bātanjal, al-qiṭʿatu ʾl-thālithatu,83 in which al-Bīrūnī’s “commentator”, al-mufassiru,84 relates the manner by which dispensing with movement can take place:

He who wishes to dispense with movement should contemplate the “tortoise”, namely, those intertwined veins above the navel that are likened to it.85

It is evident that the original passage from Kitāb Bātanjal differs significantly from the phrase that is elided into the bridging text of the Hind: “… in the manner that a tortoise withdraws its limbs when it is afraid”.86 Nevertheless, the relationship between the two texts can be credibly established in terms of form, content and context. Firstly, in terms of form the bridging text in question is unequivocally introduced to us as coming from Kitāb Bātanjal: “Moreover, in Kitāb Bātanjal that which bears supporting witness in semblance of what has been cited above [from Kitāb Sānk]”.87 This unequivocal statement allows us to determine with certainty the fact that the reference to the tortoise must derive from Kitāb Bātanjal since al-Bīrūnī refers to no other source when introducing the bridging text. A review of Kitāb Bātanjal reveals that a tortoise is significantly mentioned only once throughout the whole book.88 Therefore, this single significant reference in Kitāb Bātanjal must, logically, be the original passage on which the interpretation contained in the phrase that is elided into the bridging text of the Hind is based.

83 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 183, l. 19. 84 Ibid., p. 188, l. 3. 85 wa man arāda ʾl-istighnāʾa ʿani ʾl-ḥarakati fal-yatafakkar fīʾl-sulaḥfāti wa hiya ʿurūqun multawiyatun fawqa ʾl-surrati shubbihat bihā.(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 14). 86 qabḍa ʾl-sulaḥfāti aʿḍāʾahā ʿinda ʾl-khawfi.(Hind, p. 62, l. 11). 87 wa amma fī Kitābi Bātanjal faʾlladhi yashhadu limithli mā taqaddama qawluhu.(Hind, p. 62, l. 10). 88 A second irrelevant and brief reference exists in which the tortoise is mentioned among a list of animals as part of an explanation of the five categories of winds to be found in the human body: “This wind differs in scope among land-based animals and those of the air. For example, the antelope and the tortoise”, wa hādhihi ʾl-rīḥu ʾl-mukhtalifatu ʾl-miqdāri fī ʾl-ḥayawānāti ʾl-mushāti waʾl-ṭayyārati ʿalā mithāli ʾl-ẓabyi waʾl-sulaḥfāti.(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 190, l. 5). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 175

In terms of content, a relationship between both passages may be established on the basis of a common purpose and subject. The image of the tortoise is employed for a similar purpose in both the Kitāb Bātanjal original and in the Hind bridging texts to illustrate the same subject under discussion, namely, the cessation of movement in the individual.89 In Kitāb Bātanjal this specific illustrative function is unequivocally set forth: “He who wishes to dispense with movement should contemplate the ‘tortoise’”.90 In the Hind bridging text the same specific illustrative purpose in the reference to the tortoise is understood, though not directly expressed, since the subject of the cessation of movement evidently continues from the preceding citation from Kitāb Sānk, in which the image employed for this identical illustrative purpose is that of a silk-weaver spinning his wheel. The continuation in the discussion of this subject is indicated at the outset of the bridging text where al-Bīrūnī affirms this continuation through the phrase: “Moreover, in Kitāb Bātanjal that which bears supporting witness in semblance of what has been cited above [from Kitāb Sānk].”91 In this case, and in contradistinction to the Kitāb Sānk citation, the cessation of action does not lead to complete liberation but represents a form of physical self-control. The original citation from Kitāb Bātanjal whose subject is the manner by which physical movement may be dispensed with is further supported through the reference to the “tortoise” in a metaphoric allusion to “those intertwined veins above the navel”,92 the contemplation of which constitutes a mental exercise that leads to the cessation of movement and not to any form of liberation whether complete or incomplete. This metaphoric tortoise becomes a real one in the Hind through its transformation from a metaphor into a simile by al-Bīrūnī in the bridging text under consideration: “… in the manner that [as] a tortoise withdraws its limbs when it is afraid”.93 The purpose of the simile further corroborates the purpose of the bridging text that seems to address some form of cessation of the physical faculties whether this be in terms of movement or action or restraint. Yet as with the original Kitāb Bātanjal source citation such a physical restraint of the bodily feelings and senses (as described in this instance) does not lead to any form of liberation whether partial or total:

89 Such a common relationship in terms of subject and purpose cannot be established between the Hind bridging text and the second reference to a tortoise in Kitāb Bātanjal (p. 190, l. 5) which is cited as part of an example constituting an illustrative explanation of the five categories of winds to be found in the human body. 90 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 14. 91 Hind, p. 62, l. 10. 92 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 14. 93 Hind, p. 62, l. 10. 176 chapter 6

“Such a man is not bound because the bond has been loosened nor is he liberated because he still has his body with him”.94 Thus it may be concluded that in terms of the content, the reference to the tortoise as a simile in the bridging text builds interpretatively on the metaphoric reference in the original Kitāb Bātanjal source passage since both tortoises share the same purpose and relate to the same underlying subject. Finally, this bridging text in the Hind can be explicitly related to the original passage in Kitāb Bātanjal by considering the context of both. The parallel is striking since in both works these two passages immediately precede exactly the same material that is directly cited in the Hind from Kitāb Bātanjal. Thus, the Kitāb Bātanjal passage under consideration is part of an expository excursus by al-Bīrūnī’s “commentator”, al-mufassiru,95 and immediately precedes the forty-seventh question and answer in which the subject of the relationship between the soul and the body is discussed within the context of the ascetic’s attainment of both praxis and knowledge as necessary for liberation. The bridging text in the Hind currently being analysed also immediately precedes a direct citation from the very same answer to the forty-seventh question in Kitāb Bātanjal. Hence, given the context of both passages, it can be concluded that the reference to the tortoise in the Hind bridging text strongly suggests it derives directly from the Kitāb Bātanjal commentary, and that the content and purpose of both passages in which the tortoise appears are related not only to each other but also to their respective contexts, in particular, to the same passage that both precede. With such a conclusion it becomes justifiably and methodologically possible to consider the psychology of the Hind as an interpretative and creative intellectual elaboration by al-Bīrūnī of his earlier explanatory translation in Kitāb Bātanjal. Kitāb Bātanjal is thus an indispensable source for comparative analysis providing the precursory conceptual and psychological background for understanding the development of these ideas in the Hind. An indication of the relationship between these two texts in the manner that is being suggested is provided by al-Bīrūnī in the concluding paragraph of his preface to the Hind where he states:

And I had translated into Arabic two books, the first on principles and the description of existents called Sānk, and the other on the emancipation of the soul from the fetters of the body called Bātanjal. These two contain

94 Hind, p. 62, l. 11. 95 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 3. al-nafs: the soul in the hind 177

the fundamentals of their [the Hindus] belief but without the details of their [religious] laws. It is my hope that this book [the Hind] will represent96 [yanūbuʿan] the earlier two and others as a written statement [al-taqrīr] and will lead to a comprehension of what is required—God willing.97

The passage suggests that the Hind will serve to provide a comprehensive analytical written representation of the various texts that al-Bīrūnī had previously translated from the Sanskrit. In this respect the earlier texts are not dispens- able by the reader, as Sachau suggested in his interpretation of the passage,98 rather the Hind represents al-Bīrūnī’s interpretative and analytical synthesis of the range of Sanskrit source material that he had earlier translated into Arabic and explained. Thus an uninterrupted methodological arch might now be convincingly traced from the earlier translation to the exploratory interpretation in the Hind. Indeed, the analysis undertaken so far in this study has revealed the indispensability of the text of Kitāb Bātanjal for an accurate comprehension of the manner in which it is relied on for analysis and interpretation in the Hind. This understanding might be more generally applied to all the primary sources that al-Bīrūnī had translated into Arabic and makes use of in the Hind despite the fact that most are no longer extant. Such a generalization must, therefore, remain speculative for those non-extant sources. The comparative use of Kitāb Bātanjal may, in conclusion, be considered to be crucial for the purpose of gauging the methodological depth and analytical sophistication of al-Bīrūnī’s psychology in the Hind.

96 Sachau translates this sentence as: “I hope that the present book will enable the reader to dispense with these two earlier ones, and with other books of the same kind; that it will give a sufficient representation of the subject, and will enable him to make himself thoroughly acquainted with it—God willing” (Sachau, 1910, vol. i: 8). Although Sachau does not directly address the word yanūbu in his translation, choosing instead an interpretation of the meaning in which the earlier two texts are “dispensed with” by the reader he, nevertheless, immediately returns to the more accurate meaning of the word yanūbu ʿan through the subsequent phrase “a sufficient representation of the subject” which is a rather wide interpretation of the Arabic al-taqrīr that it intended to render. 97 wa kuntu naqaltu ilā ʾl-ʿarabiyyi Kitābayni aḥaduhumā fī ʾl-mabādiʾi wa ṣifati ʾl-mawjūdāti, wa ismuhu “Sānk” waʾl-ākharu fī takhlīṣi ʾl-nafsi min ribāṭi ʾl-badani wa yuʿrafu bi- “Bātanjal” wa fīhimā aktharu ʾl-uṣūli ʾllatī ʿalayhā madāru iʿtiqādihim dūna furūʿi sharāʾiʿihim, wa arjū anna hādhā yanūbu ʿanhumā wa ʿan ghayrihimā fiʾl-taqrīri wa yuʾaddī ilā ʾl-iḥāṭati biʾl-maṭlūbi bimashīʾati ʾllāhi (Hind, p. 6, l. 1). 98 Sachau, 1910, vol. i: 8. 178 chapter 6

The practical significance of such a conclusion is twofold. First on a general level, establishing a direct relationship between the two texts allows for the analysis of the original source in Kitāb Bātanjal in order to clarify, comprehend and appreciate the reasoning behind the interpretative development founded on it in the Hind. The content of this latter magnum opus is very often in a conceptually condensed and textually concentrated form that, if read in isolation, could lead to much misunderstanding and mistranslation. The picture emerging from this comparative analysis confirms the basic argument that it is no longer possible to describe al-Bīrūnī as a mere translator when considering the Hind or indeed even Kitāb Bātanjal. Al-Bīrūnī is clearly interested in reading Patañjali creatively and interpretatively for the purpose, among others, of developing a novel psychological perspective. The reasons behind such a purpose may be the subject of debate; however, the indubitable existence of this interpretative development can no longer be ignored. Second and more specifically, the fact that the bridging text in the Hind, though not a direct quotation, has been found to derive directly from two separate passages in Kitāb Bātanjal reveals the complexity in the integration of ideas and their conceptual synthesis undertaken by al-Bīrūnī in the Hind. The bridging text is composed through the elision of material and its creative interpretation on the level of form, content, and context in a profoundly sophisticated manner. Although the bridging text in the Hind reveals certain superficial similarities with the Kitāb Sānk citation as suggested by al-Bīrūnī, nevertheless, in terms of its conceptual content a disparity may be surmised. Whereas in the citation that follows it from KitābBātanjal the cessation of movement leads to complete liberation, in the bridging text, that is inspired by the Kitāb Bātanjal source passage, dispensing with physical movement does not in fact lead to complete liberation. The scene is now set for the introduction of the next direct citation from Kitāb Bātanjal, as al-Bīrūnī presents it, and that he argues contradicts the previous bridging text also taken from Kitāb Bātanjal as well as the Kitāb Sānk citation99 that precedes both. One would, therefore, expect to find in this new citation a reflection or elaboration of the more epistemological understanding of liberation that is proposed in the question and two possible answers100

99 Hind, p. 62, l. 1. 100 See Hind, p. 61, l. 16 quoted and translated above. This question with its two possible responses, analyzed earlier and based on the 78th question and answer in Kitāb Bātanjal, is slightly modified in the Hind interpretation in order to establish a clear differentiation between the two possibilities: one answer being physiological in character, the other epistemological. al-nafs: the soul in the hind 179 taken from Kitāb Bātanjal given immediately prior to these three passages101 and representing the second possible response to the question concerning how liberation may be attained: the first physiological, the second epistemological, as discussed above. Such a bipolar differentiation, however, is not arbitrarily imposed in al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of the two passages from Kitāb Sānk and KitābBātanjal. Indeed, it will become evident in his reading of a second passage from Kitāb Bātanjal102 that what al-Bīrūnī undertakes seems to suggest a non- physiological attainment of complete liberation rather than a clearly expressed epistemological one. This is, in fact, confirmed in the subsequent complementary (fourth) passage103 taken, perhaps surprisingly, from Kitāb Sānk in which the ideas set out here naturally develop toward their epistemological conclusion. On this basis, it is argued that the difference of opinion regarding the attainment of liberation between “the two men” (Sānk and Bātanjal) is revealed to be part of al-Bīrūnī’s interpretative analysis of these two translated texts and is most apparently shown by incorporating both points of view in each of these translations. It is al-Bīrūnī who selectively interprets from both Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal to facilitate for the reader a harmonious analysis leading to a unified understanding, without hiding the fact that he is setting out an interpretation and that the texts carry the potential for both opinions relating to the attainment of liberation. The point that al-Bīrūnī seems to be making is that although both possibilities are described in his two translations of Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal they, nevertheless, seem to differ concerning the attainment of liberation. Kitāb Sānk apparently tends towards the physiological answer whilst Kitāb Bātanjal prefers the epistemological one. It is, however, the case that the epistemological interpretation, as al-Bīrūnī presents it, is the more convincing in his opinion and the one that he finally settles on in both texts. Thus, the interpretation that al-Bīrūnī gives here takes the reader beyond the individual arguments (at times contradictory) that are in themselves selected and translated by him from KitābSānk and KitābBātanjal. This is in order to present his unified reading in the Hind of these translations that is both a synthesized and authoritative viewpoint of Hindu psychology as well as of many other subjects related to India beyond his study.

