Teutonic Terror the History of German Counterterrorism Policy
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Teutonic Terror The History of German Counterterrorism Policy Although terrorist attacks are ofen construed as a large- afer a small group of RAF members shot and killed a civil- ly 21st century phenomenon, the Federal Republic of ian while successfully freeing Andreas Baader from incar- Germany (BRD) faced similarly formidable acts of vi- ceration, they coalesced as a organization and for the frst olence dating all the way to the 1960s. Chief among the time showed a willingness to resort to violence to achieve German domestic terror groups who oversaw such vio- political goals. Unsurprisingly, the RAF’s tactics became lence was the Red Army Faction (RAF), which formed ever more violent following a short stent training Palestin- in 1970 and continued to operate until its ofcial dis- ian guerilla units in Gaza and the West bank. Tis violent solution in 1998. As such, post World War II policy behavior achieved headlines throughout the BRD, begin- developments pertaining to German counterterrorism ning in 1972 with the bombing of US military barracks in eforts have occurred in reaction to two fundamentally Frankfurt, leaving 13 soldiers stationed at the base badly in- diferent security challenges. Te frst as stated above, jured. Similar attacks and kidnappings continued regularly arose out of a need to combat domestic lef-wing mili- until they reached an apex in both magnitude and infamy tant groups such as the RAF; the second was necessitat- in the fall of 1977, during what is known as the Deutscher ed by the events occurring on 9/11, intended to combat Herbst (German Fall). During this time, the RAF members foreign Islamic terrorist organizations. Tis paradoxical kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the president of the Fed- shif of the general aims of German counterterrorism eration of German Employers’ Associations, and executed initiatives has forced governmental security agencies to him near the German-Belgian border some fve weeks later. revamp their policies and practices while also driving a Over the same time period, four Palestinian terrorists asso- ferce public debate. ciated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked Lufhansa fight 181, killing the pilot and In the 1960s, lef-wing radicalism gained greater mo- abducting 86 passengers. In exchange for the passengers, the mentum, backed in large part, by student movements hijackers demanded the release of 13 RAF prisoners held by comprised mainly of the postwar generation of Ger- the German government, but were ultimately unsuccessful. mans. Among this new generation of German youth In all, the RAF was responsible for the death of at least 35 were the founders and leaders of the early RAF, Ulrike people, including the four American soldiers during attacks Meinhof, Andreas Baader, and Gudrun Ensslin. In 1970, on two US military bases in May 1972. Fall 2015 | 13 Although there are some instances where the RAF worked in conjunction with foreign governments THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN (especially the German Democratic Republic in COUNTERTERROR POLICY East Germany, or DDR) and other terrorist groups, nearly all of their attacks occurred on German soil. Prior to the escalation in RAF attacks beginning in As a result, the BRD’s counterterrorism measures 1972, German collective understanding of terrorism focused on domestic, secular terror organizations. was framed overwhelmingly by the way it related to Until the attacks of September 11th in the United the Nazi government from 1933-1945. This history States, most of the German efforts were geared to- wards homegrown threats. The German government shaped a disjointed counterterrorism policy aimed did not have total freedom, however, as many checks more at leveraging against federal overreach rather were put on the BRD’s various national security or- than external national security threats. This securi- ganizations. This imperative to contain governmen- ty apparatus was based on three overarching princi- tal power and influence is largely a product of the ples: first, police and security authorities had to be widely publicized abuses that occurred during the organized along both federal and state lines, meaning Nazi era. that the 16 German Länder (states) were equipped with their own police, intelligence services, and legal There were three different acts relating to coun- institutions each operating independently from the terterrorism that occurred in the BRD in direct re- federal branch. Germany has no federal police force sponse to the RAF; these occurred in 1972, 1976 and that serves as the overarching national authority for 1978. These three separate acts criminalized the for- domestic security, similar to the FBI in the United mation of terrorist organizations or the support and States. Second, there had to be a clear legal and polit- encouragement of serious violent crimes; strength- ical distinction between police and intelligence ser- ened the powers of prosecution authorities; and vices, as stated by the separation clause. Third, Ger- limited the legal rights of the defense, in particular, man authorities had to distinguish between internal allowing terrorist activity to be tried under differ- and external security issues, creating a strong separa- ent penal conditions than other criminal acts. Addi- tion between the police and military. tionally, in 1977 the BRD implemented the contact ban law that limited the rights of the defense and These three guiding principles led to the establish- allowed law enforcement bodies to isolate victims ment 39 separate departments tasked with protecting that have been charged with terror-related crimes. national security interests. The most important of Beyond legal instruments, another key change that these offices in regards to counterterrorism strategy was precipitated by the RAF was the moderniza- are the Federal Office for the Protection of the Con- tion and computerization of police and intelligence stitutions (BfV), tasked with domestic intelligence services, where databases were required to be kept gathering that includes a federal office and 16 differ- on members of the RAF and other left-wing terror ent Länder offices, the Federal Criminal Police Of- groups. Although the creation of a new digital da- fice (BKA) that provides information exchange and tabase for criminals may seem innocuous to many central databases for criminal records, finger prints, observers, it certainly was not for many German photographs, and DNA analysis in conjunction citizens, who had grown distrusting of such pro- with 16 State Criminal Police Offices (Länderkrim- grams following egregious abuses seen among the Nazis. Even though these developments may seem inalamte or LKAs. Additionally, there are the Feder- commonplace when observed through the lens of al Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or an American citizen, these legal changes and instru- BND), the Military Counterintelligence Service (Mil- ments led to an intense debate over whether they itärischer Abschirmdiesnt or MAD), the Federal Bor- challenged the fundamental rights and freedoms of der Guard (BGS), and the Customs Criminal Office the German citizenry. (ZKA). Fall 2015 | 14 9/11 and Resulting Policy Decisions agencies, better identifcation and background checks in Following the terrorist events of September 11 in New visa application procedures, and allowed for the use of York City, the BRD was required to reconsider the legal armed sky marshals as well as the use of frearms by securi- procedure and practices of its counterterrorism opera- ty ofcials on civilian airliners. Another provision granted tions. Tis decision was further motivated by the fact that police institutions, intelligence agencies and other law-en- three of the four hijackers had been educated and radical- forcement entities the power to obtain information from ized in Hamburg. Prior to fall of the World Trade Center various public and private services such as telecommunica- towers, the notion of terrorism was considered a domestic tions, mail, air trafc, banking records, employment infor- issue in the BRD. As a result, several new measures were mation and university records. Although this information required in order to meet the challenge of a dangerous can only be acquired afer obtaining special permission transnational right-wing Islamist threat. Tis change in from the government with oversight by a parliamentary policy took place in two separate security packages that body, the law greatly extended the reach and scope of intel- sought to achieve fve key objectives: destroy terrorist ligence and law-enforcement agencies involved in counter- structures through comprehensive searches and investi- terrorism operations. During 2012, the policies enacted in gations, repel terrorists before they can launch attacks in the early 2000s were renewed and currently constitute the Germany, enhance international cooperation in combat- framework through which the BRD conducts counterter- ing terrorism, protect the German population and reduce rorism operations. the vulnerability of the country, and remove the root caus- es of terrorism. Looking to the Future Te history of counterterrorism operations in the BRD has Te frst security package focused primarily on two issues, been shaped in large part by four overarching factors: the the frst of which led to the abolishment of the “religious Nazi period, lef-wing terrorist activity by the RAF and privilege.” It became possible to ban certain religious or- others, police and intelligence abuses