101 The first being from Kitāb Sānk, then the bridging text, finally the citation from Kitāb Bātanjal. 102 Excluding the opening question with its two possible answers (Hind, p. 61, l. 16) based on the 78th question and answer in Kitāb Bātanjal which is also subject to an interpretative reading by al-Bīrūnī. 103 See Hind, p. 63, l. 7. 180 chapter 6

Thus the second citation from Kitāb Bātanjal is now presented as describing a different opinion concerning the attainment of liberation from that which was indicated in the opening passage given by al-Bīrūnī from Kitāb Sānk with its rather physiological reading. The reader is, therefore, naturally led to expect that this apparent quotation from Kitāb Bātanjal will support in its argumentation the second more epistemological answer to the question concerning the attainment of liberation.104 This is by no means the case as the translation below of this passage reveals:

That which contradicts it [above citation from Kitāb Sānk] from his discourse [in Kitāb Bātanjal] is his statement: bodies are the nets of souls to acquire recompense. He who arrives at the stage of liberation has recompensed in his physical mould his past actions and he suspends acquisition in the future. [As a result] he frees himself from the net and no longer needs his mould. He moves freely within it, without being ensnared. He is able to go wherever and whenever he wishes not in the manner that [this movement] takes place after death. Thick and contiguous bodies are no obstacle to his mould, how much the less [then is] his body in relation to his soul.105

What al-Bīrūnī intends by his initial statement here that this Kitāb Bātanjal citation, as he seems to claim it to be by using the opening word qawluhu,106 “contradicts” the previous bridging text also inspired by Kitāb Bātanjal as well as the opening citation taken from Kitāb Sānk, cannot be in reference to a physiological or epistemological contradiction or difference in the understanding of liberation between the earlier two passages and this present “citation”. Further, it cannot be in reference to a contradictory conception regarding the means by which liberation is attained: whether this is a physiological or epistemological process. This observation is supported by the clear absence of any epistemological terms in this citation despite the fact that the first half of the source passage in Kitāb Bātanjal, omitted here, reveals an unmistakably epistemological lan-

104 See Hind, p. 61, l. 16. 105 waʾlladhī yukhālifuhu min kalāmihi qawluhu: inna ʾl-abdāna shibāku ʾl-arwāḥi liʾistīfāʾi ʾl-mukāfaʾati waʾl muntahī ilā darajati ʾl-khalāṣi qad istawfāhā fī qālibihi ʿalā māḍī ʾl-fiʿli thumma taʿaṭṭala ʿani ʾl-iktisābi liʾl-mustaʾnafi faʾnḥalla ʿani ʾl-shabakati wa ʾstaghnā ʿani ʾl-qālibi wa taqalqala fīhi ghayra mushtabakin fahuwa qādirun ʿalā ʾl-intiqāli ilā ḥaythu aḥabba wa matā arāda lā ʿalā wajhi ʾl-mawti faʾinna ʾl-ajsāma ʾl-kathīfata ʾl-mutamāsikata ghayru mumāniʿatin liqālibihi fakayfa jasaduhu li-rūḥihi (Hind, p. 62, l. 12). 106 qāla or qawluhu are used throughout the Hind to indicate the opening of a quotation. al-nafs: the soul in the hind 181 guage in its conception of liberation and of the means by which it is attained. Had al-Bīrūnī’s intention been to emphasize the epistemological nature of liberation in Kitāb Bātanjal he would certainly not have omitted this opening half of the answer to the 47th question:

The questioner said: is there above this recompense through knowledge anything higher? Patañjali answered: why should this not be the case? For this knowledge is not truly knowledge but is in fact an obstacle to true knowledge. We had previously described the consequences of the theoretical part107 of knowledge, let us now discuss the consequences of the practical part of knowledge. In the case of the ascetic described earlier who has acquired the advantage of praxis [combined] with knowledge and is at the point of attaining what is being sought [by him], if he wishes to move while in this [state of] entanglement from his body to another body that has become free from its soul,108 then this movement would

107 Reading the Arabic as qism, “part”, rather than qasm, “division”. Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 262) seem to read either qasm or qism and cover both possible readings with “division” which in the English, of course, may be used either as a verb or a noun. They do not appear to commit themselves to a single reading. However, the context in which theoretical knowledge was earlier discussed, for example in answer to the 42nd question in Kitāb Bātanjal, does not reveal that this knowledge was divided into separate parts: “Knowledge in them [i.e., the final three of the ‘eight qualities’ or thamānī khiṣāl (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 8) in reference to the Classical Yoga system’s eight-limbed path, aṣṭānga-yoga. The final three are described as being “more distant from the senses and closer to the intellect” (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 184, l. 4)] is one for [when] it spreads from the knower to the known objects it becomes characterized by multiplicity. When [on the other hand] the knower makes knowledge quiescent and cuts it off from those factors that cause it to spread out then it becomes one”, waʾl-ʿilmu fīhā wāḥidun liʾannahu kāna yanbaththu mina ʾl-ʿālimi ilā ʾl-maʿlūmāti fatattasimu biʾl-kathrati, falammā sakkanahu wa qaṭaʿa ʿanhu mawādda ʾl- inbithāthi ṣāra wāḥidan (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 184, l. 8). Furthermore, the current discussion of practical knowledge does not demonstrate any process of division either. In fact Patañ- jali’s answer here is in response to the question whether there is something higher than the recompense by means of the theoretical knowledge just set out by the “commentator”, al-mufassiru (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 3). In response Patañjali explains that what had earlier been mentioned is the theoretical part of knowledge, however, there is also a practical part of knowledge which he now describes and which he considers to be the superior part (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 23). 108 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 262), translate the phrase khalā ʿan rūḥihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 5) as “except for his spirit” in reference to the one who wishes to “be transported in this entanglement” from his body to another: “If he wishes that he, except for his spirit, be transported in this entanglement, from his (own) body to another body, not in a way 182 chapter 6

not be in the manner it takes place after death but rather he is able to carry it out by his volition, will and choice.109

The discussion in the first half of this source passage centres on the nature of the “true knowledge”, al-ʿilmu ʾl-ḥaqīqī, to be sought after that would lead to complete liberation and on whether this true knowledge is “theoretical knowledge”, al-ʿilmu ʾl-naẓarī, or “practical”, al-ʿamalī.110 Clearly, had al-Bīrūnī wished to set out an epistemological interpretation of liberation at this point in the Hind through his citation from the 47th question and answer in Kitāb Bātanjal then he would certainly not have omitted the first half of that answer which, as may be surmised from the translation above, sets out a praxis-based knowledge as the means by which the soul attains complete liberation.111 Moreover,

in which (one is) transported after death, but rather in virtue of his (own) will, volition and (free) choice, he is able to bring this about”. However, this cannot be the correct translation since the state of entanglement, hādhā ʾl-irtibāki (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 4), is a reference to the entanglement of the body with the soul, and the soul must in fact be what is being described as moving from one body to another. The receiving body must, of course, necessarily be vacant of its soul, khalā ʿan rūḥihi, if metempsychosis is to take place successfully since a single body cannot host two souls simultaneously. Furthermore, no distinction is made in the Arabic between “soul” and “spirit” in order that rūḥihi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 5) be justifiably translated as “spirit” on this occasion especially since this would imply that the soul, on being transported from the body of origin, leaves its spirit behind. Finally, the dictionary definition of the phrase khalā ʿan cannot strictly be translated as “except for his spirit” as Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., have proposed. See for example: Hava, J.G., Al-Farāʾid Arabic-English Dictionary. Beirut, Dar el-Mashreq, 1982, p. 183, where khalā ʿan is translated as: “to be free from”. 109 Qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: hal fawqa hādhihi ʾl-mukāfaʾati biʾl-ʿilmi shayʾun ashrafu minhā? Qāla ʾl- mujību: lima lā yakūnu? Wa hādhā ʾl-ʿilmu laysa biʿilmin fīʾl-ḥaqīqati wa innamā huwa māniʿun ʿani ʾl-ʿilmi ʾl-ḥaqīqī wa qad dhakarnā natāʾija qismi ʾl-ʿilmi ʾl-naẓarī fal-naqul ʾil- āna ʿalā natāʾiji qismihi ʾl-ʿamalī, wa dhālika anna ʾl-zāhida ʾlladhī taqaddamat ṣifatuhu wa qad ḥaṣalat lahu maziyyatu ʾl-ʿamali maʿa ʾl-ʿilmi wa ashrafa ʿalā nayli ʾl-maṭlūbi idhā arāda an yantaqila fī hādhā ʾl-irtibāki min jasadihi ilā jasadin ākharin khalā ʿan rūḥihi intiqālan lā ʿalā ʾl-wajhi ʾlladhī yakūnu baʿda ʾl-mawti wa-lākin bi-mashīʾatihi wa irādatihi wa ikhtiyārihi qadara ʿalayhi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 23). 110 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 2. 111 This is in itself an interesting interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali proposed by al-Bīrūnī in his Kitāb Bātanjal translation. What seems to be suggested at this point in Kitāb Bātanjal is that the results which proceed from the attainment and exercise (praxis) of practical knowledge, natāʾiji qismihi ʾl-ʿamalī (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 2), lead to the complete state of liberation described in the second half of the answer to question 47 and which, far from resulting in the soul’s removal or separation from matter, actually implies al-nafs: the soul in the hind 183 this epistemological description of the soul’s complete liberation is understood within an incarnate context, while the body is still alive, and not in the explicitly physiological interpretation presented in the first citation taken from Kitāb Sānk, where the soul is only finally completely freed from the body postmortem, when physical movement completely ceases and it is able to “cast away” this now dead body. Complete liberation112 is understood to be attained primarily through the combination of praxis with knowledge, al-ʿamali maʿa ʾl-ʿilmi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 3) that would then allow the ascetic to begin a process that reaches “the point of attaining what is being sought”, ashrafa ʿalā nayli ʾl- maṭlūbi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 3). That which is being sought is described in the second half of the same answer (to the 47th question), namely, the soul’s state of complete liberation through a process of recompense in the body for former deeds, be they evil or good, a process that can only begin with the combination of praxis with knowledge that the ascetic acquires in the first place:

Since bodies are the nets of souls for the sake of recompensing them for previous good and evil [actions] with corresponding ease or discomfort [respectively]. Drawing one of them [good] and driving away the other [evil] involves some wrongful treatment of a member of his species or of the other species and [leads to] a prolongation resulting in a [necessary] assurance of future recompense. The ascetic mentioned above has in fact fulfilled in his present form everything he merits from the past and he withdraws from acquisition [of further karma] for the future and is, in his case, no longer indebted.113 He knows where his soul has come from and where it is going and is thus able to transfer it [soul] and move it without being stuck to the body in which the soul [now] moves freely. For this reason too he is able to die by his volition whenever he wishes.114

that one of the benefits in the praxis of the three methods of spiritual ascesis described elsewhere in Kitāb Bātanjal (p. 184, l. 3) and summarized here as “praxis [combined] with knowledge”, al-ʿamal maʿa ʾl-ʿilm (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 3), may be conceived of as a realignment of soul with matter by means of unification, al-ittiḥād, i.e., yoga. 112 According to the first half of the answer to the 47th question in Kitāb Bātanjal. 113 Pines, S., and Gelblum, T., (1983: 262), translate the phrase falaysa fīhi birahnin as: “In his case there is no guaranteed (necessity)”. 114 min ajli anna ʾl-abdāna shibāku ʾl-arwāḥi lilmujāzāti ʿalā ʾl-khayri wa ʾl-sharri ʾl-mutaqaddimi bimithlihimā min niʿmatin aw shiddatin, wa fī jarri aḥadihimā wa dafʿi ʾl-ākhari taḥāmulun mā ʿalā ahli nawʿihi aw sāʾiri ʾl-anwāʿi wa imdāʾun yaḥṣulu bihi ʾl-irtihānu liʾl- jazāʾi ʾl-mustaʾnafi, fa-ammā ʾl-zāhidu ʾl-madhkūru faqadi ʾstawfā fī ʾl-qālibi ʾlladhī huwa fīhi mā ʾstaḥaqqahu ʿalā ʾl-sālifi waʾnqabaḍa ʿani ʾl-iktisābi liʾl-mustaʾnafi falaysa fīhi birah- 184 chapter 6

8 Conclusion: Liberation, Metempsychosis and al-Bīrūnī’s Islamic Reading of Hinduism

In the Hind version of this same passage from Kitāb Bātanjal it is the final state of liberation attained through a process of metempsychosis that al-Bīrūnī focuses on rather than a study of the epistemological nature of this liberation that the original passage in Kitāb Bātanjal sets out. It is for this reason that the epistemological dimension of the original version in the Kitāb Bātanjal passage is completely removed in the Hind.115 This is not because al-Bīrūnī is against an epistemological reading of yogic liberation but rather because his reinterpretation here of the original passage highlights the central tenet of metempsychosis according to Hinduism as he defines it within an Islamic framework116 and the principal role that it plays in the attainment of liberation. Therefore, on a methodological level and as part of his overall Islamic interpretation of Hindu religion, al-Bīrūnī’s purpose in this passage is to illustrate the centrality of metempsychosis for Hinduism as a whole, given its indispensable function for the attainment of yoga’s ultimate goal of liberation. In doing so he is able to corroborate his defining statement at the outset of the preceding fifth chapter in the Hind that metempsychosis is the characterizing sign of Hinduism.117 For this same purpose not only is the epistemological dimension of the original passage completely removed but also the physiological emphasis is significantly downplayed. In the Hind version of the passage al-Bīrūnī removes the heavily physiological description of the process of recompense118 that includes

nin wa qad ʿalima nafsahu min ayna jāʾat wa ilā ayna tadhhabu, fa-huwa qādirun ʿalayhā biʾl-naqli waʾl-taḥrīki lā yatashabbathu biʾl-badani fa-innahā muqalqalatun fīhi, wa lihādhā ayḍan yamūtu bi-irādatihi matā shāʾa (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 6). 115 Not only is the heavily epistemological first part of the 47th question and answer in the original passage from KitābBātanjal removed in the Hind interpretation but also a number of significant and related modifications are made by al-Bīrūnī within the remaining second part of the passage. The most noticeable of these is the complete removal of the phrase falaysa fīhi birahnin wa qad ʿalima nafsahu min ayna jāʾat wa ilā ayna tadhhabu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 10): “… and is, in his case, no longer indebted. He knows where his soul has come from and where it is going”. It is no coincidence that this particular phrase which is removed by al-Bīrūnī is saliently epistemological in character having as its main verb ʿalima, “to know”, and is, therefore, at odds with the analytical focus of his reinterpretation of the passage. 116 Discussed at the outset of this chapter. 117 Hind, p. 38, l. 4. 118 lilmujāzāti ʿalā ʾl-khayri wa ʾl-sharri ʾl-mutaqaddimi bimithlihimā min niʿmatin aw shiddatin, wa fī jarri aḥadihimā wa dafʿi ʾl-ākhari taḥāmulun mā ʿalā ahli nawʿihi aw sāʾiri al-nafs: the soul in the hind 185 such sensual vocabulary as “ease” and “discomfort” in addition to very physical verbs such as “drawing”, and “driving away”. Further, al-Bīrūnī substitutes the less physiological verb “he suspends”, taʿaṭṭala in the phrase taʿaṭṭala ʿani ʾl-iktisābi (Hind, p. 62, l. 15) for the original verb “he withdraws”, inqabaḍa in the very same phrase waʾnqabaḍaʿaniʾl-iktisābi (KitābBātanjal, p. 189, l. 9). The reason for this modification is not only to reduce the physiological dimension of the passage but also to create a sharp difference between this passage and the immediately preceding bridging text119 where in fact the very same verb qabaḍa is used twice to describe in very physiological terms the action of a man who has restrained his feelings and senses in a manner similar to that of a tortoise withdrawing its limbs when it is afraid. Al-Bīrūnī explicitly sets out his understanding that the current passage differs from both the preceding bridging text and citation from Kitāb Sānk on introducing the current passage from Kitāb Bātanjal120 and works on shaping the passage in order to emphasize this difference to the reader. By understating the physiological dimension of this passage al-Bīrūnī is revealing an interpretation central to his wider argument at this point, namely, that the liberation of the soul is in no way related to the death of the body and its being cast away by the soul as explained in the earlier citation from Kitāb Sānk, nor can it be achieved through the physical restraint of one’s feelings and senses. Thus according to al-Bīrūnī’s reinterpretation of the Kitāb Bātanjal passage there is no direct relationship between the liberation of the soul and any function or lack thereof in the body either on an epistemological level or on a physiological one. Liberation is, therefore, attained purely through the removal of karma121 by means of recompense for past deeds and refraining from future ones.122 Once karma is removed in this way and irrespec-

ʾl-anwāʿi wa imdāʾun yaḥṣulu bihi ʾl-irtihānu liʾl-jazāʾi ʾl-mustaʾnafi (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 6): “For the sake of recompensing them for previous good and evil [actions] with corresponding ease or discomfort [respectively]. Drawing one of them [good] and driving away the other [evil] involves some wrongful treatment of a member of his own species or of the other species and [leads to] a prolongation resulting in a [necessary] assurance of future recompense”. 119 Hind, p. 62, l. 10–12, discussed earlier. 120 waʾlladhī yukhālifuhu min kalāmihi qawluhu (Hind, p. 62, l. 12): “That which contradicts it [what has been cited above from Kitāb Sānk] from his [Bātanjal’s] discourse [in Kitāb Bātanjal] is his statement”. 121 Al-Bīrūnī provides the phrase al-aʿmāl ʾl-sābiqa, “past actions”, (Hind, p. 63, l. 10) as an equivalent term in Arabic for the concept of karma. Cf. also: “Others maintain that the disposer is karma, namely, action”: wa zaʿama ākharūn anna al-mudabbir huwa Karma ayy al-ʿamal (Hind, p. 272, l. 10). 122 Hind, p. 62, l. 14. 186 chapter 6 tive of whether its bodily vessel is alive or dead the soul becomes disentangled from the body and is able to move about freely inside and outside of it and even transmigrate to another body,123 as long as the target body is vacant of a soul.124 Death, after the attainment of this state of liberation becomes subject to the ascetic’s will who is able to choose the time and place of his death. In Kitāb Bātanjal only the time of death is mentioned in the concluding phrase of the answer to question 47: “For this reason too he is able to die by his volition whenever he wishes”.125 This concluding phrase is removed in the Hind reinterpretation of the passage and is instead replaced by a related citation from an unnamed Sufi source:

That which compares to this is expressed by the Sufis. The account of a group of them is given in their writings: A group of Sufis came to us and sat some distance away. One of them got up to pray and when he finished he turned to me and said, ‘O Sheikh, do you know of a location here that would be suitable for us to die in?’ I thought that he wanted to sleep and so I pointed out a location to which he then went, threw himself on his back and was still. I got up, went towards him and moved him but he had gone cold. They interpret God’s words: ‘We established him in the land,’126 that if he wishes the earth folds itself up for him, and if he so wills it he can walk on water and air that provide him with enough resistance to do so whilst mountains do not resist his endeavour.127

It is very significant that al-Bīrūnī should make such a modification when concluding his discussion of how liberation is outwardly revealed according to Hinduism. For it is indeed the case that his citations from Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Bātanjal, here as elsewhere, are clearly meant to sum up Hindu beliefs on this

123 Hind, p. 62, l. 15. 124 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 4. 125 wa lihādhā ayḍan yamūtu bi-irādatihi matā shāʾa (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 189, l. 11). 126 Qurʾān, 18:84. 127 wailāqarībinminhādhāyadhhabuʾl-ṣūfiyyafaqadḥukiyafīkutubihimʿanbaʿḍihim:innahū waradat ʿalaynā ṭāʾifatun mina ʾl-ṣūfiyyati wa jalasū biʾl-buʿdi ʿannā wa qāma aḥaduhum yuṣallī fa-lammā farigha iltafata wa qāla lī yā shaykh taʿrifu hāhunā mawḍiʿan yuṣliḥu liʾan namūta fīhi? fa-ẓanantu annahu yurīdu ʾl-nawma fa-awmaʾtu ilā mawḍiʿin wa dhahaba wa ṭaraḥa nafsahu ʿalā qafāhu wa sakana faqumtu ilayhi wa ḥarraktuhu wa idhā annahu qad barida, wa qālū fī qawli ʾl-lāhi taʿālā “innā makkannā lahu fī ʾl-arḍi”: innahu in shāʾa ṭūwīyat lahu wa in shāʾa mashā ʿalā ʾl-māʾi waʾl-hawāʾi yuqāwimānih fīhi wa lā tuqāwimuhu ʾl-jibālu fī ʾl-qaṣdi (Hind, p. 62, l. 18). al-nafs: the soul in the hind 187 topic. The replacement of the concluding phrase from the second Kitāb Bātan- jal citation with a comparable Sufi account taken from an unnamed source has two important functions. The first, is to corroborate the content of the second Kitāb Bātanjal citation that is reinterpreted and reshaped by al-Bīrūnī for the purpose of demonstrating that the principal outward expression of spiritual liberation is neither epistemological nor physiological but rather an act of will through a soul that has become liberated of karma, having recompensed for its past actions, and that has consequently attained the ability to move freely inside and outside of its body through metempsychosis. Through this Sufi account al-Bīrūnī is able to suggest an additional aspect of this outward sign of spiritual liberation, namely, that this act of will to freely determine one’s time of death also relates to place of death since the Sufi in this citation also seeks a suitable location for his death to take place. The second function is comparative in nature since al-Bīrūnī is overtly drawing connec- tions between the commonly held understanding of the outward actions of spiritual liberation in Hinduism and Sufism. This point is further supported in the second part of the passage through intertextuality where the Sufi interpretation of the Qurʾanic verse is understood as upholding the ability of a Sufi who has attained liberation to walk on water and air, among other things. This same power is attributed to the yogic ascetic who has attained liberation and that is attested for in the 48th question and answer of Kitāb Bātanjal where we are told that he: “Therefore walks on flowing water and shifting mud as someone else would walk on the earth’s surface without drowning or sink- ing”.128 Al-Bīrūnī’s sophisticated comparative analysis at this point is another example of how his work exhibits a deep synthetic appreciation of the different religious paths and beliefs that he is interpreting. He also displays an incredible intellectual sensitivity in the manipulation of the sacred texts at his disposal that is revealed through the refined intertextual echoes that at times function on an intra-religious level (Kitāb Sānk, Kitāb Bātanjal, the gīta etc.) and at others on an inter-religious one, in this instance Hinduism with Sufism. Al-Bīrūnī brings the reader at this point to the realization that Hinduism is indeed defined by metempsychosis—its characterizing tenet—as he had established at the outset of the fifth chapter of the Hind. This is because the ultimate religious goal of spiritual liberation is expressed through the ability of the soul to move freely and transmigrate in a manner that does not resemble its

128 fa-mashā ʿalā ʾl-māʾi ʾl-sāʾili waʾl-waḥli ʾl-zaḥzāḥi mashiya ghayrihi ʿalā adīmi ʾl-arḍi lā yaghriqu wa lā yarsibu (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 190, l. 2). 188 chapter 6 movement or metempsychosis after death.129 The difference lies in the ability of the ascetic to exert his willpower at any time over the movement of his soul while physically alive, whereas after death metempsychosis takes place in a manner beyond his control.130 Metempsychosis, then, as is illustrated here, is the functional expression or outward sign of spiritual liberation as well as the means to attaining this spiritual liberation. It is because of its ubiquitous and indispensible role that al-Bīrūnī earlier defines Hinduism through it and that may in fact represent the earliest recorded formulation of Hinduism based on an Islamic religious model. Indeed, as discussed at the outset of this chapter metempsychosis is stated to be the “banner” of the “Indian religion” in an associative comparison with those articles of faith that characterize Islam, Christianity and Judaism

129 Hind, p. 62, l. 17. 130 “He is able to go wherever and whenever he wishes not in the manner that [this movement] takes place after death”: fahuwa qādirun ʿalā ʾl-intiqāli ilā ḥaythu aḥabba wa matā arāda lā ʿalā wajhi ʾl-mawti (Hind, p. 62, l. 16). Conclusion

The main argumentative thrust of this book has involved a definition of al- Bīrūnī’s epistemological method and an illustrative application of this method in his overview of Hindu metaphysics in the Hind. A case study of Hindu psychology in Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind was then undertaken, chiefly to demonstrate the continuum of his methodological approach from the Arabic translation of a Sanskrit source (Kitāb Bātanjal) to its integration and explication in the Hind. Aside from the main argument, a number of conclusions have been drawn in the process which may be summarised as follows. The aim of the preliminary chronological study and evaluation of secondary literature on the Hind was primarily to conduct a comparative analysis of a number of articles relating to this work. Despite the differences in approach, however, it was concluded that certain a priori positions were uncritically inherited and preserved from earlier scholarship. The nature of this analysis was, therefore, a critical study of the manner in which al-Bīrūnī’s methodology has been taken out of its textual and historical context and how his approach to Indian thought in the Hind has been misinterpreted. Edward Sachau’s important preface to his translation of the Hind was found to be the beginning of a real appreciation in European scholarship of al-Bīrūnī as a cultural historian, scientist and Indol- ogist. Further, it was concluded that this preface formed the basis of assumptions and the source of many of the arguments to be found in later publications. Analysis of the prologues to three of al-Bīrūnī’s works was attempted in order to arrive at a more accurate appreciation of his methodology and philosophy. Three points of reference were maintained throughout, whose general absence was found to somewhat hamper much of the scholarship examined. First, little recognition of the need to place each prologue in a historical, political and professional context so as to ensure an interpretation that takes into consideration questions of dynastic rivalry and promotion, patronage and personal advancement. Second, was the need to place this writing in an intellectual context so as to avoid the commonly encountered analysis of al-Bīrūnī in a vacuum that leads, inevitably, to a conclusion that describes his thought as “exceptional” in the adverse and anomalous sense of the word. Finally, al-Bīrūnī’s methodology was gleaned from a reinterpretation of the language he uses ensuring that the development and refinement of his methodology is derived from a new philological appreciation of his writings and their historic-intellectual context and not imposed on them.

The sources, structure and organisation of the Hind were then considered and the conclusions which may be drawn from them. The dominant note here was contesting scholarship which uses this organisation to argue that either al-Bīrūnī was limited to a number of sources from which he derived his information or that he wittingly limited himself through the structure and content of the Hind to a preconceived view of Hindu culture and belief. To address these considerations, the case study presented here focused on al-Bīrūnī’s understanding and use of Sanskrit literature. It was a philological study which consisted, in the main, of an analysis of the religious content and metaphysics of Kitāb Bātanjal. On the basis of this case study the conclusion has been drawn that there is indeed a continuum of methodological perspective between Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind and that Kitāb Bātanjal marks the beginning of an interpretation and evaluation of the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali which finds its final form in the Hind. First, Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind seem not only to maintain a continuum of methodological perspective but also comprise a representation of the Yoga- Sūtra which closely, though not slavishly, reflect the Sūtras and fully engage with both known commentaries and some currently unidentified. Second, this representation is as illuminative of the cultural and intellectual context in which these works arose as it is of their immediate subject. Thus a sense of al- Bīrūnī’s socio-intellectual environment suggests itself in the choice and treatment of the subject matter, informing the Arabic philosophical debate concerning the nature of the soul with a novel, if unorthodox, perspective. This is not to ignore the important role which Kitāb Bātanjal plays as an eleventh-century reflection of the Yoga-Sūtra which, in addition, closely represents an earlier tradition of as yet unidentified commentaries. The final aim of this case study was to establish a preliminary template for examining al-Bīrūnī’s understanding and appraisal of Hinduism and for assessing the nature of his interpretative translation, and his capacity for the evaluation of other Sanskrit texts cited in the Hind. A number of additional conclusions were made in the course of this book; the first is a reversal of the claim that al-Bīrūnī reported little about India from first-hand observation and personal analysis and that he instead consulted Brahmin gurus who were willing to respond to his questions and communicate their knowledge to him only fragmentarily. Through a close philological study of Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind it was revealed that al-Bīrūnī was fully capable not only of understanding primary Sanskrit sources but also synthesising their contents into a unified and well-constructed whole both on the level of critical translation in Kitāb Bātanjal and a commentarial and analytical one in the Hind. conclusion 191

A final salient argument which was presented centres on the notion that al-Bīrūnī introduced Islamic categories into his analysis of Hindu thought. Specifically, his structuring of Hindu belief as it is depicted begins with God as transcendent being, treats His relation to creation, and, after an excursus on the Greek/Hindu notion of metempsychosis, concludes with the depiction of His saving power. This refinement was undertaken through a philological evaluation of the relevant terminology,contextualised on the basis of the Hindu subject matter to which the terminology applies, and reassessed based on the conclusion that the Hind took partial shape as an extension of al-Bīrūnī’s intensive interest in, and translation of “the book,”1 namely, the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali. Al-Bīrūnī presents his interpretation of Hindu belief in metempsychosis in the fifth chapter of the Hind in the light of his defining statement that this is the characterizing feature of Hinduism. It is an interpretation that clearly betrays an Islamic understanding of religion. Here the concept of metempsychosis is not only represented as the chief distinguishing feature of what al-Bīrūnī refers to as the “Indian religion” as a whole, but also forms the final refinement in the exploration of the content and nature of Hindu psychology begun with his translation of Sanskrit texts on the subject among which is included Kitāb Bātanjal. Interestingly, the preface to Kitāb Bātanjal also cites the belief in metempsychosis as a headline religious doctrine and, by direct association, the framework for the psychology of “the book”,which suggests the existence of this overarching theme from the very outset:

An introduction which halts partly on the nature of the people and the book: This is a people whose discourse about their religion is never bare of topics concerning reincarnation and the misfortunes of incarnation and unification and generation not according to the principle of birth.2

The discussion on the nature of the soul in the Hind enables us to identify the wider concept of metempsychosis as the common denominator in the various psychological details cited, and as the theoretical mould within which the quoted passages from identifiable sources and diverse technical and terminological descriptions are set. This concluding argument not only consolidates the notion of a continuity, synthesis of method, and psychology in the process from Kitāb Bātanjal to the Hind, but also establishes, by this proposed single

1 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 14. 2 Ibid. 192 conclusion unifying concept, far greater philosophical and religious significance within the then contemporary intellectual context of the vibrant and, at times subversive, Muslim psychological debate. What is of primary interest for consideration is the approach towards the concept of metempsychosis in a number of Muslim authors illustrating a surprising diversity of opinion. An objection may be raised regarding the rationale of comparing the discussion of metempsychosis in the Hind, being, overtly a description of a doctrine within the Hindu belief system, with the concept of metempsychosis in Mus- lim metaphysical writing such as in the De Anima of Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. This would be the case if the text of the Hind was composed purely of translations and direct quotations from Sanskrit sources with no analytical, critical or explanatory input whatsoever. On the contrary, however, not only is the subject explained in a manner which facilitates understanding for a Muslim readership by means of, for example, illuminating comparisons with Sufism and the classical Greek tradition but also, and more significantly, the terminology of the contemporary Arabic philosophical debate is consciously used throughout. This usage, as earlier proposed, suggests a motivation beyond the simple presentation of a foreign non-Islamic doctrine. The Hind seems to engage with and expound on the subject of metempsychosis within what may be described as an Islamic sphere of intellectual writing and deliberation but without any self-imposed restrictions or limiting caveats thanks to its overtly non-Islamic subject matter. Such a choice of subject renders the accusation of heresy a logical impossibility and grants the author a free hand to explore unscathed this controversial concept, in all its facets, within the sphere of the Islamic reading of Hinduism which he provides. This book focused primarily on the contemporary implications and contextual significations of al-Bīrūnī’s treatise on the Hind. Thus, the systematisation of Hinduism which al-Bīrūnī undertook was considered in terms of its internal methodological dynamic and was only then tentatively set against the contemporary Graeco-Arabic epistemological and psychological system as expressed in Ibn Sīnā’s writings. The potential within such an approach lies in the understanding that the language of the then contemporary Arabic philosophical debate was basically Greek in heritage, such that a possible conclusion from the ability to undertake a comparison of this sort, both terminologically and conceptually, is that al-Bīrūnī’s treatise is in effect a Graeco-Arabic philosophical systematisation of Indian cosmology for the purpose of alternative debate. A second potentially promising area for further analysis, on the basis of these considerations, is the possible development and later impact on Sufism by this relatively early and unprecedented systematisation of Hinduism in Ara- conclusion 193 bic. For whilst al-Bīrūnī considered in his treatise an entirely novel civilisation and religion,3 he draws interesting and illustrative parallels with religious and psychological trends within his Islamic tradition and civilisation from the very outset,4 the most suggestive of which are those drawn in the Hind with Sufism and contemporary Sufi figures. The period in which al-Bīrūnī composed Kitāb Bātanjal and the Hind was one in which Sufism was disparately expressed (represented by such figures as al-Bisṭāmī, al-Shiblī and al-Ḥallāj) but also faced the challenge of the recently undertaken Islamic cosmological systematisation of philosophy and kalām. That certain psychological and epistemological issues in Hinduism centring on the relationship of humanity with God, the connection of the lower with the higher, and the sophisticated, at times, unorthodox approach to understanding the Deity are also Sufi concerns which are, arguably, approached in a similar manner has not eluded earlier scholars. For example, a direct parallel is drawn in the Hind between the “path” or doctrine of Patañjali and that of the Sufis regarding their preoccupation with meditation on “the Truth”, al-Ḥaqq, and an insistence by both on the priority of a monistic approach in their meditation on existence (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 20; Hind, p. 66, l. 12). This latter passage in the Hind is cited by Louis Massignon (1922: 78) in his development of the argument for a direct appropriation of Hindu mysticism (1922: 63) and, in particular, the teachings of Patañjali by both early Sufi thinking and individuals.5 Neither the importance of Kitāb Bātanjal in this process of influence is overlooked (1922: 79) nor the role of the Hind (1922: 64–65). Massignon’s promising arguments in this area have not been sufficiently explored (though, there is, as a rare example, an article6 on the striking similarities in a number of early Sufi citations with their equivalents in important Sanskrit religious texts). It is hoped that the importance of

3 In the introduction to a fascinating subsection of his Lexique entitled “L’hindouisme et la mystique de l’Islam”, (1922: 63), Louis Massignon differentiates between Islam’s early amalgamation of Greek/Persian science and philosophy and the independent influence, primarily on Islamic mysticism, and the direct appropriation of Hinduism that came as a result of sud- den Islamic expansion, (1922: 63). 4 Although Massignon knew of the existence of Kitāb Bātanjal in manuscript form (1922: 79) he does not discuss it in detail. He was, nevertheless, fully aware of al-Bīrūnī’s centrality in any early comparative assessment of Islam and Hinduism or the quantification of any influence of one on the other (1922: 77–80). 5 Massignon sets out his Samkhyan understanding of the teachings of Patañjali (1922: 72–73) then attempts a terminological comparison, in tabular form, between the vocabulary used by Patañjali and that used in Islamic mysticism (1922: 74). 6 Zaehner, R.C., (1955: 286–301). 194 conclusion al-Bīrūnī’s Indology, as explored in this analysis, will prove to be a useful tool for consequent research in measuring the extent of the influence of Hinduism on the early formative period of Sufism as well as its later systematisation. appendix Translation of Section iv of Kitāb Bātanjal

(Ritter, p. 193)1

The Fourth Section q. 57. The postulant said: you stated earlier that the [condition of] renunciation in the afore-mentioned renunciant is only achieved either through devotion undertaken with a pure and immaculate heart, with good intention and a holiness in actions or through reining in from the objects of sense perception and a domination of the senses. Can this [condition] be achieved in any way other than these two? [Patañjali] answered: it is achieved in five ways: the first of which is that the individual performs many good acts in the world and worships God for an extensive period of time and will, consequently, not attain this [condition of] renunciation in the [bodily] vessel he is in until he is transported by death, having been readied for a [bodily] vessel in which he can enjoy this [condition]. The second [way] is that he should perform many good deeds and increase his efforts in devotion as a result of which God will grace him, whilst in his [bodily] vessel, with the acquisition of wisdom and purvey to him, whilst in it [bodily vessel], the splendour of this [condition of] renunciation. The third [way]2 is that he achieve it by ingesting “rasāyana”, drugs and medical treatments prescribed for this [purpose].3 The fourth and fifth [ways] are those earlier stated at the outset. q. 58. The postulant said: is it possible for the aforementioned renunciant to become spiritual [spirit-like]? [Patañjali] answered: as for when he is in his bodily vessel then he is unable to transfer to that stage and when he separates from his [bodily] vessel then if this [state of separation] persists and he intensifies one of the three primary forces as if it were

1 The page numbers and question numbers in this translation correspond to the Arabic edition by Ritter, which is used here. 2 thumma atbaʿahā biqismin rābiʿin khurafiyyin yusammā Rasāyan wa hiya tadābīru biʾadwiy- atin tajrī majrā ʾl-kīmīyāʾi fī taḥṣīli ʾl-mumtanaʿāti bihā (Hind, p. 61, l. 4). “Then he [Patañjali] adds to these [parts] a fantastical fourth part called ‘Rasāyan’ consisting of medical concoctions by means of which, as in alchemy, the achievement of impossiblities is sought”. 3 Sūtra iv. 1: “Supernormal Powers Come With Birth Or Are Attained Through Herbs, Incan- tations, Austerities Or Concentration”. All quotations from the Yoga-Sūtra are taken from Mukerji, P.N., (1963).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004305540_010 196 appendix his option, then he will be delivered to the species whose force he had intensified and he will become an angel or a devil or a jinni.4 q. 59. The postulant said: by intensifying one of the three forces is he seeking a reward or incurring a sin, so that, through it, he deserves a bodily incarnation of the genus he desires? [Patañjali] answered: this [intensification] is not for the purpose of acquiring anything rather it is simply change so that if he intensifies the good [force], he will remove the evil from his soul and will thus become an angel, and if he intensifies the evil [force], he will remove the good from his soul and will thus become a devil; just as someone who irrigates his crop and excess water gathers unintentionally in one part of it and he proceeds to dig a channel to siphon it off then this is not for the purpose of irrigation, but is merely to remove the excess [water] from his crop.5 q. 60. The postulant said: if the aforementioned renunciant is able to magnify that which is small and increase that which is (Ritter, p. 194) scant and transforms his body into many bodies in order [for them] to assist [each other] in the pursuit of one aim, would these bodies exist with many hearts [minds] or with one or with none?6 The last [option] compels them [bodies] to be lifeless corpses; the middle [option] necessitates activity in one of them, for the heart [mind], firstly, reflects, then, secondly, the body acts accordingly; and if they [bodies] exist with many hearts [minds] then there would be contradictory thoughts that would lead to contradictory action.7 [Patañjali] answered: each one of them [bodies] has its own exclusive heart [mind] and none of them possesses anything that the other [does not have] which would make them different from each other, rather, they are bodies and hearts [minds] that issue from him. The source, then, is the first [body] and the rest are consequent to it.8 q. 61. The postulant said: which of the five aforementioned ways to achieving the [condition] of renunciation is the most preferable? [Patañjali] answered: the final, fifth [one] which is the domination and control of the senses.

4 Sūtra iv. 2: “Of These, The Mutation Of Body And Sense-Organs Into Those Of One Born In A Different Species—Takes Place Through The Filling In Of Their Nature Innate”. 5 Sūtra iv. 3: “Causes Do Not Put The Nature Into Motion. Only The Removal Of Obstacles Takes Place Through Them. This Is Like A Farmer Breaking Down The Barrier To Let The Water Flow The Hindrances Being Removed By The Causes, The Nature Innate Impenetrates By Itself”. 6 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 4: “When the Yogin constructs many bodies, have they only one mind or many minds?” 7 Sūtra iv. 4: “All Created Minds Are Constructed From Pure ‘I’—Sense Or Ego”. 8 Sūtra iv. 5: “One Mind Is The Director Of The Many Created Minds In Respect Of The Variety Of Their Activities”. translation of section iv of kitāb bātanjal 197

q. 62. The postulant said: if this [condition] of renunciation covers those who employ the five ways then what is the purpose in specifying the last of them as excellent? [Patañjali] answered: because they [who employ the first four ways] are not free from the commission of reward [the good] or sin or that which lies between them such that their hearts [minds] are dissolutely divided by recompense for acquisition or requital, whereas the renunciant empties his heart [mind] in reality. What a difference [there is] between the one who is free of something and the one who is occupied by it.9 q. 63. The postulant said:10 if a man acquires that by which requital is necessitated while in a [bodily] vessel that is not the one in which the acquisition had taken place then the period of time between the two states would be far in the past and the matter would have been forgotten. [Patañjali] answered: activity is incumbent on the soul because it is its function and the body is an instrument for this [function]. There is no forgetfulness in matters

9 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 6: “Constructed minds or minds that have attained perfection or supernormal powers are of five varieties, viz. obtained by birth, through chemicals, incantations, austerities and concentration. Of these, the mind obtained through meditation is desire- less, i.e., has no desires or latencies of attachment. That is why it has no connection with (worldly) virtue or vice, and that is how Yogins are free from misery”. 10 qāla ʾl-sāʾilu: idhā ʾktasaba ʾl-insānu mā yūjibu ʾl-mukāfaʾata fī qālibin ghayri qālibi ʾl- iktisābi faqad baʿuda ʾl-ʿahdu fīmā bayna ʾl-ḥālayni wa nusiya ʾl-amru? qāla ʾl-mujību: al- ʿamalu mulāzimun liʾl-rūḥi liʾannahu kasbuhā waʾl-jasadu ālatun lahā wa lā nisyāna fī ʾl- ashyāʾi ʾl-nafsāniyyati faʾinnahā khārijatun ʿani ʾl-zamāni ʾlladhī yaqtaḍī ʾl-qurba waʾl-buʿda fī ʾl-muddati waʾl-ʿamalu bimulāzamatihi ʾl-rūḥi yajbilu khulqahā wa ṭibāʿahā ilā mithli ʾl-ḥāli ʾllatī tantaqilu ilayhā faʾl-nafsu biṣafāʾihā ʿālimatun dhālika mutadhakkiratun lahu ghayru nāsiyatin wa innamā taghaṭṭā nūruhā bikudūrati ʾl-badani idhā ʾjtamaʿat maʿahu ʿalā mithāli ʾl-insāni ʾl-mutadhakkiri shayʾan ʿarafahu thumma nasiyahu bijunūnin aṣābahu aw ʿillatin ʿtarathu aw sukrin rāna ʿalā qalbihi (Hind, p. 42, l. 16). “The postulant said: if a man acquires that which necessitates requital while in a [bodily] vessel that is not the one in which the acquisition had taken place then the period of time between the two states would be far in the past and the matter would have been forgotten. [Patañjali] answered: activity is incumbent on the spirit because it [activity] is its [spirit] acquisition and the body is its instrument. There is no forgetfulness in matters relating to the soul for it [soul] lies outside time that [time] determines what is recent and distant in duration. Activity, being incumbent on the spirit, moulds its nature and innate disposition so as to resemble that state to which it is being translated, for the soul in its purity knows this, recognises it and does not forget it. However, its light is covered by the body’s turbidity when it combines with it just as an individual who recollects something he knew proceeds to forget it as a result of a madness that strikes him or an illness that befalls him or a drunkenness that overcomes his heart [mind]”. 198 appendix relating to the soul for it [soul] lies outside time and [time] determines what is recent and distant in duration. This activity, being incumbent on the soul, transforms its nature and innate disposition so as to resemble that state to which it is being translated, for the soul in its purity knows by means of this, recognises it and does not forget it.11 However, the body’s turbidity covers its light when it combines with it (just as an individual who recollects something he knew proceeds to forget it as a result of a madness that strikes him or an illness that befalls him or a drunkenness that overcomes his heart [mind]).12

(Ritter, p. 195) q. 64. The postulant said: if the evil-doer is transported and acquires through the process that which compounds the evil [act], then does this [process] have a defined limit that necessitates cessation or not? [Patañjali] answered: the limit is unknown to us even if it exists. However, we witness juveniles13 and children who are pleased when long life is supplicated for them and who are saddened when a hasty end is invoked against them. What meaning would this have either for them or against them,14 were it not that they had tasted the sweetness of life and known the bitterness of death in past cycles in which they had been reborn on account of various reasons for requital.15 q. 65. The postulant said: if a beginning is not known for this [process] and [the individual] is moved constantly between acquisition and reward, and then this activity

11 Sūtra iv. 9: “On Account Of Similarity Between Memory And Corresponding Latent Im- pressions, The Subconscious Impressions Of Feelings Appear Simultaneously Even When They Are Separated By Birth, Space And Time”. 12 The analogy in brackets is added by Ritter from the parallel passage found in Hind, p. 43, l. 4. 13 amā tarā ʾl-ṣibyāna waʾl-aḥdātha yartāḥūna lilduʿāʾi lahum biṭūli ʾl-baqāʾi wa yaḥzanūna lilduʿāʾi ʿalayhim biʿājili ʾl-fanāʾi wa mādhā lahum wa ʿalayhim fīhimā lawlā annahum dhāqū ḥalāwata ʾl-ḥayāti wa ʿarifū marārata ʾl-wafāti fī mawāḍī ʾl-adwāri ʾllatī tanāsakhū fīhā liwujūdi ʾl-mukāfaʾati (Hind, p. 43, l. 5). “Do you not see [how] juveniles and children are pleased when long life is supplicated upon them and are saddened when a hasty end is invoked against them? What meaning would this have for them and against them, were it not that they had tasted the sweetness of life and known the bitterness of death in past cycles in which they had been reborn due to the existence of requital?” 14 Ritter has replaced the original lahum, “for them”, with lahum wa ʿalayhim, “for them and against them”, from the parallel passage found in Hind, p. 43, l. 7. 15 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 10: “In their opinion this explains how there may be a middle state or how the mind gives up one body, takes up another and fills up the gap between them (between death and rebirth), it also explains Samsăra and the cycle of births”. translation of section iv of kitāb bātanjal 199 in the [bodily] vessels becomes natural for him such that, furthermore, an end to it [this activity] is not known: this leads to a fundamental cessation of his achieving liberation. [Patañjali] answered: were it not that this activity has a cause that produces and induces it then the matter would have been as you pictured it. However, you know necessarily that it [activity] has causes that drive it such that if the causes are removed, the activity will also be removed along with them and it [activity] will reach its end and conclusion, and the path to seeking liberation will become easy.16 Since the heart [mind] is inconstant in its recollection of the end, preoccupied with what has been prepared for it by way of requital, whose contentment it desires on one occasion and whose affliction it dreads on another, and requital is nullified through the removal of what necessitates reward or sin; then, pray tell what the heart [mind] attaches itself to at that time, if it does not do so through desire or dread since it is only a lack of occupation that enables it to seek liberation. As long as both these [desire/dread] are present and not removed then the matter revolves in the domain of acquisition within the [bodily] vessels in a contiguous and connected manner, even if [the individual] does not remain in one state or similar states but both types, good and evil, are transformed the one into the other by exchange or by interpenetration. Sometimes, man is rewarded with benevolence and being tossed about in them [bodily vessels] compels him to commit an offence, and harming another necessitates sin. Similarly, when he is punished for wickedness and there emerge from him [when] in them [bodily vessels] some sentiments of mercy or benevolence that necessitate reward. If they [good/evil] are not both nullified simultaneously there will not be cessation nor will the cycle be broken. However, the afore-mentioned renunciant has nullified the matter of both for the future and they in themselves have regressed to the past so that they are annihilated or are nearly so and it is because of this that he has achieved what was demanded.

(Ritter, p. 196) q. 66. The postulant said: if both [good/evil] are annihilated in his past and in his future and liberation … then how is an effect produced from two nothings? [Patañjali] answered: their annihilation is not absolute rather it is a movement into potentiality or an existence in potentia in two periods of time that are such and such so that they have no actual effect on the actually existent present, just as [when] what is white becomes yellow, and then the yellow becomes black, yet the white and the

16 Sūtra iv. 11: “On Account Of Being Held Together By Cause, Result, Substratum And Sup- porting Object, Văsană [latent impression of feeling created by an experience] Disappears When They Are Absent”. 200 appendix black in the state of yellowness are not absolutely annihilated otherwise their existence would have changed.17 However, that which is to come stands in relation to them both [black/white] in potentiality so that even if it [their existence] is too subtle to be felt by the senses it is not too subtle to be perceived by the intellect. Furthermore, both are formed by the three primary forces18 the proof of which is that when the past was the present it was not devoid of requital [the cause of which was those forces] just as the future, when it becomes present, will not be free of them [the forces]. Both [present and past], therefore, have a result19 [in reality], for otherwise they would not have an effect on existence. q. 67. The postulant said: if the three primary forces mutate and differ is it then possible for them to come together in a [state of] unification? [Patañjali] answered: why should this not be the case when the function of the oil, the wick and the fire differ from each other [yet] when their effects are combined and their actions are in unison the lamp, because of them, [burns] with a single illumination. For this reason when the heart [mind] is purified and the soul is disciplined so that they exist together then the intellected, the intellect, and the intellector become one and they all become an intellector.20 q. 68. The postulant said: what is the meaning of “the intellected” when the intellect intellects and unites with what it has intellected, for this can only lead to the conclusion that nothing other than the intellect exists?21 [Patañjali] answered: just as you establish nothing other than the intellect so we establish nothing other than the intellector. Ultimately there is no difference of meaning between us. Rather, the difference lies in expression. The meaning of “unification”, as it stands, transpires within a single given; just as the wife of a man is endowed by [her] spouse with the form of love, and he calls her (Ritter, p. 197) “beloved”, whereas he endows her after a beating with the form of enmity, due to his excessive jealousy,

17 Sūtra iv. 12: “The Past And The Future Are In Reality Present In Their Fundamental Forms, There Being Only Difference In The Characteristics Of The Forms Taken At Different Times”. 18 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 13: “Of the three-phased characteristics, the manifest state is called the present. In the past and the future states they are in six unspecialised subtle forms. These phenomenal forms and their properties are but special dispositions of the Gunas, as primarily they are nothing but Gunas”. 19 Reading the corrupt word athyn as atharayn as suggested by Ritter. 20 Sūtra iv. 14: “On Account Of The Co-Ordinated Mutation Of The Three Gunas, Objects Appear As One”. 21 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 15: “There may be a common object that is the focus of many minds; it is not figured by one mind, nor by many minds, but is grounded in itself. How does this happen?” translation of section iv of kitāb bātanjal 201 and calls her “loathsome”,22 while some of them [wives] are [endowed] with the form of equality in marriage thus he [the spouse] would call her “partner”,and similar examples in which the meaning coincides and the name differs. For when intellect alone exists, it is a necessary consequence that knowledge and gnosis alone perpetuate. Yet we observe that known things may often become unknown, from which we can deduce that the difference between these two states is brought about by an intellector who intellects by means of an instrument belonging to it, namely the intellect. It [intellect] cognises that [thing] when it is present and it becomes unknown to it when it disappears. It cognises that thing then another [thing] presents itself to it which is then cognised and the cognition of the two things subject to corruption is itself subject to corruption and there is a separation between them.23 If there was nothing other than the intellect then gnosis could only be one and of all things perpetually. However, the intellect with regard to the intellector is like a gem concerning the relationship between sight and what is seen; when a light is shone on it, it conveys the colours and forms of what is seen to the seer.24 q. 69. The postulant said: is the intellect like a lamp in that when it comes to making its self manifest it requires nothing other than itself? [Patañjali] answered: as the lamp is for someone who seeks light, so the intellect is for an intellector.25 q. 70. The postulant said: does the intellect perceive itself and for itself so that it, therefore, has no need for anything other than itself? [Patañjali] answered: on the contrary, its perception is not of itself since that which is collected does not collect itself, rather, something other than it collects it. The intellect only perceives after a stimulus to perception and it only perceives something that is intellected.26 Thus, the imprint of something other than itself and some form

22 Reading Ritter’s baghīḍih as baghīḍa,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 197, l. 1). 23 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 16: “If an object were dependent on one mind, then what will happen to it when that mind is inattentive or closed and does not concern itself with the nature of the object? Because then it will not be the object of any other mind nor will it be noticed by any other mind. If it again comes into touch with the mind (from which it was said to be born) wherefrom will it come? On this line of argument there cannot be any unknown part (by a particular perceiver) of an object … If therefore there is no unknown part, the known part and the perception thereof also become unrealities. That is why it must be admitted that an object has distinct entity common to all, and minds are also distinct and peculiar to each individual”. 24 Sūtra iv. 17: “External Objects Are Known Or Unknown To The Mind According As They Colour The Mind”. 25 Sūtra iv. 18: “On Account Of The Immutability Of Puruṣa Who Is Lord Of The Mind, The Modifications Of The Mind Are Always Known Or Manifest”. 26 Sūtra iv. 19: “It (Mind) Is Not Self-Illuminating Being An Object (Knowable)”. 202 appendix of collection takes place within it. The intellector differs from this for it is unification rather than collection that takes place within him thus your view is nullified and what we said is correct. q. 71. The postulant said: what is the fruit of subtle knowledge? [Patañjali] answered: its fruit is the extinction of desire and the desired.27 q. 72. The postulant said: what is the benefit from the extinction of this desire? [Patañjali] answered:28 [it is attaining] the middle path towards knowledge that douses desire and realises the [state of] unity for the one, the truth.29

(Ritter, p. 198) q. 73. The postulant said: does there remain in him who reaches this sublime level remnants of worldly filth or is he purified from the stain of ignorance? [Patañjali] answered: ignorance with regard to man whilst in the world is as it were the natural state and knowledge is extraneous and foreign to him. Thus remnants of that which is innate and customary are inevitable during the onset of that which is uncustomary.30 q. 74. The postulant said: how is he smelted so as to be completely purified of them? [Patañjali] answered: by means of habituation, meditational praxis, and physical exercise, the manner of which has already been mentioned. When he gradually becomes habituated to the necessary then that which is habitual becomes as it were natural, it contends with nature at that time and it overcomes nature, and the habitual becomes purified of those remnants. On reaching this level he becomes removed from the motives of both recompense and sin so that he becomes cleansed of impurities, and knowledge becomes established to such a measure that it cannot be increased by the abundance of known things and it is impossible for them to become distant or simple, for these are then annihilated through the unification of the three afore-mentioned [forces].31

27 Sūtra iv. 26: “(Then) The Mind Inclines Towards Discriminative Knowledge And Naturally Gravitates Towards The State Of Isolation”. 28 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 26: “While engaged in acquiring knowledge of the special distinction, the mind of the devotee, that used to be occupied with the experience of objects of senses and was roaming in paths of ignorance, takes a different turn. Then it directs itself towards isolation and moves in the path of discriminative knowledge”. 29 It is impossible not to read this passage in Kitāb Bātanjal as referring to God. 30 Sūtra iv. 27: “Through Its Breaches (i.e., Breaks In Discriminative Knowledge) Arise Other Thoughts Involving Fluctuations Due To Residual Subliminal Impressions”. 31 Sūtra iv. 28: “It Has Been Said That Their Removal (i.e., Of Indiscriminative Impressions) Follows The Same Process As The Removal Of Afflictions”. Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 28: “As seeds translation of section iv of kitāb bātanjal 203

q. 75. The postulant said: what would be the state of the three primary forces at that time? [Patañjali] answered: the activity of these forces is connected with time and duration, and that happiness that occurs in the one who is truly happy is in lieu of32 time and duration, and [thus] he transcends the three forces and has no need of them.33 q. 76. The postulant said: what is the measure of the action’s duration? [Patañjali] answered: it is ksh which is a quarter of the blink of an eye. q. 77. The postulant said: how can the action’s requirement for duration be known? [Patañjali] answered: [it is known] from when that which is coloured white progresses towards yellowness, for the transition between them [the two colours] requires this measure.34 q. 78. The postulant said: how is liberation [brought about]?35 [Patañjali] answered: you can say that it [liberation] is the suspension of the three principle forces from their activity and their return to the source from which they had come. Or you can just as well say that it is the return of the soul [in a state of knowing]36 to its nature.37

(of affliction) when in a roasted state do not germinate, so previous latent impressions, when reduced to a roasted state in the fire of knowledge do not produce any modification, i.e., they do not emerge into a state of knowledge. The latent impression of knowledge, however, wait for the termination of the function of the mind (i.e., they automatically die out when the mind ceases to act), and no special effort is necessary therefore”. 32 Reading the Arabic word bdl,(Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, l. 13), which according to Ritter is unclear (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 198, footnote 4), as badalun, “instead of” or “in lieu of”. 33 Sūtra iv. 32: “From That (Cloud Pouring Virtue) The Gunas Having Fulfilled Their Purpose, The Sequence Of Their Mutation Ceases”. 34 Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 33: “Sequence is of the nature of incessant flow of moments and is conceived only when a change becomes noticeable. The oldness of a new piece of cloth is known when the change does not remain unfelt”. 35 lidhālika saʾala ʾl-sāʾilu fī khātimati kitābi Bātanjal ʿan kayfiyyati ʾl-khalāṣi? faqāla ʾl-mujību: in shiʾta faqul huwa taʿaṭṭulu ʾl-quwā ʾl-thalāthi wa-ʿawduhā ilā ʾl-maʿdani ʾlladhī ṣadarat ʿanhu, wa in shiʾta faqul huwa rujūʿu ʾl-nafsi ʿālimatan ilā ṭibāʿihā (Hind, p. 61, l. 16). “For this reason the postulant asked at the conclusion of Kitāb Bātanjal about how liberation is brought about. [Patañjali] answered: you can say that it [liberation] is the suspension of the three forces and their return to the source from which they had issued. Or you can just as well say that it is the return of the soul in a state of knowing to its nature”. 36 Reading ʿālimatan as introduced by Ritter from the parallel passage to be found in Hind, p. 61, l. 19. 37 Sūtra iv. 34: “Isolation Is The Complete Disappearance Of The Gunas Which Have Ceased To Be Objectives (By Providing Experience Or Liberation Of Puruṣa), In Other Words, It Is Supreme Consciousness Established In Its Own Self”. Vyāsa on Sūtra iv. 34: “In other words, when the supreme Consciousness is established in His own self, i.e., the absolute 204 appendix

(Ritter, p. 199)

This concludes the fourth section on the subject of liberation and unification and with it the book comes to an end consisting in its entirety of one thousand one hundred points in verse. Abū Rayḥān said: this was the book of Bātanjal and that which called for its translation is the absence of the Indians’ beliefs concerning their religious paths among those who discuss them in books such that, were their content to be used for disputation with opponents no shared point of reference would remain amongst the disputants given that the starting point of their [the disputants] examination is disapproval and disbelief. He who does not recognise evil cannot avoid it just as he who does not recognise the good cannot procure it, and for this reason it is said: learn magic but do not use it. As for what the book contains in terms of impossibilities, it is on account of two matters: The first of which is that you rarely find a community adhering to the basic beliefs we mentioned of incarnation and unification, and in the developed form to an excess in ascetic practice, without them mentioning something that is rationally impossible. I pass over that group which turns miracles [worked by] saints out of examples similar to those previously mentioned, and another group that, in its opposition to them, mag- nifies them [impossibilities] and depicts them as challenges to the miracles [worked by] the prophets, may God’s prayers be upon them. I refer back to the Christians whose characterisation is as we have indicated. Their excess in ascetic practice and withdrawal from the world, witnessed in their anchorites who refrain from [public] exposure due to their being engaged with their souls and their [souls’] purgation to such an extent that the humours are eliminated from their bodies and no flesh remains between the skin and bone. It is possible that one of them [can] die upright in worship and remain propped up against the wall whilst leaning on a staff for generations and ages as a result of the absence of weighty matter within him and the lack of rottenness and that which is prone38 to it [rottenness] in his body. [The dust is frequently removed from him, he becomes known through mention39 (of his condition) and through pilgrimage from all regions]40 until dryness accomplishes that which moisture was unable to do by stiff- ening his limbs and decaying his bones at which point he is annihilated. With regard to

consciousness is unrelated to or unconcerned with the intellect, and remains all alone for all time, it is known as the state of Kaivalya [perfect isolation, final emancipation]”. 38 Ritter does not attempt a reading of the word -q-lha (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 199, l. 16), however, one possibility is to read it as taqbiluhā which would mean, in the context, a proneness to rotting. 39 Reading biʾl-dhikrā (Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 199, l. 17). 40 The meaning of the passage in square brackets is unclear because of textual corruption. translation of section iv of kitāb bātanjal 205 their impossible accounts, you will hear about miracles when they mention the ancient fathers, the bishops and patriarchs of the past and those martyred because of the faith and [about] the growth of their hair and nails when dead so as to require cutting and clipping and that at which astonishment on the part of others does not cease. As for the other [second matter] it is that the Indians maintain the greatest share of this [the rationally impossible] and are the least in terms of [critical] examination and scientific study, to such an extent that I can only compare their books on mathematical astronomy from the aspect of concepts, logical order, and arrangement to pearls mixed with dung and gems [mixed] with earthenware. They are not guided to distinguishing good astronomical ideas nor do they delegate [others] to refine and improve them.41 This [matter] is augmented by their practice of segregating themselves from others and refraining from associating with them, and were it not for this they would have improved themselves as a result of the objections of opponents and the refutation of what they maintain. The only debates that they hold are with the Buddhists who live amongst them, who are similar to them and who are no better. God permitting, I will compose a book giving an account of their religious laws, explicating their beliefs and giving an indication of their terminology and narratives as well as some features of their land and cities. It will be an apparatus for the one who aims to participate and converse with them, if God provides ample time and removes the obstacles of illnesses and ailments. This is the conclusion of the book of Bātanjal and God is the Highest and Most Sublime with His pre-eternal grace and succour. Have mercy, O Lord, for You are Merciful, Compassionate.

41 lā ushabbihu mā fī kutubihim mina ʾl-ḥisābi wa nawʿi ʾl-taʿālīmi illā biṣadafin makhlūṭin bikhazafin aw bidurrin mamzūjin bibaʿrin aw bimahan maqṭūbin biḥaṣan waʾl-jinsān ʿin- dahum siyyāni (Hind, p. 19, l. 7). “I can only compare the content of their books on mathematics and astronomical literature to [pearl] shells mixed with earthenware or to pearls mixed with dung or to crystals gathered with pebbles. Both types are equal in their esti- mation”. Glossary of Terms

This glossary is not intended to represent term for term al-Bīrūnī’s translation of the Sanskrit texts under consideration, but merely to be a general indicator of parallel concepts in the Arabic and Sanskrit languages.

Arabic English Sanskrit English al-ʿadāwāt1 enmities dveṣa aversion2 al-ʿālim3 knower al-ʿaql4 intellect buddhi intellect al-athqāl5 afflictions/burdens kleśa affliction al-burhān6 decisive proof al-dalīl/al-istidlāl7 deduction/inference al-dhāt8/al-nafs9 self/soul ātman inner self al-ʿibāda10 worship bhakti devotion al-ʿilm11 knowledge jñāna knowledge al-istiqrār12 firm of foundation samādhi concentration itʿābu ʾl-badani13 wearying the body tapas austerity

1 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 1 & 19. 2 Translation of the Sanskrit terms is with reference to, Grimes, J., A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy. New York, 1996. 3 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11; p. 180, l. 11, 16; p. 181, l. 9, 10, 12, 14, 23. 4 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11; p. 178, l. 14; p. 184, l. 4; p. 196, l. 7, 14, 16, 17; p. 197, l. 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14. 5 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 20. 6 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 2; Hind, p. 184, l. 17; Qānūn, p. 5, l. 6. 7 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 1. 8 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 188, l. 21. 9 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 170, l. 3, 5, 8; p. 171, l. 14, 16; p. 175, l. 7, 9; p. 177, l. 19; p. 180, l. 1, 5; p. 182, l. 1; p. 188, l. 20; p. 189, l. 10; p. 192, l. 19, 21; p. 194, l. 16, 18, 19; p. 196, l. 14; p. 197, l. 10, 12; p. 198, l. 21; Hind, p. 2, l. 4; p. 6, l. 2; p. 21, l. 15; p. 22, l. 14, 17; p. 23, l. 5; p. 30; p. 43, l. 13, 18. 10 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9; p. 193, l. 3, 8. 11 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 2, 9; p. 170, l. 1, 4; p. 174, l. 8; p. 176, l. 11; p. 184, l. 8; p. 188, l. 19; p. 191, l. 12, 14, 15, 17; p. 197, l. 3; p. 198, l. 3, 9; Hind, p. 20, l. 13, 17; p. 21, l. 2, 9, 10; p. 22, l. 9; p. 51, l. 18; Qānūn, p. 3, l. 2, 16, 17. 12 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 171, l. 19; p. 177, l. 10 (iqrār ʾl-qalb). 13 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 177, l. 14.

Arabic English Sanskrit English al-ittiḥād14 unification yoga union al-ʿiyān15 observation al-jahl16 ignorance avidyā ignorance al-khabar17 transmitted knowledge al-khalāṣ18 liberation mokṣa liberation al-maḥsūsāt/al-maʿlūmāt19 sensibilia al-maʿlūm20 known al-maʿqūlāt21 intelligibilia al-maʿrifa22 general knowledge al-murīd/al-sāʾil23 disciple/postulant śiṣya disciple al-murshid teacher guru teacher al-nafs soul puruṣa spirit al-qalb24 heart/mind al-qālib25/al-badan26 mould/body prakrti al-raghba27 desire rāga attachment

14 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 15; p. 176, l. 11 (ittaḥada); p. 184, l. 1 (tattaḥid); p. 188, l. 19 (muttaḥad); p. 192, l. 21; p. 196, l. 11; p. 197, l. 16; p. 199, l. 1; Hind, p. 6, l. 1; p. 66, l. 16. 15 Āthār, p. 2, l. 9, 16; Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 21; p. 169, l. 1, 12; Hind, p. 1, l. 1, 3; p. 184; Qānūn, p. 5, l. 8. 16 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 174, l. 8; p. 175, l. 14; p. 178, l. 1; p. 179, l. 20, 21; p. 180, l. 18; p. 181, l. 5, 14; p. 198, l. 3; Hind, p. 2, l. 10; p. 20, l. 13, 17. 17 Āthār, p. 3, l. 3; Hind, p. 1, l. 1, 3, 4; p. 21, l. 13; p. 21, l. 13; p. 102; p. 184. 18 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 2; p. 169, l. 3, 13; p. 172, l. 4, 6; p. 173, l. 8; p. 179, l. 20; p. 180, l. 16 (yatakhallaṣ); p. 181, l. 12, 16, 22; p. 191, l. 15, 17; p. 198, l. 19; p. 199, l. 1; Hind, p. 22, l. 3; p. 40, l. 18; p. 51, l. 18; p. 62, l. 9, 14. 19 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 176, l. 11; p. 180, l. 16; p. 181, l. 20. 20 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 169, l. 1; p. 181, l. 1, 6, 9, 12, 14, 19. 21 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 181, l. 20. 22 Āthār, p. 2, l. 13; Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9; p. 181, l. 2, 3; p. 191, l. 15; p. 197, l. 3, 6, 7; Hind, p. 22, l. 5; p. 183, l. 13. 23 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 170, l. 5. 24 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 1, 4; p. 173, l. 10; p. 177, l. 10, 19, 21; p. 183, l. 14, 20; p. 188, l. 19, 20; p. 192, l. 20; p. 194, l. 2, 5; p. 196, l. 14; Hind, p. 40, l. 13, 17; p. 33, l. 12. 25 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 179, l. 15; p. 183, l. 1; p. 194, l. 14, 15; Hind, p. 40, l. 15–17; p. 62, l. 14. 26 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 173, l. 9; p. 175, l. 19; p. 177, l. 14; p. 182, l. 2; p. 189, l. 11; p. 194, l. 1; Hind, p. 3, l. 2; p. 6, l. 3. 27 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 178, l. 1, 16. 208 glossary of terms

(cont.)

Arabic English Sanskrit English al-sharḥ28 explanation/ commentary ṭalabu ʾl-ʿilmi29 seeking of knowledge jñāna-yoga path of wisdom al-tanāsukh30 reincarnation al-taraddud31 metempsychosis/ rebirth al-taʿwīd32 habituated action abhyāsa constant practice thamānī khiṣāl33 eight limbs aṣṭānga-yoga eight-limbed yoga al-zuhdu ʾl-fikrī34 intellectual ascesis vairāgya dispassion

28 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 168, l. 5. 29 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 9; p. 170, l. 1, 4; p. 174, l. 8; p. 176, l. 11; p. 184, l. 8; p. 188, l. 19; p. 191, l. 12, 14, 15, 17; p. 197, l. 3; p. 198, l. 3, 9; Hind, p. 20, l. 13, 17; p. 21, l. 2, 9, 10; p. 22, l. 9; p. 51, l. 18; Qānūn, p. 3, l. 2, 16, 17. 30 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 15; Hind, p. 38, l. 5. 31 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 167, l. 19; p. 180, l. 7; Hind, p. 23, l. 3. 32 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 171, l. 15; p. 173, l. 8; p. 175, l. 8; p. 198, l. 6. 33 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 182, l. 8. 34 Kitāb Bātanjal, p. 172, l. 1. Bibliography

Abbreviations

Afghanistan Afghanistan: historical and cultural quarterly. Kabul. caj Central Asian Journal. Wiesbaden. bsoas Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London. London. ei2 Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leiden, 1964. gal Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur. Leiden, 1943. gas Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. Leiden, 1974. ic Islamic Culture. Hyderabad. ijhs Indian Journal of History of Science. New Delhi. Iran Society 1951 Al-Bīrūnī Commemoration volume. Calcutta: Iran Society, 1951. is Islamic Studies. Islamabad. jnes Journal of Near Eastern Studies. Chicago. mideo Institut Dominicain d’Etudes Orientales: Mélanges. Cairo. zdmg Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Leipzig.

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Zaehner, R.C., “Abū Yazīd of Bisṭām a Turning-Point in Islamic Mysticism”, in Indo- Iranian Journal i, 1955, pp. 286–301. Zaki, M., Arab Accounts of India. Delhi, 1981. Ziauddin, A., “Al-Bīrūnī, his life and his works”, in Islamic Culture 5, iii. 1931, pp. 343– 351. Index of Subjects abhyāsa (constant practice) 96–97 China 8, 18, 29 ʿadāwāt (enmities) 110 ʿālim (knower) 89, 109, 111–116, 119, 121, dalīl / istidlāl (deduction/inference) 89– 127–128 91 Al-Bīrūnī dhāt (self/soul) 100, 122, 163, 165 on Aristotle 11, 24–25, 32 dveṣa (aversion) 107 on astronomy 4, 9–10, 12, 18, 21, 35, 37, 205 evil 46, 86–87, 101, 111, 114, 116, 154, 183, 185, Court astrologer 4, 23 196, 198, 199, 204 on dating systems 15–16 on ethics 26–27, 29, 116–117 falāsifa 12 on geography 18 heretic? 7, 50, 77, 192 Ghazna 4, 9, 18, 38 on kingship 19–20 Ghaznavid Empire 5, 9–10, 12–13, 18, 20, 23 on his sources 30, 36–37, 49, 56–57, 76 gnosis 33, 143, 201 on mineralogy 10, 36 guru (teacher) 57, 80, 94–96, 190 on natural philosophy 11 nisba 8 ḥadīth 8, 16, 28 on pharmacology 10 Ḥaqq (Truth) 13, 23, 25–26, 30, 70, 77, 94, 98, patrons of 3, 8–13, 15–18, 20–21, 23, 193 26–28 Hinduism rivalry with Ibn Sīnā 3, 9, 11–14, 21, 23–25, European definitions of 3 32, 77, 81 Dietary rules 4 and Sunnism 19 Doctrine of God 41–48, 51–52, 59–63 and Shiism 19 Doctrine of creation 46, 51, 70, 150 ʿaql (intellect) 24–25, 101, 125, 127, 129, 143, Doctrine of the soul 74–75, 79, 81, 83, 86, 145–147 94, 97, 99, 103, 110–111, 115, 123, 151, 191, ascesis 5, 39, 63, 75, 85, 87, 96, 97, 100–101, 192 112, 116, 183 Fasting 4, 105, 117, 156 aṣṭānga-yoga (eight-limbed yoga) 31, 83, Festivals 4 181 Funerary ceremonies 4 athqāl (afflictions/burdens) 107, 109–111 Initiation 4, 95 ātman (soul/self) 69–70, 72, 100 Pilgrimage 4, 39, 204 Atomism 32, 33 Salvation 4, 40, 58, 61, 79, 82, 96, 131, 132 avidyā (ignorance) 107–109, 113, 127, 131, 135, Sacrifices 4, 69–70 137 worship 43, 52, 54–55, 63, 66, 155–156, awliyāʾ 19 195, 204

Baghdad 18, 20, 34–35 ʿibāda (worship) 43, 52, 54, 66, 96, 98, bhakti (devotion) 96, 102–103, 105–106 102–106, 117, 122, 156 bhakti-yoga 96, 105–106 ʿilm (knowledge) 21, 34, 45–47, 50–51, 60, buddhi (intellect) 55, 66, 98, 100, 109, 115, 121, 64, 76, 78–79, 90, 112–113, 119, 122, 127, 127–128, 132–133, 136, 172 136–137, 139, 143, 157, 159, 181–183 Buddhism 29, 80 India 1–2, 4, 8, 10, 18, 23, 27–30, 33–36, 39, 55, Bukhara 11–12 57, 73, 190 burhān (decisive proof) 22, 88, 90–93, 95 Indian cosmology 4, 10–11, 34, 36, 192 222 index of subjects

Indian medicine 4, 35 mokṣa (liberation) 75, 78, 154–155 Indian science 4, 10–11, 31, 34, 36, 43, 44 muʾminīn 19 Indian philosophy 10, 31, 33, 35, 50, 66, murīd (disciple/postulant) 94 78, 80, 150, 189 murshid (teacher) 17, 94 Indian religion 1–2, 5–7, 29, 59, 150, 152, 188, 191, 204 nafs (soul) 5–6, 71, 73–75, 81, 93, 96, 98, 101, Languages 4, 23 113, 121–122, 125, 151, 163 istiqrār (firm of foundation) 97–98, 100 naql (tradition) 24 itʿābu ʾl-badani (wearying the body) 105 New Testament 26 ittiḥād (unification) 33, 73–74, 85–86, 94, 96–97, 111–112, 119–120, 122, 125, 129–130, Peripatetic School 11, 80 142, 157, 183 prakrti (matter) 39, 46, 55–56, 67–69, 71, ʿiyān (observation) 16, 22, 24–25, 30, 84, 81–82, 86, 93, 109, 121–123, 135, 138–140, 88–91, 93, 95–96 166, 169 puruṣa (spirit) 39, 46, 55, 66–69, 71, 75, jahl (ignorance) 26, 45–46, 92, 99, 106–107, 81–82, 86, 93, 96, 98, 101–102, 109, 113, 109–113, 137, 157 121–122, 127–128, 130, 132–133, 135–136, jñāna (knowledge) 95, 106, 122, 165 138, 149, 163, 165–166, 169, 172, 201, jñāna-yoga (path of wisdom) 76, 78, 96, 203 105–106 Jurjān 9, 12–13 qalb (heart/mind) 73, 85, 87, 96, 98, 101–107, Jurjāniyya 9 113, 118, 120, 133, 135, 142, 156, 197 qālib (mould/body) 70–71, 87, 93, 109, 117, kalām 8, 32, 47–49, 75, 193 122–123, 134, 151, 153, 156, 180, 183, 197 karma 69–71, 122, 183, 185, 187 karma-yoga 96, 106 rāga (attachment) 107, 110 Kāth 7, 8 raghba (desire) 107, 110 khabar (transmitted knowledge) 21–22, reincarnation 6, 69, 85, 87, 99, 155, 191 24–26, 52, 65, 84, 90–91 khalāṣ (liberation) 70–71, 73, 75, 78–79, sāʾil (disciple/postulant) 43, 45, 47, 50, 52, 85–87, 93, 95–97, 101–102, 106, 109, 112, 56, 88, 96–97, 103, 107, 117, 129–132, 134, 114, 120, 122, 126–128, 131–133, 137, 139, 135, 137, 139, 142–144, 157, 160, 172, 182, 150, 152–153, 156–159, 160, 163, 167–183, 187, 197, 203 203 samādhi (concentration) 40, 98, 101, 107, 116, Khwārazm 7–9 119, 136, 138 kleśa (affliction) 107–110 Samkhya philosophy 31, 39–40, 66–72, 76, 82–83, 86, 93, 97, 102, 107, 112, 116, 121, maḥsūsāt (sensibilia) 16, 60, 64, 89, 92, 159 127, 135, 140–142, 158, 166–170, 193 maʿlūm (known) 93, 114–115, 127–128 Shams al-Maʿālī 9, 12–17, 19 maʿlūmāt (sensibilia) 89, 92, 109, 111–114, 119, sharḥ (explanation/commentary) 89–92 127–128, 137, 139, 143, 181 śiṣya (disciple) 80 maqūla 23 Sufis 7, 15, 36, 94, 150, 154–155, 186, 187, maʿqūlāt (intelligibilia) 16, 79, 89, 92, 127, 192–194 159 maʿrifa (knowledge) 89–90, 103–106, 114–115, Ṭabaristān 9, 12–13, 37 139, 143, 154 taḥqīq (verification) 22–23, 29, 42, 63 Metempsychosis 2–4, 6–7, 33, 87, 124, 150, ṭalabu ʾl-ʿilmi (seeking of knowledge) 78 152–153, 182, 184, 187–188, 191–192 tanāsukh (reincarnation) 2, 86, 87, 152 in Muslim writings 7, 192 tapas (austerity) 105 index of subjects 223 taraddud (metempsychosis/rebirth) 87, 111, path of action see karma-yoga 120, 152 path of devotion see bhakti-yoga taʿwīd (habituated action) 52, 54, 96–98, path of eight limbs see aṣṭānga-yoga 100, 102–103, 137 path of knowledge see jñāna-yoga thamānī khiṣāl (eight limbs) 115, 181 psychology of 1–3 Transmigration of souls 2 sacred syllable “Om” 47 Transoxania 7–8, 29 Samkhya, differences with 39–40, 82–83, 102, 169–170 vairāgya (dispassion) 96, 100–101 school of 80, 106 spiritual initiation 95 yoga (union) systemisation of 80 body projection 108 etymology of 73 zīj (astronomical tables) 18 guru/disciple relationship 94–95 Ziyārid dynasty 9, 12–13, 16 history of 39–40 zuhdu ʾl-fikrī (intellectual ascesis) 96, liberation through 71, 86, 93, 121–122, 170, 100–102 184 Index of Modern Authors

Ăgāśe, K.S. 93, 102, 107 Larson, G. 39 Akasoy, A. 94 Lawrence, B.B. 5, 74–75 al-Ahwānī, A.F. 83 Leaman, O. 24–25 Lester, R.C. 106 Barani, S.H. 3, 10, 12 Barbier de Meynard, C.A. 34 Madkur, E. 79 Blumenthal, H. 150 Massignon, L. 73, 161, 193 Boilot, D.J. 7, 38 Mohaghegh, M. 3, 9 Bosworth, C.E. 7 Montgomery, J. 24, 41 Bulgakov, P.G. 9 Mukerji, P.N. 40, 46, 88, 103, 107–108, 114, 126, 195 Chapple, C.K. 140 Nasr, S.H. 3, 9 Daiber, H. 94 Dasgupta, S. 80 Pavet de Courteille, B.M.M. 34 Dodge, B. 34–35 Pines, S. 1, 33, 36, 46, 85, 103–104, 106, 115, 121–123, 151, 153, 161–167, 181–183 Edgerton, F. 60–61 Rahman, F. 75, 79, 81, 83 Feuerstein, G. 88, 96, 108, 110 Ritter, H. 1, 73, 78, 85, 99, 103, 110, 141, 161–164, Flood, G. 40, 96 167, 195–196, 198–204 Flugel, G. 34 Rosenthal, F. 5, 50, 74, 78, 89 Roy Choudhury, M.L. 34–35 Gardet, L. 91 Gelblum, T. 1, 33, 46, 85, 103–104, 106, 115, Sachau, E. 1–3, 8, 10, 27, 30–31, 37, 56–59, 61, 121–123, 151, 153, 161–167, 172, 181–182 64, 71–72, 76, 161–162, 165, 167, 171–173, Goichon, A. 23, 25–27, 29, 47, 79, 89–90, 97, 177, 189 101, 109 Said, H.M. 10 Grimes, J. 206 Śāstri, K.S. 72 Sharma, A. 59–61, 64 Hava, J.G. 161, 182 Hill, D.P. 61 Whicher, I. 39, 55, 58, 67, 69, 74, 81–83, 86, 92, 95, 102, 105, 107–109, 116, 119, 127, 130, Kelly, E.P. 140 132, 133, 135, 138, 140 Kraus, P. 4 Krenkow, F. 10 Zaehner, R.C. 36, 193 Index of Names

Abal 35 Ibrāhīm b. Ḥabīb al-Fazārī 34 Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) 3, Īśvara Kriṣna (Īśvarakrṣna) 31, 71, 166 7–9, 11–14, 21, 23–25, 32, 75, 77, 79–81, 83, 89–91, 97, 101, 109, 113, 125–126, 146–147, Jāḥiẓ 34 192 Abū Bakr al-Rāzī 77 Kapila 38, 58, 166 Abū Bakr al-Shiblī 36, 94, 193 Khān Jain 35 Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās al-Īrānshahrī 29–30, 37 Kindī 36 Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās al-Maʾmūn b. Maʾmūn 9 Abū ʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī 9 Mank 35 Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī 8 Manṣūr ii b. Nūḥ ii (Sāmānid Emir) 11 Abū Muḥammad Allah 35 Mashtarī (Bṛihaspati) 90 Abū Naṣr Manṣūr b. ʿAlī b. ʿIrāq 8 Masʿūdī 34 Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī 8, 90, 113, Miskawayh 30 147 Muḥammad (Prophet) 13–15, 19–20 Abū Sahl al-Tiflīsī 30, 34 Muḥammad b. Isḥāq al-Nadīm (Ibn al-Nadīm) Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī 30 28, 34–35, 90 Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī 14, 30 Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī 8 Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī 36, 94, 193 Muḥammad b. Mūsa al-Khwārazmī 8 ʿAḍud al-Dawla (Būyid ruler) 12 Muqannaʿ 77 Alexander (the Great) 33 ʿAlī b. Zain 36–37 Patañjali 1–2, 5–6, 31, 33, 37–48, 50, 52, Aristotle 8, 11, 24–25, 32, 90, 113, 147 54, 56, 58, 62, 66, 73–76, 80–83, 86, Ārya Bhatta (Ȃryabhaṭa) 35, 89 88, 91–93, 95, 97, 101–104, 106–109, Asanga 140, 145 114–116, 125–127, 129–135, 137, 139–140, 142–143, 145, 150, 154–156, 158, 160, Bahrām Gūr (Sasanian Emperor) 12, 17 166, 170–172, 178, 181–182, 190–191, 193, Balabhadra 91 195–203 Bhoja Rāja 163 Paulisa 37 Brahmagupta 34–35, 37 Plato 93, 155 Plotinus 33, 150 Democritus 32–33 Pythagoras 33 Dhan 35 Rāmānuja 106 Euclid 38 Sahīl (Agastya) 90 Gauḍapāda 71–72, 100, 166 Ṣāliḥ ʿAbd al-Ḳuddūsā 35 Śankara Bhagavatpāda 163 Ḥallāj 193 Shams al-Maʿālī Qābūs b. Wushmagīr (Ziyārid Haribhatta 37 ruler) 9, 12–17, 19 Hārūn al-Rashīd 35 Socrates 94, 150 Heliodorus 56 Srisena 37 St. Anselm 52–53 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ 35 Sultan ʿAbd al-Rashīd of Ghazna 13 Ibn Hindū 30 Sultan Abū Aḥmad Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd Ibn Rushd 24 of Ghazna 18 226 index of names

Sultan Maḥmūd b. Sebuktigin of Ghazna 4, 114, 117–118, 120, 123, 126–128, 130, 9–10, 13, 18, 23, 27–28, 30 132–134, 136–138, 140–142, 144–145, Sultan Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd of Ghazna 10, 13, 151, 162–164, 172, 196–198, 200– 18–21 203 Sultan Mawdūd of Ghazna 10, 13 Vijnāñā Bhikṣu 71 Vishnu Sarmā 35 Vācaspati-miśra 85 Varāhamihira 37–38 Yaʿqūb b. Ṭāriq 36 Veda-Vyasa 46–48, 50–54, 56, 66, 73, 80, 91, 98–101, 103, 107–108, 110– Zurqān 29–30, 37 Index of Ancient and Mediaeval Sources

Agastyamata 90 Kitāb ʾl-Inṣāf 12 Aḥwāl ʾl-Nafs 83, 125, 146 Kitāb ʾl-jamāhir fi maʿrifat ʾl-jawāhir 10 Akhbār ʾl-mubayyiḍa waʾl-qarāmiṭa 77 Kitāb ʾl-ṣaydana fiʾl-ṭibb 10 al-Arkand 35 Kitāb Sānk 5–6, 37–38, 40–41, 65–67, Al-Asʾila waʾl-Ajwiba 3, 9, 11, 13, 23–25, 32 71–72, 82, 155, 158, 163–180, 183, Al-Āthār ʾl-Bāqiya ʿan ʾl-Qurūn ʾl-Khāliya 3, 185–187 8–9, 12–24, 26, 28–29, 32, 77 Kitāb taḥdīd nihāyat ʾl-amākin li-taṣḥīḥ Almagest 18, 38 masāfāt ʾl-masākin 9 al-Majisṭī 38 Kitāb taḥqīq mā lil-Hind min maqūla maqbūla Al-Qānūn al-Masʿūdī fiʾl-hayʾa waʾl-nujūm 3, fiʾl-ʿaql aw mardhūla 1–7, 10, 12, 14–15, 10, 12, 15, 18–24, 26, 28 17–18, 23–31, 33–84, 86–91, 93–94, al-Samāʾ waʾl-ʿĀlam 11 98, 100, 104–106, 109, 112, 115, 122–124, 126–127, 131, 140, 150–193, 195, 197–198, Bhagavadgītā 5, 37, 42–43, 55–64, 67, 72, 76, 203, 205–209 96, 100, 105, 155–156, 187 Bhāṣya (of Gaudapada) 71–72, 166 Laghujātaka 37 Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta 34, 37 Laukayāta 90 Brhatsamhitā 37–38 Mahābhārata (Great Epic of the Bharata Carak Samhitā 36–37 Dynasty) 42, 55–56, 58 Chhanda 37 Metaphysics (of Ibn Sīnā’s Shifāʾ) 13, 79 Murūj ʾl-dhahab 34 De Anima (of Ibn Sina’s Shifāʾ) 7, 75, 81, 83, 93, 125, 146–148, 192 Nakshatra Sāstra 35 De Caelo 11 Nyāya 38 De Intellectu 113 De Interpretatione 113 Pañcasiddhāntikā 37 Panchatantra 35 Elements 38 Panjika 35 Enneads 33 Pātañjalayo-gasūtrabhāṣyavivarna (sub- commentary of Sankara Bhagavatpada) Ganit 35 163 Paulisasiddhāntā 37 Hitopadesh 35 Phaedo 93–94, 99, 155 Posterior Analytics 90 Josapha and Bārlām (Bodhisatwa and Purohit) Proslogion 53 35 al-Qurʾān 8, 19, 21, 26, 60, 91, 186–187 Kalīlā wa Dimnā 35 Karana Tilak 35 Ramayana (Romance of Rama) 55 Karna 36 Rasāʾil 34 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 39, 100 Romakasiddhānta 37 Khanḍakhādyaka 35, 37 Khayāl ʾl-kusūfayn 37 Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī 8 Kitāb al-Burhān 90 Sāmkhya 6, 38 Kitāb ʾl-fihrist 34–35, 90 Sāṃkhya-kārikā (Sānkhyakārikā) 31, 71, 166 228 index of ancient and mediaeval sources

Śāstras 47–48, 51 Vishnu-Dharma 155 Shifāʾ 7, 13, 75, 79, 81, 83, 93, 192 Sind Hind 34 Yoga-Bhāṣya 66, 164, 172 Yoga-Sūtra 1–3, 5–6, 31, 33, 37–42, 44–48, Tarjamatu kitābi Bātanjal fiʾl-khalāṣi mina 50–56, 62, 70, 73–76, 78, 80–81, ʾl-irtibāki (Kitāb Bātanjal) 1, 3, 5–6, 33, 85–86, 88, 91–93, 97–101, 103–104, 37–38, 40–41, 43–52, 54–56, 58, 62–66, 107–123, 125–138, 140–142, 144–145, 68, 70–83, 85–191, 193, 195–208 148–151, 154, 162–166, 172, 182, 190–191, Tarkīb ʾl-aflāk 36 195–203